# 1AC

**Plan**

#### The United States federal judiciary should rule that the President of the United States lacks the authority to detain individuals indefinitely.

### Terror 1AC

#### Current US detention policies are collapsing US legitimacy

Vaughns 13 (8/12, Katherine L. JD from Berkley, professor of Law at the University of Maryland, "Of Civil Wrongs and Rights: Kiyemba v. Obama and the Meaning of Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Rule of Law Ten Years After 9/11," Asian American Law Journal, Vol 20.1

As history will recall, in May 1977, former President Richard M. Nixon famously told British interviewer David Frost that "when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal." n163 The Bush administration, taking a page out of Nixon's playbook, used various tactics, apparently effectively, to "dismantle constitutional checks and balances and to circumvent the rule of law." n164 In so doing, the administration took advantage of 9/11 to assert "the most staggering view of unlimited presidential power since Nixon's assertion of imperial prerogatives." n165 The D.C. Circuit's opinion in Kiyemba III, reinstating as modified its opinion in Kiyemba I, is, as I have noted, now governing precedent. That earlier opinion, adopting a view that the government had argued all along, re-characterizes the law pertaining to detainees at Guantanamo Bay as a matter of immigration. Immigration is an area of law where the sovereign prerogative on which an individual is admitted or excluded from entry into the United States is virtually immune from judicial review. n166 The Bush administration long ago adopted the position that judicial review of its detention policies would frustrate its war efforts and its Commander-in-Chief authority, so that efforts to fit Kiyemba within the immigration framework worked to the government's benefit. But, as the Boumediene Court explained, "the exercise of [the Executive's Commander-in-Chief] powers is vindicated, not eroded, when [or if] confirmed" by the judiciary. n167 In 2007, Ninth Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima observed that the rule of law - touted by the United States throughout the world since the end of World War II - has been "steadily undermined ... since we began the so-called "War on Terror.'" n168 "The American legal messenger," Tashima [\*32] notes, "has been regarded throughout the world as a trusted figure of goodwill, mainly by virtue of close identification with the message borne: that the rule of law is fundamental to a free, open, and pluralistic society," that the United States represents "a government of laws and not of persons," and that "no one - not even the President - is above the law." n169 But, according to Tashima, the actions that the United States has "taken in the War on Terror, especially [through] our detention policies, have belied our commitment to the rule of law and caused [a] dramatic shift in world opinion," so that the War on Terror has been greeted internationally with "increasing skepticism and even hostility." n170 Put differently, the United States has shot the messenger - and with it, goes the message, the commitment to the rule of law, and our international credibility. The primary assassin in this "assault on the role of law" is the argument "that the President is not bound by law - that he can flout the Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States as Commander-in-Chief during times of war." n171 Also wreaking havoc on the rule of law is the notion, described above, that the President's actions in times of war are unreviewable, and that the judiciary has no role to play in checking wartime policies - a notion perpetuated by placement of issues like those raised in Kiyemba within the immigration framework.

#### And detention outweighs the alt causes

Welsh 11 (David, JD University of Utah, “Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally

Unfair Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy” University of New Hampshire Law Review, <http://law.unh.edu/assets/images/uploads/publications/unh-law-review-vol-09-no2-welsh.pdf>)

The Global War on Terror has been ideologically framed as a struggle between the principles of freedom and democracy on the one hand and tyranny and extremism on the other. 2 Although this war has arguably led to a short-term disruption of terrorist threats such as al-Qaeda, it has also damaged America’s image both at home and abroad. 3 Throughout the world, there is a growing consensus that America has “a lack of credibility as a fair and just world leader.” 4 The perceived legitimacy of the United States in the War on Terror is critical because terrorism is not a conventional threat that can surrender or can be defeated in the traditional sense. Instead, this battle can only be won through legitimizing the rule of law and undermining the use of terror as a means of political influence. 5 Although a variety of political, economic, and security policies have negatively impacted the perceived legitimacy of the United States, one of the most damaging has been the detention, treatment, and trial (or in many cases the lack thereof) of suspected terrorists. While many scholars have raised constitutional questions about the legality of U.S. detention procedures, 6 this article offers a psychological perspective of legitimacy in the context of detention.

#### Legitimacy is crucial to sustainable and effective US hegemony—judicial review is key

Knowles 9 [Spring, 2009, Robert, Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution”, ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87]

American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity was thought to be inherently unstable because other nations, seeking to protect their own security, form alliances to counter-balance the leading state. n322 But no nation or group of nations has yet attempted to challenge America's military predominance. n323 Although some realists predict that [\*140] counter-balancing will occur or is already in some ways occurring, n324 William Wohlforth has offered a compelling explanation for why true counter-balancing, in the traditional realist sense, will probably not happen for decades. n325 American unipolarity is unprecedented. n326 First, the United States is geographically isolated from other potential rivals, who are located near one another in Eurasia. n327 This mutes the security threat that the U.S. seems to pose while increasing the threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one another. n328 Second, the U.S. far exceeds the capabilities of all other states in every aspect of power - military, economic, technological, and in terms of what is known as "soft power." This advantage "is larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the modern state system." n329 Third, unipolarity is entrenched as the status quo for the first time since the seventeenth century, multiplying free rider problems for potential rivals and rendering less relevant all modern previous experience with balancing. n330 Finally, the potential rivals' possession of nuclear weapons makes the concentration of power in the United States appear less threatening. A war between great powers in today's world is very unlikely. n331 These factors make the current system much more stable, peaceful and durable than the past multi-polar and bipolar systems in which the United States operated for all of its history until 1991. The lack of balancing means that the United States, and by extension the executive branch, faces much weaker external constraints on its exercise of power than in the past. n332 Therefore, the internal processes of the U.S. matter now more than any other nations' have in history. n333 And it is these internal processes, as much as external developments, that will determine the durability of American unipolarity. As one realist scholar has argued, the U.S. can best ensure the [\*141] stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that its predominance appears legitimate. n334 Hegemonic orders take on hierarchical characteristics, with the preeminent power having denser political ties with other nations than in a unipolar order. n335 Stability in hegemonic orders is maintained in part through security guarantees and trade relationships that result in economic specialization among nations. n336 For example, if Nation X's security is supplied by Hegemon Y, Nation X can de-emphasize military power and focus on economic power. In a hegemonic system, the preeminent state has "the power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own interests." n337 The hegemon, in return, provides public goods for the system as a whole. n338 The hegemon possesses not only superior command of military and economic resources but "soft" power, the ability to guide other states' preferences and interests. n339 The durability and stability of hegemonic orders depends on other states' acceptance of the hegemon's role. The hegemon's leadership must be seen as legitimate. n340 [\*142] The United States qualifies as a global hegemon. In many ways, the U.S. acts as a world government. n341 It provides public goods for the world, such as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for open markets. n342 After World War II, the U.S. forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic and political institutions - such as the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank - that remain in place today. The U.S. provides security for allies such as Japan and Germany by maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe. n343 Because of its overwhelming military might, the U.S. possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly" on the use of force. n344 This prevents other nations from launching wars that would tend to be truly destabilizing. Similarly, the United States provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism and confront - even through regime change - rogue states. n345 The United States also provides a public good through its promulgation and enforcement of international norms. It exercises a dominant influence on the definition of international law because it is the largest "consumer" of such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale. n346 The U.S. was the primary driver behind the establishment of the United Nations system and the development of contemporary treaties and institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and private international law. n347 Moreover, controlling international norms are [\*143] sometimes embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather than in treaties or customary international law. For example, whether terrorist threats will be countered effectively depends "in large part on U.S. law regarding armed conflict, from rules that define the circumstances under which the President can use force to those that define the proper treatment of enemy combatants." n348 These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the system by legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it. The transnational political and economic institutions created by the United States provide other countries with informal access to policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to American hegemony, encouraging others to "bandwagon" with the U.S. rather than seek to create alternative centers of power. n349 American hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization - the increasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures - which tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict. n350 The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American constitutional separation of powers is an international public good. The risk that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or decisively in foreign affairs is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides in permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the government. n351 Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive branch agencies in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign policy is made. n352 They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers. n353 Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of particular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of affecting foreign policy. n354 The courts, too, are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as an [\*144] important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S. courts. n355 Empires are more complex than unipolar or hegemonic systems. Empires consist of a "rimless-hub-and-spoke structure," with an imperial core - the preeminent state - ruling the periphery through intermediaries. n356 The core institutionalizes its control through distinct, asymmetrical bargains (heterogeneous contracting) with each part of the periphery. n357 Ties among peripheries (the spokes) are thin, creating firewalls against the spread of resistance to imperial rule from one part of the empire to the other. n358 The success of imperial governance depends on the lack of a "rim." n359 Stability in imperial orders is maintained through "divide and rule," preventing the formation of countervailing alliances in the periphery by exploiting differences among potential challengers. n360 Divide-and-rule strategies include using resources from one part of the empire against challengers in another part and multi-vocal communication - legitimating imperial rule by signaling "different identities ... to different audiences." n361 Although the U.S. has often been labeled an empire, the term applies only in limited respects and in certain situations. Many foreign relations scholars question the comparison. n362 However, the U.S. does exercise informal imperial rule when it has routine and consistent influence over the foreign policies of other nations, who risk losing "crucial military, economic, or political support" if they refuse to comply. n363 The "Status of Force Agreements" ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights and responsibilities of U.S. military personnel and others on U.S. bases throughout the world are typically one-sided. n364 And the U.S. occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan had a strong imperial dynamic because those regimes depended on American support. n365 [\*145] But the management of empire is increasingly difficult in the era of globalization. Heterogeneous contracting and divide-and-rule strategies tend to fail when peripheries can communicate with one another. The U.S. is less able control "the flow of information ... about its bargains and activities around the world." n366 In late 2008, negotiations on the Status of Force Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq were the subject of intense media scrutiny and became an issue in the presidential campaign. n367 Another classic imperial tactic - the use of brutal, overwhelming force to eliminate resistance to imperial rule - is also unlikely to be effective today. The success of counterinsurgency operations depends on winning a battle of ideas, and collateral damage is used by violent extremists, through the Internet and satellite media, to "create widespread sympathy for their cause." n368 The abuses at Abu Ghraib, once public, harmed America's "brand" and diminished support for U.S. policy abroad. n369 Imperial rule, like hegemony, depends on maintaining legitimacy. B. Constructing a Hegemonic Model International relations scholars are still struggling to define the current era. The U.S.-led international order is unipolar, hegemonic, and, in some instances, imperial. In any event, this order diverges from traditional realist assumptions in important respects. It is unipolar, but stable. It is more hierarchical. The U.S. is not the same as other states; it performs unique functions in the world and has a government open and accessible to foreigners. And the stability and legitimacy of the system depends more on successful functioning of the U.S. government as a whole than it does on balancing alliances crafted by elite statesmen practicing realpolitik. "World power politics are shaped primarily not by the structure created by interstate anarchy but by the foreign policy developed in Washington." n370 These differences require a new model for assessing the institutional competences of the executive and judicial branches in foreign affairs. [\*146] One approach would be to adapt an institutional competence model using insights from a major alternative theory of international relations - liberalism. Liberal IR theory generally holds that internal characteristics of states - in particular, the form of government - dictate states' behavior, and that democracies do not go to war against one another. n371 Liberalists also regard economic interdependence and international institutions as important for maintaining peace and stability in the world. n372 Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter has proposed a binary model that distinguishes between liberal, democratic states and non-democratic states. n373 Because domestic and foreign issues are "most convergent" among liberal democracies, Slaughter reasons, the courts should decide issues concerning the scope of the political branches' powers. n374 With respect to non-liberal states, the position of the U.S. is more "realist," and courts should deploy a high level of deference. n375 One strength of this binary approach is that it would tend to reduce the uncertainty in foreign affairs adjudication. Professor Nzelibe has observed that it would put courts in the difficult position of determining which countries are liberal democracies. n376 But even if courts are capable of making these determinations, they would still face the same dilemmas adjudicating controversies regarding non-liberal states. Where is the appropriate boundary between foreign affairs and domestic matters? How much discretion should be afforded the executive when individual rights and accountability values are at stake? To resolve these dilemmas, an institutional competence model should be applicable to foreign affairs adjudication across the board. In constructing a new realist model, it is worth recalling that the functional justifications for special deference are aimed at addressing problems of a particular sort of role effectiveness - which allocation of power among the branches will best achieve general governmental effectiveness in foreign affairs. In the twenty-first century, America's global role has changed, and the best means of achieving effectiveness in foreign affairs have changed as well. The international realm remains highly political - if not as much as in the past - but it is American politics that matters most. If the U.S. is truly an empire - [\*147] and in some respects it is - the problems of imperial management will be far different from the problems of managing relations with one other great power or many great powers. Similarly, the management of hegemony or unipolarity requires a different set of competences. Although American predominance is recognized as a salient fact, there is no consensus among realists about the precise nature of the current international order. n377 The hegemonic model I offer here adopts common insights from the three IR frameworks - unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial - described above. First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives. If the United States were to withdraw from its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its place. n378 The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major war. n379 In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from the public goods it had formerly produced; as the largest consumer, it would suffer the most. Second, the hegemonic model assumes that American hegemony is unusually stable and durable. n380 As noted above, other nations have many incentives to continue to tolerate the current order. n381 And although other nations or groups of nations - China, the European Union, and India are often mentioned - may eventually overtake the United States in certain areas, such as manufacturing, the U.S. will remain dominant in most measures of capability for decades**.** According to 2007 estimates, the U.S. economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025. n382 The U.S. accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would-be competitors. n383 Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have thus far proved premature. n384 [\*148] Third, the hegemonic model assumes that preservation of American hegemony depends not just on power, but legitimacy. n385 All three IR frameworks for describing predominant states - although unipolarity less than hegemony or empire - suggest that legitimacy is crucial to the stability and durability of the system. Although empires and predominant states in unipolar systems can conceivably maintain their position through the use of force, this is much more likely to exhaust the resources of the predominant state and to lead to counter-balancing or the loss of control. n386 Legitimacy as a method of maintaining predominance is far more efficient. The hegemonic model generally values courts' institutional competences more than the anarchic realist model. The courts' strengths in offering a stable interpretation of the law, relative insulation from political pressure, and power to bestow legitimacy are importantfor realizing the functional constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy. This means that courts' treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its treatment of domestic affairs. Given the amorphous quality of foreign affairs deference, this "domestication" reduces uncertainty. The increasing boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the deference gap. And the dilemma caused by the need to weigh different functional considerations - liberty, accountability, and effectiveness - against one another is made less intractable because it becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly grapple with in adjudicating domestic disputes.

