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The rhetoric and ideology surrounding Obama’s war powers discussions are steeped in militaristic ideology based on an ever-expanding and pernicious notion of just war

Reeves and May ’13 (Joshua Reeves, Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Memphis in Tennessee, and Matthew S. May, Assistant Professor of Rhetoric in the Department of Communication Studies at North Carolina State University in Raleigh, “The Peace Rhetoric of a War President: Barack Obama and the Just War Legacy,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs Volume 16, Number 4, Winter 2013)

In this public climate of ambivalence and unmet expectations, many analysts viewed Obama’s Prize as an appeal to achieve what the Nobel committee called a “new climate in international politics.”3 In the words of New York Times journalists Steven Erlanger and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, the award “seemed a kind of prayer and encouragement by the Nobel committee for future endeavor and more consensual American leadership.”4 Indeed, it appeared as if the Nobel committee was attempting to reconstitute American foreign policy by awarding the young president its coveted Peace Prize. Yet during his address Obama resisted this reconstitution, giving a speech that tested the generic conventions of Peace Prize lectures and asserted his independence from the constraints implied by the award.5 Instead of reviewing his accomplishments, rearticulating his foreign policy objectives, and outlining a plan for a renewed peace, Obama finessed the occasion by giving an address **steeped in traditional tropes of American exceptionalism and just war**.6

The address’s ambivalent vision dissatisfied many commentators7 ; others, however, found that it provided a compelling image of international peace in this age of interdependence and insecurity.8 For example, in a deft, impressive work of rhetorical criticism recently published in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Robert Terrill argues that Obama’s controversial lecture may have presented “an altogether fitting vision of peace for the twenty-first century.”9 Acknowledging Obama’s tremendous debt to the just war tradition, Terrill finds that traditional just war principles such as jus in bello and jus ad bellum—acting justly during war and having just reasons for waging war—**give Obama a moral framework** for **repositioning the United States toward a more benevolent foreign policy**. As a rejoinder to Professor Terrill’s article, we would like to offer a different yet somewhat complementary [End Page 624] perspective of Obama’s just war rhetoric, one that reevaluates the historical just war tradition that Obama has inherited, and reconsiders the consequences of that inheritance. This historical depth provides a much-needed context for Obama’s address, we argue, because it sheds light on some of the more pernicious implications of the rhetoric of “just war.”

We begin by providing a brief intellectual history of the paradoxical visions that have structured just war thought. Turning primarily to Plato, Cicero, and Augustine, we illustrate how the just war tradition often has justified the **irresponsible extension** of exceptional states’ military jurisdiction. Because Obama’s Nobel Prize address pivots primarily upon jus ad bellum, we describe how his lecture functions alongside the “**defensive” extension of American military power.** We will argue, for example, that Obama’s rhetorical realism10 presents a world in which war originates at the beginning of time and reverberates everywhere, thereby ambiguating the bounds of peace-space and war-space. We further assert that Obama’s lecture adopts a transcendent, postpolitical perspective by the use of balanced reasoning and formal equilibrium to establish the **ethos of an orator-statesman** who sees through mere politics to encounter the world “as it is.” Coldly revealing this privileged perspective, Obama inundates his audiences with scenes of terrible violence, misery, and deprivation. By constructing and exploiting his audiences’ moral culpability in this human suffering, Obama’s address **directs that culpability toward an** ostensibly unavoidable **resolution**: the “just” intervention of state violence. For these reasons, we are left to conclude that the peace waged by Obama’s address is not “uneasy,” as Terrill claims; it is effectively foreclosed.11

These aspects of Obama’s lecture follow quite smoothly from traditional just war principles: just war theorists have frequently employed rhetoric that **diffuses war’s spatiotemporal limits,** praises the **supposedly postpolitical** decisions of elite individuals and institutions, and offers ever more inclusive definitions of originary hostile acts that demand the “retribution” of just war.12 Ultimately we argue that although this prestigious international award provided Obama with a clear exigence to dedicate his administration to a more peaceful role among the nations, he neglected this kairotic opportunity. Instead, President Obama used that historic occasion to rationalize and praise the “just” violence of the exceptional American state. Amid the Obama administration’s unsettling record of preemptive aggression—and despite its preference to casuistically stretch these war acts [End Page 625] into “kinetic military action”13 or “overseas contingency operations”14 —we hope to generate a renewed assessment of the **role played by Obama’s rhetoric in the** alarming proliferation **of America’s just wars.**

Paradox and Impossible Peace in the Just War Tradition

Obama’s Nobel lecture develops upon two structural paradoxes that, since at least the time of Plato, have rationalized the waging of “just” wars. One of these paradoxes derives from Plato’s and Augustine’s idealist notions of peace and justice, and their related visions of an **essentially fallen human nature**. In their theories of the just war, peace is located in a “fictional” realm of spatiotemporal ideality—for instance, in a “healthy” or “heavenly” city—that effectively forecloses it as a human possibility.15 Nevertheless, in this vision peace must be invoked as a guiding and legitimating ethical principle. Channeling this paradox into the twenty-first century, Obama argues that peace, **despite its regrettable impossibility,** must be “the North Star that guides us on our journey.”16 Underlying Obama’s just war rhetoric is also a second paradox, one that arises with Cicero and that has become increasingly prominent in the rhetoric of American foreign policy since September 11, 2001. Justice is identified with the state, which in its divine mission to spread peace must wage war against those who resist its advances. The state, thus conceived as the world’s vehicle of justice, has to maintain moral integrity as it continues its ordained expansion. Those who cannot be assimilated into that growing moral apparatus, and who thus **threaten its integrity, deserve the state’s “just” violence**. From this point of view, war is a teleological fulfillment of the cause of peace.17

Obama’s use of just war ideology places humanity in a constant war with itself. Just war will always be interpreted to brutalize those who can’t assimilate to exceptionalist culture in the paradoxical war for peace

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After Augustine the question of just war becomes central to medieval Christian thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, as burgeoning European states struggle to reconcile the peaceful tenets of their new religion with its proselytizing imperatives.34 Realists such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Grotius pick up the just war question between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from whom it is then bequeathed to Enlightenment thinkers who attempt to reconceptualize a secular ethics of just war. In the early American republic, of course, secular Enlightenment just war theory becomes **infused with a religious exceptionalism** that figures into America’s westward expansion (“manifest destiny”) and later into our twentieth-century entanglements in European, Asian, and African conflicts.35 If the history of American war rhetoric is to be trusted, each of these wars can be rationalized under traditional just war principles, being paradoxically fought for the causes of justice and, ultimately, peace. Inheriting an ancient tradition that has been rechanneled by many of his American predecessors—men as diverse as George Washington,36 Teddy Roosevelt,37 Woodrow Wilson,38 George H. W. Bush,39 and George W. Bush40 —President Obama confronts [End Page 629] the paradoxical challenge of waging war in the name of peace.41 Given this long inheritance, Obama’s speech **reinscribes a discourse** that precedes and will certainly follow him. His just war rhetoric, then, is **not interesting merely as an isolated moment of presidential address**, but also as a reflection and reinscription of a cultural tradition that developed its distinctive features long before Obama took the stage in Oslo.

Like his intellectual forebears in the just war tradition, Obama presents a world that is always-already at war with itself. In this context of total war, an exceptional state must emerge not to keep the peace, but to ensure that violence is channeled toward the immoral. The righteous values that under-gird his foreign policy, Obama assures us, justify the aggressive and sometimes regrettable means by which they have to be spread. For Obama, **in a world in which warfare is inevitable, peace is an ideal that only exists far off in the stars;** so it should only inspire us to the extent that we do not lose sight of the essential brutality of human nature, and thus of the necessity of intervention by those whose values are more closely aligned with a righteous will. As Augustine’s concession of an innate human brutality allowed him to praise Christian values and to advocate a closer alignment of the state and Christian institutions, Obama’s invocation of the just war permits him to **present and constitute a chaotic, brutal world in need of closer alignment with American institutions and values**—a world in need of American salvation.

Just War Everywhere

At the outset of his speech, Obama emplots himself in a tragedy that stretches back to the origins of humankind.42 “War,” he declares, “appeared with the first man. At the dawn of history, its morality was not questioned; it was simply a fact, like drought or disease—the manner in which tribes and then civilizations sought power and settled their differences.”43 **This initial justification sets up Obama’s alignment with the just war tradition**. Although Obama asserts that current events “require us to think in new ways about the notions of just war” (emphasis added),44 his address actually recycles the same structural paradoxes that have rationalized the waging of “just war” since at least Classical Greece. Rechanneling the arguments of Plato and Augustine, Obama identifies war as evidence of the “imperfection of man”: “We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not [End Page 630] eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations—acting individually or in concert—will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified....Tosay that force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism—it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.”45

Like Augustine**, Obama locates humankind in a debased City of Man**, in a world **inhospitable to peace**. To accept war, then, is simply to recognize what Obama portrays as “the hard truth” of our natural imperfections as a species. This opening trajectory reverberates throughout Obama’s speech, leading us to take note, along with Roland Barthes, at the way in which discourses appeal to history to “dress themselves up” in natural reality. As Barthes observes, “In short,...I resented seeing Nature and History confused at every turn, and I wanted to track down, in the decorative display of what-goes-without-saying, the ideological abuse which, in my view, is hidden there.”46 In our view, Obama’s total war mythology, which with biblical overtones locates war with the first “man,” turns to history to justify the “nature” he has wreaked with the drones, missiles, and tanks of the American military. His reading of history thus reduces the past to an intensifying cycle of violence **that has finally met its best match in the “just” benevolence of American military power**. **In Platonic fashion, Obama** waxes dreamily on the healthy city; but in the end, he invokes John F. Kennedy to argue for “a more practical, attainable peace”—a “peace,” of course, secured by the vigilant proliferation of “just” wars.47

Obama’s eschatological history **unfolds toward the salvation offered by American global hegemony**, as mankind’s innate savagery is “haltingly” overcome by the refinement and spread of an ideology of “humanitarian” interventionism that, in Obama’s words, **prevents the Axis of Evil**—he mentions Iraq, Iran, and North Korea specifically—from “gaming the system.” Recalling the contentious rise of just war philosophy, Obama argues that, “as codes of law sought to control violence within groups, so did philosophers, clerics, and statesmen seek to regulate the destructive power of war.” Yet, he laments, “For most of history, this concept of just war was rarely observed. The capacity of human beings to think up new ways to kill one another proved inexhaustible.”48 A just peace, according to Obama, was for centuries a fantasy in the minds of an intellectual elite. But the wistful imagination of philosophers was always trumped by humankind’s “capacity” to dream up new technologies and excuses for violence. Yet after the [End Page 631] tragedy of World War II, “it became clear **to victor and vanquished alike that the world needed institutions to prevent another World War**.”49

The **most remarkable aspect** of this rhetoric is its tragedian emplotment of humankind versus itself: not only does it imply an ambivalent, Augustinian **division within each human**—whose innate brutality **must be defused by the right kind of governance**—but it also posits a division between humans. According to Obama, because of humankind’s violent “nature” an **intellectual vanguard** that understands the just economy of peace and war has always been ignored or defeated. That is, until now: in the postwar era, the international community has been brought into line under the moral guidance of an exceptional state. The telos of the just has finally been fulfilled in the ascent of “international” entities like the United Nations and NATO—institutions that are bounded, Obama assures us, by the “universal aspirations of mankind.” Because “wars between nations have increasingly given way to wars within nations,” Obama declares that “we” must dedicate ourselves to a new international responsibility: in “today’s wars,” “a few small men with outsized rage”—men, of course, who cannot be easily tied to a single sovereign territory—can now be expected to indiscriminately murder civilians in unprecedented numbers. Solving terrorism and “wars within nations,” he claims, will require the **same vision and persistence as traditional sovereign warfare**, but this vision and persistence will have to be waged based upon revised notions of justice, war, and peace: in Obama’s words, we must “think in new ways about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace.” These new ways of thinking about war, Obama declares, will require the wisdom and action of “international” institutions under the **guidance of an exceptional state**.50

Although Obama asserts that “America cannot act alone,” he takes pride in America’s role in the postwar propagation of its signature political and economic models. After invoking the legacy of his predecessor Woodrow Wilson, who is well known for justifying American entry into the First World War because it was “the war to end all wars,”51 Obama invokes the Marshall Plan and the United Nations as evidence that, in the postwar period, “America led the world in constructing an architecture to keep the peace..., and it is a legacy for which my own country is rightfully proud.”52 Consistent with the ideology of American exceptionalism that appears throughout the address, Obama praises two developments that have been essential in pulling the postwar world into America’s orbit: the [End Page 632] Marshall Plan and the United Nations.53 The Marshall Plan, of course, was a program designed to infuse capital into war-torn Europe in order, among other goals, to lure nations into the American rather than the Soviet sphere of influence. As Neil Smith has recognized, the Marshall Plan was “aimed unabashedly at the political-economic reconstruction of a capitalist Europe,”54 leading President Truman to proclaim that the Plan was evidence that traditional American values like freedom were inextricably tied to global trade and unfettered capitalist development: “Peace, freedom and world trade are indivisible.”55 And the United Nations, of course, has played an even greater role in the export of American geopolitical influence, establishing a worldwide jurisdiction for American military and economic interventions.56 Obama does not seem very bashful about this: he openly conflates such “internationalism” with American power, citing the Marshall Plan and the United Nations as two things for which his own country—not the international community—should be “rightfully proud.”57 He implores his global audience to remember “that it was not simply international institutions—not just treaties and declarations—that brought stability to a post-World War II world.” It is the fortitude and foresight of America, he proclaims, that have brought “liberty, self-determination, equality and the rule of law” to a grateful planet.58

