## 1ac – plenary power

#### The 12 year indefinite detention of the Uighurs was based on the US government’s assertion of plenary power, despite the lack of evidence for detention.

Jamal Kiyemba et al. 9, petition for cert to SCOTUS, “brief of petitioners”, No. 08-1234, <http://ccrjustice.org/files/2009-12-04%20kiyemba_FINAL%20merits%20brief_0.pdf>

Over more than three years, the government never made a return for any Petitioner grounding power to detain in an immigration law. This is not a technical quibble—Congress requires that the government “make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (cl. 3). The government can hardly claim surprise by the immigration issue. It abandoned an “enemy combatant” theory months before the habeas hearing, when it conceded that it would not re-CSRT Parhat.36 Two weeks later it made the same concession for four prisoners, including Sabir Osman and Khalid Ali.37 On September 30, the government advised that all remaining Uighur prisoners would “be treated as if they are no longer enemy combatants.” JA 427a.38

Immigration issues had been on the table since 2005 in any event. Two identically situated Uighurs litigated them in Qassim. 407 F. Supp. 2d at 201. And the government engaged with these Petitioners— months before the habeas hearing—on immigration issues. On July 22, 2008, Parhat explained why immigration law was not a bar to release. JA 185a-193a. On August 5, the government asserted immigration-law grounds to resist release, citing in particular 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), and a plenary immigration power. JA 243a-244a. When Petitioners demanded an evidentiary hearing, the government objected to the request. JA 436a437a. In short, for years the government had specific notice of the immigration issues. It did not simply fail to address them—it resisted all efforts of the Petitioners to address them. Remand—which neither party sought—was unwarranted.

ii. Plenary power

The core theory of the Kiyemba panel majority was that detention power could be located in plenary Executive control of the border—that is, in an immanent power separate from the Constitution or statute. Pet.App.4a-7a. The panel majority traced this power to Chae Chan Ping v. United States (“The Chinese Exclusion Case”), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).39 Pet.App.6a. The precarious foundations of that decision eroded more than a century ago, see Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (invalidating law authorizing imprisonment of any Chinese citizen in the U.S. illegally), and today have collapsed where detention power is claimed. As the Court explained in Martinez, “the security of our borders” is for Congress to attend to, consistent with the requirements of habeas and the Due Process Clause. 543 U.S. at 386 (emphasis added); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (no detention power incident to border prerogative without express congressional grant, which is subject to constitutional limits); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he executive branch, like the Federal Government as a whole, possesses only delegated powers. The purpose of the Constitution was not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.”); Pet.App.29a (collecting cases). The “whole volume” of history, to which the government refers, Cert. Opp’n at 14, actually describes “the power of Congress” over regulating admission and deportation, see Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (emphasis added). The border gives the Executive no plenary power to detain.

If an extra-constitutional Executive border power existed, one might have expected some treatment of it in United States v. Libellants of Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841), the last of many cases argued before this Court by John Quincy Adams. Aboard a schooner that arrived off Montauk, Long Island in August, 1839 were Africans. Kidnapped by Spanish slavers, they had killed the crew and seized control of the ship. At Spain’s request, President Van Buren prosecuted treaty-based salvage claims for the vessel and, on the theory that the latter were slaves of Spaniards, the Africans themselves. The Executive asserted significant Article II interests grounded in foreign relations with Spain. Yet neither diplomatic concerns (no less urgent to the Executive of the day than the control-of-theborder interest asserted here) nor a vague notion of security (the Africans had committed homicides) dissuaded Justice Story from ordering the Africans released into Connecticut, thence to travel where they liked. 40 U.S. at 592-97. 40 Nor did any notion of plenary power over immigration, which received no mention at all.

iii. Statutory Power

The government’s failure to file a return asserting a statutory detention power was not inadvertent—no statute afforded detention power here either. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) bars admission of aliens who, among other things, “prepare or plan a terrorist activity” or receive “military-type training” from a “terrorist organization.” No evidence was offered to Judge Urbina that any Petitioner fit this description, and following the Parhat decision in June, the government expressly abandoned the opportunity to pursue such a theory in a second CRST. JA 426a-427a. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6) authorizes indefinite detentions of aliens who pose a threat to national security. The Government offered no evidence of such a threat (and, indeed, resisted Petitioners’ request for an evidentiary hearing to confront any allegations of this character, see JA 437a) and evidently discerns no such threat to civilians in Bermuda or Palau.

If it existed, any immigration detention power would be limited and in this case was exhausted years ago.

Detention power incident to a proper grant of removal or other immigration power, if it existed at all, would be limited in any event. The right to release— even of concededly undocumented aliens—has trumped the assertion by the political branches even of indefinite detention powers related to a legitimate interest in removal and authorized by statute. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. In Martinez, the Court extended this proposition to aliens who, like Petitioners, had never made an entry under the immigration laws (and who, unlike Petitioners, were criminals). See 543 U.S. at 386-87. Martinez permitted only a presumptive six-month detention beyond the 90 days for aliens inadmissible under section 1182. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6) (“[l]imitation on indefinite detention”). Once removal is no longer “reasonably foreseeable,” as happened years ago in the Uighur cases, the Executive must release the alien. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 377-78; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

The government would limit Martinez to the construction of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), but whenever a “‘serious constitutional threat’” is raised by reading a statute to permit indefinite detention, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance applies. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 377, 380-81. Detention here initially was premised on one statute, the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (“AUMF”), see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004), and now appears to be based on others, see Pet.App.17a (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(16) (requiring visas)); see also Cert. Opp’n at 18 n.3 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1)). Given the absence of an express detention power in the AUMF, the constitutional requirements imposed by the Suspension Clause suggest a maximum six-month limit after the government determines that the laws of war do not authorize detention. Constitutional avoidance also counsels strongly against construing a statute to impose a visa requirement on those whom the government forces here without one. Cf. United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins, 163 F.2d at 330-31.

Martinez did precisely what the Kiyemba panel majority contends no court had ever done. See Pet.App.15a. It directed the Executive to release into the population illegal aliens who had not entered and whom the Executive, on congressional authority, had imprisoned. The decision contradicts the argument that separation-of-powers concerns prohibit the Judiciary from intervening to force the release of inadmissible aliens against the will of the political branches. 543 U.S. at 386-87; see also Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271.

#### This application of plenary power to justify detention was fueled by a fear of the immigrant Other

Ernesto Hernández-López 12, law prof at Chapman, “Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law: An Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World”, uc irvine law review, Vol. 2:193

Since the Supreme Court in Boumediene found that detainees’ alien status and their physical location outside U.S. borders did not bar access to constitutional habeas,46 judicial review of base detentions has continued on an anomalous path. Suspending legal norms in a geographic area for reasons of political necessity, this anomaly is historic since the United States first occupied Cuba in 1898 and leased the base after 1903.47 Much of this anomaly has to do with practical hurdles or substantive determinations of overseas adjudication. But independent of these anomalies, immigration law provides stable doctrinal justifications to continue detention, even in the prolonged and extreme cases of the Kiyemba detainees. For the alien detained overseas, plenary power reasoning creates a doctrinal wall between constitutional habeas and historic rights exclusions.

To explain how exclusionary assumptions in immigration law came to frame Guantánamo habeas litigation six years after detentions began, and persisted for years after that, this Section describes how judicial opinions refer to immigration law. Mentioned in varying levels of detail in Boumediene, Kiyemba I, Kiyemba II, and Kiyemba III, these issues include: political deference for noncitizen issues; territorial and/or border reasoning to justify rights exclusions (i.e. aliens do not enjoy constitutional rights, aliens do not have a right to enter the United States, or the base is outside sovereign jurisdiction); immigration law statutes do not apply to the base; and detainees need a nonimmigrant or immigrant basis to enter the United States. An examination of these judicial opinions suggests that prodetention opinions consistently refer to noncitizen exclusions with plenary reasoning, but the relevance of this doctrine increased after the Supreme Court and district court affirmed constitutional rights protections for aliens detained overseas. In short, plenary power assumptions operate as a “fallback” set of norms to exclude noncitizens, even when they enjoy constitutional habeas, are not combatants, and have been in detention for nearly nine years. In situations like the Kiyemba cases, when there are potentially dueling doctrinal approaches of extending habeas release or relying on deference to the political branches, the utility of the plenary power doctrine stands out. Here, the doctrine appears more applicable due to the location of the detainees at an overseas base and the diplomatic difficulty of their resettlement. The plenary power doctrine’s utility is triggered explicitly by political resistance concerning the War on Terror and national security, and implicitly by notions of the foreign national “Other,” feeding off fears of Muslims, Asians, Chinese, or something other than Western, Christian, and democratic.48

#### Interrogating the legal doctrines, like plenary power, that are used to justify racist exclusion is a critical first step in reconfiguring oppressive political structures

Change and Aoki 97 (Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1395)

Examining the immigrant's entry into and presence in the racialized space of the United States provides an opportunity to explore the racial structures that undergird and constitute this nation-state. We might question official state apparatuses such as the census, which might be described as an official identity producer, and its role in (re)producing racialized subjects.'° **We might question legal doctrines**, such as equal protection, and their role in producing racialized identities while simultaneously mandating color-blindness on the part of public actors." The point of the critique is not to abandon race, but rather to examine the political economy of race, the processes through which race is used to distribute power and maintain racial privilege. These processes produce and maintain both immigrant and native identities. Examination of the immigrant allows us to observe the dynamics of racial formation 2 as immigrants enter the political/cultural/legal space of the United States and "become" differentially racialized as Asian American, Black, Latina/o, and White. 3 It is important to note, though, that this is not a one-way process-as immigrants "become" Asian American, Black, Latina/o, and White, these racial formations are themselves subject to reconfiguration and may become focal points around which one organizes a politics of identity.

The differential racialization of immigrants is evident in the different treatment accorded White immigrants when compared with those from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America." Fear of immigration, often discussed in generalized terms, is colored so that only certain immigrant bodies excite fear. In the midst of cries to limit legal immigration, the Immigration Act of 1990 included legislation to encourage immigration from northwestern European countries such as Ireland." In the midst of cries to limit illegal immigration, the figure of the Mexican border-crosser or of the Chinese boat person makes the evening news, whereas the fact that Italians constitute the largest group of undocumented immigrants in New York is obscured. 6 (After the Italians, the most numerous groups of undocumented immigrants in New York come from Ecuador, Poland, Ireland, and Russia.17) These examples show how the "problem" of legal and illegal immigration is colored in the national imagination: fear over immigration is not articulated solely around foreignness per se; it includes a strong racial dimension."

Etienne Balibar, writing in the European context, describes the new racism, centered around the category of immigration, as:

a racism of the era of "decolonization," of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space.... It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but "only" the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of lifestyles and traditions; in short, it is what P.A. Taguieff has rightly called a differentialist racism.9

In the United States, this differentialist racism might be termed nativistic racism. Nativistic racism is not just an intersectional term, but signifies that both nativism and racism are mutually constitutive of the other and operate in tandem to preserve a specific conception of the nation. 0

The nativist movements directed against immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, immigrants who were ostensibly White, reflect the constitutive relationship between nativism and racism. As John Higham demonstrates, nativism against those groups did not gain real currency until scientific racism provided a language that allowed them to become targets of nativistic racism. Southern and Eastern European immigrants were represented as racially other to "White" Americans and could therefore be discriminated against.2 To combat this discrimination, these immigrants engaged in an identity politics in which they claimed a White identity.' This eventually proved to be a successful strategy-by claiming a White identity, they could become "American" and escape the animus of nativistic racism.'

Blacks, already present in the geographic space of the United States, posed a different problem. Ironically, the granting of freedom and formal national membership to Blacks provided the predicate for a new form of racial nationalism, the ideology underwriting "[t]he identification of American with White (and the colonization or, failing that, segregation of blacks)."' The demise of the master/slave relationship and the formal ban against racial discrimination necessitated new technologies of racism to preserve White privilege. The Supreme Court provided a new technology in Plessy v. Ferguson, setting forth the "separate but equal" doctrine that marked

a new development in racial thinking ... [that] affirmed racial distinction as such; it affirmed, that is, racial distinction independent of any other legal consideration so that the relation between black and white was radically distinguished from the relation between master and slave. Slaves, in principle, could become free; blacks could never become white. 5

Racial nationalism, or "the identification of American with white," required that Blacks never become American. The doctrine of "separate but equal" enabled the economic disempowerment, political disfranchisement, and physical terrorization of Blacks, preserving the national community as White.

These formations, though, are not static. It is important to note that nativistic racism, which constructs "immigrants" as Asian American, Black, Latina/o, and White, is not a one-way process. These racial and national formations are themselves subject to reconfiguration. Stated more strongly, immigrants, in addition to introducing and representing diversity, remind us of the diversity already present-that Asian American, Black, Latina/o, and White communities are and have always been "heterogenous, hybrid, and multiple." 8 While many scholars have commented on the tremendous diversity within the Asian American and Latina/o formulations,29 relatively little attention has been paid to the new immigration that is bringing an increased diversity to Black communities."0 Further, despite the growing literature on Whiteness as a racial phenomenon,31 insufficient attention has been paid to the diversity encompassed within Whiteness.

Examination of the immigrant requires us to take pluralism seriously and creates the discursive space for an enriched discussion of what it means to be a nation. 2 It forces us to remember that multiculturalism is not just about recognizing and respecting the presence of minority cultures against the backdrop of a dominant, White Euro-American culture; multiculturalism requires us to recognize and respect the heterogeneity within minority and majority communities.3

Although nativistic racism tends to disguise the diversity within broad racial categories, it also creates the enabling condition for ethnic and racial identity politics. Despite the outlawing of formal discrimination,' **the United States remains a hierarchical society that has failed to live up to its democratic principles. Responding to nativistic racism may help us develop an emancipatory politics** that will move us toward what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe describe as "a radical and plural democracy": In the face of the project for the reconstruction of a hierarchic society, the alternative of the Left should consist of locating itself fully in the field of the democratic revolution and expanding the chain of equivalents between the different struggles against oppression. **The task of the Left** therefore **cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy**.' Instead of advocating sameness, the "concept of solidarity" may be invoked to establish a "chain of equivalents" between the different groups and their struggles against oppression. 6

## 1ac – human rights

#### Kiyemba reduces habeas to a rubber-stamp – restoring the remedy of release is key to Suspension Clause effectiveness

Brennan Center et al 9, Brief For The Association Of The Bar Of The City Of New York, The Brennan Center For Justice At The New York University School Of Law, The Constitution Project, The Rutherford Institute, And The National Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners, May 7, <http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/090507.kiyemba.cert.pdf>

2. The Holding of the Court of Appeals That Not Every Violation of a Right Yields a Remedy Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns.

Instead of looking to the history and function of the Suspension Clause as Boumediene directed, the court of appeals relied on an abstract principle that has no application to the scope of constitutional habeas jurisdiction: that “[n]ot every violation of a right yields a remedy, even when the right is constitutional.” Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1027. In so doing, it not only eviscerated the Suspension Clause’s express guarantee of a remedy and this Court’s holding in Boumediene, but also triggered grave constitutional questions that should be resolved in the first instance by this Court.

While it is true that an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated may not be entitled to a particular remedy (e.g., damages), this Court has cautioned repeatedly that **a constitutional violation entitles the individual to some remedy**. Any effort to eliminate all effectual remedies for a constitutional violation raises grave constitutional concerns. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (stating that a “serious constitutional question” would arise if the Court were to construe a federal statute as denying “any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim”) (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974) (same); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (same); accord Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (“[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.”).3

The cases on which the court of appeals relied do not support that court’s conclusion that not every constitutional violation has a remedy. Indeed, they do not even concern habeas jurisdiction. Towns of Concord, Norwood & Wellesley v. FERC, 955 F.2d 67 (D.C. Cir. 1992), for example, involved the scope of remedies available under a complex federal regulatory regime, and did not hold that a remedy did not exist for a constitutional violation. Similarly, the Court in Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007), denied Bivens damages, but recognized that other judicial remedies were available. Id. at 2600-01. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the “availability of federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of constitutional interests” is presumed). Moreover, contrary to the court of appeals’ belief, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), explicitly reaffirmed the availability of relief against state officers as a means to ensure some effectual remedy for states’ constitutional violations. Id. at 757.

Whatever significance a hoary adage like “no remedy for every rights violation” might have in the common law, it has no place in habeas jurisprudence under **the Suspension Clause** — a constitutional provision that **enshrines beyond doubt the availability of a judicial remedy**.

