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## 1AC – Plan

The United States Congress should statutorily restrict the President’s war powers authority by prohibiting the use of offensive cyber operations.

## 1AC – Warming

Contention One: Warming

New multilateral warming agreements are being negotiated for 2015 – they require resolving disputes between developed and developing countries

**Langley 13** (Claire, Research Associate at The Brookings Institution, 11/27/2013, "Climate Change Negotiations in Warsaw Result in a Timeline for Agreement in 2015," Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/11/27-climate-change-warsaw-cop19-timeline-hultman)

Small steps toward an agreement on climate change in 2015 were made at the recent 19th Conference of Parties (COP19) talks in Warsaw, Poland over the past two weeks. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conference was extremely tense, with emotions running high after the devastation of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the frustrations over slow-moving texts and the explosive new issues on the table such as “loss and damage.” The conference went a record 38 hours overtime— finally ending on Saturday night— and was marked by fasting, staged walkouts by developing countries and environmental groups, and frenzied last minute negotiations. In the end, the conference left the door open for a new agreement in 2015, but with a lot of work to be done in the coming two years. The intense and emotional nature of the negotiations is not unusual at this stage of the game. What was meant to be an interim negotiating session whose main role was to produce a timeline from now until the final COP in Paris where a new agreement is to be struck, turned into a battle over familiar, longstanding issues that are inextricably tied to the negotiations on an eventual treaty. Ultimately negotiators were able to achieve compromises on a series of controversial issues—evidence that there is space for agreement and that political momentum is ramping up. Hard fought compromises were made on issues such as reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+), and loss and damage (financial compensation for developing countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change for damages they would incur as temperatures increase). Crucially, a timetable was put forward to guide negotiations over the coming two years, which was arguably the most important and anticipated outcome of the talks. Small steps were made on discussions of financial contributions to fill existing funding mechanisms like the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund, although this is an area of the UNFCCC process that is among the most contentious and cuts across almost every single issue under negotiation. Here are some highlighted outcomes in four major negotiating areas: 1. Structure and timeline of the 2015 agreement Compromise was reached on the framework for a 2015 agreement, resulting in a new text for the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) that will form the basis of negotiations going forward. The key portion of text reads: All nations should “initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions.” The hard-won language of “contributions” is intentionally vague and steps back from language sought by others that called for “commitments,” which would have implied mandatory actions as opposed to weaker voluntary actions. Additionally, it was agreed that these “contributions” should be ready by the end of the first quarter of 2015. The United States is among those advocating pledges be made by the end of the first quarter of 2015, while the European Union would like to see pledges on the table in 2014. The earlier countries are able to put forward pledges, the more likely a robust international review of these pledges can take place before the 2015 agreement is finalized. Crucial language remaining in the text defines a 2015 agreement “in the context of adopting a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties." This text reflects a compromise by the United States—who would prefer an agreement that covers all countries by 2020—and large developing countries led by China and India who advocate for a clear division between countries based on common but differentiated responsibilities (or CBDR, a key founding principle of the UNFCCC). This language effectively kicks the conversation on emission reduction commitments and their legal nature down the road, increasing the likelihood for discord at Lima in 2014 and Paris in 2015. This new text also eliminated suggested language calling for a "legally binding treaty under international law," for which the European Union was advocating and for which the United States would not be able to sign up. At this point, the legal nature of the agreement is still undecided, leaving it the most politically important decision facing negotiators over the next two years. 2. Financial contributions Finance and financial contributions have been a central part of recent negotiations, with developing countries calling for financial contributions to existing funding mechanisms before they were willing to talk about post-2020 emission reduction actions. Several fragmented pledges for new money emerged from Warsaw. The U.S. pledged $25 million as part of a major new $280 million funding initiative aimed at slowing deforestation and stemming its effect on world carbon emissions. In this initiative, the U.S. joined Norway, the U.K. and the World Bank in launching the "BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes." The fund will provide incentives to developing countries that are taking steps to limit deforestation under the United Nations' REDD+ program. Norway pledged substantially more—$135 million—and the United Kingdom pledged $120 million. Countries also promised $100 million to top up the existing Adaptation Fund, which was set up in 2008 to provide money for poorer countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The Adaptation Fund was given new pledges of assistance by mainly European countries: Norway pledged $2.5 million; Sweden pledged $30.2 million; Belgium pledged $1.6 million; and Germany pledged $40.7 million (or 30 million euros). Additionally, Sweden announced a $45 million commitment to the Green Climate Fund once it "becomes operational with all the necessary arrangements and standards in place," and Japan promised $16 billion to help developing countries reduce emissions over the next three years. Adding to the calendar in 2014, the U.K. announced that it will convene a “global summit” on climate finance next spring to build political momentum on financial issues. 3. Loss and damage In addition to the existing mechanisms for delivering climate finance, such as the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund, calls have emerged recently for a new and separate process to assist poor countries after climate-linked losses (such as the aforementioned recent Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines). This loss and damage discussion became a seriously polarizing issue in these talks, and disagreements prompted the developing country G-77 to walk out of discussions late Tuesday night. Bilateral discussions took over late in the week in an attempt to achieve compromise between key countries, and this effort resulted in a new international mechanism. The new “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts” does not promise compensation for damages caused by climate change impacts in developing countries, a red line for the United States and other developed countries. The mechanism places the issue under an adaptation framework for at least three years, with a review built in for 2016. This outcome represents a hard-fought compromise between the United States, Nicaragua, the Bahamas and Fiji, and was seen as a satisfactory interim outcome for both sides. 4. REDD+ The REDD+ program covers guidelines and provisions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation, and it has emerged as one of the major success stories out of Warsaw. Negotiators reached several goals that were set at the 2010 conference in Cancun, agreeing on key text regarding scientific and technical rules, financing and a national coordination system. Additions to the text on technical issues included decisions to enforce environmental and human rights safeguards in REDD+ projects; lay the groundwork for a system to monitor, report and verify carbon emissions reductions from standing forests; establish national forest monitoring systems; institute reference levels—or base lines—upon which a country measures efforts in reducing deforestation; and create definitions for the drivers of deforestation (text on these decisions can be found here). Negotiators also agreed to text on REDD+ finance, including a clause saying that countries must show recent proof that safeguards are respected in order to receive compensation. Additionally, the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom announced the first major pledge for REDD+ since the 2009 conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, a joint $280 million to the World Bank's BioCarbon Fund (mentioned above). In conclusion, the Warsaw talks are best seen as the end of the first stage in a roughly three-year arc to develop a new climate agreement. In a difficult negotiation, one would not expect major breakthroughs or concessions in these early stages, nor did we see any in Warsaw. Yet plans for the coming two years were made, and, if followed, they would be an improvement in providing a more orderly discussion of commitments than has been the case in previous high-profile negotiations (such as Kyoto and Copenhagen). The loss and damage mechanism was created, but without any real substance. Provisions on REDD+ were agreed upon and should provide scope for the incorporation of forest carbon activities into national pledges. Despite these small successes, the bigger question is whether the cracks emerging between the developed and developing country parties will widen over the coming months.

That requires US-China cooperation

**Kerry 13** (John, Sec of State, 7/19/2013, "Getting The U.S.-China Climate Partnership Right", thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/07/19/2328571/sec-kerry-getting-the-us-china-climate-partnership-right/)

Today, it’s not just our geopolitics that are changing — it’s the earth itself. And it requires a new partnership with China to meet the challenge. Nothing less than a transformation of the way we use and produce energy will be enough to tackle the urgent threat of climate change. Of course, the future has a way of humbling those who try to predict it with any certainty. But here’s what the science is telling us: if we fail to connect the dots — if we fail to take action — the impacts of climate change will become unmanageable at catastrophic levels. That’s why this week, at the Major Economies Forum, Todd Stern, our Special Envoy for Climate Change, carried a message of the need to make potent progress both in terms of concrete action now, and in terms of developing a new global agreement for 2015. Plain and simple, all nations have a responsibility to make near-term emissions reductions. The costs of inaction get more and more expensive the longer we wait — and the longer we wait, the less likely we are to avoid the worst and leave future generations with a sustainable planet. We all know China and the United States have unique national circumstances. But we also have a special role. Together, we account for more than 40 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. While that’s a truly staggering reality, it also means our two nations can make a profound difference. The decisions we make today — right now — will determine the fate of our planet not just for our children and grandchildren but for generations to come. So here’s the bottom line: For better or worse, the eyes of the world are upon us. Either we create the necessary momentum to galvanize a global response, or else we risk a global catastrophe. Either we set an example for the world, or the world will make an example out of us. After all, Mother Nature knows no boundaries.

Resolving cyber issues are key to that coop

**Walker 13** (Tim, Writer for The Independent, 6/9/2013, "'Positive' US-China summit stumbles over cyber security", www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/positive-uschina-summit-stumbles-over-cyber-security-8651256.html)

A weekend summit between the US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping has concluded in California, with one US official describing the talks as “unique, positive and constructive”. Tom Donilon, the US National Security Adviser, said the leaders had broadly agreed on topics including the denuclearisation of North Korea, and tackling climate change. The matter of cyber security, however, remained a stumbling block for US-China relations. The two-day “shirtsleeves” summit at the Sunnylands private estate in Rancho Mirage near Palm Springs was billed as an opportunity for the leaders of the world’s two largest economies to build a personal rapport. It is the first time the men have met since Mr Xi took office in March. As they strolled together in the 200-acre grounds in sweltering heat on Saturday, Mr Obama told reporters they had made “terrific” progress in their talks. Observers noted that, unlike his reserved predecessor Hu Jintao, Mr Xi seemed at ease with the enforced informality of the event, at which neither leader nor their staff wore ties. The Chinese were keen to portray the summit as a meeting of equals. For both sides, it was an opportunity to ease tensions as each expands its military and economic engagement in the Pacific. At a press conference following the talks, Mr Donilon said the thorniest issue at hand was cyber security. In recent months China has been accused of digital thefts from a series of US businesses and government agencies. In one instance Chinese hackers are thought to have accessed the confidential designs for more than two dozen US weapons systems. On Saturday morning Mr Obama reportedly pressed his guest to rein in his country’s cyber espionage activities. According to Mr Donilon, the US President told Mr Xi that the alleged hacking was “inconsistent with the kind of relationship we want to have with China”. If it continued, he said, it would be “a very difficult problem in the economic relationship”. The Chinese, however, said they too were victims of hacking. Last week The Guardian published details of a presidential directive in which Mr Obama allegedly ordered US intelligence officials to make a list of potential foreign targets for US cyber attacks. Mr Xi’s senior foreign policy adviser Yang Jiechi told reporters, “Cyber security should not become the cause of mutual suspicion; rather it should be a new bright spot in our co-operation.” There was less debate over the two countries’ approach to China’s troublesome neighbour, North Korea, which the leaders discussed on Friday evening over a dinner of lobster tamales, porterhouse steak and cherry pie prepared by the celebrity chef Bobby Flay. According to Mr Donilon: “They agreed that North Korea has to denuclearise, that neither country will accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and that we would work together to deepen co-operation and dialogue to achieve denuclearisation.” The White House released a statement following the summit saying the US and China had agreed to co-operate for the first time to reduce the “production and consumption” of hydrofluorocarbons, a greenhouse gas found in refrigerators and other appliances, which is believed to contribute to climate change.

The plan solves – prevents poisonous spillover to warming policy

**Lieberthal & Singer 12** (Kenneth G. Lieberthal - Director @ John L. Thornton China Center & Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development @ Brookings Peter W. Singer -- Director @ 21st Century Defense Initiative & Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy @ Brookings, “ Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations” February 23, 2012, Brookings Institution)

There is perhaps no relationship as significant to the future of world politics as that between the U.S. and China. No other two nations play such dominant roles in critical global issues from peace and security to finance, trade, and the environment. How these two powers manage their relationship will likely be a key determinant of not only their own political and economic futures, but also wider global stability and prosperity.

In the web of relationships that have built up between the U.S. and China, no issue has emerged of such importance, and generated such friction in so short a time span, as cybersecurity. Just a generation ago, “cyberspace” effectively did not exist beyond the nascent links among a limited number of university labs’ computer networks. Today, the cen trality of cyberspace to our entire global pattern of life is almost impos sible to fathom. There are some 4 billion people behind the roughly 50 billion devices that connect to the Internet. They send more than 90 trillion emails a year, and conduct more than two trillion transactions. 1 Domains that range from commerce to communication to the critical infrastructure that powers and protects our modern day civilization all depend on the safe and secure operation of this globalized network of networks.

And yet, concerns over this domain have rapidly moved to the forefront of U.S.-China relations. While both senior policymakers and general publics are struggling to understand the cyber realm’s basic dynamics and implications, the issue of cybersecurity is looming ever larger in U.S.-China relations and is seriously affecting threat perceptions on both sides. 2 Indeed, despite it being such a new issue, the cyber realm is proving to be as challenging as the more traditional concerns that have long dominated the U.S.-China agenda (such as trade, human rights, cross-Strait relations, and regional territorial disputes).

The underlying concern is driven by the fact that the malevolent side of cyberspace has increased hand in hand with the growing scale and use of the benevolent side. There are an estimated 55,000 new pieces of malware found each day and another 200,000 computers worldwide turned into “zombies” (compromised computers under the control of an actor other than the owner) each day. These computers are often bundled together into “botnets,” chains of thousands and in some cases even millions of computers externally controlled and often used for nefarious activities. 3

But even more important than the growing numbers behind the mali cious use of the Internet may be the evolution of the cyber threat land scape from one dominated by individual hackers, often motivated by a search for attention, to one driven by complex, organized groups, which range from international criminal networks to state-related es pionage and military efforts. The result is that just as the positive side of the cyber domain is rippling out into the physical domain with rapid and often unexpected consequences, so too is the negative side.

The Internet thus may have no formal state borders, but it is increas ingly a place that state entities both operate in and care deeply about. In U.S.-China relations, the most recent cyber trends have generally been negative. Stories about suspected “Chinese” attacks on U.S. and allied interests in both the public and private domain have become an al most daily occurrence in the media, and a source of regular discussion within the Washington, D.C. policy community. 4 In 2011, this took on a new level of concern and publicity with several major reported intrusions into American and allied government, military, corporate, university, NGO, and think tank networks. The most notable per haps was the disclosure of the “Shady RAT” attacks that successfully targeted some 72 governments, international institutions, corpora tions, and think tanks. 5

Such incidents have reportedly involved the unapproved copy ing and exportation of startling amounts and varieties of valuable data. The information accessed ranged from state secrets and weapons technology to business intellectual property and corporate negotiating strategies to personal files and communications of both high ranking and notable individuals and members of the general pub lic. Some claim that if the overall scale of the loss were measured in financial terms, it would be the largest theft in history.

Despite China’s own blanket denials of culpability in such actions, the perception is growing at both the popular and elite level in America that the cyber threat from China, while multifaceted, has a large government-directed component. Such incidents are repeatedly described as being different from normal cyber crime in that very specific stra tegic objectives seemed to have been particularly targeted: inputs into decisions concerning China, monitoring and threatening dissidents who live abroad, proprietary technology of special strategic inter est (a frequently cited example is that normal cybercriminals would have little to gain from targeting systems in NASA’s Space Shuttle), and military-oriented planning and reconnaissance. The public debate also notes that accessing such networks for theft also can simultaneously lay the potential groundwork for future exploitation and attack. 7

In short, U.S. concern about cybersecurity has reached a fever pitch— to the extent that the U.S. government’s 2011 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report specifically names China as the “most active and persistent” perpetrator of cyber intrusions into the United States. 8 In the press, the mood is best captured by the depiction of a cyberattack as a massive pixilated mushroom cloud looming over every American city (as the cover of the July 2010 Economist magazine had it). Similarly, in senior policy circles, malware has been described as “like a WMD [weapon of mass destruction]” (Sen. Carl Levin, chair of Senate Armed Services Committee), able to “destroy our society” former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft), meaning it should be looked at as “an existential threat” (Adm. Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 9 Indeed, many are now framing the U.S.-China relationship in this space as a digital echo of the Cold War between the U.S. and USSR of a past generation.

While the Cold War metaphor is certainly a flawed parallel, as scholars at Brookings have recently argued, 11 concern has grown to view the cyber threat on that scale. President Barack Obama’s 2011 Cyberspace Policy Review declared that “cybersecurity risks pose some of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21 st century.” 12 And, in turn, there have been a host of new U.S. legislative initiatives and the launch of a new cyber deterrence strategy by the U.S. military to accompany the creation of its U.S. Cyber Command. While it did not specify any individual nation, the Pentagon Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace was clearly keyed to China as among the many threats it foresaw in this realm. 13 It sought to lay out a cyber deterrence doctrine clearly targeting state actors, including leaving open the option for es calation to traditional military means in the physical realm if the U.S. ever felt it suffered too dearly in the cyber realm.

Unsurprisingly, Chinese writers and officials have reacted angrily to the above narrative of direct and veiled accusations, describing them as “groundless and reflecting Cold War mentality.” 14 In both public and private, Chinese writers and officials assert that it is their systems that are more frequently under attack. 15 The Ministry of Public Security has noted that the number of cyber attacks on Chinese computers and websites has soared by more than 80 percent annually, and, by the raw numbers, China is the world’s largest victim of cyberattacks. 16 Indeed, in December 2011, more than a dozen of China’s most popular online shopping, microblogging, social networking and gaming websites were hacked, resulting in the release of more than 100 million Internet user names, passwords and emails.