This exceptionalist rhetoric shows Obama’s allegiances to the Ciceronian tradition of just war. For Obama, of course, America is the new righteous power, and its expansion and influence are predicated on the fulfillment of humankind’s “free” and “prosperous” destiny: “We have [acted internationally] out of enlightened self-interest—because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.... America’s commitment to global security will never waiver.”59 Embedded within this commitment are **two dangerous claims** about America’s role among the nations: not only does Obama promise the world that the American military is committed “globally,” he also promises that this global commitment will “never waiver.” In other words, Obama universalizes the potential spatiotemporal reach of American military actions. What is perhaps most innovative in Obama’s war rhetoric, then, is how it makes operable the traditional global aspirations of just war philosophy: Obama renders his **enemies and their threats so ambiguous** that they, like the innate human evil posited by Plato and Augustine, can be perpetually [End Page 633] fought but never conquered. Therefore “the enemy” exists everywhere and at all times, providing the righteous state with **an open warrant to react against it.** Obama argues that these exceptional commitments are required “in a world in which threats are more diffuse, and missions more complex.”60 This rhetoric of the “threat” **deflects responsibility** in such a way that the enemy’s originary act of war is theorized to **have already taken place** from afar. In the words of Marc Redfield, “**It is the other...who declares war**; the president, in the staged immediacy of his interior consciousness, **merely declares war back**....War as declaration originates elsewhere: the wielder of sovereign power... relegates sovereignty to the other in order to take it back. The true performativity of war as declaration is thus imagined to take place at a distance.”61 Obama’s war rhetoric therefore functions less as a unilateral declaration of war than a **reluctant acknowledgment** that he simply must re-engage the enemies’ originary hostilities—hostilities, of course, that are being produced by an enemy whose **territorial fluidity establishes the** whole world as war-space.

That brutalizing impulse is the result of a self-other dualism that is the root cause of all forms of political violence – only non-violence as a political strategy can spill over to combat cycles of oppression

Hongyu Wang, Ph.d., Professor, STCL - Curriculum Studies, 2014, “A Nonviolent Perspective on Internationalizing Curriculum Studies,” International Handbook of Curriculum Research, Ch. 5 Routledge

Affirming the human capacity for nonviolence **does not deny** the existence of psychic and social violence in multiple dimensions across different scales. Just as many a spiritual tradition has a core principle of nonviolence, there is always a contested interpretation of the same tradition through violence as well (Smith-Christopher. 2007). Much of psychoanalysis is based upon the notion of psychic aggression as pan of humanity. Current social, cultural, and ecological disasters are testimonies to various forms of violence. Precisely because we have coexisting narratives of violence and nonviolence, the aspect that is actualized in reality more fully will depend on which course—nonviolence or violence—we choose to follow. If we intentionally cultivate nonviolence to its full potential, the world will become more nonviolent and loving.

The root cause of violence is dualism (of mind and body) and the sense of separateness(of self and other) (Bai & Cohen. 2008; Shastri & Shastri, 2007). Control of and domination over the other I whether this other Is individual, group, nation, or an ecological other) **as the result of such a dualistic split** feeds the cycle of violence. Here violence does not merely refer to physical violence but includes many realms, such as intellectual, emotional, spiritual, social, and cultural violence (Wang. 201(1). and includes both individual and structural violence. To treat the root of violence, to dissolve its fundamental mechanism, and **to work through the knot of violence take nothing less than nonviolence**. In the case of gendered violence, for example, Allan O. Johnson (2003) argues, "**there is no way around or over (patriarchy]—the only way out is through"** (p. 232). We cannot ignore the social reality of patriarchy, neither can we use another mode of domination to destroy it. but we must work through It. To **undo the** mechanism of violence **in its domination**, we must confront and transcend the psychic and social dualism in such a way that the cycle of control and domination can be broken**. Racism, sexism, classism. homophobia, colonization, imperialism, and other forms of violence** are all caught in such a cycle. Only nonviolent pathways can work through violence to unravel the knot and cane out lines of interconnections.

As a positive force, nonviolence is both active and receptive. One of the **misconceptions** about nonviolence is that it is too soli and passive. So entrenched in the logic of control and aggression, especially in the United States, **we often associate the evocation of nonviolence with being sod**, despite the long-standing American tradition of nonviolence in feminist, civil rights, and other social movements (Cooncy & Michalnwski. I\*J87: Howlctt & Lieberman, 2008). A person, a group, or a nation is either tough or soft, and there is no other alternative. But there are alternatives: nonviolence activism iSharp, 2005: Slichm. 2006; Zinn. 2002) is based upon compassion.

**Nonviolence is not soft but radical in its denouncement of all forms of violence**: Even though political leaders repeatedly evoked the ideals of democracy, justice, freedom, or even peace to lead armies into war, none of them could use the ideal of nonviolence us an excuse. **Nonviolence does not accept sacrificing others' interests in order to serve one's own interest in any disguised way**. And its active nature Mends with its receptive quality to form a particular mode of strength capable of **enduring attacks from inside and outside**. Without the capacity for receptiveness. there is no capacity for compassion. In our dualistic world, we **split active and passive, or aggressive and receptive, as if the two poles cannot be compatible**. But reception is an action, and it takes more effort for such a response than for an impulsive aggressive reaction. By combining activeness with receptiveness, nonviolence shows us a different path, a more sustainable and humane way.

Nonviolence can be enacted not only from bottom to top. but also from top to bottom **as a way of governing.** The modern use of the term "nonviolence" has mainly referred to grassroots political uprisings against authority, such us Indian independence and American civil rights movements. But Nagler (2004) points out that nonviolent governing has existed. His examples include the Umpcror Ashoka. who based his rule on Buddhisi nonviolent principles (p. 111-117j. or William Penn's governance of the Delaware Indian tribe by nonviolent principles (also see l.ynd & l.ynd, IW5. p. 1-3). My example is Taoism in China, which historically played the role of restoring the economy and society when a new dynasiy was established, such as the successful restoration policy of the Han Dynasty leading to peace and prosperity in its initial periods (Cai. 20O2).

Such a vertically downward motion has significant implications for establishing nonviolent pedagogical relationships and educational communities. Only if the teacher, as the authority, practices and embodies non-violent principles, despite institutional constraints (e.g., the hierarchical system o! schooling in most countries), can it become possible 10 educate about, for, and through nonviolence. Ultimately, every member of a community becomes an important site for enacting nonviolent dynamics. Nonviolence is situated in the web of relationships, not only vertically, but also horizontally, between and among different individuals and groups. When it becomes the major orientation of a community in all directions, **nonviolence can be fully practiced and have rippling effects**.

Discourse is a crucial sight of intervention – Obama uses it as a mechanism for legitimizing violence under the law and paving the way for new interventionism under a veneer of morality

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 For example, Obama begins by acknowledging the tremendous controversy that erupted over his award: “perhaps the most profound issue surrounding my receipt of this prize is the fact that I am the Commander-in-Chief of a nation in the midst of two wars.”65 The recognition of the “fact” of the controversy creates a rhetorical sense of distance from which Obama establishes the **measured and** objective ethos **of the commander-in-chief.** This privilege of perspective and self-reflection is coupled with the responsibility to **transcend mere politics** in reaching decisions about the use of military force. Although Obama cites a debt to Martin Luther King’s argument that “violence... solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones,” he assures us that he **is not afforded the luxury of such speculation.** The force of King’s example is tempered by his need to “face the world as it is.” This **antithetical reasoning** provides a rhythm to much of the address: although the war in Afghanistan is “a conflict we did not seek,” he is obliged to recognize that “still, we are at war, and I am responsible for the deployment of thousands of young Americans to battle in distant lands.” While Obama reminds the world that “the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of arms,” he also acknowledges that “yes, terrible wars have been fought, and atrocities committed.” But despite these atrocities, “there has been no Third World War.”66 Instead, as the “jubilant crowds dismantling a wall” apparently indicate, the world is now stitched together in the benevolent if untidy web of global capitalism and liberal democracy.67 [End Page 635]

This tight, **symmetrical reasoning** crafts the illusion that human suffering calls for and is constitutive of a politically transcendent perspective. As Robert Scott insightfully argued in 1967, “accepting the notion that truth exists, may be known, and communicated leads logically to the position that there should be only two modes of discourse: a neutral presenting of data among equals and a persuasive leading of inferiors by the capable.”68 Because the address’s allegedly “democratic” symmetry draws attention away from the violence in which Obama’s rhetoric is culpable, the “radical flexibility” Terrill identifies—which articulates its moral vision through perspective-taking—serves to **forestall rather than encourage critical reflection**. Terrill argues that the address’s moral vision constitutes “a thoroughly rhetorical understanding of war and peace; it is governed by the practical judgment that rhetorical training has always been meant to foster, and it is coupled fundamentally to a particular style of speech.”69 The speech is governed by principles that are informed by traditional rhetorical concerns about the eloquence of symmetry and the privilege of patient, rational deliberation over the haste of autocratic violence. Yet if the address provides a fitting vision of peace, as Terrill claims, it is the peace of militarized American exceptionalism—the peace of a **perpetual state of postponed execution**.70

By giving Obama’s address the veneer of a morally driven, postpolitical vision, antithetical reasoning and formal equilibrium play an essential role in governing the address’s rhetoric. Instead of outlining a humbler, less interventionist vision for American foreign policy under his administration—which, given the occasion, could have been appropriate—the rhetorical equilibrium of the address assures us that multiple perspectives have been considered and that the commander-in-chief will reluctantly shoulder the postpolitical burden of dispensing violence **when and where it is absolutely necessary**.71 On the one hand, this sends a message to America’s opponents and lukewarm allies that Obama’s foreign policy would not be constrained by the prize. On the other hand, Obama’s domestic and allied audiences are given the assurance that American forces will administer relief to the world’s suffering bodies, leaving them free to imagine civic duty as deferring judgment and action to those who know—and speak—better.

Hence while John M. Murphy has found that Obama’s rhetoric has at times constituted “advocate and audience as responsible, moral agents in a living narrative,”72 we find that Obama’s Nobel lecture introduces a more [End Page 636] complex and ambivalent moral vision: a moral vision that is complicated by the dialectically organized tropes of “Home,” an idyllic, depoliticized space, and a war-torn, chaotic “There” of foreign territory. Obama mobilizes this dissociative vision by juxtaposing a mythical, tranquil West with an unjust, volatile There that deserves the justice of Western intervention. Throughout his address Obama inundates his audiences with images of self-evident injustice, invoking genocide in Darfur, “systematic rape in the Congo,” the invasion of Kuwait, “famine and human suffering” in Somalia, and a host of other atrocities. Upon this unsettling foundation of specific horrors, he argues that “the resurgence of ethnic or sectarian conflicts; the growth of secessionist movements, insurgencies, and failed states... have increasingly trapped civilians in unending chaos. In today’s wars, many more civilians are killed than soldiers; the seeds of future conflict are sewn, economies are wrecked, civil societies torn asunder, refugees amassed, and children scarred.... More and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region.”73 These charges strike a blistering contrast with the everyday predicaments of the “we” that Obama crafts in his address, creating a profound existential distance between the Western portion of his audiences and the scene of moral exigency.

In contrast to the devastated, war-torn societies that Obama describes in his speech, he symmetrically evokes a “we”—an **implicitly Western, NATO-based “we”**—that is secure because of its “civil and political rights,” “economic security and opportunity,” and freedom from fear and want; a “we” that dwells in an idyllic place characterized by an abundance of food, clean water, and medicine, a place where anyone can get a “decent” education and a “decent” job.74 These sanitized visions of “home” **ignore and erase domestic sociopolitical grievances** while generating a sense of privileged, distanced perspective from which a united, allied audience can be constituted.75

While producing this sense of Western/American privilege, Obama **infuses it with special responsibility:** **“Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later**. That is why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.... Peace requires responsibility. Peace entails sacrifice. That is why NATO continues to be indispensable....we honor [NATO soldiers] not as makers of war, but as wagers of peace.”76 Thus faced with the [End Page 637] cruel “real” world that he has dramatized throughout the address, the allied portion of Obama’s audience is faced with a moral dilemma: they must either “act,” or be complicit in an even more horrific intervention later. The irony here, of course, is that while Obama argues that “inaction tears at our conscience,” he offers his audience **no practicable action whatsoever**. So when he implores us to “sacrifice” and “take responsibility,” what exactly does he have in mind? Absent from Obama’s rhetoric is any specific, actionable program for peace or justice in which his audiences can participate.77 Although Obama succeeds in stoking his audiences’ moral responsibility and outrage, he offers them only one outlet for the expression of that concern: **deferring responsibility to the American commander-in-chief**, who will assume the postpolitical burden of sending young men and women—whom he hauntingly calls “wagers of peace”—to kill and be killed to restore a just global economy of “peace.”78

Thus, [ ] and I affirm: The United States federal government should not use violent strategies of governance.