**U.S. leadership is key to global stability and preventing great power wars**

Zhang and Shi 11 (Yuhan, 1-22, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lin Shi, Columbia University, “America’s Decline: A Harbinger of Conflcit and Rivalry,” EAST ASIA FORUM, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>)

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, **many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony** and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, **creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts**. However, **as** the **hegemony** that drew these powers together **withers,** so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. **The result will be an** international **order where power is more diffuse,** American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, **and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation.** For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that **a post-hegemonic world would return to** the problems of the 1930s: **regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry.** Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. **Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy.** Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). **A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge,** the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

**Indefinite detention increases terrorism—multiple warrants**

Scheinin 12 (January 11, Martin, professor of international law and former UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism from 2005 to 2011, “Should Human Rights Take a Back Seat in Wartime?” <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/01/11/national_defense_authorization_act_scheinin_interview-full.html>)

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), signed by President Barack Obama December 31, 2011, codifies into law the post-9/11 practice of indefinite detention without charge of terrorist suspects. Martin Scheinin, professor of international law and former UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism from 2005 to 2011, offered his thoughts on the new law and its potential implications for the global counter-terrorism struggle. Casey L. Coombs: First, Mr. Scheinin, could you provide your general impressions of the NDAA’s indefinite detention provisions vis-à-vis international legal standards governing civil liberties? Martin Scheinin: The NDAA builds upon the well-established rule in international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict) that during an international armed conflict combatants, i.e. soldiers of one of the states involved in the war, can be detained as prisoners of war until the end of hostilities. When there is an international armed conflict and when someone is a combatant, then such detention does not amount to arbitrary detention that would violate international human rights law. The NDAA extends the possibility - even presumption - of indefinite detention to terrorism, far beyond genuine situations of international or even non-international armed conflict. And it extends indefinite detention to persons who are not combatants, or analogously situated persons in a non-international armed conflict. For instance, persons who are held to have provided substantial support to terrorism would be subject to indefinite detention. This approach has no support in the laws of war and will unavoidably result in what human rights law considers arbitrary detention and hence a violation of international treaties legally binding upon the United States, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CLC: As a world leader and active promoter of universal human rights, the practice of indefinite detention without charge would seem to clash with U.S. ideals. Could you comment on this contradiction? MS: One of the main lessons learned in the international fight against terrorism is that counter-terrorism professionals have gradually come to learn and admit that human rights violations are not an acceptable shortcut in an effective fight against terrorism. Such measures tend to backfire in multiple ways. They result in legal problems by hampering prosecution, trial and punishment. The use of torture is a clear example here. They also tend to alienate the communities with which authorities should be working in order to detect and prevent terrorism. And they add to causes of terrorism, both by perpetuating "root causes" that involve the alienation of communities and by providing "triggering causes" through which bitter individuals make the morally inexcusable decision to turn to methods of terrorism. The NDAA is just one more step in the wrong direction, by aggravating the counterproductive effects of human rights violating measures put in place in the name of countering terrorism. CLC: Does the NDAA afford the U.S. a practical advantage in the fight against terrorism? Or might the law undermine its global credibility? MS: It is hard to see any practical advantage gained through the NDAA. It is just another form of what I call symbolic legislation, enacted because the legislators want to be seen as being "tough" or as "doing something." The law is written as just affirming existing powers and practices and hence not providing any meaningful new tools in the combat of terrorism. By constraining the choices by the executive, it nevertheless hampers effective counter-terrorism work, including criminal investigation and prosecution, as well as international counter-terrorism cooperation, markedly in the issue of closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Hence, it carries the risk of distancing the United States from its closest allies and the international community generally. And of course these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them for their own political purposes.

**Indefinite detention is the key internal link to recruitment and causes a resource trade off which shatters the ability to fight terrorism**

**Powell 8** (Catherine, Georgetown Law Visiting Professor for the 2012-13 academic year and teaches international law, constitutional law, and constitutional rights in comparative perspective. She has recently served in government on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s Policy Planning Staff and on the White House National Security Staff, where she was Director for Human Rights. “Scholars’ Statement of Principles for the New President on U.S. Detention Policy: An Agenda for Change\*” <http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Alumni_Affairs/Scholars_Statement.pdf>)

Across the political spectrum, there is a growing consensus that the existing system of long term detention of terrorism suspects without trial through the network of facilities in Guantanamo and elsewhere is an unsustainable liability for the United States that must be changed. The current policies undermine the rule of law and our national security. The last seven years have seen a dangerous erosion of the rule of law in the United States through a disingenuous interpretation of the laws of war, the denial of ordinary legal process, the violation of the most basic rights, and the use of unreliable evidence (including secret and coerced evidence). The current detention policies also point to the inherent fallibility of “preventive” determinations that are based on assessment of future dangerousness (as opposed to past criminal conduct). Empirical studies demonstrate that “preventive” detention determinations that rely on assessment of future dangerousness generate unacceptably high levels of false positives (i.e., detention of innocent people).1 Indeed, while the Bush Administration once claimed the Guantanamo detainees were “the worst of the worst,” following minimal judicial intervention, it subsequently released more than 300 of them, as of the end of 2006.2 Because it is viewed as unprincipled, unreliable, and illegitimate, the existing detention system undermines our national security. Because the current system threatens our national security, we strongly oppose any effort to extend the status quo by establishing either (1) a comprehensive system of long-term “preventive” detention without trial for suspected terrorists, or (2) a specialized national security court to make “preventive” detention determinations and ultimately to try terrorism suspects.3 Despite dressed up procedures, these proposals would make some of the most notorious aspects of the current failed system permanent. To the extent such systems were established within the territorial United States as opposed to on Guantanamo or elsewhere, they would essentially bring the failed Guantanamo system home. Perhaps most fundamental is the fact that the supporters of these proposals typically fail to make clear who should be detained, much less how such individuals, once designated, can prove they are no longer a threat. Without a reasonably precise definition, not only is arbitrary and indefinite detention possible, it is nearly inevitable. Moreover, many of the proponents of a renewed “preventive” detention regime explicitly underscore the primacy of interrogation with respect to detainees’ otherwise-recognized rights. A detention system that permits ongoing interrogation inevitably treats individuals as means to an end, regardless of the danger they individually pose, thereby creating perverse incentives to prolonged, incommunicado, arbitrary (and indefinite) detention, minimized procedural protections, and coercive interrogation. Such **arrangements instill resentment and provide propaganda for recruitment of future terrorists, undermine our relationships with our allies, and embolden terrorists as “combatants” in a “war on terror”** (rather than delegitimizing them as criminals in the ordinary criminal justice system).4 Moreover, the current system of long term (and, essentially, **indefinite) detention diverts resources and attention away from other, more effective means of combating terrorism.** Reflecting what has now become a broad consensus around the need to use the full range of instruments of state power to combat terrorism, the bi-partisan 9/11 Commission pointed out that “long-term success [in efforts to pursue al Qaeda] demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense.”5 Thus, in addition to revamping the existing detention program to bring it within the rule of law, the incoming President should work with Congress to utilize this broad array of tools to vigorously prosecute terrorism.

**Al Qaeda is still a major threat—predictions of decline are premature and false**

Sinai 13 (Joshua, JINSA Fellow, Washington, DC-based consultant on national security studies, focusing primarily on terrorism, counterterrorism, and homeland security, 3-11-13, “Al Qaeda Threat to U.S. Not Diminished, Data Indicates” The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs) http://www.jinsa.org/fellowship-program/joshua-sinai/al-qaeda-threat-us-not-diminished-data-indicates#.UbaiWvmsiSo

Conventional wisdom holds that the threat to America posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates is greatly diminished compared to 9/11. Today, it is claimed, al Qaeda is less well organized, with many of its top leaders eliminated, and is so broken into geographically disparate franchises that it is unable to recruit, train, and deploy a specialized cell to carry out a comparable catastrophic attack against America. The fact that no al Qaeda terrorist attacks have been carried out in America over the last two years, while some 20 individuals have plotted to carry out attacks but were arrested and convicted during the pre-incident phases, is seen as evidence that this terrorist threat is decreasing domestically. Therefore, according to this thesis, security authorities should prepare for more numerous and frequently occurring but low casualty attacks mounted by less well-trained and capable homegrown operatives, particularly by what are termed "lone wolves." When a more complete compilation of all the components involved in terrorism are taken into account, however, the magnitude of the threat becomes much clearer and includes a higher likelihood of attempts to carry out catastrophic attacks as well as evidence that al Qaeda continues to recruit and prepare terrorist operatives in the United States. Downplaying the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates also has significant political implications due in part to the more than $70 billion that is spent annually on America's domestic counterterrorism programs (with larger amounts expended for overseas operations), all of which need to be continuously justified as cost effective by Administration planners and Congressional appropriators. Such purported decline in al Qaeda attacks domestically, however, is now being seized upon by those who favor reduced government funding for counterterrorism programs, including weakening the USA PATRIOT Act, to support their position that a reduced threat requires reduced funding and resources. When the trajectory of attacks by al Qaeda and its associates over the years are carefully studied, however, certain patterns recur. Specifically, every time the threat is underplayed, it is invariably followed by a major attack. In the months leading up to the November 2012 elections, the media was filled with pronouncements that al Qaeda's threat had greatly diminished as a result of the elimination of its leadership and the reduced operational role over attacks by what is termed "al Qaeda Central" in Pakistan's tribal areas. While accurate on one level, this did not stop al Qaeda and its affiliates from continuing to launch major terrorist attacks, including that by its Libyan affiliate against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, which led to severe political repercussions for the Administration for its unpreparedness to anticipate such an attack. This was followed by the launching of the devastating cross-border attack against the natural gas facility in eastern Algeria in mid-January by another al Qaeda affiliate in Mali. Thirty-six foreign workers were murdered in that attack, which, again, was unanticipated.Moreover, the fact that a catastrophic attack against America comparable to 9/11 has not occurred over the past 11 years should not suggest that a future one is not being planned. In summer 2006, al Qaeda-linked operatives in London plotted to detonate liquid explosives on board 10 transatlantic airliners flying from the UK to America and Canada. In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi and his associates were arrested for plotting to conduct a suicide bombing attack against the New York City subway system. On Christmas Day, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab failed to detonate plastic explosives while on board an airliner heading to Detroit. Anwar al Awlaki, a former American extremist cleric, reportedly masterminded Abdulmutallab's operation. Awlaki was killed in a drone attack in Yemen on September 30, 2011. The killings of al Awlaki and Samir Khan, another American extremist who had made his way to Yemen in 2009, could well trigger a catastrophic attack by al Qaeda to avenge their deaths.The recent capture of Osama Bin Laden's son-in-law, Sulaiman abu Ghaith, and the decision to try him in New York City, is also likely to trigger a major revenge attack against America. Finally, organizing catastrophic terrorist attacks requires extensive planning, funding and preparation. A terrorist group that feels itself strong will take its time to carefully plan a few but devastating attacks, while a group that regards itself as weak may feel compelled to carry out frequent, but low-casualty attacks to demonstrate its continued relevancy. Some incident databases, such asa recent compilation of data about American al Qaeda terrorists by the UK-based Henry Jackson Society, only account for completed attacks and convictions of those arrested. If such counting is expanded to include other factors, however, then the overall threat becomes much more severe. Other factors, therefore, should include the potential consequences ofthe thwarted attacks had they not been prevented, the number of radicalized Americans who travel overseas to join al Qaeda-affiliated insurgencies, and the extent of radicalized activity by al Qaeda's American sympathizers in jihadi website forums and chatrooms. A more complete accounting of the threat will now reveal that the supportive extremist infrastructure for al Qaeda in America is actually not diminishing and that the purported "lone wolf" actors have actual ties to al Qaeda operatives overseas. We should not, therefore, also be misled into complacencyif catastrophic attacks by al Qaeda do not occur for lengthy periods. Nor so by the comforting but false sense of security that comes with believing that "lone wolf" attacks in the United States are not a product of al Qaeda recruitment and support. It is also possible, nevertheless, that al Qaeda's terrorist planners are considering both types of attacks, infrequent catastrophic and frequent low casualty. This may explain why al Qaeda's propaganda organs are calling on its radicalized followers in the West to take matters into their own hands and embark on any sort of attacks that may be feasible at the moment, but with further surprise attacks of a catastrophic nature still ahead.

**Terrorism goes nuclear---high risk of theft and attacks escalate**

**Dvorkin 12** (Vladimir Z., Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html)

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “**dirty bombs**” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of **panic and socio-economic destabilization**.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that **well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities**.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. **Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible**. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is **comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima**. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. **The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order**.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

#### Extinction – tech and poor response mechanisms

Myhrvold 13 (Nathan, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton, and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>)

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces to be reckoned with. At the same time, a different set of technology trends means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmented. History suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.

**Venezuela Advantage: 1AC**

**US efforts to push Judicial Reforms in Venezuela through the Inter-American Human Rights Commission are hampered by hypocritical indefinite detention policy**

**Bosworth 13** (James, Former Associate for Communications at The Inter-American Dialogue and Director of Research at The Rendon Group, Consultant at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Protecting the IACHR, now make it stronger,” 3-25-13, <http://www.bloggingsbyboz.com/2013/03/protecting-iachr-now-make-it-stronger.html>)