Even more, many believe that China’s systems are more vulnerable than are America’s. 18 This assertion has merit, in part because greater use of “pirated” software by Chinese companies and institutions means that their systems typically do not get the same upgrades of protection to evolving cyber threats that normal buyers receive. Some estimate that 10 million or more Chinese computers are currently part of botnets. 19

Chinese officials and writers also assert that most attacks on Chinese computers originate in the United States, claiming that China has been the target of some 34,000 cyber attacks from the US. 20 While the num bers are arguable, it is undeniable that a large amount of malicious In ternet activity emanates from or at least moves through the U.S. For example, security researchers at HostExploit have found that 20 of the top 50 crime-spewing ISPs (Internet Service Providers—the compa nies that provide access to the Internet) in the world are American. 21 Also, U.S. government agencies like the NSA are active and expert in cyber operations.

Finally, Chinese actors often express a sense of unfairness. Many feel that the U.S. has a too highly privileged position in the global cyber communications world as a legacy of its seminal role in developing the Internet and many related cyber technologies. They note, for example, that of the 13 root servers that are essential to the function of the entire Internet, 10 were originally located in the U.S. (and include U.S. gov ernment operators like the U.S. Army Research Lab and NASA), and the other 3 are in U.S. allies (Japan, Netherlands, Sweden). Similarly, ICANN, which essentially manages the protocol addresses so essential to preserving the stability and smooth operation of the global Internet, started out through a U.S. government mandate.

Whichever position one takes, what is even more worrisome is that such tensions and concerns are inexorably growing. The last year has amplified all of these trends. On top of this, both the scale and sophistication of attacks in cyber space has grown, notably in the Stuxnet episode. In this situation, a specially designed computer worm targeted Siemens Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used to run the centrifuges at five Iranian nuclear research facilities. The episode was viewed as a success for counter-proliferation efforts (in that it hampered illegal nuclear weapons research in a highly fo cused way), but also was described in both American and Chinese circles as an indicator of a new level of threat. 23

Indeed, two scholars at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences re leased a report whose tone effectively captured the perceived level of tension and confusion this issue has generated in such a short period: “Of late, an Internet tornado has swept across the world ... massively impacting and shocking the globe. Behind all this lies the shadow of America. Faced with this warm-up for an Internet war, every nation and military can’t be passive but is making preparations to fight the Internet war.” 24

In sum, distrust of each other’s actions in the cyber realm is growing between the U.S. and China, and such distrust easily spills over into broader assessments of the other country’s long term intentions. It is heightened by the link between the cyber domain and key values like individual privacy on the U.S. side and concerns with internal stabil ity on the Chinese side. Even more, the potentially poisoning effect of cybersecurity on the relationship is occurring at a time when there is genuine uncertainty about the degree and speed of changes in the global balance of power. The disagreements feed into the anxieties on all sides as to whether America and China will have a basically cooperative or antagonistic relationship over the coming several decades. 25

In traditional relations between two powers, the intersection of capability, vulnerability, and intention directs whether the states look at each other as partners or threats. Thus, the stakes in this fundamental issue could hardly be higher. Policymakers and publics on both sides must face the fact that, at this point, developments in the cyber realm are contributing to tensions rather than enhancing confidence in each side’s ability to find ways to cooperate with the other to handle the major issues we collectively face in a changing world.

Warming is real and anthropogenic–best climate data and models

Mueller 12

(The New York Times, Richard A. Mueller, July 28, 2012, “The Conversion of a Climate Change Skeptic” Richard A. Muller, a professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, is the author, most recently, of “Energy for Future Presidents: The Science Behind the Headlines.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all>)

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct. I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbon dioxide, measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice. Just as important, our record is long enough that we could search for the fingerprint of solar variability, based on the historical record of sunspots. That fingerprint is absent. Although the I.P.C.C. allowed for the possibility that variations in sunlight could have ended the “Little Ice Age,” a period of cooling from the 14th century to about 1850, our data argues strongly that the temperature rise of the past 250 years cannot be attributed to solar changes. This conclusion is, in retrospect, not too surprising; we’ve learned from satellite measurements that solar activity changes the brightness of the sun very little. How definite is the attribution to humans? The carbon dioxide curve gives a better match than anything else we’ve tried. Its magnitude is consistent with the calculated greenhouse effect — extra warming from trapped heat radiation. These facts don’t prove causality and they shouldn’t end skepticism, but they raise the bar: to be considered seriously, an alternative explanation must match the data at least as well as carbon dioxide does. Adding methane, a second greenhouse gas, to our analysis doesn’t change the results. Moreover, our analysis does not depend on large, complex global climate models, the huge computer programs that are notorious for their hidden assumptions and adjustable parameters. Our result is based simply on the close agreement between the shape of the observed temperature rise and the known greenhouse gas increase.

Prefer scientific consensus

Trenberth et al. 12 (Kevin Trenberth, Sc.D, Distinguished Senior Scientist, Climate Analysis Section, National Center for Atmospheric Research Richard Somerville, Ph.D., Distinguished Professor, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego Katharine Hayhoe, Ph.D., Director, Climate Science Center, Texas Tech University Rasmus Benestad, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, The Norwegian Meteorological Institute Gerald Meehl, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Climate and Global Dynamics Division, National Center for Atmospheric Research Michael Oppenheimer, Ph.D., Professor of Geosciences; Director, Program in Science, Technology and Environmental Policy, Princeton University Peter Gleick, Ph.D., co-founder and president, Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security Michael C. MacCracken, Ph.D., Chief Scientist, Climate Institute, Washington Michael Mann, Ph.D., Director, Earth System Science Center, Pennsylvania State University Steven Running, Ph.D., Professor, Director, Numerical Terradynamic Simulation Group, University of Montana Robert Corell, Ph.D., Chair, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment; Principal, Global Environment Technology Foundation Dennis Ojima, Ph.D., Professor, Senior Research Scientist, and Head of the Dept. of Interior's Climate Science Center at Colorado State University Josh Willis, Ph.D., Climate Scientist, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory Matthew England, Ph.D., Professor, Joint Director of the Climate Change Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Australia Ken Caldeira, Ph.D., Atmospheric Scientist, Dept. of Global Ecology, Carnegie Institution Warren Washington, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, National Center for Atmospheric Research Terry L. Root, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University David Karoly, Ph.D., ARC Federation Fellow and Professor, University of Melbourne, Australia Jeffrey Kiehl, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Climate and Global Dynamics Division, National Center for Atmospheric Research Donald Wuebbles, Ph.D., Professor of Atmospheric Sciences, University of Illinois Camille Parmesan, Ph.D., Professor of Biology, University of Texas; Professor of Global Change Biology, Marine Institute, University of Plymouth, UK Simon Donner, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Canada Barrett N. Rock, Ph.D., Professor, Complex Systems Research Center and Department of Natural Resources, University of New Hampshire David Griggs, Ph.D., Professor and Director, Monash Sustainability Institute, Monash University, Australia Roger N. Jones, Ph.D., Professor, Professorial Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, Australia William L. Chameides, Ph.D., Dean and Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University Gary Yohe, Ph.D., Professor, Economics and Environmental Studies, Wesleyan University, CT Robert Watson, Ph.D., Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Chair of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia Steven Sherwood, Ph.D., Director, Climate Change Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia Chris Rapley, Ph.D., Professor of Climate Science, University College London, UK Joan Kleypas, Ph.D., Scientist, Climate and Global Dynamics Division, National Center for Atmospheric Research James J. McCarthy, Ph.D., Professor of Biological Oceanography, Harvard University Stefan Rahmstorf, Ph.D., Professor of Physics of the Oceans, Potsdam University, Germany Julia Cole, Ph.D., Professor, Geosciences and Atmospheric Sciences, University of Arizona William H. Schlesinger, Ph.D., President, Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies Jonathan Overpeck, Ph.D., Professor of Geosciences and Atmospheric Sciences, University of Arizona Eric Rignot, Ph.D., Senior Research Scientist, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Professor of Earth System Science, University of California, Irvine Wolfgang Cramer, Professor of Global Ecology, Mediterranean Institute for Biodiversity and Ecology, CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, France, 2/1/2012, “Check With Climate Scientists for Views on Climate”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204740904577193270727472662.html)

Do you consult your dentist about your heart condition? In science, as in any area, reputations are based on knowledge and expertise in a field and on published, peer-reviewed work. If you need surgery, you want a highly experienced expert in the field who has done a large number of the proposed operations. You published "No Need to Panic About Global Warming" (op-ed, Jan. 27) on climate change by the climate-science equivalent of dentists practicing cardiology. While accomplished in their own fields, most of these authors have no expertise in climate science. The few authors who have such expertise are known to have extreme views that are out of step with nearly every other climate expert. This happens in nearly every field of science. For example, there is a retrovirus expert who does not accept that HIV causes AIDS. And it is instructive to recall that a few scientists continued to state that smoking did not cause cancer, long after that was settled science. Climate experts know that the long-term warming trend has not abated in the past decade. In fact, it was the warmest decade on record. Observations show unequivocally that our planet is getting hotter. And computer models have recently shown that during periods when there is a smaller increase of surface temperatures, warming is occurring elsewhere in the climate system, typically in the deep ocean. Such periods are a relatively common climate phenomenon, are consistent with our physical understanding of how the climate system works, and certainly do not invalidate our understanding of human-induced warming or the models used to simulate that warming. Thus, climate experts also know what one of us, Kevin Trenberth, actually meant by the out-of-context, misrepresented quote used in the op-ed. Mr. Trenberth was lamenting the inadequacy of observing systems to fully monitor warming trends in the deep ocean and other aspects of the short-term variations that always occur, together with the long-term human-induced warming trend. The National Academy of Sciences of the U.S. (set up by President Abraham Lincoln to advise on scientific issues), as well as major national academies of science around the world and every other authoritative body of scientists active in climate research have stated that the science is clear: The world is heating up and humans are primarily responsible. Impacts are already apparent and will increase. Reducing future impacts will require significant reductions in emissions of heat-trapping gases. Research shows that more than 97% of scientists actively publishing in the field agree that climate change is real and human caused. It would be an act of recklessness for any political leader to disregard the weight of evidence and ignore the enormous risks that climate change clearly poses. In addition, there is very clear evidence that investing in the transition to a low-carbon economy will not only allow the world to avoid the worst risks of climate change, but could also drive decades of economic growth. Just what the doctor ordered.

It’s not too late—emissions reductions can avoid and delay catastrophic impacts.

Chestney 1/13/13

Nina, senior environmental correspondent, “Climate Change Study: Emissions Limits Could Avoid Damage By Two-Thirds,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/13/climate-change-study-emissions-limits_n_2467995.html>, AM

The world could avoid much of the damaging effects of climate change this century if greenhouse gas emissions are curbed more sharply, research showed on Sunday. The study, published in the journal Nature Climate Change, is the first comprehensive assessment of the benefits of cutting emissions to keep the global temperature rise to within 2 degrees Celsius by 2100, a level which scientists say would avoid the worst effects of climate change. It found 20 to 65 percent of the adverse impacts by the end of this century could be avoided. "Our research clearly identifies the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions - less severe impacts on flooding and crops are two areas of particular benefit," said Nigel Arnell, director of the University of Reading's Walker Institute, which led the study. In 2010, governments agreed to curb emissions to keep temperatures from rising above 2 degrees C, but current emissions reduction targets are on track to lead to a temperature rise of 4 degrees or more by 2100. The World Bank has warned more extreme weather will become the "new normal" if global temperature rises by 4 degrees. Extreme heatwaves could devastate areas from the Middle East to the United States, while sea levels could rise by up to 91 cm (3 feet), flooding cities in countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, the bank has said. The latest research involved scientists from British institutions including the University of Reading, the Met Office Hadley Centre and the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change, as well as Germany's Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. It examined a range of emissions-cut scenarios and their impact on factors including flooding, drought, water availability and crop productivity. The strictest scenario kept global temperature rise to 2 degrees C with emissions peaking in 2016 and declining by 5 percent a year to 2050. FLOODING Adverse effects such as declining crop productivity and exposure to river flooding could be reduced by 40 to 65 percent by 2100 if warming is limited to 2 degrees, the study said. Global average sea level rise could be reduced to 30cm (12 inches) by 2100, compared to 47-55cm (18-22 inches) if no action to cut emissions is taken, it said. Some adverse climate impacts could also be delayed by many decades. The global productivity of spring wheat could drop by 20 percent by the 2050s, but the fall in yield could be delayed until 2100 if strict emissions curbs were enforced. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions won't avoid the impacts of climate change altogether of course, but our research shows it will buy time **to** make things like buildings, transport systems and agriculture more resilient to climate change," Arnell said.

Warming causes extinction

Brandenberg 99 (John & Monica Paxson, Visiting Prof. Researcher @ Florida Space Institute, Physicist Ph.D., Science Writer, Dead Mars Dying Earth, Pg 232-233)

The ozone hole expands, driven by a monstrous synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far north and south and not the major nations’ heartlands. The seas rise, the tropics roast but the media networks no longer cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high-pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil, the Nile dries up and the monsoons fail. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event occurs—a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or Mars), or a **nuclear war** that starts between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia . . . Suddenly the gradual climb in global temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide from their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. As the oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms the oceans, causing them to dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires, which release more carbon dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in what is termed a runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one telling the other, “See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!” Earth, as we know it, dies. After this Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and the dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun for it to be the second Venus for long. Its atmosphere is slowly lost—as is its water—because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while temperatures are nearly normal, but the ultraviolet **sears any life** that tries to make a comeback. The carbon dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few wispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Mars—red, **desolate, with** perhaps a **few** hardy microbes surviving.

Warming disrprotionately impacts oppressed populations

**Burkett 8** (Maxine Burkett, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School, 2008, "Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism," 56 Buffalo L. Rev. 169, Lexis)

The profound injustices that inhere in climate change’s disproportionate effects are obvious, yet two bear explication. One is that the unequal burden that is occurring, and is predicted, falls on those who have not been primarily responsible for climate change, domestically as well as internationally.75 African Americans, for example, are “less responsible for climate change than other Americans; . . . at present, African Americans emit 20 percent less greenhouse gases per household,”76 and on a per capita basis.77 It is also true that the less wealthy half of America, regardless of race, is far less responsible for carbon dioxide emissions as well.78 Further, historically these percentage disparities were even higher.79 The second, and perhaps most compelling, injustice is the compounding effect of the environmental risk on the underlying societal inequities— inequality that resulted in the uneven patterns of development and access to resources and opportunity in America.80 In other words, the legacy of slavery, segregation, the placement of reservations for indigenous populations, and the more elusive systemic discrimination that has followed, for example, is now locking in differentiated experiences of a warming planet. The reach of that racial discrimination has deep implications for the structuring of sound and just climate policy. The distribution of climate change impacts is likely to be increasingly unjust; for that reason, it is imperative that the solutions proffered neither entrench existing vulnerabilities nor introduce new ones.81 Without early and meaningful participation from EJ communities, the interests and needs of those communities will insufficiently inform strategies to mitigate and adapt to climate change.82 In short, climate policy for both mitigation and adaptation can create its own “winners and losers,”83 and without fair decision-making in the process of crafting solutions, “fair outcomes will only ever be coincidental.”84

This is overwhelmingly the case.

Cuomo ’11

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The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina made it plain that structural inequalities produced by racism can determine who is most affected by severe weather events, and in turn disasters can greatly intensify social and political inequalities. In addition, within nearly any society the poorest and most vulnerable includes disproportionate numbers of females, people of color, and children. Research shows that large-scale disasters are especially devastating for those who lack economic and decision-making power, and that “economic insecurity is a key factor increasing the impact of disasters on women as caregivers, producers, and community actors” (Enarson 2000, viii). But economic security is not the only factor influencing female vulnerabilities. Existing social roles and divisions of labor can also set the stage for increased susceptibility to harm. The tsunami that struck Asia in late 2004 resulted in a much greater loss of life among women and girls in many locations, because women “stayed behind to look for their children and other relatives; men more often than women can swim; men more often than women can climb trees,” and at the time the waves struck, many men and boys were working in small boats or doing errands away from home (Oxfam 2005; see also American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 2006). Extreme droughts, already occurring due to climate change, exacerbate gender inequalities in places where it is women’s and girls’ responsibility to gather daily water, for when water becomes more scarce, “many poor people, but particularly women and girls, will have to spend more time and energy fetching water from further away” (Stern 2009, 70). Physical hardship for women and girls is multiplied, but there are also auxiliary effects, such as decreased opportunities for girls to attend school and increased risk of assault (American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 2006; Stern 2009; UN News Centre 2009). And wealthier high emitters with running water are not immune to such ecological pressures. In southeast Australia previously prosperous farmers are suffering due to reduced water availability and accompanying distribution policies. Women married to men in farming families report that their burden is greatly increased, because drought reduces farm income, and when wages are needed women find more opportunities for off-farm work. Some must travel far or temporarily relocate for employment, although their caretaking responsibilities remain. Male partners respond to the compounding impacts of loss of financial security, livelihood, and identity with increased incidences of depression and domestic violence (Alston 2008). Not surprisingly, their vulnerabilities are also shaped by norms of sex and gender.