#### The remedy of release against wrongful imprisonment is a fundamental human right

Tony Ginsburg et al\* 9, law prof at Chicago, “brief of international law experts as amici curiae in support of petitioners”, <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1234_PetitionerAmCuIntlLawExperts.authcheckdam.pdf>

\*Ryan Goodman is Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law Professor of Politics and Sociology and Co-Chair of the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at NYU School of Law. Oona Hathaway is Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School. Jennifer Martinez is Professor of Law and Justin M. Roach, Jr. Faculty Scholar at Stanford Law School. Steven R. Ratner is Bruno Simma Collegiate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. Kal Raustiala is Professor at UCLA School of Law and UCLA International Institute and Director of the UCLA Ronald W. Burkle Center for International Relations. Beth Van Schaack is Associate Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law and a Visiting Scholar with the Center on Democracy, Development & The Rule of Law at Stanford University. David Scheffer is Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law and Director of the Center for International Human Rights. James Silk is Clinical Professor of Law at Yale Law School, where he directs the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic. He is also executive director of the Law School’s Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights. David Sloss is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Global Law and Policy at Santa Clara University School of Law.

International human rights norms condemn prolonged arbitrary detention and support prompt release in cases of unlawful detention. The prohibition against prolonged arbitrary detention found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – a binding treaty on the United States, see supra Part I.A. – originates in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Articles 8 and 9 of the Universal Declaration flatly prohibit prolonged arbitrary detention and further set forth a “right to an effective remedy” for violations of “fundamental rights.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 8-9, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].17 **For individuals like Petitioners whose “fundamental rights” are being violated through prolonged arbitrary detention, Article 8’s right to an “effective remedy” necessarily means the right to be released**.

The United States was a central force behind the promulgation of the Universal Declaration in 1948, see Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 87, 89 (2001), and the United States has consistently urged the Declaration’s adoption as “a common standard of achievement for all nations and all peoples.” Proclamation No. 2999, 3 C.F.R. 46 (1953). **Today, the Universal Declaration is embraced across the globe. Its provisions are regarded as foundational international norms**.18

A core concept of international human rights law is the right to an effective remedy where a violation of rights is found. This right to an effective remedy is the linchpin supporting the protection of all other rights. Thus, the Universal Declaration refers generally to the right to an “effective remedy,” supra art. 8 (emphasis added), and the American Convention on Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights. . . . The State Parties . . . ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.” Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 25, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 131 [hereinafter American Convention] (emphasis added); see also Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.Y.S. 232 (1955) [hereinafter European Convention] (providing that “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effec- tive remedy before a national authority” (emphasis added)); Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 29, May 26, 1995, Council of Europe Doc. H (95) 7 rev. (stating that “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms are violated shall be entitled to be effectively restored to his rights and freedoms” (emphasis added)); Case of Chaparro Álvarez and o Íñiguez v. Ecuador, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 170, ¶ 133 (Nov. 21, 2007) (interpreting Article 7 of Inter-American Convention to require that “**it is not enough that . . . a remedy exists formally, it must be effective**; that is, it must provide results or responses to the violations of rights established in the Convention”).

**In the case of prolonged arbitrary detention, the right to an “effective remedy” necessarily requires that the competent court be able to order release**. Indeed, the right to release as an “effective remedy” for unjustified detention is made explicit in numerous international agreements. As already mentioned, supra Part I.A., the Covenant provides that for “[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention,” there is a right to judicial review “without delay” and a court shall “order . . . release if the detention is not lawful.” Covenant, supra, art. 9(4). The Covenant has been ratified by 165 countries. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man contains similar language.19 It provides that “[e]very individual . . . has the right to have the legality of his detention ascertained without delay . . . and the right to be tried without undue delay or, otherwise, to be released.” American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, art. 25, Int’l Conf. of Am. States, 9th Conf., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. L./V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948) (emphasis added). The American Convention, which the United States signed in 1977 but has ratified, also requires release as the remedy for unlawful detention: “Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful.” American Convention, supra, art. 7(6); see Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(d), adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (protecting the right of every child “to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court” and to “a prompt decision on any such action”); European Convention, supra, art. 5(4) (“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”).

#### Human rights are protections, pure and simple – they require universality to be effective

Michael **Ignatief 1**, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “The Attack on Human Rights”, Foreign Affairs, November/December

But at the same time. Western defenders or human rights have traded too much away. In the desire to find common ground with Islamic and Asian positions and to purge their own discourse of the imperial legacies uncovered by the postmodernist critique, Western defenders of human rights norms risk compromising the very universality they ought to be defending. They also risk rewriting their own history. Many traditions, not just Western ones, were represented au inc drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—for example, the Chinese, Middle Eastern Christian, Marxist, Hindu, Latin American, and Islamic. The members of the drafting committee saw their task not as a simple ratification of Western convictions but as an attempt to delimit a range of moral universals from within their very different religious, political, ethnic, and philosophical backgrounds. This fact helps to explain why the document makes no reference to God in its preamble. The communist delegations would have vetoed any such reference, and the competing religious traditions could not have agreed on words that would make human rights derive from human beings' common existence as Gods creatures. Hence the secular ground of the document is not a sign of European cultural domination so much as a pragmatic common denominator designed to make agreement possible across a range of divergent cultural and political viewpoints. It remains true, of course, that Western inspirations—and Western drafters—played the predominant role in the drafting of the document. Even so, the drafters' mood in 1947 was anything but triumphalist. They were aware, first of all, that the age of colonial emancipation was at hand: Indian independence was proclaimed while the language of the declaration was being finalized. Although the declaration does not specifically endorse self-determination, its drafters clearly foresaw the coming tide of struggles for national independence. Because it does proclaim the right of people to selfgovernment and freedom of speech and religion, it also concedes the right of colonial peoples to construe moral universals in a language rooted in their own traditions. Whatever failings the drafters of the declaration may be accused of, unexamined Western triumphalism is not one of them. Key drafters such as Rene Cassin of France and John Humphrey of Canada knew the knell had sounded on two centuries of Western colonialism. They also knew that the declaration was not so much a proclamation of the superiority of European civilization as an attempt to salvage the remains of its Enlightenment heritage from the barbarism of a world war just concluded. The declaration was written in full awareness of Auschwitz and dawning awareness of Kolyma. A consciousness of European savagery is built into the very language of the declarations preamble; "Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind ..." The declaration may still be a child of the Enlightenment, but it was written when faith in the Enlightenment faced its deepest crisis. In this sense, human rights norms are not so much a declaration of the superiority of European civilization as a warning by Europeans that the rest of the world should not reproduce their mistakes. The chief of these was the idolatry of the nation-state, causing individuals to forget the higher law commanding them to disobey unjust orders. The abandonment of this moral heritage of natural law and the surrender of individualism to collectivism, the drafters believed, led to the catastrophes of Nazi and Stalinist oppression. Unless the disastrous heritage of European collectivism is kept in mind as the framing experience in the drafting of the declaration, its individualism will appear to be nothing more than the ratification of Western bourgeois capitalist prejudice. In 'act, it was much more: a studied attempt to reinvent the European natural law tradition in order to safeguard individual agency against the totalitarian state. IT REMAINS TRUE, therefore, that the core of the declaration is the moral individualism for which it is so reproached by non-Western societies. It is this individualism for which Western activists have become most apologetic, believing that it should be tempered by greater emphasis on social duties and responsibilities to the community. Human rights, it is argued, can recover universal appeal only if they soften their individualistic bias and put greater emphasis on the communitarian parts of the declaration, especially Article 29, which says that "everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible." This desire to water down the individualism of rights discourse is driven by a desire both to make human rights more palatable to less individualistic cultures in the non-Western world and also to respond to disquiet among Western communitarians at the supposedly corrosive impact of individualistic values on Western social cohesion. But this tack mistakes what rights actually are and misunderstands why they have proven attractive to millions of people raised in non-Western traditions. Rights are meaningful only if they confer entitlements and immunities on individuals; they are worth having only if they can be enforced against institutions such as the family, the state, and the church. This remains true even when the rights in question are collective or group rights. Some of these group rights such as the right to speak your own language or practice your own religion-are essential preconditions for the exercise of individual rights. The right to speak a language of your choice will not mean very much if the language has died out. For this reason, group rights are needed to protect individual rights. But the ultimate purpose and justification of group rights is not the protection of the group as such but the protection of the individuals who compose it. Group rights to language, for example, must not be used to prevent an individual from learning a second language. Group rights to practice religion should not cancel the right of individuals to leave a religious community if they choose. Rights are inescapably political because they tacitly imply a conflict between a rights holder and a rights "withholder," some authority against which the rights holder can make justified claims. To confuse rights with aspirations, and rights conventions with syncretic syntheses of world values, is to wish away the conflicts that define the very content of rights. Individuals and groups will always be in conflict, and rights exist to protect individuals. Rights language cannot be parsed or translated into a non-individualistic, communitarian framework; it presumes moral individualism and is nonsensical outside that assumption. Moreover, it is precisely this individualism that renders human rights attractive to non-Western peoples and explains why the fight for those rights has become a global movement. The language of human rights is the only universally available moral vernacular that validates the claims of Rights doctrines women and children against the oppression they experience in patriarchal and tribal challenge powerful. societies; it is the only vernacular that enables religions tribes, and dependent persons to perceive themselves a and as moral agents and to act against practices- authoritaran states. arranged marriages, purdah, civic disenfranchisement, genital mutilation, domestic slavery, and so on-that are ratified by the weight and authority of their cultures. These agents seek out human rights protection precisely because it legitimizes their protests against oppression. If this is so, then it is necessary to rethink what it means when one says that rights are universal. Rights doctrines arouse powerfiul opposition because they challenge powerful religions, family structures, authoritarian states, and tribes. It would be a hopeless task to attempt to persuade these holders of power of the universal validity of rights doctrines, since if these doctrines prevailed, their exercise of authority would necessarily be abridged and constrained. Thus universality cannot imply universal assent, since in a world of unequal power, the only propositions that the powerful and powerless would agree on would be entirely toothless and anodyne. Rights are universal because they define the universal interests of the powerless-namely, that power be exercised over them in ways that respect their autonomy as agents. In this sense, human rights represent a revolutionary creed, since they make a radical demand of all human groups that they serve the interests of the individuals who compose them. This, then, implies that human groups should be, insofar as possible, consensual, or at least that they should respect an individual's right to exit when the constraints of the group become unbearable. The idea that groups should respect an individual's right of exit is not easy to reconcile with what groups actually are. Most human groups-the family, for example-are blood groups, based on inherited kinship or ethnic ties, People do not choose to be born into them and do not leave them easily, since these collectivities provide the frame of meaning within which individual life makes sense. This is as true in modern secular societies as it is in religious or traditional ones. Group rights doctrines exist to safeguard the collective rights-for example, to language-that make individual agency meaningful and valuable. But individual and group interests inevitably conflict. Human rights exist to adjudicate these conflicts, to define the irreducible minimum beyond which group and collective claims must not go in constraining the lives of individuals. CULTURE SHOCK ADOPTING THE VALUES of individual agency does not necessarily entail adopting Western ways of life. Believing in your right not to be tortured or abused need not mean adopting Western dress, speaking Western languages, or approving of the Western lifestyle. To seek human rights protection is not to change your civilization; it is merely to avail vourself of the protections of what the philosopher Isaiah Berlin called "negative liberty": to be free from oppression, bondage, and gross physical harm. Human rights do not, and should not, delegitimize traditional culture as a whole. The women in Kabul who come to human rights agencies seeking protection from the Taliban do not want to cease being Muslim wives and mothers; they want to combine their traditions with education and professional health care provided by a woman. And they hope the agencies will defend them against being beaten and persecuted for claiming such rights. The legitimacy of such claims is reinforced by the fact that the people who make them are not foreign human rights activists or employees of international organizations but the victims themselves. In Pakistan, for example, it is poor rural women who are criticizing the grotesque distortion of Islamic teaching that claims to justify "honor killings"-in which women are burned alive when they disobey their husbands. Human rights have gone global by going local, empowering the powerless, giving voice to the voiceless. It is simply not the case, as Islamic and Asian critics contend, that human rights force the Western way of life on their societies. For all its individualism, human rights rhetoric does not require adherents to jettison their other cultural attachments. As the philosopher Jack Donnelly argues, Human rights should human rights assume "that people probably are best suited, and in any case are entitled, not delegitimize to choose the good life for themselves."

#### The moral obligation to uphold universal human rights imbues the concept of ‘personhood’ with meaning

Bernard den **Ouden 97**, philo prof at the University of Hartford, “Sustainable Development, Human Rights, and Postmodernism”, PHIL & TECH 3:2 Winter

There are, however, limits to the postmodernist and social constructionist perspectives. To say that cultures are different and that they are undergoing continuing fragmentation is not necessarily to conclude that the members of humankind cannot have anything in common. We share a dependence on earth, air, fire, and water. We have relatively similar bodies. The deforestation and reforestation in which we engage have dramatic effects beyond all of our borders. The burning of high sulfur fuels affects everyone. The decreasing supply of fresh, potable water is now affecting and will increasingly affect all humankind. Furthermore, universal human rights are not only possible to articulate, but they are necessary to the human condition. We should have the right to personhood regardless of gender or culture. All humankind have the right to the fruits of their labors. We also have the right to due process in legal matters. In addition, individuals should have the right to marry or not to marry. They should be able to leave their country of origin or return to it. (I grant that in many countries or contexts this is only something that world citizens hope for in the future.) My argument is a simple one. Unless we understand and work with cultural differences and the best of indigenous values, economic and social development is not sustainable. However, we must infuse this process with the values and ideals of universal human rights for which all of us are responsible. Without creating or protecting fundamental human rights for our fellow world citizens, sustainable development will not occur. The fruits and benefits of improvement or the development of economic strengths will go to the wealthy and the powerful. Unless the rights and lives of the poorest of the poor in India and Nepal are attended to and protected, systematic deforestation will continue to occur at a traumatic rate in that region. Unless the water subsidies and privileges of agribusiness in California are carefully scrutinized, challenged, and changed in order to take into account all the citizens of the Western part of North America, access to potable water and to an environment even relatively safe from harmful chemicals will continue to be compromised. The economies of Russia and the many former Communist states may continue to grow, but a strong shared base of economic development will not occur unless and until Russia and its surrounding neighbors become societies based on just laws. Marxism has much to say about self-formation and a sense of common humanity. However, one reason why Marxist regimes failed is that they tried— even while retaining class and economic privilege for many party members—to change and improve material conditions in their societies while neither believing in nor genuinely implementing constitutions that respected personhood, cultural diversity, due process, or the right to leave the country of origin. One can create economic growth through cowboy capitalism and by means of economies of extortion. But without laws and respect for persons, economic development that is broad-based and sustainable will not occur. Human rights are tied to global responsibilities. We can, for example, discuss the rights of children, but it is imperative to have moral courage. When children are being enslaved or when they are "parts-out" or used for organ sales which are in turn sold on the black market, to take refuge in differing views of humanity and cultural values is to retreat from our responsibilities. Cultural difference needs to be understood; however, if tolerance is to be real it must have limits. No government or people, for example, should do or be allowed to do what European Americans have done to the people and cultures of the American Indians. Conquest is not a right, and no rights follow from conquest. Quite simply, much (though perhaps not all) of postmodernism ends in hopeless relativism and moral impotence. If we conclude and/or accept that all relations are purely power relations and that all values are historical, relative, and accidental, then today we could just as well be planning or implementing conquest and slavery rather than trying to extend human understanding or to contribute to the unending struggle against cruelty and barbarism. As Kwame Anthony Appiah says in an excellent essay entitled, "The Post-Colonial and the Postmodern" (1995), postmodernism suffers from the same exclusivity of vision it rejects and pretends to abhor. Although allegedly nothing can be said about all cultures, because all cultures are only fragments of difference and meanings, the claim is made for all cultures. Absolute cultural relativism legitimates genocide, sexism, and abusive power relations. Ethical universalism need not be tied to European world views or imperial domination. Appiah is looking for a humanism fully cognizant of human suffering; one which is historically contingent, anti-essentialist, and yet powerfully demanding. He bases his ethics in a concern for human suffering and asserts that obligations or responsibilities transcend cultural differences and national identity. To maintain that we live only in our cultural fragments is to inhabit what Kumkum Sangari (1995) calls "present locales of undecidability" and to live lives void of moral action. Sangari, in "The Politics of the Possible," offers an argument parallel to that of Appiah. She contends (1995, p. 143) that postmodern epistemology "universalizes the self-conscious dissolution of the bourgeois subject." Again, the same contradictory claims. There are allegedly no universal values or modes of knowledge, yet the truth of this assertion is made for all cultures. Sangari regards one of the most important weaknesses of postmodernism to be that it "valorizes indeterminacy as a cognitive mode, [and] also deflates social contradiction into forms of ambiguity or deferral, instates arbitrary juxtaposition or collage as historical 'method,' preempts change by fragmenting the ground of praxis" (Sangari, 1995, p. 147). Postmodernism universalizes cultures into insularity. It generalizes its own skepticism which is its dogmatic epistemological preoccupation. It instantiates the imperialism of relativism. It gives no philosophical or social place to political responsibility or ethical values. In this mode of discourse and inaction, we can only engage in involuted descriptions or in the articulating of ephemeral world pictures which are lost in themselves or at best captured in paralyzed discourses. Action in this mode is as valuable or as hopelessly tragic as inaction. Without the possibility and actuality of moral action, I would argue that we are at best what Dostoevsky referred to as "neurotic bipeds."