Last Friday, the OAS voted to reform the Inter-American Commission on Human **Rights** (IACHR). Most importantly, the organization managed to **push back** against a set of cynical and **harmful proposals by** four countries - Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and **Venezuela** - that would have weakened the organization and reduced its funding sources. Those four countries ended up isolated from the other 30 voting members of the OAS who remained committed to strengthening the Inter-American human rights system. Sources: AQ, Pan-American Post, IPS, Ecuador wanted the system to be funded only by countries that have signed the San Jose Pact and wanted all the rapporteurs funded equally. This would have eliminated most of the funding for the IACHR coming from the US, Canada and Europe without guarantees of pledges to replace that money. It also would have weakened the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, a particularly thorn in the side for Ecuador's censorship-loving president. Of course, the ALBA criticisms aren't actually about funding. The ALBA countries tried to weaken the IACHR because they are annoyed that any independent outside organizations criticizes their abuses of human rights and free speech. So, good on the rest of the Americas including the US, Brazil and Mexico for working to stop those proposals from being implemented. All three of those countries have all recently faced **tough criticisms** from the IACHR, making it notable that they still defended the commission at this session. From the speech of Deputy Secretary Burns: This is why we actively respond to the Commission even as it raises challenging issues for us – from the death penalty and the human rights of migrants and incarcerated children, to **the status of detainees** at Guantanamo Bay. And this is why we continue to collaborate with the Commission – including its recent on-site visit to immigrant detention facilities in the United States. We do this not because we always see eye to eye with the Commission. We do it because we are secure in our **commitment to democratic principles** and in our conviction that we are accountable to our citizens for the protection of their human rights. We do it because we believe that no government should place itself beyond international scrutiny when it comes to the protection of basic human rights and civil liberties. Strong words that I absolutely agree with. However.... On 12 March the US formally answered questions to the IACHR about the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. At that time, the US lawyer did not provide any timeline for closing the detention center and refused to admit anyone is being held in "indefinite detention," though the fact they are held without trial and without a potential release date seems to be the definition of that term. Though the US defended the conditions of the prison, as far as I can tell, no representative from the IACHR has been allowed to visit. On the issue of immigrant detentions, here is the IACHR in July 2009 based on its visits to detention centers (longer report released in 2011): Finally, the Rapporteurship was distressed at the use of solitary confinement to ostensibly provide personal protection for vulnerable immigrant detainees, including homosexuals, transgender detainees, detainees with mental illnesses, and other minority populations. The use of solitary confinement as a solution to safeguard threatened populations effectively punishes the victims. The Rapporteurship urges the U.S. Government to establish alternatives to protect vulnerable populations in detention and to provide the mentally-ill with appropriate treatment in a proper environment. Here is the NYT yesterday: On any given day, about 300 immigrants are held in solitary confinement at the 50 largest detention facilities that make up the sprawling patchwork of holding centers nationwide overseen by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials, according to new federal data. Nearly half are isolated for 15 days or more, the point at which psychiatric experts say they are at risk for severe mental harm, with about 35 detainees kept for more than 75 days. Four years after the IACHR visited the immigrant detention facilities and spoke out against the practice of solitary confinement, the article in the NYT from 2013 reads just like the IACHR report from 2009. Nothing has been done to respond to those criticisms. The US gets credit for fighting back against the ALBA countries' push to silence the IACHR. The commission provides a needed voice for the hemisphere's human rights. Over the past month, with the purpose of protecting and strengthening human rights in the hemisphere, I've heard US officials praise Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay for listening and acting on the recommendations of the IACHR. The sad truth is that the US praised those other countries because the US hasn't acted on many of the important criticisms that it has received from the IACHR. It's part of the **credibility gap** that the US faces in this hemisphere. Last week, the Obama administration played a vital role in protecting human rights in the hemisphere by leading the effort at the OAS to maintain a strong IACHR. We need to remember that nothing the US says diplomatically at the OAS will be as powerful as the US ability to **lead by example**. If the US really wants stronger human rights protections in this hemisphere, that effort starts at home. The issues raised by Deputy Secretary Burns in his OAS speech - **Guantanamo and immigrant detention conditions - would be great places to start.**

#### Specifically true for a lack US Judicial Independence – sends a signal of appropriate balancing

**Yamamato 13** (Eric K., law professor at the University of Hawai'i William S. Richardson School of Law, BA University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa 1975, JD UC Berkeley School of Law 1978, Race, Rights and Reparation: Law and the Japanese American Internment, 2013, p. 411-412)

For all these reasons, Justice Jackson’s warning still resonates loudly today. How will the judiciary prevent false **executive claims** of national security necessity from becoming a “**loaded weapon**” aimed at the essence of American democracy— the balance of national security and civil liberties? Rasul confirmed the salience of **judicial oversight** of executive national security policies. Yet the Rasul majority failed to articulate the appropriate level of judicial review of executive national security actions that curtail fundamental liberties. Deferential judicial review effectively affords the President a **blank check**. Unyielding scrutiny, however, may unduly constrain the executive. Ordinary judicial review doctrine embraces deferential review for most government actions, giving the President wide leeway to act in the best interest of the country. That doctrine also mandates heightened scrutiny where government action restricts fundamental liberties. It is still an open question whether the national security setting alters this paradigm of judicial review. Varying approaches persist. Some judges and scholars, including former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, argued that the judiciary should play a muted role in reviewing military necessity restrictions of civil liberties during military conflict: An entirely separate and important philosophical question is whether occasional presidential excesses and judicial restraint in wartime are desirable or undesirable. . . . [T]here is every reason to believe that the historic trend against the least justified of the curtailments of civil liberty in wartime will continue in the future. It is neither desirable nor remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in wartime as it does in peacetime. But it is both desirable and likely that more **careful attention** will **be paid by the courts** to the basis for the government’s claims of necessity as a basis for curtailing civil liberty. The laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.1210 By adopting this posture of sharply limited judicial review or almost total judicial deference to executive actions, courts would have a straightforward task. They would simply align with the executive whenever it invokes national security, even when fundamental liberties are significantly restricted. For others, the highly deferential approach conflicts with constitutional mandates. The judiciary’s purpose is to serve as a constitutional check on the two political branches of government, particularly where fundamental liberties are at stake.1211 Without close **judicial scrutiny,** no governmental body exists to assure executive and legislative accountability under law. The consequences of this were seen in the wartime internment cases. A watchful care approach would call for the judiciary to apply a heightened standard of review to executive restrictions of fundamental liberties even during times of war or national security crises, accounting for the government’s security concerns in the court’s analysis of the government’s asserted compelling interest.1212 During the Civil War, the U.S. Supreme Court barred President Lincoln from suspending the writ of habeas corpus if the civilian courts were open and functioning. The Court ruled that the safeguards of liberty [should receive the] watchful care of those [e]ntrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and laws [namely, the judiciary].1213 This heightened scrutiny, or watchful care, approach calls for careful judicial assessment of the government’s proffered security justification for the restrictions. Under this approach, [e]xcept as to actions under civilly-declared martial law . . . a heightened standard of review [should] be applied to evaluate government restrictions of constitutionally-protected liberties ostensibly justified by military necessity or national security. At the same time, the watchful care approach affords the government needed protection for sensitive information or policies. In particular, a **heightened standard of review** confirms the appropriate **competency of federal courts** to adjudicate disputes at the intersection of civil liberties and national security. It **announces a confidence that courts possess** existing tools for ensuring strict confidentiality where warranted. Secrecy has its proper place. But the internment illustrates that the executive branch historically has invoked confidentiality to evade accountability.1214 How will American courts respond today and in the future? Some predict that “blind acceptance by the courts of the government’s insistence on the need for secrecy . . . [will] impermissibly compromise the **independence of the judiciary** and open the door to possible abuse.”1215 Yet, in hearing habeas corpus challenges after Rasul and Boumediene, the federal courts have more consistently scrutinized the government’s justification for indefinite detention, upholding 16 detentions and invalidating 37 others.1216 In his final pronouncement, Fred Korematsu urged that through public and judicial vigilance “the internment can remain a lighthouse that helps . . . navigate the rocky shores triangulated by freedom, equality, and security.”121

**Now is the key time – Maduro is consolidating power in Venezuela – a signal of an independent judiciary is crucial to a smooth, democratic transition**

**The Economist 13** (“Latin America’s Venezuela problem: Ostrich diplomacy, Venezuela’s neighbours studiously ignore the crisis unfolding next door,” 6-8-13, <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21579067-venezuelas-neighbours-studiously-ignore-crisis-unfolding-next-door-ostrich-diplomacy/>)

FOR Latin American presidents of all political persuasions, a knock on the door from Henrique Capriles is a far from welcome sound these days. Not that the leader of Venezuela’s opposition is a particularly boring or obnoxious guest, despite the strenuous efforts of President Nicolás Maduro to portray him as a “murderous fascist”. It’s just that having Mr Capriles round for a cup of tea can get you into all sorts of trouble, as Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos found out to his cost. On May 29th a shirtsleeved Mr Santos held a private meeting of about an hour with Mr Capriles, which provoked a barrage of invective from the Venezuelan government. The Colombian president had “put a bomb under” relations between the two countries, said Diosdado Cabello, the speaker of Venezuela’s National Assembly. Venezuela would have to “review” its support for Colombia’s peace talks with the leftist FARC guerrillas, added Elías Jaua, the foreign minister. To top things off, Mr Maduro said certain Colombian institutions “at the highest level” were plotting with the Venezuelan opposition to inject him with a poison that would lead to a slow death. Mr Santos said this was “crazy”. His foreign minister declined to engage in microphone diplomacy. Colombia and Venezuela, whose governments are poles apart ideologically, have enjoyed a friendship of convenience in recent years after a very rocky decade. The reason for all the huffing and puffing is that Mr Capriles, who came within an ace of winning a snap presidential election on April 14th, has challenged the result in the **supreme court** and is seeking to persuade the region’s governments of his case. Mr Maduro is the chosen successor of Hugo Chávez, who died of cancer in March, five months after being re-elected. He heads a weak administration beset by political and economic problems and desperate to hang on to the international support that Chávez built up over more than a decade of oil diplomacy. With the Chávez charisma gone, the new president’s **legitimacy in doubt** and the money running out, bluster is one of the few resources not in short supply. This week was to have been Peru’s turn to receive a visit from Mr Capriles. But such was the panic in Ollanta Humala’s government at having to decide whether to receive him that the trip was postponed. Peru currently chairs the South American Union (Unasur), one of several regional bodies failing to deal with the Venezuelan crisis. Unasur held an emergency meeting on the eve of Mr Maduro’s inauguration to insist on an audit of the election result. But although the opposition says the partial audit now under way is insufficient, Unasur has failed to pursue the case. Peru’s foreign minister stood down—officially for health reasons—shortly after he had the effrontery to say publicly that a fresh Unasur summit on the subject was being mooted. Most Latin American and Caribbean governments are either ideologically close to the chavista regime, dependent on its oil-fuelled largesse, or simply disinclined to incur its wrath. The Organisation of American States (OAS), whose annual assembly began on June 4th in Guatemala, is bound by treaty to monitor its members’ democratic credentials. But the OAS’s Democratic Charter, launched in 2001, has so far been used only to protect presidents (including Chávez) and to bludgeon puny countries such as Honduras and Paraguay. Brazil, which has the muscle to take on a country the size of Venezuela, seems more concerned with protecting its businesses, which are making billions from trade with its northern neighbour. Ahead of the OAS meeting its secretary-general, José Miguel Insulza, said the “atmosphere” was not conducive to a discussion of the Venezuelan crisis—a diplomatic way of saying no one was prepared to pick up the hot potato. Mr Insulza himself has in the past admitted that Venezuela is in breach of the **Democratic Charter**. Among other things, it requires an **independent judiciary** and guarantees recourse to the inter-American human-rights system. Venezuela has announced that it will abandon the system later this year. The ostrich approach may not work for ever. For one thing, the Venezuelan **opposition’s campaign** across the region is putting presidents under pressure from their parliaments and civic groups to **support democracy**. Second, Venezuela’s **political fragility** and Mr Maduro’s weakness threaten instability which the region may be unable to ignore. Shutting the door in Mr Capriles’ face could prove a short-sighted policy, as well as a shameful one.

#### Venezuelan Stability is crucial to stops Russian Arctic development

**Weafer 13** (Chris Weafer is chief strategist at Sberbank Investment Research, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political, “No business as usual for Russia in Venezuela – paper,” 3-12-13, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring)

Despite assurances from government officials in Caracas that it will be business as usual after the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez last week, his passing will almost certainly lead to the start of political and social changes in that country. The only question is the **time frame**. Chavez's death and the emergence of a new presidential administration will surely have a significant impact on the global oil industry and price of oil, although perhaps on an even longer timeline. According to the BP Energy Review, Venezuela sits on the world's largest exploitable reserves of oil. Chavez's policies have led not only to no significant exploitation of those reserves but have actually directly led to a cut in the country's average daily oil output by one-third in the 14 years he served as president. In 1999, the country produced an average of 3.5 million barrels per day, while the current average output has dropped to 2.5 million barrels. With the right investments, the country may easily support average daily oil output of 5 million barrels and probably higher, according to industry estimates. There can be little doubt that as of last week, Venezuela has become the **most important target location** for foreign oil majors, especially **US companies**. Russian oil majors still have a small advantage, and senior executives from state-owned Rosneft and Gazprom will be eager to ensure good relations with the next administration. But they must know that there is now a limited window to convert promised cooperation with the Venezuelan state-owned oil company, PDVSA, into actual projects. Oil executives from Houston will soon be descending on Venezuela with lucrative alternatives, and **PDVSA**, in dire need of capital investment, **will** surely **be listening to** their **offers**. For Russia, that means three risks. First, Gazprom and Rosneft will have more competition for joint-venture deals in that country. Second, Venezuela is an **easier alternative** to the hostile and unpredictable **Russian Arctic** for US oil companies, which may make it harder for Moscow to attract joint-venture deals. Finally, the prospect of more oil coming out of Venezuela adds to the growth projections for shale oil as a significant longer-term threat to the price of oil, and therefore, to the Russian economy. None of this will be lost on the Kremlin. It means that there will have to be greater urgency to convert promised deals into real projects in Venezuela. At the same time, the Kremlin will want to conclude more joint ventures to **exploit the Arctic**. It also means that the clock counting down to lower oil revenues is now ticking, increasing the need for more urgent progress in economic reforms. The Venezuelan constitution mandates that a new election must take place within 30 days. As it stands today, the current vice president, Nicolas Maduro, is expected to be elected to replace Chavez. Maduro said he intends to stick with the economic and political policies and ideologies of his former boss, but since Maduro is no Chavez, this will be virtually impossible to achieve. Chavez was a hugely charismatic, larger-than-life leader who managed to maintain unity of purpose among the many vested interests in the country. At the same time, he stayed popular with the people even as the economy slid further into trouble. With oil averaging over 110 dollars per barrel last year, the Venezuelan state budget ran a deficit of close to 20 per cent of gross domestic product. Now that Chavez is gone, the soon-to-be-elected president Maduro will come under **increasing pressure** to take actions to start improving the economy. No different from President Vladimir Putin's situation when he took over an ailing economy in Russia in 2000, **the only place** that the new Venezuelan president can get revenue is from **the oil sector**. But after Chavez practically destroyed PDVSA when he fired 20,000 skilled engineers and other workers in 2002, PDVSA will need a huge boost to capital spending and joint-venture partnerships. Although politically risky, Maduro may have no other choice than to ask ExxonMobil and Chevron, two of the US majors that had their local projects nationalized by Chavez, to come back. Venezuela is certainly an attractive option for the world's big oil majors. Recoverable reserves are now put at just under 300 billion barrels, compared to about 265 billion in Saudi Arabia and less than 100 billion in Russia. Most of Venezuelan oil is heavy and more expensive to refine, but it lies only a few hundred meters below the Orinoco Belt. That makes it a lot more attractive than, for example, speculatively drilling in the hostile Russian Arctic while dodging icebergs. The Orinoco Belt is an extremely important natural environment, and the inevitable objections from domestic, regional and international environmentalists will slow any development. But as has happened in similar situations elsewhere, the quest for the prize will almost certainly prevail. Venezuela needs the money. Venezuela has also very likely moved to near the top of the US government's list of geopolitical priorities. The US is set on a course to become **energy independent**, and the International Energy Agency calculates this may take two to three decades based on current trends and with optimistic assumptions for US shale oil production. Such assumptions have always been speculative when it comes to the oil industry. But a more achievable target for the US is to become **regionally oil independent** -that is, to only source its oil requirements domestically and from Canada, Mexico and now perhaps from **Venezuela**. That would allow the US to become completely independent of Middle East oil within 10 years or so. A change in Venezuela's political and economic priorities would also weaken the Cuban economy since Chavez supplied Cuba with almost free oil. That would hasten the inevitable regime change there as well, an extra bonus for Washington. But while such an outcome would be **very favourable for the US economy**, it would **accelerate the game change** already started in the global oil industry with the rapid growth in **shale oil volumes**. No matter how you work the assumptions, the world is heading for a lot more oil supply over the balance of this decade. New major oil production will come from North America, Iraq and the Caspian Sea, where Kazakhstan's giant Kashagan field starts to produce from this year, almost certainly from Venezuela if a new administration takes concrete steps to increase foreign investment and production in the oil sector. This may be the real reason Russian officials shed a few tears at Chavez's funeral on Friday.