Questioning the use of just war is the only way to interrupt the political machinery that construes legitimate violence, otherwise we cede agency to war planners

Andrew Fiala, assistant professor of philosophy and humanistic studies at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, 2004, “Citizenship, Epistemology, and the Just War Theory,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 7.2 (2004) 100-117

Patriotism, Protest, and Civil Disobedience

One might object that the standard of proof demanded here is too high, and that, in practice, this would lead to the inability of a government ever to justify war. I accept this objection and readily admit that my position leads to a form of pacifism. However, I leave open the possibility that citizens could be persuaded that any given war is justified. Moreover, I claim that it is the duty of a democratic government to persuade its citizens by providing as much evidence and argument as possible while still maintaining levels of secrecy that are necessary for security. The problem is that, because some secrecy is necessary, citizens can never be absolutely sure that the government's claims are justified.

One might further object that patriotism **requires obedience to and support** of the government: "Whether a war is just or not is not for the private man to judge: he must obey his government."20 This may work for **hierarchical governments** that demand blind obedience. But liberal government requires trust based on reasons, consent, and open information.21 One might object that the position I advocate breaks down the trust that is necessary for the adequate functioning of government. I admit that my position hinges on a certain amount of distrust of those in power. This distrust is rational, however, in light of a long history that shows a tendency toward manipulation and abuse of power by those in power. In liberal states—which, since Locke, have been understood as fiduciary institutions—citizens have a right and a duty to raise skeptical objections **to ensure their trust is not abused**. This is **especially true** with regard to actions **as momentous as war**. The "patriot" objection might hold if war were, in fact, merely the action of an entity called the nation or state, which was not reducible to the will of its citizens. However, wars are fought by citizen-soldiers, and they are supported by tax dollars generated by the labor of citizens. This is the decisive point: citizens do not abdicate the moral demand that they evaluate and judge actions done in their names. [End Page 112]

It is moral duty to question and judge actions of state. And it is also a moral duty through civil disobedience and other forms of nonviolent resistance, to **resist those actions of state that are judged to be immoral**. However, in light of my skeptical analysis, the question of civil disobedience becomes quite vexing. This is an open question. I have not claimed that all wars are immoral. I have merely claimed that we usually do not know whether a given war is justified. Civil disobedience certainly is called for in wars that are clearly immoral. In a situation of agnosticism, however, perhaps the best we can do is question and protest, while supporting our leaders who, we hope, are also concerned with the morality of their actions. Civil disobedience and active resistance should be employed only when we have good reason to believe that an unjust war is being fought. Here we might reverse the question of the burden of proof. In this case, because civil disobedience is risky, we might impose a high burden of proof on those who would claim that we should actively resist the war effort.

There is an important ambiguity in political analysis that must be admitted by practical pacifism. There are many levels within the division of labor in society. Two should be emphasized here: **the level of military and civilian leadership and the level of the ordinary citizen**. The question of justification, in light of the just war criteria, is ultimately a question that must be answered directly by those military and civilian leaders who are in the know. They must consult their own moral consciences to answer the question of whether any given war is justified. For ordinary citizens, however, the question is whether they trust their leaders to make sound moral judgments. One of the practical results of my argument is that citizens must actively engage their leaders in order to demand information and justification. This is necessary so that citizens can reach conclusions, however tentative and incomplete, about wars that are fought in their name. A further reason to actively question political and military leadership is to remind our leaders of their political [End Page 113] and moral obligations: in actively questioning them, we force them to provide justifications and thus confront their own moral consciences.

Active resistance is key – merely recognizing exceptionalist oppression enforces a cycle of victimage and ressentiment that creates vengeful politics

Enns 12

Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University (Dianne, The Violence of Victimhood, 28-30)

Guilt and Ressentiment We need to think carefully about what is at stake here. Why is this perspective appealing, and what are its effects? At first glance, the argument appears simple: white, privileged women, in their theoretical and practical interventions, must take into account the experiences and conceptual work of women who are less fortunate and less powerful, have fewer resources, and are therefore more subject to systemic oppression. The lesson of feminism's mistakes in the civil rights era is that this “mainstream” group must not speak for other women. But such a view must be interrogated. Its effects, as I have argued, include a veneration of the other, moral currency for the victim, and an insidious competition for victimhood. We will see in later chapters that these effects are also common in situations of conflict where the stakes are much higher. ¶ We witness here a twofold appeal: otherness discourse in feminism appeals both to the guilt of the privileged and to the resentment, or ressentiment, of the other. Suleri's allusion to “embarrassed privilege” exposes the operation of guilt in the misunderstanding that often divides Western feminists from women in the developing world, or white women from women of color. The guilt of those who feel themselves deeply implicated in and responsible for imperialism merely reinforces an imperialist benevolence, polarizes us unambiguously by locking us into the categories of victim and perpetrator, and blinds us to the power and agency of the other. Many fail to see that it is embarrassing and insulting for those identified as victimized others not to be subjected to the same critical intervention and held to the same demands of moral and political responsibility. Though we are by no means equal in power and ability, wealth and advantage, we are all collectively responsible for the world we inhabit in common. The condition of victimhood does not absolve one of moral responsibility. I will return to this point repeatedly throughout this book.¶ Mohanty's perspective ignores the possibility that one can become attached to one's subordinated status, which introduces the concept of ressentiment, the focus of much recent interest in the injury caused by racism and colonization. Nietzsche describes ressentiment as the overwhelming sentiment of “slave morality,” the revolt that begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values. 19 The sufferer in this schema seeks out a cause for his suffering—“ a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering”— someone on whom he can vent his affects and so procure the anesthesia necessary to ease the pain of injury. The motivation behind ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, is the desire “to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.” 20 In its contemporary manifestation, Wendy Brown argues that ressentiment acts as the “righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured,” which “delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the ‘injury’ of social subordination.” Identities are fixed in an economy of perpetrator and victim, in which revenge, rather than power or emancipation, is sought for the injured, making the perpetrator hurt as the sufferer does. 21¶ 30¶ Such a concept is useful for understanding why an ethics of absolute responsibility to the other appeals to the victimized. Brown remarks that, for Nietzsche, the source of the triumph of a morality rooted in ressentiment is the denial that it has any access to power or contains a will to power. Politicized identities arise as both product of and reaction to this condition; the reaction is a substitute for action— an “imaginary revenge,” Nietzsche calls it. Suffering then becomes a social virtue at the same time that the sufferer attempts to displace his suffering onto another. The identity created by ressentiment, Brown explains, becomes invested in its own subjection not only through its discovery of someone to blame, and a new recognition and revaluation of that subjection, but also through the satisfaction of revenge. 22¶ The outcome of feminism's attraction to theories of difference and otherness is thus deeply contentious. First, we witness the further reification reification of the very oppositions in question and a simple reversal of the focus from the same to the other. This observation is not new and has been made by many critics of feminism, but it seems to have made no serious impact on mainstream feminist scholarship or teaching practices in women's studies programs. Second, in the eagerness to rectify the mistakes of “white, middle-class, liberal, western” feminism, the other has been uncritically exalted, which has led in turn to simplistic designations of marginal, “othered” status and, ultimately, a competition for victimhood. Ultimately, this approach has led to a new moral code in which ethics is equated with the responsibility of the privileged Western woman, while moral immunity is granted to the victimized other. Ranjana Khanna describes this operation aptly when she writes that in the field of transnational feminism, the reification of the other has produced “separate ethical universes” in which the privileged experience paralyzing guilt and the neocolonized, crippling resentment. The only “overarching imperative” is that one does not comment on another's ethical context. An ethical response turns out to be a nonresponse. 23 Let us turn now to an exploration of this third outcome.

Shifting the terrain of political discourse from militarism to nonviolence falls in the hands of intellectuals and debaters – the process of criticism is key to fostering resistance

John C. Landreau, The College of New Jersey, 2011, “Obamas My Dad: Mixed Race Suspects, Political Anxiety and the New Imperialism,” thirdspace: a journal of feminist theory & culture, Vol 10, No 1 (2011)

Obama's national security policies and rhetoric are, to be fair, significantly different in many ways than Bush's. Nonetheless, he steeps his rhetoric of hope for a new foreign policy in the old, familiar language of American exceptionalism. This illustrates how the political logic of a **militarized and masculinized nation,** presidency and citizenry has proved to be more enduring, significant and powerful than the strategy differences that have divided Democrats and Republicans over the last 60 years. It is important also because the cultural logic of American exceptionalism **guaranteed by military power makes so many questions difficult to ask** because the questions themselves seem absurd, effeminately nave, or simply out of rhetorical limits. These are unasked questions such as what violence was required to achieve our affluence and power? **How can that violence be justified?** Are there models for world peace, prosperity and freedom other than America's dominance and "leadership?" Does military power and violence produce security? What constitutes security? Is invulnerability a legitimate security goal? Is the authority of Commander-in-chief one that automatically adheres to the presidency at all times, or should the executive be more limited in its power as originally envisioned in the Constitution? Is citizenship best characterized in terms of a militarized and masculinized patriotism? Can terrorism be fought with large-scale military tactics?

Of course, it is impossible to know all the ins and outs of how Obama and his advisors reached the decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. For those who voted for Obama over Clinton during the Democratic primary campaign because of his clear-spoken commitment to a different kind of foreign policy, the decision is disappointing to say the least. In the final analysis, when the decision was made, and its justification needed to be formulated into public rhetoric, what is clear is that the Obama administration felt at home in and oriented by - the old language of American exceptionalism. Familiar orientations, as Sara Ahmed argues, are an "effect of inhabitance." That is, their sense, their familiarity and their surety are **products of their alignment with an already aligned world** (7). My argument here is that the sense Obama makes of war is indebted to and made possible by - the familiarity and common-sense orientation of American exceptionalism. If the militarism and masculinism of his national security logic seem sensible or reassuring, it is because they are oriented in deeply familiar ways. The rhetoric of war and national security also works, of course, to recreate the familiar orientation from which it emerges. As Susan Jeffords argues, in the post-Vietnam context, heroic narratives about the war had the decisive (but indirectly manifested) effect of "remasculinizing American culture." This is why the work of disorientation that is proposed by feminist International Relations scholars and activists with its specific focus on the hidden injuries of gender in the familiar discourses of war and security is so important. It is also why it is so difficult.

I have argued that **Obama's war logic is oriented by, and serves to reorient us towards, a national mythology grounded in narratives of** glorified violence and masculinity. The difficulty of **challenging and disorienting that prevailing narrative** is eloquently described by Jorge Luis Borges in his story "The South." The story serves as an apt allegory of the mythology of American exceptionalism with its multiple commitments to masculinity and violence, and for the ways this mythology works to make military violence the seemingly inevitable and sensible locus where the national story is both resolved and reinvigorated. The main character in "The South" is named Juan Dahlmann. Dahlmann feels "deeply Argentine" despite the fact that his paternal grandfather was a northern European immigrant. Dahlmann's patriotic sense of identity involves, among other things, having purchased a little ranch in the south that had once been in his mother's family. Dahlmann lives in Buenos Aires, and for him the south has tremendous symbolic resonance as that place that retains the masculinist features of national mythology: the pampa, the gaucho, the singing bard, the tavern, the duel. Dahlmann dreams about the ranch and its old house, and takes comfort in imagining it waiting for him on the pampa, even though he never really gets a chance to actually go there. One day, Dahlmann is struck gravely ill with a terrible infection and is hospitalized with high fever. As is typical of so many of Borges' stories, it is impossible to tell if the subsequent narrated events are products of his hallucinatory state or are really happening to him. In any event, after some days of medical intervention, he is released and boards a train towards the south to convalesce at his ranch. He arrives, enters a tavern where he eats barbeque and drinks wine, and then is taunted by some young men who have been drinking too much. Although the bar owner tells him to pay them no mind, Dahlmann confronts them as any traditional male character in a gaucho story would be required to do. In seeming recognition of his decisive entrance into one of the enduring storylines of nationalist mythology (the knife fight between men at a watering hole on the pampa), the ancient gaucho in the corner of the bar who until now has remained motionless as if frozen in time, becomes "ecstatic" and throws him a dagger. The rest is preordained: Dahlmann will walk out of the tavern with a knife in his hand, he will fight bravely, and then die with the stranger's blade in his gut. It is, the narrator says, "as if the South had decided that Dahlmann should agree to the duel." (203) When he picks up the dagger, he feels two things: first, "that this almost instinctive act committed him to fighting" and, second, "that, in his clumsy hand, the weapon would not serve to defend him, but rather to justify their killing of him" (Borges, 203 translations mine).

For me, "The South" is a story about the masculinist mythology of national identity and violence. Intricate and contradictory is it dream or reality? the myth exercises its force both from within on Dahlmann's imagination and from without on his body. The logic of a militarized and masculinized rhetoric of national security, in concert with the economic logic of our military budget and the imperial logic of our global ambition, serves as our "south" leading us onward towards the use of large-scale military violence **as if in a dream from which we cannot wake.** We cannot hear the warnings of the barkeep who tries to tell us that we do not have to kill or be killed in this instance. Like Dahlmann, our politicians even the less bellicose among them when faced with security threats simply cannot imagine any alternative to masculinist bravado and the duel to the death.