#### Disregarding rights means atrocity and dictatorship go unstopped

Richard D. **Mohr 95**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “The Perils of Postmodernism”, The Harvard Gay & Lesbian Review, Fall 1995, pp. 9-13

But this sense of equality as non-degradation presupposes a culturally-neutral claim that each and every person presumptively is worthy of equal regard and that we have some means of determining this moral fact outside of the moral twists and turns of any given society. Due to its relativistic commitments, postmodernism can never provide this presumption. If a society thinks, in the manner of the Supreme Court's 1857 Dred Scott decision, that slavery is acceptable because blacks are lesser beings, and if values are socially and historically specific - all culture-bound and culturally determined as postmoderns claim - then there is no fulcrum and lever with which one could dislodge this belief about blacks by showing it to be false. But then, if blacks are inferior, they are not treated worse than they should be when they are treated as slaves rather than as full persons. We can tell from within a culture (say, from its jokes and slang) that some group is humiliated, held in contempt; but without culturally-neutral values, one cannot tell whether that group does or does not indeed deserve that contempt. Without such values, we cannot know that certain groups aren't simply being put in their proper place. Postmodern theorists like Judith Butler, author of Gender Trouble, brand as fascist any appeal to culturally-neutral values and the metaphysics such values inevitably entail. But without such values we are unable to tell when ill treatment and ill-will are warranted and when they constitute oppression. The moral relativism of postmoderns leaves them unable even to refute Nazi views on homosexuals: "Himmler recounted to his SS generals the ancient Germanic mode of execution for homosexuals - drowning in bogs - and added: 'That was no punishment, merely the extinction of an abnormal life. It had to be removed just as we now pull up stinging nettles, toss them on a heap and burn them.'" (from James Steakley's 1975 The Homosexual Emancipation Movement in Germany) The moral relativism of the postmoderns destroys the very foundations of the sort of equality which they want to espouse. Talk, Discourse, Free Speech When, as in postmodernism, there are no culturally neutral criteria with which one could properly show to be false a socially held belief that some group is worthy of derision, all one can do is to change the belief itself from within the culture, thus transforming the culture into a different one with its own, new values, which again, thanks to moral relativism, are unassailable. Inevitably, then, under postmodern pressures, equality rights have no separate standing from concerns about how to persuade people to change their values. At best, equality rights against oppression and degradation must be abandoned in favor of rights to free speech, by means of which one side or faction in society tries to upgrade the status of certain groups within the culture. But most postmoderns have not embraced free speech rights. Ruthann Robson, for example, guts the First Amendment in one sentence: "The First Amendment is a rule of law with its roots in European liberal individualism and property-based notions. Its value to lesbians must be decided by us, not assumed by us." Free speech rights are good only if they "assist us" - i.e., us lesbians. This stance, holding that asserted rights really are rights only when the asserting group says they are, does away with free-speech rights altogether once some other competing and winning group makes the same claim for itself: "we believe in free-speech rights only when they work for us, and we've won, so no speech rights for you." In short, majorities, on this account, get to determine what rights there are - which is to say the "rights" are not rights at all, but majority privileges. Perhaps the best-known postmodern attack on the First Amendment is Stanley Fish's 1992 article entitled "There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too." Fish holds that speech "impinges on the world in ways indistinguishable from the effect of physical action." This position is silly when taken literally, as it would imply that I can move mountains with my mind and tongue as easily as with dynamite and a steam shovel. What Fish is really doing is taking the postmodern pledge that people's ideas determine what they do because they determine who they "are." To make people good, we, like Plato's Philosopher-Kings, must control what people hear and must hold them legally responsible for their utterances as though these were thrown knives - only worse. Speech for postmoderns is nothing but politics by other means. It cannot be subject to rules other than those of political power, which include the acceptability of its suppression through the machinery of majority rule. Fish's hope is that majority rule, free of the burdens of the First Amendment, will choose to suppress such speech as the shouting of "faggot" and so sweep in a millenium of gay liberation. After all, how else could one do that but with words? Liberation on this account will be cheap, quick, and easy, because talk is cheap, quick, and easy. Fish gives no acknowledgments to the sorts of arguments made by traditional liberals in favor of free-speech rights - arguments like those from John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (1859). Fish fails to see that the free exchange of ideas is the chief means by which we critically assess our beliefs to see if they are warranted and is what allows us, to a significant degree, to evaluate courses of action without having previously performed them ourselves. It is this critical capacity of speech, language, and thought that distinguishes words conceptually from actions and that positions them as things that centrally need to be protected if individuals are to be autonomous, and so warrants speech's protection even if these produce incidental harms in the world of action. Lessons of recent history should teach us that Fish's hope of liberation through the control of speech is a misguided fantasy. When governments suppress speech, it is lesbian and gay speech that they suppress first. In February 1992, the Canadian Supreme Court accepted Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin's analysis that pornography may be legally banned because it is degrading to women. After this ruling, the very first publication in Canada to lead to a bookseller's arrest was the lesbian magazine Bad Attitude. The Glad Day Bookstore, Toronto's only gay bookstore, continues now to be harassed by customs officials and police just as it was before the MacKinnon-rationalized decision, because the police view gay sex itself, in whatever form, as degrading to the humanity of its participants. It is not just lesbian feminists who should fear unleashed censorship. The New York Times (June 29, 1994) reports that "earlier this month, the America Online network shut down several feminist discussion forums, saying it was concerned that the subject matter might be inappropriate for young girls who would see the word 'girl' in the forum's headline and 'go in there looking for information about their Barbies'." The cost of postmodernism is high. It eliminates privacy rights, equality rights, and free-speech rights. Ironically, it turns out that postmoderns themselves, when they deign to descend from their ivory towers, also believe that the cost of postmodernism is too high. When confronted with the real world and the need to act politically, they resort to what they call "strategic essentialism" - essentialism here is a code word for the assumptions about human nature that are embedded in liberal individualism. Postmoderns recognize that their own sort of relativistic talk will not get them anywhere in the real world, and that they will have to resort at least to the strategies, styles, and cant used by liberal humanists - that is, if gay progress is to be made. But bereft of the substance and principles of liberalism that are its real tools and that postmodernism supposes it has destroyed, liberal strategies will hardly be effective. Moreover, despite postmoderinism's thick jargon and tangled prose, there is no reason to suppose that the courts won't eventually see through the postmodern bluff and, like Toto, pull back the curtain of its liberal guise to reveal machinery which conservative justices can effectively use to further restrict rights. It is not too difficult to imagine a scenario in which Justice Scalia signs off an opinion upholding the mass arrest of gay Marchers on Washington by block-quoting Stanley Fish: "In short, the name of the name has always been politics, even when (indeed, especially when) it is played by stigmatizing politics as the area to be avoided by legal restraints." Indeed the Supreme Court's most recent gay case gives evidence that it is already able to co-opt postmodern discourses as means of oppressing gays. In its June 1995 St. Patrick's Day Parade ruling, the Court voided the gay civil rights protections of Massachusetts' public accommodations law as applied to parades. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court had to find that Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade constituted political speech despite the fact that the Court could find no discernible message conveyed by the parade; as far as any message went, the Court analogized the parade to the verse of Lewis Carroll and the music of Arnold Schönberg. What to do? Well, the Court sought out a source that would claim for it and against common opinion that all parades are inherently political. And where better to find such a source than in postmodern beliefs that hold that everything is politics? The Court quoted the requisite claim about the inherently political nature of parades from an obscure 1986 academic book Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia, which, on the very next page after the one quoted by the Court, signals its intellectual allegiances: "The concepts framing this study flow from ... E.P. Thompson ... and Raymond Williams." These two men are the Marxist scholars who founded cultural studies in England. The Right-wing Supreme Court here used postmodern Marxist scripture to clobber gays. Global Postmodernism It used to be that tyrants - be they shah or ayatollah - would simply deny that human rights violations were occurring in their countries. But in the last few years, tyrants have become more "theoretical" and devious. Their underlings have been reading Foucault. Now, when someone claims that a ruler is violating some human right, say, religious freedom, the ruler simply asserts that while the purported right may well be a right in Northern European thinking, this fact have no moral weight in his own way of thinking. Indeed, if, as postmoderns claim, values are always historically and culturally specific in their content, then the ruler can claim not only that North European thinking about rights need have no weight in his own thinking, but moreover that it cannot have any weight in his own thinking, determined as it is by local conditions and cultural forces. Recently Muslim fundamentalists have defended their religious cleansing of Coptic Christians out of Egypt by asserting that there is no international human right to religious freedom. In a similar spirit, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States took out a full-page ad in the Sunday New York Times titled "Modernizing in Our Own Way" (July 10, 1994). The ad couched moral relativism in pseudo-liberal verbiage - appealing to "rights to our own basic values" and "respect for other people's cultures" - in order to justify Saudi Arabia's barbaric departures from "Western human rights." For a gay example of such judgment-arresting relativity, consider the case of the 19-year-old Jamaican reggae singer, Buju Banton. In 1992 he had a hit song, "Boom Bye Bye," with lyrics that translate approximately to "Faggots have to run or get a bullet in the head." A spokesman in the singer's defense claimed, "Jamaica is for the most part a Third World country with a different ethical and moral code. For better or worse, homosexuality is a deep stigma there, and the recording should be judged in a Jamaican context." If postmodernism is right, such fundamentalists, ambassadors, and spokesmen are irrefutable. Surprisingly, such moral relativism has even infected Amnesty International - a group that is a conceptual joke if the very idea of international human rights comes a cropper. Through the 1980s, British, Dutch, and American sectors of Amnesty International argued that people arrested for homosexual behavior should be classified as prisoners of conscience - Amnesty International's blanket designation for those whose human rights have been violated. But for a long time, these arguments were drowned out by Third World voices, which claimed that while sexual privacy may be a right in some First World places, it certainly is not where they speak. If postmodernism is right, these Third World voices are irrefutable. Finally, in 1991, "hegemonic" Western voices got the Third World to go along with the reclassification of gay sex acts, but no without a proviso holding that ny work that Amnesty International directs at enforcement of rights to sexual privacy should be as deferential as possible to local conditions. No other right recognized by Amnesty International comes with such a morally deflationary fillip. Human rights won this battle, but in a way that holds out the prospect that they will lose the peace.

#### But embracing human rights does not obviate the need for difference – pluralism and contingency are only possible with basic protections

Zühtü **Arslan 99**, an assistant professor of the Faculty of Security Sciences at the Police Academy in Ankara, Turkey, “Taking Rights Less Seriously: Postmodernism and Human Rights”, Res Publica 5: 195–215, http://www.philosophy.ru/library/pdf/234617.pdf

Incredulous of foundational truth claims, the postmodernists reject the idea that human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being human. Foucault for instance claims that, like the individual, civil liberties are nothing but expressions of governance and disciplinary power.98 Gaete writes: [A] Post-Modern perspective would assume that human rights are neither the expression of a universal truth nor a denial of it and regard their truth claims as only local moves in a game the subject enters when formulating his/her relationship to power in the language of fundamental rights.99 The postmodern hymn of relativity rules out the possibility of any universal claim to human rights. In the postmodern condition, it would be impossible to argue that individuals have some basic rights irrespective of their nationality or geography. The inevitable consequence of the relativisation of “truth-claims” is to undercut any universal, “principled, normative basis” for claiming that human rights simply exist.100 But without such a basis, we are left in a situation in which we lack any criteria to distinguish between right and wrong. This ethical vacuum may easily lead to the apparent legitimation and justification of almost any belief and practice in the realm of rights. This conservative support of the prevailing status quo is an obvious rejection of the “revolutionary” nature of universal human rights. At the end of the day, the notion of rights is forced to surrender its power as a legitimating factor of political regimes. With the demise of the subject and his/her rights, the postmodernists in fact undermine any possible resistance against oppressive orders. As Touraine asserts, “[T]he idea of the subject is a dissident idea which has always upheld the right to rebel against an unjust power.”101 Touraine also reminds the murderers of the subject what a subject-less world would look like: [T]he day when the Subject is debased to meaning introspection, and the Self to meaning compulsory social roles, our social and personal life will lose all its creative power and will be no more than a post-modern museum in which multiple memories replace our inability to produce anything of lasting importance.102 The postmodern defence of “uncertainty” and “contingency” is equally problematic. The very idea of “uncertainty” itself implies the existence of a certainty, after all: “[I]f you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.”103 Human beings live with their values, and need to rank them. Their highest values, or what Charles Taylor calls “hypergoods”,104 play a central role in our lives. Individuals define and are defined by these hypergoods, be they a divine being, Brahma, Nirvana, Justice, Reason, Science, Progress, Cogito or Superman. To kill our hypergoods therefore means an attempt to kill the sources of the self, sources which confer meaning on the lives of human beings. The need for hypergoods points to the necessity of “an absolute truth”, to use Sartre’s phrase.105 This necessity is also the precondition of any critique. Thus Habermas claims that “Nietzsche’s critique consumes the critical impulse itself”; for “if thought can no longer operate in the realms of truth and validity claims, then analysis and critique lose their meaning”. 106 Oddly, perhaps, Derrida seems to agree with Habermas when he says that he “cannot conceive of a radical critique which would not be ultimately motivated by some sort of affirmation, acknowledged or not”.107 Postmodernity, despite its dream of a “godless” epoch,108 cannot escape the necessity we have explored. Such a dream itself anyway reflects, however implicitly and unintentionally, the belief in linear progress, one of the hypergoods of modernity.109 Postmodernism turns out to be a new grand narrative: “a grand narrative of postmodernity”.110 Even Lyotard comes close to acknowledging the existence of this new metanarrative. He states that “the great narratives are now barely credible. And it is therefore tempting to lend credence to the great narrative of the decline of great narratives.”111 As a new “totalising” project, postmodernism reproduces the very predicaments of modernity,112 and its rejection of metaphysics becomes a merely “rhetorical” claim.113 The real question now is how to establish a socio-political framework in which people’s hypergoods might peacefully live side by side without people trying to kill each other. This is the project of political liberalism: but it is also to certain extent the project of postmodernism itself, as we have earlier seen.114 In other words, pluralism is the common value which in fact pervades the writings of liberals and postmodernists alike,115 even though it is expressed in different terms, and on different epistemological grounds, amounting, ironically, to both the “ethical relativism” of John Keane116 and the “moral universalism” of Habermas.117 Keane writes: [T]o defend relativism requires a social and political stance which is throughly modern. It implies the need for establishing or strengthening a democratic state and a civil society consisting of a plurality of public spheres, within which individuals and groups can openly express their solidarity with (or opposition to) others’ ideas.118 In an interview, Habermas explains what his “moral universalism” stands for: [W]hat does universalism mean, after all? That one relativizes one’s own way of life with regard to the legitimate claims of other forms of life, that one grants the strangers and the others, with all their idiosyncrasies and incomprehensibilities, the same rights as oneself, that one does not insist on universalizing one’s own identity, that one does not simply exclude that which deviates from it, that the areas of tolerance must become infinitely broader than they are today – moral universalism means all these things.119 At the core of this pluralism required by “ethical relativism” and “moral universalism” alike lies the conception of autonomy.120 Indeed, as Raz puts it, pluralism is a necessary requirement of the value of autonomy.121 Autonomy, however, is inextricably connected with rights. An autonomous individual who is “the author of his own life” has certain rights.122 In Raz’s words “autonomy is constituted by rights and nothing else: the autonomous life is a life within unviolated rights”.123 Since it is an essential part and parcel of human being (or being human), autonomy constitutes a “sufficient ontological justification” for rights and thus gives an invaluable support to those who seek for a justificatory ground for them.124 Autonomy requires the existence of the Other(s).125 The Other is not simply external to me, but he or she at the same time constitutes my identity: I am in a way parasitic on the Other. My autonomy makes sense only insofar as there exist others. As Sartre puts it, “[T]he other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself.”126 And unless I in turn recognise others as autonomous beings I shall end up in the fundamental predicament of “absolute loneliness and terror”.127 This points to the absolute necessity of living with others,128 as a “zoon politikon” in Marx’s words.129 Thus autonomy is a key value not only for “I”, but also for others. The postmodernists must take into account autonomy, if they are to present an ethical/political project part of which involves rights, however “locally”. They can do so, furthermore, without having to abandon their conceptual tools. Difference and otherness, the magical terms of postmodern discourse, are in fact quite compatible with such conceptions as autonomy and universality. As Lyotard himself argues, a human being has rights only if she is also an other human being. Likewise, as Terry Eagleton emphasises, universalism and difference are not mutually exclusive. Difference may need universalism. The idea of difference is indeed likely to be undermined by “certain militant particularisms of our day”.130 V. CONCLUSION Whatever the merits of the entirety of their arguments, the postmodernists emphasise the paramount importance of human rights: they are, after all, its starting-point. As Bauman points out, “[T]he great issues of ethics – like human rights . . . – have lost nothing of their topicality”,131 and he is well aware of the fact that “[m]oral issues tend to be increasingly compressed into the idea of ‘human rights’ ”.132 Lyotard himself likewise states that “[A] human being has rights only if he is other than a human being. And if he is to be other than a human being, he must in addition become an other human being.”133 More importantly, influenced by the communitarian and postmodern critique of metaphysical grounds for ethical and political claims, some liberal rights theorists such as Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls adopt a kind of “apologetic” attitude towards the theoretical foundation of rights, refusing to play the traditional role of moral magician by plucking ethical claims out of a metaphysical hat. In a recent essay, Rawls makes it clear that [T]hese [human] rights do not depend on any particular comprehensive moral doctrine or philosophical conception of human nature, such as, for example that human beings are moral persons and have equal worth or that they have certain particular moral and intellectual powers that entitle them to these rights. To show this would require a quite deep philosophical theory that many if not most hierarchical societies might reject as liberal or democratic or else as in some way distinctive of Western political tradition and prejudicial to other countries.134 This passage implies that in fact the idea of human rights is a product of the western liberal tradition, but in order to make it universally applicable we must refrain from any theoretical attempt to reveal this fact. Let’s pretend that human rights are simply there. They do not need any moral or philosophical ground for justification. But there need be no contradiction between the postmodernists and the liberals; nor need the latter apologize for “rights”. For, as we have seen, the postmodernists have never underestimated the importance of human rights. They argue that ethical issues such as human rights “only need to be seen, and dealt with, in a novel way”.135 Yet the postmodernists have not presented us with any postmodern “novel way” in which human rights might be seen. It seems to be difficult, if not impossible, for them to show this novel way without taking into account the conceptions of autonomous self and universality. Perhaps they need to begin taking rights more seriously.