**Russian energy development in the Arctic causes escalating military competition**

**Talmadge 12** (Eric – AP, Huffington Post, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity\_n\_1427565.html)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. **They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic**, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and **a slew of potential conflicts**. By Arctic standards, **the region is already buzzing with military activity**, and experts believe that **will increase significantly** in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, **so will the need for policing, border patrols and** — if push comes to shove — **military muscle to enforce rival claims**. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and **30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic**. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle — **has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower**. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. **This is only going to increase as time goes on**." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "**We want to maintain our edge up there**," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in **the Arctic** has never really waned. It **remains very important**." **But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions**, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it **lacks ships** able to operate in or near Arctic ice, **support facilities and adequate communications**. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — **it doesn't have any icebreakers**, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. **The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers**.

**De-escalation is key to prevent Arctic conflicts from going nuclear – draws in major powers**

**Wallace and Staples 10** (Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. \*Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, **and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic**. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, **deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states** – the United States and the Russian Federation, which **together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world** **– converge on the Arctic and have competing claims**. These claims, together **with those of other allied NATO countries** – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, **if unresolved**, **lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons**.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but **no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly**. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

**Extinction – it’s categorically different from all other impacts**

**Bostrom 2** (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why **it is useful to distinguish them from other risks**. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a **whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are** **mere ripples** **on the surface of the great sea of life**. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness **or determined the long-term fate of our species**. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) **A much greater existential risk** **emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and** the **USSR**. **An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might** have been persistent enough to **qualify as global and terminal**. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it **might annihilate our species** or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large

nuclear arsenals. Note however that **a smaller nuclear exchange**, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Supreme court action to restrict detention powers is key

Reinhardt 6 (Stephen, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, "The Judicial Role in National Security," http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume86n5/documents/REINHARDTv.2.pdf)

The role of judges during times of war – whether it be a traditional war or a ¶ “war on terrorism” – is essentially no different than during times of peace: it is ¶ to interpret the law to the best of our ability, consistent with our ¶ constitutionally mandated role **and without regard to external pressure**. Among ¶ the differences in wartime for the judiciary, however, is one that involves a ¶ principle that is essential to the proper operation of the federal courts – **judicial** ¶ **independence**. In wartime, the need for judicial independence is **at its highest**, ¶ yet the very concept is **at its most vulnerable**, imperiled by threats both within ¶ and without the judiciary. Externally, there is pressure from the elected ¶ branches, and often the public, to afford far more deference than may be ¶ desirable to the President and Congress, as they wage wars to keep the nation ¶ safe. Often this pressure includes threats of retribution, including threats to ¶ strip the courts of jurisdiction. Internally, judges may question their own right ¶ or ability to make the necessary, potentially perilous judgments at the very ¶ time when it is most important that they exercise their full authority. This ¶ concern is exacerbated by the fact that the judiciary is essentially a ¶ conservative institution and judges are generally conservative individuals who ¶ dislike controversy, risk taking, and change. ¶ As Professor Stone can tell you, the history of judicial responses to threats ¶ to our liberties in wartime is mixed at best.1¶ Now, in the first years of the ¶ twenty-first century, the threat to judicial independence is **proving particularly troublesome**, and I am not referring just to those demagogues who rush to the ¶ steps of the Capitol to call for legislation stripping the federal courts of ¶ jurisdiction every time they do not like a decision bolstering the Bill of Rights. ¶ Rather, I refer to the chilling reality that, as we enter the fifth year of the socalled “Global War on Terror,” we are faced with a conflict with no projected ¶ or foreseeable end, and, thus, with the prospect that the war-related challenges ¶ to constitutional rights and to judicial independence, which typically subside ¶ with the end of a conflict, will continue unabated into the indefinite future. In ¶ an era of “war without end,” any inclination of judges to lessen the necessary ¶ constitutional vigilance will not only seriously jeopardize basic rights to ¶ privacy and liberty, but also **will make it more difficult to fend off** other, nonwar-related challenges to judicial **independence**, and as a result cause harm to ¶ all of our fundamental rights and liberties. ¶ Archibald Cox – who knew a thing or two about the necessity of ¶ government actors being independent – emphasized that an essential element ¶ of judicial independence is that “there shall be no tampering with the ¶ organization or jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of controlling their ¶ decisions upon constitutional questions.”2¶ Applying Professor Cox’s precept ¶ to current events, we might question whether some recent actions and ¶ arguments advanced by the elected branches constitute threats to judicial ¶ independence. Congress, for instance, recently passed the Detainee Treatment ¶ Act.3¶ The Graham-Levin Amendment, which is part of that legislation, ¶ prohibits any court from hearing or considering habeas petitions filed by aliens ¶ detained at Guantanamo Bay.4¶ The Supreme Court has been asked to rule on ¶ whether the Act applies only prospectively, or whether it applies to pending ¶ habeas petitions as well. It is unclear at this time which interpretation will ¶ prevail.5¶ But if the Act is ultimately construed as applying to pending appeals, ¶ one must ask whether it constitutes “tampering with the . . . jurisdiction of the ¶ courts for the purposes of controlling their decisions,” which Professor Cox ¶ identified as a key marker of a violation of judicial independence. All of this, ¶ of course, is wholly aside from the question of whether Congress and the ¶ President may strip the courts of such jurisdiction prospectively. And it is, of ¶ course, also wholly apart from the Padilla case,6¶ in which many critics believe ¶ that the administration has played fast and loose with the courts’ jurisdiction in ¶ order to avoid a substantive decision on a fundamental issue of great ¶ importance to all Americans. ¶ Another possible **threat to judicial independence** involves the position taken ¶ by the administration regarding the scope of its war powers. In challenging ¶ cases brought by individuals charged as enemy combatants or detained at ¶ Guantanamo, the administration has argued that the President has “inherent ¶ powers” as Commander in Chief under Article II and that actions he takes ¶ pursuant to those powers are essentially not reviewable by courts or subject to ¶ limitation by Congress.7¶ The administration’s position in the initial round of ¶ Guantanamo cases was that no court anywhere had any jurisdiction to consider ¶ any claim, be it torture or pending execution, by any individual held on that ¶ American base, which is located on territory under American jurisdiction, for ¶ an indefinite period.8¶ The executive branch has also relied on sweeping and ¶ often startling assertions of executive authority in defending the ¶ administration’s domestic surveillance program, asserting at times as well a ¶ congressional resolution for the authorization of the use of military force. To ¶ some extent, such assertions carry with them a challenge to judicial ¶ independence, as they seem to rely on the proposition that a broad range of ¶ cases – those that in the administration’s view relate to the President’s exercise ¶ of power as Commander in Chief (and that is a broad range of cases indeed) – ¶ are, in effect, beyond the reach of judicial review. The full implications of the ¶ President’s arguments are open to debate, especially since the scope of the ¶ inherent power appears, in the view of some current and former administration ¶ lawyers, to be limitless. What is clear, however, is that the administration’s ¶ stance raises important questions about how the constitutionally imposed ¶ system of checks and balances should operate during periods of military ¶ conflict, **questions judges should not shirk from resolving**. ¶ The fundamental question, I suppose, is whether the role of the judge should ¶ change in wartime. The answer is that while our function does not change, the ¶ manner in which we perform the balancing of interests that we so often ¶ undertake in constitutional cases does. In times of national emergency, we ¶ must necessarily give greater weight in many instances to the governmental, ¶ more specifically the national security, interest than we might at other times. ¶ As courts have often recognized, the government’s interests in protecting the ¶ nation’s security are heightened during periods of military conflict. ¶ Accordingly, particular searches or detentions that might be unconstitutional ¶ during peacetime may well be deemed constitutional during times of war – not ¶ because the role of the judge is any different, and not because courts curtail ¶ their constitutionally mandated role, but because a governmental interest that ¶ may be insufficient to justify such deprivations in peacetime may be ¶ sufficiently substantial to justify that action during times of national ¶ emergency. **Courts must not**, however, at any time allow the balancing to turn ¶ into a routine licensing of unbridled and unsupervised governmental power.

#### Obama would comply with the court – costs of circumvention too high

Vladeck 9 (Stephen I.. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, senior editor of the peer-reviewed Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Supreme Court Fellow at the Constitution Project, and fellow at the Center on National Security at Fordham University School of Law, JD from Yale Law School, 3-1-2009, “The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity / Legality Paradox,” <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=facsch_bkrev>)

Moreover, even if one believes that suspensions are unreviewable, there is a critical difference between the Suspension Clause and the issue here: at least with regard to the former, there is a colorable claim that the Constitution itself ousts the courts from reviewing whether there is a “Case[ ] of Rebellion or Invasion [where] the public Safety may require” suspension––and even then, only for the duration of the suspension.179 In contrast, Jackson’s argument sounds purely in pragmatism—courts should not review whether military necessity exists because such review will lead either to the courts affirming an unlawful policy, or to the potential that the political branches will simply ignore a judicial decision invalidating such a policy.180 Like Jackson before him, Wittes seems to believe that the threat to liberty posed by judicial deference in that situation pales in comparison to the threat posed by judicial review. ¶ The problem is that such a belief is based on a series of assumptions that Wittes does not attempt to prove. First, he assumes that the executive branch would ignore a judicial decision invalidating action that might be justified by military necessity.181 While Jackson may arguably have had credible reason to fear such conduct (given his experience with both the Gold Clause Cases182 and the “switch in time”),183 **a lot has changed in the past six-and-a-half decades**, to the point where I, at least, **cannot imagine** a contemporary President possessing the **political capital** to squarely refuse to comply with a Supreme Court decision. But perhaps I am naïve.184

# 2AC

## T

## Legitimacy

### 2ac Overview Zhang Long

#### Heg is Good-

#### First- Only heg leads to bandwagonning, deterrence, and stability that can confront the challenges that face the world

#### Second- Heg halts conflict escalation - we solve all scenarios because we prevent the *reason* any conflict goes nuclear

#### Third – decline causes conflict – because of redistribution and the re-creation of trade blocs – that’s all Zhang and Shi

#### Hegemonic decline causes transition wars

Pape 9

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago “Empire Falls” National Interest January 6th http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484]

Most disturbing, whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences.

### 2AC Drone Shift

#### non-unique, - decreasing detainees now

Brookings 8 (Benjamin Wittes and Zaahira Wyne with Erin Miller, Julia Pilcer, and Georgina Druce, December 16, 2008, “The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical Study” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/12/16%20detainees%20wittes/1216\_detainees\_wittes)

As of December 16, 2008, the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba held 248 detainees. This figure represents only a fraction of the 779 who have passed through the facility since it opened in 2002. Of the 558 detainees who remained at the base long enough to go through the CSRT process, 330 have been transferred or released. Over that same time period, 20 additional detainees have arrived at Guantánamo. Fourteen of these came in September 2006, when the CIA transferred the so-called high-value detainees, whom it had previously held for interrogation in its secret detention program overseas; six additional detainees arrived between March 2007 and March 2008.21 Our calculations concerning the current population have a small but real margin of error, described below in our discussion of sources and methods.

#### Previous rulings non-unique

Vladeck 12 (10/01/12, Professor Stephen I. Vladeck of the Washington College of Law at American University, “Detention Policies: What Role for Judicial Review?”, <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/detention_policies_what_role_for_judicial_review/>)

The short chapter that follows aims to take Judge Brown’s suggestion seriously. As I explain, although Judge Brown is clearly correct that judicial review has affected the size of the detainee populations within the territorial United States and at Guantanamo, it does not even remotely follow that the jurisprudence of the past decade has precipitated a shift away from detention and toward targeted killings. To the contrary, the jurisprudence of Judge Brown’s own court has simultaneously (1) left the government with far greater detention authority than might otherwise be apparent where noncitizens outside the United States are concerned; and (2) for better or worse, added a semblance of legitimacy to a regime that had previously and repeatedly been decried as lawless. And in cases where judicial review prompted the government to release those against whom it had insufficient evidence, the effects of such review can only be seen as salutary. Thus, at the end of a decade where not a single U.S. military detainee was freed by order of a federal judge, it is more than a little ironic for Judge Brown to identify “take no prisoners” as Boumediene’s true legacy.

#### No link uniqueness- we use drones when capturing is impossible now- and there wouldn’t be a shift

Robert Chesney 11, Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the UT School of Law as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow at Brookings, "Examining the Evidence of a Detention-Drone Strike Tradeoff", October 17, www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10/examining-the-evidence-of-a-detention-drone-strike-tradeoff/

