# Round 1 GSU

### 1NC

**A. Interpretation – debate is a game that requires the aff to have a defense of limiting war powers in one of the topical areas - targeted killing; indefinite detention; offensive cyber operations; or introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities**

#### Authority includes delegated powers with a legal basis, not assertions of power

**Words and Phrases 4** (Volume 4a, Cumulative Supplement Pamphlet, p. 275)

#### U.S.N.Y. 1867. Under the federal judiciary act, giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review a final judgement or decree of a state court of last resort in any suit where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, it is held that the term “authority exercised under the United States” must be something more than a bare assertion of such authority, and must be an authority having a real existence derived from competent governmental power, and in this respect the word “authority” stands on the same footing with “treaty” or “statute.” Hence, where a party claimed authority under an order of a federal court which, when rightfully viewed, did not purport to confer any authority upon him, a writ of error to the Supreme Court has dismissed.—Milligar v. Hartupee, 73 U.S. 258, 6 Wall. 258, 18 L.Ed. 829

**B. They don’t meet – they claim unique advantages based off of something other than the limitation of war powers authority- that’s anti-topical**

**C. Reasons to prefer:**

**Debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible**

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Debate games are often based on **pre-designed scenarios** that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a **domain-specific game space**. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create **virtually endless possibilities** for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a **complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces** that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

**The opening of infinite frameworks destroys stasis – agreement on the topic as the starting point for debate creates a platform of argumentative stability that is the crucial foundation for deliberation and makes debate meaningful**

**O’Donnell 4** (Dr. Tim, Director of Debate – Mary Washington U., “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”, Debater’s Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/ DRGArticles/Framework%20article%20for%20the%20DRG%20final2.doc)

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary,* a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question? The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis.[[1]](#endnote-1) Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is **prior** to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, **genuine engagement is not possible** because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a **productive outcome** are **diminished significantly**. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.[[2]](#endnote-2) How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what **separates debate from other forms of communication** and gives the exchange a directed focus.[[3]](#endnote-3)

**A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive teaching of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact**

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Debate is a **means of settling differences**, so there **must be a** difference of opinion or a **conflict of interest** before there can be a debate. **If everyone is in agreement** on a tact or value or policy, there is **no need for debate**: **the matter can be settled by unanimous consent**. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, **there is no debate**. In addition, debate **cannot produce effective decisions** without **clear identification of a question or questions to be answered**. For example, **general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration**. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is **not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question** and identification of a line **demarcating sides in the controversy**. To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly**. **Vague understanding** results in **unfocused deliberation** and **poor decisions**, frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007**.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions**, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without finding points of clarity or potential solutions.** **A gripe session would follow**. But if a **precise question** is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more **profitable area of discussion** is opened up **simply by placing a focus on the search** for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a **productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making** by directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined**. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a **general subject**, we have not yet stated a problem. **It is still too broad**, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a **debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, or **that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy**; in fact, **these sorts of debates may be very engaging**. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Switch-side is key---Effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation The 2ac will tell you that asking them to affirm production is bad – if this is true it is a reason to vote negative because it proves the resolution false

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism

Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into **solipsistic and unreflective behavior**. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all **imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience**, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)

What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that **it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical**. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."

Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who **abdicate their human capacities** and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with **disastrous consequences**, **both for other people and eventually for themselves**" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a **people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews**. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their **constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible**. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a **totalitarian system**, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; **there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies**. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.

It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the **playful and competitive space of agonism**; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the **assumption of competition,** and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are **not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments**, **of one's thought**. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.

Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to **articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response**. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that **one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it**. The situation is agonistic **not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict**, but because **conflict is a necessary consequence of difference**. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.

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Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to **engage in mass murder** **because he was able not to think about it,** especially **not from the perspective of the victims**, and he was able to **exempt himself from personal responsibility** by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).

Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,

Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the **central mystery of the holocaust**—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, **fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy**, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)

Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.

Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).

Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: **denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive**. To put it another way, **theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies**.

Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).

By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:

Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)

There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "**critical thinking**, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, **necessarily public discourse**: critical thinking is possible "**only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection**" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; **participants are interlocutors** and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must **be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.**

Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).

Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).

The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). **The paradoxical nature of agonism** (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

Arendt's Polemical Agonism

As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still **values conflict, disagreement, and equality** among interlocutors, but it **has the goal of reaching agreement,** as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).

Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it **is how one tests the validity of one's thought**. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.

Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:

You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)

Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).

In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.

This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.

Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).

Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does **not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth**; **it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered.** Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).

Agonism demands that one **simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions**, **rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think.** The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).

Yet, there are **important positive political consequences of agonism.**

Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how **the system could be actively moral**. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the **evil of conformity**—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state **makes possible extraordinary evil** carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill **undermines the political force of conformity**, so it is **a force against the bureaucratizing of evil.** If people think for themselves, **they will resist dogma**; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, **they will resist totalitarianism**. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.

In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the **best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere**. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Second, discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development---we control uniqueness: students already have preconceived ideological notions---government policy discussion facilitates engagement with and resolution of competing perspectives to improve social outcomes---it does NOT blame the individual for violence, but instead emphasizes individual AGENCY---it breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

Esberg & Sagan 12 \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

**Effective decision-making outweighs---**

**Only portable skill---means our framework turns case**

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of **intense debate**, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps **equally difficult** for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. **Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made**. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. **Life demands decision making**. We make **countless individual decisions** every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. **Every profession** requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through **military invasion or diplomacy**? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? **And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others**. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. **We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?**

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

**Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us**. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a custo

### Case

#### Neoliberalism inevitable – elites shut down opposition

Vakulabharanam 12

[Vamsi Vakulabharanam, faculty member with the School of Economics at the University of Hyderabad, India., Why Does Neoliberalism Persist Even After the Global Crisis?, 12/20/12, <http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/12/why-does-neoliberalism-persist-even-after-the-global-crisis.html>]

The 2007-9 crisis in global capitalism brought a new energy and focus to the heterodox economists, and more broadly to the critics of neoliberalism from different arenas of society. It seemed clear at that time that neoliberalism had run its course when it met its structural contradiction – with the burst of the US housing bubble and the concomitant financial crises across the world, it looked like the avenues through which demand was being generated were closed and the system was poised for structural change. Three years later, Southern Europe is witnessing an intense so-called sovereign debt crisis with the working people bearing the brunt of it, and real economies in the developed world are continuing to witness slow growth. The US seems to be under the threat of the so-called fiscal cliff (which seems more like a political event rather than an economic one). The economies that grew quickly during the neo-liberal period, like China and India, have slowed down considerably. Across the globe, we seem to be going through a period of uncertainty without a clear path ahead. Yet, neoliberalism persists. Why? There are multiple explanations for this. Bailout packages of various governments were directed at rescuing financial capital, and this has pitted the interests of financial capital against the interests of the majority. The global left has not been strong enough to take advantage of the crisis to better represent the interests of the majority. Governments across the world, after a brief gap, have returned to their neoliberal posture of supporting financial capital and so forth. There is truth in all these explanations. However, we need to broaden the array of explanations both to take into account the spatial diversity of neoliberalism, as well as to deepen our analytical understanding of this persistence. I offer one such explanation from field explorations in India to add to the existing explanations. This addition is not simply academic, but it shows the need for deeper political engagement to bring about systemic change, given that our explanations of the structural contradictions of neoliberalism are on the mark. In two recent field visits that we (a group of local researchers) undertook to understand the persistence of neoliberalism at the concrete level, we found some interesting phenomena. Both these visits were in the state of Andhra Pradesh in South India. The first visit was in the region of Telangana, which is highly politicized right now, as the people of the region are fighting for a separate state within the Indian nation-state. The second visit was to a tribal habitat in the northeastern region of the same state, where communist struggles have been active for a while. In both these areas, there are continued appropriations of common lands, common resources and minerals, such as Granite and Bauxite by local and foreign capitalist elites aided by the State. In the process, these elites are destroying the local livelihoods without creating credible alternative. Both these are classic cases of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession, a process that has centrally defined neoliberalism over the last thirty-five years across the globe. Accumulation by dispossession operates in our times through the following modes of appropriation. First, it operates through the acquisition of lands from small producers such as peasants, tribal people, artisans and the urban poor in the name of Special Economic Zones and the like. Some of the lands acquired thus, have became open to speculative enterprises of real estate dealers. Second, there has been a large-scale privatization drive in most countries that has made public sector enterprises alienate their properties at throwaway prices to private players. Third, and these are the cases that we have focused on – commons have been appropriated with ease either because the laws governing them are weak or because common properties are often meddled with by the State. What we found in these two regions is that the particular modes of appropriation that have come into being with great force during the neoliberal period have persisted even after the crisis. Why is this the case? One explanation that ties in with the explanations above is that resistance has not been strong enough or effective from the people and their social movements or from the larger left movements. The other explanation that we offered is that neoliberalism has been able to create structures of populism that are deeply entrenched. The local elites have pursued a three-fold strategy for the continued appropriation of the commons. First, they (with the support of the State) have put in place various populist policy imperatives that have temporarily addressed the consumption needs of the majority without altering the deeper neoliberal structural forces that have inhibited employment growth and wage growth over the last thirty years. For example, there are schemes such as housing or subsidized food for the poor even as their productive resources such as land are acquired by the elites/states. These have tended to perpetuate themselves after the global crisis, even with the loud demands for austerity. Second, the elites have continued to appropriate common and public resources to keep their own accumulation levels above an acceptable minimum in a time of slowdown of accumulation opportunities through regular economic growth. Resistance is sought to be controlled through populism of the kind discussed above. Even in regions that are highly politicized, such as Telangana, the leadership of the movement has been hand-in-glove with the local elites who gain consistently through the perpetuation of these appropriation practices.Third, professionals and middle classes have been the beneficiaries of a system that has thrived on the creation of enclave economies where there is a sharing of rents among the elites and these professional groups. These professional classes have taken up key positions in the government, media, corporate executive roles, and as intermediaries between the elites and the working people who use the commons. The broad support of these classes for the local elites has played a key role in the perpetuation of neoliberalism. As long as these processes persist, neoliberalism will be strong on the ground, with the elites and non-elites bound together in the larger neoliberal system through the different, yet entangled processes of appropriation, rent sharing and populism. Of course, this cannot go on, since the logic of austerity is bound to create contradictions in the path of populism. However, this contradiction may unfold very differently across space and time, as not all governments are going to react identically to the demands of austerity. The 1% in the US (that the Occupy movement has targeted) or the top decile of the population (in countries like China and India) continue to benefit from the perpetuation of the neoliberal configuration while they are pitted against their large majorities. As long as the political groups on the ground do not make their voices heard loudly enough against the top 1% or the top 10%, and **as long as there are continued benefits for the elites from the perpetuation of neoliberalism,** the system will persist**.**