#### Azhar and I demand that the United States federal government release petitioners who have been guaranteed habeas corpus from detention. The United States federal government should decide for the petitioners in Kiyemba et al. v. Obama, ruling that the Suspension Clause guarantees release from detention as its remedy.

## 1ac – solvency

#### The intersection of xenophobia and racist anti-terror policy represented by the Uighurs at Gitmo provides a useful avenue to explore the exclusionary nature of detention policy write large

Ernesto Hernández-López 12, law prof at Chapman, “Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law: An Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World”, uc irvine law review, Vol. 2:193

Next, with an examination of detainee nationalities and their exclusion from legal protections, the detention program at Guantánamo reflects de facto racist discrimination. Base detentions and “unlawful enemy combatants” classifications created proxies in American law to specifically exclude persons from rights protections.254 Initial White House justifications claimed that unlawful enemy combatants did not enjoy protections in international law and that this resembled historic denials of similar rights for savages or barbarians in colonial wars.255 Interestingly, a Washington Post report states that the Chinese detainee population was twenty-two, placing China in the second tier of nationalities represented along with Algeria.256 Of these twenty-two, five remain detained and brought the claims in the Kiyemba cases. Compiling the numbers of all base detainees since 2002, the Washington Post reports Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Pakistan each had more than seventy, making them the most represented. But Chinese detainees (i.e., the Uighurs) include a sizably larger population than those from forty-four other countries.257 Most of these detainees may be from countries, especially the top four mentioned, from which the United States had particular strategic reasons to detain based on the Afghanistan campaign. China’s sizable population at the base, relative to all 779 inmates, does suggest Chinese nationality was relevant to the choice to detain them. Based on reviews of WikiLeaks documents released in April of 2011, the New York Times reports a detainee’s country of origin appears as the most important factor for determining if they can be released.258

Drawing inferences concerning the law’s racial exclusions from detainee demographics is difficult.259 Detainee nationalities indicate that most are from the Persian Gulf or Central Asia, regions vital to American security in terms of the War on Terror and regional geopolitics. The Uighur homeland and the place the Uighurs were captured are both in Central Asia. Because American law reserves detention primarily for these populations, detention practices suggest a discriminatory impact in the detention program’s application. With regard to the twenty-two Uighurs, detainees from China appear not as an accident, isolated or limited. One or two men represent the majority of the forty-eight nationalities at the base detention center.260 This suggests it is not an accident or aberration that China is one of the most represented countries at the base detention center, with twenty-two out of 779 detainees being from this particular nationality.

Referring to American law’s racialization of foreigners and the War on Terror, critical race legal scholarship inspires inquiries on base detentions and race. It elucidates how immigration and alienage law stems from, and never fully breaks with, social mechanisms to exclude certain races from American rights protections. Kevin Johnson describes how alienage serves as a proxy for race in U.S. law.261 He ties in history, social, legal, foreign, and domestic analyses. Immigration law, with explicit intent or ignored effect, discriminates against citizens and noncitizens of color. Johnson explains not only how social biases feed lawmaking, but how racism provided the initial reasoning for sovereignty-based immigration doctrine.262 The plenary power doctrine justifies why political branches have plenary powers in foreign relations, overseas territories, and immigration matters. This frames how American law approaches base detention, by focusing jurisprudence on national security, base location, and detainee alienage.

We know we’re not the USFG—Obviously the aff doesn’t happen but it’s still useful to talk about.

Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/13, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course **was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying** doctrinal **material and** creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, **while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage**. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. **This is the most important determination, because the substance of the** doctrinal portion of the course and the **simulation follows from this decision**. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. **This**, then, **becomes a guide for the** doctrinal part of the **course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation** are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. **The one-size fits all approach** currently **dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised** in the current conversation. **Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at** the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion **simulations**, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may **provide an important way forward**. Such **simulations** also **cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education**, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed **the simulation model** above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it **does provide a** starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. **It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which** they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

The law is malleable—debating it is the best way to affect change

Todd Hedrick, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University, Sept 2012, Democratic Constitutionalism as Mediation: The Decline and Recovery of an Idea in Critical Social Theory, Constellations Volume 19, Issue 3, pages 382–400

Habermas’ alleged abandonment of immanent critique, however, is belied by the role that the democratic legal system comes to play in his theory. While in some sense just one system among others, it has a special capacity to shape the environments of other systems by regulating their interaction. Of course, the legal system is not the only one capable of affecting the environments of other systems, but law is uniquely open to inputs from ordinary language and thus potentially more **pliant and responsive** to democratic will formation: “Normatively substantive messages can circulate throughout society only in the language of law … . Law thus functions as the ‘transformer’ that guarantees that the socially integrating network of communication stretched across society as a whole holds together.”55 This allows for the possibility of consensual social regulation of domains ranging from the economy to the family, where actors are presumed to be motivated by their private interests instead of respect for the law, while allowing persons directed toward such interests to be cognizant that their privately oriented behavior is compatible with respect for generally valid laws. While we should be cautious about automatically viewing the constitution as the fulcrum of the legal order, its status as basic law is significant in this respect. For, recalling Hegel's broader conception of constitutionalism, political constitutions not only define the structure of government and “the relationship between citizens and the state” (as in Hegel's narrower “political” constitution); they also “implicitly prefigure a comprehensive legal order,” that is, “the totality comprised of an administrative state, capitalist economy, and civil society.”56 So, while these social spheres can be conceived of as autonomous functional subsystems, their boundaries are legally defined in a way that affects the manner and degree of their interaction: “The political constitution is geared to shaping each of these systems by means of the medium of law and to harmonizing them so that they can fulfill their functions as measured by a presumed ‘common good’.”57 Thus, constitutional discourses should be seen less as interpretations of a positive legal text, and more as attempts to articulate legal norms that could shift the balance between these spheres in a manner more reflective of generalizable interests, occurring amidst class stratification and cultural pluralism. A constitution's status as positive law is also of importance for fundamentally Hegelian reasons relating to his narrower sense of political constitutionalism: its norms must be public and concrete, such that differently positioned citizens have at least an initial sense of what the shared hermeneutic starting points for constitutional discourse might be. But these concrete formulations must also be understood to embody principles in the interest of all citizens, so that constitutional discourse can be the site of effective democratic will formation concerning the basic norms that mediate between particular individuals and the general interests of free and equal citizens. This recalls Hegel's point that constitutions fulfill their mediational function by being sufficiently positive so as to be publicly recognizable, yet are not exhausted by this positivity – the content of the constitution is instead filled in over time through ongoing legislation. In order to avoid Hegel's foreshortened conception of public participation in this process and his consequent authoritarian tendencies, Habermas and, later, Benhabib highlight the importance of being able to conceive of basic constitutional norms as themselves being the products of public contestation and discourse. In order to articulate this idea, they draw on legal theorists like Robert Cover and Frank Michelman who characterize this process of legal rearticulation as “jurisgenesis”58: a community's production of legal meaning by way of continuous rearticulation, through reflection and contestation, of its constitutional project. Habermas explicitly conceives of the democratic legal order in this way when, in the context of considering the question of how a constitution that confers legitimacy on ordinary legislation could itself be thought to be democratically legitimate, he writes: I propose that we understand the regress itself as the understandable expression of the future-oriented character, or openness, of the democratic constitution: in my view, a constitution that is democratic – not just in its content but also according to its source of legitimation – is a tradition-building project with a clearly marked beginning in time. All the later generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped normative substance of the system of rights.59 A constitutional order and its interpretive history represent a community's attempt to render the terms under which they can give themselves the law that shapes their society's basic structure and secure the law's integrity through assigning basic liberties. Although philosophical reflection can give us some grasp of the presuppositions of a practice of legitimate lawmaking, this framework of presuppositions (“the system of rights”) is “unsaturated.”60 In Hegelian fashion, it must, to be meaningful, be concretized through discourse, and not in an one-off way during a founding moment that fixes the terms of political association once and for all, but continuously, as new persons enter the community and as new circumstances, problems, and perspectives emerge. The stakes involved in sustaining a broad and inclusive constitutional discourse turn out to be significant. Habermas has recently invoked the concept of dignity in this regard, linking it to the process through which society politically constitutes itself as a reciprocal order of free and equal citizens. As a status rather than an inherent property, “dignity that accrues to all persons equally preserves the connotation of a self-respect that depends on social recognition.”61 Rather than being understood as a quality possessed by some persons by virtue of their proximity to something like the divine, the modern universalistic conception of dignity is a social status dependent upon ongoing practices of mutual recognition. Such practices, Habermas posits, are most fully instantiated in the role of citizens as legislators of the order to which they are subject. [Dignity] can be established only within the framework of a constitutional state, something that never emerges of its own accord. Rather, this framework must be created by the citizens themselves using the means of positive law and must be protected and developed under historically changing conditions. As a modern legal concept, human dignity is associated with the status that citizens assume in the self-created political order.62 Although the implications of invoking dignity (as opposed to, say, autonomy) as the normative core of democratic constitutionalism are unclear,63 plainly Habermas remains committed to strongly intersubjective conceptions of democratic constitutionalism, to an intersubjectivity that continues to be legally and politically mediated (a dimension largely absent from Honneth's successor theory of intersubectivity). What all of this suggests is a constitutional politics in which citizens are empowered to take part and meaningfully impact the terms of their cultural, economic, and political relations to each other. Such politics would need to be considerably less legalistic and precedent bound, less focused on the democracy-constraining aspects of constitutionalism emphasized in most liberal rule of law models. The sense of incompleteness and revisability that marks this critical theory approach to constitutionalism represents a point where critical theories of democracy may claim to be more radical and revisionary than most liberal and deliberative counterparts. It implies a sharp critique of more familiar models of bourgeois constitutionalism: whether they conceive of constitutional order as having a foundation in moral rights or natural law, or in an originary founding moment, such models a) tend to be backward-looking in their justifications, seeing the legal order as founded on some exogenously determined vision of moral order; b) tend to represent the law as an already-determined container within which legitimate ordinary politics takes place; and c) find the content of law to be ascertainable through the specialized reasoning of legal professionals. On the critical theory conception of constitutionalism, this presumption of completeness and technicity amounts to the reification of a constitutional project, where a dynamic social relation is misperceived as something fixed and objective.64 We can see why this would be immensely problematic for someone like Habermas, for whom constitutional norms are supposed to concern the generalizable interests of free and equal citizens. If it is overall the case for him that generalizable interests are at least partially constituted through discourse and are therefore not given in any pre-political, pre-discursive sense,65 this is especially so in a society like ours with an unreconciled class structure sustained by pseudo-compromises. Therefore, discursive rearticulation of basic norms is necessary for the very emergence of generalizable interests. Despite offering an admirably systematic synthesis of radical democracy and the constitutional rule of law, Habermas’ theory is hobbled by the hesitant way he embraces these ideas. Given his strong commitment to proceduralism, the view that actual discourses among those affected must take place during the production of legitimate law if constitutionalism is to perform its mediational function, as well as his opposition to foundational or backward-looking models of political justification, we might expect Habermas to advocate the continuous circulation in civil society of constitutional discourses that consistently have appreciable impact on the way constitutional projects develop through ongoing legislation such that citizens can see the links between their political constitution (narrowly construed), the effects that democratic discourse has on the shape that it takes, and the role of the political constitution in regulating and transforming the broader institutional backbone of society in accordance with the common good. And indeed, at least in the abstract, this is what the “two track” conception of democracy in Between Facts and Norms, with its model of discourses circulating between the informal public sphere and more formal legislative institutions, seeks to capture.66 As such, Habermas’ version of constitutionalism seems a natural ally of theories of “popular constitutionalism”67 emerging from the American legal academy or of those who, like Jeremy Waldron,68 are skeptical of the merits of legalistic constitutionalism and press for democratic participation in the ongoing rearticulation of constitutional norms. Indeed, I would submit that the preceding pages demonstrate that the Left Hegelian social theoretic backdrop of Habermas’ theory supplies a deeper normative justification for more democratic conceptions of constitutionalism than have heretofore been supplied by their proponents (who are, to be fair, primarily legal theorists seeking to uncover the basic commitments of American constitutionalism, a project more interpretive than normative.69) Given that such theories have very revisionary views on the appropriate method and scope of judicial review and the role of the constitution in public life, it is surprising that Habermas evinces at most a mild critique of the constitutional practices and institutions of actually existing democracies, never really confronting the possibility that institutions of constitutional review administered by legal elites could be paternalistic or extinguish the public impetus for discourse he so prizes.70 In fact, institutional questions concerning where constitutional discourse ought to take place and how the power to make authoritative determinations of constitutional meaning should be shared among civil society, legislative, and judiciary are mostly abstracted away in Habermas’ post-Between Facts and Norms writings, while that work is mostly content with the professional of administration of constitutional issues as it exists in the United States and Germany. This is evident in Habermas’ embrace of figures from liberal constitutional theory. He does not present an independent theory of judicial decision-making, but warmly receives Dworkin's well-known model of “law as integrity.” To a certain extent, this allegiance makes sense, given Dworkin's sensitivity to the hermeneutic dimension of interpretation and the fact that his concept of integrity mirrors discourse theory in holding that legal decisions must be justifiable to those affected in terms of publicly recognizable principles. Habermas does, however, follow Michelman in criticizing the “monological” form of reasoning that Dworkin's exemplary Judge Hercules employs,71 replacing it with the interpretive activities of a specialized legal public sphere, presumably more responsive to the public than Hercules. But this substitution does nothing to alleviate other aspects of Dworkin's theory that make a match between him and Habermas quite awkward: Dworkin's standard of integrity compels judges to regard the law as a complete, coherent whole that rests on a foundation of moral rights.72 Because Dworkin regards deontic rights in a strongly realistic manner and as an unwritten part of the law, there is a finished, retrospective, “already there” quality to his picture of it. Thinking of moral rights as existing independently of their social articulation is what moves Dworkin to conceive of them as, at least in principle, accessible to the right reason of individual moral subjects.73 Legal correctness can be achieved when lawyers and judges combine their specialized knowledge of precedent with their potentially objective insights into deontic rights. Fashioning the law in accordance with the demands of integrity thereby becomes the province of legal elites, rendering public discourse and the construction of generalizable interests in principle unnecessary. This helps explain Dworkin's highly un-participatory conception of democracy and his comfort with placing vast decision-making powers in the hands of the judiciary.7 There is more than a little here that should make Habermas uncomfortable. Firstly, on his account, legitimate law is the product of actual discourses, which include the full spate of discourse types (pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral). If the task of judicial decision-making is to reconstruct the types of discourse that went into the production of law, Dworkin's vision of filling in the gaps between legal rules exclusively with considerations of individual moral rights (other considerations are collected under the heading of “policy”75) makes little sense.76 While Habermas distances himself from Dworkin's moral realism, calling it “hard to defend,”77 he appears not to appreciate the extent to which Dworkin links his account of legal correctness to this very possibility of individual insight into the objective moral order. If Habermas wishes to maintain his long held position that constitutional projects involve the ongoing construction of generalizable interests through the democratic process – which in my view is really the heart of his program – he needs an account of legal correctness that puts some distance between this vision and Dworkin's picture of legal elites discovering the content of law through technical interpretation and rational intuition into a fixed moral order. Also puzzling is the degree of influence exercised by civil society in the development of constitutional projects that Habermas appears willing to countenance. While we might expect professional adjudicative institutions to play a sort of yeoman's role vis-à-vis the public, Habermas actually puts forth something akin to Bruce Ackerman's picture of infrequent constitutional revolutions, where the basic meaning of a constitutional project is transformed during swelling periods of national ferment, only to resettle for decades at a time, during which it is administered by legal professionals.78 According to this position, American civil society has not generated new understandings of constitutional order that overcome group divisions since the New Deal, or possibly the Civil Rights era. Now, this may actually be the case, and perhaps Habermas’ apparent acquiescence to this view of once-every-few-generations national conversations is a nod to realism, i.e., a realistic conception of how much broad based, ongoing constitutional discourse it is reasonable to expect the public to conduct. But while a theory with a Left Hegelian pedigree should avoid “the impotence of the ought” and utopian speculation, and therefore ought not develop critical conceptions of legal practice utterly divorced from present ones, such concessions to realism are unnecessary. After all, critical theory conceptions of constitutionalism will aim to be appreciably different from the more authoritarian ones currently in circulation, which more often than not fail to stimulate and sustain public discourse on the basic constitution of society. Instead, their point would be to suggest how a more dynamic, expansive, and mediational conception of constitutionalism could unlock greater democratic freedom and rationally integrated social identities. Given these problems in Habermas’ theory, the innovations that Benhabib makes to his conception of constitutionalism are most welcome. While operating within a discourse theoretic framework, her recent work more unabashedly recalls Hegel's broader conception of the constitution as the basic norms through which a community understands and relates to itself (of which a founding legal document is but a part): a constitution is a way of life through which individuals seek to connect themselves to each other, and in which the very identity and membership of a community is constantly at stake.79 Benhabib's concept of “democratic iterations,” which draws on meaning-as-use theories, emphasizes how meaning is inevitably transformed through repetition: In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the original usage and its intended meaning: rather, very repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever-so-subtle ways. In fact, there is really no ‘originary’ source of meaning, or an ‘original’ to which all subsequent forms must conform … . Every iteration involves making sense of an authoritative original in a new and different context … . Iteration is the reappropriation of the ‘origin’; it is at the same time its dissolution as the original and its preservation through its continuous deployment.80 Recalling the reciprocal relationship that Hegel hints at between the narrow “political” constitution and the broader constitution of society's backbone of interrelated institutions, Benhabib here seems to envision a circular process whereby groups take up the conceptions of social relations instantiated in the legal order and transform them in their more everyday attempts to live with others in accordance with these norms. Like Cover and Michelman, she stresses that the transformation of legal meaning takes place primarily in informal settings, where different groups try (and sometimes fail) to live together and to understand themselves in their relation to others according to the terms they inherit from the constitutional tradition they find themselves subject to.81 Her main example of such democratic iteration is the challenge Muslim girls in France raised against the head scarf prohibition in public schools (“L’Affaire du Foulard”), which, while undoubtedly antagonistic, she contends has the potential to felicitously transform the meaning of secularity and inclusion in the French state and to create new forms of togetherness and understanding. But although Benhabib illustrates the concept of democratic iterations through an exemplary episode, this iterative process is a constant and pervasive one, which is punctuated by events and has the tendency to have a destabilizing effect on authority.82 It is telling, however, that Benhabib's examples of democratic iterations are exclusively centered on what Habermas would call ethical-political discourses.83 While otherwise not guilty of the charge,84 Benhabib, in her constitutional theory, runs afoul of Nancy Fraser's critical diagnosis of the trend in current political philosophy to subordinate class and distributional conflicts to struggles for cultural inclusion and recognition.85 Perhaps this is due to the fact that “hot” constitutional issues are so often ones with cultural dimensions in the foreground, rarely touching visibly on distributional conflicts between groups. This nonetheless is problematic since much court business clearly affects – often subtly and invisibly – the outcomes of these conflicts, frequently with bad results.86 For another reason why centering constitutional discourse on inclusion and cultural issues is problematic, it is useful to remind ourselves of Habermas’ critique of civic republicanism, according to which the main deficit in republican models of democracy is its “ethical overburdening” of the political process.87 To some extent, republicanism's emphasis on ethical discourse is understandable: given the level of cooperativeness and public spirit that republicans view as the font of legitimate law, political discourses need to engage the motivations and identities of citizens. Arguably, issues of ethical self-understanding do this better than more abstract or arid forms of politics. But it is not clear that this is intrinsically so, and it can have distorting effects on politics. In the American media, for example, this amplification of the cultural facets of issues is very common; conflicts over everything from guns to taxes are often reduced to conflicts over who is a good, real American and who is not. It is hard to say that this proves edifying; substantive issues of rights and social justice are elided, politics becomes more fraudulent and conflictual. None of this is to deny a legitimate place for ethical-political discourse. However, we do see something of a two-steps-forward-one-step-back movement in Benhabib's advancement of Habermas’ discourse theory of law: although her concept of democratic iterations takes center stage, she develops the notion solely along an ethical-political track. Going forward, critical theorists developing conceptions of constitutional discourse should work to see it as a way of integrating questions of distributional justice with questions of moral rights and collective identities without subordinating or conflating them. 4. Conclusion Some readers may find the general notion of reinvigorating a politics of constitutionalism quixotic. Certainly, it has not been not my intention to overstate the importance or positive contributions of constitutions in actually existing democracies, where they can serve to entrench political systems experiencing paralysis in the face of long term fiscal and environmental problems, and where public appeals to them more often than not invoke visions of society that are more nostalgic, ethno-nationalistic, authoritarian, and reactionary than what Habermas and Benhabib presumably have in mind. Instead, I take the basic Hegelian point I started this paper with to be this: modern persons ought to be able to comprehend their social order as the work of reason; the spine of institutions through which their relations to differently abled and positioned others are mediated ought to be responsive to their interests as fully-rounded persons; and comprehending this system of mediation ought to be able to reconcile them to the partiality of their roles within the universal state. Though modern life is differentiated, it can be understood, when seen through the lens of the constitutional order, as a result of citizens’ jointly exercised rationality as long as certain conditions are met. These conditions are, however, more stringent than Hegel realized. In light of this point, that so many issues deeply impacting citizens’ social and economic relations to one another are rendered marginal – and even invisible – in terms of the airing they receive in the public sphere, that they are treated as mostly settled or non-questions in the legal system consitutues a strikingly deficient aspect of modern politics. Examples include the intrusion of market logic and technology into everyday life, the commodification of public goods, the legal standing of consumers and residents, the role of shareholders and public interests in corporate governance, and the status of collective bargaining arrangements. Surely a contributing factor here is the absence of a shared sense of possibility that the basic terms of our social union could be responsive to the force that discursive reason can exert. Such a sense is what I am contending jurisgenerative theories ought to aim at recapturing while critiquing more legalistic and authoritarian models of law. This is not to deny the possibility that democratic iterations themselves may be regressive or authoritarian, populist in the pejorative sense. **But the denial of their** legitimacy or **possibility moves us in the direction of authoritarian conceptions of law and political power and the isolation of individuals and social groups wrought by a political order of machine-like administration** that Horkheimer and Adorno describe as a main feature of modern political domination. Recapturing some sense of how human activity makes reason actual in the ongoing organization of society need not amount to the claim that reason culminates in some centralized form, as in the Hegelian state, or in some end state, as in Marx. It can, however, move us to envision the possibility of an ongoing practice of communication, lawmaking, and revision that seeks to reconcile and overcome positivity and division, without the triumphalist pretension of ever being able to **fully do so**.

