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Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action. That undermines preparation and clash. Changing the question now leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow, uneducational debate. Requiring debate on a communal topic forces argument development and develops persuasive skills critical to any political outcome.

Simualted national security law debates inculcate agency and decision-making skills—that enables activism and avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/13, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course **was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying** doctrinal **material and** creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, **while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage**. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. **This is the most important determination, because the substance of the** doctrinal portion of the course and the **simulation follows from this decision**. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. **This**, then, **becomes a guide for the** doctrinal part of the **course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation** are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. **The one-size fits all approach** currently **dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised** in the current conversation. **Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at** the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion **simulations**, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may **provide an important way forward**. Such **simulations** also **cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education**, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed **the simulation model** above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it **does provide a** starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. **It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which** they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

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*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable and flexible skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

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*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

In the spring of 2011, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack Obama considered its options in providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, the past decade has challenged American leaders to make many difficult decisions in response to potentially catastrophic problems. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. Individuals also faced daunting decisions. A young couple, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, considered walking away from their loan; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical deci­sions' relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of’ others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, mature adults require a reasoned methods of decision making. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

Linking the ballot to a *should* question in combination with USFG simulation teaches the skills to organize pragmatic consequences *and* philosophical values into a course of action

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

Pure identity focus causes irresolvable solipsism—a halfway point between individual argument and prescriptions for social change is key to contestation

David Bridges, Centre for Applied Research in Education, University of East Anglia, 2001, The Ethics of Outsider Research, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 35, No. 3

First, it is argued that only those who have shared in, and have been part of, a particular experience can understand or can properly understand (and perhaps `properly' is particularly heavily loaded here) what it is like. You need to be a woman to understand what it is like to live as a woman; to be disabled to understand what it is like to live as a disabled person etc. Thus Charlton writes of `the innate inability of able-bodied people, regardless of fancy credentials and awards, to understand the disability experience' (Charlton, 1998, p. 128).

Charlton's choice of language here is indicative of the rhetorical character which these arguments tend to assume. This arises perhaps from the strength of feeling from which they issue, but it warns of a need for caution in their treatment and acceptance. Even if able-bodied people have this `inability' it is difficult to see in what sense it is `innate'. Are all credentials `fancy' or might some (e.g. those reflecting a sustained, humble and patient attempt to grapple with the issues) be pertinent to that ability? And does Charlton really wish to maintain that there is a single experience which is the experience of disability, whatever solidarity disabled people might feel for each other?

The understanding that any of us have of our own conditions or experience is unique and special, though recent work on personal narratives also shows that it is itself multi-layered and inconstant, i.e. that we have and can provide many different understandings even of our own lives (see, for example, Tierney, 1993). Nevertheless, our own understanding has a special status: it provides among other things a data source for others' interpretations of our actions; it stands in a unique relationship to our own experiencing; and no one else can have quite the same understanding. It is also plausible that people who share certain kinds of experience in common stand in a special position in terms of understanding those shared aspects of experience. However, once this argument is applied to such broad categories as `women' or `blacks', it has to deal with some very heterogeneous groups; the different social, personal and situational characteristics that constitute their individuality may well outweigh the shared characteristics; and there may indeed be greater barriers to mutual understanding than there are gateways.

These arguments, however, all risk a descent into solipsism: if our individual understanding is so particular, how can we have communication with or any understanding of anyone else? But, granted Wittgenstein's persuasive argument against a private language (Wittgenstein, 1963, perhaps more straightforwardly presented in Rhees, 1970), **we cannot in these circumstances even describe or have any real understanding of our own condition in such an isolated world**. **Rather it is in talking to each other, in participating in a shared language, that we construct the conceptual apparatus that allows us to understand our own situation in relation to others,** and this is a construction which involves understanding differences as well as similarities.

Besides, we have good reason to treat with some scepticism accounts provided by individuals of their own experience and by extension accounts provided by members of a particular category or community of people. We know that such accounts can be riddled with special pleading, selective memory, careless error, self-centredness, myopia, prejudice and a good deal more. A lesbian scholar illustrates some of the pressures that can bear, for example, on an insider researcher in her own community:

As an insider, the lesbian has an important sensitivity to offer, yet she is also more vulnerable than the non-lesbian researcher, both to the pressure from the heterosexual world--that her studies conform to previous works and describe lesbian reality in terms of its relationship with the outside-and to pressure from the inside, from within the lesbian community itself--that her studies mirror not the reality of that community but its self-protective ideology. (Kreiger, 1982, p. 108)

In other words, while individuals from within a community have access to a particular kind of understanding of their experience, this does not automatically attach special authority (though it might attach special interest) to their own representations of that experience. Moreover, while we might acknowledge the limitations of the understanding which someone from outside a community (or someone other than the individual who is the focus of the research) can develop, this does not entail that they cannot develop and present an understanding or that such understanding is worthless. Individuals can indeed find benefit in the understandings that others offer of their experience in, for example, a counselling relationship, or when a researcher adopts a supportive role with teachers engaged in reflection on or research into their own practice. Many have echoed the plea of the Scottish poet, Robert Burns (in `To a louse'):