Warming causes hydrogen sulfide poisoning—extinction.

Ward 10

(Peter, PhD, professor of Biology and Earth and Space Sciences at the University of Washington, paleontologist and NASA astrobiologist, Fellow at the California Academy of Sciences, The Flooded Earth: Our Future in a World Without Ice Caps, June 29, 2010)

In the rest of this chapter I will support a contention that within several millennia (or less) the planet will see a changeover of the oceans from their current “mixed” states to something much different and dire. Oceans will become stratified by their oxygen content and temperature, with warm, oxygen-free water lining the ocean basins. **Stratified oceans** like this in the past (and they were present for most of Earth’s history) **have always been preludes to biotic catastrophe**. Because the continents were in such different positions at that time, models we use today to understand ocean current systems are still crude when it comes to analyzing the ancient oceans, such as those of the Devonian or Permian Periods. Both times witnessed major mass extinctions, and these extinctions were somehow tied to events in the sea. Yet catastrophic as it was, the event that turned the Canning Coral Reef of Devonian age into the Canning Microbial Reef featured at the start of this chapter was tame compared to that ending the 300 million- to 251 million-year-old Permian Period, and for this reason alone the Permian ocean and its fate have been far more studied than the Devonian. But there is another reason to concentrate on the Permian mass extinction: it took place on a world with a climate more similar to that of today than anytime in the Devonian. Even more important, it was a world with ice sheets at the poles, something the more tropical Devonian Period may never have witnessed. For much of the Permian Period, the Earth, as it does today, had abundant ice caps at both poles, and there were large-scale continental glaciations up until at least 270 million years ago, and perhaps even later.4 But from then until the end of the Permian, the planet rapidly warmed, the ice caps disappeared, and the deep ocean bottoms filled with great volumes of warm, virtually oxygen-free seawater. The trigger for disaster was a short-term but massive infusion of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere at the end of the Permian from the spectacular lava outpourings over an appreciable portion of what would become northern Asia. The lava, now ancient but still in place, is called the “Siberian Traps,” the latter term coming from the Scandinavian for lava flows. The great volcanic event was but the start of things, and led to changes in oceanography. The ultimate kill mechanism seems to have been a lethal combination of rising temperature, diminishing oxygen, and influx into water and air of the highly poisonous compound hydrogen sulfide. The cruel irony is that this latter poison was itself produced by life, not by the volcanoes. The bottom line is that life produced the ultimate killer in this and surely other ancient mass extinctions. This finding was one that spurred me to propose the Medea Hypothesis, and a book of the same name.5 **Hydrogen sulfide poisoning might indeed be the worst biological effect of global warming**. There is no reason that such an event cannot happen again, given short-term global warming. And because of the way the sun ages, it may be that **such events will be ever easier to start** than during the deep past. How does the sun get involved in such nasty business as mass extinction? Unlike a campfire that burns down to embers, any star gets ever hotter when it is on the “main sequence,” which is simply a term used to described the normal aging of a star—something like the progression we all go through as we age. But new work by Jeff Kiehl of the University of Colorado shows that because the sun keeps getting brighter, amounts of CO2 that in the past would not have triggered the process result in stagnant oceans filled with H2S-producing microbes. His novel approach was to estimate the global temperature rise to be expected from carbon dioxide levels added to the energy hitting the earth from the sun. Too often we refer to the greenhouse effect as simply a product of the gases. But it is sunlight that actually produces the heat, and that amount of energy hitting the earth keeps increasing. He then compared those to past times of mass extinctions. The surprise is that a CO2 level of 1,000 ppm would—with our current solar radiation—make our world the second hottest in Earth history—**when the five hottest were each associated with mass extinction**. In the deep history of our planet, there have been at least five short intervals in which the majority of living species suddenly went extinct. Biologists are used to thinking about how environmental pressures slowly choose the organisms most fit for survival through natural selection, shaping life on Earth like an artist sculpting clay. However, mass extinctions are drastic examples of natural selection at its most ruthless, killing vast numbers of species at one time in a way hardly typical of evolution. In the 1980s, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Luis Alvarez, and his son Walter Alvarez, first hypothesized that the impact of comets or asteroids caused the mass extinctions of the past.6 Most scientists slowly come to accept this theory of extinction, further supported by the discovery of a great scar in the earth—an impact crater—off the coast of Mexico that dates to around the time the dinosaurs went extinct. An asteroid probably did kill off the dinosaurs, but the causes of the remaining four mass extinctions are still obscured beneath the accumulated effects of hundreds of millions of years, and no one has found any credible evidence of impact craters. Rather than comets and asteroids, it now appears that short-term **global warming was the culprit for the four other mass extinctions**. I detailed the workings of these extinctions first in a 1996 Discover magazine article,7 then in an October 2006 Scientific American article, and finally in my 2007 book, Under a Green Sky.8 In each I considered whether such events could happen again. In my mind, such extinctions constitute the worst that could happen to life and the earth as a result of short-term global warming. But before we get to that, let us look at the workings of these past events. The evidence at hand links the mass extinctions with a changeover in the ocean from oxygenated to anoxic bottom waters. The source of this was a change in where bottom waters are formed. It appears that in such events, the source of our earth’s deep water shifted from the high latitudes to lower latitudes, and the kind of water making it to the ocean bottoms was different as well: it changed from cold, oxygenated water to warm water containing less oxygen. The result was the extinction of deep-water organisms. Thus a greenhouse extinction is a product of a changeover of the conveyor-belt current systems found on Earth any time there is a marked difference in temperatures between the tropics and the polar regions. Let us summarize the steps that make greenhouse extinction happen. First, the world warms over short intervals due to a sudden increase in carbon dioxide and methane, caused initially by the formation of vast volcanic provinces called flood basalts. The warmer world affects the ocean circulation systems and disrupts the position of the conveyor currents. Bottom waters begin to have warm, low-oxygen water dumped into them. The warming continues, and the decrease of equator-to-pole temperature differences brings ocean winds and surface currents to a near standstill. The mixing of oxygenated surface waters with the deeper and volumetrically increasing low-oxygen bottom waters lessens, causing ever-shallower water to change from oxygenated to anoxic. Finally, the bottom water exists in depths where light can penetrate, and the combination of low oxygen and light allows green sulfur bacteria to expand in numbers, filling the low-oxygen shallows. The bacteria produce toxic amounts of H2S, with the flux of this gas into the atmosphere occurring at as much as 2,000 times today’s rates. The gas rises into the high atmosphere, **where it breaks down the ozone layer**. The subsequent increase in ultraviolet radiation from the sun kills much of the photosynthetic green plant phytoplankton. On its way up into the sky, the hydrogen sulfide also kills some plant and animal life, and the combination of high heat and hydrogen sulfide **creates a mass extinction on land**.9 Could this happen again? No, says one of the experts who write the RealClimate.org Web site, Gavin Schmidt, who, it turns out, works under Jim Hansen at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center near Washington, DC. I disagreed and challenged him to an online debate. He refused, saying that the environmental situation is going to be bad enough without resorting to creating a scenario for mass extinction. But special pleading has no place in science. Could it be that global warming could lead to the extinction of humanity? That prospect cannot be discounted. To pursue this question, let us look at what might be the most crucial of all systems maintaining habitability on Planet Earth: the thermohaline current systems, sometimes called the conveyor currents.

The state is inevitable and an indispensable part of the solution to warming

**Eckersley 4** Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, “The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty”, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books, pp. 3-8

While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation, I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation.10 As Bull argued, **given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not**, then the call to get "beyond the state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it.""¶ In any event, rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the **state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance**. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that **any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent**. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about **ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions** and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.¶ Of course, it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change. Nonetheless, while the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains, the political power concentrated in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. **Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities**, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism**. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis**. Given that the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed **without the active support of states**. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power.¶ Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends\* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16¶ In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings. The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. **It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment.**¶ In short, although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, **there are still few social institution that can match the** same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that **states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems** such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17

It super-charges any other solution.

Cuomo ’11

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Due to the scale of change that is needed, individual and household reductions in greenhouse-gas pollution will be effective only if they are deep and widespread, and only if they are accompanied by meta-level efforts, but meta-level policies and corporate practices seem unlikely to emerge without significant support from “below.” Addressing climate change through mitigation and transnational funding for adaptation requires administrative action in the form of binding treaties, laws and regulations, taxes, incentives for technological development, and increased international aid, but such policies and practices require mass popular support. An unfair and possibly unmanageable degree of practical responsibility therefore falls on citizens and consumers, who may turn out to be ineffective as political actors because of the problems of insufficiency and disempowerment, among other things. Nonetheless, if national and corporate policies will not go in a more sustainable direction without a great swell of public support in places like the United States, then it is ethically and practically necessary that the significant minority who hopes to effectively address the problem of climate change find ways to build that support. It would be tragic if increasing disempowerment fueled by well-intentioned green messaging were to magnify political ineffectiveness among environmentalists and global human rights advocates by making it more attractive to focus on personal or private-sphere changes, rather than investing time or energy in work for change at higher levels. Perhaps money and energy otherwise spent on highpriced home retrofitting or demanding lifestyle changes should be aimed directly toward growing movements that increase “green” consciousness and political influence and that effectively demand full corporate responsibility for pollution. If such efforts were to result in a few very significant policy changes, such as a global moratorium on gas flaring or a greening of the military, the payoff in terms of long-term mitigation could be great. Such successes could in turn energize cultural shifts toward more effective alternative technologies. What can a well-organized collection of people who care accomplish through democratic politics and cultural transformation? Can advocates for environmental integrity and human rights better help us all to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions in due time? The problem of climate change provides opportunities to foster regenerating movements toward more sustainable and humane futures, and so inevitably some will step up and take responsibility for addressing the problem. Could they possibly succeed? Given the urgency created by the industrial greenhouse effect, an ethically motivated minority must effectively act on their caring while also making it contagious through the creation of a more effective political will. The insufficiency problem might be reduced if those who care about climate change and climate justice channel their mitigation efforts more effectively to influence decision-makers and policies at higher levels, where actions can be carried out with significant and immediate effects on emission levels and matters of social justice. If more corporate and governmental actors are pressured (or inspired) to take responsibility for the causes of climate change, their decisions and innovations can in turn create more options for carbon-free lifestyles, which will also help reduce the insufficiency and disempowerment problems for average consumers. The knowledge we need to avert a more extreme climate disaster already exists, in many places and in multiple forms. Those who care about humanity and Earth’s green growing mantle of life need the power to turn dominant practices and policies toward better futures. Grand successes along those lines are needed very soon.

## 1AC – Deliberation

Contention two – deliberation

Debate over the implementation of the plan is key to effective advocacy and decision-making in war powers – those skills overcome technocracy and improve political outcomes

Laura K. **Donohue**, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/**13**, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course **was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying** doctrinal **material and** creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, **while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage**. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. **This is the most important determination, because the substance of the** doctrinal portion of the course and the **simulation follows from this decision**. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. **This**, then, **becomes a guide for the** doctrinal part of the **course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation** are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. **The one-size fits all approach** currently **dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised** in the current conversation. **Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at** the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion **simulations**, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may **provide an important way forward**. Such **simulations** also **cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education**, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed **the simulation model** above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it **does provide a** starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. **It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which** they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

It’s specifically true for climate policy

Mitchell 10

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of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, where he also directs the William Pitt Debating

Union. Robert Asen’s patient and thoughtful feedback sharpened this manuscript, which was also

improved by contributions from members of the Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group

(DAWG), a consortium of public argument scholars at the University of Pittsburgh that strives

to generate rigorous scholarship addressing the role of argumentation and debate in society. SWITCH-SIDE DEBATING MEETS DEMAND-DRIVEN RHETORIC OF SCIENCE. MITCHELL, GORDON R.1 Rhetoric & Public Affairs; Spring2010, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p95-120, 26p