**"The South", then, is a cautionary tale**. As long as presidents and politicians dare not challenge the role of the military budget as the primary organizing principle of our economy, and as long as the militarized and masculinized ideology of American exceptionalism remains the almost unitary language with which we speak of national security and foreign policy, there should be no surprise when ostensible doves from the Democratic Party such as Barack Obama pursue large-scale military campaigns in places like Afghanistan, and seem to do so as readily as their reputedly hawkish counterparts in the Republican Party. Alternate strategies to large-scale military violence require new story-lines of national identity and national security. We need to give ourselves a choice about whether taking up the knife is what the situation calls for. We need to ask questions about **how we got into such a situation in the first place**. We need to create alternatives to the logic that defines security as killing or being killed. Clearly**, rhetoric plays a significant role in preparing these choices.** But, as Obama's performance indicates, it is unlikely that our presidents and our politicians will do the rhetorical work necessary to disorient the prevailing exceptionalist narrative and reorient the debate towards the ethos of human security. It falls to us - citizens, activists and intellectuals - **to turn our political rhetoric away from antagonisms that require violence towards the democratic task of contending with opponents with whom we share the world**.

It’s try or die – ideologies of violence are destroying academic spaces of resistance and enforcing militarized knowledge production – radical pedagogy is impossible without exposing the spectacles of exceptionalist violence

Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 2012, “The Post-9/11 Militarization of Higher Education and the Popular Culture of Depravity: Threats to the Future of American Democracy,” RISE - International Journal of Sociology of Education, 1(1), 27-53)

As higher education is weakened through an **ongoing assault** by rightwing ideologues, corporate power, and the **forces of militarization, the very idea of the university as a site of critical thinking**, public service, and socially responsible research is in danger of disappearing. This is especially true as the national security state, the Pentagon, and corporate power set their sites on restructuring higher education at a time when it is vulnerable because of a loss of revenue and a **growing public disdain towards critical thinking**, faculty autonomy, and the public mission of the university. Higher education has been targeted because when it **aligns its modes of governance, knowledge production**, and view of learning with the forces of neoliberal capitalism and the **mechanisms of violence and disposability**, it makes a belief in commodified and militarized knowledge a part of everyday life. Imposing new forms of discipline, affective investments, modes of knowledge, and values conducive to a public willing to substitute training for education, a corporatized and militarized mode of pedagogy removes ethical considerations from the social and human costs produced by the market and the permanent warfare state. More specifically, higher education in this instance makes possible a belief in militarized and instrumental knowledge as a fact of life while legitimating those social processes “in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence” (Geyer, 1989, p. 79).

**There is more at stake here than the corruption of academic fields**, faculties, and the overall ideal of the university as a democratic public sphere. There is the total transformation of the state from a liberal social state into a punishing state. **The machinery of death is more than a technology;** it is also driven by a formative culture that creates the knowledge, values, and practices that enable human beings to work in the service of violence and death. When the military increasingly becomes a model for shaping the most basic institutions of society—institutions ranging from public schools and industry to higher education—the ideals of democracy become a faint memory and American society plunges into barbarism on all fronts. The militarization and neoliberalization of higher education is thus inextricably linked to the intensification of a general moral coma that now hangs over American society, representing one of the **most disturbing legacies of the War on Terror.**

Marked by a **virulent notion of hardness and aggressive masculinity**, a **culture of depravity** has become commonplace in a society in which pain, humiliation, and abuse are condensed into digestible spectacles of violence endlessly circulated through extreme sports, reality TV, video games, YouTube postings, and proliferating forms of the new and old media. But the ideology of hardness and the economy of pleasure it justifies are also present in the material relations of power that have reigned **virtually unchecked** since the Reagan presidency, when a shift in government policies first took place and set the stage for the emergence of torture and state violence under the Bush-Cheney regime. This shift moved the state further away from providing social protections and safeguarding civil liberties toward the establishment of legislative programs intent on promoting **shared fears** and increasing disciplinary modes of governance that rely on the criminalization of social problems and precarious forms of punishment (Wacquant, 2009; Simon, 2007; Davis, 2005). Today, conservative and liberal politicians alike are willing to spend millions waging wars around the globe, funding the largest military state in the world, providing huge tax benefits to the ultra-rich and major corporations, and all the while draining public coffers, increasing the scale of human poverty and misery, and eliminating all viable public spheres—whether they be the social state, public schools, public transportation, or any other aspect of a formative culture that addresses the needs of the common good.

Meanwhile, as suggested above, exaggerated violence now rules not only screen culture but the **discourse of government officials.** The public pedagogy of entertainment includes extreme images of violence, human suffering, and torture splashed across giant movie screens, some in 3D, offering viewers every imaginable portrayal of violent acts, each more shocking and brutal than the last. What is appalling about this glut of screen violence and cruelty is that it becomes a resource for many politicians who mimic its values and legitimate its politics. For instance, Republican Party leadership in an effort to rally their members in the budget battle with the Obama administration played a short clip from the Ben Affleck movie “The Town” (Legum, 2011). The exchange between Affleck and one of friends played by Jeremy Renner goes as follows: Ben Affleck: “I need your help. I can’t tell you what it is. You can never ask me about it later. And we’re going to hurt some people.” Jeremy Renner: “Whose car are we going to take?” What Affleck and Renner then do is proceed to put on hockey masks, break into an apartment and bludgeon two men with sticks and shot another in the leg. Images of mind-crushing punishment and cruelty now provide the framework for establishing legislative practices among a group of right-wing extremists who are shaping policy in the United States. This is not merely barbarism parading as theater for political reform—it is also a blatant indicator of the degree to which sadism and the infatuation with violence have become normalized in a society that seems to take delight in dehumanizing itself.

**As the social is devalued along with rationality, ethics, and any vestige of democracy,** spectacles of violence **and brutality now merge into forms of** collective pleasurethat constitute what I believe is an important and new symbiosis between visual pleasure, violence, and suffering. Revelling in the suffering of others should no longer be reduced to a matter of individual pathology, but now registers a larger economy of pleasure across the broader culture and social landscape. My emphasis here is on the sadistic impulse and how it merges spectacles of violence and brutality with forms of collective pleasure. This is what I call the depravity of aesthetics—the emergence of a new aesthetic of amplified voyeurism characteristic of a social order that has narrowed the range of social expression and values, turning instead to the pursuit of pleasure and the receipt of instant gratification as its sole imperatives. Before building on the contemporary relationship between aesthetics and violence put on display in the “Kill Team” photos, I will draw upon prior discussions of the aestheticization of human suffering in order to underscore what has shifted in the broader culture since the aesthetics of depravity was conceptualized, and what educational issues are at stake in the emerging depravity of aesthetics.

To be clear, nonviolence is not the only strategy for resistance, nor is it always possible, but introducing it as a thought experiment in debates over resistance to the state is indispensible to the development of educational spaces contra oppressive ideology. The process is key – myopic pedagogies impose artificial limits on knowledge and glorify violence

Hongyu Wang, Ph.d., Professor, STCL - Curriculum Studies, 2014, “A Nonviolent Perspective on Internationalizing Curriculum Studies,” International Handbook of Curriculum Research, Ch. 5 Routledge

By defining the notion of nonviolence. I hope that by now li Is clear why I advocate nonviolence in internationalizing curriculum studies. Simultaneously incorporating the ideals of democracy, justice, or equality and going beyond their individualistic basis (see Ted Aoki's 120051 analysis of these ideals as tooted in (lie individual), nonviolence constitutes on Inherent mechanism for **working through violence** for a better life for all members of this world and this planet. Not negating the importance of those ideals that come largely from Western political and social history and have become the shared heritage across the globe, I see nonviolence as a thread that weaves through **many non-Western and Western countries** and cultures and thus may **heal the divide between East and West**. **North and South**, or the first, second, or third worlds. It belongs to the vital, life-affirmative, and best part of each culture and may have the potentiality to unite us across differences to co-create more compassionate and creative expressions of humanity.

Different Approaches lo Nonviolence Education

Nonviolence education is closely related to peace education. Humans have taught each other how to solve conflicts without violence throughout history, but peace studies as a formal program was historically rooted in international studies and initiated after World War II (Harris. 2008: Hakvoon, 2010). To a great degree, peace education is about establishing nonviolent international, cross-cultural, and multicultural relationships in the midst of conflicts IBajaj, 2008; Lin. Brantmeier. & Btuhn, 2008; Irani, Wahnnan. & (iross. 2006: Salomon & Cairns. 2010a). As scholars suggest (Caltung. 2008), peace education has lagged behind peace research and peace movements, but it has **developed rapidly** for the past several decades.

There are many definitions of peace education but. as (iavricl Salomon and lid Cairns (2010b) point out. the underlying idea is that "peace education is to negate violence and conflict and to promote a culture of peace to counter a culture of war" (p. 4). Peace education involves cultivating knowledge, skills, and attitudes that can lead to peace rather than to violence through a formal curriculum or community-based activities (Gemstone Peace Education Team. 201)8: Hakvuort. 20101. Education for and about peace is its primary message. Originally dealing with the causes of war and its prevention, peace education has recently evolved to **embrace new paradigms** that locate unity (Dancsh. 2010> or harmony (Dranimeier & Lin. 2>!HIS.i as the center of attention and shift the focus from negation lo creation. As Edward J. Dranimeier and Jing Lin 42008) argue.

Peace is to be understood as both a process and result of balance and harmony that is **negotiated and renegotiated over time**. It inherently transcends duality and dichotomy. In other words, **peace is not “lack of” this or "absence of” that,** but a balance, harmony, and interplay of opposites that constitute a living, ongoing interdependent dynamic, (p. XV)

This definition of peace is compatible with the conception of nonviolence **rooted in nondualily**. Within peace studies literature, nonviolence is often perceived as a means through which to achieve the end of peace; nonviolence education is considered one aspect, of peace education |de Rivera. 20II)). But I approach nonviolence, a nondualistic cultivation of interconnectedncss and creativity, as fundamental, not merely instrumental, to all education. I think that the content, means, and purpose of education should be united through nonviolence, and that the message of nonviolence must permeate all dimensions of education to fully play out its potential. Moreover. **I prefer " nonviolence" rather than "peace"** due to its clear-cut position against all forms of violence, which includes "negative peace.'" which Martin Luthcr King. Jr. (1961/1986. p. 50) defined as repressive acceptance of racial oppression. Furthermore, I think nonviolence has a **broader meaning and significance for education** while peace is usually perceived as an opposite to war.

Nonviolence-oriented education requires a radical approach of curriculum transformation. We usually perceive violence as physical aggression, but violence is much more than physical, and many practices at schools are impositional rather than educational, such as the labeling and tracking of students, concentrating on students" intellectual development at the expense of emotional growth, constraining their freedom to explore through standardization, **leaching narrow-minded ethnocentric nationalism**, and glorifying war. to list just a few. To contest such imposition and to **challenge its basis in dualism**, the educational system, teaching contents, and pedagogical relationships all need to undergo transformation to locate wholeness, integrity, complexity, embodiment, and freedom at the center of educational practices. When the integrative power of nonviolence plays out in multiple dimensions of education, differences do not lead to violence but lo the expansion of horizons of students to adopt new lenses, form new relationality, and acquire new knowledge. Even if conflicts emerge, they can be resolved peacefully, as evident in the three approaches to nonviolence education mat I review next.

Prefer our specific point of intervention – politics rooted in the abstract affirmation difference produces political ambivalence, passivity, and recreates hierarchy

Thomas Nail, Post-doctoral Lecturer in European Philosophy at the University of Denver, 2013, Deleuze, Occupy, and the Actuality of Revolution, Theory & Event Volume 16, Issue 1