O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us To see oursels as others see us!3

--**even if they might have been horrified with what such power revealed to them**. Russell argued that it was the function of philosophy (and why not research too?) `to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom . . .It keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect' (Russell, 1912, p. 91). `Making the familiar strange', as Stenhouse called it, often requires the assistance of someone unfamiliar with our own world who can look at our taken-for-granted experience through, precisely, the eye of a stranger. Sparkes (1994) writes very much in these terms in describing his own research, as a white, heterosexual middleaged male, into the life history of a lesbian PE teacher. He describes his own struggle with the question `is it possible for heterosexual people to undertake research into homosexual populations?' but he concludes that being a `phenomenological stranger' who asks `dumb questions' may be a useful and illuminating experience for the research subject in that they may have to return to first principles in reviewing their story. This could, of course be an elaborate piece of self-justification, but it is interesting that someone like Max Biddulph, who writes from a gay/bisexual standpoint, can quote this conclusion with apparent approval (Biddulph, 1996).

People from outside a community clearly can have an understanding of the experience of those who are inside that community. It is almost certainly a different understanding from that of the insiders. Whether it is of any value will depend among other things on the extent to which they have immersed themselves in the world of the other and portrayed it in its richness and complexity; on the empathy and imagination that they have brought to their enquiry and writing; on whether their stories are honest, responsible and critical (Barone, 1992). Nevertheless, this value will also depend on qualities derived from the researchers' externality: their capacity to relate one set of experiences to others (perhaps from their own community); their outsider perspective on the structures which surround and help to define the experience of the community; on the reactions and responses to that community of individuals and groups external to it.4

Finally, it must surely follow that if we hold that a researcher, who (to take the favourable case) seeks honestly, sensitively and with humility to understand and to represent the experience of a community to which he or she does not belong, is incapable of such understanding and representation, then how can he or she understand either that same experience as mediated through the research of someone from that community? The argument which excludes the outsider from understanding a community through the effort of their own research, a fortiori excludes the outsider from that understanding through the secondary source in the form of the effort of an insider researcher or indeed any other means. Again, the point can only be maintained by insisting that a particular (and itself ill-defined) understanding is the only kind of understanding which is worth having.

The epistemological argument (that outsiders cannot understand the experience of a community to which they do not belong) becomes an ethical argument when this is taken to entail the further proposition that they ought not therefore attempt to research that community. I hope to have shown that this argument is based on a false premise. Even if the premise were sound, however, it would not necessarily follow that researchers should be prevented or excluded from attempting to understand this experience, unless it could be shown that in so doing they would cause some harm. This is indeed part of the argument emerging from disempowered communities and it is to this that I shall now turn.

III OUTSIDERS IMPORT DAMAGING FRAMEWORKS OF UNDERSTANDING

Frequent in the literature about research into disability, women's experience, race and homosexuality is the claim that people from outside these particular communities will import into their research, for example, homophobic, sexist or racist frameworks of understanding, which damage the interests of those being researched.

In the case of research into disability it has been argued that outsider researchers carry with them assumptions that the problem of disability lies with the disabled rather than with the society which frames and defines disability. `The essential problem of recent anthropological work on culture and disability is that it perpetuates outmoded beliefs and continues to distance research from lived oppression' (Charlton, 1998, p. 27). By contrast: `a growing number of people with disabilities have developed a consciousness that transforms the notion and concept of disability from a medical condition to a political and social condition' (Charlton, 1998, p.17). Charlton goes on to criticise, for example, a publication by Ingstad and Reynolds Whyte (1995), Disability and Culture. He claims that, although it does add to our understanding of how the conceptualisation and symbolisation of disability takes place, `its language is and perspective are still lodged in the past. In the first forty pages alone we find the words suffering, lameness, interest group, incapacitated, handicapped, deformities. Notions of oppression, dominant culture, justice, human rights, political movement, and selfdetermination are conspicuously absent' (Charlton, 1998 p. 27).

Discussing the neo-colonialism of outsider research into Maori experience, Smith extends this type of claim to embrace the wider methodological and metaphysical framing of outsider research: `From an indigenous perspective Western research is more than just research that is located in a positivist tradition. It is research which brings to bear, on any study of indigenous peoples, a cultural orientation, a set of values, a different conceptualization of such things as time, space and subjectivity, different and competing theories of knowledge, highly specialized forms of language, and structures of power' (Smith, 1999, p. 42).5