Yesterday Jack linked to this piece by Noah Feldman, which among other things advances the argument that the Obama administration has resorted to drone strikes at least in part in order to avoid having to grapple with the legal and political problems associated with military detention:¶ Guantanamo is still open, in part because Congress put obstacles in the way. Instead of detaining new terror suspects there, however, Obama vastly expanded the tactic of targeting them, with eight times more drone strikes in his first year than in all of Bush’s time in office.¶ Is there truly a detention-drone strike tradeoff, such that the Obama administration favors killing rather than capturing? As an initial matter, the numbers quoted above aren’t correct according to the New America Foundation database of drone strikes in Pakistan, 2008 saw a total of 33 strikes, while in 2009 there were 53 (51 subsequent to President Obama’s inauguration). Of course, you can recapture something close to the same point conveyed in the quote by looking instead to the full number of strikes conducted under Bush and Obama, respectively. There were relatively few drone strikes prior to 2008, after all, while the numbers jump to 118 for 2010 and at least 60 this year (plus an emerging Yemen drone strike campaign). But what does all this really prove?¶ Not much, I think. Most if not all of the difference in drone strike rates can be accounted for by specific policy decisions relating to the quantity of drones available for these missions, the locations in Pakistan where drones have been permitted to operate, and most notably whether drone strikes were conditioned on obtaining Pakistani permission. Here is how I summarize the matter in my forthcoming article on the legal consequences of the convergence of military and intelligence activities:¶ According to an analysis published by the New America Foundation, two more drone strikes in Pakistan’s FATA region followed in 2005, with at least two more in 2006, four more in 2007, and four more in the first half of 2008.[1] The pattern was halting at best. Yet that soon changed. U.S. policy up to that point had been to obtain Pakistan’s consent for strikes,[2] and toward that end to provide the Pakistani government with advance notification of them.[3] But intelligence suggested that on some occasions “the Pakistanis would delay planned strikes in order to warn al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, whose fighters would then disperse.”[4] A former official explained that in this environment, it was rare to get permission and not have the target slip away: “If you had to ask for permission, you got one of three answers: either ‘No,’ or ‘We’re thinking about it,’ or ‘Oops, where did the target go?”[5]¶ Declaring that he’d “had enough,” Bush in the summer of 2008 “ordered stepped-up Predator drone strikes on al Qaeda leaders and specific camps,” and specified that Pakistani officials going forward should receive only “‘concurrent notification’…meaning they learned of a strike as it was underway or, just to be sure, a few minutes after.”[6] Pakistani permission no longer was required.[7] ¶ The results were dramatic. The CIA conducted dozens of strikes in Pakistan over the remainder of 2008, vastly exceeding the number of strikes over the prior four years combined.[8] That pace continued in 2009, which eventually saw a total of 53 strikes.[9] And then, in 2010, the rate more than doubled, with 188 attacks (followed by 56 more as of late August 2011).[10] The further acceleration in 2010 appears to stem at least in part from a meeting in October 2009 during which President Obama granted a CIA request both for more drones and for permission to extend drone operations into areas of Pakistan’s FATA that previously had been off limits or at least discouraged.[11] ¶ There is an additional reason to doubt that the number of drone strikes tells us much about a potential detention/targeting tradeoff: most of these strikes involved circumstances in which there was no feasible option for capturing the target. These strikes are concentrated in the FATA region, after all. ¶ Having said all that: it does not follow that there is no detention-targeting tradeoff at work. I’m just saying that drone strikes in the FATA typically should not be understood in that way (though there might be limited exceptions where a capture raid could have been feasible). Where else to look, then, for evidence of a detention/targeting tradeoff?¶ Bear in mind that it is not as if we can simply assume that the same number of targets emerge in the same locations and circumstances each year, enabling an apples-to-apples comparison. But set that aside.¶ First, consider locations that (i) are outside Afghanistan (since we obviously still do conduct detention ops for new captures there) and (ii) entail host-state government control over the relevant territory plus a willingness either to enable us to conduct our own ops on their territory or to simply effectuate captures themselves and then turn the person(s) over to us. This is how most GTMO detainees captured outside Afghanistan ended up at GTMO. Think Bosnia with respect to the Boumediene petitioners, Pakistan’s non-FATA regions, and a variety of African and Asian states where such conditions obtained in years past. In such locations, we seem to be using neither drones nor detention. Rather, we either are relying on host-state intervention or we are limiting ourselves to surveillance. Very hard to know how much of each might be going on, of course. If it is occurring often, moreover, it might reflect a decline in host-state willingness to cooperate with us (in light of increased domestic and diplomatic pressure from being seen to be responsible for funneling someone into our hands, and the backdrop understanding that, in the age of wikileaks, we simply can’t promise credibly that such cooperation will be kept secret). In any event, this tradeoff is not about detention versus targeting, but something much more complex and difficult to measure.

#### Strikes now

McClatchy 13 (May 23, Lesley Clark and Jonathan S. Landay | McClatchy Washington Bureau

“Obama speech suggests possible expansion of drone killings”

www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/23/192081/obama-promises-anew-to-transfer.html#storylink=cpy)

But Obama’s speech appeared to expand those who are targeted in drone strikes and other undisclosed “lethal actions” in apparent anticipation of an overhaul of the 2001 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force against al Qaida and allied groups that supported the 9/11 attacks on the United States. In every previous speech, interview and congressional testimony, Obama and his top aides have said that drone strikes are restricted to killing confirmed “senior operational leaders of al Qaida and associated forces” plotting imminent violent attacks against the United States. But Obama dropped that wording Thursday, making no reference at all to senior operational leaders. While saying that the United States is at war with al Qaida and its associated forces, he used a variety of descriptions of potential targets, from “those who want to kill us” and “terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat” to “all potential terrorist targets.” The previous wording also was absent from a fact sheet distributed by the White House. Targeted killings outside of “areas of active hostilities,” it said, could be used against “a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the forces that organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks.” The preconditions for targeted killings set out by Obama and the fact sheet appear to correspond to the findings of a McClatchy review published in April of U.S. intelligence reports that showed the CIA killed hundreds of lower-level suspected Afghan, Pakistani and unidentified “other” militants in scores of drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal are during the height of the operations in 2010-11. Nearly 4,000 people are estimated to have died in U.S. drone strikes since 2004, the vast majority if them conducted by the CIA in Pakistan’s tribal area bordering Afghanistan. The fact sheet also said that those who can be killed must pose a “continuing and imminent threat” to “U.S. persons,” setting no geographic limits. Previous administration statements have referred to imminent threats to the United States – the homeland or its interests. “They appear to be broadening the potential target set,” said Christopher Swift, an international legal expert who teaches national security studies at Georgetown University and closely follows the targeted killing issue.

#### Not an alt cause – our evidence indicates that overturning indefinite detention is SUFFICIENT to solve the aff – its seen as changing the deference trend – that’s Martin and Reinhardt and it’s the key internal to hearts and minds - spaulding

#### Drone arms race inevitable

USA Today 13

(1/9, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/08/experts-drones-basis-for-new-global-arms-race/1819091/, “Experts: Drones basis for new global arms race”, AB)

The success of U.S. drones in Iraq and Afghanistan has triggered a global arms race, raising concerns the remotely piloted aircraft could fall into unfriendly hands, military experts say. The number of countries that have acquired or developed drones expanded to more than 75, up from about 40 in 2005, according to the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress. Iran and China are among the countries that have fielded their own systems. "People have seen the successes we've had," said Lt. Gen. Larry James, the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The U.S. military has used drones extensively in Afghanistan, primarily to watch over enemy targets. Armed drones have been used to target terrorist leaders with missiles that are fired from miles away.

### Rendition

#### Plan’s precedent solves—deference is the legal justification of rendition

Richards 06 [Nelson, JD Cand @ Berkeley, “The Bricker Amendment and Congress’s Failure to Check the Inflation of the Executive’s Foreign Affairs Powers,” 94 Calif. L. Rev. 175, January, LN//uwyo-ajl]

H. Jefferson Powell has posited that the Supreme Court has all but ceded the creation of a foreign affairs and national security legal framework to the OLC. Indeed, he goes so far as to assert that OLC legal opinions, not Supreme Court opinions, are the first sources the executive branch looks to when researching foreign affairs and national security law. Another set of John Yoo's writings support the validity of Powell's claim: the infamous memos declaring enemy combatants outside the protection of the Geneva Conventions. These, combined with the "Torture Memos," the expanding practice of "extraordinary rendition," and the current Administration's blase response to the Supreme Court's ruling that prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to judicial access, have brought peculiar focus to the weight and seriousness of the OLC's legal authority. In the realm of foreign affairs, the Court has written off its obligation, claimed in Marbury, as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. While it may have reviewed some of the legal premises put forth in the above-mentioned OLC opinions, it has not curbed the OLC's claim to power over foreign affairs. The Court is more than capable of challenging the President. It has the power to send messages to the President, but it has done so only in two narrow contexts: when U.S. citizens are labeled enemy combatants (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ) and when prisoners are held in U.S. facilities (Rasul v. Bush). The Hamdi and Rasul decisions, which amount to piecemeal restraints on the President's freedom to act, accord with the Court's general failure to check the executive's use of power abroad.

### 2ac Overview vs. Heg Bad

#### Heg is good-

#### A) We control uniqueness- Heg has been here for a while and intervention is inevitable – that’s Zhang and Shi - means their impact turns are empirically denied

#### B) We solve all their impact turns- Zhang and Shi evidence indicates that the only way to uphold stability is to maintain the status quo military and leadership structure- that allows for deterrence, bandwagoning, and democracy promotion – checks any backlash

#### We don’t link – this is about US legitimacy NOT unipolarity – stopping doing something messed up is fundamentally different from the kinds of bad heg your ev is speaking to

#### Hegemonic decline causes transition wars

Pape 9

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago “Empire Falls” National Interest January 6th http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484]

Most disturbing, whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences.

#### And we’ll always pursue heg

Shalmon and Horowitz 09

(Dan, Mike, Total B.A.’s, Orbis, Spring)

It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military forces able to project power around the world. Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the global order.24

#### Plus decline causes aggression- triggers the impact

**Snyder 07**

Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations at Columbia University

[Jack “FREE HAND ABROAD, DIVIDE AND RULE AT HOME: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF UNIPOLARITY” (http://www.henryfarrell.net/unipolarity.pdf)]

Plausible as these arguments may be, the opposite case may be equally plausible. States that are under intense international pressure may be especially vulnerable to myth-ridden foreign policies. Hostile encirclements heighten the enemy images, bunker mentalities, and double standards in perception that are common in competitive relationships of all kinds, especially in international relations. 9 Nationalist and garrison-state ideologies are reinforced. Likewise, Charles Kupchan argues that declining empires typically adopt strategic ideologies of aggressive forward defense out of fear that their opponents will discover the truth about their growing weakness. 10 In contrast, diplomatic historians commonly applaud the pragmatism of powerful “off-shore balancers,” whose privileged position grants them the freedom to be selective and fact-driven, waiting upon developments before committing troops. Whether powerful, unconstrained states are more ideological than weaker or highly constrained states depends greatly on their domestic politics, not simply their position in the international system. 11 Krasner’s corollary hypothesis—that powerful or unconstrained states are likely to succumb to an ideology of expansionism—is also an oversimplification. Powerful, secure states have the option to express their ideological values in the world through coercion, but they also have other options. They might choose to engage with the world pragmatically, taking what they need and ignoring the global problems that good fortune insulates them from. Or they might adopt a highly principled foreign policy that increases humanitarian assistance abroad, but eschews empire and declines to meddle in the internal politics of foreign peoples. Finally, they might be tempted by policies of limited liability, embarking on good works and moralistic hectoring abroad, but then heading for the exits when backlash makes costs rise. 12 Simply being powerful says little about whether or how ideology will express itself.

## Venezuela

### A2: Venezuelan Withdrawal

#### Venezuelan denunciation of the Convention on Human Rights means that the OAS’s Inter-American Commission remains the best hope of promoting judicial independence in Venezuela

Biron 13 (Carey L. Biron, Inter Press Service, “Venezuelan Pullout from Rights Pact Called “Deeply Concerning,” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/09/venezuelan-pullout-from-rights-pact-called-deeply-concerning/>)

WASHINGTON, Sep 10 2013 (IPS) - The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) says it is “deeply concerned” over the Venezuelan government’s decision to withdraw from the American Convention on Human Rights, a move that went into effect Tuesday. The Venezuelan government has denounced the four-decade-old convention, which currently covers 23 of the 35 members of the Organisation of American States (OAS), as a tool of U.S. meddling in Latin America. But rights groups warn the move will eliminate a court-of-last-resort option for Venezuelans who feel they are unable to receive a fair judicial response within their own country – an option that remains guaranteed in the Venezuelan constitution. “This comes at the expense of the protection of rights of the people of Venezuela, who are stripped of a mechanism to protect their human rights,” the IACHR, based here in Washington, stated Tuesday. “The Inter-American Commission calls on Venezuela to reconsider this decision … [and] regrets that, despite repeated calls by the Commission and by other international bodies for Venezuela to reconsider its decision to denounce the Convention, the State of Venezuela has not reversed that decision.” The American Convention on Human Rights sets out how OAS countries must guarantee citizens’ human rights. It also empowers the IACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, based in Costa Rica, to monitor and rule on rights-related complaints that have not been dealt with through domestic judicial channels. Venezuela is the third country to formally denounce the American Convention on Human Rights and withdraw from the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction. Trinidad & Tobago made a similar decision in 1998 after the court criticised that country’s use of the death penalty, while Peru tried to do the same the following year. “It is very unfortunate that the Venezuelan government has decided to go through with this action,” Francisco Quintana, programme director for the Andean, North America and Caribbean region at the Centre for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), a Washington-based advocacy group, told IPS. “Yet if the government thought it was going to get away from this international supervision completely, that’s not right – at least with regard to any human rights violations that occurred before Sep. 10.” Indeed, given that Venezuela remains a member of the OAS, the IACHR will maintain jurisdiction to monitor the country’s human rights situation. Further, as Quintana notes, the Inter-American Court will be able to continue hearing cases of alleged rights violations from during the period that Venezuela was party to the convention, from 1977 until Tuesday. Yet critics worry about the potential impact not only on Venezuelans who have suffered abuses but also on the strength of the overall Inter-American structure, one of the world’s oldest pan-regional rights systems. The United Nations warned Tuesday the move could “have a very negative impact on human rights in [Venezuela] and beyond”. ‘Grave backlash’ Tuesday’s withdrawal follows through on one of the last policy decisions made by former president Hugo Chavez, who in July 2012 stepped up complaints that the Inter-American Court was interfering in domestic affairs. Chavez had earlier accused the OAS of supporting a coup against his government. But the final motivation to withdraw appears to have been a ruling by the Inter-American Court in favour of Raul Diaz Pena, a Venezuelan who was found to have been mistreated in prison after being convicted of placing bombs near Caracas embassies. “The Venezuelan government was against the external supervision of human rights issues from an international organ – over the past decade, the Inter-American Court lodged many cases against Venezuela, and the Chavez administration began to view these as political attacks,” CEJIL’s Quintana says. “While the court established that there were clear violations of human rights, many didn’t even take place under Chavez. Some had to do with judicial independence, others with excessive force by the police – a wide range of cases, which offered no reason for the government to become frustrated with the system as a whole. After all, these rights were explicitly protected by the system and the convention.” On Monday, CEJIL and more than 50 other organisations from 14 countries throughout the region derided the Venezuelan move and lamented its broader implications. “Venezuela’s denunciation of the American Convention represents a grave backlash for the protection of human rights in the region,” the groups warned. “Additionally, this denunciation is preceded in recent years by the non-compliance of most of the sentences and measures of protection issued by the Inter-American Court.” Also on Monday, Venezuela’s president, Nicolas Maduro, reiterated Chavez’s charge that the Inter-American system was a U.S. pawn. “[T]he U.S. is not part of the human rights system, does not acknowledge the court’s jurisdiction or the commission, but … the commission headquarters is in Washington,” President Maduro said at a news conference, according to media reports. “Almost all participants and bureaucracy that are part of the IACHR are captured by the interests of the State Department of the United States.” Indeed, the United States, itself a member of the OAS, has signed but never ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, part of a longstanding suspicion of international legal instruments. Yet rights groups are suggesting that Maduro’s criticism underlines an incongruous policy stance. “The Venezuelan government’s attitude is highly contradictory,” Guadalupe Marengo, deputy director of the Americas programme at Amnesty International, a watchdog group, said Tuesday. “On the one hand it is promoting universal ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights and urging other countries to ratify this instrument while, on the other, it is withdrawing from it and denying its inhabitants access to the protection of one of its bodies.”