(1) Political Ambivalence

“Affirming Difference in the state of permanent revolution [affirmer la Différence dans l’état de révolution permanente],” as Deleuze says in Difference and Repetition (75/53),8 may escape the previous problems of vanguardism and the party-state, **but it also poses a new danger: that the “pure affirmation of Difference” will be ultimately** ambivalent. Revolution may provide a new non-representational space of liberty, or it may provide a ruptured “open” domain for a new discourse of rights and military occupation by the state, or it may merely reproduce a complicity with the processes of capitalist deterritorialization necessary for new capitalist reterritorializations. Slavoj Žižek, in particular, frequently attributes this capitalist ambivalence to Deleuze and Guattari’s politics (2004, 184). But to say, with Alain Badiou, that **affirming the** potentiality **for transformation as such is to affirm a “purely ideological radicality” that** “inevitably **changes over into its opposite**: **once the mass festivals of democracy and discourse are over, things make place for the modernist restoration of order** among workers and bosses,” would be to overstate the problem (Badiou and Balmès 1976, 83). Rather, it would be much more appropriate to say, with Paolo Virno, that “[t]he multitude is a form of being that can give birth to one thing but also to the other: ambivalence” (Virno 2003, 131). Accordingly, the affirmation of this ambivalence as a political commitment, and the “politico-ontological optimism and unapologetic vitalism” it assumes in Hardt, Negri, and Deleuze’s work, according to Bruno Bosteels, remains radically insufficient (2004, 95). While the purely creative power of the multitude may be the condition for global liberation from Empire, it is also the productive condition for Empire as well. With no clear political consistency to organize or motivate any particular political transformation “vitalist optimism” is politically ambivalent, speculative, and spontaneous. Showing the non-foundational or ungrounded nature of politics provides no more of a contribution for organized politics than does the creative potentiality of desire. “A subject’s intervention,” Bosteels suggests, “cannot consist merely in showing or recognizing the traumatic impossibility, void, or antagonism around which the situation as a whole is structured” (2004, 104). Rather, following Badiou, a “political organization is necessary in order for the intervention, as wager, to make a process out of the trajectory that goes from an interruption to a fidelity. In this sense, organization is nothing but the consistency of politics” (Badiou 1985, 12). And in so far as Deleuze and Guattari, and those inspired by their work, do not offer developed concepts of political consistency and organization that would bring differential multiplicities into specific political interventions and distributions, they remain, at most, ambivalent toward revolutionary politics. (2) Virtual Hierarchy In addition to this first danger of revolutionary ambivalence, Deleuze’s concept of revolution, according to Badiou and Hallward, risks a second danger; namely, that of creating a political hierarchy of virtual potential. Badiou argues at length in The Clamor of Being that, … contrary to all egalitarian or “communitarian” norms, Deleuze’s conception of thought is profoundly aristocratic. Thought only exists in a hierarchized space. This is because, for individuals to attain the point where they are seized by their preindividual determination and, thus, by the power of the One-All—of which they are, at the start, only meager local configurations—they have to go beyond their limits and endure the transfixion and disintegration of their actuality by infinite virtuality, which is actuality’s veritable being. And individuals are not equally capable of this. Admittedly, Being is itself neutral, equal, outside all evaluation … But ‘things reside unequally in this equal being’ (Deleuze 1994, 60/37). And, as a result, it is essential to think according to ‘a hierarchy which considers things and beings from the point of view of power’ (Deleuze 1994, 60/37; Badiou 1999, 12–13). **The political thrust of this argument is that, if we understand revolutionary change as the pure potential for change as such, and not** actual **change** for or against certain forms, **then, contrary to any kind of egalitarianism, there will instead** be a hierarchy of actual political beings that more or less participate in this degree of pure potential transformation. The more actual political beings renounce their specific and local determinations and affirm their participation in the larger processes of difference-in-itself, the more powerful they become. Thus, if the point of examining any local political intervention is in every case to show to what degree it renounces its concrete determinations and might “become other than it is” (as a virtuality or potentiality), there is, according to Badiou, a risk of “asceticism” and hierarchy in such a relationship of potential (Badiou 1999, 13). Similarly, Peter Hallward has argued that Deleuze’s political philosophy is “indifferent to the politics of this world” (2006, 162). Hallward claims that “once a social field is defined less by its conflicts and contradictions than by the lines of flight running through it” any distinctive space for political action can only be subsumed within the more general dynamics of creation, life, and potential transformation (2006, 62n16). And since these dynamics are “themselves anti-dialectical if not anti-relational, there can be little room in Deleuze’s philosophy for relations of conflict and solidarity” (2006, 162). If each concrete, localized, actual political being is important only in so far as it realizes a degree of pure potentiality of a virtual event, “and every mortal event in a single Event” (Deleuze 1990, 178/152), then the processional “telos” of absolute political deterritorialization is completely indifferent to the actual politics of this world (2006, 97). By valorizing this pure **potentiality** for transformation as such against all actual political determinations, Hallward argues, Deleuze is guilty of affirming an impossible utopianism. “By posing the question of politics in the starkly dualistic terms of war machine or state,” Hallward argues, “by posing it, in the end, in the apocalyptic terms of a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth—the political aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy amounts to little more than utopian distraction” (2006, 162). (3) Subjective Paralysis The differential reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of revolution may be able to avoid the problem of representational subjectivity—that it can reject or affirm particular desires but never change the nature of the “self that desires”—but it does so only at the risk of diffusing the self into an endless multiplicity of impersonal drives: a self in perpetual transformation. This leads to the third danger, that of subjective paralysis. Firstly, to read Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity as the “simple fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality” (Agamben 1993, 43), or as Paul Patton calls it, one’s “critical freedom” (“the freedom to transgress the limits of what one is presently capable of being or doing, rather than just the freedom to be or do those things” (2000, 85) suggests an ambivalence of action. What are the conditions and factors by which one might decide to take an action or not? Emancipation and enslavement in this sense are merely just different things to be done. Secondly, without a pre-given unity of subjectivity, how do agents qua multiplicities deliberate between and distinguish (in themselves) different political decisions? Without the representational screen of reason, or the state-guaranteed grounds of political discourse, what might something like a dispute or agreement look like? If “becoming other is not a capacity liberated individuals possess to constitute themselves as autonomous singularities,” but “what defines ‘autonomy’ itself” (2006, 146), as Simon Tormey argues, then the political danger, according to Hallward, is that the subject is simply replaced by the larger impersonal process of transformation as such: “pure autonomy.” **The radical affirmation of the ambivalen**t and unlocalizable processes of subjective potentiality (qua pure multiplicities) **seems then to have nothing to contribute to an analysis of the basic function of participatory democracy and collective decision-making, which remains at** the core **of** many of **today’s radical political struggles** (See Starr, Martinez-Torres, and Rosset 2011). Insofar as a theory of subjectivity is defined only by its potential for transformation, it is stuck in a kind of paralysis of endless potential change no less disempowering than subjective stasis. Or, as Hallward frames this criticism, Deleuze “abandons the decisive subject in favor of our more immediate subjection to the imperative of creative life or thought” (2006, 163).

Exclusive truth regimes destroy resistance – embracing the possibility of collective resistance is key to challenge violent normative assumptions

Anderson ‘6

Amanda, prof of English at Johns Hopkins, The Way We Argue Now, 33-6, EBSCO

In some ways, this is understandable as utopian writing, with recognizable antecedents throughout the history of leftist thought. But what is distinctive in Butler’s writing is the way temporal rhetoric emerges precisely at the site of uneasy normative commitment. In the case of performative subversion, a futural rhetoric displaces the problems surrounding agency, symbolic constraint, and poststructuralist ethics. Since symbolic constraint is constitutive of who we can become and what we can enact,¶ 34¶ there is clearly no way to truly envision a reworked symbolic. And since embracing an alternative symbolic would necessarily involve the imposition of newly exclusionary and normalizing norms, to do more than gesture would mean lapsing into the very practices that need to be superseded. Indeed, despite Butler’s insistence in Feminist Contentions that we must always risk new foundations, she evinces a fastidious reluctance to do so herself.¶ The forward-looking articulation of performative politics increasingly gives way, in Bodies That Matter, to a more reflective, and now strangely belated, antiexclusionary politics. Less sanguine about the efficacy of outright subversion, Butler more soberly attends to ways we might respond to the politically and ontologically necessary error of identity categories. We cannot choose not to put such categories into play, but once they are in play, we can begin to interrogate them for the exclusions they harbor and generate. Butler here is closely following Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s position on essentialism, a position Butler earlier sought to sublate through the more exclusive emphasis on the unremitting subversion of identity.18 If performative subversion aimed to denaturalize identity and thus derail its pernicious effects, here, by contrast, one realizes the processes of identity formation will perforce proceed, and one simply attempts to register and redress those processes in a necessarily incomplete way. The production of exclusion, or a constitutive outside, is “the necessary and founding violence of any truth-regime,” but we should not simply accept that fact passively:¶ The task is to refigure this necessary “outside” as a future horizon, one in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in the process of being overcome. But of equal importance is the preservation of the outside, the site where discourse meets its limits, where the opacity of what is not included in a given regime of truth acts as a disruptive site of linguistic impropriety and unrepresentability, illuminating the violent and contingent boundaries of that normative regime precisely through the inability of that regime to represent that which might pose a fundamental threat to its continuity. . . . If there is a violence necessary to the language of politics, then the risk of that violation might well be followed by another in which we begin, without ending, without mastering, to own—and yet never fully to own—the exclusions by which we proceed. (BTM, 53)¶ Because the exclusionary process is productive of who and what we are, even in our oppositional politics, our attempts to acknowledge and redress it are always post hoc. Here the future horizon is ever-receding¶ 35¶ precisely because our own belated making of amends will never, and should never, tame the contingency that also begets violence. But the question arises: does Butler ever propose that we might use the evaluative criteria governing that belated critical recognition to guard against such processes of exclusion in the first place? Well, in rare moments she does project the possibility of cultivating practices that would actually disarm exclusion (and I will be discussing one such moment presently). But she invariably returns to the bleak insistence on the impossibility of ever achieving this. This retreat is necessitated, fundamentally, by Butler’s failure to distinguish evaluative criteria from the power-laden mechanisms of normalization. Yet the distinction does reappear, unacknowledged, in the rhetoric of belatedness, which, like performative thresholdism, serves to underwrite her political purism. As belated, the incomplete acts of “owning” one’s exclusions are more seemingly reactive and can appear not to be themselves normatively implicated.¶ We can see a similar maneuver in Butler’s discussion of universalist traditions in Feminist Contentions. Here she insists that Benhabib’s universalism is perniciously grounded in a transcendental account of language (communicative reason), and is hence not able to examine its own exclusionary effects or situated quality (FC, 128–32). This is, to begin with, a mischaracterization. Benhabib’s account of communicative reason is historically situated (if somewhat loosely within the horizon of modernity) and aims to justify an ongoing and self-critical process of interactive universalism—not merely through the philosophical project of articulating a theory of universal pragmatics but more significantly through the identification and cultivation of practices that enable democratic will formation.19 Butler then introduces, in contrast to Benhabib, an exemplary practice of what she calls “misappropriating” universals (Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic is cited here). Now, it is hard not to see this as a species of dogmatism. Bad people reinscribe or reinforce universals, good people “misappropriate” them. Benhabib calls for the reconstruction of Enlightenment universals, but presumably even reconstruction is tainted. The key point, however, is that misappropriation is a specifically protected derivative process, one whose own belatedness and honorific disobedience are guaranteed to displace the violence of its predecessor discourse.¶ Let me pursue here for a moment why I find this approach unsatisfactory. Simply because the activity of acknowledging exclusion or misappropriating universals is belated or derivative does not mean that such¶ 36¶ an activity is not itself as powerfully normative as the “normative political philosophy” to which Butler refers with such disdain. There is a sleight of hand occurring here: Butler attempts to imply that because such activities exist at a temporal and critical remove from “founding regimes of truth,” they more successfully avoid the insidious ruse of critical theory. But who’s rusing who here? Because Butler finds it impossible to conceive of normativity outside of normalization, she evades the challenging task of directly confronting her own normative assumptions. Yet Butler in fact advocates ethical practices that are animated by the same evaluative principles as communicative ethics: the rigorous scrutiny of all oppositional discourse for its own newly generated exclusions, and the reconfiguration of debilitating identity terms such as “women” as sites “of permanent openness and resignifiability” (FC, 50). Both these central practices rely fundamentally on democratic principles of inclusion and open contestation. Communicative ethics does no more than to clarify where among our primary social practices we might locate the preconditions for such activities of critique and transformation. By justifying its own evaluative assumptions and resources it aims not to posit a realm free of power but rather to clarify our own ongoing critiques of power. This does not mean that such critiques will not themselves require rigorous scrutiny for harboring blindnesses and further exclusions, but neither does it mean that such critiques will necessarily be driven by exclusionary logic. And **communicative ethics** is by no means a “merely theoretical” or “philosophical” project inasmuch as it **can identify particular social and institutional practices that foster democratic ends.** By casting all attempts to characterize such practices as pernicious normalizing, Butler effectively disables her own project and leaves herself no recourse but to issue dogmatic condemnations and approvals.

# 2ac

## At: Daulatzai

#### Daulatzai buries and essentializes Muslim history – no coherent link argument

Plummer ’13 (Brenda Gayle Plummer, University of Wisconsin–Madison, “Reviews: Sohail Daulatzai , Black Star, Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and Black Freedom beyond America,” Journal of American Studies / Volume 47 / Issue 03 / , pp 839-840) \

Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam (NOI) dominate much of the book, and they are **made to stand in** for the Muslim challenge to the West as a whole. Drawing heavily on the work of Melani McAlister, Daulatzai traces how the NOI and its most noted orator stood the “moral geography” and symbolism of Christendom on its ear to craft oppositional discourses and practices that provided alternative pathways to personal and collective emancipation for African Americans. He recuperates the Nation's use of the term “Asiatic black man,” explaining that blacks should not limit themselves to Africa as the exclusive site of what is actually a global identity. These sweeping claims, however, bury as much history as they reveal. We learn very little of the substantial history of Islam in America before the NOI, nor are the black American Muslims who did not belong to the Nation **or who disagreed with its tenets** acknowledged or described. It is also odd that the author sees little contradiction in bequeathing Louis Farrakhan, a lethal enemy of Malcolm X, the mantle of Malcolm's internationalist energy and commitment. No specific examination of Farrakhan's views is found in this account. Farrakhan's opportunism is forgotten, and he is praised for making peace among various hip hop artists and for being cited in their lyrics.

Black Star, Crescent Moon **could use less of the author's** irritatingly essentialized appeals to the “Muslim International” and the “Muslim Third World.” While the author describes the former as “a parallel space to the state,” **the “Muslim Third World” is never defined**. It includes variously Saudi Arabia and the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, although neither of the two leading conference luminaries, Nehru and Zhou Enlai, were Muslims or represented Muslims. If the “Muslim International” and the “Muslim Third World” are meant to connote spaces of anti-imperialist popular resistance, the inclusion of certain polities is indeed puzzling. Are people who grew up in refugee camps or confront brutal Israeli apartheid policies to be conflated with those who secretly tipple fine scotch in Jeddah mansions? In reality there is no neat equation **between Islam as currently practiced and anti-imperialism and antiracism**. Just as Islam has been the principal religion in some revolutionary regimes that resisted domination, in other places it has proven compatible with slavery, racism, and exploitative capitalism, now as in the past. The same may be said for all of the “universal” religions.