This position requires, I think, some qualification. First, researchers are clearly not immune from some of the damaging and prejudicial attitudes on matters of race, sexuality, disability and gender which are found among the rest of the population, though I might hope that their training and experience might give them above-average awareness of these issues and above-average alertness to their expression in their own work. Even where such attitudes remain in researchers' consciousness, this intelligent self-awareness and social sensitivity mean on the whole that they are able to deploy sufficient self-censorship not to expose it in a damaging way. Researchers may thus remain morally culpable for their thoughts, but, at least, communities can be spared the harm of their expression. It is also a matter of some significance that researchers are more exposed than most to public criticism, not least from critics from within these disempowered communities, when such prejudices do enter and are revealed in their work. If they employ the rhetoric of, for example, anti-racist or anti-sexist conviction, they are at least in their public pronouncements exposed to the humiliation of being hoisted by their own petard. It is difficult to see the fairness in excluding all outsider researchers on the a priori supposition of universal prejudice. It is better, surely, to expose it where it is revealed and, if absolutely necessary, to debar individuals who ignore such criticism and persist in using the privilege of their research position to peddle what can then only be regarded as damaging and prejudicial propaganda. Secondly, it is plainly not the case that Western research is located exclusively (as is implied) in a positivist tradition, even if this tradition has been a dominant one. Phenomenology, ethnography, life history, even, more recently, the use of narrative fiction and poetry as forms of research representation, are all established ingredients of the educational research worlds in the UK, USA or Australasia. Contemporary research literature abounds with critiques of positivism as well as examples of its continuing expression.

I have placed much weight in these considerations on the importance of any research being exposed to criticism--most importantly, perhaps, but by no means exclusively by the people whose experience it claims to represent. This principle is not simply an ethical principle associated with the obligations that a researcher might accept towards participants in the research, but it is a fundamental feature of the processes of research and its claims to command our attention. **It is precisely exposure to, modification through and survival of** a process of vigorous public **scrutiny that provides research with whatever authority it can claim**. In contemporary ethnographic research, case-study and life-history research, for example, this expectancy of exposure to correction and criticism is one which runs right through the research process. The methodological requirement is for participants to have several opportunities to challenge any prejudices which researchers may bring with them: at the point where the terms of the research are first negotiated and they agree to participate (or not); during any conversations or interviews that take place in the course of the research; in responding to any record which is produced of the data gathering; in response to any draft or final publication. Indeed, engagement with a researcher provides any group with what is potentially a richly educative opportunity: an opportunity to open their eyes and to see things differently. It is, moreover, an opportunity which any researcher worth his or her salt will welcome.

Not all researchers or research processes will be as open as are described here to that educative opportunity, and not all participants (least of all those who are self-defining as `disempowered') will feel the confidence to take them even if they are there. **This may be seen as a reason to set up barriers to the outsider researcher, but they can and should** more often **be seen as problems** for researchers and participants **to address together in the interests of** their **mutual understanding and benefit.**