## Off

### Agamben K 2ac

#### 1. Framework- the role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option

#### Net benefits-

#### First- Fairness- they moot the entirety of the 1ac, makes it impossible to be affirmative

#### Second – Education- Policy education is good- it teaches future decisionmaking

#### 2. K doesn’t come first

**Owens 2002** (David – professor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology **over explanatory** and/or interpretive **power** as if the latter two were merely a **simple function** of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), **it is by no means clear that it is**, in contrast, wholly dependent **on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but **this does not undermine** the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, **it is not the only or even necessarily the** most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a **question for social-scientific inquiry**, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one **theoretical approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### 3. Extinction outweighs

Bok 88

(Sissela, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Rosenthal and Shehadi, Ed.)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical Imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences. Acknowledging such a rift would post a strong challenge to the unity and simplicity of Kant’s moral theory.

#### No biopower impact---US democratic system prevents genocide

Edward Ross Dickinson 4, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, Central European History, Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 34-36

And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable.¶ Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies.¶ In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90¶ Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. ¶ This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91

#### War kills alt solvency

**Linklater 90** (Andrew, Senior Lecturer in Politics – Monash University, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, p. 32)

These theoretical disagreements with Marxism generate major differences at the practical level. It is necessary to conclude that a post-Marxist critical theory of international relations must concede that technical and practical orientations to foreign policy are **inescapable** at least at this juncture. Such an approach must appreciate the need for classical realist methods of protecting the state under conditions of insecurity and distrust, and recognise the importance of the rationalist defence of order and legitimacy in the context of anarchy. It is important to take account of the rationalist claim that order is unlikely to survive if the major powers cannot reconcile their different national security interests. In a similar vein, a critical approach to international relations is obliged to conclude that the project of emancipation will **not make significant progress** if international order is in decline. One of its principal tasks would then be to understand how the community of states can be expanded so that it approximates a condition which maximises the importance of freedom and universality. In this case, a critical theory of international relations which recognises the strengths of realism and Marxism must aim for a political practice which deals concurrently with the problem of power, the need for order and the possibility of emancipation through the extension of human community

#### -- Alt fails – wishful calls for revamping sovereignty do nothing – simultaneous political action is vital to prevent short-term threats to survival

**Lombardi 96** (Mark Owen, Associate Professor of Political Science – Tampa, Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty, p. 161)

Sovereignty is in our collective minds. What we look at, the way we look at it and what we expect to see must be altered. This is the call for international scholars and actors. The assumptions of the paradigm will dictate the solution and approaches considered. Yet, a mere call to change this structure of the system does little except activate reactionary impulses and intellectual retrenchment. Questioning the very precepts of sovereignty, as has been done in many instances, does not in and of itself address the problems and issues so critical to transnational relations. That is why theoretical changes and paradigm shifts must be coterminous with applicative studies. One does not and should not precede the other. We cannot wait until we have a neat self-contained and accurate theory of transnational relations before we launch into studies of Third-World issues and problem-solving. If we wait we will never address the latter and arguably most important issue-area: the welfare and quality of life for the human race.

#### External checks are effective

Aziz Z. Huq 12, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, "Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics)", May 25, www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/400-ah-binding.pdf

Paulson ’ s genuflection and Obama ’ s reticence, I will contend here, are symptomatic of our political system ’ s operation rather than being aberration al . It is generally the case that even in the heart of crisis, and even on matters where executive competence is supposedly at an acme , legislators employ formal institutional powers not only to delay executive initiatives but also affirmatively to end presidential policies. 20 Numerous examples from recent events illustrate the point. Congressional adversaries of Obama, for instance, cut off his policy of emptying Guantánamo Bay via appropriations riders. 21 Deficit hawks spent 2011 resisting the President’s solutions to federal debt, while the President declined to short - circuit negotiations with unilateral action. 22 Even in military matters, a growing body of empirical research suggests Congress often successfully influences the course of overseas engagements to a greater degree than legal scholars have discerned or acknowledged. 23¶ That work suggests that the failure of absolute congressional control over military matters cannot be taken as evidence of “the inability of law to constrain the executive ” in more subtle ways (p 5). The conventional narrative of executive dominance , in other words, is at best incomplete and demands supplementing .¶ This Review uses The Executive Unbound as a platform to explore how the boundaries of discretionary executive action are established. As the controversial national security policies of the Bush administration recede in time, the issue of executive power becomes ripe for reconsideration. Arguments for or against binding the executive are starting to lose their partisan coloration. There is more room to investigate the dynamics of executive power in a purely positive fashion without the impinging taint of ideological coloration.¶ Notwithstanding this emerging space for analys i s, t here is still surprising inattention to evidence of whether the executive is constrained and to the positive question of how constraint works. The Executive Unbound is a significant advance because it takes seriously this second “ mechanism question. ” Future studies of the executive branch will ignore its i mportant and trenchant analysis at their peril. 24 Following PV ’ s lead, I focus on the descriptive , positive question of how the executive is constrained . I do speak briefly and in concluding to normative matters . B ut f irst and foremost, my arguments should be understood as positive and not normative in nature unless otherwise noted.¶ Articulating and answering the question “ W hat binds the executive ?” , The Executive Unbound draws a sharp line between legal and political constraints on discretion — a distinction between laws and institutions on the one hand, and the incentives created by political competition on the other hand . While legal constraints usually fail, it argues, political constraints can prevail. PV thus postulate what I call a “strong law/ politics dichotomy. ” My central claim in this Review is that this strong law/politics dichotomy cannot withstand scrutiny. While doctrinal scholars exaggerate law ’s autonomy, I contend, the realists PV underestimate the extent to which legal rules and institutions play a pivotal role in the production of executive constraint. Further, the political mechanisms they identify as substitutes for legal checks cannot alone do the work of regulating executive discretion. Diverging from both legalist and realist positions, I suggest that law and politics do not operate as substitutes in the regulation of executive authority. 25 They instead work as interlocking complements. An account of the borders of executive discretion must focus on the interaction of partisan and electoral forces on the one hand and legal rules. It must specify the conditions under which the interaction of political actors’ exertions and legal rules will prove effective in limiting such discretion.

#### -- Doesn’t solve the case – impact is short-term extinction – they’re too slow

#### -- Bare life isn’t the root of everything – ignores specificity, far too general, and empirically false

#### -- Alt fails – they view power as top-down – makes resistance impossible

**Hardt 00** (Michael Hardt, Literature @ Duke, 2000, Theory and Event, 4.3, p Muse)

But still none of that addresses the passivity you refer to. For that we have to look instead at Agamben’s notions of life and biopower. Agamben uses the term “naked life” to name that limit of humanity, the bare minimum of existence that is exposed in the concentration camp. In the final analysis, he explains, modem sovereignty rules over naked life and biopower is this power to rule over life itself What results from this analysis is not so much passivity, I would say, but powerlessness. There is no figure that can challenge and contest sovereignty. Our critique of Agamben’s (and also Foucault’s) notion of biopower is that it is conceived only from above and we attempt to formulate instead a notion of biopower from below, that is, a power by which the multitude itself rules over life. (In this sense, the notion of biopower one finds in some veins of ecofeminism such as the work of Vandana Shiva, although cast on a very different register, is closer to our notion of a biopower from below.) What we are interested in finally is a new biopolitics that reveals the struggles over forms of life.

#### -- Can’t advocate the plan – steals all the Aff crushing ground, allows tiny impossible to beat PICs and proves the Aff true

#### -- Turn – political vacuum – abandoning state reforms causes worse forces to fill-in

**Barbrook 97** (Dr. Richard, School of Westminster, Nettime, “More Provocations”, 6-5,

http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html)

I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left posturing of the 'zero-work' demand. In Europe, we have real social problems of deprivation and poverty which, in part, can **only be solved by state action**. This does not make me a statist, but rather an anti-anti-statist. By opposing such intervention because they are carried out by the state, anarchists are **tacitly lining up with the neo-liberals**. Even worse, refusing even to vote for the left, they acquiese to rule by neo-liberal parties. I deeply admire direct action movements. I was a radio pirate and we provide server space for anti-roads and environmental movements. However, this doesn't mean that I support political abstentionism or, even worse, the mystical nonsense produced by Hakim Bey. It is great for artists and others to adopt a marginality as a life style choice, but most of the people who are economically and socially marginalised were never given any choice. They are excluded from society as a result of deliberate policies of deregulation, privatisation and welfare cutbacks carried out by neo-liberal governments. During the '70s, I was a pro-situ punk rocker until Thatcher got elected. Then we learnt the hard way that voting did change things and **lots of people suffered** if state power was withdrawn from certain areas of our life, such as welfare and employment. Anarchism can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

#### -- Conditionality is a voter – creates time and strategy skews, argumentative irresponsibility, and dispo solves

#### -- Perm – endorse the Aff and non-exclusive parts of the alt – solves the links, avoids short-term case impacts. Double-bind – if alt overcomes status quo links, it solves – if it doesn’t, alt fails.

#### -- No impact

**Dickinson 4** (Dr. Edward Ross, Professor of History – University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’”, Central European History, 37(1), p. 18-19)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been **constrained** by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they **did not proceed** tothe next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But **neither** the **political structures** of democratic states **nor** their **legal and political principles** **permitted** such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a **democratic** political **context** they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

#### -- Turn – demanding limitations on war powers reverses power relations and encourages resistance to the state

**Campbell 98** (David, Professor of International Relations – University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, p. 203-205)

Recognizing the possibility of rearticulating danger leads us to a final question: what modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? To be sure, a comprehensive attempt to answer such a question is beyond the ambit of this book. But it is important to note that asking the question in this way mistakenly implies that such possibilities exist only in the future. Indeed, the extensive and inten­sive nature of the relations of power associated with the society of security means that there has been and remains a not inconsiderable freedom to explore alternative possibilities. While traditional analy­ses of power are often economistic and negative, Foucault’s under­standing of power emphasizes its productive and enabling nature. Even more important, his understanding of power emphasizes the ontology of freedom presupposed by the existence of disciplinary and normalizing practices. Put simply, there cannot be relations of power unless subjects are in the first instance free: the need to institute negative and constraining power practices comes about only because without them freedom would abound. Were there no possibility of freedom, subjects would not act in ways that required containment so as to effect order.37 Freedom, though, is not the absence of power. On the contrary, because it is only through power that subjects exercise their agency, freedom and power cannot be separated. As Foucualt maintains: At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provok­ing it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of free­dom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an “agonism” — of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confronta­tion which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.38 The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the “bio-power” discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in Western nations have been increasingly directed towards modes of being and forms of life—such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government—the ongoing agonism between those pratices and the freedom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulataed a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight coun­terparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provoca­tion of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the **“strategic reversibility”** **of power relations**: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the “history of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counterconducts,’” Indeed, the emergence of the state as the major articulation of “the political” has involved an **unceasing agonism** between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective action, **the result** of which **has been** both **resistance to the state** and new claims upon the state. In particular, “the core of what we now call ‘citizenship’ . . .consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.” **In** more **recent times, constituencies associated with** women’s, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) **have** also **issued claims on society**.

#### -- Judge choice: representations are potential, not mandatory. Vote Aff for non-security reasons – avoids the link. Its logical and anything else causes reactionary conservativism.

#### -- Alt collapses

**Milbrath 96** (Lester W., Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Sociology – SUNY Buffalo, Building Sustainable Societies, Ed. Pirages, p. 289)

In some respects personal change cannot be separated from societal change. Societal transformation will not be successful without change at the personal level; such change is a necessary but not sufficient step on the route to sustainability. People hoping to live sustainably must adopt new beliefs, new values, new lifestyles, and new worldview. But **lasting** personal change is unlikely without simultaneous transformation of the socioeconomic/political system in which people function. Persons may solemnly resolve to change, but that resolve is **likely to weaken** as they perform day-today within a system reinforcing different beliefs and values. Change agents typically are met with denial and great resistance. Reluctance to challenge mainstream society is the major reason most efforts emphasizing education to bring about change are ineffective. If societal transformation must be speedy, and most of us believe it must, pleading with individuals to change is **not** **likely to be** **effective**.

#### -- Turn – the Messiah –

#### They cause Messianic politics – causes the worst violence

**Kohn 6** [Margaret, Asst. Prof. Poli Sci @ Florida, “Bare Life and the Limits of the Law,”.Theory and Event, 9:2, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v009/9.2kohn.html>, Retrieved 9-26-06//]

Is there an alternative to this nexus of anomie and nomos produced by the state of exception? Agamben invokes genealogy and politics as two interrelated avenues of struggle. According to Agamben, "To show law in its nonrelation to life and life in its nonrelation to law means to open a space between them for human action, which once claimed for itself the name of 'politics'." (88) In a move reminiscent of Foucault, Agamben suggests that breaking the discursive lock on dominant ways of seeing, or more precisely not seeing, sovereign power is the only way to disrupt its hegemonic effects. **Agamben** clearly **hopes that his theoretical analysis could contribute to the political struggle against authoritarianism, yet** he only offers tantalizingly abstract hints about how this might work. Beyond the typical academic conceit that theoretical work is a decisive element of political struggle, Agamben **seems to embrace a utopianism that provides little guidance for political action**. He imagines, "One day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free them from it for good." (64) **More troubling is his messianic suggestion that "this studious play" will usher in a form of justice that cannot be made juridical**. Agamben might do well to consider Hannah Arendt's warning that the **belief in justice unmediated by law was one of the characteristics of totalitarianism**. It might seem unfair to focus too much attention on Agamben's fairly brief discussion of alternatives to the sovereignty-exception-law nexus, but it is precisely those sections that reveal the flaws in his analysis. It also brings us back to our original question about how to resist the authoritarian implications of the state of exception without falling into the liberal trap of calling for more law. For Agamben, the problem with the "rule of law" response to the war on terrorism is that it ignores the way that the law is fundamentally implicated in the project of sovereignty with its corollary logic of exception. Yet **the solution that he endorses reflects a similar blindness**. Writing in his utopian-mystical mode, he insists, "the only truly political action, however, is that which severs the nexus between violence and law."(88) Thus Agamben, in spite of all of his theoretical sophistication, ultimately falls into the trap of **hoping that politics can be liberated from law**, at least the law tied to violence and the demarcating project of sovereignty.

#### The impact is massive extermination

**Joines 99** (Richard E., Professor of English – Auburn University, “Contretemps: Derrida's Ante and the Call of Marxist Political Philosophy”, Cultural Logic, 3(1), Fall, http://clogic.eserver.org/3-1&2/joines.html)

29. Marxists argue that we are unable to imagine communism before its arrival, but "the someone or something" that follows hard upon the messianic event Derrida speaks of will usher in an opposite unimaginable concept of the political and establish the *rangordnung* of Nietzsche's ancient desires. Derrida's "appeal for an International whose essential basis or motivating force [is] not class, citizenship, or party" ("MS," p. 252) should be read and understood as a threat to any potential international organized around such concepts. Marxists witnessed the actualization of a similar, yet philosophically inadequate, threat in the twentieth century,17 but the new Messiah waited for (without waiting) will **make Hitler and Mussolini look like rank amateurs**. Marxists have the ability to recognize the content of this messianicity, yet they stubbornly persist in the delusion that Derrida is speaking of "something familiar," and that he is not a "class enemy." Certainly, he is not. He is **worse**, and we call him "comrade" at great risk to creating a communist future.