#### It’s bunk research, orientalist, and their use of islam for competitive gains turns the case.

Johnson ‘13

Ian, Independent Scholar and Foreign Correspondent, “Sohail Daulatzai, Black Star Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and Black Freedom beyond America.,” Journal of Cold War Studies Volume 15, Number 2, Spring 2013

This is a **fun** book to read, full of rhetorical flourishes and swing-for-the-fences statements. It is a book aimed at like-minded people, readers who do not need **careful formulations** and **solid research** to be convinced of an idea but who instead want to be thrilled by what a blurb on the back cover describes as "rebel reading for right now." The topic of the book is the interaction of black elites and cultural figures from the United States with global Islam in the post-1945 era. The overall theme is that, faced with racism at home, some in the U.S. black community found fulfillment and inspiration through affiliation with overseas Muslim organizations, or even through conversion. This is not an original theme, having been explored by scholars such as Michael L. Krenn and James L. Roark, but Sohail **Daulatzai's work is not meant to be** an original work of **scholarship**. **Instead** (and despite the publisher's suggestion that it be catalogued as a book of history), it must be seen as **an essay meant to rouse the troops**. The author is forthright about this. In the introduction he says he wants to use these tales from the past to illuminate U.S. racism today, especially in the post-9/11 era. In the conclusion, he says he hopes that immigrants will not buy into conventional U.S. values but will keep a critical and radical distance from the mainstream. Works of opinion are fine (although in today's society we seem to be overwhelmed by them), but it is a pity that **the author and his academic backers cloak this pamphlet as an academic work**—published by a university press with a grant from another university (University of California, Irvine) and featuring the full scholarly apparatus of endnotes and an index—all of which might give the unsuspecting reader the impression that the book will offer a comprehensive or fair treatment of the topic. (Daulatzai, who teaches in the subjective world of film studies, might question the idea that any work can or should try to be even-handed or fair.) Instead, we have superimposed on an unremarkable thesis a barrage of **clever-sounding phrases**. We learn that from the 1960s to the 21st century, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton (although apparently not Jimmy Carter) launched policies that "gave birth to an urban police state" (p. 90). It is probably priggish to point out that the United States is not actually a police state. The book contains the de rigueur use of "empire" or "imperial" to describe the United States (pp. ix, xiii, 1), without any attempt at a definition. Unargued, these words and phrases are empty and might turn off people who care about scholarly or linguistic precision. Other choices belie a disturbing smugness. Although probably meant to be playful, making fun of people's accents seems at best juvenile. Discussing Ohio voters and the issue of Barack Obama's education in a madrassa, Daulatzai parodies their pronunciation of the word "Muslim" as "Muzz-lum" (p. xiv). Unmentioned is the fact that Ohio during that same 2008 campaign voted for Obama by a hefty 4.6 percent margin, indicating that a majority of Ohioans overcame the underlying racism supposedly indicated by their thick accents. In this genre of writing, the breezy terminology and mockery are meant to show the author's insight and ability to see beyond the veil. The idea is that the author and reader share the same beliefs and suppositions and thus do not need to go down the silly road of having to define terms and trying to present the already discredited side of an argument. One can have a good time and laugh at the people in the flyover zone. The problem is that one can ignore one's own suppositions. Daulatzai does not really explore, for example, the way African Americans were themselves indulging in Orientalism by treating Islam **as a prop**. Daulatzai refers to this euphemistically **as "mapping Third World solidarity** against white supremacy onto the racial terrain of the United States" (p. 29), but he means it in a positive way. He lauds Malcolm X as a theorizer of global exploitation, whose essays "laid bare to both U.S.-based Blacks and those in the ThirdWorld, that white supremacy is a global phenomenon endemic to the very fabric of European and American identity" (p. 29). Surely the works of African decolonizers made this clear, too, and it was not all due to the (relatively late-to-the-game) Malcolm X? **Did they really need an American to tell them these obvious truths?** In any case, **Daulatzai provides no evidence for his statements; we are just meant to accept them** and celebrate Malcolm X's wisdom and daring.

## 2ac rotb

#### The affirmatives questioning of militarization is productive and should be affirmed in this space – rejecting the aff cedes the game to exceptionalism

Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 2012, “The Post-9/11 Militarization of Higher Education and the Popular Culture of Depravity: Threats to the Future of American Democracy,” RISE - International Journal of Sociology of Education, 1(1), 27-53)

Higher education should be one place where young people learn to question the framing mechanisms that allow them both to be **turned into** producers and consumers of violenceand to become increasingly indifferent to matters of social and moral responsibility. Military modes of education largely driven by the demands of war and organized violence are **investing heavily in pedagogical practices** that train students in various intelligence operations. Programs such as the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program and the Intelligence Community Scholarship Programs disregard the principles of academic freedom and recruit students to serve in a number of intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, which have a long history of using torture, assassinations, and illegal prisons, and on occasion committing domestic atrocities—such as spy- -ing on Juan Cole, a prominent academic and critic of the Iraq War (Zwerling 2011). The increasingly intensified and expansive symbiosis between the military-industrial complex and academia is also on full display the creation of the “Minerva Consortium,” ironically named after the goddess of wisdom, whose purpose is to fund various universities to “**carry out social sciences research relevant to national security**” (Brainard, 2008). As David Price (2010) has brilliantly documented, **the CIA and other intelligence agencies “today sneak unidentified students with undisclosed links to intelligence agencies into university classrooms**. A new generation of so-called flagship programs have quietly taken root on campuses, and, with each new flagship, **our universities are transformed into vessels of the militarized state.”** As Price (2011) points out, not only is knowledge militarized, but specific disciplines such a anthropology are now weaponized. The Pentagon’s desire to turn universities into militarized knowledge factories producing knowledge, research, and personnel in the interest of the Homeland (In)Security State should be of special concern for intellectuals, artists, academics, and others who believe that the university should oppose such interests and alignments. Connecting universities with any one of the 16 U.S. security and intelligence agencies replaces the ideal of educating students to be critical citizens with the notion of students as potential spies and citizen soldiers (Price, 2009). Pedagogy, in this instance becomes militarized. Militarization suggests more than simply a militaristic ideal—with its celebration of war as the truest measure of the health of the nation and the soldier-warrior as the most noble **expression of the merging of masculinity and** unquestioning patriotism. It suggests **an intensification and expansion of the underlying values, practices, ideologies, social relations, and cultural representations** associated with military culture. The values of militarization are no longer restricted to foreign policy ventures; the ideals of war in a post-9/11 world have become normalized, serving as a powerful educational force that shapes our lives, memories, and daily experiences. The military has become a way of life, producing modes of education, goods, jobs, communication, and institutions that transcend traditional understandings of the role, territory, and place of the military in American society. Military values, social relations, and practices now bleed into every aspect of American life. What is distinctive about the militarization of the social order is that war becomes a source of pride rather than alarm, while organized violence is elevated to a place of national honor, **recycled endlessly through a screen culture that bathes in blood, death, and war porn**. As democratic idealism is replaced by the combined forces of the military-industrial complex, civil liberties are gradually eroded along with the formative culture in which the dictates of militarization can be challenged. Wars abroad also further accentuate the failure to address serious problems at home. As Andrew Bacevich (2010) points out, “Fixing Iraq or Afghanistan ends up taking precedent over fixing Cleveland and Detroit” (pp. 17-18). Cities rot; unemployment spreads; bridges collapse; veterans are refused adequate medical care; youth lack jobs and hope—and yet the permanent warfare state squanders over a trillion dollars waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Kevin Baker (2003) insists, “We now substitute military solutions for almost everything, including international alliances, diplomacy, effective intelligence agencies, democratic institutions—even national security....**The logic is inexorable”** (p. 45). A primitive tribalism now grips American society as its democratic institutions and public spheres become inseparable from the military.

## Perm

The oppositional nature of our two political strategies proves the perm is the best option

Kathleen Higgins, University of Texas-Austin, Philosophy Professor, Winter 2013, Post-Truth Pluralism: The Unlikely Political Wisdom of Friedrich Nietzche, Kindle

Progressives are right that we live increasingly in a post-truth era, but rather than rejecting it and pining nostalgically for a return to a more truthful time, we should learn to better navigate it. Where the New York Times and Walter Cronkite were once viewed as arbiters of public truths, today the Times competes with the Wall Street Journal, and CBS News with FOX News and MSNBC, in describing reality. The Internet multiplies the perspectives and truths available for public consumption. The diversity of viewpoints opened up by new media is not going away and is likely to intensify. This diversity of interpretations of reality is part of a longstanding trend. Democracy and modernization have brought a proliferation of worldviews and declining authority of traditional institutions to meanings. Citizens have more freedom to create new interpretations of facts.

This proliferation of viewpoints makes the challenge of democratically addressing contemporary problems more complex. One consequence of all this is that our problems become more wicked and more subject to conflicting meanings and agendas. We can’t agree on the nature of problems or their solutions because of fundamentally unbridgeable values and worldviews. In attempting to reduce political disagreement to black and white categories of fact and fiction, progressives themselves uniquely ill-equipped to address our current difficulties, or to advance liberal values in the culture.

A new progressive politics should have a different understanding of the truth than the one suggested by the critics of conservative dishonesty. We should understand that human beings make meaning and apprehend truth from radically different standpoints and worldviews, and that our great wealth and freedom will likely lead to more, not fewer, disagreements about the world. Nietzsche was no democrat, but the pluralism he offers can be encouragement to today’s political class, as well as the rest of us, to become more self-aware of, and honest about, how our standpoint, values, and power affect our determinations of what is true and what is false.

In the post­truth era, we should be able to articulate not one but many different perspectives. Progressives seeking to govern and change society cannot be free of bias, interests, and passions, but they should strive to be aware of them so that they can adopt different eyes to see the world from the standpoint of their fiercest opponents. Taking multiple perspectives into account might alert us to more sites of possible intervention and prime us for creative formulations of alternative possibilities for concerted responses to our problems.

Our era, in short, need not be an obstacle to taking common action. We might see today’s divided expert class and fractions public not as temporary problems to be solved by more reason, science, and truth, but rather as permanent features of our developed democracy. We might even see this proliferation of belief systems and worldviews as an opportunity for human development. We can agree to disagree and still engage in pragmatic action in the World.

## at: libidinal economy

There is no libidinal economy – they’re reading 19th century “science”

Victoroff 5, department of neurology and psychiatry, University of Southern California School of Medicine

(Jeff, <http://srliebel.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/victoroff-jocr-2005.pdf>)

Psychoanalysis is based on the proposition that much of mental life is unconscious, that psychological development proceeds in stages based on infantile sexual fantasies, and that psychological distress derives from unresolved intrapsychic conflict regarding those fantasies (Gabbard 2000). **The** “**dynamics**” **of this theory was literally derived from** nineteenth-century concepts of **physics**, **in which** the flow of mental and **libidinal energy** is deterministicallyexpressed, repressed, or discharged. The theory has variants, but they share the notions that (1) parenting (as opposed to intrinsic temperament) determines psychological temperament and health; (2) active, unconscious forces exclude unpleasant thoughts from the consciousness; and (3) relationships with others, “object relations,” are controlled by unconscious forces such as projection— the theory that one irrationally attributes one’s own attitude to others (Wallerstein 1995; Gabbard 2000). Multiple nonscientific assumptions underlie the “discoveries” claimed by psychoanalysts, principally that the early analysts’ impressionistic interpretations of classic cases according to their own dynamic theory constitute evidence supporting that theory. Psychoanalytic approaches to terrorist behavior may be roughly divided according to their emphasis on identity theory, narcissism theory, paranoia theory, and absolutist thinking.

## at: wilderson

#### Positive political strategies are important

Wilderson 10

Frank b. Wilderson III, Prof at UC Irvine, speaking on a panel on literary activism at the National Black Writers Conference, March 26, 2010, "Panel on Literary Activism", transcribed from the video available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/222448, begins at roughly 49:10

Typically what I mean when I ask myself whether or not people will like or accept my reading, what I'm really trying to say to myself whether or not people will like or accept me and this is a difficult thing to overcome especially for a black writer because we are not just black writers, we are black people and as black people we live every day of our lives in an anti-black world. A world that defines itself in a very fundamental ways in constant distinction from us, we live everyday of our lives in a context of daily rejection so its understandable that we as black writers might strive for acceptance and appreciation through our writing, as I said this gets us tangled up in the result. The lessons we have to learn as writers resonate with what I want to say about literature and political struggle. I am a political writer which is to say my writing is self consciously about radical change but when I have worked as an activist in political movements, my labor has been intentional and goal oriented. For example, I organized, with a purpose to say free Mumia Abu Jamal, to free all political prisoners, or to abolish the prison industrial complex here in the United States or in South Africa, I have worked to abolish apartheid and unsuccessfully set up a socialist state whereas I want my poetry and my fiction, my creative non fiction and my theoretical writing to resonate with and to impact and impacted by those tangible identifiable results, I think that something really debilitating will happen to the writing, that it the writing will be hobbled if and when I become clear in the ways that which I want my writing to have an impact on political struggle what I am trying to say when I say that I want to be unclear is I don't want to clarify, I do not want to clarify the impact that my work will have or should have on political struggle, is that the relationship of literature to struggle is not one of causality but one of accompaniment, when I write I want to hold my political beliefs and my political agenda loosely. I want to look at my political life the way I might look at a solar eclipse which is to say look indirectly, look arie, in this way I might be able to liberate my imagination and go to places in the writing that I and other black people go to all the time the places that are too dangerous to go to and too dangerous to speak about when one is trying to organize people to take risk or when a political organization is presetting a list of demands, I said at the beginning this is an anti-black world. Its anti black in places I hate like apartheid South Africa and apartheid America and it’s anti-black in the places I don't hate such as Cuba, I've been involved with some really radical political movements but none of them have called for an end of the world but if I can get away from the result of my writing, if I can think of my writing as something that accompanies political struggle as opposed to something that will cause political struggle then maybe just maybe I will be able to explore forbidden territory, the unspoken demands that the world come to an end, the thing that I can’t say when I am trying to organize maybe I can harness the energy of the political movement to make breakthroughs in the imagination that the movement can't always accommodate, if its to maintain its organizational capacity.