Notwithstanding these considerations, one of the chief complaints coming out of disempowered communities is that this kind of mutual interest and benefit is precisely what is lacking in their experience of research. It is to this consideration that I shall now turn. IV OUTSIDERS EXPLOIT INSIDER PARTICIPANTS IN THE COMMUNITIES THEY RESEARCH Ellen describes how fieldwork has become `a rite of passage by which the novice is transformed into the rounded anthropologist and initiated into the ranks of the profession'Ða ritual by which `the student of anthropology dies and a professional anthropologist is born' 􏰈Ellen, 1984, p. 23). This is a reminder that research can carry benefits to the researcher which go beyond those associated with the `pure' pursuit of understanding. As participants in research become more aware of this, their attitudes towards research and researchers can, understandably, change. The following observation was made by a woman from a community that had experienced several waves of enthusiastic researchers: The kind of behaviour researchers have towards locals tells us that they just want to exploit them and take from them their ideas and information. It also tells us that they don't really care at all. They want the information to use in front of a group of people at home, so that they can be seen as clever academics. Then in the end they publish books, reviews, articles etc in order to spread their popularities. So what is this, and what is research really about? Not all researchers are exploiters, but most are, and I think it is time up now for this, and that these researchers should also be exploited by local people. 􏰈Florence Shumba, quoted in Wilson, 1992, p. 199) Researchers who are sensitive to this issue typically look for ways to counter the imbalance of benefit. They will sometimes discuss with participants ways in which the research could be designed to benefit all parties, by, for example, ensuring that it addresses issues on which the participants need information as well as the researchers or by providing data that the research participants can use independently and for their own purposes. In the absence of any other perceived benefit, some schools in the UK have responded to researchers' requests for access and time for interviews by proposing to charge by the hour for teachers' time. Of course sometimes participants will be persuaded to participate on the grounds that some other people whose interests they care aboutÐ pupils in schools, for example, or children currently excluded from educationÐwill secure the benefit of the research, but there has to be the link between something which they perceive to be a benefit 􏰈albeit altruistically) and the commitment which they are asked to make. These illustrations of the terms of engagement between researchers and their participants present a picture of a trade in benefit, the negotiation of a utilitarian equation of mutual happiness and, perhaps, pain, though one in which higher satisfactions 􏰈e.g. new insights and the improvements to the future education of children) have a place alongside lower ones 􏰈a bit of self-publicity or cash in the school fund). Questions of exploitation, in Kantian terms of treating people as means rather than ends 􏰈see Kant, 1964)6 come in if, as is sometimes alleged, researchers use their positions of authority or their sophistication to establish relationships in which the benefits are very one-sided in their favour. This distinction between the utilitarian principle and the Kantian one is crucial here. The utilitarian principle might require us to measure in the scales a much wider community of benefit. If, for example, the researcher could show that, even though the Maori community he or she was researching experienced the inconvenience of the research without the benefit, thousands of other people would benefit from it, then the utilitarian equation might provide justification for the research. But this is precisely one of the weaknesses of the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest numberÐat least when it is applied with this sort of simplicity. It requires either a broader take on the utilitarian principle 􏰈which might observe that a programme of action which allocates all the benefits to one group and all the `pain' to another will not be conducive to the greatest aggregation of happiness) or the invoking of something closer to the Kantian principle, which would demand that we do not exploit one group of people to the exclusive benefit of another. Researchers seeking collaboration with participants in disempowered communities have essentially two forms of appealÐto their self-interest or to their generosity. Either they need to see some benefit to themselves which is at least roughly commensurate to the effort that is required of them 􏰈or in some cases the value of what they have to offer); or they need knowingly to contribute out of their own benevolence towards the researcher or others whom they believe the research will benefit. In this second case, the researcher is placed in something of the position of the receiver of a gift and he or she needs to recognise consequently the quite elaborate ethical apparatus that surrounds such receipt. There is a particular `spirit' in which we might be expected to receive a gift: a spirit of gratitude, of humility, of mutuality in the relationship. There may also be a network of social expectations, which flow from such givingÐof being in thrall to the giver, of being in his or her debtÐbut on the whole anyone contributing to an educational research project would be naõÈve to assume that such `debts' might be repaid. Most of the time, researchers are in fact inviting the generosity of their participants, and perhaps there is something more ethically elevated in responding to such generosity with a true spirit of gratitude and a recognition of the mutuality of relationship which binds giver and receiver, than in seeking to establish a trade in dubious benefits. Smith 􏰈1999) provides a wonderful picture of the combination of spirit and benefits that might be involved in establishing this relationship 􏰈as well as a whole new angle on the notion of `empowerment'!) when she outlines the range of issues on which a researcher approaching a Maori community might need to satisfy them: `Is her spirit clear? Does he have a good heart? What other baggage are they carrying? Are they useful to us? Can they fix up our generator? Can they actually do anything?' 􏰈Smith, 1999, p.10). Perhaps all educational researchers should be required to satisfy participants on these questions. I conclude that the possibility that outsider educational research may be conducted in an exploitative manner is not an argument for obstructing it comprehensively, but it is an argument for requiring that it be conducted under an appropriate set of principles and obligations and in a proper spirit. `Qualitative researchers', argued Stake, `are guests in the private spaces of the world. Their manners should be good and their code of ethics strict' 􏰈Stake, 1998, p.103). Any community may legitimately reject a researcher 􏰈insider or outsider) who fails to establish and conduct relationships under these requirements. In this field, ethics is never far removed from politics. This essay has focused on the relationship between educational researchers and communities that are self-defined as `disempowered' but has not really addressed the issue of power. At the heart of the objections to outsider research is a view that such research, far from challenging and removing such disempowerment, operates to reinforce it. It is this argument which I shall now address. V OUTSIDERS' RESEARCH DISEMPOWERS INSIDERS At least one of the arguments against outsider research into self-defined `disempowered' sections of the population is made independently of the measure of sensitivity and care, which the outsider researchers demonstrate in its conduct. `If we have learned one thing from the civil rights movement in the US', wrote Ed Roberts, a leading figure in the Disability Rights Movement 􏰈DRM), `it's that when others speak for you, you lose' 􏰈quoted in Driedger, 1989, p. 28). Roberts' case is in part that for so long as such groups depend on outsiders to represent them on the wider stage, they will be reinforcing both the fact and the perception of their subordination and dependency as well as exposing themselves to potential misrepresentation. They have to break the vicious circle of dependencyÐand that means taking control for themselves of the ways in which their experience is represented more widely: The DRM's demand for control is the essential theme that runs through all its work, regardless of political-economic or cultural di􏰀erences. Control has universal appeal for DRM activists because their needs are everywhere conditioned by a dependency born of powerlessness, poverty, degradation, and institutionalisation. This dependency, saturated with paternalism, begins with the onset of disability and continues until death. 􏰈Charlton, 1998, p. 3) Outsider researchers sometimes persuade themselves that they are acting in an emancipatory way by `giving voice to' neglected or disenfranchised sections of the community. Their research may indeed push the evident voice of the researcher far into the background as he or she `simply presents', perhaps as large chunks of direct transcription and without commentary, what participants have to say. But, as Reinharz has warned, this is by no means as simple as it might appear: To listen to people is to empower them. But if you want to hear it, you have to go hear it, in their space, or in a safe space. Before you can expect to hear anything worth hearing, you have to examine the power dynamics of the space and the social actors . . . Second, you have to be the person someone else can talk to, and you have to be able to create a context where the person can speak and you can listen. That means we have to study who we are and who we are in relation to those we study . . . Third, you have to be willing to hear what someone is saying, even when it violates your expectations or threatens your interests. In other words, if you want someone to tell it like it is, you have to hear it like it is. 􏰈Reinharz, 1988, pp. 15±16) Even with this level of self knowledge, sensitivity and discipline, there is a significant temptation in such situations to what is sometimes called ventriloquy: the using of the voice of the participant to give expression to the things which the researcher wants to say or to have said. This is a process which is present in the selection of participants, in the framing of the questions which they are encouraged to answer, in the verbal and visual cues which they are given of the researcher's pleasure or excitement with their responses, and, later, in the researcher's selection of material for publication. Such ventriloquy, argues Fine, disguises `the usually unacknowledged stances of researchers who navigate and camouflage theory through the richness of ``native voices''' 􏰈Fine, 1994, p.22).