#### -- Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

### NSC Courts 2AC

#### 1. Perm do both

#### Doesn’t solve court action – this is essentially a congress CP – it’s takes the decision out of the hands of the judiciary by creating a brand new court system that’s seen as less credible than squo courts

#### Perm do the counterplan – it’s an example of the way the plan could be done – all federal courts are article III courts

#### Doesn’t Solve Terror -

#### Interrogation techniques benefit from judicial oversight – it’s a strategic benefit to the war on terror – that’s Hathaway

#### AND *Judicial* restrictions are key to effective counterterrorism

Guiora 11 (Amos, Prof of Law @ Univ. of Utah, "Indeﬁnite Detention of Megaterrorists: A Road We Must Not Travel," April, http://johnjayresearch.org/cje/files/2012/10/GUIORA-out.pdf)

Offering modifications or alternatives, such as indefinite detention, to¶ replace existing legal structures\*in¶ whole or in part\*raises a fundamental question: have sufficient controls been created? Although creating¶ alternatives, even if justifiable, is¶ risky, any expansion of executive¶

power\*the net result of Scheid’s¶ proposal\*must be tempered by¶ both independent judicial review¶ and robust congressional oversight.¶ Restraining the executive branch is¶ essential, especially when alternatives are created.¶ When Scheid asked if I would¶ consider commenting on his paper¶ (before I had a chance to read it) I instinctively agreed. My reasons were¶ simple. I first met Scheid when he¶ graciously attended a public lecture I¶ gave at the William Mitchell Law¶ School (hosted by my good friend¶ and colleague, John Radson). His questions were particularly engaging and¶ our subsequent communications\*including Scheid’s insightful and critical¶ blog postings in response to my¶ writings\*have invariably been interesting and thought-provoking.¶ When Scheid explained the article’s thesis I was intrigued, largely¶ because of my own efforts to grapple¶ with how to create alternative legal¶ infrastructures relevant to the post 9/¶ 11 world. As a consistent advocate¶ for the creation of a National Security¶ Court,1¶ I have probed the limits of¶ many of the issues Scheid addresses.¶ Friends and colleagues have criticized various aspects of my proposal;¶ similarly, members of the U.S. Senate¶ Judiciary Committee were skeptical¶ of my proposal when I testified¶ before the committee.¶ Precisely for the above reasons, I¶ feel well suited to respond to Scheid’s¶ proposal. Perhaps I have an insider’s¶ perspective of proposing an alternative and then responding to the inevitable criticism. Experience has¶ taught me that any alternative that¶ involves an expansion of executive¶ powers is only as good as the limits¶ it also imposes.¶ Scheid’s proposal does not conjure up images of President Bush’s¶ ‘‘by all means necessary’’ approach¶ to counterterrorism because it wisely¶ includes independent judicial review¶ in accordance with constitutional¶ principles of checks and balances¶ and separation of powers. The key¶ question, however, is: ‘‘how much¶ judicial review’’? Not enough to ensure effective external restraints on¶ the executive. Although Scheid¶ clearly incorporates some control¶ measures, the overall sense is of¶ insufficient restraint.¶ To push the issue: we must ask¶ whether there are controls, whether¶ they are sufficiently defined, and¶ whether they can be implemented.¶ Simply put, suggesting an alternative¶ alone is not sufficient, particularly¶ when its intended purpose is to¶ create an infrastructure specifically¶ designed to limit rights rather than¶ protect them.

#### Doesn’t Solve Venezuela –

#### Links to NB

#### NSC bypasses the 6th amendment and evidence rules.

Rittgers 9 [David Rittgers is an attorney and decorated former Army Special Forces officer who served three tours in Afghanistan and is now a legal policy analyst at the Cato Institute; “National Security Court: Reinventing the Wheel, Poorly”; 9/21/2009; <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/national-security-court-reinventing-wheel-poorly>]

In Sulmasy’s proposed “national security court,” suspected terrorists would be tried in front of a panel of three federal judges, violating their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Defendants would be detained, tried, and imprisoned on military bases, a practice out of step with a federal statutory bar to the military’s direct participation in domestic law enforcement. The Bush administration kept its military commissions more palatable for the public by keeping American citizens and aliens detained in the United States out of Guantanamo. Sulmasy proposes that we bring Gitmo home and open its doors to citizens and non-citizens alike. Sulmasy does endeavor to solve one perceived problem with the military commissions that military lawyers have expressed to me: few courts-martial deal with contested felony charges, so most military lawyers have little courtroom experience. We are now entrusting them with the biggest trials of our time. Sulmasy proposes to fix this by using veteran federal prosecutors instead. The catch? The defense counsel would be those same military lawyers he says are not up to the task of prosecuting the case, unless the defendant could afford his own attorney with a high-level security clearance. Sulmasy also reduces the core protections of defendants by barring the use of the exclusionary rule, the doctrine that bars evidence collected illegally or otherwise in violation of the law. Without the prospect of excluding evidence collected in ways barred by federal courts, there is no incentive for law enforcement officers to follow any rules. Looking for terrorists? No warrant? No problem. Sulmasy attempts to allay fears of lost civil liberties by claiming that this court’s jurisdiction is limited to “international terrorists” such as al Qaeda and their ilk. In this, he falls into the trap that Benjamin Wittes, another proponent of national security courts, warns us of: “a slippery slope in which what they approve for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed today the government will use for someone like Jose Padilla tomorrow, a minor drug offender next week, and a political dissenter five years from now.” Sulmasy makes the leap from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (a non-citizen terrorist organizer) to Padilla (a citizen terrorist operative) immediately, leaving the rest of the downhill slide to broader jurisdiction to an aggressive prosecutor’s argument or a subsequent change in the court’s authorizing statute. After all, with an increasingly connected world, the definition of “international terrorist” is an elastic term. Would someone have to have orders from abroad to be “international”? If so, then Jose Padilla, alleged “dirty bomb” plotter, certainly qualifies. What about two American citizens who traveled overseas to help suicide bombers planning to infiltrate Iraq and attack American troops? What about a native-born American citizen who met with like-minded extremists in Canada and sent surveillance videos of potential targets to a radical in London? Federal courts dealt with all of the above. No special court needed. The transition to prosecuting drug charges in a national security court is no great leap either. We already have a federal narco-terrorism statute, a long-standing “war on drugs,” and a government ad campaign telling us that buying drugs supports terrorism financing. For all of the courage that Sulmasy exercises in giving a specialized court extraordinary power, he shies away from letting terrorists lose when they unleash a tirade in the courtroom. While he claims that it is necessary to close sessions of court so that “hearings do not become propaganda tools for the enemy,” this is part and parcel of letting civil society defeat violent extremists in the marketplace of ideas. The disgruntled student who drove through the center of the University of North Carolina and wounded nine had such an outburst (which you probably wouldn’t know about unless you read it here) and is now serving a minimum of 26 years in a state prison. At his sentencing, Shoe Bomber Richard Reid slandered the court and declared that he was at war with the United States. Federal District Judge William Young told Reid, “You are not a soldier in any war. You are a terrorist. To give you that reference, to call you a soldier gives you far too much stature.” Reid received three life sentences plus 110 years, which ended the debate rather firmly. Sulmasy tries to work up the reader with potential legal fallout from the Boumediene decision, alarming us with the prospect of civilian courts requiring soldiers and Marines on the battlefield to get a search warrant before they enter an al Qaeda safehouse. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not have any extraterritorial application, so this simply doesn’t hold water.

#### Doesn’t solve equality because it creates a separate branch

Sloan et al 8 [Virginia E. Sloan and the panel of The Constitution Project, think tank specializing in constitutional law cases; “A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS””; 6/23/2008; http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique\_of\_the\_National\_Security\_Courts.pdf]

National security courts for criminal prosecutions are not just unnecessary; they are also dangerous. They run the risk of creating a separate and unequal criminal justice system for a particular class of suspects,6 who will be brought before such specialized courts based on the very allegations they are contesting. Such a system undermines the presumption of innocence for these defendants, and risks a broader erosion of defendants’ rights that could spread to traditional Article III trials.7 It was Justice Frankfurter who wrote that “It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.”8 Committee members strongly believe that the shadow of terrorism must not be the basis for abandoning these fundamental tenets of justice and fairness. In addition, these proposals are alarmingly short on details with respect to the selection of judges for these national security courts. Although there is a history of creating specialized federal courts to handle particular substantive areas of the law (e.g., taxation; patents), unlike tax and patent law, there is simply no highly specialized expertise that would form relevant selection criteria for the judges. Establishing a specialized court solely for prosecutions of alleged terrorists might also create a highly politicized process for nominating and confirming the judges, focusing solely on whether the nominee had sufficient “tough on terrorism” credentials — hardly a criterion that lends itself to the appearance of fairness and impartiality.

#### Those things are specifically violations to due process

Paust 8 [Jordan J. Paust is the Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor at the University of Houston, a former U.S. Army JAG officer and member of the faculty of the Judge Advocate General’s School; “The Case Against a National Security Court”; October 23, 2008; http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/10/case-against-national-security-court.php]

As documented in Beyond the Law and recognized by the Supreme Court in Hamdan, violations of customary rights to due process would include: (1) preclusion of the accused and defense counsel from learning what evidence was presented in closed hearings, (2) admission of hearsay evidence, (3) admission of unsworn statements, (4) denial of access by an accused and defense counsel to evidence in the form of classified information, (5) denial of confrontation of all witnesses against an accused, (6) use of “evidence obtained through coercion,” (7) denial of the right to be tried in one’s presence (absent disruptive conduct or consent), and (8) denial of review by a competent, independent, and impartial court of law (i.e., an Article III court). It seems unavoidable that a special national security court with special procedures that deviate from the federal rules of criminal procedure would not be designed to enhance fairness, fully meet bilateral and multilateral treaty requirements of equality of treatment, or provide more general equal protection of the law to criminal accused.

**3. Perm do the CP – it’s an example of the congress legislating the plans’ restriction**

#### CP decks legitimacy

Glenn Sulmasy 9, Associate Professor of Law at the United States Coast Guard Academy and was a National Security and Human Rights Fellow at the Carr Center, Harvard Kennedy School, April 13, “THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM”, PDF

Thank you Professor, and special thanks to the Journal as well as Chris Borgen for his kind invitation to have me here to speak – and to his expert organization of this conference. The use of military commissions in the war on al Qaeda has been, to say the least, unsuccessful and disastrous as a matter of policy. Although some now advocate for the use of the Article III court system to try terror suspects, such a policy would be equally unsuccessful and potentially more problematic. Our ability to successfully—and humanely—detain and prosecute those who wish to undermine our ideals will inevitably be an issue upon which history will judge the great “American experiment.” It now is clear that the best approach is to reject the two prevailing rigid paradigms and pursue a more flexible, realistic approach – a “third way” is needed. An alternative, hybrid court system will be required to successfully deal with these suspects in the future. In doing so, we remain on the right side of history, restore our reputation abroad, and continue to make progress in the war on al Qaeda.¶ THE CURRENT SITUATION¶ The West, whether we accept this reality or not, is fighting and engaged in an armed conflict against violent, international terrorists. This is exemplified by the current situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, parts of Pakistan, numerous other areas of the world, and even in the homeland. Coalition military forces have been largely successful on the battlefield against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, however, the current war involves so much more than victory on the battlefield. Winning the war against al Qaeda means the defeat of an ideology of hate, the removal of state sponsors of terror, and the spread of democracy in new regions of the world. We must also remember that defeating terrorists does not just mean victory in combat, but victory for the rule of law, and the adjudication of terror suspects within these very same processes of law. Again, although the West has been largely militarily successful in action(s) against al Qaeda, the road to justice in the courtroom has been a strategic shortfall.¶ The administration has long advocated,1 and it has now become exceedingly clear, that this conflict is dissimilar to those wars fought by previous generations of Americans. Indeed, it is an armed conflict of some sort, but again, not a traditional one. Al Qaeda fighters do not wear uniforms, do not fight under a flag, and they certainly are not parties to any of the conventions related to warfare that America and the rest of the civilized world are bound by. America’s enemies hide among civilian populations, roam along international borders, target innocent civilian populations with indiscriminate weapons of slaughter and chaos, and vow to fight until the end. The military is constantly changing tactics and adapting to be able to best combat the enemy. Although the fight against al Qaeda and international terrorism involves the use of the American military, unlike prior conflicts, the so called “war on terror” now involves the FBI, the CIA, and even local law enforcement. The terrorist attacks of September 11, as well as the ensuing fight against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations abroad, contributed to the largest reorganization of the Federal government since the National Security Act of 1947,2 resulting in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.3¶ Rather than sitting in a “war room,” planning the movement of large brigades of tanks, plotting wide-scale aerial bombardment of enemy territory, planning to control strategic areas on the high seas, and other traditional tactics, today’s war is being fought through use of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, large scale intelligence operations, and even the training of local police. Thus, the current military approach implements a hybrid model, one that involves both a military and a law enforcement response. While these tactical changes have resulted in a great deal of military success abroad, in particular the troop “surge” in Iraq,4 parallel strategic adaptations have not taken place in America’s legal approach to fighting this war. Seven years later, America is using a universally discredited military commission system to adjudicate suspected terrorists held in Guantanamo. Simply put, perceptions matter in 21st century warfare, or “fourth generation conflicts.” The longer this system continues, the more harm comes to America’s reputation and credibility abroad on other critical, humanitarian issues.