#### No limits to growth—tech and demographics solve

Bisk 12

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The Case for No Limits to Growth Notwithstanding all of the above, I want to reassert that by imagineering an alternative future—based on solid science and technology— we can create a situation in which there are “no limits to growth.” It begins with a new paradigm for food production **now under development**: the urban vertical farm. This is a concept popularized by Prof. Dickson Despommier of Columbia University.30 A 30-story urban vertical farm located on five square acres could yield food **for fifty thousand people**. We are talking about high-tech installations that would multiply productivity by a factor of 480: four growing seasons, times twice the density of crops, times two growing levels on each floor, times 30 floors = 480. This means that **five acres** of land can **produce the equivalent of 2,600 acres of conventionally planted and tended crops**. Just 160 such buildings occupying only 800 acres could feed the entire city of New York. Given this calculus, **an area the size of Denmark could feed the entire human race**. Vertical farms would be self-sustaining. Located contiguous to or inside urban centers, they could also contribute to urban renewal. They would be urban lungs, improving the air quality of cities. They would produce a varied food supply year-round. They would **use 90% less water.** Since agriculture consumes two-thirds of the water worldwide, mass adoption of this technology would solve humanity’s water problem. Food would no longer need to be transported to market; it would be produced at the market and would not require use of petroleum intensive agricultural equipment. This, **along with lessened use of pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers,** would not only be better for the environment but would eliminate agriculture’s dependence on petroleum and **significantly reduce petroleum demand**. Despite increased efficiencies, direct (energy) and indirect (fertilizers, etc.) energy use represented over 13% of farm expenses in 2005-2008 and have been increasing as the price of oil rises.31 Many of the world’s damaged ecosystems would be repaired by the consequent abandonment of farmland. A “**rewilding”** of our planet would take place. Forests, jungles and savannas would reconquer nature, increasing habitat and becoming giant CO2 “sinks,” sucking up the excess CO2 that the industrial revolution has pumped into the atmosphere. Countries **already investigating** the adoption of such technology include Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and China—countries that are water starved or highly populated. Material Science, Resources and Energy The embryonic revolution in material science now taking place is the key to “no limits to growth.” I refer to “smart” and superlight materials. Smart materials “are materials that have one or more properties that can be significantly changed in a controlled fashion by external stimuli.” 32 They can produce energy by exploiting differences in temperature (thermoelectric materials) or by being stressed (piezoelectric materials). Other smart materials save energy in the manufacturing process by changing shape or repairing themselves as a consequence of various external stimuli. These materials have all passed the “**proof of concept**” phase (i.e., are scientifically sound) and many are in the prototype phase. Some are **already commercialized and penetrating the market**. For example, the Israeli company Innowattech has underlain a one-kilometer stretch of local highway with piezoelectric material to “harvest” the wasted stress energy of vehicles passing over and convert it to electricity.33 They reckon that Israel has stretches of road that can efficiently produce 250 megawatts. If this is verified, consider the tremendous electricity potential of the New Jersey Turnpike or the thruways of Los Angeles and elsewhere. Consider the potential of railway and subway tracks. We are talking about tens of thousands of potential megawatts produced without any fossil fuels. Additional energy is derivable from thermoelectric materials, which can transform wasted heat into electricity. As Christopher Steiner notes, capturing waste heat from manufacturing alone in the United States would provide an additional 65,000 megawatts: “enough for 50 million homes.”34 **Smart glass** is already commercialized and can save significant energy in heating, airconditioning and lighting—up to 50% saving in energy has been achieved in retrofitted legacy buildings (such as the former Sears Tower in Chicago). New buildings, designed to take maximum advantage of this and other technologies could save even more. Buildings consume 39% of America’s energy and 68% of its electricity. They emit 38% of the carbon dioxide, 49% of the sulfur dioxide, and 25% of the nitrogen oxides found in the air.35 Even greater savings in electricity could be realized by replacing incandescent and fluorescent light bulbs with LEDS which use 1/10th the electricity of incandescent and half the electricity of fluorescents. These three steps: transforming waste heat into electricity, retrofitting buildings with smart glass, and LED lighting, could cut America’s electricity consumption and its **CO2 emissions by 50% within 10 years.** They would also generate hundreds of thousands of jobs in construction and home improvements. Coal driven electricity generation would become a thing of the past. The coal released could be liquefied or gasified (by new environmentally friendly technologies) into the energy equivalent of 3.5 million barrels of oil a day. This is equivalent to the amount of oil the United States imports from the Persian Gulf and Venezuela together.36 Conservation of energy and parasitic energy harvesting, as well as urban agriculture would cut the planet’s energy consumption and air and water pollution significantly. **Waste-to-energy technologies could begin to replace fossil fuels**. Garbage, sewage, organic trash, and agricultural and food processing waste are essentially hydrocarbon resources that can be transformed into ethanol, methanol, and biobutanol or biodiesel. These can be used for transportation, electricity generation or as feedstock for plastics and other materials. Waste-to-energy is essentially a recycling of CO2 from the environment instead of introducing new CO2 into the environment. Waste-to-energy also prevents the production, and release from rotting organic waste, of **methane**—a greenhouse gas 25 times more powerful than CO2. Methane accounts for 18% of the manmade greenhouse effect. Not as much as CO2, which constitutes 72%, but still considerable (landfills emit as much greenhouse gas effect, in the form of methane, as the CO2 from all the vehicles in the world). Numerous prototypes of a variety of waste-to-energy technologies are already in place. When their declining costs meet the rising costs of fossil fuels, they will become commercialized and, if history is any judge, will replace fossil fuels **very quickly**—just as coal replaced wood in a matter of decades and petroleum replaced whale oil in a matter of years. Superlight Materials But it is superlight materials that have the greatest potential to transform civilization and, in conjunction with the above, to usher in the “no limits to growth” era. I refer, in particular, to car-bon nanotubes—alternatively referred to as Buckyballs or Buckypaper (in honor of Buckminster Fuller). Carbon nanotubes are between 1/10,000th and 1/50,000th the width of a human hair, more flexible than rubber and 100-500 times stronger than steel per unit of weight. Imagine the energy savings if planes, cars, trucks, trains, elevators—everything that needs energy to move—were made of this material and weighed 1/100th what they weigh now. Imagine the types of alternative energy that would become practical. Imagine the positive impact on the environment: replacing many industrial processes and mining, and thus lessening air and groundwater pollution. Present costs and production methods make this impractical but that infinite resource—the human mind—has confronted and solved many problems like this before. Let us take the example of aluminum. A hundred fifty years ago, aluminum was more expensive than gold or platinum.37 When Napoleon III held a banquet, he provided his most honored guests with aluminum plates. Less-distinguished guests had to make do with gold! When the Washington Monument was completed in 1884, it was fitted with an aluminum cap—the most expensive metal in the world at the time—as a sign of respect to George Washington. It weighed 2.85 kilograms, or 2,850 grams. Aluminum at the time cost $1 a gram (or $1,000 a kilogram). A typical day laborer working on the monument was paid $1 a day for 10-12 hours a day. In other words, today’s common soft-drink can, which weighs 14 grams, could have bought 14 ten-hour days of labor in 1884.38 Today’s U.S. minimum wage is $7.50 an hour. Using labor as the measure of value, a soft drink can would cost $1,125 today (or $80,000 a kilogram), were it not for a new method of processing aluminum ore. The Hall-Héroult process turned aluminum into one of the cheapest commodities on earth only two years after the Washington Monument was capped with aluminum. Today aluminum costs $3 a kilogram, or $3000 a metric ton. The soft drink can that would have cost $1,125 today without the process now costs $0.04. Today the average cost of industrial grade carbon nanotubes is about $50-$60 a kilogram. This is already far cheaper in real cost than aluminum was in 1884. Yet revolutionary methods of production are now being developed that will drive costs down even more radically. At Cambridge University they are working on a new electrochemical production method that could produce 600 kilograms of carbon nanotubes **per day** at a projected cost of around $10 a kilogram, or $10,000 a metric ton.39 This will do for carbon nanotubes what the Hall-Héroult process did for aluminum. **Nanotubes will become the universal raw material of choice**, displacing steel, aluminum, copper and other metals and materials. Steel presently costs about $750 per metric ton. Nanotubes of equivalent strength to a metric ton of steel would cost $100 if this Cambridge process (or others being pursued in research labs around the world) proves successful. Ben Wang, director of Florida State’s High Performance Materials Institute claims that: “If you take just one gram of nanotubes, and you unfold every tube into a graphite sheet, you can cover about two-thirds of a football field”.40 Since other research has indicated that carbon nanotubes would be more suitable than silicon for producing **p**hoto**v**oltaic energy, consider the implications. Several grams of this material could be the energy-producing skin for new generations of superlight dirigibles—making these airships energy autonomous. They could replace airplanes as the primary means to transport air freight. Modern American history has shown that anything human beings decide they want done can be done in 20 years if it does not violate the laws of nature. The atom bomb was developed in four years; putting a man on the moon took eight years. It is a reasonable conjecture that **by 2020 or earlier**, **an industrial process for the inexpensive production of carbon nanotubes will be developed**, and that this would be the key to solving our energy, raw materials, and environmental problems all at once. Mitigating Anthropic Greenhouse Gases Another vital component of a “no limits to growth” world is to formulate a rational environmental policy that saves money; one that would gain wide grassroots support because it would benefit taxpayers and businesses, and would not endanger livelihoods. For example, what do sewage treatment, garbage disposal, and fuel costs amount to as a percentage of municipal budgets? What are the costs of waste disposal and fuel costs in stockyards, on poultry farms, throughout the food processing industry, and in restaurants? How much aggregate energy could be saved from all of the above? Some experts claim that we could obtain enough liquid fuel from recycling these hydrocarbon resources to satisfy all the transportation needs of the United States. Turning the above waste into energy by various means would be a huge cost saver and value generator, in addition to being a blessing to the environment. The U.S. army has developed a portable field apparatus that turns a combat unit’s human waste and garbage into bio-diesel to fuel their vehicles and generators.41 It is called TGER—the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery. It eliminates the need to transport fuel to the field, thus saving lives, time, and equipment expenses. The cost per barrel must still be very high. However, the history of military technology being civilianized and revolutionizing accepted norms is long. We might expect that **within 5-10 years**, economically competitive units using similar technologies will appear in restaurants, on farms, and perhaps even in individual households, turning organic waste into usable and economical fuel. We might conjecture that within several decades, centralized sewage disposal and garbage collection will be things of the past and that even the Edison Grid (unchanged for over one hundred years) **will be deconstructed**. The Promise of Algae Biofuels produced from algae could eventually provide a substantial portion of our transportation fuel. Algae has a much higher productivity potential than crop-based biofuels because it grows faster, uses less land and requires only sun and CO2 plus nutrients that can be provided from gray sewage water. It is the primo CO2 sequesterer because it works for free (by way of photosynthesis), and in doing so produces biodiesel and ethanol in much higher volumes per acre than corn or other crops. Production costs are the biggest remaining challenge. One Defense Department estimate pins them at more than $20 a gallon.42 But once commercialized in industrial scale facilities, production cost could go as low as $2 a gallon (the equivalent of $88 per barrel of oil) according to Jennifer Holmgren, director of renewable fuels at an energy subsidiary of Honeywell International.43 Since algae uses waste water and CO2 as its primary feedstock, its use to produce transportation fuel or feedstock for product would actually improve the environment. The Promise of the Electric Car There are 250 million cars in the United States. Let’s assume that they were all fully electric vehicles (EVs) equipped with 25-kWh batteries. Each kWh takes a car two to three miles, and if the average driver charges the car twice a week, this would come to about 100 charge cycles per year. All told, Americans would use 600 billion kWh per year, which is only 15% of the current total U.S. production of 4 trillion kWh per year. If supplied during low demand times, this would not even require additional power plants. If cars were made primarily out of Buckypaper, one kWh might take a car 40-50 miles. If the surface of the car was utilized as a photovoltaic, the car of the future might conceivably become **energy autonomous** (or at least semi-autonomous). A kWh produced by a coal-fired power plant creates two pounds of CO2, so our car-related CO2 footprint would be 1.2 trillion pounds if all electricity were produced by coal. However, burning one gallon of gas produces 20 pounds of CO2.44 In 2008, the U.S. used 3.3 billion barrels of gasoline, thereby creating about 3 trillion pounds of CO2. Therefore, a switch to electric vehicles would cut CO2 emissions by 60% (from 3 trillion to 1.2 trillion pounds), even if we burned coal exclusively to generate that power. Actually, replacing a gas car with an electric car will cause zero increase in electric draw because refineries use seven kWh of power to refine crude oil into a gallon of gasoline. A Tesla Roadster can go 25 miles on that 7 KWh of power. So the electric car can go 25 miles using the same electricity needed to refine the gallon of gas that a combustion engine car would use to go the same distance. Additional Strategies The goal of mitigating global warming/climate change without changing our lifestyles is not naïve. Using proven Israeli expertise, planting forests on **just 12%** of the world’s semi-arid areas would offset the annual CO2 output of **one thousand 500-megawatt coal plants** (a gigaton a year).45 A global program of foresting 60% of the world’s semi-arid areas **would offset five thousand 500-megawatt coal plants** (five gigatons a year). Since mitigation goals for global warming include reducing our CO2 emissions by eight gigatons by 2050, this project alone would have a tremendous ameliorating effect. Given that large swaths of semi-arid land areas contain or border on some of the poorest populations on the planet, we could put millions of the world’s poorest citizens to work in forestation, thus accomplishing two positives (fighting poverty and environmental degradation) with one project. Moving agriculture from its current fieldbased paradigm to vertical urban agriculture would eliminate **two gigatons of CO2.** The subsequent re-wilding of vast areas of the earth’s surface could help sequester up to **50 gigatons of CO2 a year**, completely reversing the trend. The revolution underway in material science will help us to become “self-sufficient” in energy. It will also enable us to create superlight vehicles and structures that will produce their own energy. Over time, carbon nanotubes will replace steel, copper and aluminum in a myriad of functions. Converting waste to energy will eliminate most of the methane gas humanity releases into the atmosphere. Meanwhile, artificial photosynthesis will suck CO2 out of the air at 1,000 times the rate of natural photosynthesis.46 This trapped CO2 could then be combined with hydrogen to create much of the petroleum we will continue to need. As hemp and other fast-growing plants replace wood for making paper, the logging industry will largely cease to exist. Self-contained fish farms will provide a major share of our protein needs with far less environmental damage to the oceans. Population Explosion or Population Implosion One constant refrain of anti-growth advocates is that we are heading towards 12 billion people by the end of the century, that this is unsustainable, and thus that we must proactively reduce the human population to 3 billion-4 billion in order to “save the planet” and human civilization from catastrophe. But recent data indicates that a **demographic winter** will engulf humanity by the middle of this century. More than 60 countries (containing over half the world’s population) already do not have replacement birth rates of 2.1 children per woman. This includes the entire EU, China, Russia, and half a dozen Muslim countries, including Turkey, Algeria, and Iran. If present trends continue, India, Mexico and Indonesia will join this group before 2030. The human population will peak at 9-10 billion by 2060, after which, for the first time since the Black Death, it will begin to shrink. By the end of the century, the human population might be as low as 6 billion-7 billion. The real danger is not a population explosion; but the consequences of the impending population implosion.47 This demographic process is not being driven by famine or disease as has been the case in all previous history. Instead, it is being driven by the greatest Cultural Revolution in the history of the human race: the **liberation and empowerment of women**. The fact is that even with **present technology**, we would still be able to sustain a global population of 12 billion by the end of the century if needed. The evidence for this is cited above.

#### The [Aff/alt] will fail – neoliberalism is over generalized and offers no explanatory power

**Barnett 5** (Clive, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University, Geoforum 36, “The consolations of ‘neoliberalism,’” p. 9-10, Ebsco)

The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. The conceptualization of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to **do without the concept of “neoliberalism” altogether**, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to **reduce** the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a ‘‘hegemonic’’ project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, refer- ring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a **muddled** set of **ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations** to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades **cannot** therefore **be adequately understood** in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to “hegemonic neoliberalism”. And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of ‘‘democracy’’ (see Barnett and Low, 2004).