Rejecting the state creates ineffective activism, undermining progressive forces

Orly Lobel, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, 2007, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf

Both the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding transformative politics — that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision rejects a shared theory of social reform, rejects formal programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in such terms as a plan of no plan,211 “a project of projects,”212 “anti-theory theory,”213 politics rather than goals,214 presence rather than power,215 “practice over theory,”216 and chaos and openness over order and formality. As a result, the contemporary message rarely includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights movement has disappeared.217 There is no unifying discourse or set of values, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this move away from grand narratives is self-defeating precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance: “[T]he opposition is not playing that game . . . . [E]veryone else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . .”218 Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of “neither left nor right” has become axiomatic only for some.219 The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested, for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of “conservative public interest lawyer[ing].”220 Although “public interest law” was originally associated exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.221 This growth in conservative advocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some thinkers have even suggested that there may be “something inherent in the left’s conception of social change — focused as it is on participation and empowerment — that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise.”222 Once again, **this conclusion reveals flaws** parallel **to the** original **disenchantment with legal reform**. Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social arrangements. Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimation. The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,223 and then to **assume** that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation. This celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial. **In fact, the myth of engagement obscures the** actual lack of change being produced**, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform produces a** false belief in the potential of change. There are few instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing. At the same time, the elephant in the room — the rising level of economic inequality — is left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and inevitable.225 This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers’ self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed reality. The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The manifestations of **extralegal** **activism** — the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action — all **produce a fantasy that change can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation**. The emphasis is local, but the locality **is** described as a microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each individual story could translate into a “time of the nation” body of knowledge and motivation.227 In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228 There is, therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed “the missing middle” by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are so embedded in current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive debate? **It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars**, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all extralegal associational life is transformative. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be self-regarding and depoliticized, and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing realities.231 We must differentiate between professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As described above, extralegal activism tends to operate on a more divided and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently, **within critical discourse there is a need to recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action**. We should question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly translating into action and action as directly translating into change. Certainly not every cultural description is political. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when groups are situated in opposition to any form of institutionalized power, they may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely producing moot activism that settles for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies. The original vision is consequently coopted, and contemporary discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.

## 2ac impact

Trend lines prove the status quo form of political engagement works—racism is not over, but it definitively disproves the necessity of radical departure from the squo

Zach Beauchamp, Think Progress, 12/11/13, 5 Reasons Why 2013 Was The Best Year In Human History, thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/11/3036671/2013-certainly-year-human-history/

Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination remain, without a doubt, extraordinarily powerful forces. The statistical and experimental evidence is overwhelming — this irrefutable proof of widespread discrimination against African-Americans, for instance, should put the “racism is dead” fantasy to bed.

Yet the need to combat discrimination denial shouldn’t blind us to the good news. Over the centuries, humanity has made extraordinary progress in taming its hate for and ill-treatment of other humans on the basis of difference alone. Indeed, it is very likely that we live in the least discriminatory era in the history of modern civilization. It’s not a huge prize given how bad the past had been, but there are still gains worth celebrating.

Go back 150 years in time and the point should be obvious. Take four prominent groups in 1860: African-Americans were in chains, European Jews were routinely massacred in the ghettos and shtetls they were confined to, women around the world were denied the opportunity to work outside the home and made almost entirely subordinate to their husbands, and LGBT people were invisible. The improvements in each of these group’s statuses today, both in the United States and internationally, are incontestable.

On closer look, **we have reason to believe the happy trends are likely to continue**. Take racial discrimination. In 2000, Harvard sociologist Lawrence Bobo penned a comprehensive assessment of the data on racial attitudes in the United States. He found a “national consensus” on the ideals of racial equality and integration. “A nation once comfortable as a deliberately segregationist and racially discriminatory society has not only abandoned that view,” Bobo writes, “but now overtly positively endorses the goals of racial integration and equal treatment. There is no sign whatsoever of retreat from this ideal, despite events that many thought would call it into question. **The magnitude, steadiness, and breadth of this change should be lost on no one.”**

The norm against overt racism has gone global. In her book on the international anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s, Syracuse’s Audie Klotz says flatly that “the illegitimacy of white minority rule led to South Africa’s persistent diplomatic, cultural, and economic isolation.” The belief that racial discrimination could not be tolerated had become so widespread, Klotz argues, that it united the globe — including governments that had strategic interests in supporting South Africa’s whites — in opposition to apartheid. In 2011, 91 percent of respondents in a sample of 21 diverse countries said that equal treatment of people of different races or ethnicities was important to them.

Racism obviously survived both American and South African apartheid, albeit in more subtle, insidious forms. “The death of Jim Crow racism has left us in an uncomfortable place,” Bobo writes, “a state of laissez-faire racism” where racial discrimination and disparities still exist, but support for the kind of aggressive government policies needed to address them is racially polarized. **But there’s reason to hope that’ll change as well**: two massive studies of the political views of younger Americans by my TP Ideas colleagues, John Halpin and Ruy Teixeira, found that millenials were significantly more racially tolerant and supportive of government action to address racial disparities than the generations that preceded them. Though I’m not aware of any similar research of on a global scale, it’s hard not to imagine they’d find similar results, suggesting that we should have hope that the power of racial prejudice may be waning.

The story about gender discrimination is very similar: after the feminist movement’s enormous victories in the 20th century, structural sexism still shapes the world in profound ways, but the cause of gender equality is making progress. In 2011, 86 percent of people in a diverse 21 country sample said that equal treatment on the basis of gender was an important value. The U.N.’s Human Development Report’s Gender Inequality Index — a comprehensive study of reproductive health, social empowerment, and labor market equity — saw a 20 percent decline in observable gender inequalities from 1995 to 2011. IMF data show consistent global declines in wage disparities between genders, labor force participation, and educational attainment around the world. While enormous inequality remains, 2013 is looking to be the worst year for sexism in history.

Finally, we’ve made astonishing progress on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination — largely in the past 15 years. At the beginning of 2003, zero Americans lived in marriage equality states; by the end of 2013, 38 percent of Americans will. Article 13 of the European Community Treaty bans discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and, in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution committing the council to documenting and exposing discrimination on orientation or identity grounds around the world. The public opinion trends are positive worldwide: all of the major shifts from 2007 to 2013 in Pew’s “acceptance of homosexuality” poll were towards greater tolerance, and young people everywhere are more open to equality for LGBT individuals than their older peers.

best\_year\_graphics-04

Once again, these victories are partial and by no means inevitable. Racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination aren’t just “going away” on their own. They’re losing their hold on us because people are working to change other people’s minds and because governments are passing laws aimed at promoting equality. Positive trends don’t mean the problems are close to solved, and certainly aren’t excuses for sitting on our hands.

That’s true of everything on this list. The fact that fewer people are dying from war and disease doesn’t lessen the moral imperative to do something about those that are; the fact that people are getting richer and safer in their homes isn’t an excuse for doing more to address poverty and crime.

But too often, the worst parts about the world are treated as inevitable, the prospect of radical victory over pain and suffering dismissed as utopian fantasy. The overwhelming force of the evidence shows that to be false. As best we can tell, the reason humanity is getting better is because humans have decided to make the world a better place. We consciously chose to develop lifesaving medicine and build freer political systems; we’ve passed laws against workplace discrimination and poisoning children’s minds with lead.

So far, these choices have more than paid off. It’s up to us to make sure they continue to.