 The watchwords for the intelligence community’s debating initiative— collaboration, critical thinking, collective awareness—resonate with key terms anchoring the study of deliberative democracy. In a major new text, John Gastil defines deliberation as a process whereby people “carefully examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution aft er a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of view.”40 Gastil and his colleagues in organizations such as the Kettering Foundation and the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation are pursuing a research program that foregrounds the democratic telos of deliberative processes. Work in this area features a blend of concrete interventions and studies of citizen empowerment.41 Notably, a key theme in much of this literature concerns the relationship between deliberation and debate, with the latter term often loaded with pejorative baggage and working as a negative foil to highlight the positive qualities of deliberation.42 “Most political discussions, however, are debates. Stories in the media turn politics into a never-ending series of contests. People get swept into taking sides; their energy goes into figuring out who or what they’re for or against,” says Kettering president David Mathews and coauthor Noelle McAfee. “Deliberation is different. It is neither a partisan argument where opposing sides try to win nor a casual conversation conducted with polite civility. Public deliberation is a means by which citizens make tough choices about basic purposes and directions for their communities and their country. It is a way of reasoning and talking together.”43 Mathews and McAfee’s distrust of the debate process is almost paradigmatic amongst theorists and practitioners of Kettering-style deliberative democracy. One conceptual mechanism for reinforcing this debate-deliberation opposition is characterization of debate as a process inimical to deliberative aims, with debaters adopting dogmatic and fixed positions that frustrate the deliberative objective of “choice work.” In this register, Emily Robertson observes, “unlike deliberators, debaters are typically not open to the possibility of being shown wrong. . . . Debaters are not trying to find the best solution by keeping an open mind about the opponent’s point of view.”44 Similarly, founding documents from the University of Houston–Downtown’s Center for Public Deliberation state, “Public deliberation is about choice work, which is different from a dialogue or a debate. In dialogue, people oft en look to relate to each other, to understand each other, and to talk about more informal issues. In debate, there are generally two positions and people are generally looking to ‘win’ their side.”45 Debate, cast here as the theoretical scapegoat, provides a convenient, low-water benchmark for explaining how other forms of deliberative interaction better promote cooperative “choice work.” The Kettering-inspired framework receives support from perversions of the debate process such as vapid presidential debates and verbal pyrotechnics found on Crossfire-style television shows.46 In contrast, the intelligence community’s debating initiative stands as a nettlesome anomaly for these theoretical frameworks, with debate serving, rather than frustrating, the ends of deliberation. The presence of such an anomaly would seem to point to the wisdom of fashioning a theoretical orientation that frames the debate-deliberation connection in contingent, rather than static terms, with the relationship between the categories shift ing along with the various contexts in which they manifest in practice.47 Such an approach gestures toward the importance of rhetorically informed critical work on multiple levels. First, the contingency of situated practice invites analysis geared to assess, in particular cases, the extent to which debate practices enable and/ or constrain deliberative objectives. Regarding the intelligence community’s debating initiative, such an analytical perspective highlights, for example, the tight connection between the deliberative goals established by intelligence officials and the cultural technology manifest in the bridge project’s online debating applications such as Hot Grinds. An additional dimension of nuance emerging from this avenue of analysis pertains to the precise nature of the deliberative goals set by bridge. Program descriptions notably eschew Kettering-style references to democratic citizen empowerment, yet feature deliberation prominently as a key ingredient of strong intelligence tradecraft . Th is caveat is especially salient to consider when it comes to the second category of rhetorically informed critical work invited by the contingent aspect of specific debate initiatives. To grasp this layer it is useful to appreciate how the name of the bridge project constitutes an invitation for those outside the intelligence community to participate in the analytic outreach eff ort. According to Doney, bridge “provides an environment for Analytic Outreach—a place where IC analysts can reach out to expertise elsewhere in federal, state, and local government, in academia, and industry. New communities of interest can form quickly in bridge through the ‘web of trust’ access control model—access to minds outside the intelligence community creates an analytic force multiplier.”48 This presents a moment of choice for academic scholars in a position to respond to Doney’s invitation; it is an opportunity to convert scholarly expertise into an “analytic force multiplier.” In reflexively pondering this invitation, it may be valuable for scholars to read Greene and Hicks’s proposition that switch-side debating should be viewed as a cultural technology in light of Langdon Winner’s maxim that “technological artifacts have politics.”49 In the case of bridge, politics are informed by the history of intelligence community policies and practices. Commenter Th omas Lord puts this point in high relief in a post off ered in response to a news story on the topic: “[W]hy should this thing (‘bridge’) be? . . . [Th e intelligence community] on the one hand sometimes provides useful information to the military or to the civilian branches and on the other hand it is a dangerous, out of control, relic that by all external appearances is not the slightest bit reformed, other than superficially, from such excesses as became exposed in the cointelpro and mkultra hearings of the 1970s.”50 A debate scholar need not agree with Lord’s full-throated criticism of the intelligence community (he goes on to observe that it bears an alarming resemblance to organized crime) to understand that participation in the community’s Analytic Outreach program may serve the ends of deliberation, but not necessarily democracy, or even a defensible politics. Demand-driven rhetoric of science necessarily raises questions about what’s driving the demand, questions that scholars with relevant expertise would do well to ponder carefully before embracing invitations to contribute their argumentative expertise to deliberative projects. By the same token, it would be prudent to bear in mind that the technological determinism about switch-side debate endorsed by Greene and Hicks may tend to flatten reflexive assessments regarding the wisdom of supporting a given debate initiative—as the next section illustrates, manifest differences among initiatives warrant context-sensitive judgments regarding the normative political dimensions featured in each case. Public Debates in the EPA Policy Process Th e preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of diff erent kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don’t work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to “decisionism,” the formulaic application of “objective” decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, “whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process.” Accordingly, he notes, “we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.”51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis’s EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions craft ed to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were craft ed to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states’ authority to control upstream states’ discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 107 debaters’ ability to act as “honest brokers” in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters “didn’t have a dog in the fight,” they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.”54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of diff erent policy options. In so doing, the diff ering, oft en tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate eff orts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. Th e dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.”56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public 108 Rhetoric & Public Affairs debate” diff ers both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English field’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis’s response to the EPA’s institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis’s dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, “Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.”60 As John Poulakos points out, “older” Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 Th e few surviving fragments of Protagoras’s work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that “two accounts [logoi] are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other,” and further, that humans could “measure” the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the “weaker argument stronger” to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras’s wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchesthe, a centripetal exercise of “coming together” deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 109 Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchesthe, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay’s earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft , such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. Th e significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchesthe, alliance formation. Th e intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University’s participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (hbcus) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis’s dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College’s tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA’s public debating initiative. Th is dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger’s and Wayne Brockriede’s vision of “total” debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis’s dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using “words as weapons”70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi diff ers significantly from the intelligence community’s eff ort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such diff erence is especially evident in light of the EPA’s commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: 110 Rhetoric & Public Affairs Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other’s argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the “argumentative turn” is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation. Conclusion Dilip Gaonkar’s criticism of first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship rests on a key claim regarding what he sees as the inherent “thinness” of the ancient Greek rhetorical lexicon.72 That lexicon, by virtue of the fact that it was invented primarily to teach rhetorical performance, is ill equipped in his view to support the kind of nuanced discriminations required for eff ective interpretation and critique of rhetorical texts. Although Gaonkar isolates rhetoric of science as a main target of this critique, his choice of subject matter Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 111 positions him to toggle back and forth between specific engagement with rhetoric of science scholarship and discussion of broader themes touching on the metatheoretical controversy over rhetoric’s proper scope as a field of inquiry (the so-called big vs. little rhetoric dispute).73 Gaonkar’s familiar refrain in both contexts is a warning about the dangers of “universalizing” or “globalizing” rhetorical inquiry, especially in attempts that “stretch” the classical Greek rhetorical vocabulary into a hermeneutic metadiscourse, one pressed into service as a master key for interpretation of any and all types of communicative artifacts. In other words, Gaonkar warns against the dangers of rhetoricians pursuing what might be called supply-side epistemology, rhetoric’s project of pushing for greater disciplinary relevance by attempting to extend its reach into far-flung areas of inquiry such as the hard sciences. Yet this essay highlights how rhetorical scholarship’s relevance can be credibly established by outsiders, who seek access to the creative energy flowing from the classical Greek rhetorical lexicon in its native mode, that is, as a tool of invention designed to spur and hone rhetorical performance. Analysis of the intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives shows how this is the case, with government agencies calling for assistance to animate rhetorical processes such as dissoi logoi (debating different sides) and synerchesthe (the performative task of coming together deliberately for the purpose of joint inquiry, collective choice-making, and renewal of communicative bonds).74 Th is demand-driven epistemology is diff erent in kind from the globalization project so roundly criticized by Gaonkar. Rather than rhetoric venturing out from its own academic home to proselytize about its epistemological universality for all knowers, instead here we have actors not formally trained in the rhetorical tradition articulating how their own deliberative objectives call for incorporation of rhetorical practice and even recruitment of “strategically located allies”75 to assist in the process. Since the productivist content in the classical Greek vocabulary serves as a critical resource for joint collaboration in this regard, demand-driven rhetoric of science turns Gaonkar’s original critique on its head. In fairness to Gaonkar, it should be stipulated that his 1993 intervention challenged the way rhetoric of science had been done to date, not the universe of ways rhetoric of science might be done in the future. And to his partial credit, Gaonkar did acknowledge the promise of a performance-oriented rhetoric of science, especially one informed by classical thinkers other than Aristotle.76 In his Ph.D. dissertation on “Aspects of Sophistic Pedagogy,” Gaonkar documents how the ancient sophists were “the greatest champions” 112 Rhetoric & Public Affairs of “socially useful” science,77 and also how the sophists essentially practiced the art of rhetoric in a translational, performative register: Th e sophists could not blithely go about their business of making science useful, while science itself stood still due to lack of communal support and recognition. Besides, sophistic pedagogy was becoming increasingly dependent on the findings of contemporary speculation in philosophy and science. Take for instance, the eminently practical art of rhetoric. As taught by the best of the sophists, it was not simply a handbook of recipes which anyone could mechanically employ to his advantage. On the contrary, the strength and vitality of sophistic rhetoric came from their ability to incorporate the relevant information obtained from the on-going research in other fields.78 Of course, deep trans-historical diff erences make uncritical appropriation of classical Greek rhetoric for contemporary use a fool’s errand. But to gauge from Robert Hariman’s recent reflections on the enduring salience of Isocrates, “timely, suitable, and eloquent appropriations” can help us postmoderns “forge a new political language” suitable for addressing the complex raft of intertwined problems facing global society. Such retrospection is long overdue, says Hariman, as “the history, literature, philosophy, oratory, art, and political thought of Greece and Rome have never been more accessible or less appreciated.”79 Th is essay has explored ways that some of the most venerable elements of the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition—those dealing with debate and deliberation—can be retrieved and adapted to answer calls in the contemporary milieu for cultural technologies capable of dealing with one of our time’s most daunting challenges. This challenge involves finding meaning in inverted rhetorical situations characterized by an endemic surplus of

heterogeneous content.

The skills acquired in the process of debating warming policy are necessary and sufficient to overcome political apathy and dissuasion

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<http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/775>

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 Getting to 350 parts per million CO2 in the atmosphere will require massive investments in clean-energy infrastructure—investments that can too often be foiled by a combination of special interests and political sclerosis. Take the recent approval of the Cape Wind project by the U.S. Department of the Interior. In some ways, this was great news for clean-energy advocates: the project’s 130 turbines will produce, on average, 170 megawatts of electricity, almost 75 percent of the average electricity demand for Cape Cod and the islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket.1 But, because of local opposition by well-organized opponents, the approval process was lengthy, costly, and grueling —and all for a project that will produce only 0.04 percent of the total (forecasted) U.S. electricity demand in 2010.2,3 Over the next few decades, the world will need thousands of large-scale, low-carbon electricity projects—wind, solar, and nuclear power will certainly be in the mix. But if each faces Cape Wind–like opposition, getting to 350 is unlikely. How can the decision-making process about such projects be streamlined so that public policy reflects the view of a well-informed majority, provides opportunities for legitimate critiques, but does not permit the opposition to [impede] the process indefinitely? One answer is **found in** a set of innovative policy-making tools founded on the principle of deliberative democracy, defined as “decision making by discussion among free and equal citizens.”4 Such approaches, which have been developed and led by the Center for Deliberative Democracy (cdd.stanford.edu), America Speaks (www.americaspeaks.org), and the Consensus Building Institute (cbuilding.org), among others, are gaining popularity by promising a new foothold for effective citizen participation in the drive for a clean-energy future. Deliberative democracy stems from the belief that democratic leadership should involve educating constituents about issues at hand, and that citizens may significantly alter their opinions when faced with information about these issues. Advocates of the approach state that democracy should shift away from fixed notions toward a learning process in which people develop defensible positions.5 While the approaches of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, America Speaks, and the Consensus Building Institute do differ, all of these deliberative methodologies involve unbiased sharing of information and public-policy alternatives with a representative set of citizens; a moderated process of deliberation among the selected citizens; and the collection and dissemination of data resulting from this process. For example, in the deliberative polling approach used by the Center for Deliberative Democracy, a random selection of citizens is first polled on a particular issue. Then, members of the poll are invited to gather at a single place to discuss the issue. Participants receive balanced briefing materials to review before the gathering, and at the gathering they engage in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders based on questions they develop in small group discussions. After deliberations, the sample is asked the original poll questions, and the resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions that the public would reach if everyone were given the opportunity to become more informed on pressing issues.6 If policymakers look at deliberative polls rather than traditional polls, they will be able to utilize results that originate from an informed group of citizens. As with traditional polls, deliberative polls choose people at random to represent U.S. demographics of age, education, gender, and so on. But traditional polls stop there, asking the random sample some brief, simple questions, typically online or over the phone. However, participants of deliberative polls have the opportunity to access expert information and then talk with one another before voting on policy recommendations. The power of this approach is illustrated by the results of a global deliberative process organized by World Wide Views on Global Warming (www.wwviews.org), a citizen’s deliberation organization based in Denmark.7 On September 26, 2009, approximately 4,000 people gathered in 38 countries to consider what should happen at the UN climate change negotiations in Copenhagen (338 Americans met in five major cities). The results derived from this day of deliberation were dramatic and significantly different from results of traditional polls. Overall, citizens showed strong concern about global warming and support for climate-change legislation, contrary to the outcomes of many standard climate-change polls. Based on the polling results from these gatherings, 90 percent of global citizens believe that it is urgent for the UN negotiations to produce a new climate change agreement; 88 percent of global citizens (82 percent of U.S. citizens) favor holding global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels; and 74 percent of global citizens (69 percent of U.S. citizens) favor increasing fossil-fuel prices in developed countries. However, a typical news poll that was conducted two days before 350.org’s International Day of Climate Action on October 24, 2009, found that Americans had an overall declining concern about global warming.7 How can deliberative democracy help to create solutions for the climate-change policy process, to accelerate the kinds of policies and public investments that are so crucial to getting the world on a path to 350? Take again the example of wind in the United States. In the mid-1990s, the Texas Public Utilities Commission (PUC) launched an “integrated resource plan” to develop long-term strategies for energy production, particularly electricity.8 Upon learning about the deliberative polling approach of James Fishkin (then at the University of Texas at Austin), the PUC set up deliberative sessions for several hundred customers in the vicinity of every major utility provider in the state. The results were a surprise: it turned out that participants ranked reliability and stability of electricity supply as more important characteristics than price. In addition, they were open to supporting renewable energy, even if the costs slightly exceeded fossil-fuel sources. Observers considered this a breakthrough: based on these public deliberations, the PUC went on to champion an aggressive renewable portfolio standard, and the state has subsequently experienced little of the opposition to wind-tower siting that has slowed development in other states.8 By 2009, Texas had 9,500 megawatts of installed wind capacity, as much as the next six states (ranked by wind capacity) in the windy lower and upper Midwest (Iowa, Minnesota, Colorado, North Dakota, Kansas, and New Mexico).9 Deliberative democracy has proven effective in a wide range of countries and settings. In the Chinese township of Zeguo, a series of deliberative polls has helped the Local People’s Congress (LPC) to become a more effective decision-making body.10 In February 2008, 175 citizens were randomly selected to scrutinize the town’s budget—and 60 deputies from the LPC observed the process. After the deliberations, support decreased for budgeting for national defense projects, while support rose for infrastructure (e.g., rural road construction) and environmental protection. Subsequently, the LPC increased support for environmental projects by 9 percent.10 In decades to come, China must be at the forefront of the world’s investments in clean-energy infrastructure. The experience of Zeguo, if scaled up and fully supported by Chinese leaders, can help to play an important role. Deliberative democracy offers one solution for determining citizen opinions, including those on pressing issues related to climate change and clean energy.

The inclusion of hypothetical impact scenarios supercharges the deliberative process by providing a normative means of assessing consequences

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Climate Change and Human Settlements

Climatechange scenarios and citizen-participation: Mitigation and adaptation perspectives in constructing sustainable futures

 In constructing normative scenarios a set of images are generated illustrating future ways of living, travelling and consuming products and services where certain goal such as a reduced climate impact is fulfilled. These are not predictions of the future, but can be used as a way to act in accordance to achieving a desired future development. They can also be a contribution to the general debate or foundations for policy decisions. These scenarios also often include an account of changes in terms of consumption patterns and behavioural change. In this sense, these scenarios are extended beyond socio-economic predictions and relations to environmental load dealt within other field, such as climatechange predictions in the work of IPCC. The scenarios in focus here build on some predictive elements, but in addition the sustainability focus when including behavioural change also includes some normative elements as how to achieve a sustainable society in the future. In essence, this also means that images of behavioural change are included, but not necessary including explanations on how these changes came about (Larsen & Höjer, 2007). The behavioural change is there formulated by describing level of acceptance (of introducing a new environmental tax) or new behaviour in daily travel patterns (new modes of transport). However, even though scenario construction is often a creative process including a range of participants demanding change, trust is built and ideas exchanged, these processes are seldom analyzed as deliberative processes. Deliberation takes places in communicative processes where participants with diverse opinions, but open to preference shifts, are seen as equal (see Hendriks, Dryzek, & Hunold, 2007). Process values such as learning and mutual understanding are created in addition to outputs such as policies. Experiences from exploring transition pathways towards sustainability distinguish between process management aspects of learning (learns how?), learning about policy options and the context in which decisions take place (learns what?), the subjects of learning (who learns?), and the results of learning (Van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005: 735). Especially questions such as who takes part in the process and whom these participants are to represent become important since the scenarios often expect great behavioural changes. Is it legitimate to expect all people to change even if they did not feel as they were represented? It is important to keep in mind that scenario making processes are not set up only to share ideas and create mutual understanding, they aim at solving specific targets such as minimizing climate change. Some writers (e.g. Hendriks et al., 2007) underline the importance of deliberative processes being open and diverse and do not put as much attention to the outcome. Understanding the importance of legitimacy we see the process as crucial, but aiming for goals such as minimized climatechange both the content and the impact of the output are also critical. Thus, we agree with Connelly and Richardson (in press) seeing effective deliberation as a process where stakeholders are engaged and the primary assessment should be regarding the process' “effectiveness in delivering an intended policy”. They also underline that governance as a whole should be assessed regarding its possibilities to take action and achieve legitimacy, where legitimacy is understood as “the recognised right to make policy” (Connelly & Richardson, in press). There are thus three dimensions Connelly and Richardson (in press) find important: content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy. We believe those dimensions are also important for participatory processes generating scenarios aiming at mitigation as well as adaptation to climatechange, otherwise they will not have any strong (and legitimate) impact on development. Hendriks et al. (2007) make an important distinction between partisan and non-partisan forums. We believe this distinction is important also when analysing scenario generating processes since it affects the legitimacy of the outcome. Partisans can be activists or belong to interest groups, organisations or associations, which strive for particular matters. Partisans are thus committed to certain agendas and are therefore often seen as poor deliberators (Hendriks et al., 2007: 362). However, from a democracy perspective they are seen as important since they legitimate processes by making sure that particular stakes are represented. While partisan forums are made up to represent interest groups in society, non-partisan forums consist of randomly selected citizens, which ideally have rather open preferences. When exploring one partisan and one non-partisan process Hendriks et al. (2007) found that contrary to common expectations, partisan forums can have substantial legitimacy and impact problems. They also found that non-partisan forums might be favourable in deliberative capacity but they might fall short in external legitimacy and policy impact. The fact was that partisan participants accepted that deliberation means that you must be willing to adjust preferences, but they failed to do so (Hendriks et al., 2007: 370). Both the partisan and non-partisan forums included participants who stuck to their positions, but non-partisan participants had greater autonomy “so their deliberative capacity can be judged superior to that of partisan forums” (Hendriks et al., 2007: 371). In the study by Hendriks et al. (2007: 372) legitimacy is defined and operationalized as: “the extent to which key-actors, decision-makers and the media accept and support the procedure and its outcomes.” In other words, the legitimacy (as defined in that study) is grounded on actors largely outside the forums active in the deliberation processes. This study also showed (by interviews of experts themselves) that the deliberation by citizens and capacity of lay people was questioned by some experts (Hendriks et al., 2007: 373–374). In addition to this distinction of external legitimacy, the concept of legitimacy is in the literature largely divided in strategic and institutional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 572). The strategic tradition stresses the managerial standpoint in how organisations making legitimate strategies resulting in manipulating to gain societal support. Hence, rather than emphasising participatory processes (and the inherent process values), these values and the participatory process can be by-passed by e.g. “astroturfing”1 or other strategic options adopted. The branch of institutional studies of legitimacy, instead, emphasizes the “normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower the organizational actors” as described in Suchman (1995: 571) examining the two approaches. The conclusion of this examination of the two parallel domains of research on legitimacy concludes three categories: pragmatic (based on audience self-interest), moral (based on normative approval) and cognitive (based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness). In practical cases one of these categories can be more protruding or legitimacy being a blend of these three. The external legitimacy category, discussed previously, share some common traits with the audience self-interest category (labelled pragmatic) in the sense that actors external to the deliberative process (the audience consisting of experts and media) has a strong saying in the legitimate value of the outcome. The constellations of forums and involvement of stakeholders in governance processes is also featured in studies recognised as communicative planning theory (Healey, 1996) and the question also becomes relevant when implementing future-oriented development in European metropolitan regions (Healey, 2000). Campbell (2006) underlines that conceptualization of justice in contemporary planning theory is much about procedural concerns. However, individual liberties may be in conflict or as Campbell (2006: 95) puts it: “In relation to planning matters, the nature of interests is often complex and problematic; for example, individuals generally both desire clean air and to be able to drive their car(s) freely. Our preferences are therefore often inconsistent and overlapping.” Also the previous work with Swedish futures studies construction in the 1960–1970s having aims at democratic scenario construction by proposing a “particular responsibility to society's weakest groups” (Andersson, 2006: 288). At that time these groups were discussed in terms of the “weakest groups” (including the poor, elderly, unemployed and the disabled). Other examples of relevance when discussing communication among actors can be found in game theory (Sally, 1995). Conditions where reciprocity and trust can help overcome self-interests are built by “cheap talk”. As we will see, content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy are intimately connected. Findings from studies of collective actions frequently find that “when the users of a common-pool resource organize themselves to devise and enforce some of their own basic rules, they tend to manage local resources more sustainably than when rules are externally imposed on them” (Ostrom, 2000: 148). Common-pool resources are in this case understood as “natural or humanly created systems that generate a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to exclude beneficiaries and one person's consumption subtracts from the amount of benefits available to others” (Ostrom, 2000: 148). The explanation from game theory is that individuals obtain results that are “better than rational” when they are allowed to communicate, or do “cheap talk” as some economists call it (see e.g. Ostrom, 1998). In other words, communicative approaches can make collaboration work better since people have the possibility to bond with each other. From this reasoning we conclude that in a process where participants are active, open to preference shifts and are allowed to actually influence the result, both the content sustainability and the capacity to act might increase.