#### Disregard their impact claims – attributing consequence to neoliberalism is epistemologically asinine.

**Castree 6** (Noel, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester, Environment and Planning A, volume 38, Issue 1, “From neoliberalism to neoliberalisation: consolations, confusions, and necessary illusions,” p. 1-5)

Yet in the slow (but enjoyable) process of reviewing the literature I have become increasingly confused as to the precise object of analytical attention. It is not simply that the research papers I am reading focus on different kinds of natural and altered environments (hardly surprising given the world's biophysical diversity). In addition, the political economic project driving environmental change – ‘neoliberalism’ – seems to alter its shape from paper to paper. So, although the authors whose essays and chapters I am reading appear to share a common analytical focus – their different environmental expertises notwithstanding – it turns out that this focus is rather fuzzy. This is not just an empirical issue. In theoretical terms what counts as neoliberalism does not appear to be a matter of consensus among critics in geography and cognate fields. In some cases privatisation and marketisation are the key criteria; in other cases additional features are listed among its differentia specifica. Empirically, it is no surprise to discover that, however defined, `neoliberalism' does not `ground itself' unchanged from place to place. Rather, as the case studies I have been reading show so well, its embedding in real-world situations muddies the clean lines of its conceptual specification. So far so unexceptional. Anyone with an even passing familiarity with geographical debates over previous grand abstractions – such as postmodernity, post-Fordism, or globalization – will doubtless interpret my `fuzzy concept' problem as no problem at all. Given time, it might be thought that those researchers whose empirical work I am surveying will sharpen theoretical understandings of neoliberalism by carefully specifying different modalities of `actually existing neoliberalism'. This being early days, it might be thought that we still have some way to go before research into the `nature' of neoliberalism reaches maturity. `Maturity', from this perspective, would be a situation in which a substantial body of evidence has both arisen from and altered increasingly refined conceptualisations of what neoliberalism is all about. As this involves increased theoretical complexity, then the theoretical abstraction ‘neoliberalism’ will, over time, give way to plural understandings of neoliberalisation as a really existing process rather than an ageographical thing. The end result will be that environmental geographers – like other geographers interested in neoliberalism – will move from the heavens of abstract theory to the nitty-gritty of empirical specifics ending up somewhere in between: with mid-range conceptualisations that have genuine explanatory and normative purchase. Though the above scenario is not implausible, I have nagging doubts – ones whose implications extend way beyond my immediate subject of concern. My worry is that analysts of neoliberalism's environmental impacts are travelling down a **road to nowhere**. The potential dead end to which I refer is not a function of the topic being researched – like any political economic project, neoliberalism will have nontrivial effects on the nonhuman world (and therefore on us). It is essential that these effects be described, explained, and evaluated. But the key question – and the basis of my concern – is what precisely produces these effects. Ostensibly it is ‘neoliberalism’ of course. But because geographical researchers of neoliberalism are rightly trying to complicate and dehomogenise this thought-abstraction, the issue of what, precisely, the object of analysis is arises. If, as Clive Barnett (2005, page 9) states, ``There is no such thing as neoliberalism!'', then we are forced to recognise one of two possibilities. The first – apropos the mid-level theory mentioned above – is that there are distinct kinds of neoliberalisation whose environmental impacts can be fairly accurately understood (even though there is unlikely to be a consistent relationship between kinds and impacts). The second is that even at this mesolevel neoliberalism can only exist as a thought-abstraction not a `real entity' because ‘it’ only ever exists in articulation with actors, institutions, and agendas that immediately call into question whether a thing called ‘neoliberalism’ – however carefully specified – can be held responsible for anything. Clearly, I am touching here upon fundamental research issues – those of ontology and epistemology – that cannot be resolved at a purely philosophical level. To date, researchers of neoliberalism in urban and economic geography have tended to resist the second possibility mentioned above (perhaps because it appears to lead to the dead end of an idiographic focus on the unique and the singular). Instead, they believe that ongoing empirical research can be synthesised and compared so that mid-level concepts will emerge. The likelihood is that the environmental geographers whose research I have recently been reading will, similarly, see the production of such grounded concepts as their long-term objective. If so, I wish to give them pause for thought – so too all those other geographers undertaking theoretically informed and theoretically relevant empirical research into neoliberalism's actually existing forms. A brief exploration of some unresolved tensions in the writings of Wendy Larner and Jamie Peck is instructive here. Economic geographers both, Larner and Peck's overview pieces on neoliberalism have enjoyed a wide readership among critical geographers (Larner, 2003; Peck 2001; 2004; see also Peck and Tickell, 2002). Both authors have tried to set agendas for current and future geographical research into neoliberalism that touch upon the source of my concern in this commentary. Larner (2003, page 510) has argued that neoliberalism needs to be given ``an identity crisis''. Following J K Gibson-Graham (1996) she argues that when critical scholars reify neoliberalism as a hegemonic, unified entity they, perversely, **exaggerate its power** despite their oppositional stance towards it. Her recommendation is that we take aspatial and universal conceptions of neoliberalism and render them geographical: that we pay attention to ``the different variants of neoliberalism, to the hybrid nature of contemporary policies and programmes...[and] to the multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques, and subjects'' (page 509, emphasis in the original). However, perhaps aware that this argument can be seen to license the proliferation of disconnected case studies, she also stresses ``the important contributions of academic work focused on identifying the similarities between different forms of neoliberalism'' (page 510). The hidden tensions in Larner's argument become manifest in Peck's excellent synoptic essays on neoliberalism. He notes that neoliberalism is a ``perplexingly amorphous political economic phenomena'' (2004, page 394) because it remains unclear at what geographical scales and levels of theoretical abstraction we can identify it. As he puts it, ``While the neoliberal discourses and strategies that are mobilized in ... different settings share certain family resemblances, local institutional context clearly (and really) matters in the style, substance, origins and outcomes ...'' (page 395). This is more than a reiteration of Larner's apparently sensible attempt to give the grand abstraction `neoliberalism' an identity crisis. More than Larner, Peck wants to identify commonalities within apparent difference without succumbing to ``the fallacies of monolithism ... or convergence thinking'' (page 403). As he continues, ``While geographers tend to be rightly sceptical of spatially totalizing claims, splitting differences over varieties of neoliberalism cannot be an end in itself, not least because it begs questions about the common roots and shared features of the unevenly neoliberalized landscape that confronts us.'' What Peck seems to have in mind here is not a process of pure thought abstraction: one in which generic similarities among different neoliberalisms are identified yielding a `neoliberal model' that nowhere exists as such. Instead, he recognises that all neoliberalisations are hybrid from the outset [“even the United States represents a ‘case’, rather than the model itself'” (page 393)]. It follows for him, therefore, that “in the absence of a more careful mapping of these hybrids-in-connection, the concept of neoliberalism ... remains seriously underspecified, little more in some cases than a radical-theoretical **slogan''** (page 403). It seems to me that, despite his best efforts, Peck fails to address satisfactorily some key problems in the argument that both he and Larner are advancing. In a sense both authors want to have their cake and eat it. They insist that we identify different modalities of neoliberalism without giving up on the task of discussing “the abstraction we might provisionally term neoliberalism in general'” (page 395) – where the latter now arises from a comparative consideration of empirical research rather than from a priori thought-experiments or reference to the programmatic writings of Friedman and Hayek. For my own part I see difficulties with this `both/and' agenda even as I understand the intentions behind it. Let me explain. First, part of neoliberalism's ‘perplexing amorphousness’ – whatever geographical scale or level of theoretical abstraction we are dealing with – stems from a fairly intractable inability to ‘fix’ the term's meanings and real-world referents. Unlike, say, water – which in one of its three states remains water wherever and whenever it is – neoliberalism does not possess stable characteristics. We only ‘know’ that a given phenomena is neoliberal – or has “a more than trivial degree of neoliberal content” (page 403) – because we have selected from among several definitions that other researchers or real-world actors use to specify what neoliberalism is. Because these definitions are multiple – as I noted earlier, critics usually offer between two and several criteria when defining what counts as a neoliberal idea or policy – then `the real world' can only partly function as a ‘court of appeal’ to resolve competing claims as to what is (or is not) neoliberal in degree and kind. Second, even if this were not an issue, neoliberal practices always, as Larner and Peck rightly argue, exist in a more-than-neoliberal context. The context matters because it introduces difference, path dependency, and unevenness in terms of process and outcome: neoliberalisations in the plural. But this then begs the question: what does it mean to abstract from context (again, whatever geographical scale or level of theoretical abstraction we are dealing with) in the way that Larner and especially Peck recommend? Even in Peck's subtle reading of ‘neoliberalism in general’ we confront the possibility that we are simply listing generic – albeit historically specific – characteristics found in multiple geographical contexts. Because the effects of these characteristics can only ever be understood contextually then the suspicion arises that neoliberalism depicted over and above context is a pure archetype: something unreal that **has no consequences or existence in itself**. This, of course, raises the key question of where context begins and where it ends. Phrased differently, it raises the question of geographical scale: at what socially constituted scale(s) does (do) discrete modes of neoliberal policy and practice exist? The answer, as the growing empirical literature shows, is that it very much depends. One of the reasons that critics see neoliberalism as tendentially hegemonic is because it has been `rolled out' by global institutions (such as the World Bank) with the (apparent) power to impose their will on whole countries. But this does not, of course, mean that it is implemented uniformly over space because of preexisting differences in the configurations of state, business, and civil society. What is more, national, regional, and local level actors in various parts of the world have enacted their own neoliberal policies in relation to specific sets of people, places, natural resources, industries, and so on. So even if neoliberal ideas have, these last twenty years, diffused out from globally powerful bodies this does nothing to alter the fact of hybridity and variety that Larner and Peck both discern. My third point, in light of this, is that it is wrong to believe that ‘larger’ geographical scales (for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement area) constitute a more uniform neoliberal landscape ‘overlaying’ more regionally and locally variable ones. The point, surely, is that even global policies and rules ‘bite’ differently all the way from the continental down to the local scales. In other words, ‘difference’ does not begin (or somehow `deepen') at the local scale alone (as implied by Perreault and Martin, 2005). Neither Larner nor Peck suggest that it does, but there is nonetheless the risk that their arguments can be seen to imply that there is a scale or scales where geographical difference ends and spatial similarity begins. As I suggested in the previous paragraph, neoliberalism is ‘impure’ at all geographical scales, meaning that the search for similarities can easily become a formal rather than substantive exercise. The way to avoid this last possibility is to do what critical realists in human geography have been doing for years. Supposing that we can agree on what neoliberalism's defining characteristics are, we start by recognising that it exists in an overdetermined socionatural universe. We therefore acknowledge that it never acts alone – only in a fairy-tale world where everything is privatised, marketised, and commodified would this not hold true. Therefore, when we identify specific variants of neoliberalism we are not examining varieties of a really existing, homogenous genus. Instead, we are doing two things. First, we are seeing how a really existing and quite widespread set of policy ideas are having conjoint effects at specific geographical scales (up to and including the global). In other words, we are examining contingently occurring processes and outcomes that may well have operated differently if the ‘neoliberal component’ had not been present. Second, this means the object of analysis in any given research project is not a mere temporary ‘variant’ of something more enduring and solid but rather a qualitatively distinct phenomenon in its own right: namely, an articulation between certain neoliberal policies and a raft of other social and natural phenomena. Rigorously pursued, a critical realist approach to neoliberalism or any other topic resists the ‘violence of abstraction’: that is, the habit of confusing epistemic discussions about a phenomenon abstracted from its contexts of operation with ontological discussions about its actual behaviour and its material effects. As the now-distant ‘localities debate’ showed, the best critical realist research does not doubt that certain phenomena cover wide spans of space and time. Instead, it insists that such phenomena are likely to be impure at all scales and this impurity must be respected not seen as a deviation from some norm or essence. How does this relate to attempts to compare different variants of neoliberalism? The answer is that critical realists would look for substantial (not formal) similarities in causal processes and contingent similarities in how those processes work out on the ground. In other words, geographical difference matters to critical realists ‘all the way down’ which is not the same as saying that the world is necessarily a patchwork of unlike parts. Critical realists, though not discussed by Peck in his recent work (though further back in time see Peck, 1996), would doubtless approach neoliberalism in the way he recommends. They would identify similarities between neoliberalisations not to suggest that the differences can be bracketed but to suggest, instead, that even with these differences substantial commonalities of process and outcome occur. Equally, though, they would be open to the evidence telling them a different story: one in which the differences make such a difference that the commonalities exist only in name (conceptually) not in actuality. In either case, it would be axiomatic that it is never `neoliberalism' alone that causes anything, but always ‘neoliberalism-plus’ – begging the empirical question of at one point of ‘impurity’ it becomes impossible to use the term neoliberal in any meaningful analytic sense. What is the relevance of all this to the relatively new research literature exploring neoliberalisms and the nonhuman world? In a recent critical review of work by Larner, Peck, and other geographic analysts of neoliberalism, Barnett (2005, pages 9-10) has made the following observation. “For all its apparent critical force'”, he argues, “the vocabulary of ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘neoliberalization’ in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation. In so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors ‘out there’, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation.'' If Barnett is right (and I think he might be) then it is important that the still-young geographical research literature on neoliberalism and nature avoids the consolations to which he refers. In a recent theme issue of this journal on neoliberalism in Latin America – in which several essays examine environmental impacts – Thomas Perreault and Patricia Martin (2005) seem drawn to these consolations despite themselves. On the one side, like Larner and Peck, they deny that neoliberalism tout court exists (only specific versions of it). Yet they also make plenary claims about ‘its' implications for the environment and its governance (page 193). What is the appeal of continuing to talk in terms of **grand abstractions**, even as they are being called into question? One answer is that the `bad' (that is, aspatial) habits of social science thinking continue to affect geographical thinking. As Barnett implies, academic critics are made to **feel important** if the object of their animus appears to be hegemonic, global, and powerful: something that demands urgent critical scrutiny. It is far less glamorous and `sexy' to have constantly to describe ones objects of analysis as multiple, complex, and varied through time and space. As David Harvey (1985, page xi) argued many years ago, spatiotemporal specificity appears to paralyse the generalising impulses of mainstream and radical social scientists (like economists and social theorists).