## at: structural antagonism

#### Anti-blackness isn’t inherent or ontological—it’s historically contingent and hence able to change

Hudson, professor of political studies – University of the Witwatersrand, ‘13

(Peter, “The state and the colonial unconscious,” *Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies*

Vol. 39, Issue 2, p. 263-277)

Thus the self-same/other distinction is necessary for the possibility of identity itself. There always has to exist an outside, which is also inside, to the extent it is designated as the impossibility from which the possibility of the existence of the subject derives its rule (Badiou 2009, 220). But although the excluded place which isn’t excluded insofar as it is necessary for the very possibility of inclusion and identity may be universal (may be considered “ontological”), its content (what fills it) – as well as the mode of this filling and its reproduction – are contingent. In other words, the meaning of the signifier of exclusion is not determined once and for all: the place of the place of exclusion, of death is itself over-determined, i.e. the very framework for deciding the other and the same, exclusion and inclusion, is nowhere engraved in ontological stone but is political and never terminally settled. Put differently, the “curvature of intersubjective space” (Critchley 2007, 61) and thus, the specific modes of the “othering” of “otherness” are nowhere decided in advance (as a certain ontological fatalism might have it) (see Wilderson 2008). The social does not have to be divided into white and black, and the meaning of these signifiers is never necessary – because they are signifiers. To be sure, colonialism institutes an ontological division, in that whites exist in a way barred to blacks – who are not. But this ontological relation is really on the side of the ontic – that is, of all contingently constructed identities, rather than the ontology of the social which refers to the ultimate unfixity, the indeterminacy or lack of the social. In this sense, then, the white man doesn’t exist, the black man doesn’t exist (Fanon 1968, 165); and neither does the colonial symbolic itself, including its most intimate structuring relations – division is constitutive of the social, not the colonial division. “Whiteness” may well be very deeply sediment in modernity itself, but respect for the “ontological difference” (see Heidegger 1962, 26; Watts 2011, 279) shows up its ontological status as ontic. It may be so deeply sedimented that it becomes difficult even to identify the very possibility of the separation of whiteness from the very possibility of order, but from this it does not follow that the “void” of “black being” functions as the ultimate substance, the transcendental signified on which all possible forms of sociality are said to rest. What gets lost here, then, is the specificity of colonialism, of its constitutive axis, its “ontological” differential. A crucial feature of the colonial symbolic is that the real is not screened off by the imaginary in the way it is under capitalism. At the place of the colonised, the symbolic and the imaginary give way because non-identity (the real of the social) is immediately inscribed in the “lived experience” (vécu) of the colonised subject. The colonised is “traversing the fantasy” (Zizek 2006a, 40–60) all the time; the void of the verb “to be” is the very content of his interpellation. The colonised is, in other words, the subject of anxiety for whom the symbolic and the imaginary never work, who is left stranded by his very interpellation.4 “Fixed” into “non-fixity,” he is eternally suspended between “element” and “moment”5 – he is where the colonial symbolic falters in the production of meaning and is thus the point of entry of the real into the texture itself of colonialism. Be this as it may, whiteness and blackness are (sustained by) determinate and contingent practices of signification; the “structuring relation” of colonialism thus itself comprises a knot of significations which, no matter how tight, can always be undone. Anti-colonial – i.e., anti-“white” – modes of struggle are not (just) “psychic” 6 but involve the “reactivation” (or “de-sedimentation”)7 of colonial objectivity itself. No matter how sedimented (or global), colonial objectivity is not ontologically immune to antagonism. Differentiality, as Zizek insists (see Zizek 2012, chapter 11, 771 n48), immanently entails antagonism in that differentiality both makes possible the existence of any identity whatsoever and at the same time – because it is the presence of one object in another – undermines any identity ever being (fully) itself. Each element in a differential relation is the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of each other. It is this dimension of antagonism that the Master Signifier covers over transforming its outside (Other) into an element of itself, reducing it to a condition of its possibility.8 All symbolisation produces an ineradicable excess over itself, something it can’t totalise or make sense of, where its production of meaning falters. This is its internal limit point, its real:9 an errant “object” that has no place of its own, isn’t recognised in the categories of the system but is produced by it – its “part of no part” or “object small a.”10 Correlative to this object “a” is the subject “stricto sensu” – i.e., as the empty subject of the signifier without an identity that pins it down.11 That is the subject of antagonism in confrontation with the real of the social, as distinct from “subject” position based on a determinate identity.

## 2ac blackness/fanon

Liberatory violence against antiblackness is political masochism that relies on incorrect assumptions of political subjectivity, causes massive anxiety, and is a terrible basis for ethics

B.K. Jha, Reader in Political Science Magadh University, Bodh Gaya, 1988, “Fanon’s Theory of Violence: A Critique,” The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3, July - September, 1988

To begin with, though Fanon gives much importance to violence, **he does not define it in clear cut terms**. He uses it in a sense that embodies the connotations we associate with injury, coerction, force, power, and the like.17 In fact, Fanon's violence, used to explain everything, explains nothing. The loose usage of such a critical term **weakens its analytical utility**.

Again, Fanon is also mistaken in regarding violence as a cause of colonial alienation. He does not say in what precise manner violence causes the alienation of the native. We know, for instance, that in the colonized society like Algeria the violence of the colonizer was not the only form of violence and that the colonized was also violent. How can we be sure that **a particular alienation expressed by a particular person is not the result of native's own violence**, different from the violence of the colonial regime.18

Moreover, Fanon's **notion of man re-creating himself** through violence may be questioned on three main grounds. In the first place, the practice of violence may change the man, but **the most probable change would be a more violent man**. Fanon overlooks the fact that too much preoccupation with violence orients man's mind towards violence even when the real object of violence **disappears after the victory of revolution**. Consequently, the revolutionary violence may degenerate into "political masochism".1' The shortcomings of any celebration of violence are not only limited to the level of individual psychosis**, they may pose problems to the social and political system**. It is not improbable that military and terroristic styles of government **generated in underground and revolutionary civil war** may result in the institutionalization of violence as mode of social control in the post- revolution era.\*0 In the second place, it is **not quite correct** to say, as Fanon maintains, that violence re-creates man by liberating his consciousness. It is true that Fanon is not alone in his appeal to violence as a liberating force for man.21 Nevertheless, violence is not the only way to achieve liberation of consciousness has been admitted by Fanon himself when he writes, "**It is clear that other peoples have come to the same conclusion in different ways**. We know for sure today that in Algeria the test of force was inevitable; but other countries through political action and through the work of clarification undertaken by a party have led their people to the same results".3\* Thus **it is possible to achieve liberation of consciousness through political education or mental contemplation** rather than only through violence. That violence is not the only way to achieve liberation of consciousness is also clear from the experiences of Marx, Lenin, and a **host of other revolutionaries**. We know that Fanon himself did not play any violent role in the Algerian revolution. How did he then acquire his revolutionary consciousness? In the third place, some commentators, on the basis of the liberating role of violence, have regarded Fanon as an advocate of "humanistic" and "non-violent violence".\*8 But the fact that it is violence of liberation, of emancipation, and of justice does not make it non-violent. Violence advocated to achieve the aims of non-violence is still vio- lence and no amount of poetic juggling of words can escape this fact. Hence the statement that Fanon is a humanist of violence appears to be "excessive, illusory, or simply dishonest". After all, it is attributed to a man who has made violence a critical feature of his world policy. It is this aspect of his concept of violence which is "considerably less convincing as policy".24

Futhermore, a fundamental objection may be raised against Fanon's view that violence frees the individual from his fear and inferiority complexes. Fanon's own psychiatric case histories prove beyond doubt that the act of killing is dehumanizing and that it leads to neurosis and distortion of personality.25 An African militant had planted a bomb in cafe, killing ten. Every year, at about the same time, he suffered from acute anxiety, insomnia and suicidal obsessions. An Algerian, whose own mother had been wantonly murdered, himself wantonly **killed a white woman who was on her knees begging for mercy.** As a result, he suffered, what Fanon calls, **an anxiety psychosis of the depersonalization type.** Thus Fanon's own deep understanding of such cases makes his theory of renovating violence more difficult to understand.28

Besides, Fanon's thesis that violence is a unifying force is questionable on several grounds. First violence is the result of a psychological state of mind which is haunted by **anger, hatred, divisions and fighting.** People who suffer from such psychological distortions may forge a bond of unity for a time being against a common enemy, **but there is** no guarantee **that such unity will continue after the disappearance of the common enemy**. Second, Teal **unity is possible where there is harmony and friendship** and **these can not be secured on the basis of violence**. For the principle of violence means the impossibility of union with oneself and -with other men. Third, the gang which is engaged in inflicting violence on foreigners may adopt the same device of injuring one another in dealing with its own members. Let it be noted that violence abroad is the mother of violence at home. Real solidarity lies in the principle of union. But the absolute prevalence of violence means incapacity to act together and consequently •disintegration and dissolution.

In addition, Fanon maintains that violence always pays. But **the trouble is that it pays indiscriminately**. It can utmost achieve short term goals. But the danger of violence, even within the framework of short term goal, is that it introduces the practice of violence into the whole body politic. Fanon says that violence can **heal the wounds it has inflicted**. "If this were true" says Arendt, "revenge would be the cure-all for most of our ills".27 Fanon's idea on violence is a myth far removed from reality. In fact, "violence does not promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor reaction".28 Atmost, it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention. It can only ensure a hearing for moderation. Thus **violence, contrary to what Fanon tells us, is** more a weapon of reform than of revolution.

Fanon's absolutization of violence goes even further. For him violence is not just a method. He proclaims it to be a value in its own right, equating it with revolution. Fanon believes that violence would emancipate the masses politically and spiritually and would provide a safeguard against bureaucratic perversions of the party and government system in the young states of the Third World. One need **hardly go to any lengths** to argue that armed struggle alone, in whatever form and on whatever scale,, cannot ensure all these things and that its success in preserving the revolutionary and democratic regime depends on the political situation, the level of political consciousness, the political staunchness, and the broad involvement of the masses even when they are waging it. Armed struggle is not an end in itself, still less a panacea against counter revolution and reaction. This is. **corroborated, among other things, by the experience of Algeria after Fanon's death**.

Lastly, it may also be said that Fanon's theory of violence is a queer mixture of revolutionary romanticism and utopianism,. of revolutionary integrity and reckless venture, **of heroic self- sacrifice and political naivete**. He attempts to **foist violence upon the people from above**. He forgets that **such type of violence is bound to** end in intrigue and conspiracy**.** In fact, revolution must be the achievement of something new. But the violence and the effects of violence - suspicion, resentment, and hatred - are things only too familiar, too hopelessly unrevolutionary.

## 2ac rev fails da

#### Alt fails and causes genocidal backlash

**Emery 7**, Phd, (Kathy, “ The Limits of Violent Resistance,” For the Western Edition, August 27, 2007 http://www.educationanddemocracy.org/Emery/westernedition/Sept07WestEd.pdf)

The August 15th editorial for SF Bayview concluded that the only way to stop gentrification in the Bayview is to “go to war.” Through all our marching and complaining and testifying at City Hall, our “City Fathers” still aren’t listening. At this point, sadly, I don’t think for a minute that anything is going to change if we continue to go the Martin route. I think we need **to channel Malcolm and the Panthers**—and start making some moves instead of making some noise. I need some soldiers on my side, and as much as I am sure that there are people who are willing to protest, I need some people next to me who are willing to go to war. By any means necessary. To me, the really sad thing, is that the editorialist, Ebony Sparks, believes that there are only two “routes” or means of opposition to the dominant/white power structure—that pursued by Martin Luther King Jr’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference or that pursued by Malcolm X and West Coast Black Panther Parties. Sparks apparently lumps the very different strategies employed by SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) and CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) into those employed by the SCLC and NAACP. She also assumes that “marching, and complaining and testifying” is what constitutes the full range of tactics employed by the SCLC. This could not be further from the truth. While I am completely sympathetic and share Sparks’ impatience with the lack of people power in the Bay Area, I think **she does not appreciate the severe limitations** and ramifications **of violent resistance to the powers-that-be**. In fact, any attempts to resist gentrification violently would be used as an excuse to make all the “undesirable” Bayview residents disappear that much more quickly. The state, especially **in the era of Homeland Security and the Patriot Act, can out-gun, out-infiltrate, and out-manipulate any individual or group of people. To “go to war” with City Hall is to attack it at it’s strongest point, a suicidal Pickett’s Charge,** if you will.

#### Their rev gets crushed

**Flaherty 5**

http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate\_insurgency.html

USC BA in International Relations, researcher in political affairs, activist and organic farmer in New Zealand

 In order to understand the national security implications of militant electronic piracy, an examination of conventional insurgency against the American Corporate State is necessary.