Our heuristic overcomes disbelief and mobilizes public responses

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The two greatest myths about global warming communications are 1) constant repetition of doomsday messages has been a major, ongoing strategy and 2) that strategy doesn’t work and indeed is actually counterproductive! These myths are so deeply ingrained in the environmental and progressive political community that when we finally had a serious shot at a climate bill, the powers that be decided not to focus on the threat posed by climate change in any serious fashion in their $200 million communications effort (see my 6/10 post “Can you solve global warming without talking about global warming?“). These myths are so deeply ingrained in the mainstream media that such messaging, when it is tried, is routinely attacked and denounced — and the flimsiest studies are interpreted exactly backwards to drive the erroneous message home (see “Dire straits: Media blows the story of UC Berkeley study on climate messaging“) The only time anything approximating this kind of messaging — not “doomsday” but what I’d call blunt, science-based messaging that also makes clear the problem is solvable — was in 2006 and 2007 with the release of An Inconvenient Truth (and the 4 assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and media coverage like the April 2006 cover of Time). The data suggest that strategy measurably moved the public to become more concerned about the threat posed by global warming (see recent study here). You’d think it would be pretty obvious that the public is not going to be concerned about an issue unless one explains why they should be concerned about an issue. And the social science literature, including the vast literature on advertising and marketing, could not be clearer that only repeated messages have any chance of sinking in and moving the needle. Because I doubt any serious movement of public opinion or mobilization of political action could possibly occur until these myths are shattered, I’ll do a multipart series on this subject, featuring public opinion analysis, quotes by leading experts, and the latest social science research. Since this is Oscar night, though, it seems appropriate to start by looking at what messages the public are exposed to in popular culture and the media. It ain’t doomsday. Quite the reverse, climate change has been mostly an invisible issue for several years and the message of conspicuous consumption and business-as-usual reigns supreme. The motivation for this post actually came up because I received an e-mail from a journalist commenting that the “constant repetition of doomsday messages” doesn’t work as a messaging strategy. I had to demur, for the reasons noted above. But it did get me thinking about what messages the public are exposed to, especially as I’ve been rushing to see the movies nominated for Best Picture this year. I am a huge movie buff, but as parents of 5-year-olds know, it isn’t easy to stay up with the latest movies. That said, good luck finding a popular movie in recent years that even touches on climate change, let alone one a popular one that would pass for doomsday messaging. Best Picture nominee The Tree of Life has been billed as an environmental movie — and even shown at environmental film festivals — but while it is certainly depressing, climate-related it ain’t. In fact, if that is truly someone’s idea of environmental movie, count me out. The closest to a genuine popular climate movie was the dreadfully unscientific The Day After Tomorrow, which is from 2004 (and arguably set back the messaging effort by putting the absurd “global cooling” notion in people’s heads! Even Avatar, the most successful movie of all time and “the most epic piece of environmental advocacy ever captured on celluloid,” as one producer put it, omits the climate doomsday message. One of my favorite eco-movies, “Wall-E, is an eco-dystopian gem and an anti-consumption movie,” but it isn’t a climate movie. I will be interested to see The Hunger Games, but I’ve read all 3 of the bestselling post-apocalyptic young adult novels — hey, that’s my job! — and they don’t qualify as climate change doomsday messaging (more on that later). So, no, the movies certainly don’t expose the public to constant doomsday messages on climate. Here are the key points about what repeated messages the American public is exposed to: The broad American public is exposed to virtually no doomsday messages, let alone constant ones, on climate change in popular culture (TV and the movies and even online). There is not one single TV show on any network devoted to this subject, which is, arguably, more consequential than any other preventable issue we face. The same goes for the news media, whose coverage of climate change has collapsed (see “Network News Coverage of Climate Change Collapsed in 2011“). When the media do cover climate change in recent years, the overwhelming majority of coverage is devoid of any doomsday messages — and many outlets still feature hard-core deniers. Just imagine what the public’s view of climate would be if it got the same coverage as, say, unemployment, the housing crisis or even the deficit? When was the last time you saw an “employment denier” quoted on TV or in a newspaper? The public is exposed to constant messages promoting business as usual and indeed idolizing conspicuous consumption. See, for instance, “Breaking: The earth is breaking … but how about that Royal Wedding? Our political elite and intelligentsia, including MSM pundits and the supposedly “liberal media” like, say, MSNBC, hardly even talk about climate change and when they do, it isn’t doomsday. Indeed, there isn’t even a single national columnist for a major media outlet who writes primarily on climate. Most “liberal” columnists rarely mention it. At least a quarter of the public chooses media that devote a vast amount of time to the notion that global warming is a hoax and that environmentalists are extremists and that clean energy is a joke. In the MSM, conservative pundits routinely trash climate science and mock clean energy. Just listen to, say, Joe Scarborough on MSNBC’s Morning Joe mock clean energy sometime. The major energy companies bombard the airwaves with millions and millions of dollars of repetitious pro-fossil-fuel ads. The environmentalists spend far, far less money. As noted above, the one time they did run a major campaign to push a climate bill, they and their political allies including the president explicitly did NOT talk much about climate change, particularly doomsday messaging Environmentalists when they do appear in popular culture, especially TV, are routinely mocked. There is very little mass communication of doomsday messages online. Check out the most popular websites. General silence on the subject, and again, what coverage there is ain’t doomsday messaging. Go to the front page of the (moderately trafficked) environmental websites. Where is the doomsday? If you want to find anything approximating even modest, blunt, science-based messaging built around the scientific literature, interviews with actual climate scientists and a clear statement that we can solve this problem — well, you’ve all found it, of course, but the only people who see it are those who go looking for it. Of course, this blog is not even aimed at the general public. Probably 99% of Americans haven’t even seen one of my headlines and 99.7% haven’t read one of my climate science posts. And Climate Progress is probably the most widely read, quoted, and reposted climate science blog in the world. Anyone dropping into America from another country or another planet who started following popular culture and the news the way the overwhelming majority of Americans do would get the distinct impression that nobody who matters is terribly worried about climate change. And, of course, they’d be right — see “The failed presidency of Barack Obama, Part 2.” It is total BS that somehow the American public has been scared and overwhelmed by repeated doomsday messaging into some sort of climate fatigue. If the public’s concern has dropped — and public opinion analysis suggests it has dropped several percent (though is bouncing back a tad) — that is primarily due to the conservative media’s disinformation campaign impact on Tea Party conservatives and to the treatment of this as a nonissue by most of the rest of the media, intelligentsia and popular culture.

Adopting a mindset of scientific inquiry for climate change makes sense because it’s a phenomenon uniquely suited to an empiricist methodology

Jean **Bricmont 1**, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Louvain, “Defense of a Modest Scientific Realism”, September 23, <http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/bielefeld_final.pdf>

Given that instrumentalism is not defensible when it is formulated as a rigid doctrine, and since redefining truth leads us from bad to worse, what should one do? A hint of one sensible response is provided by the following comment of Einstein: Science without epistemology is insofar as it is thinkable at all primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving epistemological systematic that far. ... He therefore must appeal to the systematic epistemologist as an unscrupulous opportunist.'1'1 So let us try epistemological opportunism. We are, in some sense, "screened'' from reality (we have no immediate access to it, radical skepticism cannot be refuted, etc.). There are no absolutely secure foundations on which to base our knowledge. Nevertheless, we all assume implicitly that we can obtain some reasonably reliable knowledge of reality, at least in everyday life. Let us try to go farther, putting to work all the resources of our fallible and finite minds: observations, experiments, reasoning. And then let us see how far we can go. In fact, the most surprising thing, shown by the development of modern science, is how far we seem to be able to go. Unless one is a solipsism or a radical skeptic which nobody really is one has to be a realist about something: about objects in everyday life, or about the past, dinosaurs, stars, viruses, whatever. But there is no natural border where one could somehow radically change one's basic attitude and become thoroughly instrumentalist or pragmatist (say. about atoms or quarks or whatever). There are many differences between quarks and chairs, both in the nature of the evidence supporting their existence and in the way we give meaning to those words, but they are basically differences of degree. Instrumentalists are right to point out that the meaning of statements involving unobservable entities (like "quark'') is in part related to the implications of such statements for direct observations. But only in part: though it is difficult to say exactly how we give meaning to scientific expressions, it seems plausible that we do it by combining direct observations with mental pictures and mathematical formulations, and there is no good reason to restrict oneself to only one of these. Likewise, conventionalists like Poincare are right to observe that some scientific "choices", like the preference for inertial over noninertial reference frames, are made for pragmatic rather than objective reasons. In all these senses, we have to be epistemological "opportunists". But a problem worse than the disease arises when any of these ideas are taken as rigid doctrines replacing 'realism". A friend of ours once said: "I am a naive realist. But I admit that knowledge is difficult." This is the root of the problem. Knowing how things really are is the goal of science; this goal is difficult to reach, but not impossible (at least for some parts of reality and to some degrees of approximation). If we change the goal if, for example, we seek instead a consensus, or (less radically) aim only at empirical adequacy then of course things become much easier; but as Bert rand Russell observed in a similar context, this has all the advantages of theft over honest toil. Moreover, the underdetermination thesis, far from undermining scientific objectivity, actually makes the success of science all the more remarkable. Indeed, what is difficult is not to find a story that "fits the data'\*, but to find even one non-crazy such story. How does one know that it is non-crazy7 A combination of factors: its predictive power, its explanatory value, its breadth and simplicity, etc. Nothing in the (Quinean) underdetermiiiation thesis tells us how to find inequivalent theories with some or all of these properties. In fact, there are vast domains in physics, chemistry and biology where there is only one"18 known non-crazy theory that accounts for Unknown facts and where many alternative theories have been tried and failed because their predictions contradicted experiments. In those domains, one can reasonably think that our present-day theories are at least approximately true, in some sense or other. An important (and difficult) problem for the philosophy of science is to clarify the meaning of “approximately true'" and its implications for the ontological status of unobservable theoretical entities. We do not claim to have a solution to this problem, but we would like to offer a few ideas that might prove useful.

We are not science, we use science – our method is the same one everyone inevitably uses on a day-to-day basis, just more rigorous

Jean **Bricmont 1**, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Louvain, “Defense of a Modest Scientific Realism”, September 23, <http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/bielefeld_final.pdf>

So, how does one obtain evidence concerning the truth or falsity of scientific assertions? By the same imperfect methods that we use to obtain evidence about empirical assertions generally. Modern science, in our view, is nothing more or less than the deepest (to date) refinement of the rational attitude toward investigating any question about the world, be it atomic spectra, the etiology of smallpox, or the Bielefeld bus routes. Historians, detectives and plumbers indeed, all human beings use the same basic methods of induction, deduction and assessment of evidence as do physicists or biochemists.18 Modern science tries to carry out these operations in a more careful and systematic way, by using controls and statistical tests, insisting on replication, and so forth. Moreover, scientific measurements are often much more precise than everyday observations; they allow us to discover hitherto unknown phenomena; and scientific theories often conflict with "common sense'\*. But [he con f I id is al the level of conclusions, nol (he basic approach. As Susan Haack lucidly observes: Our standards of what constitutes good, honest, thorough inquiry and what constitutes good, strong, supportive evidence are not internal to science. In judging where science has succeeded and where it has failed, in what areas and at what times it has done better and in what worse, we are appealing to the standards by which we judge the solidity of empirical beliefs, or the rigor and thoroughness of empirical inquiry, generally.1'1 Scientists' spontaneous epistemology the one that animates their work, regardless of what they may say when philosophizing is thus a rough-and-ready realism: the goal of science is to discover (some aspects of) how things really are. More The aim of science is to give a true (or approximately true) description of reality. I'll is goal is realizable, because: 1. Scientific theories are either true or false. Their truth (or falsity) is literal, not metaphorical; it does not depend in any way on us, or on how we test those theories, or on the structure of our minds, or on the society within which we live, and so on. 2. It is possible to have evidence for the truth (or falsity) of a theory. (Tt remains possible, however, that all the evidence supports some theory T, yet T is false.)20 Tin- most powerful objections to the viability of scientific realism consist in various theses showing that theories are underdetermined by data.21 In its most common formulation, the underdetermination thesis says that, for any finite (or even infinite) set of data, there are infinitely many mutually incompatible theories that are "compatible'' with those data. This thesis, if not properly understood22, can easily lead to radical conclusions. The biologist who believes that a disease is caused by a virus presumably does so on the basis of some "evidence" or some "data'\*. Saying that a disease is caused by a virus presumably counts as a "theory'' (e.g. it involves, implicitly, many counlerfactual statements). But if there are really infinitely many distinct theories that are compatible with those "data", then we may legitimately wonder on what basis one can rationally choose between those theories. In order to clarify the situation, it is important to understand how the underdetermination thesis is established; then its meaning and its limitations become much clearer. Here are some examples of how underdeterminatiou works; one may claim that: The past did not exist: the universe was created five minutes ago along with all the documents and all our memories referring to the alleged past in their present state. Alternatively, it could have been created 100 or 1000 years ago. The stars do not exist: instead, there are spots on a distant sky that emit exactly the same signals as those we receive. All criminals ever put in jail were innocent. For each alleged criminal, explain away all testimony by a deliberate desire to harm the accused; declare that all evidence was fabricated by the police and that all confessions were obtained bv force.2'1 Of course, all these "theses'1 may have to be elaborated, but the basic idea is clear: given any set of facts, just make up a story, no matter how ad hoc, to "account" for the facts without running into contradictions.2,1 It is important to realize that this is all there is to the general (Quinean) underdetermination thesis. Moreover, this thesis, although it played an important role in the refutation of the most extreme versions of logical positivism, is not very different from the observation that radical skepticism or even solipsism cannot be refuted: all our knowledge about the world is based on some sort of inference from the observed to the unobserved, and no such inference can be justified by deductive logic alone. However, it is clear that, in practice, nobody ever takes seriously such "theories" as those mentioned above, any more than they take seriously solipsism or radical skepticism. Let us call these "crazy theories'\*2'1 (of course, it is not easy to say exactly what it means for a theory to be non-crazy). Xote that these theories require no work: they can be formulated entirely a priori. On the other hand, the difficult problem, given some set of data, is to find even one non-crazy theory that accounts for them. Consider, for example, a police enquiry about some crime: it is easy enough to invent a story that "accounts for the facts'" in an ad hoc fashion (sometimes lawyers do just that); what is hard is to discover who really committed the crime and to obtain evidence demonstrating that beyond a reasonable doubt. Reflecting on this elementary example clarifies the meaning of the underdelermination thesis. Despite the existence of innumerable "crazy theories'\* concerning any given crime, it sometimes happens in practice that there is a unique theory (i.e. a unique story about who committed the crime and how) that is plausible and compatible with the known facts; in that case, one will say that the criminal has been discovered (with a high degree of confidence, albeit not with certainty). It may also happen that no plausible theory is found, or that we are unable to decide which one among several suspects is really guilty: in these cases, the underdetermination is real.-'' One might next ask whether there exist more subtle forms of underdetermination than the one revealed by a Duhem Quine type of argument. In order to analyze this question, let us consider the example of classical electromagnetism. This is a theory that describes how particles possessing a quantifiable property called "electric charge" produce "electromagnetic fields" that "propagate in vacuum" in a certain precise fashion and then "guide" the motion of charged particles when they encounter them.2' Of course, no one ever "sees" directly an electromagnetic field or an electric charge. So, should one interpret this theory "realistically'', and if so, what should it be taken to mean? Classical electromagnetic theory is immensely well supported by precise experiments and forms the basis for a large part of modern technology. It is "confirmed'' every time one of us switches on his or her computer and finds that it works as designed.'8 Does this overwhelming empirical support imply that there are "really"' electric and magnetic fields propagating in vacuum? In support of the idea that thenare, one could argue that electromagnetic theory postulates the existence of those fields and that there is no known non-crazy theory that accounts equally well for the same data; therefore it is reasonable to believe that electric and magnetic fields really exist. But is it in fact true that there are no alternative non-crazy theories? Here is one possibility: Let us claim that there are no fields propagating "in vacuum", but that, rather, there are only "forces" acting directly between charged particles.29 Of course, in order to preserve the empirical adequacy of the theory, one lias to use exactly the same Maxwell Lorentz system of equations as before (or a mathematically equivalent system). But one may interpret the fields as a mere "calculational device" allowing us to compute more easily the net effect of the "real" forces acting between charged particles.30 Almost every physicist reading these lines will say that this is some kind of metaphysics or maybe even a play on words that this "alternative theory" is really just standard electromagnetic theory in disguise. Xow, although the precise meaning of "metaphysics" is hard to pin down 31, there is a vague sense in which, if we use exactly the same equations (or a mathematically equivalent set of equations) and make exactly the same predictions in the two theories, then they are really the same theory as far as "physics" is concerned, and the distinction between the two if any lies outside of its scope. The same kind of observation can be made about most physical theories: In classical mechanics, are there really forces acting on particles, or are the particles instead following trajectories defined by variational principles? In general relativity, is space-time really curved, or are there, rather, fields that cause particles to move as if space-time were curved?'2 Let us call this kind of underdetermination "genuine'\*, as opposed to the "crazy" underdeterminations of the usual Duhem Quine thesis. By "genuine'\*, we do not mean that these underdeterminations are necessarily worth losing sleep over, but simply that there is no rational way to choose (at least on empirical grounds alone) between the alternative theories if indeed they should be regarded as different theories.