#### Their argument elevates white supremacy to an all-pervasive force that explains all oppression – that re-inscribes its inevitability---specific analysis of racism is crucial

Margaret L. Andersen 3, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Delaware, 2003, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed Doane & Bonilla-Silva, p. 28

Conceptually, one of the major problems in the whiteness literature is the reification of whiteness as a concept, as an experience, and as an identity. This practice not only leads to conceptual obfuscation but also impedes the possibility for empirical analysis. In this literature, "whiteness" comes to mean just about everything associated with racial domination. As such, whiteness becomes a slippery and elusive concept. Whiteness is presented as any or all of the following: identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination. As one critic writes, "If historical actors are said to have behaved the way they did mainly because they were white, then there's little room left for more nuanced analysis of their motives and meanings" (Stowe 1996:77). And Alastair Bonnett points out that whiteness "emerges from this critique as an omnipresent and all-powerful historical force. Whiteness is seen to be responsible for the failure of socialism to develop in America, for racism, for the impoverishment of humanity. With the 'blame' comes a new kind of centering: Whiteness, and White people, are turned into the key agents of historical change, the shapers of contemporary America" (1996b:153).¶ Despite noting that there is differentiation among whites and warning against using whiteness as a monolithic category, most of the literature still proceeds to do so, revealing a reductionist tendency. Even claiming to show its multiple forms, most writers essentialize and reify whiteness as something that directs most of Western history (Gallagher 2000). Hence while trying to "deconstruct” whiteness and see the ubiquitousness of whiteness, the literature at the same time reasserts and reinstates it (Stowe 1996:77).¶ For example, Michael Eric Dyson suggests that whiteness is identity, ideology, and institution (Dyson, quoted in Chennault 1998:300). But if it is all these things, it becomes an analytically useless concept. Christine Clark and James O'Donnell write: "to reference it reifies it, to refrain from referencing it obscures the persistent, pervasive, and seemingly permanent reality of racism" (1999:2). Empirical investigation requires being able to identify and measure a concept— or at the very least to have a clear definition—but since whiteness has come to mean just about everything, it ends up meaning hardly anything.

#### White supremacy isn’t a monolithic root cause---they shut off productive debate over solutions – means the alt fails

Tommie Shelby 7, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity

Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely, if ever, able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the members of a poor black community to determine with any accuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of world trade, the ascendancy of conservative ideology, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, or some other explanation altogether. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials.¶ There are very real empirical difficulties in determining the specific causal significance of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on blacks' life chances. We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that systematic empirical inquiry, historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. We must instead rely on open public debate—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—with the aim of garnering rationally motivated and informed consensus. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable.¶ These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help expose the superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to contemporary forms of racism or white supremacy. A more penetrating, subtle, and empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments (such as immigration policy or reduced federal funding for higher education).

## 2ac method

Our authors are not synonmous with whiteness --- their critique is reductive means no alt solvency

**Jackson**, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, **‘11**

(Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to **worry endlessly about foundational assumptions.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. **Hirschman** (1970b, 338) **noted this very danger**, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the **focus on** producing internally **consistent** packages of **assumptions instead of** actually examining **complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus **we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress**, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles **as uniquely scientific**, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a **firmer scientific footing** by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103).

The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but **only after the fundamentals have been** soundly **established.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

Use of the ballot as a currency to oppose privilege is politically counterproductive—it substitutes the valorization of oppression for political movement-building

Andrea Smith, Ph.D., co-founder of Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, UC Riverside Associate Professor, 2013, Geographies of Privilege, Unsettling the Privilege of Self-Reflexivity, Kindle

In my experience with a plethora of antiracist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/ race/ sexuality/ class/ etc. privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: “I am so and so, and I have x privilege.” It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had her or his proclaimed privilege. It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects to dismantle the structures of domination that enabled their privilege. Rather, the confessions became the political project themselves. The benefits of these confessions seemed to be ephemeral. For the instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. The one who confessed could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her or his abuses of power and relief from white/ male/ heterosexual/ etc. guilt. Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there was generally little critique of the fact that in the end, it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist. One of the reasons there was little critique of this practice is that it bestowed cultural capital to those who seemed to be the “most oppressed.” Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered. “I may be white, but my best friend was a person of color, which caused me to be oppressed when we played together.” Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. And **despite the cultural capital that was**, at least **temporarily, bestowed** to those who seemed to be the most oppressed, these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the colonized/ racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity.

## At: state bad

#### The state can be redeemed!

Brubaker 4

Rogers Brubaker, Department of Sociology, UCLA, 2004, In the Name of the Nation: Reflectionson Nationalism and Patriotism, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, [www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf](http://www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf)

This, then, is the basic work done by the category ‘nation’ in the context of nationalist movements—movements to create a polity for a putative nation. In other contexts, the category ‘nation’ is used in a very different way. It is used not to challenge the existing territorial and political order, but to create a sense of national unity for a given polity. This is the sort of work that is often called nation-building, of which we have heard much of late. It is this sort of work that was evoked by the Italian statesman Massimo D’Azeglio, when he famously said, ‘we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’. It is this sort of work that was (and still is) undertaken—with varying but on the whole not particularly impressive degrees of success—by leaders of post-colonial states, who had won independence, but whose populations were and remain deeply divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. It is this sort of work that the category ‘nation’ could, in principle, be mobilized to do in contemporary Iraq—to cultivate solidarity and appeal to loyalty in a way that cuts across divisions between Shi’ites and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, North and South.2

In contexts like this, the category ‘nation’ can also be used in another way, not to appeal to a ‘national’ identity transcending ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious, or ethnoregional distinctions, but rather to assert ‘ownership’ of the polity on behalf of a ‘core’ ethnocultural ‘nation’ distinct from the citizenry of the state as a whole, and thereby to define or redefine the state as the state of and for that core ‘nation’ (Brubaker, 1996, p. 83ff). This is the way ‘nation’ is used, for example, by Hindu nationalists in India, who seek to redefine India as a state founded on Hindutva or Hinduness, a state of and for the Hindu ethnoreligious ‘nation’ (Van der Veer, 1994). Needless to say, this use of ‘nation’ excludes Muslims from membership of the nation, just as similar claims to ‘ownership’ of the state in the name of an ethnocultural core nation exclude other ethnoreligious, ethnolinguistic, or ethnoracial groups in other settings.

In the United States and other relatively settled, longstanding nation-states, ‘nation’ can work in this exclusionary way, as in nativist movements in America or in the rhetoric of the contemporary European far right (‘la France oux Franc¸ais’, ‘Deutschland den Deutshchen’). Yet it can also work in a very different and fundamentally inclusive way.3 It can work to mobilize mutual solidarity among members of ‘the nation’, inclusively defined to include all citizens—and perhaps all long-term residents—of the state. To invoke nationhood, in this sense, is to attempt to transcend or at least relativize internal differences and distinctions. It is an attempt to get people to think of themselves— to formulate their identities and their interests—as members of that nation, rather than as members of some other collectivity. To appeal to the nation can be a powerful rhetorical resource, though it is not automatically so. Academics in the social sciences and humanities in the United States are generally skeptical of or even hostile to such invocations of nationhood. They are often seen as de´passe´, parochial, naive, regressive, or even dangerous. For many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, ‘nation’ is a suspect category.

Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who do. And often with good reason, since flag-waving has been associated with intolerance, xenophobia, and militarism, with exaggerated national pride and aggressive foreign policy. Unspeakable horrors—and a wide range of lesser evils—have been perpetrated in the name of the nation, and not just in the name of ‘ethnic’ nations, but in the name of putatively ‘civic’ nations as well (Mann, 2004). But this is not sufficient to account for the prevailingly negative stance towards the nation. Unspeakable horrors, and an equally wide range of lesser evils, have been committed in the name of many other sorts of imagined communities as well—in the name of the state, the race, the ethnic group, the class, the party, the faith.

In addition to the sense that nationalism is dangerous, and closely connected to some of the great evils of our time—the sense that, as John Dunn (1979, p. 55) put it, nationalism is ‘the starkest political shame of the 20th-century’— there is a much broader suspicion of invocations of nationhood. This derives from the widespread diagnosis that we live in a post-national age. It comes from the sense that, however well fitted the category ‘nation’ was to economic, political, and cultural realities in the nineteenth century, it is increasingly ill-fitted to those realities today. On this account, nation is fundamentally an anachronistic category, and invocations of nationhood, even if not dangerous, are out of sync with the basic principles that structure social life today.4

The post-nationalist stance combines an empirical claim, a methodological critique, and a normative argument. I will say a few words about each in turn. The empirical claim asserts the declining capacity and diminishing relevance of the nation-state. Buffeted by the unprecedented circulation of people, goods, messages, images, ideas, and cultural products, the nation-state is said to have progressively lost its ability to ‘cage’ (Mann, 1993, p. 61), frame, and govern social, economic, cultural, and political life. It is said to have lost its ability to control its borders, regulate its economy, shape its culture, address a variety of border-spanning problems, and engage the hearts and minds of its citizens. I believe this thesis is greatly overstated, and not just because the September 11 attacks have prompted an aggressively resurgent statism.5 Even the European Union, central to a good deal of writing on post-nationalism, does not represent a linear or unambiguous move ‘beyond the nation-state’. As Milward (1992) has argued, the initially limited moves toward supranational authority in Europe worked—and were intended—to restore and strengthen the authority of the nation-state. And the massive reconfiguration of political space along national lines in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War suggests that far from moving beyond the nation-state, large parts of Europe were moving back to the nation-state.6 The ‘short twentieth century’ concluded much as it had begun, with Central and Eastern Europe entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era through the large-scale nationalization of previously multinational political space. Certainly nationhood remains the universal formula for legitimating statehood.

 Can one speak of an ‘unprecedented porosity’ of borders, as one recent book has put it (Sheffer, 2003, p. 22)? In some respects, perhaps; but in other respects—especially with regard to the movement of people—social technologies of border control have continued to develop. One cannot speak of a generalized loss of control by states over their borders; in fact, during the last century, the opposite trend has prevailed, as states have deployed increasingly sophisticated technologies of identification, surveillance, and control, from passports and visas through integrated databases and biometric devices. The world’s poor who seek to better their estate through international migration face a tighter mesh of state regulation than they did a century ago (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, pp. 30–1, 267). Is migration today unprecedented in volume and velocity, as is often asserted? Actually, it is not: on a per capita basis, the overseas flows of a century ago to the United States were considerably larger than those of recent decades, while global migration flows are today ‘on balance slightly less intensive’ than those of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century (Held et al., 1999, p. 326). Do migrants today sustain ties with their countries of origin? Of course they do; but they managed to do so without e-mail and inexpensive telephone connections a century ago, and it is not clear—contrary to what theorists of post-nationalism suggest—that the manner in which they do so today represents a basic transcendence of the nation-state.7 Has a globalizing capitalism reduced the capacity of the state to regulate the economy? Undoubtedly. Yet in other domains—such as the regulation of what had previously been considered private behavior—the regulatory grip of the state has become tighter rather than looser (Mann, 1997, pp. 491–2).

The methodological critique is that the social sciences have long suffered from ‘methodological nationalism’ (Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 2002; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002)—the tendency to take the ‘nation-state’ as equivalent to ‘society’, and to focus on internal structures and processes at the expense of global or otherwise border-transcending processes and structures. There is obviously a good deal of truth in this critique, even if it tends to be overstated, and neglects the work that some historians and social scientists have long been doing on border-spanning flows and networks.

But what follows from this critique? If it serves to encourage the study of social processes organized on multiple levels in addition to the level of the nation-state, so much the better. But if the methodological critique is coupled— as it often is—with the empirical claim about the diminishing relevance of the nation-state, and if it serves therefore to channel attention away from state-level processes and structures, there is a risk that academic fashion will lead us to neglect what remains, for better or worse, a fundamental level of organization and fundamental locus of power.

The normative critique of the nation-state comes from two directions. From above, the cosmopolitan argument is that humanity as a whole, not the nation- state, should define the primary horizon of our moral imagination and political engagement (Nussbaum, 1996). From below, muticulturalism and identity politics celebrate group identities and privilege them over wider, more encompassing affiliations.

One can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the cosmopolitan argument. The strong cosmopolitan argument is that there is no good reason to privilege the nation-state as a focus of solidarity, a domain of mutual responsibility, and a locus of citizenship.8 The nation-state is a morally arbitrary community, since membership in it is determined, for the most part, by the lottery of birth, by morally arbitrary facts of birthplace or parentage. The weaker version of the cosmopolitan argument is that the boundaries of the nation-state should not set limits to our moral responsibility and political commitments. It is hard to disagree with this point. No matter how open and ‘joinable’ a nation is—a point to which I will return below—it is always imagined, as Benedict Anderson (1991) observed, as a limited community. It is intrinsically parochial and irredeemably particular. Even the most adamant critics of universalism will surely agree that those beyond the boundaries of the nation-state have some claim, as fellow human beings, on our moral imagination, our political energy, even perhaps our economic resources.9

The second strand of the normative critique of the nation-state—the multiculturalist critique—itself takes various forms. Some criticize the nation-state for a homogenizing logic that inexorably suppresses cultural differences. Others claim that most putative nation-states (including the United States) are not in fact nation-states at all, but multinational states whose citizens may share a common loyalty to the state, but not a common national identity (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11). But the main challenge to the nation-state from multiculturalism and identity politics comes less from specific arguments than from a general disposition to cultivate and celebrate group identities and loyalties at the expense of state-wide identities and loyalties.

In the face of this twofold cosmopolitan and multiculturalist critique, I would like to sketch a qualified defense of nationalism and patriotism in the contemporary American context.10 Observers have long noted the Janus-faced character of nationalism and patriotism, and I am well aware of their dark side. As someone who has studied nationalism in Eastern Europe, I am perhaps especially aware of that dark side, and I am aware that nationalism and patriotism have a dark side not only there but here. Yet the prevailing anti-national, post-national, and trans-national stances in the social sciences and humanities risk obscuring the good reasons—at least in the American context—for cultivating solidarity, mutual responsibility, and citizenship at the level of the nation-state. Some of those who defend patriotism do so by distinguishing it from nationalism.11 I do not want to take this tack, for I think that attempts to distinguish good patriotism from bad nationalism neglect the intrinsic ambivalence and polymorphism of both. Patriotism and nationalism are not things with fixed natures; they are highly flexible political languages, ways of framing political arguments by appealing to the patria, the fatherland, the country, the nation. These terms have somewhat different connotations and resonances, and the political languages of patriotism and nationalism are therefore not fully overlapping. But they do overlap a great deal, and an enormous variety of work can be done with both languages. I therefore want to consider them together here.

I want to suggest that patriotism and nationalism can be valuable in four respects. They can help develop more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive social policies, foster the integration of immigrants, and even serve as a check on the development of an aggressively unilateralist foreign policy.

First, nationalism and patriotism can motivate and sustain civic engagement. It is sometimes argued that liberal democratic states need committed and active citizens, and therefore need patriotism to generate and motivate such citizens. This argument shares the general weakness of functionalist arguments about what states or societies allegedly ‘need’; in fact, liberal democratic states seem to be able to muddle through with largely passive and uncommitted citizenries. But the argument need not be cast in functionalist form. A committed and engaged citizenry may not be necessary, but that does not make it any less desirable. And patriotism can help nourish civic engagement. It can help generate feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility across the boundaries of identity groups. As Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 7) put it, the nation is conceived as a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’. Identification with fellow members of this imagined community can nourish the sense that their problems are on some level my problems, for which I have a special responsibility.12

Patriotic identification with one’s country—the feeling that this is my country, and my government—can help ground a sense of responsibility for, rather than disengagement from, actions taken by the national government. A feeling of responsibility for such actions does not, of course, imply agreement with them; it may even generate powerful emotions such as shame, outrage, and anger that underlie and motivate opposition to government policies. Patriotic commitments are likely to intensify rather than attenuate such emotions. As Richard Rorty (1994) observed, ‘you can feel shame over your country’s behavior only to the extent to which you feel it is your country’.13 Patriotic commitments can furnish the energies and passions that motivate and sustain civic engagement.