**Neoliberalism isn’t the root cause of war**

**Roberts and Sparke 3** (Susan, Professor of Geography – University of Kentucky, and Matthew, Professor of Geography – University of Washington, “Neoliberal Geopolitics,” Antipode, 35(5), p. 886-897)

Barnett’s work is our main example in this paper of a more widespread form of neoliberal geopolitics implicated in the war-making. This geopolitical world vision, we argue, is closely connected to neoliberal idealism about the virtues of free markets, openness, and global economic integration. Yet, linked as it was to an extreme form of American unilateralism, we further want to highlight how the neoliberal geopolitics of the war planners illustrated the contradictory dependency of multilateral neoliberal deregulation on enforced re-regulation and, in particular, on the deadly and far from multilateral re-regulation represented by the “regime change” that has now been enforced on Iraq. Such re-regulation underlines the intellectual importance of studying how neoliberal marketization dynamics are hybridized and supplemented by various extra-economic forces.2 Rather than making neoliberalism into a **totalizing economic master narrative**, we therefore suggest that it is vital to examine its inter-articulation with certain dangerous supplements, including, not least of all, the violence of American military force. We are not arguing that the war is completely explainable in terms of neoliberalism, nor that neoliberalism is reducible to American imperialism. Instead, the point is to explore how a certain globalist and economistic view of the world, one associated with neoliberalism, did service in legitimating the war while simultaneously finessing America’s all too obvious departure from the “end of the nation-state” storyline. [Continues] As we said at the start, we do not want to claim too much for neoliberalism. It cannot explain everything, least of all the diverse brutalities of what happened in Iraq. Moreover, in connecting neoliberal norms to the vagaries of geopolitics, we risk **corrupting the analytical purchase of neoliberalism** on more clearly socioeconomic developments. By the same token, we also risk obscuring the emergence of certain nonmilitarist geoeconomic visions of global and local space that have gone hand in hand with neoliberal globalization (see Sparke 1998, 2002; Sparke and Lawson 2003). But insofar as the specific vision of neoliberal geopolitics brought many neoliberals to support the war (including, perhaps, Britain’s Tony Blair as well as Americans such as Friedman), insofar as it helped thereby also to facilitate the planning and overarching coordination of the violence, and insofar as the war showed how the extension of neoliberal practices on a global scale has come to depend on violent interventions by the US, it seems vital to reflect on the inter-articulations.

#### Breaking down neoliberalism kills leadership

Duménil and Lévy 09

[Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, Directors of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, The Crisis of Neoliberalism and U.S. Hegemony, 2009, <http://www.beigewum.at/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009_2_006-13.pdf>]

Beginning the historical investigation at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States, neoliberalism appears as the third such »social order«. A first financial hegemony prevailed from the beginning of the century, but it was destabilized during the Great Depression and the New Deal, **a period of intense class struggle.** The social order characteristic of the period that stretches from the New Deal to the late 1980s can be denoted as »social democratic« or »Keynesian«, with significant differences among countries. Its main social feature was a »compromise« between managerial and popular classes, paralleling the containment of capitalist interests. How neoliberalism was established historically lies beyond the limits of the present study. Conversely, the description of the methods used is rather straightforward. A new discipline was imposed on workers, with the control of their purchasing power, new labor conditions, and the decline of welfare. While, after World War II, a large percentage of profits were conserved within nonfinancial corporations to the end of investment, in neoliberalism, profits were lavishly distributed as dividends and, up to 2000s, a large fraction was paid out as interest. Policies aiming at price stability were substituted for macro policies tending to growth and employment. Financial regulations inherited from the Great Depression were gradually lifted. Restrictions to international trade were eliminated to the benefit of free trade, and the free international mobility of capital was imposed to most countries. Neoliberal globalization allowed for the deployment of transnational corporations worldwide. The United States emerged from the two world wars as the leading international power. While other imperialist countries, as France or the United Kingdom, were still involved in the defense of their traditional empire, the United States abandoned the first attempts at the constitutions of such an empire at the end of the 19th century, to the benefit of the Wilsonian vision of the informal dominance of the most advanced among capitalist countries, with the gradual imposition of the dollar as international currency. The Great Depression did not destabilize this hegemony, which was dramatically consolidated by the victorious participation of the country in World War II. The United States never accepted the new rules of the Bretton Woods agreements limiting international trade and the international movements of capital, and the dollar was confirmed as a substitute for a truly international currency. After World War II, the United States fought for the defense, in front of the Soviet Union, of the so-called »free world« and for their own dominance worldwide. Everywhere, corruption, subversion, and wars were used to these ends. The U.S. economy came to dominate the nonfinancial and financial world economy. The transnational corporations of the country were the most powerful, in particular financial institutions. In the 1970s, many analysts of global trends pointed, however, to a decline of U.S. hegemony and the formation of a »triad« (the United States, Europe, and Japan). Neoliberalism inverted these trends and strengthened the preeminence of the U.S. economy. As of the 2000s, the U.S. economy was presented to other major capitalist countries as a model to be emulated, and the United States as a leader to be followed.

#### Nuclear war

Brooks et al 13 [Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 7-51,<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107>]

  A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive wartemptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without theAmerican pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins toswing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimismregarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by astill-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on itsparticular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however,undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and theyengage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts thatthe withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war).

#### Neoliberalism key to free trade and globalization

Makwana 06

[Rajesh, Director of Share The World’s Resources (www.stwr.org), an NGO campaigning for global economic and social justice., Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization, 11/23/06, <http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html>]

Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures. Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries by levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and revenue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low, effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development. With this self interest driving globalization, economically powerful nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade.

#### Protectionism causes extinction

Pazner 8 (faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” p. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to **full-scale military encounters**, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles **soaked in blood**. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### Disregard their impact claims – attributing consequence to neoliberalism is epistemologically asinine.

**Castree 6** (Noel, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester, Environment and Planning A, volume 38, Issue 1, “From neoliberalism to neoliberalisation: consolations, confusions, and necessary illusions,” p. 1-5)

Yet in the slow (but enjoyable) process of reviewing the literature I have become increasingly confused as to the precise object of analytical attention. It is not simply that the research papers I am reading focus on different kinds of natural and altered environments (hardly surprising given the world's biophysical diversity). In addition, the political economic project driving environmental change – ‘neoliberalism’ – seems to alter its shape from paper to paper. So, although the authors whose essays and chapters I am reading appear to share a common analytical focus – their different environmental expertises notwithstanding – it turns out that this focus is rather fuzzy. This is not just an empirical issue. In theoretical terms what counts as neoliberalism does not appear to be a matter of consensus among critics in geography and cognate fields. In some cases privatisation and marketisation are the key criteria; in other cases additional features are listed among its differentia specifica. Empirically, it is no surprise to discover that, however defined, `neoliberalism' does not `ground itself' unchanged from place to place. Rather, as the case studies I have been reading show so well, its embedding in real-world situations muddies the clean lines of its conceptual specification. So far so unexceptional. Anyone with an even passing familiarity with geographical debates over previous grand abstractions – such as postmodernity, post-Fordism, or globalization – will doubtless interpret my `fuzzy concept' problem as no problem at all. Given time, it might be thought that those researchers whose empirical work I am surveying will sharpen theoretical understandings of neoliberalism by carefully specifying different modalities of `actually existing neoliberalism'. This being early days, it might be thought that we still have some way to go before research into the `nature' of neoliberalism reaches maturity. `Maturity', from this perspective, would be a situation in which a substantial body of evidence has both arisen from and altered increasingly refined conceptualisations of what neoliberalism is all about. As this involves increased theoretical complexity, then the theoretical abstraction ‘neoliberalism’ will, over time, give way to plural understandings of neoliberalisation as a really existing process rather than an ageographical thing. The end result will be that environmental geographers – like other geographers interested in neoliberalism – will move from the heavens of abstract theory to the nitty-gritty of empirical specifics ending up somewhere in between: with mid-range conceptualisations that have genuine explanatory and normative purchase. Though the above scenario is not implausible, I have nagging doubts – ones whose implications extend way beyond my immediate subject of concern. My worry is that analysts of neoliberalism's environmental impacts are travelling down a **road to nowhere**. The potential dead end to which I refer is not a function of the topic being researched – like any political economic project, neoliberalism will have nontrivial effects on the nonhuman world (and therefore on us). It is essential that these effects be described, explained, and evaluated. But the key question – and the basis of my concern – is what precisely produces these effects. Ostensibly it is ‘neoliberalism’ of course. But because geographical researchers of neoliberalism are rightly trying to complicate and dehomogenise this thought-abstraction, the issue of what, precisely, the object of analysis is arises. If, as Clive Barnett (2005, page 9) states, ``There is no such thing as neoliberalism!'', then we are forced to recognise one of two possibilities. The first – apropos the mid-level theory mentioned above – is that there are distinct kinds of neoliberalisation whose environmental impacts can be fairly accurately understood (even though there is unlikely to be a consistent relationship between kinds and impacts). The second is that even at this mesolevel neoliberalism can only exist as a thought-abstraction not a `real entity' because ‘it’ only ever exists in articulation with actors, institutions, and agendas that immediately call into question whether a thing called ‘neoliberalism’ – however carefully specified – can be held responsible for anything. Clearly, I am touching here upon fundamental research issues – those of ontology and epistemology – that cannot be resolved at a purely philosophical level. To date, researchers of neoliberalism in urban and economic geography have tended to resist the second possibility mentioned above (perhaps because it appears to lead to the dead end of an idiographic focus on the unique and the singular). Instead, they believe that ongoing empirical research can be synthesised and compared so that mid-level concepts will emerge. The likelihood is that the environmental geographers whose research I have recently been reading will, similarly, see the production of such grounded concepts as their long-term objective. If so, I wish to give them pause for thought – so too all those other geographers undertaking theoretically informed and theoretically relevant empirical research into neoliberalism's actually existing forms. A brief exploration of some unresolved tensions in the writings of Wendy Larner and Jamie Peck is instructive here. Economic geographers both, Larner and Peck's overview pieces on neoliberalism have enjoyed a wide readership among critical geographers (Larner, 2003; Peck 2001; 2004; see also Peck and Tickell, 2002). Both authors have tried to set agendas for current and future geographical research into neoliberalism that touch upon the source of my concern in this commentary. Larner (2003, page 510) has argued that neoliberalism needs to be given ``an identity crisis''. Following J K Gibson-Graham (1996) she argues that when critical scholars reify neoliberalism as a hegemonic, unified entity they, perversely, **exaggerate its power** despite their oppositional stance towards it. Her recommendation is that we take aspatial and universal conceptions of neoliberalism and render them geographical: that we pay attention to ``the different variants of neoliberalism, to the hybrid nature of contemporary policies and programmes...[and] to the multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques, and subjects'' (page 509, emphasis in the original). However, perhaps aware that this argument can be seen to license the proliferation of disconnected case studies, she also stresses ``the important contributions of academic work focused on identifying the similarities between different forms of neoliberalism'' (page 510). The hidden tensions in Larner's argument become manifest in Peck's excellent synoptic essays on neoliberalism. He notes that neoliberalism is a ``perplexingly amorphous political economic phenomena'' (2004, page 394) because it remains unclear at what geographical scales and levels of theoretical abstraction we can identify it. As he puts it, ``While the neoliberal discourses and strategies that are mobilized in ... different settings share certain family resemblances, local institutional context clearly (and really) matters in the style, substance, origins and outcomes ...'' (page 395). This is more than a reiteration of Larner's apparently sensible attempt to give the grand abstraction `neoliberalism' an identity crisis. More than Larner, Peck wants to identify commonalities within apparent difference without succumbing to ``the fallacies of monolithism ... or convergence thinking'' (page 403). As he continues, ``While geographers tend to be rightly sceptical of spatially totalizing claims, splitting differences over varieties of neoliberalism cannot be an end in itself, not least because it begs questions about the common roots and shared features of the unevenly neoliberalized landscape that confronts us.'' What Peck seems to have in mind here is not a process of pure thought abstraction: one in which generic similarities among different neoliberalisms are identified yielding a `neoliberal model' that nowhere exists as such. Instead, he recognises that all neoliberalisations are hybrid from the outset [“even the United States represents a ‘case’, rather than the model itself'” (page 393)]. It follows for him, therefore, that “in the absence of a more careful mapping of these hybrids-in-connection, the concept of neoliberalism ... remains seriously underspecified, little more in some cases than a radical-theoretical **slogan''** (page 403). It seems to me that, despite his best efforts, Peck fails to address satisfactorily some key problems in the argument that both he and Larner are advancing. In a sense both authors want to have their cake and eat it. They insist that we identify different modalities of neoliberalism without giving up on the task of discussing “the abstraction we might provisionally term neoliberalism in general'” (page 395) – where the latter now arises from a comparative consideration of empirical research rather than from a priori thought-experiments or reference to the programmatic writings of Friedman and Hayek. For my own part I see difficulties with this `both/and' agenda even as I understand the intentions behind it. Let me explain. First, part of neoliberalism's ‘perplexing amorphousness’ – whatever geographical scale or level of theoretical abstraction we are dealing with – stems from a fairly intractable inability to ‘fix’ the term's meanings and real-world referents. Unlike, say, water – which in one of its three states remains water wherever and whenever it is – neoliberalism does not possess stable characteristics. We only ‘know’ that a given phenomena is neoliberal – or has “a more than trivial degree of neoliberal content” (page 403) – because we have selected from among several definitions that other researchers or real-world actors use to specify what neoliberalism is. Because these definitions are multiple – as I noted earlier, critics usually offer between two and several criteria when defining what counts as a neoliberal idea or policy – then `the real world' can only partly function as a ‘court of appeal’ to resolve competing claims as to what is (or is not) neoliberal in degree and kind. Second, even if this were not an issue, neoliberal practices always, as Larner and Peck rightly argue, exist in a more-than-neoliberal context. The context matters because it introduces difference, path dependency, and unevenness in terms of process and outcome: neoliberalisations in the plural. But this then begs the question: what does it mean to abstract from context (again, whatever geographical scale or level of theoretical abstraction we are dealing with) in the way that Larner and especially Peck recommend? Even in Peck's subtle reading of ‘neoliberalism in general’ we confront the possibility that we are simply listing generic – albeit historically specific – characteristics found in multiple geographical contexts. Because the effects of these characteristics can only ever be understood contextually then the suspicion arises that neoliberalism depicted over and above context is a pure archetype: something unreal that **has no consequences or existence in itself**. This, of course, raises the key question of where context begins and where it ends. Phrased differently, it raises the question of geographical scale: at what socially constituted scale(s) does (do) discrete modes of neoliberal policy and practice exist? The answer, as the growing empirical literature shows, is that it very much depends. One of the reasons that critics see neoliberalism as tendentially hegemonic is because it has been `rolled out' by global institutions (such as the World Bank) with the (apparent) power to impose their will on whole countries. But this does not, of course, mean that it is implemented uniformly over space because of preexisting differences in the configurations of state, business, and civil society. What is more, national, regional, and local level actors in various parts of the world have enacted their own neoliberal policies in relation to specific sets of people, places, natural resources, industries, and so on. So even if neoliberal ideas have, these last twenty years, diffused out from globally powerful bodies this does nothing to alter the fact of hybridity and variety that Larner and Peck both discern. My third point, in light of this, is that it is wrong to believe that ‘larger’ geographical scales (for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement area) constitute a more uniform neoliberal landscape ‘overlaying’ more regionally and locally variable ones. The point, surely, is that even global policies and rules ‘bite’ differently all the way from the continental down to the local scales. In other words, ‘difference’ does not begin (or somehow `deepen') at the local scale alone (as implied by Perreault and Martin, 2005). Neither Larner nor Peck suggest that it does, but there is nonetheless the risk that their arguments can be seen to imply that there is a scale or scales where geographical difference ends and spatial similarity begins. As I suggested in the previous paragraph, neoliberalism is ‘impure’ at all geographical scales, meaning that the search for similarities can easily become a formal rather than substantive exercise. The way to avoid this last possibility is to do what critical realists in human geography have been doing for years. Supposing that we can agree on what neoliberalism's defining characteristics are, we start by recognising that it exists in an overdetermined socionatural universe. We therefore acknowledge that it never acts alone – only in a fairy-tale world where everything is privatised, marketised, and commodified would this not hold true. Therefore, when we identify specific variants of neoliberalism we are not examining varieties of a really existing, homogenous genus. Instead, we are doing two things. First, we are seeing how a really existing and quite widespread set of policy ideas are having conjoint effects at specific geographical scales (up to and including the global). In other words, we are examining contingently occurring processes and outcomes that may well have operated differently if the ‘neoliberal component’ had not been present. Second, this means the object of analysis in any given research project is not a mere temporary ‘variant’ of something more enduring and solid but rather a qualitatively distinct phenomenon in its own right: namely, an articulation between certain neoliberal policies and a raft of other social and natural phenomena. Rigorously pursued, a critical realist approach to neoliberalism or any other topic resists the ‘violence of abstraction’: that is, the habit of confusing epistemic discussions about a phenomenon abstracted from its contexts of operation with ontological discussions about its actual behaviour and its material effects. As the now-distant ‘localities debate’ showed, the best critical realist research does not doubt that certain phenomena cover wide spans of space and time. Instead, it insists that such phenomena are likely to be impure at all scales and this impurity must be respected not seen as a deviation from some norm or essence. How does this relate to attempts to compare different variants of neoliberalism? The answer is that critical realists would look for substantial (not formal) similarities in causal processes and contingent similarities in how those processes work out on the ground. In other words, geographical difference matters to critical realists ‘all the way down’ which is not the same as saying that the world is necessarily a patchwork of unlike parts. Critical realists, though not discussed by Peck in his recent work (though further back in time see Peck, 1996), would doubtless approach neoliberalism in the way he recommends. They would identify similarities between neoliberalisations not to suggest that the differences can be bracketed but to suggest, instead, that even with these differences substantial commonalities of process and outcome occur. Equally, though, they would be open to the evidence telling them a different story: one in which the differences make such a difference that the commonalities exist only in name (conceptually) not in actuality. In either case, it would be axiomatic that it is never `neoliberalism' alone that causes anything, but always ‘neoliberalism-plus’ – begging the empirical question of at one point of ‘impurity’ it becomes impossible to use the term neoliberal in any meaningful analytic sense. What is the relevance of all this to the relatively new research literature exploring neoliberalisms and the nonhuman world? In a recent critical review of work by Larner, Peck, and other geographic analysts of neoliberalism, Barnett (2005, pages 9-10) has made the following observation. “For all its apparent critical force'”, he argues, “the vocabulary of ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘neoliberalization’ in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation. In so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors ‘out there’, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation.'' If Barnett is right (and I think he might be) then it is important that the still-young geographical research literature on neoliberalism and nature avoids the consolations to which he refers. In a recent theme issue of this journal on neoliberalism in Latin America – in which several essays examine environmental impacts – Thomas Perreault and Patricia Martin (2005) seem drawn to these consolations despite themselves. On the one side, like Larner and Peck, they deny that neoliberalism tout court exists (only specific versions of it). Yet they also make plenary claims about ‘its' implications for the environment and its governance (page 193). What is the appeal of continuing to talk in terms of **grand abstractions**, even as they are being called into question? One answer is that the `bad' (that is, aspatial) habits of social science thinking continue to affect geographical thinking. As Barnett implies, academic critics are made to **feel important** if the object of their animus appears to be hegemonic, global, and powerful: something that demands urgent critical scrutiny. It is far less glamorous and `sexy' to have constantly to describe ones objects of analysis as multiple, complex, and varied through time and space. As David Harvey (1985, page xi) argued many years ago, spatiotemporal specificity appears to paralyse the generalising impulses of mainstream and radical social scientists (like economists and social theorists).