# 2ac

## 2AC ROB

Prioritization claims are counter-productive and illogical – you should evaluate the veracity of the 1ac’s claims about the world while embracing a plurality of (methods / ontologies / theories)

Andrew **Bennett 13**, government prof at Georgetown, The mother of all isms: Causal mechanisms and structured pluralism in International Relations theory, European Journal of International Relations 2013 19:459

The political science subfield of International Relations (IR) continues to undergo debates on whether and in what sense it is a 'science,1 how it should organize its inquiry into international politics, and how it should build and justify its theories. On one level, an 'inter-paradigm' debate, while less prominent than during the 1990s, has continued to limp along among researchers who identify their work as fitting within the research agenda of a grand school of thought, or 'ism,' and the scholar most closely associated with it, including neorealism (Waltz, 1979), neoliberalism (Keohane, 1984), constructivism (Wendt, 1992), or occasionally Marxism (Wallerstein, 1974) or feminism (Tickner, 1992). Scholars participating in this debate have often acted as if their preferred 4 ism' and its competitors were either "paradigms" (following Kuhn, 1962) or "research programs' (as defined by Lakatos, 19701. and some have explicitly framed their approach as paradigmatic or programmatic (Hopf, 1998).

A second level of the debate involves post-positivist critiques of IR as a "scientific' enterprise (Lapid, 1989). While the vague label "post-positivist, encompasses a diverse group of scholars, frequent post-positivist themes include arguments that observation is theory-laden (Kuhn, 1962), that knowledge claims are always part of mechanisms of power and that meaning is always social (Foucault, 1978), and that individual agents and social structures are mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1992). Taken together, these arguments indicate that the social sciences face even more daunting challenges than the physical sciences.

A third axis of contestation has been methodological, involving claims regarding the strengths and limits of statistical, formal, experimental, qualitative case study, narrative, and other methods. In the last two decades the argument that there is 'one logic of inference1 and that this logic is 'explicated and formalized clearly in discussions of quantitative research methods' (King et al., 1994: 3) has generated a useful debate that has clarified the similarities, differences, uses, and limits of alternative methods ( Brady and Collier, 2010; George and Bennett, 2005; Goertz and Mahoney, 2006).

These debates have each in their own way proved fruitful, increasing the theoretical, epistemological, and methodological diversity of the field (Jordan el al., 2009). The IR subfield has also achieved considerable progress in the last few decades in its theoretical and empirical understanding of important policy-relevant issues, including the inter-democratic peace, terrorism, peacekeeping, international trade, human rights, international law, international organizations, global environmental politics, economic sanctions, nuclear proliteration, military intervention, civil and ethnic conflicts, and many other topics.

Yet there is a widespread sense that this progress has arisen in spite of interparadigmatic debates rather than because of them. Several prominent scholars, including Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, have argued that although research cast within the framework of paradigmatic debates has contributed useful concepts and findings, framing the IR field around inter-paradigmatic debates is ultimately distracting and even counterproductive (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; see also David Lake, 2011, and in this special issue, and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, 2009, and in this special issue). These scholars agree that IR researchers have misapplied Kuhn's notion of paradigms in ways that imply that grand theories of tightly connected ideas — the isms — are the central focus of IR theorizing, and that such isms should compete until one wins general consensus. Sil and Katzenstein argue that the remedy for this is to draw on pragmatist philosophers and build upon an 'eclectic' mix of theories and methods to better understand the world (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). In this view, no single grand theory can capture the complexities of political life, and the real explanatory weight is carried by more fine-grained theories about 'causal mechanisms."

In this article I argue that those urging a pragmatic turn in IR are correct in their diagnosis of the drawbacks of paradigms and their prescription tor using theories about causal mechanisms as the basis for explanatory progress in IR. Yet scholars are understandably reluctant to jettison the "isms' and the inter-paradigmatic debate not only because they fear losing the theoretical and empirical contributions made in the name of the isms, but because framing the field around the isms has proven a useful shorthand for classroom teaching and field-wide discourse. The 'eclectic' label that Sil and Katzenstein propose can easily be misinterpreted in this regard, as the Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines 'eclectic\* as 'selecting what appears to be best in various doctrines, methods, or styles,' as Sil and Katzenstein clearly intend, but it also includes as synonyms "indiscriminate" and 'ragtag.'1 By using the term 'eclecticism' and eschewing any analytic structure for situating and translating among different examples of IR research, Sil and Katzenstein miss an opportunity to enable a discourse that is structured as well as pluralistic, and that reaches beyond IR to the rest of the social sciences.

I maintain that in order to sustain the genuine contributions made under the guise of the inter-paradigmatic debate and at the same time get beyond it to focus on causal mechanisms rather than grand theoretical isms, four additional moves are necessary. First, given that mechanism-based approaches are generally embedded within a scientific realist philosophy of science, it is essential to clarify the philosophical and definitional issues associated with scientific realism, as well as the benefits — and costs — of making hypothesized causal mechanisms the locus of explanatory theories. As Christian Reus-Smit argues in this special issue, IR theory cannot sidestep metatheoretical debates. Second, it is important to take post-positivist critiques seriously and to articulate standards for theoretical progress, other than paradigmatic revolutions, that are defensible even if they are fallible. Third, achieving a shift toward mechanismic explanations requires outlining the contributions that diverse methods can make to the study of causal mechanisms. Finally, it is vital to demonstrate that a focus on mechanisms can serve two key functional roles that paradigms played for the IR subfield: first, providing a framework for cumulative theoretical progress; and, second, constituting a useful, vivid, and structured vocabulary for communicating findings to fellow scholars, students, political actors, and the public (see also Stefano Guzzini's article in this special issue). I argue that the term 'structured pluralism' best captures this last move, as it conveys the sense that IR scholars can borrow the best ideas from different theoretical traditions and social science disciplines in ways that allow both intelligible discourse and cumulative progress.

Alter briefly outlining the problems associated with organizing the IR field around the "isms/ this article addresses each of these four tasks in turn. First, it takes on the challenges of defining "causal mechanisms' and using them as the basis of theoretical explanations. Second, it acknowledges the relevance and importance of post-positivist critiques of causal explanation, yet it argues that scientific realism and some approaches to interpretivism are compatible, and that there are standards upon which they can agree forjudging explanatory progress. Third, it very briefly clarifies the complementary roles that alternative methods can play in elucidating theories about causal mechanisms. Finally, the article presents a taxonomy of theories about social mechanisms to provide a pluralistic but structured framework for cumulative theorizing about politics. This taxonomy provides a platform for developing typological theories — or what others in this special issue, following Robert Merton, have called middle-range theories — on the ways in which combinations of mechanisms interact to produce outcomes. Here, I join Lake in this special issue in urging that IR theorizing be centered around middle-range theories, and I take issue with Jackson and Nexon's suggestion herein that such theorizing privileges correlational evidence, and their assertion that statistical evidence is inherently associated with Humean notions of causation. I argue that my taxonomy of mechanisms offers a conceptual bridge to the paradigmatic isms in IR. adopting and organizing their theoretical insights while leaving behind their paradigmatic pretensions. The article concludes that, among its other virtues, this taxonomy can help reinvigorate dialogues between IR theory and the fields of comparative and American politics, economics, sociology, psychology, and history, stimulating cross-disciplinary discourses that have been inhibited by the scholasticism of IR's ingrown 'isms.'

## DM Impact

#### Decision-making is a trump impact—it improves all aspects of life regardless of its specific goals

Shulman, president emeritus – Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, ‘9

(Lee S, Education and a Civil Society: Teaching Evidence-Based Decision Making, p. ix-x)

These are the kinds of questions that call for the exercise of practical reason, a form of thought that draws concurrently from theory and practice, from values and experience, and from critical thinking and human empathy. None of these attributes is likely to be thought of no value and thus able to be ignored. Our schools, however, are unlikely to take on all of them as goals of the educational process. The goal of education is not to render practical arguments more theoretical; nor is it to diminish the role of values in practical reason. Indeed, all three sources—theoretical knowledge, practical knowhow and experience, and deeply held values and identity—have legitimate places in practical arguments. An educated person, argue philosophers Thomas Green (1971) and Gary Fenstermacher (1986), is someone who has transformed the premises of her or his practical arguments from being less objectively reasonable to being more objectively reasonable. That is, to the extent that they employ probabilistic reasoning or interpret data from various sources, those judgments and interpretations conform more accurately to well-understood principles and are less susceptible to biases and distortions. To the extent that values, cultural or religious norms, or matters of personal preference or taste are at work, they have been rendered more explicit, conscious, intentional, and reflective. In his essay for this volume, Jerome Kagan reflects the interactions among these positions by arguing: We are more likely to solve our current problem, however, if teachers accept the responsibility of guaranteeing that all adolescents, regardless of class or ethnicity, can read and comprehend the science section of newspapers, solve basic mathematical problems, detect the logical coherence in non-technical verbal arguments or narratives, and insist that all acts of maliciousness, deception, and unregulated self-aggrandizement are morally unacceptable. Whether choosing between a Prius and a Hummer, an Obama or a McCain, installing solar panels or planting taller trees, a well-educated person has learned to combine their values, experience, understandings, and evidence in a thoughtful and responsible manner. Thus do habits of mind, practice, and heart all play a significant role in the lives of citizens.

## Perm

#### The oppositional nature of our two political strategies proves the perm is the best option

Kathleen **Higgins**, University of Texas-Austin, Philosophy Professor, Winter 20**13**, Post-Truth Pluralism: The Unlikely Political Wisdom of Friedrich Nietzche, Kindle

Progressives are right that we live increasingly in a post-truth era, but rather than rejecting it and pining nostalgically for a return to a more truthful time, we should learn to better navigate it. Where the New York Times and Walter Cronkite were once viewed as arbiters of public truths, today the Times competes with the Wall Street Journal, and CBS News with FOX News and MSNBC, in describing reality. The Internet multiplies the perspectives and truths available for public consumption. The diversity of viewpoints opened up by new media is not going away and is likely to intensify. This diversity of interpretations of reality is part of a longstanding trend. Democracy and modernization have brought a proliferation of worldviews and declining authority of traditional institutions to meanings. Citizens have more freedom to create new interpretations of facts.

This proliferation of viewpoints makes the challenge of democratically addressing contemporary problems more complex. One consequence of all this is that our problems become more wicked and more subject to conflicting meanings and agendas. We can’t agree on the nature of problems or their solutions because of fundamentally unbridgeable values and worldviews. In attempting to reduce political disagreement to black and white categories of fact and fiction, progressives themselves uniquely ill-equipped to address our current difficulties, or to advance liberal values in the culture.

A new progressive politics should have a different understanding of the truth than the one suggested by the critics of conservative dishonesty. We should understand that human beings make meaning and apprehend truth from radically different standpoints and worldviews, and that our great wealth and freedom will likely lead to more, not fewer, disagreements about the world. Nietzsche was no democrat, but the pluralism he offers can be encouragement to today’s political class, as well as the rest of us, to become more self-aware of, and honest about, how our standpoint, values, and power affect our determinations of what is true and what is false.

In the post­truth era, we should be able to articulate not one but many different perspectives. Progressives seeking to govern and change society cannot be free of bias, interests, and passions, but they should strive to be aware of them so that they can adopt different eyes to see the world from the standpoint of their fiercest opponents. Taking multiple perspectives into account might alert us to more sites of possible intervention and prime us for creative formulations of alternative possibilities for concerted responses to our problems.

Our era, in short, need not be an obstacle to taking common action. We might see today’s divided expert class and fractions public not as temporary problems to be solved by more reason, science, and truth, but rather as permanent features of our developed democracy. We might even see this proliferation of belief systems and worldviews as an opportunity for human development. We can agree to disagree and still engage in pragmatic action in the World.

## AT: Climate Justice

#### Alt can’t solve warming – it will misdiagnose climate problems and undermine pragmatic, feasible solutions

Christopher **Foreman**, Breakthrough Institute Senior Fellow, University of Maryland Public Policy School Social Policy Program Director, Winter 20**13**, On Justice Movements: Why they Fail the Environment and the Poor, Kindle

But beneath Naidoo’s aspirational vision lies a diagnosis of what ails the poor and the powerless that is a good deal more problematic. “You have loaded our atmosphere with a carbon debt. Do not pass the bill to the continent of Africa,” he wrote in an open letter to world leaders.

The theory of climate justice tells us that the gap between rich and poor and the looming threat of catastrophic climate change are not simply unfortunate circumstances that demand our attention and action, but rather the result of active efforts on the part of rich nations, wealthy elites, and powerful corporations to profit on the backs of the global poor and the environment. In this telling, the failure to deploy plentiful renewable energy in the developing world is the fault of the developed world.

There is, of course, no shortage of injustices that have been visited upon the global poor for which the wealthy developed world bears some responsibility. But denying impoverished people their rightful access to clean renewable energy is not among them. Many parts of the developing World are indeed blessed with abundant wind and sunlight. But solar and wind energy are still intermittent, difficult to scale, and substantially more costly than fossil energy, which is why they require significant subsidies.

Demands for climate justice too often ignore basic practicalities of energy, poverty, and climate change, directing our gaze away from the issues that really matter to the future prospects of both the global poor and the planet and toward issues that don’t.

Huge swaths of the world have been developing over the last three decades at an unprecedented pace and scale. That remarkable transformation has come not from the forced redistribution of global Wealth or renewable energy but instead from the rapid growth of the global economy fueled by cheap fossil energy. China, India, and Brazil have become the manufacturers, farmers, and phone centers to the world, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the process.

Contemporary demands for climate justice have been, at best, indifferent to these rather remarkable developments and, at worst, openly hostile. Some activists reject development and modernization altogether, lauding poor indigenous communities for living a simpler, more virtuous life in a closer relationship with nature. Others almost unavoidably find themselves reinventing archaic international Socialist tropes in the name of sustainability.

Neither posture offers much succor to the global poor. While our inclination to slap the label “justice” on any problem that affects rich and poor differently offers tempting rhetorical possibilities, it is not clear that transforming issues of equity (defined as a desire to lessen economic and other disparities between rich and poor) into issues of justice (understood as a demand for retribution and reparations) does much for constituencies in desperate need of economic development and affordable energy.

The technological, social, and institutional innovations that will be necessary to expand access to energy and modern living standards while mitigating global carbon emissions will require more development, more engagement with world markets for the global poor, and greater cooperation between governments and corporations. That is the struggle that really matters for the poor, and while climate justice serves a range of discursive purposes for the international Left, it is not always clear which side of that struggle the movement is actually on.

1. The inspiration for our present-day proliferation of justice movements took root in the 1970s, a better time for US environmentalists but a difficult one for civil rights activists. In the decade after the passage of the federal civil rights and voting rights acts, civil rights leaders turned to the far more complicated challenge of economic justice. Creating jobs and businesses and expanding access to higher education required costly and contentious policies, from school busing to affirmative action, that alienated some of those who had supported an end to legalized segregation. Where the moral clarity of the civil lights struggle had galvanized the nation, the struggle for economic justice divided it. Meanwhile, fresh-faced environmentalists were winning in Washington and both national political parties wanted a piece of the action. But largely low»income communities of color were conspicuously absent. The Congressional Black Caucus provided little environmental policy leadership; indeed, some black leaders were decidedly underwhelmed by the new Wave of concern for snail darters and spotted owls. Unemployed urban youth seemed the endangered species, worth worrying about, and the newly ascendant environmental movement appeared to divert the nation’s attention away from their plight.