Engaging the law through in-depth debate is critical to solve their impacts

Harris, professor of law – UC Berkeley, ‘94

(Angela P., 82 Calif. L. Rev. 741)

CRT has taken up this method of internal critique. Like the crits, race-crits have tried to go beyond espousing Doctrine X over Doctrine Y, claiming instead to show that both doctrines are biased against people of color from the outset. n33 For example, as Brooks and Newborn note, the CRT critique of equal protection law challenges not only the "intent" test of Washington v. Davis, n34 but the understanding of racism on which that test is based. n35 And, as Farber notes, the CRT critique of affirmative action challenges the very notion of "merit." n36 This commitment to conceptual as well as doctrinal critique is CRT's radicalism - its attempt to dig down to the very roots of legal doctrine, in contrast with the more reformist bent of traditional civil rights scholarship. Following the first wave's announcement that law is not separate from politics, the second wave of CLS moved to the study of law as "rhetoric" - [\*748] the ways in which legal reasoning accomplishes its ideological effects. n37 Second wave crits have attempted to examine how binary thinking in the law is produced and how it reflects larger historical processes of bureaucratization and commodification. In so doing, the second wave of CLS has found no "there" there beneath the rhetoric of law. Where first wave crits assumed that beneath law's indeterminacy was a "fundamental contradiction" in the human condition itself, n38 or relied on the existence of moments of unalienated, authentic "being" in the world, n39 second wave crits have begun to question whether the very assumption of a human condition separate from the language we use to talk about it makes sense. I call this mood of profound doubt and skepticism "postmodernist." There are as many different definitions of postmodernism as there are postmodernists. n40 As law professors have understood the term, n41 however, [Postmodernism] suggests that what has been presented in our social-political and our intellectual traditions as knowledge, truth, objectivity, and reason are actually merely the effects of a particular form of social power, the victory of a particular way of representing the world that then presents itself as beyond mere interpretation, as truth itself. n42 Postmodernism's strength is in its corrosiveness. First wave crits insisted that law functions as a mask for power; second wave crits question the first wave's faith in "unmasking" itself. The effort to expose law as ideology assumed that it was possible, through the force of critique, to suddenly see the way things "really" are in a flash of enlightenment. But the [\*749] second wave crits doubt this very reliance on a "real reality" underlying ideology. Instead, they suggest that ideology is all there is. n43 Postmodernist critique is congenial to race-crits, who had already drawn from history the lesson that "racism" is no superficial matter of ignorance, conscious error, or bigotry, but rather lies at the very heart of American - and western - culture. In one of the foundational articles of CRT, Kimberle Crenshaw notes that the civil rights movement achieved material and symbolic gains for blacks, yet left racist ideology and race-baiting politics intact. n44 In Crenshaw's view, the crits' critiques did not go far enough to expose the racism in legal reasoning and legal institutions. Derrick Bell argues that racism is a permanent feature of the American landscape, not something that we can throw off in a magic moment of emancipation. n45 And in a moment of deep pessimism, Richard Delgado's fictional friend "Rodrigo Crenshaw" has suggested that racism is an intrinsic feature of "The Enlightenment" itself. n46 The deeper that race-crits dig, the more embedded racism seems to be; the deeper the race-crit critique of western culture goes, the more useful postmodernist philosophy becomes in demonstrating that nothing should be immune from criticism. By calling everything taken for granted into question, postmodernist critique potentially clears the way for alternative accounts of social reality, n47 including accounts that place racism at the center of western culture. Thus, Gerald Torres has identified postmodernism as a useful position from which to criticize both theories of interest-group and "communitarian" politics. n48 Anthony Cook sees deconstruction, a postmodernist method of reading texts, as potentially "liberatory" for progressive scholars of color. n49 [\*750] And Robert Chang argues that post-structuralism is useful in order to understand the interaction between Asian American political action and the law. n50 Postmodernist thought refuses to accept any concept, linguistic usage, or value as pure, original, or incorruptible. Postmodernist narratives, as used by race-crits, contend that concepts like neutrality and objectivity, and institutions like law, have not escaped the taint of racism, but rather are often used to perpetuate it. Postmodernist narratives emphasize the ways in which "race" permeates our language, our perceptions, even our fondest "colorblind" utopias. n51 CRT tells postmodernist narratives when it digs down into seemingly neutral areas of law and finds concepts of "race" and racism always already there. B. CRT and Modernist Narratives Even while it exposes racism within seemingly neutral concepts and institutions, however, CRT has not abandoned the fundamental political goal of traditional civil rights scholarship: the liberation of people of color from racial subordination. Although, like crits, race-crits have questioned concepts of neutrality and objectivity, they have done so from a perspective that places racial oppression at the center of analysis and privileges the racial subject. This commitment to antiracism over critique as an end in itself has created rifts between CRT and CLS. For example, in a symposium published by the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, race-crits broke with crits over the efficacy of "rights talk." n52 CLS writers had argued "that rights were malleable and manipulative, that in practice they served to isolate and marginalize rather than empower and connect people, and that progressive people should emphasize needs, informality, and connectedness rather than rights." n53 Patricia Williams, Richard Delgado, and Mari Matsuda, however, all rejected this yearning to go beyond rights to more [\*751] direct forms of human connection, arguing that, for communities of color, "rights talk" was an indispensable tool. n54 This argument between CRT and CLS was more a matter of strategy and tactics than of fundamental disagreement. Both sides agreed that progressive political action should be antiracist and that human connection was a good thing. But a comparison of CRT work with the second wave of CLS work also indicates a more serious tension. In its commitment to the liberation of people of color, CRT work demonstrates a deep commitment to concepts of reason and truth, transcendental subjects, and "really-out-there" objects. Thus, in its optimistic moments, CRT engages in "modernist" narratives. n55 Modernist narratives assume three things: a subject, free to choose, who can be emancipated or not; an objective world of things out there (a world "the way it really is" as opposed to the way things appear to be in a condition of false consciousness); and "reason," the bridge between the subject and the object that enables subjects to move from their own blindness to "enlightenment." Modernist narratives thus call on a particular intellectual machinery, a methodology Brian Fay describes as "critical social science." Critical social science requires the following: First, that there be a crisis in a social system; second, that this crisis be at least in part caused by the false consciousness of those experiencing it; third, that this false consciousness be amenable to the process of enlightenment ...; and fourth, that such enlightenment lead to emancipation in which a group, empowered by its new-found self-understanding, radically alters its social arrangements and thereby alleviates its suffering. n56 [\*752] In its optimistic moments, CRT is described very well by "critical social science." The crisis in our social system is our collective failure to adequately perceive or to address racism. This crisis, according to CRT, is at least in part caused by a false understanding of "racism" as an intentional, isolated, individual phenomenon, equivalent to prejudice. This false understanding, however, can be corrected by CRT, which redescribes racism as a structural flaw in our society. Through these explanations, readers will come to a new and deeper understanding of reality, an enlightenment which in turn will lead to legal and political struggle that ultimately results in racial liberation. Under CRT, as Fay remarks of critical social science in general, "the truth shall set you free." n57 This project fits well with the kind of scholarship most often found in law reviews. As several scholars have recently argued, one characteristic of conventional legal scholarship is its insistent "normativity": the little voice that constantly asks legal scholars, "So, what should we do?" n58 Normativity is both a stylistic and a substantive characteristic. At the stylistic level, normativity refers to how law review articles typically are structured: the writer identifies a problem within the existing legal framework; she then identifies a "norm," within or outside the legal system, to which we ought to adhere; and finally she applies the norm to resolve the problem in a way that can easily translate into a series of moves within the currently existing legal system. n59 At the substantive level, normativity describes the assumption within legal scholarship of a coherent and unitary "we" - a legal subject who speaks for and acts in the people's best interest - with the power to "do" something. Legal normativity also confidently assumes "our" ability to reason a way through problems with neutrality and objectivity: to "choose" a norm and then "apply" it to a legal problem. n60 Whereas second-wave CLS work sits very uneasily with this scholarly method, n61 both traditional civil rights scholarship and CRT adhere for the [\*753] most part to stylistic and substantive normativity. Although the "we" assumed in these articles and essays is often "people of color" and progressive whites rather than a generic "we," the same confidence is exhibited of "our" ability to choose one norm over another, to apply the new principle to a familiar problem, to achieve enlightenment, and to move from understanding to action. n62 Even when the recommended course of action goes beyond adopting Doctrine X over Doctrine Y, as CRT makes a point of doing, the exhortation to action often still assumes that liberation is just around the corner. CRT's commitment to the liberation of people of color - and the project of critical social science (generally) and normative legal scholarship (in particular) as a way to further that liberation - suggest a faith in certain concepts and institutions that postmodernists lack. When race-crits tell modernist stories, they assume that "people of color" describes a coherent category with at least some shared values and interests. They assume that the idea of "liberation" is meaningful - that racism is something that can one day somehow cease to exist, or cease to exert any power over us. Modernist narratives assume a "real" reality out there, and that reason can bring us face to face with it. And modernist narratives have faith that once enough people see the truth, right action will follow: that enlightenment leads to empowerment, and that empowerment leads to emancipation. Modernist narratives, then, are profoundly hopeful. They assume that people of color and whites live in the same perceptual and moral world, that reason speaks to us all in the same way despite our different experiences, and that reason, rather than habit or power, is what will motivate people. Modernist narratives also can be profoundly romantic. They imagine heroic action by a formerly oppressed people rising up as one, "empowered" to be who they "really" are or choose to be, breathing the thin and bracing air of freedom. This optimism and romanticism, though easy to caricature, cannot be easily dismissed. As Patricia Williams and Mari Matsuda have pointed out, faith in reason and truth and belief in the essential freedom of rational subjects have enabled people of color to survive and resist subordination. n63 Political modernism, more generally, has been a powerful force in the lives of subjugated peoples; as a practical matter, politically liberal societies are [\*754] vastly preferable to the alternatives. n64 A faith in reason has sustained efforts to educate people into critical thinking and to engage in debate rather than violence. n65 The passionate and constructive energy of modernist narratives of emancipation is also grounded in a moral faith: that human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights; that oppression is wrong and resistance to oppression right; that opposing subjugation in the name of liberty, equality, and true community is the obligation of every rational person. In its modernist moments, CRT aims not to topple the Enlightenment, but to make its promises real. n66

## At: rights = white

#### The existence of habeas petitions promoting human rights proves that an institution can be caught up in systems of whiteness while still combatting violence

Robert A **Williams** Jr **90**, “Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World”, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1990, No. 4, Frontiers of Legal Thought III, (Sep., 1990), pp. 660-704

Not too long ago, it was fashionable for some legal academics in this country to assert that rights discourse—that is, talk and thought about rights—was actually harmful to the social movements of peoples of color and other oppressed groups.1 And as recent times have shown, legal academics of color can attract a great deal of attention and the sympathies of anonymous white colleagues by telling us that the sufferings and stories of peoples of color in this country possess no unique capacity to transform the law.2 These legal academic denials of the efficacy of rights discourse and storytelling for the social movements of peoples of color now seem disharmonious with the larger transformations occurring in the world. Why any legal academics would discount the usefulness of such proven, liberating forms of discourse in the particular society they serve from their positions of privilege is a curious and contentious question. The disaggregated narratives of human rights struggles on the nightly news apparently have not been sufficient for some legal academics. They want documented accounts demonstrating the efficacy of rights discourse and storytelling in the social movements of outsider groups. Empirical evidence of the traditions, histories, and lives of oppressed peoples actually transforming legal thought and doctrine about rights could then be used to cure skeptics of the critical race scholarly enterprise.3 "See here," the still unconverted in the faculty lounge can be told, "this stuff works, if applied and systematized correctly." Despite the attacks from society's dominant groups in the legal academic spectrum—both the left and right—the voices of legal scholars of color have sought to keep faith with the struggles and aspirations of oppressed peoples around the world. These emerging voices recognize that now is the time to intensify the struggle for human rights on all fronts— to heighten demands, engage in intense political rhetoric, and sharpen critical thinking about all aspects of legal thought and doctrine. The rapid emergence of indigenous peoples\* human rights as a subject of major concern and action in contemporary international law provides a unique opportunity to witness the application of rights discourse and storytelling in institutionalized, law-bound settings around the world.4 By telling their own stories in recognized and authoritative intcrnational human rights standard-setting bodies during the past decade, indigenous peoples have sought to redefine the terms of their right to survival under international law.5 Under present, Western-dominated conceptions of international law, indigenous peoples are regarded as subjects of the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the settler state regimes that invaded their territories and established hegemony during prior colonial eras.6 At present, international law does not contest unilateral assertions of state sovereignty that limit, or completely deny the collective cultural rights of indigenous peoples.7 Contemporary international law also does not concern itself with protecting indigenous peoples' traditionally-occupied territories from uncompensated state appropriation, even when indigenous territories are secured through treaties with a state. According to contemporary international discourse, such treaties should be treated as legal nullities.8 Finally, modern international law refuses to recognize indigenous peoples as "peoples," entitled to rights of self-determination as specified in United Nations and other major international human rights legal instruments.9 Since the 1970s, in international human rights forums around the world, indigenous peoples have contested the international legal system's continued acquiescence to the assertions of exclusive state sovereignty and jurisdiction over the terms of their survival. Pushed to the brink of extinction by state-sanctioned policies of genocide and ethnocide, indigenous peoples have demanded heightened international concern and legal protection for their continued survival.10 The emergence of indigenous rights in contemporary international legal discourse is a direct response to the consciousness-raising efforts of indigenous peoples in international human rights forums. Specialized international and regional bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and advocacy groups are now devoting greater attention to indigenous human rights concerns." By far the most important of these specialized initiatives to emerge out of the indigenous human rights movement is the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Working Group). The Working Group is composed of five international legal experts drawn from the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Working Group was created by the Sub-Commission's parent body, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1982 and given a specific mandate to develop international legal standards for the protection of indigenous peoples' human rights.12

#### Conceiving of rights as universally legitimate punishes those who deny them

Hunt ’90 (Alan, Professor of Law and Sociology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, “Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemon Strategies,” Journal of Law and Society Vol. 17 No. 3, 1990)

As we saw above, Gramsci identified hegemony as: ... posing all the questions around which struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental group over a series of subordinate groups.28 Let me now defend the thesis that to achieve the shift from the 'corporate' to the 'hegemonic' counter-hegemony requirest he transition from the discourse of 'interests' to the discourse of 'rights'. Gramsci's suggestive, but undeveloped, insight is that the project of counter-hegemony requires a shift from the plane of the 'corporate' to the 'universal'. He identifies the counter-hegemonic project as involving: ... the concrete birth of a need to construct a new intellectual and moral order, and hence the need to develop more universal concepts and more refined and decisive ideological weapons.29

By the concept of the 'corporate' Gramsci refers to the level of 'interests' conceived as specifying those circumstances that benefit the group. Thus, for example, I share with my academic colleagues an interest in securing a higher salary. The critical point is that the existence of this interest discloses no reason why any other social group should support my claim. The forms of legitimation that support and justify the myriad of 'corporate' interests are legion. The discourse of rights provides a key exemplification of the movement to the plane of the 'universal'; rights are contestable and comparable, and they are capable of articulating social norms that are general and capable of sustaining legitimation.

Rights discourses operate at a number of different levels; without attempting a complete classification, it is desireable to distinguish between rights-claims, institutional-rights and legal-rights. Rights-claims are interests interpellated into the normative language of rights which embody some claim to legitimation by analogy or extension from other rights; for example, my salary claim expressed as a right may express an entitlement to comparability with some other group. An institutional-right exists where as the result, for example, of local bargaining an agreement has been secured for an annual salary review. A legal-right is a rights-claim or an institutional-right which has secured legal recognition which involves a capacity to mobilize public resources for its assertion or defence. Once secured as legal-rights they achieve the distinct status of being **pre-legitimated claims.** Legal and constitutional rights mark out those social claims and demands which have already, as a matter of political fact, been adopted by the legal system and which have available some access to legal resources for their enforcement. It should be noted that this does not involve any assumption about the efficiency or the effectiveness with which particular political systems protect legal-rights.

It is now possible to spell out the radical implications of my contention that rights are significant precisely because they function at the 'plane of the universal'. This claim is significant precisely because **it is a direct inversion of the most persistent objection against rights**, articulated most fully in the critical legal studies movement's critique of rights, namely, **that it is precisely the universalistic form of rights which embodies their abstraction and thus manifests their inherent reification.** These differences can be explored by considering Mark Tushnet's objection to rights on the grounds that both sides can structure their discourse in the typically abstract form of legal-rights.30 This, he argues, entails the 'troublesome consequence' of raising the problem that the claim, for example, to exercise a free speech right by political demonstration pushes one towards conceding that others have the same rights with respect to causes which we find repugnant.

Let us face it directly; in perhaps its most dramatic form it is the problem of 'rights for racists'. Legal-rights are never absolute; they always clash with competing rights. This, rather than being a disadvantage, is a distinct merit in that it makes it possible to compare rights-claims at the most relevant level of generality. Presumptively the general right to free speech should be protected; the problem posed by racists is to determine whether some other right (for example, to personal security in black neighbourhoods) is infringed to such an extent as to justify the denial of free-speech rights to some particular category of persons. Whether the test applied be that of 'clear and present danger' or some other test is not my present concern; my contention is that there is real merit in needing to **provide some overriding consideration**, itself **couched within a discourse of rights,** before denying **to any group,** however unpleasant, **one of the most basic of political rights**. The need to provide and to struggle for such a justification is a central feature of democratic politics.