#### Academics must learn to engage the public’s line of thinking: abstract moralism without addressing how to get our policies passed is useless.

Jeffrey Isaac, Spring 2002. Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=601.

What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left—by which I mean “progressive” faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates—has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing—about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq—continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it—about globalization and sweatshops— is new and in some ways promising (see my “Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement,” *Dissent*, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, **and what the likely costs**, as well as the benefits, **are of any reasonable strategy**. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic—petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of **the vast majority of Americans**, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and **who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives**. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. **It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates** (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating *moralism*; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global *politics*. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in *political* terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism. case in point is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: “Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law.” This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national

Campus Greens, 9- 11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: “vengeance offers no relief. . . retaliation can never guarantee healing. . . and to meet violence with violence breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice.” On this view military action of any kind is figured as “aggression” or “vengeance”; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, “healing” is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response. None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response—or at least any U.S. military response—is simply *defined* as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of *any* military response. It is virtually impossible either to “apprehend” and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the “criminals” in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to “arrest” them. And, finally, while “healing” is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a *political* goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for “social justice abroad.” It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility—these are unmentioned. They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter—the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America’s use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare— which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation—make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation. And yet the left’s reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of “materialism” and evocations of “struggle,” especially on the part of those many who are *not* pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable “anti-militarism” of today’s campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not. This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post–cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post–September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it. As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of “aggression,” but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most “peace” activists would prefer not to ask: *What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime?* What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: **it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals** and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Decision-making based on consequences is best mode for action.

Weiss, Prof Poli Sci – CUNY Grad Center, ‘99

(Thomas G, “Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 13.1)

Scholars and practitioners frequently employ the term “dilemma” to describe painful decision making but “quandary” would be more apt.27A dilemma involves two or more alternative courses of action with unintended but unavoidable and equally undesirable consequences. If consequences are equally unpalatable, then remaining inactive on the sidelines is an option rather than entering the serum on the field. A quandary, on the other hand, entails tough choices among unattractive options with better or worse possible outcomes. While humanitarians are perplexed, they are not and should not be immobilized. The solution is not indifference or withdrawal but rather appropriate engagement. The key lies in making a good faith effort to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of different alloys of politics and humanitarianism, and then to choose what often amounts to the lesser of evils.

Thoughtful humanitarianism is more appropriate than rigid ideological responses, for four reasons: goals of humanitarian action often conflict, good intentions can have catastrophic consequences; there are alternative ways to achieve ends; and even if none of the choices is ideal, victims still require decisions about outside help. What Myron Wiener has called “instrumental humanitarianism” would resemble just war doctrine because contextual analyses and not formulas are required. Rather than resorting to knee-jerk reactions to help, it is necessary to weigh options and make decisions about choices that are far from optimal.

Many humanitarian decisions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda—and especially those involving economic or military sanctions— required selecting least-bad options. Thomas Nagle advises that “given the limitations on human action, it is naive to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem. “29 Action-oriented institutions and staff are required in order to contextualized their work rather than apply preconceived notions of what is right or wrong. Nonetheless, classicists continue to insist on Pictet’s “indivisible whole” because humanitarian principles “are interlocking, overlapping and mutually supportive. . . . It is hard to accept the logic of one without also accepting the others. “30

The process of making decisions in war zones could be compared to that pursued by “clinical ethical review teams” whose members are on call to make painful decisions about life-and-death matters in hospitals.sl The sanctity of life is complicated by new technologies, but urgent decisions cannot be finessed. It is impermissible to long for another era or to pretend that the bases for decisions are unchanged. However emotionally wrenching, finding solutions is an operational imperative that is challenging but intellectually doable. Humanitarians who cannot stand the heat generated by situational ethics should stay out of the post-Cold War humanitarian kitchen.

Principles in an Unprincipled World

Why are humanitarians in such a state of moral and operational disrepair? In many ways Western liberal values over the last few centuries have been moving toward interpreting moral obligations as going beyond a family and intimate networks, beyond a tribe, and beyond a nation. The impalpable moral ideal is concern about the fate of other people, no matter how far away.szThe evaporation of distance with advances in technology and media coverage, along with a willingness to intervene in a variety of post–Cold War crises, however, has produced situations in which humanitarians are damned if they do and if they don’t. Engagement by outsiders does not necessarily make things better, and it may even create a “moral hazard by altering the payoffs to combatants in such a way as to encourage more intensive fighting.“33

This new terrain requires analysts and practitioners to admit ignorance and question orthodoxies. There is no comfortable theoretical framework or world vision to function as a compass to steer between integration and fragmentation, globalization and insularity. Michael Ignatieff observes, “The world is not becoming more chaotic or violent, although our failure to understand and act makes it seem so. “34Gwyn Prins has pointed to the “scary humility of admitting one’s ignorance” because “the new vogue for ‘complex emergencies’ is too often a means of concealing from oneself that one does not know what is going on. “3sTo make matters more frustrating, never before has there been such a bombardment of data and instant analysis; the challenge of distilling such jumbled and seemingly contradictory information adds to the frustration of trying to do something appropriate fast.

International discourse is not condemned to follow North American fashions and adapt sound bites and slogans. It is essential to struggle with and even embrace the ambiguities that permeate international responses to wars, but without the illusion of a one-size-fits-all solution. The trick is to grapple with complexities, to tease out the general without ignoring the particular, and still to be inspired enough to engage actively in trying to make a difference.

Because more and more staff of aid agencies, their governing boards, and their financial backers have come to value reflection, an earlier policy prescription by Larry Minear and me no longer appears bizarre: “Don’t just do something, stand there! “3sThis advice represented our conviction about the payoffs from thoughtful analyses and our growing distaste for the stereotypical, yet often accurate, image of a bevy of humanitarian actors flitting from one emergency to the next.