The argument that insiders within `disempowered' communities (or any other communities for that matter) should be researching and, where appropriate, giving public expression to their own experience is surely uncontroversial. In a context in which insider research has been negligible and hugely subordinated to waves of outsider research, there is a good case for taking practical steps to correct that balance and spare a community what can understandably be experienced as an increasingly oppressive relationship with research.

There are, however, at last three reasons in principle for keeping the possibility of outsider research open: (i) that such enquiry might enhance the understanding of the researcher; (ii) that it might enhance the understanding of the community itself; and (iii) that it might enhance the understanding of a wider public. There is no doubt a place for researching our own experience and that of our own communities, but surely we cannot be condemned lifelong to such social solipsism? Notwithstanding some postmodernist misgivings, `There is still a world out there, much to learn, much to discover; and the exploration of ourselves, however laudable in that at least it risks no new imperialistic gesture, is not, in the end, capable of sustaining lasting interest' (Patai, 1994, p. 67). The issue is not, however, merely one of satisfying curiosity. **There is a real danger that if we become persuaded that we cannot understand the experience of others and that `we have no right to speak for anyone but ourselves', then we will all too easily find ourselves** epistemologically and morally isolated**, furnished with a comfortable legitimation for** ignoring the condition of anyone but ourselves. This is not, any more than the paternalism of the powerful, the route to a more just society.

How, then can we reconcile the importance of (1) wider social understanding of the world of `disempowered' communities and of the structures which contribute to that disempowerment, (2) the openness of those communities and structures to the outsider researcher, and (3) the determination that the researcher should not wittingly or unwittingly reinforce that disempowerment? The literature (from which a few selected examples are quoted below) provides some clues as to the character of relations between researcher and researched which `emancipatory', `participatory' or `educative' research might take.

To begin with, **we need to re-examine the application of the notion of `property' to the ownership of knowledge**. In economic terms, knowledge is not a competitive good. It has the distinctive virtue that (at least in terms of its educative function) it can be infinitely distributed without loss to any of those who are sharing in it. Similarly **the researcher can acquire it from people without denying it to them and can return it enriched**. However, it is easy to neglect the processes of reporting back to people and sharing in knowledge and the importance which can be attached to this process by those concerned. For Smith, a Maori woman working with research students from the indigenous people of New Zealand, `Reporting back to the people is never a one-off exercise or a task that can be signed off on completion of the written report'. She describes how one of her students took her work back to the people she interviewed. `The family was waiting for her; they cooked food and made us welcome. We left knowing that her work will be passed around the family to be read and eventually will have a place in the living room along with other valued family books and family photographs' (Smith, 1999, pp. 15±16).

For some, what is required is a moving away from regarding research as a property and towards seeing it as a dialogic enquiry designed to assist the understanding of all concerned:

Educative research attempts to restructure the traditional relationship between researcher and `subject'. Instead of a one-way process where researchers extract data from `subjects', Educational Research encourages a dialogic process where participants negotiate meanings at the level of question posing, data collection and analysis . . . It . . . encourages participants to work together on an equal basis to reach a mutual understanding. Neither participant should stand apart in an aloof or judgmental manner; neither should be silenced in the process. (Gitlin and Russell, 1994, p. 185)

Engagement the law solves their impacts, even if bottom-up approaches are ultimately better

Andrews, associate professor of law – University of San Francisco, ‘3

(Rhonda V. Magee, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 483)