#### Perm do both --- permutation is the best way to affirm agency

Iglesias, 1997

Elizabeth Iglesias, Professor of Law, University of Miami, 1997, The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 177

Hernandez-Truyol and special thanks to my friend and colleague, Professor Francisco Valdes.

 Just as engagement with international law promises to expand the way LatCrits/RaceCrits formulate and pursue our antisubordination agenda in theory and practice, these Colloquium proceedings also show how the application of LatCrit/RaceCrit methodologies, perspectives, and themes can expand international human rights legal discourse. The various presentations illustrate the extent to which critical methodologies like story-telling, the mapping of legal terms, and the incorporation of political economy and postmodern conceptualizations of identity can alter the terms of debate on key concepts and issues in international and human rights law. Concepts like national sovereignty, refugee and alien, sustainable development, free trade, and regional integration take on new dimensions when approached through a LatCrit perspective. By bringing the perspective and methodologies of Critical Race theory to bear on the analysis of international law, processes, relations, and institutions, LatCrit theory has created a conceptual space for exploring how the formulation and resolution of key debates in international law reproduce the conditions of subordination of peoples of color, both domestically and internationally. In short, by making the international move, these proceedings open the door to the formulation of new critical perspectives and sites of contestation in the struggle for social transformation through law. [\*183] The rest of this Foreword tracks the structure of the Colloquium in the Miami proceedings. Professor Celina Romany's keynote address, n5 laying out in broad strokes the theoretical and political possibilities for LatCrit scholarship in the field of international human rights, was followed by three panel presentations. The panels were organized thematically around the socalled "three generations" of international human rights. n6 All the panel participants were asked to address their remarks to one or more of the following three questions: (1) Does a LatCrit theoretical perspective on identity politics, the multiplicity and intersectionality of Latina/o identities and cultural values, as well as the convergences and divergences in our histories and discourses of assimilation, independence, and revolution offer new perspectives on the traditional themes and concerns that have organized the legal and political struggle to promote the recognition and enforcement of human rights, broadly conceived? (2) Does LatCrit theory offer new perspectives on the recent trend toward regional economic integration in agreements such as NAFTA, and the likely impact of these developments on the human rights of Latinas/os within the United States, at the borders, and within the Latin American states considering regional integration? (3) Does LatCrit theory have anything to say about key debates over (a) the status of national sovereignty in international law, (b) the proper scope and limits of state intervention in civil [\*184] society, for example, police interventions to enforce immigration restrictions or promote drug enforcement operations, particularly in minority communities, at the borders or within the territorial jurisdiction of Latin American states or both, and (c) the status of international human rights in regional integration agreements? In presenting an introductory overview of the participants' rich, varied, and compelling interventions, Part I focuses on the presentations of panel one, which addresses the ways in which LatCrit theory can further the theoretical and practical work of promoting respect for first generation civil and political rights. Part II examines panel two, which addresses second generation economic, social, and cultural human rights, and Part III focuses on the third panel analysis of third generations solidarity rights. Read cumulatively, these presentations illustrate both the contributions a richer understanding of key debates in international law can make to our struggles against subordination, as well as the contributions LatCrit theoretical perspectives can make to the development of international law. II. IMAGINED COMMUNITIES AND TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES: LATCRIT PERSPECTIVES ON FIRST GENERATION CIVIL AND POLITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS The presentations of the first panel develop a critical analysis of the role international civil and political rights discourse and practices can play in promoting and invigorating the antisubordination struggles of the LatCrit movement in the United States. Using different methodologies and points of departure, each presentation offers insightful variations on some common themes. In each presentation, U.S. domestic laws, policies, and judicially articulated legal doctrines are measured against the requirements of international law. Each presentation questions, in one way or another, the legitimacy of these policies and doctrines, focusing particularly on the way they impact the enjoyment of internationally recognized civil and political human rights. Professor Hernandez-Truyol's intervention provides an excellent point of departure. n7 In introducing panel one, Hernandez-Truyol [\*185] provides an overview of the evolution and development of international human rights law. This history reveals that human rights law, in general, and civil and political rights, in particular, are artifacts of a long and continuing struggle to articulate normative frameworks and develop enforcement mechanisms that might be effectively invoked to restrict the manner and conditions under which states exercise coercive power against individuals within their jurisdiction. Early formulations grounded individual rights against the state in religious and metaphysical conceptions of a transcendent moral order or natural law. Since World War II, these rights have been asserted by reference to the positive laws of the world community, grounded for example, in the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration, the International Covenants, and a proliferation of international human rights instruments articulating the rights of the world's most vulnerable groups. In recounting this history, Hernandez-Truyol makes numerous important observations. Although the Universal Declaration includes both economic and social, as well as civil and political rights, the legal framework for the enforcement of human rights law was subsequently divided into two regimes--one focused on civil and political rights, the second on economic, social, and cultural rights, each embodied in a different Covenant establishing different institutional arrangements and enforcement procedures. By reminding us that this fragmentation was a product of differences in the ideological commitments and priorities of developed and developing countries, Hernandez-Truyol strikes two important themes. The first theme focuses on the way the inequality of states in the international political economy constrains the articulation and enforcement of human rights law, a theme developed more fully in subsequent interventions. The second theme, while related, goes directly to the heart of the antisubordination project of the LatCrit movement (as a project in legal theory and scholarship), that is, the effort to articulate a vision of human identity that offers the most inclusive normative reference point for the enforcement of international human rights. Hernandez-Truyol argues that "a human rights construct makes sense only with a holistic reading of rights that truly allows the enjoyment of the aspirational dignity that attaches to our [\*186] status as human." n8 Accordingly, she attacks the fragmentation of human rights law into sePte regimes. While the United States recognizes only civil and political rights and continues to deny economic and social rights any legal status, Hernandez-Truyol argues that this sePtion is morally and conceptually incoherent. From the perspective of individual persons, these rights are clearly interdependent and interrelated. Civil and political rights mean very little without the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly given the differences that class and culture can otherwise make in our access to the state and to the resources necessary for effective political mobilization. Indeed, this observation has not escaped the world community, as evidenced by the Third World sponsored General Assembly Resolution 32/130 of 1977, as well as in the numerous other human rights instruments Professor Hernandez-Truyol discusses. n9

By sourcing the foundation of human rights in the individual's status as an individual and in the dignity and justice owed to individuals because of our status as human beings, Professor Hernandez-Truyol deploys a formulation and stakes a position that transcends, as contingencies, the differences of race, class, gender, and citizenship. Her formulation invokes our common humanity as the fundamental normative reference point for the conceptualization and enforcement of international human rights. Making this move, she provides a normative basis for combating the very real violence that is perpetrated by domestic legal regimes organized around contingent constructs like citizenship. In short, Hernandez-Truyol offers LatCrits an invitation to move even further beyond the black/white Pdigm of early Critical Race theory and embrace the objective of achieving a global moral order that treats all human beings as equal.

To be sure, this formulation is not entirely unproblematic. The international legal order that LatCrits have inherited is one profoundly at odds with the centrality Hernandez-Truyol would confer upon the individual. As she acknowledges, sovereign states, not individuals, still remain the primary subjects of international law. International human rights enforcement practices [\*187] are still constrained by and within institutional procedures constructed around deference to sovereignty. Moreover, achieving a normative consensus will not necessarily produce effective social change, since law still operates in and against the structures and relations of power it seeks to regulate.

More troubling however, this emphasis on the human dignity of the individual person, when deployed as a normative reference point for combating the state-centric positivism of international law, resonates, perhaps intentionally, with the language of natural rights and divinely ordained moral order. n10 Can such a move withstand the modernist challenge that it represents a psychological lapse into utopian delusion, a retreat from critical engagement to a metaphysical moral order which exists only in the imaginings of a new (LatCrit) coterie of high priests and priestesses? To my mind, it can. If modernism struck a death blow to any claims of direct access to the mind of God, the crisis in modernist categories, institutions and values has opened a space for what Professor Richard Falk has called "the postmodern possibility." n11 This is the possibility of creating a new world order that resolves the crisis of modernism by transcending the mess it has left us. That mess is the poverty produced by market efficiency; the conflict, instability, and violence perpetuated and exacerbated for the sake of national security; the confusion disseminated through a technocratic objectivity that purports to sePte the articulation of fact and value; the ecological and human disasters that mark our development; and the crisis of identity and solidarity we confront as we struggle to imagine communities that can resolve and transcend the hatreds and injustices we have inherited from the modernist categories of class, race, and nation.

In short, what Professor Hernandez-Truyol's formulation offers is an enigma--a point of re-entry into a normative order we have yet to create. Rather than building this future through excathedra pronouncements grounded on some privileged epistemological access to divine will or natural law, her emphasis on the human dignity of the individual is a call to commit ourselves to the project of a radical and global democracy--based on a recognition [\*188] of the fundamental equality of all human beings and a faith that more inclusive participation is our only real means of access to the common good.

#### Supporting institutional rights a key necessary for struggles against oppression – we may not change the heart, but we can restrain the heartless

Cook 90

Anthony E. Cook, Florida University Associate law Professor, Beyond Critical legal Studies: The Reconstrutive Theology of Dr. Martin luther King, Jr., 1990, 103.5, JSTOR

Unlike some CLS scholars, King understood the importance of a system of individual rights. CLS proponents have urged that rights are incoherent and indeterminate reifications of concrete experiences; they obfuscate, through the manipulation of abstract categories, disempowering social relations. [FN158] King, on the other hand, understood that the oppressed could make rights determinate in practice; although "law tends to declare rights--it does not deliver them. A catalyst is needed to breathe life experience into a judicial decision."' [FN159] For King, the catalyst was persistent social struggle to transform the oppressiveness of one's existential condition into ever closer approximations of the ideal. The hierarchies of race, gender, and class define those conditions, and the struggle for substantive rights closes the gap between the latter and the ideal of the Beloved Community. Under the pressures of social struggle, the oppressed can alter rights to better reflect the exigencies of social reality--a reality itself more fully understood by those engaged in transformative struggle.

King's Beloved Community accepted and expanded the liberal tradition of rights. King realized that notwithstanding its limits, the liberal vision contained important insights into the human condition. For those deprived of basic freedoms and subjected to arbitrary acts of state authority, the enforcement of formal rights was revolutionary. African-Americans understood the importance of formal liberal rights and demanded the full enforcement of such rights in order to challenge and rectify historical practices that had objectified and subsumed their existence.

Although conservatives contended that the emphasis on rights disrupted the gradual moral evolution that would ultimately change white sentiment, King contended that "[j]udicial decrees may not change the heart, but they can restrain the heartless."' [FN160] On the other \*1036 hand, although radicals contended that such rights were mere tokens and created a false sense of security masking continued violence, King understood that the strict enforcement of the rule of law was essential to any struggle for social justice, whether that struggle was moderate or radical in its sentiment and goals. Freedom of dissent and protest; freedom from arbitrary searches, seizures, and detention; and freedom to organize and associate with those of common purpose were necessary rights that no movement for social reconstruction could take for granted.

Furthermore, King saw the initial emphasis on civil rights, [FN161] I believe, as a necessary struggle for the collective self-respect and dignity of a people whose subordination was, in part, maintained by laws reproducing and reinforcing feelings of inadequacy and inferiority. The civil rights struggle attempted to lift the veil of shame and degradation from the eyes of a people who could then glimpse the possibilities of their personhood and achieve that potential through varied forms of social struggle. King's richer conception of rights provided limitations on collective action while broadening the scope of personal duty to permit movement toward a more socially conscious community.

## Perm

#### Single issue rights focus spills over and is distinct from the ideologies that determine its use

Hunt ’90 (Alan, Professor of Law and Sociology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, “Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemon Strategies,” Journal of Law and Society Vol. 17 No. 3, 1990)

Beyond questions concerning the criteria of 'success' there is another and perhaps more fundamental problem with the existing studies of the use of litigation by social movements. There is a failure to distinguish between the very different types of social movements that have been studied.26 What is missing is a concern with what I propose to call the 'hegemonic capacity' of social movements. In a first approximation the distinction can be drawn between **'single issue' movements** and those whose **goals would constitute a wider set of social changes** than their immediate objectives. But this approximation requires further refinement because some movements which are apparently single issue have extensive ramifications. The abortion rights movement, whilst superficially focusing on a single issue, has ramifications extending beyond the immediate question of women's right to control their fertility. The abortion rights movement is a prime example of the concept of 'local hegemony'. Such a movement is not directed to the kind of global hegemony that Gramsci had in mind with his focus on the role of the revolutionary party. But movements directed towards local (or regional) hegemony can only be adequately judged in their capacity to **transform a wide range of social practices and discourses**. For present purposes I suggest that, in addition, the environmental movement and the civil rights movement also serve as my example of movements of 'local hegemony' in that **while focused on a set of** specific demands**, their realization would both necessitate and occasion** wider structural changes**.** The most immediate implication is that their 'success' is not a matter of securing some immediate interest. It follows that to evaluate the role of litigation for such movements necessitates that focus be directed to the articulation between the elements that make up the strategic project of the movement. My suggestion is that a key feature of any such assessment revolves around their capacity to **put in place a new or transformed discourse of rights** which **goes to the heart** of the way in which the substantive issues are conceived, expressed, argued about, and struggled over. My more controversial suggestion is that the immediate **'success' or 'failure' of specific litigation has to be approached in a different way** which requires that we take account of the possibility that litigation 'failure' may, paradoxically, provide the conditions of 'success' that compel a movement forward. In current struggles over wife abuse, all those cases in which judges impose derisory sanctions are contexts which drive the movement forward because they provide instances of a dying discourse in which women 'deserve' chastisement by their husbands. Such judicial pronouncements become more self-evidently anachronistic and in this inverted form speak of a new and emergent discourse of rights and autonomy. The implications of this line of thought are that the whole question of the success or failure of litigation and its connection with transformative strategies is far more complex than our existing attempts to measure 'success' and 'failure' admit.

A more far-reaching criticism of litigation is that, rather than helping, 'law', conceived variously as litigation or legal reform politics, is itself part of the problem. This line of argument is at the root of Kristin Bumiller's study of the civil rights movement.27 This strand of the anti-rights critique is, I want to suggest, even if unintended, a form of 'Leftism' whose inescapable error lies in the fact that it imagines a terrain of struggle in which a social movement can, by an act of will, **step outside the terrain on which the struggle is constituted**, Here a hegemonic strategy must insist that it is precisely in the engagement with the actually existing terrain, in particular, with its discursive forms**, that the possibility of their transformation and transcendence becomes possible.** To refuse this terrain is, in general, Leftist because is marks a refusal to engage with the conditions within which social change is grounded.

#### The perm’s effective---no cooption as “their cause” can become “our cause”

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, andthat these are offered by the work of two theorists, SatyaMohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000)post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the excessesof the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as aproposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993]2000), identities must be understood as theoretical constructions that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explana-tions of the social world and its constitutive relations of power. Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive– is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaningand signiﬁcance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced (Scott 1991). Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), whosimilarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning ork nowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the“death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology,Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are theagents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possiblefor an individual to know something that another individualcould not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to makesense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworksand practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator andrepository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity astheoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on episte-mological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individu-als in the context of the communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had” the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the expe-rience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one afeminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts tounderstand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make theidentiﬁcation “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given factof a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, beingdesignated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achieve-ment” – that is, something worked towards through a process of analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First,that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is some-thing that is “achievable” by men. 3 While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one person to another with transparency, we think that there is some-thing politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, orthen on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity poli-tics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to understand an experience one has not had, then what point is there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive responsibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experi-ence of others has led to an assumption on the part of some whitefeminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the soleresponsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998).Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the preferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus making those experi-ences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while recognising that they are not equally available or powerful forall subjects. 4 Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular,overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this orthat is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding avoids what Bramen identiﬁes as the postmodern excesses of “post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“rac-ism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is whathe chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American”(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that,as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological com-munity requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and thatare social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recog-nised by particular communities as valid in order to be success-ful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the commu-nities that confer identity are constituted through their shared epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared characteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible. 5 Hence, the epistemological community that enables us to identify our-selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations between the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/orpostcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000). We believe that it is the identiﬁcation of injustice which calls forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy solidarities. 6 While it is accepted that there may be important differences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage while being, in some respects, its beneﬁciary (for example, men, white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities,dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its asso-ciated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to notions of ﬁxed characteristics – the focus is on the activities indi- viduals participate in rather than the characteristics they aredeemed to possess. Identity is thus deﬁned further as a function of activity located in particular social locations (understood asthe complex of objective forces that inﬂuence the conditions in which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.