#### Giroux’s account of oppression doesn’t apply to debate – he overdetermines the cooptation of pedagogical practices

Benjamin **Franks 7**, Lecturer in Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, “Who Are You to tell me to Question Authority?”, Variant issue 29, <http://www.variant.org.uk/29texts/Franks29.html>

Potentially stronger criticisms of Giroux’s text lie precisely in his underlying hypothesis concerning the totalising power of neo-conservatism. Giroux shares with the members of the Frankfurt School, who he approvingly cites, a pessimistic and almost wholly determined account of future social developments, in which the prognosis for alternatives to dominant powers looks bleak. Giroux, like Adorno and Marcuse, fears that we are approaching a one-dimensional future composed of intellectually stunted individuals, who are manipulated by the cultural industries, endorse militarised social hierarchies and engage in relationships conceived of only in terms of market-values. This grim dystopia is subject to continual monitoring by an evermore technologically-equipped police and legitimised by an increasingly subservient, partisan and trivial media. However, whilst Giroux’s account of growing authoritarianism is convincingly expressed, it is potentially disempowering, as it would suggest little space for opposition. It is not simply wishful thinking to suggest that the existing power structures are neither as complete nor as impervious as Giroux’s account would suggest. Whilst the old media of radio, film and television are increasingly dominated by a few giant corporations (p.46), new technologies have opened access to dissident voices and created new forms of communication and organisation. Whilst the military are extending their reach into greater areas of social and political life, and intervening in greater force throughout the globe, resistance to military discipline is also arising, with fewer willing to join the army in both the US and UK.7 Bush’s long term military objectives look increasingly unfeasible as Peter Schoomaker, the former US Chief of Staff, told Congress on December 15, 2006 that even the existing deployment policy is looking increasingly ‘untenable’.8 The ‘overstretch’ of military resources is matched by an economy incapable of fulfilling its primary neo-conservative goals of low taxation, sound national finances and extensive military interventions. Whilst this is not to suggest that the US is on the point of financial implosion, the transition to a fully proto-fascist state is unlikely to be seamless or certain. Giroux’s preferred form of resistance is radical education. The photographs from Abu Ghraib were iconic not just in their encapsulation of proto-fascism, but in their public pedagogic role. Their prominence highlighted the many different sites of interpretation, as Giroux rightly stresses, there is no single way to interpret a photograph, however potent the depiction. The ability to interpret an image requires an ongoing process by a critical citizenry capable of identifying the methods by which a picture’s meanings are constructed (p. 135). Giroux’s critical pedagogy overtly borrows from Adorno’s essay ‘Education After Auschwitz’, and proposes “modes of education that produce critical, engaging and free minds” (p. 141). But herein lies one of the flaws with the text: Giroux never spells out what sorts of existing institutions and social practices are practical models of this critical pedagogy. Thus, he does not indicate what methods he finds appropriate in resisting the proto-fascist onslaught nor how merely interpreting images critically would fundamentally contest hierarchical power-relationships. Questions arise as to the adequacy of his response to the totalising threat he identifies in the main section of the book. Clearly existing academic institutions in the US are barely adequate given the campaigns against dissident academics led by David Horowitz (p.143). Giroux recounts in the final chapter, an interview conducted by Sina Rahmani, his own flight from the prestigious Penn State University to McMaster University in Canada because of managerial harassment following his public criticisms of Penn’s involvement in military research (p. 186). But whilst Giroux recognises that education is far wider than what takes place in institutions of learning there is no account of what practical forms these take. Nor does Giroux give an account of why a critical pedagogy would take priority over informed aesthetic or ethical practices. Such a concentration on education would appear to prioritise those who already have (by virtue of luck or social circumstance) an already existing expertise in critical thinking, risking an oppressive power-relationship in which the expert drills the student into rigorous assessment. This lapse into the role of the strident instructor demanding the correct form of radical response, occasionally appears in Giroux’s text: “within the boundaries of critical education, students have to learn the skills and knowledge to narrate their own stories [and] resist the fragmentation and seductions of market ideologies” (p. 155). Woe betide the student who prefers to narrate the story of the person sitting next to them, or fails to measure up to the ‘educators’ standard of critical evaluation.

#### There's no feasible alternative to neoliberalism

Yglesias 11 (Matthew, Contributor @ Think Progress, "What Is The Alternative To ‘Neoliberalism’?," 7/18, http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/07/18/272099/what-is-the-alternative-to-neoliberalism/?mobile=nc)

The fact that Doug Henwood disagrees with me about monetary policy has suddenly turned into a sprawling cross-blog discussion of “neoliberalism” and its discontents. Personally, I find the argument to be infuriatingly devoid of content, but here’s Henry Farrell’s core claim, devoid of examples:¶ Neo-liberals tend to favor a combination of market mechanisms and technocratic solutions to solve social problems. But these kinds of solutions tend to discount politics – and in particular political collective action, which requires strong collective actors such as trade unions. This means that vaguely-leftish versions of neo-liberalism often have weak theories of politics, and in particular of the politics of collective action. I see Doug and others as arguing that successful political change requires large scale organized collective action, and that this in turn requires the correction of major power imbalances (e.g. between labor and capital). They’re also arguing that neo-liberal policies at best tend not to help correct these imbalances, and they seem to me to have a pretty good case. To put it more succinctly – even if left-leaning neo-liberals are right to claim that technocratic solutions and market mechanisms can work to relieve disparities etc, it’s hard for me to see how left-leaning neo-liberalism can generate any self-sustaining politics.¶ Having read this and various people agreeing with it, I have no idea what it is that we’re disagreeing about. Neoliberals on this telling, favor progressive taxation. Non-neoliberals criticize this agenda as not politically workable in the long-term. And they counterpose as their alternative, more workable agenda, . . . what? Kevin Drum offers this effort:¶ I don’t know the answer either. But as I said a few months ago, “If the left ever wants to regain the vigor that powered earlier eras of liberal reform, it needs to rebuild the infrastructure of economic populism that we’ve ignored for too long. Figuring out how to do that is the central task of the new decade.” It still is.¶ So I really, strongly, profoundly agree with this. The moment someone comes up with a workable idea on this front, please sign me up. But if there’s no idea to debate, then there’s no idea to debate. Debating the desirability of devising some hypothetical future good idea seems kind of pointless to me.

## 2NC

### AT: Life Quality

#### Free trade solves poverty globally

**Bhagwati 05** (Jagdish, Professor of Economics at Columbia, New Perspectives Quarterly, “China Shows Trade is Best Route out of Poverty”, Spring)

JAGDISH BHAGWATI |That is exactly right. Liberalized trade, along with foreign investment, has opened up opportunity for the poor across the globe by expanding economic growth. In fact, the great sea change over the past decade has been precisely that the governments of traditionally poor countries like India, China and Brazil now see liberalized trade and investment flows not as a threat but as the opportunity it actually is. This way of thinking marks a profound break with the old prominent ideas of people like Raul Prebisch about the “Third World periphery” being exploited by the “rich center.” As a sociology professor before he preceded (Luiz Inacio) Lula (da Silva) as president of Brazil and changed his mind, Fernando Henrique Cardoso formulated the “dependencia” theory, which said that the “South” was poor because the “North” exploited it to get rich. If a country avoided the “neocolonial embrace,” he thought in the old days, it would be better off.

Governments in the poorer world today have not changed their policies on ideological grounds—“embracing the neoliberal,Washington consensus”—but as a pragmatic response to the need for access to markets, investment capital and economic growth.They did not move to the right, only from the left to the center. Of course, privatization can be corrupted, as it was in Russia’s haste to break with the Communist past. It went from the Politburo to the oligarchs. China, of course, has its problems with corruption. But two decades of high growth that resulted from opening up to the world economy have pulled hundreds of millions out of poverty.

#### Their concerns are disproven by history – the system evolves but doesn’t fail, and quality of life is higher each time

Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, 2010

(Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 41-43)

In truth, **far from being unsustainable**, **the interdependence of the world through trade is the very thing that makes modern life as sustainable as it is**. Suppose your local laptop manufacturer tells you that he already has three orders and then he is off on his holiday so he cannot make you one before the winter. You will have to wait. Or suppose your local wheat farmer tells you that last year’s rains means he will have to cut his flour delivery in half this year. You will have to go hungry. Instead, you benefit from a global laptop and wheat market in which somebody somewhere has something to sell you so there are rarely shortages, only modest price fluctuations. For example, the price of wheat approximately trebled in 2006–8, just as it did in Europe in 1315–18. At the earlier date, Europe was less densely populated, farming was entirely organic and food miles were short. **Yet in** 20**08**, **nobody ate a baby or** pulled **a corpse** from a gibbet for food. Right up until the railways came, it was cheaper for people to turn into refugees than to pay the exorbitant costs of importing food into a hungry district. **Interdependence spreads risk**. The decline in agricultural employment caused consternation among early economists. François Quesnay and his fellow ‘physiocrats’ argued in eighteenth-century France that manufacturing produced no gain in wealth and that switching from agriculture to industry would decrease a country’s wealth: only farming was true wealth creation. Two centuries later the decline in industrial employment in the late twentieth century caused a similar consternation among economists, who saw services as a frivolous distraction from the important business of manufacturing. They were just as wrong. There is no such thing as unproductive employment, so long as people are prepared to buy the service you are offering. **Today**, **1 per cent works in agriculture and 24 per cent in industry**, **leaving 75 per cent to offer movies**, **restaurant meals**, **insurance broking and aromatherapy**.

#### US and global economic recovery now – strong US growth, leading economic indicators, China/Europe/Japan improving

**Doll 9/17/13** (Bob, chief equity strategist and senior portfolio manager at Nuveen Asset Management LLC, "Nuveen's Doll: 'Risk-on' resumes as uncertainty subsides," http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130917/FREE/130919917#)

In conclusion, geopolitical tremors from the Middle East and concerns over Fed tapering have heightened investor anxiety and financial market volatility. However, these anxieties seem to be easing. We believe underlying macro fundamentals for the global economy have not been deflected. The global recovery is gradually gaining traction and starting to broaden. Leading economic indicators and purchasing manager surveys continue to rise slowly and point to potentially better growth ahead. There is increasing evidence that the U.S. economic expansion is developing. Around the world, data suggests the Euro area is starting to stabilize, aggressive reflation has shifted Japan to a net contributor to global GDP, and the deceleration in China seems to have ended. Also, global monetary settings will stay supportive.¶ In our view, the uptrend in the global stock/bond ratio will persist. Investors have just started to reposition out of bonds and into equities. Relative valuations continue to strongly favor equities despite the recent rise in bond yields and forward price/ earnings ratios. We continue to favor economic growth sensitive assets in order to capitalize on our expectations for a strengthening global economy and a shift in investor preferences.

### Neolib Inev – 2NC

#### Even if it’s not inevitable – people think it is and are unwilling to overthrow the system

Hursh and Henderson 11

[David W. Hursh\* and Joseph A. Henderson Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA, Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures, Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education Vol. 32, No. 2, May 2011, 171185]

Consequently, in order to understand the rise and dominance of neoliberalism, we seek to understand the ways in which it has gained and maintained dominance, the way in which it has become seen by most as the only basis on which to make economic and policy decisions. We build, therefore, on Foucault’s concept of governmentality to show how neoliberals have gained power not only through their economic dominance but also through particular discourses and practices that shape individuals and society in a particular way, and use critical geography to examine communities, cities, or countries within particular scales, networks, and hierarchies. Dean (1999), in Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, undertakes a Foucauldian approach, or what he describes as a historical sociology of neoliberal governmentality, in which he engages in ‘an analytics of government that takes as its central concern how we govern and are governed within different regimes, and the conditions under which such regimes emerge, continue to operate, and are transformed’ (p. 23). Besley and Peters (2007) add that Foucault was particularly interested in ‘the history of the ways in which human beings are constituted as subjects’ (p. 6). Foucault’s notion of governmentality is helpful because it leads us to examine the relationship between discourses and material practices, and how neoliberal policies are conceptualized and carried out. Further, it requires us to reconceptualize the notion of the state in several ways. First, the state is no longer limited to the elected government but includes all those who ‘attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behavior according to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends’ (Dean, 1999, p. 10). We are required, then, to examine not only the statements and actions of governmental and corporate leaders, but also those in the media, such as bestselling authors like Thomas Friedman (1999, 2005) whose ideas are accepted and adopted by corporate and political leaders, are echoed in the media, and are seen as ‘the official narrative of globalization’ (Stegner, 2005, p. 54). In The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Friedman (1999) argues that every country must adopt the same economic rules: Making the private sector the primary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing stateowned industries and utilities, deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic competition as possible, eliminating government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks as much as possible, opening its banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership and competition, and allowing its citizen to choose from an array of competing pension options and foreign-run pension and mutual funds. (p. 105) While Friedman never uses the term neoliberalism, preferring instead free-market capitalism, the policies he advances are the same: competition, markets, deregulation, privatization, and the reduction of the welfare state. He argues that globalization requires neoliberal policies and that neoliberal policies support the process of globalization. They are essentially two sides of the same coin: we can no more reject free-market capitalism than we can reject globalization. He concludes: The driving force behind globalization is free-market capitalism the more you let market forces rule and the more you open your economy to free trade and competition, the more efficient your economy will be. Globalization means the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world. Therefore globalization also has its own set of economic rules rules that revolve around opening, deregulating and privatizing your economy, in order to make it more competitive and attractive to foreign investment. (Friedman, 1999, p. 9) Similarly, Leitner, Sheppard, Sziarto, and Maringanti (2007), critics of neoliberalism, write that current reforms are embedded within a neoliberal logic favouring: Competitiveness, decentralization, devolution, and attrition of political governance, deregulation and privatization of industry, land and public services, and replace welfare with ‘workfarist’ social policies ... A neoliberal subjectivity has emerged that normalizes the logic of individualism and entrepreneurialism, equating individual freedom with self-interested choices, making individuals responsible for their own wellbeing, and redefining citizens as consumers and client. Margaret Thatcher’s notorious ‘there is no alternative’seems to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. (pp. 12) Neoliberals, including journalists like Friedman but also ‘economic experts’such as the previous Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, Alan Greenspan, and influential advisors in previous and current presidential administrations, such as Lawrence Summers and Timothy Geithner, have so dominated the public discourse that people are increasingly unlikely to challenge their assertions. Neoliberalism has become ingrained as the rationale for social and economic policies and, as such, is rarely challenged, but accepted as necessary and inevitable: A whole set of propositions is being imposed as self-evident: it is taken for granted that maximum growth, and therefore productivity and competitiveness, are the ultimate and sole goal of human actions; or that economic forces cannot be resisted. (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 30) Thomas Friedman describes neoliberalism as not only inevitable but also as selfregulating, it has ‘its own set of rules’, which, if followed, creates maximum efficiency. Consequently, questions of equality or social justice are irrelevant, markets are seen as both natural and self-regulating and we cannot opt out of neoliberalism any more than we can opt out of the process of globalization. Neoliberalism, then, provides a technical solution to our problems: the market makes the choices for us.