The following argument relies on a few important assumptions. The first is the assumption that legal rules have consequences that reach far beyond their intended application from the standpoint of legal analysis. Legal rules play an important part in shaping concrete and metaphysical aspects of the world that we know. Thus, the impact of equal protection doctrine on the meta-narrative of race in America is more than merely symbolic. The Supreme Court's pronouncements on race are presumptively to be followed by lower courts, and together these opinions and their consequences influence the representations of race in federal and state social policies, in the media, in literature, and in the arts. n18 As Justice Brennan noted from the bench, every decision of the court has "ripples" which impact society and social processes. n19 Perhaps in no other area is this basic sociological insight more demonstrably true than in the area of race law. In a very real sense, the history of American civil rights law is the history of America's socio-legal construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of what it means to be a constitutionally protected human being. In the aftermath of the war required to preserve the Union itself, the architects of the First Reconstruction n20 took on [\*491] the task of reforming the Constitution to provide federal protection for newly "freed" Americans. The law they made not only created a new world in which the centuries-old institution of slavery was virtually **impossible**, n21 but perhaps more importantly, marked the beginning of the reshaping of American **thinking** about the very nature of humanity through the powerful symbolism and mechanisms of the law. n22 Thus, the continuing evolution of what it means to be a human being, and refinement of the state's obligations to human beings subject to its laws, are among the most significant of the unstated objectives of the reconstruction of post-slavery America, and the law itself will play a central role.

### word pic

#### The term ‘Islamophobia’ is the wrong frame for evaluating anti-Muslim racism:

#### 1. Essentialism. ‘Islamophobia’ portrays all Muslims as defined by Islam—locks in discrimination and anti-Muslim alarmism

Halliday, professor of international relations – London School of Economics, ‘99

(Fred, “`Islamophobia’ reconsidered,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Volume 22, Number 5, p. 892-902, September)

No subject in contemporary public discussion has attracted more confused discussion than that of relations between ‘Islam’ and the West. Whether it be the discussion of relations between Muslim states and non- Muslim countries, or that of the relations between non-Muslims and Muslims within Western countries, the tendency has on both sides been, with some exceptions , towards alarmism and simplification. Alarmism has concerned the ‘threat’ which, from one side, ‘Islam’ poses to the non- Muslim world, and on the other, which ‘the West’ poses to Muslims. Non- Muslim simplification involves many obvious issues: terrorism – as if most Muslims are terrorists or most terrorists are Muslims; the degree of aggressiveness found in the Muslim world and the responsibility of Muslims for this; the willingness of Muslims to allow for diversity, debate, respect for human rights. It is not only the sensationalist media, but also writers with an eye to current anxieties of the reading public, such as V. S. Naipaul and Samuel Huntington, who reinforce such misrepresentation. Muslim simplification is itself two-sided: on the one hand, a stereotyping of the ‘West’; on the other, the assertion of a unitary identity for all Muslims, and of a unitary interpretation of text and culture. The core simplification involves these very terms themselves: ‘the West’ is not a valid aggregation of the modern world and lends itself far too easily to monist, conspiratorial presentations of political and social interaction. But nor is the term ‘Islam’ a valid shorthand for summarizing how a billion Muslims, divided into over éfty states, and into myriad ethnicities and social groups, relate to the contemporary world, to each other or to the non-Muslim world. To get away from such simpliécations is, however, virtually impossible, since both those opposed to ‘Islam’ and those invoking it adhere to such labels. Moreover, as much of this literature shows, those who are most intent on critiquing standard Western prejudices about the Muslim world themselves fall back on another set of simplifcations. Instead of fearing or hating anti-Muslim stereotypes, we are now invited to respect, understand, study ‘Islam’. Islamophobia, Eurocentrism, stereotyping The literature under review here ranges across several aspects of this question. The Runnymede and Wilton Park reports identify misinterpretations, above all in the West, of the Muslim world and advocate a more tolerant, informed, relation to the Muslim world. They reèect an approach derived, on the one hand, from race relations and, on the other, from inter-faith dialogue. They both set current frictions in the context of the long historical relations between Muslims and the Christian world, both identify the role of the media in reinforcing stereotypes, both advocate greater discussion between communities. Most signiécantly, perhaps, they accept the term ‘Islam’ as a denomination of the primary identity of those who are Muslims; they avoid discussion of the diversities within Muslim societies, on ethnic grounds or on the interpretation of the Muslim tradition and on its application to the contemporary world.

#### 2. Islamophobia discourse is backdoor censorship—crowds out legitimate discussion of Islam by conflating the religion with the people

Malik, Fellow – Royal Society of Arts, history and philosophy of science – Imperial College, writer, lecturer, broadcaster – BBC, ‘5

(Kenan, “The Islamophobia Myth,” *Prospect*, February, <http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/prospect_islamophobia.html>)

Pretending that Muslims have never had it so bad might bolster community leaders and gain votes for politicians, but it does the rest of us, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, no favours at all. The more that the threat of Islamophobia is exaggerated, the more that ordinary Muslims come to accept that theirs is a community under constant attack. It helps create a siege mentality, stoking up anger and resentment, and making Muslim communities more inward looking and more open to religious extremism. Muslim leaders constantly warn that Islamophobia is alienating Muslims and pushing many into the hands of extremists. However, it's not Islamophobia, but the perception that it blights lives, that is often the bigger problem. In making my Channel 4 documentary I asked dozens of ordinary Muslims across the country about their experience of Islamophobia. Everyone believed that police harassment was common though no one had been stopped and searched. Everyone insisted that physical attacks were rife, though few had been attacked or knew anyone who had.