The environmental justice movement changed all of that, providing a framework through which many environmentalists and civil rights advocates could common cause. In 1982, protesters in Warren County, North Carolina, a mostly African American community, battled a proposed landñll for polychlorinated biphenyl-contaminated soil, a landmark moment for the nascent movement. Increasingly, not-in-my-backyard protesters spread the word about pollution in racial terms. Disparate exposure to toxins and associated health impacts did not just happen but were allowed to happen. They were even deliberately promoted by a system that favored wealthy, white communities. A racial rhetoric evolved: “environmental equity” morphed into the more provocative “environmental racism” and eventually “environmental justice,” which sought to fuse classand race-based complaints.

Research emerged to support the thesis and gained credibility among environmental journalists, who were as conscious of the lack of diversity in the newsroom as environmental activists were of it in nonprofit organizations. Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States, a milestone 1987 study, suggested that there was proliferating hazardous-waste-based risk in minority areas. Its release became an immediate media sensation, propelling its leading proponent, Benjamin Chavis, to the executive director’s job at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Subsequent studies cast doubt on claims that polluters were deliberately targeting minority communities and that poor communities were disproportionately exposed to toxic waste. But by then the die had been cast. Toxic Wastes and Race fed a politically useful narrative and seemed intuitively on target.

The concept of environmental justice was potent, since it implied a continuation of discrimination in a new form. And the political establishment - the Environmental Protection Agency, under George H. W. Bush appointee William Reilly and, more aggressively, under Bill Clinton appointee Carol Browner - responded. Here, after all, was an issue that fused race and the environment, core concerns of the Democratic Party. The Clinton administration rechristened the Bush EPA’s Office of Environmental Equity as the of Environmental Justice, to which citizens could direct their inquiries. Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, encouraging agencies of government to accommodate this new brand of environmental concern.

Environmental justice proved to be an important innovation for both the civil rights and environmental movements. It simultaneously injected a somewhat shopworn civil rights advocacy with new vitality, helped advance a national conversation about racial inequality, and brought new voices to environmental policy. Traditional environmental groups like the Sierra Club now had a way to reach people generally unexcited by the “hiking and biking” brand of environmentalism.

Poorly funded local organizations came and went in response to NIMBY battles. But a robust movement endured, sustained by a combination of health fears, political mobilizing, government endorsement, energizing victories against potentially hazardous sites, and a supportive national network of sympathetic professors, students, advocacy journalists, and funders.

Environmental justice also had real, if modest, impacts on environmental policy. Advocacy efforts raised the priority for research and assessment of lead, urban air pollutants, and other toxic substances. And by effectively targeting industrial and waste-permit processes, activists made industrial siting for companies like Shintech, the largest domestic producer of polyvinyl chloride, more treacherous.

But other aspects of environmental justice advocacy were more problematic and would illustrate the ways in which fill-in-the-blank justice advocacy of all sorts has too often failed the disadvantaged constituencies it has attempted to serve. Environmental justice activism tended to mobilize communities to address perceived local risks that often did not track very well with the most serious risks that residents actually faced. While eliminating low-level exposures to industrial chemicals might make for good organizing, it doesn’t represent a particularly defensible public health prescription.

People continue to speak of the region between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, for instance, as “Cancer Alley,” even though no spike in environmentally induced cancer has been proven. Meanwhile, long before the summer of 2oo5, one could see that a direct hurricane strike was the most serious collective hazard faced by residents of New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward and other poor neighborhoods. But environmental justice advocacy in Louisiana, dependent on convenient and visible targets of outrage, could never prioritize the more abstract hurricane risk.

Hurricane Katrina represents an admittedly spectacular misjudgment of the risks faced by low-income communities. But it is also just the tip of the iceberg. A long list of more prosaic risks - heart disease, smoking, poor diet, lack of exercise, and crime, to name just a few - plague low-income communities and dwarf the concerns that have generally mobilized the environmental justice movement.

Moreover, the environmental policies that have significantly improved health outcomes in minority and low-income communities have been universal ones, not those that specifically targeted disparities in exposures based upon race or class. Well-documented successes in battling particulates, airborne lead, and dirty water supplies have naturally benefited people concentrated in urban or industrial areas and heavily reliant on public resources. And yet environmental justice casts mainstream environmentalism not as the solution but as part of the problem. Environmental justice scholars suggest that both economic growth and improvements in environmental quality have come at the expense of community-of­color “sacrifice zones.”

Still, environmental justice activists were, from the start, on to something central and important: cheap land is a magnet for low-income housing and industry, not for affluent residents. Until recently, though, the environmental justice movement has had little to say about the main causes of poverty and inequality that afflict poor communities: the dearth of good jobs, schools, and health care. By directing its ire at environmental threats that fit neatly into its seductive trinity of risk, race, and place, rather than those that are most pervasive and destructive, environmental justice has never had much success in improving quality of life in poor communities.

Consider that after some two years of struggle, the town of Convent, Louisiana, finally fended off Shintech’s proposed polyvinyl chloride plant when the company withdrew in September 1998. But while Shintech’s corporate masters have taken their operation elsewhere, Convent remains desperately poor, its residents plagued by illnesses that rarely affect the affluent.

2. Environmental justice set a template that other postmodern justice movements would follow: take an issue previously defined as having broad or universal impacts upon everyone - environmental pollution, climate change, reproductive rights, obesity - and redefine it in racial terms. Justice, in this context, takes on a very spefific meaning. Disparities between rich and poor are the result of active conspiracies on the part of the rich, powerful, and corporate. Complicated social phenomena - teen pregnancy and childhood obesity, even famines and civil wars - can be reduced to a single overriding cause, the exploitation of the poor and nonwhite by the wealthy and white.

Climate justice took this strategy to new heights, offering a framework from which virtually any affliction associated with global poverty might be hung. The scope of the attributions that climate justice activists make are truly sweeping. The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis, an influential 2009 report produced by the Global Humanitarian Forum, a now-defunct nonprofit group whose president was former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, asserts that “every year climate change leaves over 300,000 people dead, 325 million people seriously affected, and economic losses of $125 billion.” The report Went on to declare that it “is a grave global justice concern that those who suffer most from climate change have done the least to cause it.”

That same year, in a letter to Sweden’s prime minister on the eve of the United Nations climate talks in Copenhagen, the late Nobel Peace Prize Winner Wangari Maathai, a champion of women’s lights and tree planting in Kenya, wrote: “My continent is slipping rapidly into a climate change-induced chaos. But this is a chaos not of Africa’s making. It is one due to the rich world’s historical emissions and current high-energy consumption levels. Not only are industrialized countries responsible for global warming given their huge historical and present emissions. But as well, they owe their current prosperity to decades of overuse of our common atmospheric space.”

The claim made by Annan, Maathai, and other activists is not that global warming will result in misery for many millions of poor people over the coming century, an assertion that climate science suggests is at the very least plausible, but that it is resulting in misery for many millions today, one that simply can’t be substantiated. Whatever global warming’s present impacts may be in Africa - and they are exceedingly difficult to measure - they are arguably the least of the continent’s problems. Sub-Saharan Africa has been afflicted by tribal division, colonialism, bad governance, and infectious diseases for centuries. Indeed, it is the legacy of those many afflictions, much more than the relative severity of the weather, that accounts for the vast majority of the carnage that results from extreme Weather events. Rich nations and communities handle extreme natural disasters much better than poor countries do even modest disasters.

The problems hanging over the climate justice agenda extend well beyond the difficulty of pinning a Kenyan drought to my grandfather’s Western emissions. Coal-addicted China, not the United States or Europe, now leads the world in carbon emissions, with some 7.7 billion tons produced in 2009, placing it above the United States and Canada combined. Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach of the University of Chicago Law School point out in their 2010 book, Climate Change Justice, that the W0rld’s biggest carbon offenders after China and the United States are Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, and India. “Without deep Cuts by these countries from current levels,” they write, is impossible to achieve reasonable stabilization goals.”

Climate justice activists regularly argue that the West should compensate the Rest for past damages. But what is to be done about an emerging future where the lion’s share of damages to vulnerable populations in the developing World is due to emissions from the developing world? If that world has not yet arrived, it will almost certainly be here soon.

## 2ac impact

#### Patriarchy’s not the root cause

**Bell**, senior lecturer – Department of Politics and International Studies @ Cambridge University, **‘6**

(Duncan, “Beware of false prophets: biology, human nature and the future of International Relations theory,” *International Affairs* 82, 3 p. 493–510)

Writing in *Foreign Aff airs* in 1998, Francis Fukuyama, tireless promulgator of the ‘end of history’ and now a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, employed EP reasoning to argue for the central role in world politics of ‘masculine values’, which are ‘rooted in biology’. His argument starts with the claim that male and female chimps display asymmetric behaviour, with the males far more prone to violence and domination. ‘Female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik.’ Moreover, the ‘line from chimp to modern man is continuous’ and this has signifi cant consequences for international politics.46 He argues that the world can be divided into two spheres, an increasingly peaceful and cooperative ‘feminized’ zone, centred on the advanced democracies, and the brutal world outside this insulated space, where the stark realities of power politics remain largely masculine. This bifurcation heralds dangers, as ‘masculine policies’ are essential in dealing with a masculine world: ‘In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability.’ Fukuyama concludes the essay with the assertion that the form of politics best suited to human nature is—surprise, surprise—free-market capitalist democracy, and that other political forms, especially those promoted by feminists and socialists, do not correspond with our biological inheritance.47 Once again **the authority of science is invoked in order to naturalize a** particular **political objective.** This is a pattern that has been repeated across the history of modern biology and remains potent to this day.48 It is worth noting in brief that Fukuyama’s argument is badly flawed even in its own terms. As anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson states, Fukuyama’s claims about the animal world display ‘a breathtaking leap over a mountain of contrary evidence’.49 Furthermore, Joshua Goldstein concludes in **the most detailed analysis of the data on war and gender** that although biological differences do play a **minor role,** focusing so heavily on them is **profoundly misleading**.50 The simplistic claims, crude stereotyping and casual use of evidence that characterize Fukuyama’s essay unfortunately recur throughout the growing literature on the biology of international politics.

#### Their reliance on gender binaries to explain all violence is essentialist and wrong

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(Darryl, “Feminist revisions of international relations,” International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 162-3)

Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations. Critics of feminist perspectives run the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the gate. At work in much of this discourse is an unstated political correctness, where the historical marginalization of women bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity group from legitimate participation in its discourse. Only feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional (personal) ontology. Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of particular groups are, of course, welcome to lend support and encouragement, but only on terms delineated by the groups themselves. In this way, they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony oyer their own self-identification, insuring the group discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, ,uu\ standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self defined. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls lor a "home.steading" does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that we be included on our terms" (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who question the merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical," but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism.93 Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary means of reinventing the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identities—the most important of which is gender.94 Intolerance or misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory.'"' Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the discipline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectual—and well established—spaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is variously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White males, for example, become generic signifiers for historical oppression, indicating an ontologicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, AND exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been “silenced.” In this same way, self-identification or “self-situation” establishes one’s credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the “authoritative” vantage point from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, *Worlding Women*, a section titled “A (personal) politics of location,” in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes apparent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties.96 Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, “It is important to provide a context for one’s work in the often-denied politics of the personal.” Accordingly, self-declaration revelas to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to “develop your brains and confess something called “sins” to always male forever priests,” and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objectivity.97 Like territorial markers, self-identification permits entry to intellectual spaces whose sovereign authority is “policed” as much by marginal subjectivies as hey allege of the oppressors who “police” the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and “malestream” theory. If Sylvester’s version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant, perspectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches, in reality it is as selective, exclusionary, and dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being. Skillful theoretical moves of this nature underscore the adroitness of postmodern feminist theory at emasculating many of its logical inconsistencies. In arguing for a feminist postmodernism, for example, Sylvester employs a double theoretical move that, on the one hand, invokes a kind of epistemological deconstructive anarchy cum relativism in an attempt to decenter or make insecure fixed research gazes, identities, and concepts (men, women, security, and nation-state), while on the other hand turning to the lived experiences of women as if ontologically given and assuming their experiences to be authentic, real, substantive, and authoritative interpretations of the realities of international relations. Women at the peace camps of Greenham Common or in the cooperatives of Harare, represent, for Sylvester, the real coal face of international politics, their experiences and strategies the real politics of “relations international.” But why should we take the experiences of these women to be ontologically superior or more insightful than the experiences of other women or other men? As Sylvester admits elsewhere, “Experience … is at once always already an interpretation and in need of interpretation.” Why, then are experience-based modes of knowledge more insightful than knowledges derived through other modes of inquiry?98 Such espistemologies are surely crudely positivistic in their singular reliance on osmotic perception of the facts as they impact upon the personal. If, as Sylvester writes, “sceptical inlining draws on substantive everydayness as a time and site of knowledge, much as does everyday feminist theorizing,” and if, as she further notes, “it understands experience…as mobile, indeterminate, hyphenated, [and] homeless,” why should this knowledge be valued as anything other than fleeting subjective perceptions of multiple environmental stimuli whose meaning is beyond explanation other than as a personal narrative?99 Is this what Sylvester means when she calls for a re-visioning and a repainting of the “canvases of IR,” that we dissipate knowledge into an infinitesimal number of disparate sites, all equally valid, and let loose with a mélange of visceral perceptions; stories of how each of us perceive we experience international politics? If this is the case, then Sylvester’s version of feminist postmodernity does not advance our understanding of international politics, leaving untheorized and unexplained the causes of international relations. Personal narratives do not constitute theoretical discourse, nor indeed an explanation of the systemic factors that procure international events, process, or the actions of certain actors. We might also extend a contextualist lens to analyze Sylvester’s formulations, much as she insists her epistemogical approach does. Sylvester, for example, is adamant that we can not really know who “women” are, since to do so would be to invoke an essentialist concept, concealing the diversity inherent in this category. “Women” don’t really exist in Sylvester’s estimation since there are black women, white women, Hispanic, disabled, lesbin, poor, rich, middle class, and illiterate women, to name but a few. The point, for Sylvester, is that to speak of “women” is to do violence to the diversity encapsulated in this category and, in its own way, to silence those women who remain unnamed. Well and good. Yet this same analytical respect for diversity seems lost with men. Politics and international relations become the “places of men.” But which men? All men? Or just white men, or rich, educated, elite, upper class, hetero-sexual men? To speak of political places as the places of men ignores the fact that most men, in fact the overwhelming majority of men, are not in these political places at all, are not decision makers, elite, affluent, or powerful. Much as with Sylvester’s categories, there are poor, lower class, illiterate, gay, black, and white men, many of whom suffer the vestiges of hunger, poverty, despair, and disenfranchisement just as much as women. So why invoke the category “men” in such essentialist and ubiquitous ways while cognizant only of the diversity of in the category “women.” These are double standards, not erudite theoretical formulations, betraying, dare one say, sexism toward men by invoking male gender generalizations and crude caricatures. Problems of this nature, however, are really manifestations of a deeper, underlying ailment endemic to discourses derived from identity politics. At base, the most elemental question for identity discourse, as Zalewski and Enloe note, is “Who am I?”100 The personal becomes the political, evolving a discourse where self-identification, but also one’s identification by others, presupposes multiple identities that are fleeting, overlapping, and changing at any particular moment in time or place. “We have multiple identities,” argues V. Spike Peterson, “e.g., Canadian, homemaker, Jewish, Hispanic, socialist.”101 And these identities are variously depicted as transient, polymorphic, interactive, discursive, and never fixed. As Richard Brown notes, “Identity is given neither institutionally nor biologically. It evolves as one orders continuities on one’s conception of oneself.”102 Yet, if we accept this, the analytical utility of identity politics seems problematic at best. Which identity, for example, do we choose from the many that any one subject might display affinity for? Are we to assume that all identities are of equal importance or that some are more important than others? How do we know which of these identities might be transient and less consequential to one’s sense of self and, in turn, politically significant to understanding international politics? Why, for example, should we place gender identity ontologically prior to class, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, ideological perspective, or national identity?103 As Zalewski and Enloe ask, “Why do we consider states to be a major referent? Why not men? Or women?”104 But by the same token, why not dogs, shipping magnates, movie stars, or trade regimes? Why is gender more constitutive of global politics than, say, class, or an identity as a cancer survivor, laborer, or social worker? Most of all, why is gender essentialized in feminist discourse, reified into the most preeminent of all identities as the primary lens through which international relations must be viewed? Perhaps, for example, people understand difference in the context of identities outside of gender. As Jane Martin notes, “How do we know that difference…does not turn on being fat or religious or in an abusive relationship?”105 The point, perhaps flippantly made, is that identity is such a nebulous concept, its meaning so obtuse and so inherently subjective, that it is near **meaningless** as a conduit for understanding global politics if only because it can mean anything to anybody.