#### The system will adapt in the face of revolution – takes out the alternative

**Kaletsky 10**

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The world did not end. Despite all the forebodings of disaster in the 2007– 09 financial crisis, the first decade of the twenty-first century passed rather uneventfully into the second. The riots, soup kitchens, and bankruptcies predicted by many of the world’s most respected economists did not materialize— and no one any longer expects the global capitalist system to collapse, whatever that emotive word might mean. Yet the capitalist system’s survival does not mean that the precrisis faith in the wisdom of financial markets and the efficiency of free enterprise will ever again be what it was before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. A return to decent economic growth and normal financial conditions is likely by the middle of 2010, but will this imply a return to business as usual for politicians, economists, and financiers? Although globalization will continue and many parts of the world will gradually regain their prosperity of the precrisis period, the traumatic effects of 2007– 09 will not be quickly forgotten. And the economic costs will linger for decades in the debts squeezing taxpayers and government budgets, the disrupted lives of the jobless, and the vanished dreams of homeowners and investors around the world. For what collapsed on September 15, 2008, was not just a bank or a financial system. What fell apart that day was an entire political philosophy and economic system, a way of thinking about and living in the world. The question now is what will replace the global capitalism that crumbled in the autumn of 2008. The central argument of this book is that global capitalism will be replaced by nothing other than global capitalism. The traumatic events of 2007– 09 will neither destroy nor diminish the fundamental human urgesthat have always powered the capitalist system— ambition, initiative, individualism, the competitive spirit. These natural human qualities will instead be redirected and reenergized to create a new version of capitalismthat will ultimately be even more successful and productive than the system it replaced. To explain this process of renewal, and identify some of the most important features of the reinvigorated capitalist system, is the ambition of this book. This transformation will take many years to complete, but some of its consequences can already be discerned. With the benefit of even a year’s hindsight, it is clear that these consequences will be different from the nihilistic predictions from both ends of the political spectrum at the height of the crisis. On the Left, anticapitalist ideologues seemed honestly to believe that a few weeks of financial chaos could bring about the disintegration of a politico-economic system that had survived two hundred years of revolutions, depressions, and world wars. On the Right, free-market zealots insisted that private enterprise would be destroyed by government interventions that were clearly necessary to save the system— and many continue to believe that the crisis could have been resolved much better if governments had simply allowed financial institutions to collapse. A balanced reassessment of the crisis must challenge both left-wing hysteria and right-wing hubris. Rather than blaming the meltdown of the global financial system on greedy bankers, incompetent regulators, gullible homeowners, or foolish Chinese bureaucrats, this book puts what happened into historical and ideological perspective. It reinterprets the crisis in the context of the economic reforms and geopolitical upheavals that have repeatedly transformed the nature of capitalism since the late eighteenth century, most recently in the Thatcher-Reagan revolution of 1979– 89. The central argument is that capitalism has never been a static system that follows a fixed set of rules, characterized by a permanent division of responsibilities between private enterprise and governments. Contrary to the teachings of modern economic theory, no immutable laws govern the behavior of a capitalist economy. Instead, capitalism is an adaptive social system that mutates and evolves in response to a changing environment. When capitalism is seriously threatened by a systemic crisis, a new version emerges that is better suited to the changing environment and replaces the previously dominant form. Once we recognize that capitalism is not a static set of institutions, but an evolutionary system that reinvents and reinvigorates itself through crises, we can see the events of 2007– 09 in another light: as the catalyst for the fourth systemic transformation of capitalism, comparable to the transformations triggered by the crises of the 1970s, the crises of the 1930s, and the Napoleonic Wars of 1803– 15. Hence the title of this book.

### Neolib Sustainable – 2NC

#### Markets solve scarcity

Worstall ‘12

Tim, Senior Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, and one of the global experts on the metal scandium, one of the rare earths. His book, Chasing Rainbows, on the economics of climate change, is available at Amazon, “Infinite growth on a finite planet? Easy-peasy!,” <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/timworstall/100017248/infinite-growth-on-a-finite-planet-easy-peasy/>, AM

So, using GDP, can we have infinite economic growth on a finite planet by just making ever more things? No, clearly, we cannot: there is a limit to the number of atoms available to us. But that's not actually what we're measuring in GDP: we're not measuring the amount, tonnage (it was the Soviets who measured that), volume or even number of things that are made. We are measuring the value. So, is there a limit to the amount of value that we can add? A useful way of thinking about technological advance is that it offers us either better ways of doing old things or the opportunity to do entirely new things. Either of which can also be described as the ability to **add** more **value.** Which leads us to the conclusion that **as long as technology keeps advancing** then **we** **can continue to add** more **value and thus we can continue to have more economic growth**. Strange as it may seem, this explanation built purely on standard neoclassical economics is exactly the same as the diagnosis that Herman Daly gives us in ecological economics. He tells us that we face real and imminent resource constraints (I don't agree, but let's go with his argumenent) and that thus we can have no more quantitative growth. This "quantitative" is the same as the above "more stuff". Daly also talks about qualitative growth. The "qualitative" is equal to the "add more value" and I suspect the only reason Daly doesn't say so is that he wants to be able to define what is valuable for people: you know the sort of thing, more walking in forests, more digging our own veg patches, rousing choruses of Kumbaya, as opposed to the neoclassical method of measuring value, which is what you, each and individually, value. Walks in the woods are just fine but so are steaks, excessive booze and even Simon Cowell. Whatever floats your boat. As an example, let's have a glimspe of an extreme form of Daly's "steady-state economy". This is one where resources from the environment are taken only at the rate that that environment can support. Renewables are used only at the rate at which they can be renewed. We're not chewing up mountains to make copper: we're only recycling that copper we've already got. Is economic growth possible here? Yes, obviously it is. For while we've got limited resources to play with, it is still always open to us to find new ways to add value to them. To be silly about it, we've got 1 million tonnes of copper and that's it. We use that copper to make paperweights. Then we learn how to make copper into computer motherboards and we recycle all paperweights into computers. We value the computers more than the paperweights: we've just had GDP growth, we've just had economic growth, with **no increase in** the **consumption** of resources. Even in this steady-state economy therefore, even one in which everything is recycled, we can still have economic growth through advancing technology. This advancing technology is known as an increase in total factor productivity (TFP). What we'd like to know next is how much limiting ourselves to only this type of growth is going to limit total growth. Bob Solow once worked out that **80 per cent of the economic growth in 20th-century market economies came from TFP growth.** Only 20 per cent came from more resource use: in the socialist economies there was no TFP growth, and all growth came from greater resource use. So we can indeed have quite a lot of economic growth even in the greenest of economies, can we not? How do we make sure that we get that right kind of growth, one that doesn't chew up those natural resources which are a constraint? The logical answer here is to set up a committee of people to study which resources are constrained. We can then charge people higher prices for trying to use them: this will encourage them to either use other, unconstrained, resources or to figure out ways to achieve the same goals with fewer of our limited resources. Sounds like a plan – and, amazingly, we've already got that committee and that method of charging higher prices**.** It's called "the market**",** which is really an abstraction, one we must be careful not to reify, but a useful one all the same. It's really just all humans-as-producers interacting with all humans-as-consumers. If the producers find a resource more difficult to find, then they'll be less willing to do so; prices rise and consumers use less of it.

### Alt Fails – 2NC

#### Their explanation is flawed – a focus on neoliberalism detracts from attention to complex details.

**Larner 3** (Wendy, Professor of Human Geography and Sociology, Research Director for the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law, University of Bristol, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, volume 21, “Neoliberalism?” p. 509-510)

At the most general level, neoliberalism appears to have usurped globalisation as **the explanatory term** for contemporary forms of economic restructuring. Neoliberalism was understood to refer to the process of opening up national economies to global actors such as multinational corporations and to global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Indeed, sometimes the two terms were linked through the phrase ‘neoliberal globalisation’. This represents an advance over the earlier ‘bulldozer’ readings of globalisation that (perhaps unintentionally) underlined the inevitability of the processes involved. The term `neoliberal globalisation' makes manifest attempts to conceptualise global restructuring as a political project and to identify the actors involved. But little else appeared to be gained. Neoliberal globalisation continued to be understood as a monolithic project emanating from the `ideological heartlands' of the United States and the United Kingdom. The actors highlighted in the analyses were the usual culprits. The differences between processes such as deregulation, privatisation, and marketisation were rarely discussed, and their effects on people and places all too predictable. Neoliberalism, it was argued, is leading to the inevitable decline of democratic processes and to increased sociospatial polarisation. The more that things change, the more they stay the same. This reinscribing of the hegemonic story is even more depressing when we remember the important work of feminists and poststructuralists and their efforts to alert us to the broader implications of our theorising, and more specifically to the effects of the `globalisation script' (Gibson-Graham, 1996; see also Larner and Walters, 2003). These efforts have revealed globalisation as a complex and multiple set of economic, political, and cultural processes with contradictory consequences. Yet, just at the time when globalisation has been shown to be more specific than was previously understood (hence the turn in a wide range of social science literatures to globalisations, globalising processes, multiple globals, and so on), neoliberalism is being positioned as an apparently unified successor term. Moreover, unlike globalisation, neoliberalism operates at multiple scales. Not only is it a supranational project (neoliberal globalisation), it involves nation-state and local (particularly urban) political projects. However, in these accounts of neoliberalism, for all their geographical and scalar diversity, little attention is paid to the different variants of neoliberalism, to the hybrid nature of contemporary policies and programmes, or to the multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques, and subjects. In this context, I have begun to worry about the work which the term `neoliberalism' is required to do in contemporary geographical literatures. In our efforts to make sense of current political-economic events, we have moved from analyses of globalisation to analyses of neoliberalism, but our labels continue to **obscure** the details and complexity of the processes involved. Moreover, the kinds of analyses we are currently developing help to explain just why it is we are seeing neoliberalism everywhere. In this context, it may be both intellectually and politically useful to disrupt current understandings of neoliberalism.

### Heg – 2NC

#### The most dangerous forms of neoliberalism are driven by authoritarians – not democratic states

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In the absence of any kind of hegemonic aura, neoliberal practices have proved increasingly unable to garner the consent, or even the reluctant acquiescence, necessary for more ‘normal’ modes of governance. Of particular importance in the post-2007 crisis has been the growing frequency with which constitutional and legal changes, in the name of economic ‘necessity’, are seeking to reshape the purpose of the state and associated institutions. This attempted reconfiguration is three-fold: (1) the more immediate appeal to material circumstances as a reason for the state being unable, despite ‘the best will in the world’, to reverse processes such as greater socioeconomic inequality and dislocation; (2) the deeper and longer-term recalibration of what kind of activity is feasible and appropriate for ‘non-market’ institutions to engage in, diminishing expectations in the process; and (3) the reconceptualisation of the state as increasingly non-democratic through its subordination to constitutional and legal rules that are ‘necessary’ for prosperity to be achieved. This process, of states reconfiguring themselves in increasingly nondemocratic ways in response to profound capitalist crisis, is what I view as the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism. Authoritarian neoliberalism does not represent a wholesale ‘break’ from earlier neoliberal practices, yet it is qualitatively distinctive due to way in which dominant social groups are less interested in neutralising resistance and dissent via concessions and forms of compromise that maintain their hegemony, favouring instead the explicit exclusion and marginalisation of such groups. However, the global crisis has intensified the crisis of legitimation already confronting various capitalist states – for instance, declining voter turnout and party membership, greater electoral volatility, growing mistrust of the political elite – meaning that authoritarian neoliberalism is simultaneously strengthening and weakening the state as the latter reconfigures into a less open and therefore more fragile polity. As a result, the attempted ‘authoritarian fix’ is potentially a sticking plaster rather than anything more epochal. The question, therefore, is whether the contradictions inherent to authoritarian neoliberalism – especially with regard to the strengthening/weakening of the state – will create the conditions in which a more progressive and radical politics can begin to reverse the tide of the last three decades. As things stand, the crisis has ambiguous implications for radical/progressive politics of the Left, not least because radical politics is often being practised most successfully by radical Right movements and parties. This is the case if one considers the rise of xenophobia and racism in Europe, the Tea Party in the US, or indeed the more general ‘anti-party’ dominance of charismatic figureheads such as Putin in various countries. However, the occupy movements have proved to be a welcome corrective to the pessimism that the above observations encourage (regarding Putin, too, as we have seen in recent weeks). In particular, they have forced onto the agenda a fundamental challenge to the dominant narratives of the crisis, which – combined with the decline of mass political parties and the imbrication of all main parties with a system in crisis – has made the state an increasingly direct target of a range of popular struggles, demands and discontent. This is crucial, because the state and its associated institutions have often been viewed as somehow inherently more progressive and democratic than the ‘market’. As a result, ‘Left’ politics has frequently been guilty of taking the law to be somehow neutral, ignoring in the process how ‘non-market’ social forms have been central to the rise of neoliberalism and thus the growing inequalities of power which characterise the world in w

hich we live. This was expressed vividly in the clearing of Zuccotti Park in New York, which not only displayed clearly (despite the attempts to herd journalists into one part of the park) the brute coercive capacities of state power, but also the denial of the constitutional right to expressive protest in the name of ‘democracy’. However, it is not an isolated case, with justifications of police violence and the mobilisation of juridical power against the occupy and other movements being a routine part of events across the globe (see for example the rather different response, compared to several months earlier, by the Egyptian security apparatuses to the occupation of Tahrir Square in late 2011). In consequence, the occupy movements have exposed the authoritarian neoliberal state to protest and struggle, and its continued delegitimation, from a radical/progressive perspective that continues to affirm the values embodied in notions of solidarity, equality and cooperation. This alerts us in a more expansive way to how inequalities of power are produced and reproduced in capitalist societies, enabling us to consider how other, more emancipatory and progressive, worlds are possible.