What is being created here is a culture of victimhood in which 'Islamophobia' has become one-stop cause of the myriad of problems facing Muslims. Take, for instance, the social problems which beset Muslim communities. The figures are truly appalling. Bangladeshis and Pakistanis (who comprise most of Muslims in this country) are two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than are whites. Average earnings among Muslim men are 68 per cent that of non-Muslim men. 65 per cent of Bangladeshis are semi-skilled manual workers compared with 23 per cent among other ethnic minorities and 15 per cent among white Britons. Fifty four per cent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi homes receive income support. In 2000, 30 per cent of Pakistani students gained five or more good GCSEs, compared with 50 per cent in the population as a whole.

It has become common to blame all of this on Islamophobia. According to the Muslim News, 'media reportage and public discourse on Islam and Muslims have a huge impact on Muslim labour market performance'. Islamophobia shapes 'how Muslim children are treated in schools', the 'self-esteem on Muslim children' as well as 'their educational achievements'. Unemployment, poverty and poor educational standards is not, however, a new phenomenon in Muslim communities in this country. And the causes are myriad. Racism certainly plays a part. So does class. The social profile of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is closer to that of Afro-Caribbeans than it is to Indians or Chinese. That is because while the latter are often from middle class backgrounds, most Banglandeshis, Pakistanis and Afro-Caribebans originally came from poor working class or rural, with few resources, especially to combat the intense racism they faced in this country. Class plays as important a role as race or religion in explaining the poor performance of Muslims. Indeed, Indian Muslims tend to be far better of than those from Bangladesh or Pakistan - and conversely Bangladeshi and Pakistani non-Muslims tend to be worse off.

Some also point the finger at cultural practices within some Muslim communities. 'By and large', the journalist Yasmin Alibhai Brown acknowledges, 'the lowest achieving communities in this country are Muslim. When you talk to people about why this is happening the one reason they give you, the only reason they give you, is Islamophobia.' It's not an argument that Alibhai Brown accepts. 'It is not Islamophobia that makes parents take 14 year old bright girls out of school to marry illiterate men, and the girl has again to bring up the next generation who will again be denied not just education but the value of education.'

Alibhai Brown disagrees with me about the extent of Islamophobia, believing that it is a major force shaping Muslim lives. But, she adds, it has also become 'a convenient label, a figleaf, a reason that is so comfortable for Muslims whenever they have to look at why they aren't in the places that they have to be. All too often Islamophobia is used as an excuse in a way to kind of blackmail society.'

What all this suggests is the need for an open, frank debate about Muslims and their relationship to wider British society. There is clearly prejudice and fear of Islam in this country. Muslims do get harassed and attacked because of their faith. At the same time the degree of hatred and discrimination is being exaggerated to suit particular political agendas, stoking up resentment and creating a victim culture.

The likelihood of such a frank, open debate is, however, not very high. 'Islamophobia' has become not just a description of anti-Muslim prejudice but also a prescription for what may or may not be said about Islam. Every year, the Islamic Human Rights Commission organises a mock awards ceremony for its 'Islamophobe of the Year'. Last year there were two British winners. One was the BNP's Nick Griffin. The other? Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee. Toynbee’s defence of secularism and women’s rights, and criticism of Islam, was, it declared, unacceptable. Isn't it absurd, I asked the IHRC's Massoud Shadjareh, to equate a liberal anti-racist like Polly Toynbee with the leader of a neo-fascist party. Not at all, he suggested. 'There is a difference between disagreeing and actually dismissing certain ideologies and certain principles. We need to engage and discuss. But there’s a limit to that.' It is difficult to know what engagement and discussion could mean when leading Muslim figures seem unable to distinguish between liberal criticism and neo-fascist attacks.

It would be tempting to dismiss the IHRC as a fringe organisation. It's not. It is a consultant body to the UN. Its work has been praised by the CRE. More importantly its principal argument - that in a plural society, free speech is limited by the need not to give offence to particular religious or cultural groups - has become widely accepted. So, for instance, the government is proposing new legislation to outlaw incitement to religious hatred. The Serious and Organised Crime and Police Bill will make it an offence ‘to knowingly use words, behaviour or material that is threatening, abusive or insulting with the intention or likely effect that hatred will be stirred up against a group of people targeted because of their religious beliefs’ Supporters of the law claim that it will extend to Muslims, and other faith groups, the same protection that racial groups already possess. Sikhs and Jews are already by the Race Relations Act. The new law is aimed squarely at meeting Muslim concerns that they seem to have been left out.