THE NATURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ACS Any violent insurgency against the ACS is sure to fail **and will only serve to enhance the state's power**. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, **Black Panthers,** Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the ACS has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The ACS attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could **ever** hope to attain.4 **This makes the ACS impervious to traditional insurgency tactics.**  - Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus The ACS employs a full time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are **unimaginable** to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have **no idea** of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS. The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS. Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, **all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement.** Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces. Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control. Letters-to-the-editor... Calls-to-elected-representatives... Waving banners... “Third” party political activities... Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones... Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations. It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways. If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins. But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

## 2ac violence bad

The alt aestheticizes violence – leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy of opposition rather than focusing on the factors that produce the need for radical politics

Simon Swift, Ph.d., Senior Lecturer in Critical and Cultural Theory, University of Leeds, 2013 “Hannah Arendt, violence and vitality,” European Journal of Social Theory 16(3) 357–376

A key aspect of Arendt’s critique of modern political life as it increasingly embodies violence that has emerged throughout this article has been the ways in which political ideologies and philosophical ideas fail to keep pace **with the flux of events that they try to understand and control.** This insight, and the important role played by violence within it, are taken further in Arendt’s account of the ‘global phenomenon’ of the student protest movement in 1968 in her late essay On Violence (Arendt, 1972: 117). Arendt claims that the **students** misrecognize the sources **for their own turn to violence**, which she repeatedly associates with the rise of technology, and which she frames especially in the context of the nuclear standoff or what she calls the ‘weird suicidal development of modern weapons’ (Arendt, 1972: 116). The general context that Arendt defines for the growing commitment to violence on the New Left is **uncertainty about the future**. In the context of nuclear armament, the means of violence overwhelm the ends of politics in a particularly dramatic way, as society’s technological development is continually geared towards preparation for a thermonuclear war that never happens. The students’ aesthetic critique of society, which takes the form of a growing commitment to violence as a furthering and enhancement of the life force, **misrecognizes its continuity with this wider political abandonment of the instrumentality of violence.** Both the Cold War powers and the students, in other words, pass beyond an instrumental model of violence, to a view of violence as an end in itself. But Arendt also asks why it is that the students ‘**cling with such** stubborn tenacity **to concepts and doctrines that have not only been refuted by factual developments** but are clearly inconsistent with their own politics’ (Arendt, 1972: 124). The disconnect with reality and what she thinks of as the outmodedness of their ideas are in fact part and **parcel of the same phenomenon**. The students cling tenaciously to an ideology of creativity in the face of the fact that an increasingly consumerist, technology-driven society has done away with any notion of work. Behind their critique of consumerism, she argues, ‘stands the illusion of Marx’s society of free producers, the liberation of the productive forces of society’; a revolution which has in fact been accomplished, Arendt thinks, by science and technology (Arendt, 1972: 117). Like the life philosophy that, in Arendt’s account, inspires it, the student protest movement’s aestheticization of violence blocks out the technological **context that determines it and that it reproduces in its radical abandonment of an instrumental view of violenc**e. As Benjamin remarked in his essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, Bergson’s philosophy, in his earlier Matter and Memory, manages above all to stay clear of that experience from which his own philosophy evolved or, rather, in reaction to which it arose. It was the inhospitable, blinding age of big-scale industrialism. In shutting out this experience the eye perceives an experience of a complementary nature in the form of its spontaneous afterimage, as it were. (Benjamin, 1992: 154) But while the students are guilty of misapprehending, like Marx before them, **the real process-character of modern life** and labour because they cling to an outmoded, humanistic idea of man as a creator-producer, a figure who, **in the work of Sartre and Fanon**, is seen to **produce himself through violence**, their expression of this doctrine of creativity is also, for Arendt, internally inconsistent. Unlike Marx, who proposes that man reproduces himself through labour, the students turn to the Nietzschean thesis that ‘the joy of destruction is a creative joy’ (Arendt, 1972: 117). They at once inhabit and depart from a Marxist humanism, and in doing so they make contact, **in their ‘seemingly so novel biological justification of violence’ with** ‘the most pernicious elements in our oldest traditions of political thought’ (Arendt, 1972: 171). **These elements enable a thinking of power in biological terms as violence**. Specifically, violence is understood as creative in its expressing of what Bertrand de Jouvenel calls ‘an inner urge to grow’ (Arendt, 1972: 171). ‘Just as in the realm of organic life everything either grows or declines or dies,’ this theory runs as Arendt rehearses it, ‘so in the realm of human affairs power supposedly can sustain itself only through expansion; otherwise it shrinks and dies.’ The endpoint of this biological theory of power is found in the view that kings are killed ‘not because of their tyranny but because of their weakness’ and that the people erect scaffolds as a ‘biological penalty for weakness’ (p. 171). In fact, Arendt had herself employed such an organicist theory of power in her effort to understand the agency of anti-Semitism in The Origins of Totalitarianism, where she had compared the Jews to aristocrats in pre-Revolutionary France. When the aristocrats lost their privileges, ‘among others the privilege to exploit and oppress, the people felt them to be parasites, without any function in the rule of the country’. Comparably, ‘[a]ntisemitism reached its climax when Jews had similarly lost their public functions and their influence, and finally were left with nothing but their wealth’ (Arendt, 1968: 4).

## 2ac identity k

Reject their identity based focus – struggles for political power in the name of narrow goals sanitizes the desire for dominance and arrests the alts radical potential. The thought experiment of stepping back to examine the international level and interconnectedness of political violence is key to deconstruct self-other dualisms

Hongyu Wang, Ph.d., Professor, STCL - Curriculum Studies, 2014, “A Nonviolent Perspective on Internationalizing Curriculum Studies,” International Handbook of Curriculum Research, Ch. 5 Routledge

In the first edition of this Handbook. William K Pinar (2003) discusses the importance of focusing on education and curriculum, rather than international political tensions, for the internationalization of curriculum studies. If we have scholars acting as if diplomatic representatives of their own countries, the intellectual and educational possibility will be lost in power struggles. Actually, in political and social movements, the egocentric pursuit **of political authority** and control, either for an individual or for a group, can hardly lead to any success, (lhandi (1942/2007) specifically points out that the nonviolence movement is "**not a program of seizure of power**" but "a program of **transformation of relationships**" (p. 40). In the Liberian women's peace movement in 2003, they adopted the strategy of not criticizing the political policies of the dictatorship—even though there were more than plenty to criticize—but demanding of peace unyieldingly and wholeheartedly (Disney & Ritickcr, 2(108; Cibowce, 2011).

Paradoxically, the key to winning social and political victories in nonviolence movements is to abandon the politics of power struggle and **instead to mobilize every participant in the powerful process of transforming the nature of relationships from dominating/being dominated to organic interconnectedness.** If we cannot go beyond the confinement of national, group, or individual self-interest, there is **no possibility of achieving** "heart unity" with others who arc distant or/and different from us. Here it is essential not only to dwell in international space, but also to move towards transnational space.

The inter-space and trans-space are both important for creating nonviolent dynamics of the local, the national. and the global through transforming relationships. The term "international" acknowledges the "in between" fluid spaces where multiplicity and differences are neither excluded nor self-contained. Moreover, internationalization as a conceptsupports the **decentering of both the national and the global** through a focus on interaction and relationship that lead to the **transformation of both locality and globalness**. To borrow the language of chaos and complexity theory (Doll. 20121, the newness of the global comes from a dynamic interaction of local parts. Also as Peter Hershock (2009) argues, it is a fallacy lo assume that "whatever is good for each and every one of us (individually) will be good for all of us (communally or ecologically)" (p. 156) since what is good for the local may become detrimental to the ecological or the global. Therefore, the global us the whole is more than the addition of (he national or the local, but emerges from interactive dynamics and is marked by organic relationality.

Noel Gough (2003) suggests that "internationalizing curriculum inquiry might best be understood as a process of creating transnational spaces in which scholars from different localities collaborate in reframing and decentering their own knowledge traditions and negotiate trust in each other's contributions to their collective work" (p. 6S). The very usage of "trans-"' indicates both an intense experiencing of (the boundary and an effort to go beyond that boundary. Such transnational spaces not only sustain hybrid movements but also support embodied work to negotiate collaborative trust. Nonviolence education must be an embodied process. Sherry B. Shapiro (2002) asserts that it is the joy and suffering of the human body that extends "beyond the boundaries of nationality, rice, ethnicity, gender, social class, or sexual or religious preference—all the ways of marking ourselves off from others" (p. I4U). Peace and nonviolence education need to **sensitize us to the collective body**, and pedagogically we need to begin with the body as the connector between the public and the private, and between social identity and a wider shared experience.

In such dynamics of international and transnational movements, identity is destabilized, power struggles are displaced into fluid modes of relationships, and nonviolent relationality across differences become multidimensional—both horizontal (among the local) and vertical (between the local and the global l. and both top-down (from the global to the individual body) and bottom-up (from the local to the international)—to form a network of nonviolence. Instead of **intensifying the fragmentation** (due to dualism) that marks the fragility of the modern life we share, the nonviolent modes of relationalily we choose to establish can contribute to the **integrative potential of the network**.

For the dynamics of intergroup relationships within the national, I reference the American field of curriculum studies as an example due to my familiarity with it. Pinar (2013) identifies "power, identity, and discourse" as the key concepts of the reconceptualized curriculum field in the United States, hut he suggests that these concepts have become assumptions—due to their success—and that these newly taken-for-granted concepts have tendencies toward totalization and reductionism. Now the assumption that "power predominates, that identity is central, and that discourse is determinative (e.g. our research provides only narratives, never truth)—are widely shared" (p. 8). **Accepted as given**, they have become "abstractions split off from the concrete complexity of the historical moment" <p. S) and exhausted in self-referentiality. Ironically, the central emphasis of identity leads to the casually of individual agency and subjective specificity.

As both an observer and participant of the American field of curriculum studies who came from China in 1996, I also would like to add another causality: organic relationality. The complexity and richness in the singularity of each individual or group **coexists with the complicated and organic relationality of humanity and life,** and when one side of the coin is undermined, ihe other side deteriorates as well. While Pinar (2013) discusses the proliferation of "uncertainty" and "dispersion" in post •structural dis-courses and their elicits. I also think ihe distance between self and other stretched by the post-structural discourses of otherness and the unknown Other may lead to the difficulty of nm being able to bring self and other back into the fabric of relationality (Wang, in press). In addressing "difference-centered politics of recognition and respect." drawing upon the Buddhist philosophy. Peter Hershock I20O9) argues for "a concerted shift from considerations of how much we are the same or different from each |sic | another to how we might best differ for one another" (p. 1611: emphasis in original).

In a nondualistic. nonviolent view, subject and object, body and mind, and self and other exist interdependent!). Hershock's perception of differences as essential for **mutual contribution** and shared welfare, as something positive that should not be erased or elevated, but as a part of a relationship network, is a challenge not only to the liberal notion of the individual as autonomous, but also to the identity politics of static diversity or the postmodern radicalization of singularity. The nonviolent relational dynamics of "differing for" rather than "differing from" are particularly imperative under the context of a profoundly shared sense of crisis in American public education. While particular differences such as racial or gendered differences must he discussed, the discussions need to orient towards changing our ways of relating to others and addressing the root course of social violence, rather than fixing on any particular social identity. Nonviolence cannot exist without social justice, but social justice for one group at the expense of the welfare of others docs not do justice to the shared human struggle for the common good of all.

Confronting the crisis in American public education, I suggest that challenging the violence of the conservative forces and working through the depressive position of educators in relation to the external attack from non-education sectors, we are called to form nonviolent relationships among different social groups and their affiliated scholarly camps. Identity-based struggles, when contextualized in the interconnected web of life, have played a progressive role in the field. However, without contextualizing and complicating one's own investment in a broader project of education for all, without taking a step back from one's own particular subjective positioning to see a bigger picture, any fixation upon one group's struggle—along or within the lines of cither nice, gender, class, sexuality, nation, or other social factors—at the expense of the collective good arrests democracy as an unfulfilled dream,

If we can initiate and participate in nonviolent dynamics of "differing for" an educationally informed, compassion-ale community across local and national borders, we are also challenging the international domination of American politics, along with its domestically repressive educational "reform" demand for raising test scores and maintaining global control. This suggestion is certainly not about subsuming diversity into uniformity, as any network has room for breaks and fragmentations. The organic relationalty of nonviolence welcomes differences and **does not avoid conflicts because it has the ability to stretch, transform, and rebuild.**

Moving from the national to the international level, the dualism of "us" versus "them" has played a **violent role in global relationships**, and the possibility of moving beyond such a fixed boundary depends upon our capacity for refusing to dehumanize the other, both the friendly other and the hostile other. Through the psychoanalytic notion of "the stranger to ourselves." Julia Kristeva (1993) invites us "to recognize ourselves as strange in order better to appreciate the foreigners outside us instead of striving to bend them to the norms of our own repression" (p. 29). If we are aware of our subconscious rather than repressing it. aliens are no longer a threat to us. Kristeva believes that a transnational or international position is situated at the crossing of boundaries, which simultaneously affirms and transcends national borders. The idea of nation "at the same time affirmed as a space of freedom and dissolved in its own identity" (p. 32) affirms both the protective function of identification and the necessity of border-crossing. Situated at the fluid border, "nations without nationalism" support nonviolent relationality.