#### US hegemony prevents global oppression and prevents more war than it causes – all their impacts assume occasional missteps

Jacoby 11 (Jeff – Boston Globe, graduate of George Washington University and the Boston University School of Law, “The world's best policeman”, 6/22, Washington Post, Factiva)

America may be the world's "indispensable nation," as Bill Clinton said in his second inaugural address, but most Americans, most of the time, are uncomfortable with the idea of US global hegemony. John Quincy Adams wrote long ago that America "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy." As the polls consistently suggest, that isolationist sentiment still resonates. But in Adams's day America was not the mightiest, wealthiest, and most influential nation on the face of the earth. Today it is. The United States is the world's only superpower, and if we shirk the role of global policeman, no one else will fill it. By nature Americans are not warmongering empire-builders; their uneasiness about dominating other countries reflects a national modesty that in many ways is admirable - and that belies the caricature of Uncle Sam as arrogant bully or "great Satan." Nevertheless, with great power come great responsibilities, and sometimes one of those responsibilities is to destroy monsters: to take down tyrants who victimize the innocent and flout the rules of civilization. If neighborhoods and cities need policing, it stands to reason the world does too. And just as local criminals thrive when cops look the other way, so do criminals on the world stage. Nazi Germany had conquered half of Europe and Japan was brutalizing much of Asia by the time America finally entered World War II. If America hadn't rescued Kuwait from Saddam Hussein in 1990, no one else would have, either. If America hadn't led NATO in halting Serbia's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, no one else would have, either. If America hadn't faced down the Soviet Union during the long years of the Cold War, no one else would have, either - and hundreds of millions of human beings might still be trapped behind the Iron Curtain. There is no realistic alternative to America as the world's policeman. It clearly isn't a job the United Nations can do. Can an organization that makes no distinction between tyranny and democracy rein in the world's monsters? As the UN's bloody trail of failure from Bosnia to Somalia to Rwanda makes clear, UN "peacekeeping" offers no protection against predators. None of this is to say that America-as-Globocop is a perfect solution to the world's ills, nor that the United States hasn't made many grievous mistakes in its actions abroad. But as the historian Max Boot argues, "America's occasional missteps should not lead us to abdicate our indispensable role,

 any more than the NYPD should stop doing its vital work, simply because cops occasionally do the wrong thing. On balance, the NYPD still does far more good than harm, and so does the United States of America." To say that America must be the world's policeman is not to call for waging endless wars against all the world's bad actors. Police officers carry weapons, but they fire them only infrequently. The cops' main function is not to gun down criminals, but to suppress crime and reduce fear by patrolling the streets and maintaining a visible presence in the community. Similarly, a well-policed world is one with less combat, not more. The purpose of America's nuclear umbrella and its global network of military bases is not to foment war on all fronts, but to prevent it - **by deterring aggression, maintaining the flow of commerce, and upholding human rights**. We don't do it perfectly, not by a long shot. We don't always live up to our own standards, we sometimes confuse police work with social work, and we are often rewarded not with thanks but resentment. A policeman's lot is not a happy one. It is, however, essential. Our world needs a policeman. And whether most Americans like it or not, only their indispensable nation is fit for the job.

### Movements

#### Global movements are insufficient

**Mayer 6** (Tom, Professor of Sociology – University of Colorado at Boulder, “Review of Michael D. Yates, Naming the System”, Cultural Logic, http://clogic.eserver.org/2006/mayer.html)

16. The disintegration of state socialist economies during the last decades of the previous century has made world capitalism **more dominant than ever**. Nevertheless anti-capitalist struggles continue and cannot be permanently eliminated. Although labor movements are indispensable in any serious effort to transcend capitalism, unions are primarily defensive organizations and usually accommodate to the system. Yates, like Lenin, thinks that revolutionary political parties can represent the whole working class more effectively. He also believes that democratic organization and democratic education can help sustain the anti-capitalist commitments of working class institutions. The author has devoted much of his life to the education of workers, and these opinions certainly deserve respect. Exactly how democratic organization and education can innoculate working class organizations against an opportunistic accommodation with a seemingly impregnable capitalist system remains unclear. 17. The final chapter of Naming the System discusses contemporary struggles for a better world. These struggles include the Brazilian landless workers movement, the revolt of the "poors" in South Africa, the student anti-sweatshop movement and the Teamsters for a Democratic Union initiative in the USA, the Columbian peasant based revolutionary army, and the Maoist rural guerrilla movement of Nepal. Yates considers both the achievements and the disastrous pathologies of Communist societies, and acknowledges that permanent overthrow of global capitalism is still a long way off. He implies, however, that the movements listed above can form the kernel of a sustained international offensive against capitalism. 18. This is **extremely doubtful to say the** **least**. Notwithstanding many sincere efforts to find new beginnings, the highly fractured international left has not yet recovered from the failure and disrepute of its century long effort to construct post-capitalist societies by using state power. Whether state power can take us beyond capitalism remains an open question. The use of state power to build socialism may operate within the polarities of revolutionary tyranny and liberal reform. Some of the contemporary movements discussed by Yates have been short-lived (e.g. the student anti-sweatshop movement). Others are mutually antagonistic in their tactics, strategies, and long term objectives. **These movements** do indicate the ubiquity and irrepressibility of opposition to capitalism, but they **are not harbingers of a global anti-capitalist offensive**.

### Overview – 2NC

#### Trade solves war – economic integration prevents rivalries which result in terrorism and armed conflict globally – that’s Pazner

#### Empirical studies prove the spread of economic interdependence solidifies global peace

Gartzke 5 - associate professor of political science at Columbia University and author of a study on economic freedom and peace contained in the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report (Erik, “Future Depends on Capitalizing on Capitalist Peace,” 10/18, Windsor Star, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5133)

With terrorism achieving “global reach” and conflict raging in Africa and the Middle East, you may have missed a startling fact - we are living in remarkably peaceable times. For six decades, developed nations have not fought each other. France and the United States may chafe, but the resulting conflict pitted french fries against “freedom fries,” rather than French soldiers against U.S. “freedom fighters.” Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac had a nasty spat over the EU, but the English aren’t going to storm Calais any time soon. The present peace is unusual. Historically, powerful nations are the most war prone. The conventional wisdom is that democracy fosters peace but this claim fails scrutiny. It is based on statistical studies that show democracies typically don’t fight other democracies. Yet, the same studies show that democratic nations go to war about as much as other nations overall. And more recent research makes clear that only the affluent democracies are less likely to fight each other. Poor democracies behave much like non-democracies when it comes to war and lesser forms of conflict. A more powerful explanation is emerging from newer, and older, empirical research - the “capitalist peace.” As predicted by Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Norman Angell and others, nations with high levels of economic freedom not only fight each other less, they go to war less often, period. Economic fr

eedom is a measure of the depth of free market institutions or, put another way, of capitalism. The “democratic peace” is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom. Democracy and economic freedom typically co-exist. Thus, if economic freedom causes peace, then statistically democracy will also appear to cause peace. When democracy and economic freedom are both included in a statistical model, the results reveal that economic freedom is considerably more potent in encouraging peace than democracy, 50 times more potent, in fact, according to my own research. Economic freedom is highly statistically significant (at the one-per-cent level). Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels. But, why would free markets cause peace? Capitalism is not only an immense generator of prosperity; it is also a revolutionary source of economic, social and political change. Wealth no longer arises primarily through land or control of natural resources. New Kind of Wealth Prosperity in modern societies is created by market competition and the efficient production that arises from it. This new kind of wealth is hard for nations to “steal” through conquest. In days of old, when the English did occasionally storm Calais, nobles dreamed of wealth and power in conquered lands, while visions of booty danced in the heads of peasant soldiers. Victory in war meant new property. In a free market economy, war destroys immense wealth for victor and loser alike. Even if capital stock is restored, efficient production requires property rights and free decisions by market participants that are difficult or impossible to co-ordinate to the victor’s advantage. The Iraqi war, despite Iraq’s immense oil wealth, will not be a money-maker for the United States. Economic freedom is not a guarantee of peace. Other factors, like ideology or the perceived need for self-defence, can still result in violence. But, **where economic freedom has taken hold, it has made war less likely**. Research on the capitalist peace has profound implications in today’s world. Emerging democracies, which have not stabilized the institutions of economic freedom, appear to be at least as warlike - perhaps more so - than emerging dictatorships. Yet, the United States and other western nations are putting immense resources into democratization even in nations that lack functioning free markets. This is in part based on the faulty premise of a “democratic peace.” It may also in part be due to public perception. Everyone approves of democracy, but “capitalism” is often a dirty word. However, in recent decades, an increasing number of people have rediscovered the economic virtues of the “invisible hand” of free markets. We now have an additional benefit of economic freedom - international peace. The actual presence of peace in much of the world sets this era apart from others. The empirical basis for optimistic claims - about either democracy or capitalism - can be tested and refined. The way forward is to capitalize on the capitalist peace, to deepen its roots and extend it to more countries through expanding markets, development, and a common sense of international purpose. The risk today is that faulty analysis and anti-market activists may distract the developed nations from this historic opportunity.

## Util

### Ethics

#### Ethics are inherently situational. We are forced to make hard choices because we have finite resources and political capabilities. Ethics makes us push the blame onto others to maintain the purity of our intentions instead of taking responsibility

Chandler, 1 – Policy Research Institute @ Leeds Metropolitan University

(David, Human Rights Quarterly 23, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism”)

When intervening for ethical ends there is little pressure to account for final policy outcomes. Whatever happens in the targeted states, under international sanctions or military action, it can be alleged to be better than non-intervention. As both Tony Blair and The Guardian argued in response to the ‘collateral’ deaths of ethnic Albanian refugees from the high altitude Nato bombing campaign in Kosovo: ‘Milosevic is determined to wipe a people from the face of this country. Nato is determined to stop him’(The Guardian, 15 May 1999). The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, although dismissing the idea that there was a Serb policy of genocide, still concluded that ‘The issue in Kosovo was ... whether in the absence of Nato intervention, the Serb campaign would have continued over many years, eventually resulting in more deaths and instability in the region than if Nato had not intervened. We believe that it would’ (UKFAC 2000, para.123). The belief that it would have been even worse without international action provides a hypothetical post facto justification that is difficult to disprove. The discourse of ethical foreign policy establishes a framework of western intervention which inevitably encourages a positive view of intervention in the face of exaggerated fears of non-intervention.

#### The impact is genocide

Mohawk, Associate Professor of History @ SUNY Buffalo, ‘2K

(John C, Utopian Legacies, p. 4-5)

People who believe that they are acting on a plan to solve all of the humankind’s problems think they are on a kind of sacred mission, even when the origin of their inspiration is secular in nature and makes no claim to intervention by a higher power. Although adherents may have only a vague idea about how the utopia will come about or what it will be like when it arrives, utopian movements often stimulate high levels of enthusiasm and a widely shared sense of being a “chosen people” with a special destiny. People caught up in such movements tend to be intolerant of others who are not part of this projected destiny, who do not believe in the same things, and are not expected to share in the future benefits. One reason for the popularity of these movements is that they exalt the importance of the group, praise their imagined superior qualities and future prospects, and urge that, relative to other peoples, they are special and more deserving. This pattern of self-aggrandizement has often proven popular and energizing. It contains a message that others who are not special or chosen are without significant value and may be treated accordingly. This kind of intolerance can result in the denial of rights, including the right to live, to hold property, to vote, or to hold professional licenses, if the inspired group has the power to do these things. A scornful indifference to these unbelieving and unentitled others can manifest as racism and/or ethnocentrism. Such intolerance has been known to lead to crimes against humanity, including systematic acts of genocide.

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. W

hile an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. ## 1NR

#### Everyting 2 No Date )http://everything2.com/title/Computer+and+Video+Games%253A+Games+as+spectator+sports)

At LAN parties, this was always a given - the top players were watched by all during one-on-one matches, even in skirmishes many chose the hero's cameraviews as their prime entertainment. Scenes of players gibbed in midair and others dodging rockets in hallways in order to bludgeon the offender at point blank were relished and awed by all (and still are.) Scripts and videos of national championships (with $30,000 in prize money) are openly available and in high demand, thousands of players train for these tournaments. So why not broadcast them on television?

#### Decisionmaking is a trump impact—it improves all aspects of life regardless of its specific goals

Shulman 9, president emeritus – Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, (Lee S, Education and a Civil Society: Teaching Evidence-Based Decision Making, p. ix-x)

These are the kinds of questions that call for the exercise of practical reason, a form of thought that draws concurrently from theory and practice, from values and experience, and from critical thinking and human empathy. None of these attributes is likely to be thought of no value and thus able to be ignored. Our schools, however, are unlikely to take on all of them as goals of the educational process. The goal of education is not to render practical arguments more theoretical; nor is it to diminish the role of values in practical reason. Indeed, all three sources—theoretical knowledge, practical knowhow and experience, and deeply held values and identity—have legitimate places in practical arguments. An educated person, argue philosophers Thomas Green (1971) and Gary Fenstermacher (1986), is someone who has transformed the premises of her or his practical arguments from being less objectively reasonable to being more objectively reasonable. That is, to the extent that they employ probabilistic reasoning or interpret data from various sources, those judgments and interpretations conform more accurately to well-understood principles and are less susceptible to biases and distortions. To the extent that values, cultural or religious norms, or matters of personal preference or taste are at work, they have been rendered more explicit, conscious, intentional, and reflective. In his essay for this volume, Jerome Kagan reflects the interactions among these positions by arguing: We are more likely to solve our current problem, however, if teachers accept the responsibility of guaranteeing that all adolescents, regardless of class or ethnicity, can read and comprehend the science section of newspapers, solve basic mathematical problems, detect the logical coherence in non-technical verbal arguments or narratives, and insist that all acts of maliciousness, deception, and unregulated self-aggrandizement are morally unacceptable. Whether choosing between a Prius and a Hummer, an Obama or a McCain, installing solar panels or planting taller trees, a well-educated person has learned to combine their values, experience, understandings, and evidence in a thoughtful and responsible manner. Thus do habits of mind, practice, and heart all play a significant role in the lives of citizens. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)