## 2ac alt fails

Their deployment of strategic essentialism fails – creates false commonality that destroys political change

**Stone ’04** (Alison, Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy Lancaster University, “Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 1.2, 2004)

An objection immediately arises to this strategic essentialist position. Any political strategy is effective only inasmuch as it allows agents to recognize and intervene into the real social events, processes and forces which make up the social field. But it seems reasonable to think that a strategy can be effective, in this sense, only insofar as it embodies an **accurate understanding of the character of social processes.** This implies that a strategy of **affirming fictitious commonalities among women** will fail to facilitate effective action **given a world where women do not really have any common social characteristics or locations**. Rather, such a strategy appears destined to mislead women into fighting against difficulties which are either non-existent or— more likely—really affect only some privileged subgroup of women. This objection can be resisted, however, as it (implicitly) is by Denise Riley in ‘Am I That Name? ’. Riley claims that **‘it is compatible to suggest that “women” don’t exist—while maintaining a politics of “as if they existed”**— since the world behaves as if they unambiguously did’. 15 In other words, for Riley, the fiction that women share a common social experience is politically effective because the social world actually does treat women as if they comprise a unitary group. Riley accepts that women are not a unitary group and that the socially prevalent idea that they are unified is false. Nevertheless, this false idea informs and organizes the practices and institutions that shape women’s experiences, so that those—very different—experiences become structured by essentialist assumptions. A strategy of affirming fictitious commonalities therefore will be effective given this world in which (false) descriptive essentialist assumptions undergird women’s social existence. Riley’s argument has a problem, though: she **cannot consistently maintain** both that women’s social experience is fully diverse and that this experience is uniformly structured by essentialist assumptions. If essentialism informs and organizes the structures that shape women’s social experience, then this experience will be organized according to certain shared models and will acquire certain common patterns and features. More concretely, the idea that women are a homogeneous group will structure social institutions so that they position all women homogeneously, leading to (at least considerable areas of) shared experience. Thus, Riley (and other strategic essentialists)may be right that essentialist constructions are socially influential, but they cannot, consistently with this, also maintain that descriptive essentialism is false. Furthermore, it is not obviously true that any uniform set of essentialist constructions informs all social experience. These constructions may all identify women as a homogeneous group, but they vary widely in their account of the context of women’s homogenous features. Consequently, these constructions will influence social structures in correspondingly varying directions, against which no counter-affirmation of common experience can be expected to be effective Strategic essentialists, then, have attempted to resuscitate essentialism by arguing that it can take a merely political and non-descriptive form. But this **attempt proves unsuccessful**, because one cannot defend essentialism on strategic grounds without first showing that there is a homogeneous set of essentialist assumptions that exerts a coherent influence on women’s social experience—which amounts to defending essentialism on descriptive grounds(as well). Advocates of essentialism therefore need to show that it accurately describes social reality. Here, though, critics can retort that essentialism is descriptively false, since women do not even share any common mode of construction by essentialist discourses. Yet this retort reinstates the problem of anti-essentialism: its paralysing effect on social criticism and political activism. Strategic essentialism has not resolved this problem, for it has not stably demarcated any merely political form of essentialism from the descriptive essentialism which critics have plausibly condemned as false and oppressive.

## 2ac rage

#### The valorization of rage as a political leads to a vicious cycle of repetitive violence

**Wenning ’09** (Mario, Phd., Assistant professor of philosophy @ the University of Macau, “The Return of Rage,” Parrhesia No. 8 pg. 89-99)

The valorization of erotic emotions and virtues over thymotic ones is as old as philosophy itself. Aristotle already insists that the virtuous person cultivates mildness of temper “the even tempered person confesses to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to be cross only in the way, at the things, and for the length of time that reason dictates.” 15 Compassion is introduced as an antidote to revenge. The virtuous character does not lose the control that is necessary to provide for a self-sufficient emotional economy, which is the precondition for achieving a life that is marked by wisdom, even-temperedness, and justice. Seneca’s influential work on rage, De ira, which was immensely influential for Christian and humanist ethics, calls for a Stoic control of the dangerous affect. The general suspicion against the destructive consequences of this aggressive emotion is not limited to the European tradition. Confucius already warns his students “to let a sudden fit of anger make you forget the safety of your own person or even that of your parents, is that not misguided judgment?” 16 Daoism and ZenBuddhism promote meditative practices and compassion to overcome our fixation on the need of being angry with ourselves and the world surrounding us. More recently, Martha Nussbaum argued that we should aim to understand “how to channel emotional development in the direction of a more mature and inclusive and less ambivalent type of love.” 17 According to Nussbaum, anger should at best operate as a tool of compassion. Acts of punishment are then seen as merciful rather than vindictive because they aim at the good of the victim. These representative examples illustrate that the erotization of the psyche replaced what is regarded as archaic forms of militancy that, it is contended, mistakenly suggest that honor, pride and craving for recognition (and the rage that results from the violation of these) has been considered to be more important than a concern for justice, equality and compassion. We might think that the dislike of negative emotions in general and potentially aggressive ones in particular results from an insight into the misfortunes these emotions bring about. Revenge, then, is undesirable because it tends to be too costly in producing long term damages. Hegel, for example, reminds us in the Philosophy of Right of the infinite chain of violence, the ec**onomy of pay-back that results from** blind vengeance **and self administered acts of justic**e. 18 The **excesses of rage** can easily lead to tragic repetitions of an original act of violence that might be impossible to get out of. Honor killings often lead to new honor killings rather than the reestablishment of justice and the fight against terror breed more terrorists.

#### Perm is key – rage-filled politics capture the oppressed body in a state of precarious life and doom their dissent to an endless failure

**Butler ’03** (Judith, Maxine Eliot Professor of Rhetoric & Comparative Literature at the University of California at Berkeley, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*, 2004, preface)

"Precarious Life" approaches the question of a non-violent ethics, one that is **based upon an understanding of how easily human life is annulled**. Emmanuel Levinas offers a conception of ethics that rests upon an apprehension of the precariousness of life, one that begins with the precarious life of the Other. He makes use of the "face" as a figure that communicates both the precariousness of life and the interdiction on violence. He gives us a way of understanding how **aggression is not eradicated in an ethics of non-violence**; aggression forms the incessant matter for ethical struggles. Levinas considers the fear and anxiety that aggression seeks to quell, but argues that **ethics is precisely a struggle to keep fear and anxiety from** turning into murderous action. Although his theological view conjures a scene between two humans each of which bears a face that delivers an ethical demand from a seemingly divine source, his view is nevertheless useful for those cultural analyses that seek to understand how best to depict the human, human grief and suffering, and how best to admit the "faces" of those against whom war is waged into public representation. The Levinasian face is not precisely or exclusively a human face, although it communicates what is human, what is precarious, what is injurable. The media representations of the faces of the "enemy" efface what is most human about the "face" for Levinas. Through a cultural transposition of his philosophy, it is possible to see how dominant forms of representation can and mUSt be disrupted for something about the precariousness of life to be apprehended. This has implications, once again, for the boundaries that constitute what will and will not appear within public life, the limits of a publicly acknowledged field of appearance. Those who remain faceless or whose faces are presented to us as so many symbols of evil, authorize us to become senseless before those lives we have eradicated, and whose grievability is indefinitely postponed. Certain faces must be admitted into public view, must be seen and heard for some keener sense of the value of life, all life, to take hold. So, it is not that mourning is the goal of politics, but that without the capacity to mourn, we lose that keener sense of life we need in order to oppose violence. **And though for some, mourning can only be resolved through violence,** it seems clear that violence only brings on more loss, and the failure to heed the claim of precarious life only leads, again and again, to the dry grief of an endless political rage. And whereas some forms of public mourning are protracted and ritualized, stoking nationalist fervor, reiterating the conditions of loss and victimization that come to justify a more or less permanent war, **not all forms of mourning lead to that conclusion.** Dissent and debate depend upon the **inclusion of those who maintain critical views of state policy** and civic culture remaining part of a larger public discussion of the value of policies and politics. To charge those who voice critical views with treason, terroriSIsympathizing, anti-Semitism, moral relativism, postmodernism, juvenile behavior, collaboration, anachronistic Leftism, is to seek to destroy the credibility nOt of the views that are held, but of the persons who hold them. It produces the climate of fear in which to voice a certain view is to risk being branded and shamed with a heinous appellation. To continue to voice one's views under those conditions is not easy, since one must not only discoum Ihe truth of the appellation, but brave the stigma that seizes up from the public domain. Dissent is quelled, in part, through threatening the speaking subject with an **uninhabitable identification**. Because it would be heinous to identify as treasonous, as a collaborator, one fails to speak, or one speaks in throttled ways, in order to sidestep the terrOrizing identification that threatens 10 take hold. This strategy for quelling dissent and limiting the reach of critical debate happens nOt only through a series of shaming tactics which have a certain psycho. logical terrorization as their effect, but they work as well by producing what will and will nOt count as a viable speaking subject and a reasonable opinion within the public domain. **It is precisely because one does not want to lose one's status as a viable speaking being that one does not say what one thinks.** Under social conditions that regulate identifications and the sense of viability to this degree, censorship operates implicitly and forcefully. The line that circumscribes what is speakable and what is livable also functions as an instrument of censorship.

#### The aff re-instates a vilified form of feminism – rage is cast as the model of what NOT to be – reinforces cultural technologies of the self that cause female oppression

**McRobbie ’07** (Angela, Professor of Communications, Goldsmiths University, “ILLEGIBLE RAGE: YOUNG WOMEN’S POST-FEMINIST DISORDERS,” *Post- Feminist Disorders: Gender, Culture and Social Change*, Ch. 1)

In her account of melancholia and rage Butler is not talking explicitly about young women, nor about feminism. Instead she develops further a discussion started in Gender Trouble about the prohibition against same sex love and the consequences of being forced to abandon that object. She asks how does the power of these specific social norms impact on the psyche? She says this does not happen directly but rather indirectly. We cannot simply blame the prohibition for causing these feminine disorders, in some sort of unmediated way. But the object which is incorporated as unavowable loss produces a critical agency which then berates the ego, turning it against itself, and ‘animating its emergence in the form of a power over the self’. And this abiding with the prohibition against same sex love produces forms of selfberatement, more acutely for women than for men, for the reason that femininity is always imperfectly realised. This turning in against the self, she argues, can be understood as a ‘recasting of soci al plaint as psychic self judgment’. Butler draws on Bhabha’s re-working of melancholia as a political analogy. If for Bhabha this state of violence against the self or self loathing is a kind of insurrectionary rage, a rebellion put down, it is also in Butler’s words a ‘nascent political text’. The greater the power of the state to cultivate this melancholic self -loathing the more ‘shameless is the selfexposure’ of those who wish to proclaim their self-worthlessness. (There is no shortage of examples, from Emin to Wine house to name the currently most voluble) At the same time the nature of this loss must remain elusive and ‘nameless’, opaque and silenced. The ideal, whether it is for love, liberty, freedom from oppression, freedom from racial hatred or freedom from sexual injustice, must remain ‘unavowed’. My question here is, can a case also be made for feminism to have been such an ideal, one which challenged as a political antagonism th e normative ideal of femininity which now finds itself aggressively re-instated? Repudiated and vilified in dominant political culture despite having gained degrees of effectivity (in legislation and as gender awareness) its only existence for a younger generation of women today is as unavowable loss. The State, media and popular culture converge in the production of female melancholia and illegible rage to pre-empt the re-invention of feminist politics through a wide range of hyper-individualising strategies and technologies of the self. These include expectations of individual excellence and an ethos of self- perfectibilit y through endless personal effort and self monitoring; various techniques of self-help for ego-bolstering and for the re-gaining of mastery over one’s own life, and the making available of media spaces (also cyberspace) for the speaking out of feminine pathologies as a means of regaining self-control. The cyclical, repetitive and ritualistic features of these practices of the self become established over time as **constitutive of the domain of femininity**. It is through this interlocking apparatus of incitements and interdictions, pleasures and punishments that the young woman is called upon to comply with the demands of the heterosexual matrix, on the basis that she is now seemingly empowered.

## 2ac offense

Their excessive male/female distinction causes the heterosexual complex to reaffirm its domination – turns case

**Prasad ’12** (Ajnesh, Australian School of Business, “Beyond analytical dichotomies,” Human Relations May 2012 vol. 65 no. 5 567-595)

A related stream of poststructuralist-inflected scholarship reveals how sexual identities that are predicated on ontological sexual difference produce heteronormativity, which can be described as the ‘the normative idealization of heterosexuality’ (Hird, 2004: 27) or ‘the centrality of heterosexual norms in social relations’ (Pringle, 2008: S111). While feminists have long critiqued the tacit and the explicit claims of ontological sexual difference, essentialist definitions of ‘female’ and ‘male’ continue to prevail in popular culture and in certain academic disciplines (Frye, 1996).12 On this point, Hird (2004) adopts a position in feminist science studies to develop a substantive critique into how the ontology of sexual difference is often rendered concrete in research propagated by the ‘natural’ – and particularly, the ‘biological’ – sciences (also see Martin, 1991). The influence of ontological sexual difference within and outside of academia, lends credence to Broadbridge and Hearn’s (2008: S39) recent observation that, ‘[s]ex and sex differences are **still often naturalized as fixed**, or almost fixed, in biology’. It is equally important to note, here, that the alchemy of ontological sexual difference is wholly dependent upon the patriarchal conflation of ‘biological’ sex and ‘cultural’ gender

 (Hird, 2004). As Pringle (2008: S112; also see Borgerson and Rehn, 2004) notes, ‘[g]ender [does] not avoid the oppositional duality embodied in the concept of sex, but reflect[s] the **interdependent relationship of masculinity and femininity’**. This reflection pivots on genital determinism, which declares that males naturally embrace masculinity while females naturally embrace femininity (Bornstein, 1994; Hird, 2000). This initial conflation of sex and gender leads to the conventional model of heterosexuality, which dictates that a man will ‘desire-to-be’ a male and will ‘desire-for’ a female, while a woman will ‘desire-to-be’ a female and will ‘desire-for’ a male (Sinfield, 2002: 126). **It is precisely these corresponding relationships whereby the ‘heterosexual matrix’ is constructed** (Butler, 1990). According to Butler, this matrix serves as the ‘grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, gender, and desires are naturalized’ (see Ringrose, 2008: 511).13

# 1ar

## eco fem

#### The alt fails – taking an ethical stance against patriarchal exploitation does nothing to alter material realities

Bina Agarwal 98, Professor of Economics, Institute of Economic Growth, University of Delhi, “Environmental management, equity and ecofeminism: Debating India's experience”, Journal of Peasant Studies, 25:4, 55-95

How does the ecofeminist formulation hold up in the light of women's experiences in the emergent community institutions? To begin with, these experiences call to question the claim that the women's movement and the environment movement both stand for egalitarian, non-hierarchical systems. As this experience shows, an agenda for 'greening' need not include one for transforming gender relations; indeed efforts at greening by male-biased institutions might sharpen gender inequalities and (as noted) even bring threats of violence upon women. Second, in relation to the ecofeminist claim that women have a special stake in environmental protection and regeneration, it is clear that women alone do not have such a stake. Both women and men whose livelihoods are threatened by the degradation of forests and commons are found to be interested in conservation and regeneration, but from different (and at times conflicting) concerns, stemming from differences in their respective responsibilities and the nature of their dependence on these resources. Men's interests can be traced mainly to the threat to their livelihood systems, their dependence on the local forests for supplementary income, and/or their need for small timber for house repairs and agricultural tools, which are their responsibility. Women's interests are linked more to the availability of fuel, fodder, and non-timber products, for which they are more directly responsible, and the depletion of which has meant everlengthening journeys. In other words, there is clearly a link between the gender division of labour and the gendered nature of the stakes. The women I interviewed from some Gujarat villages were unambiguous about this: Q: On what issues do men and women differ in forest protection committee meetings? A: Men can afford to wait for a while because their main concern is timber. But women need fuelwood daily. Third, women's concerns, even if pressing, do not necessarily translate into effective environmental action by the community or by women themselves. Case studies of several autonomous forest-management initiatives in Orissa (east India) highlight both the gendered motivation for forest protection and the unequal distribution of power which has enabled men's interests to supersede women's: In most of the cases protection efforts started only when the forest had degraded and communities faced shortage of small timber for construction of houses and agricultural implements. Although there was a scarcity of fuelwood, it hardly served as an initiating factor [ISO/Swedforest, 1993: 46]. Although firewood is a household necessity and not just a women-specific one, since it is women's unpaid labour that goes into providing it, any additional cost in terms of women's time and energy remains invisible or of insufficient importance to generate a community response. Women's own responses too are far from automatic. The experience of an NGO in Rajasthan, working on the regeneration of village commons, as described by Sarin and Sharma [1993: 122], illustrates this well: [TJhere is nothing 'automatic' in the extent of women's active participation in the development of village common lands, no matter how acute their hardship of searching for fuel and fodder. Even in the villages where women took the initiative and played a leadership role, this was preceded by enabling them to interact with other women's groups ...

 Continuous interaction with [the NGO's] women staff has been another crucial input for facilitating women's genuine participation. It is notable that even in the Chipko movement, the specific incident which served as catalyst was the conflict between a sports goods manufacturer who was granted government permission to cut a tract of oak forest and the village co-operative which was refused permission to cut even a few trees for agricultural implements. The growing firewood and fodder shortage that was causing women enormous hardship, did not elicit the same kind of response from the community or from the women.37 These experiences are in keeping with the alternative theoretical perspective to ecofeminism which I had spelt out elsewhere under the formulation, feminist environmentalism [Agarwal, 1992]. As I had argued then, and as the above discussion also indicates, people's relationship with nature, their interest in protecting it, and their ability to do so effectively, are significantly shaped by their material reality, their everyday dependence on nature for survival, and the social, economic and political tools at their command for furthering their concerns. Ideological constructions of gender, of nature, and of the relationship between the two, would impinge on how people respond to the environmental crisis, but cannot be seen as the central determinants of their response, as emphasised in ecofeminist discourse.38