### Terror DA

### 2AC Intel DA

#### No internal link – your evidence says congressional discussion of terrorist intel causes the impact – no reason this occurs

#### 1. State secrets doctrine low now – takes out the IL

Bazzle 12 (Tom – J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2011, “Shutting the Courthouse Doors: Invoking the State Secrets Privilege to Thwart Judicial Review in the Age of Terror”, 2012, 23 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 29, lexis)

The district court's threshold inquiry in resolving the state secrets claim was determining whether the NSA surveillance program that gave rise to the suit actually qualified as a "secret." n74 Because the government had disclosed the existence of the program and AT&T admitted to assisting the government in classified matters when asked, the court concluded that state secrets did not foreclose discovery. n75 While the state secrets privilege did not support pre-discovery dismissal of the case, the court found that there was sufficient ambiguity about the extent of AT&T's involvement in the program, and the contents of any communication records surveyed, so as to permit AT&T to not disclose the extent of its participation in the TSP. n76 The court [\*42] made clear, however, that if information about AT&T's role in supporting the TSP became public during the course of the litigation, the government could no longer invoke state secrets to resist disclosing this information. n77 After rejecting the government's motion to dismiss on state secrets grounds, the court reiterated its constitutional duty to exercise judicial review: But it is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has its limits. While the court recognizes and respects the Executive's constitutional duty to protect the nation from threats, the court also takes seriously its constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes that come before it. To defer to a blanket assertion of secrecy here would be to abdicate that duty, particularly because the very subject matter of this litigation has been so publicly aired. The compromise between liberty and security remains a difficult one. But dismissing this case at the outset would sacrifice liberty for no apparent enhancement of security. n78 This is a revealing statement by the court. While forcefully asserting its authority to decide the complicated constitutional questions at issue in this case, the court implied that this duty is not absolute, and that the balance between liberty and security may tilt toward security under different facts. Of particular importance, especially with regard to how the government has applied the state secrets privilege to subvert judicial review in the war-on-terror context, is the weight the court conferred to the public airing of the wiretapping program. n79 The court was reluctant to defer to the government's claim of secrecy in this case because the government's own public statements about the existence of the program directly contradicted its state secrets claim. n80 Acknowledging the extensive media coverage of the program, the court insisted that the only relevant public disclosures about the contested government program, at least with respect to measuring a claim [\*43] of government secrecy, are public statements by the government and its implicated private accomplices. n81

### 2AC Intel Link

#### Prosecution helps with intel gathering

Human Rights First 09 (March 2009, non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based in New York and Washington D.C., "The Case Against A Special Terrorism Court" Human Rights First) www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090323-LS-nsc-policy-paper.pdf

Finally, In Pursuit of Justice finds that criminal prosecution often assists rather than inhibits intelligence gathering. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution entitles any suspect who has been criminally charged to legal representation. But many suspects with lawyers end up cooperating with the government in exchange for leniency in sentencing. “The cooperation process has proven historically to be one of the government’s most powerful tools in gathering intelligence,” write Zabel and Benjamin. “Indeed, the government recognizes that cultivating cooperation pleas is an effective intelligence gathering tool for all types of criminal investigations, including significant terrorist cases.”18

#### Guantanamo doesn’t provide intel to stop terror but it does increase the chances of it

Greenberg 7 (Karen- Director of the Center on National Security and permanent member of the Council on Foreign Relations while Research for this article was contributed by Center on Law and Security Research Fellow Francesca Laguardia, February, “8 Reasons to Close GUANTANAMO NOW”, lexis)

#5 It undermines intelligence efforts¶ Despite the tens of thousands of hours of interrogation that have taken place at Guantanamo, very little worthwhile intelligence has been extracted. What information is left is now five years old, and it is doubtful that any Guantanamo prisoner has knowledge of a ticking bomb or a current plot.¶ And while the government maintains that detainees can provide a primer on jihad networks and al-Qaeda's strategic goals, at this point, the information is likely out of date. Besides, what can be extracted from individuals who, for the most part, were the wrong people to imprison in the first place.¶ According to a report by Seton Hall School of Law, 86 percent of detainees were arrested by Pakistan or the Northern Alliance and "handed over to the United States at a time when the United States offered large bounties for capture of suspected enemies."¶ Moreover, Guantanamo's very existence has alienated potential inside sources of information. Two years ago, at a Center on Law and Security conference in Florence, Italy, two of Europe's leading terrorism magistrates pointed out that attempts to infiltrate terrorist cells had become much more difficult in the wake of rising public anger over Guantanamo.¶ ¶ #6 It creates new enemies¶ Guantanamo has fomented that which it was created to combat -- anti-American extremism and jihad. Guantanamo is just the public face of a global network of "ghost prisons." According to Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights), the United States has acknowledged 20 detention centers in Afghanistan, in addition to the bases at Bagram and Kandahar; as a prison near the Afghan borde

ases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than **wild fantasies,** far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shr in Kohat, Pakistan; and the al Jafr prison in Jordan. This suggests that Guantanamo may have been a smokescreen for more inhumane, less legal incarceration and interrogation practices elsewhere.¶ According to Armando Spataro, a senior Italian prosecutor known for his work on global terrorism, Guantanamo and the U.S. renditions policy "is extremely damaging to all our efforts to integrate our Muslim communities." Muslims around the world are asking why there is so little international opposition to the U.S. policy of imprisonment without due process. The collateral damage of Guantanamo -- the incarceration of nearly 800 individuals who are denied legal rights, who regularly report being abused and who face a lifetime of imprisonment -- is incalculable. It breeds new angers and resentments, and thus new enemies.

#### Indefinite detention undermines international coop and alliances – that’s 1AC Sheinin

**NATO is resilient**

**RIA 6** (Regulatory Intelligence Agency, 12-21, Lexis)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21, 2006 - The **N**orth **A**tlantic **T**reaty **O**rganization **is healthy and its best years lie ahead**, Marine Gen. James L. Jones said today at the Europe Atlantic Council here. Jones stepped down as NATO's supreme allied commander earlier this month. While some aspects of the alliance may need work, Jones said that, **on the whole, it is an "incredibly healthy organization**." Jones assumed his office in January 2003 after serving as the commandant of the Marine Corps. During his time in the position, the alliance has changed dramatically. "Perhaps the highlight of the last four years was witnessing the accession of seven new nations into the alliance in 2004," he said. "It was a very emotional moment for seven former Warsaw Pact countries." Membership in NATO meant acceptance in the free world to the former communist countries, Jones said. "There was a sort of palpable enthusiasm for freedom, democracy, rule of law and just the vast potential for those people that had been unleashed," he said. "You feel every day their enthusiasm from these new members." During Jones' tenure, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan grew from a force providing security in and around the Afghan capital of Kabul, to providing security for the entire country. The NATO commander in Afghanistan now commands 32,000 troops from 32 different countries, Jones said. **The NATO mission in Afghanistan and NATO training mission in Iraq are just two operations that show the term "out of area operations" is obsolete**, he said. During the Cold War, NATO's job was to defend Western Europe from the menace of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. There were no "out-of-area operations, nor was the possibility even really contemplated," he said. "It is a given that NATO is operating today on three different continents with more than 50,000 troops committed to NATO missions," he said. **Troops under NATO command operate in Asia, Africa and Europe, and** Jones said **the alliance is also embracing change**. "Nowhere was that more in evidence than in establishing the NATO Response Force," he said. The force - 25,000 personnel ready to deploy at a moment's notice - is now fully operational and capable. The general said the force is NATO's greatest commitment to transformation. The force is ready to "take on missions at a strategic distance, but in an expeditionary manner," he said. The NATO Response Force's first real deployment - to Pakistan to help with humanitarian relief following the earthquakes in January 2005 - is a prime example of this, Jones said. The fact that the force's first mission was a humanitarian operation has also caused some reassessment in NATO, he said. **"NATO is reinventing itself** and re-explaining itself because in this world NATO is thought of, correctly, as principally a warfighting organization," he said. "This transformation of NATO - going from a reactive 20th-century force, which it needed to be, to a 21st-century more expeditionary and agile force - brings with a whole lot of things" that countries didn't realize when they signed up for the process in 2002. "It has caused a lot of pain because it gets you into such things as multinational logistics (and) organic intelligence, which NATO has never had," he said. Other transformational aspects during Jones' command included eliminating duplicate NATO headquarters, disestablishing the Alled Command Atlantic and replacing it with the Allied Command Transformation and placing all operations under Allied Command Europe. This is not to say there are not problems that NATO must address, Jones said. First and foremost is money. The per capita share of many countries has actually gone down since the Prague Summit in 2002. NATO nations agreed during that summit to spend roughly 3 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. Another problem is national caveats, Jones said. This is where troops assigned to a mission has such stringent restrictions placed on them, that commanders can hardly use them. But **the alliance is remarkably adaptable and resilient**, Jones said. "**The other** bit of **evidence that the alliance is healthy is that I know of no countries that are trying to leave the alliance,"** Jones said. "And I know **quite a few** that **are trying to** queue up and measure up to **become members by** as early as **2008**."

**Too many alt causes to NATO**

**Jankowski ’11** (10/31 (Domink, expert analyst at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland and is pursuing a doctorate at the Warsaw School of Economics, "A Post-Libya NATO Assessment," <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/post-libya-nato-assessment-6016?page=1>)

From the NATO perspective, two worrisome trends have emerged. First, despite the political backing for operation “Unified Protector,” fewer than one-third of NATO allies actually participated in strike missions, and fewer than half contributed contingents. That raises a question: Why so few? Some countries, especially the more recent entrants, have been extensively engaged in other NATO operations (Afghanistan, Kosovo). They may believe a contribution to another mission would overstretch their capabilities. Others lack the necessary air and naval assets that would mesh operationally with those of their allies. Both situations reveal, however, another pan-European weakness: the decline in defense spending. The financial crisis has become the new normal. It changed the logic of international relations, ushering in a new era marked by intensifying “zero-sum” geopolitical rivalries. Thus, only four European countries are meeting the minimum threshold of 2 percent GDP expenditures on national defense. From the EU perspective, **the situation seems even worse**. One of the recent issues of the prestigious European magazine *Europe’s World* contained an eye-catching advertisement for NATO: “Question: Which organization adopted a new vision of its geopolitical role in Lisbon? Hint: It wasn’t the European Union!” The ad’s not so subtle jibe has been borne out by the Libyan crisis, which caught the EU by surprise. In fact, there is a growing sense of ambiguity about the real outcome of the EU’s crisis-management policy. Despite being the subject of occasional good news, it is hardly an unalloyed success. That is in part because of two main operational obstacles the EU continues to face. First and foremost, the EU still lacks adequate civilian and military capabilities. The second obstacle is inherent in the EU’s institutional structure and how it works. The bureaucracies responsible for foreign and security policy—including the European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic corps—are still essentially under construction.

**NATO is irrelevent**

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But Libya was also a warning: NATO remains **utterly dependent** on American air power and munitions to beat even a third-rate enemy like Gaddafi. How much longer will U.S. lawmakers and taxpayers continue to provide that support? Why should they underwrite the performance of European militaries when Europe’s own taxpayers refuse to do so? In a farewell speech this past June in Brussels, then–U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates gave a **dismal** assessment of the alliance’s Libyan performance, warning that NATO had shown itself to be at risk of “collective military **irrelevance**.” NATO’s membership has more than doubled to 28 countries since its inception in 1949, but its basic principle remains the same: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Only once in NATO’s 62-year history has its mutual-defense clause been invoked: after the Sept. 11 attacks on America. More than 10 years later, NATO allies continue to fight America’s fight, with 40,000 non-U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan. That’s loyalty. Imagine how hard it would be for an American president to sustain involvement in someone else’s war after 10 years. Yet NATO has been a good deal for the Europeans and Canadians: for the past six decades the world’s strongest military has been committed to their defense. Nearly 80,000 U.S. military personnel are currently stationed in Europe, working closely and routinely under NATO’s integrated military command, sharing expertise, plans, equipment, and training. In fact, Europeans have more influence over U.S. policies in NATO than in any other forum. Its rules, originally drawn up for Western Europe’s defense, give the European allies so much leverage that Washington insisted that its treaty obligations be limited to “Europe or America,” carefully excluding the Europeans’ colonial possessions in Asia and Africa. (Times do change—in recent years the United States has been the leading proponent of NATO’s security responsibilities around the world.) The allies can count on America to step in whenever they lack the required capabilities. The British and the French may have flown most of the missions during Operation Unified Protector, but it was U.S. personnel and equipment that destroyed Libya’s air defenses at the outset, firing more than 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles on the first day. As the intervention continued, the Americans provided 80 percent of the necessary intelligence; dispatched targeting specialists to make up for a shortage of qualified European technicians; and supplied additional munitions to the other allies when they ran short. And it was practically inevitable that they would run short. Minus the United States, NATO’s members spend roughly $150 billion a year on defense, a figure that’s not even close to the U.S. expenditure—excluding war costs—of around $560 billion. That’s fully half the world’s total. Russia and China each spend about $100 billion (although it’s hard to be sure about China, because its reporting is so opaque). Libya itself spent $1 billion in the year before Gaddafi’s overthrow. All told, the alliance has nearly 2 million military members, including battle-hardened veterans of the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Seven of the world’s 10 best militaries are European members of NATO. Even without U.S. participation, the Europeans should be able to defeat any potential enemy. The trouble is, they no longer believe they can. Britain openly admits its dependence on the United States. Since 1997, the United Kingdom has predicated its defense planning on the assumption that it will not fight a war without American assistance. While Eurochauvinists may harbor notions of independence, the **truth** is that **few of them are willing to fight** unless America is at their side, no matter now noble the cause may be.

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#### We don’t call for role-playing, only policy-analysis---that’s effective and productive

Shulock 99 Nancy, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY --- professor of Public Policy and Administration and director of the Institute for Higher Education Leadership & Policy (IHELP) at Sacramento State University, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2, 226–244 (1999)

In my view, none of these radical changes is necessary. As interesting as our politics might be with the kinds of changes outlined by proponents of participatory and critical policy analysis, we do not need these changes to justify our investment in policy analysis. Policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas into politics, and affects policy outcomes. The problem is not that policymakers refuse to understand the value of traditional policy analysis or that policy analysts have not learned to be properly interactive with stakeholders and reflective of multiple and nontechnocratic perspectives. The problem, in my view, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has changed, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment. Regardless of what the textbooks say, there does not need to be a client in order for ideas from policy analysis to resonate through the policy environment.10¶ Certainly there is room to make our politics more inclusive. But those critics who see policy analysis as a tool of the power elite might be less concerned if they understood that analysts are only adding to the debate—they are unlikely to be handing ready-made policy solutions to elite decisionmakers for implementation. Analysts themselves might be more contented if they started appreciating the appropriation of their ideas by the whole gamut of policy participants and stopped counting the number of times their clients acted upon their proposed solutions. And the cynics disdainful of the purported objectivism of analysis might relax if analysts themselves would acknowledge that they are seeking not truth, but to elevate the level of debate with a compelling, evidence-based presentation of their perspectives. Whereas critics call, unrealistically in my view, for analysts to present competing perspectives on an issue or to “design a discourse among multiple perspectives,” I see no reason why an individual analyst must do this when multiple perspectives are already in abundance, brought by multiple analysts. If we would acknowledge that policy analysis does not occur under a private, contractual process whereby hired hands advise only their clients, we would not worry that clients get only one perspective.¶ Policy analysis is used, far more extensively than is commonly believed. Its use could be appreciated and expanded if policymakers, citizens, and analysts themselves began to present it more accurately, not as a comprehensive, problem-solving, scientific enterprise, but as a contributor to informed discourse. For years Lindblom [1965, 1968, 1979, 1986, 1990] has argued that we should understand policy analysis for the limited tool that it is—just one of several routes to social problem solving, and an inferior route at that. Although I have learned much from Lindblom on this odyssey from traditional to interpretive policy analysis, my point is different. Lindblom sees analysis as having a very limited impact on policy change due to its ill-conceived reliance on science and its deluded attempts to impose comprehensive rationality on an incremental policy process. I, with the benefit of recent insights of Baumgartner, Jones, and others into the dynamics of policy change, see that even with these limitations, policy analysis can have a major impact on policy. Ideas, aided by institutions and embraced by citizens, can reshape the policy landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.