#### The alternative is to adopt the term “anti-Muslimism”—that’s a better way to situate our ideological relationship with the Middle East

Saeed, Senior Lecturer in Media and Cultural Studies – University of Sunderland, ‘7

(Amir, “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media,” Sociology Compass Volume 1, Issue 2, p. 443-462, November)

Halliday (1996, 160), however, notes that a distinction must be made between Islamophobia and anti-Muslimism

The tone of this rhetoric is often alarmist, and encompasses racist, xenophobic and stereotyping elements. The term ‘anti-Muslimism’ is used here to signify such a diffuse ideology, one rarely expressed in purely religious terms but usually mixed in with other rhetoric's and ideologies ... It involves not so much hostility to Islam as a religion ... But hostility to Muslims, to communities of peoples whose sole or main religion is Islam and whose Islamic character, real or invented, forms one of the objects of prejudice. In this sense anti-Muslimism often overlaps with forms of ethnic prejudice, covering peoples within which there may be well a significant non-Muslim element, such as Albanians, Palestinians or even Caucasians.

In short, it appears that what Halliday is arguing is that ‘anti-Muslimism’ is almost a new form of racism that discriminates not only on physical traits but also religious characteristics. For Halliday, the term ‘Islamophobia’ is inaccurate because it is too uniform. Halliday (1999) points out that usage of this term implies that there is only one Islam and that all Muslims are homogenous. In short, Halliday (1999, 898) is proposing that Islamophobia as a term suggests fear of Islam as a religion not fear of the people who follow Islam

### case

Daulatzai burries and essentializes Muslim history – no coherent link argument

Plummer ’13 (Brenda Gayle Plummer, University of Wisconsin–Madison, “Reviews: Sohail Daulatzai , Black Star, Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and Black Freedom beyond America,” Journal of American Studies / Volume 47 / Issue 03 / , pp 839-840) \

Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam (NOI) dominate much of the book, and they are **made to stand in** for the Muslim challenge to the West as a whole. Drawing heavily on the work of Melani McAlister, Daulatzai traces how the NOI and its most noted orator stood the “moral geography” and symbolism of Christendom on its ear to craft oppositional discourses and practices that provided alternative pathways to personal and collective emancipation for African Americans. He recuperates the Nation's use of the term “Asiatic black man,” explaining that blacks should not limit themselves to Africa as the exclusive site of what is actually a global identity. These sweeping claims, however, bury as much history as they reveal. We learn very little of the substantial history of Islam in America before the NOI, nor are the black American Muslims who did not belong to the Nation **or who disagreed with its tenets** acknowledged or described. It is also odd that the author sees little contradiction in bequeathing Louis Farrakhan, a lethal enemy of Malcolm X, the mantle of Malcolm's internationalist energy and commitment. No specific examination of Farrakhan's views is found in this account. Farrakhan's opportunism is forgotten, and he is praised for making peace among various hip hop artists and for being cited in their lyrics.

Black Star, Crescent Moon **could use less of the author's** irritatingly essentialized appeals to the “Muslim International” and the “Muslim Third World.” While the author describes the former as “a parallel space to the state,” **the “Muslim Third World” is never defined**. It includes variously Saudi Arabia and the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, although neither of the two leading conference luminaries, Nehru and Zhou Enlai, were Muslims or represented Muslims. If the “Muslim International” and the “Muslim Third World” are meant to connote spaces of anti-imperialist popular resistance, the inclusion of certain polities is indeed puzzling. Are people who grew up in refugee camps or confront brutal Israeli apartheid policies to be conflated with those who secretly tipple fine scotch in Jeddah mansions? In reality there is no neat equation **between Islam as currently practiced and anti-imperialism and antiracism**. Just as Islam has been the principal religion in some revolutionary regimes that resisted domination, in other places it has proven compatible with slavery, racism, and exploitative capitalism, now as in the past. The same may be said for all of the “universal” religions.

That bankrupts their epistemology

McCloud ’07 (Aminah, Ph.d., Professor of Islamic Studies, Temple University, “African-American Muslim Intellectual Thought,” Souls 9 (2): 171–181, 2007)

By denying Black Muslim communities authentic standing, scholars of the African-American religious experience have chosen to investigate them solely as either **sociological or anthropological oddities**. These studies, while popular, barely scratch the surface of understanding Islam as a bona fide religious expression among Black Americans. With its religious authenticity denied, all Black Muslim experience is reduced to expressions of Black nationalism or cultism. With much if not all research on the Nation of Islam focused on its language of protest, which constitutes **only a small part of its rhetoric,** scholars are then able to reduce all that is Islam in the Black community **to expressions of protest thought**. Black protest thought has (and hopefully will always have) a special place in American history as an expected and accepted space of protest against white American racism. In that space, performance modes including ecstatic worship and marches reside—and African-American Islam has been absent in this space.

Beyond the space of protest, another designated space for African-Americans is that labeled as their “quest for identity”—whites know who they are, but Blacks are still struggling to find out who they are. This space serves various purposes. The abhorrent phenomenon of slavery—in which Blacks were uprooted from their homes and homelands to be bought and sold as property—has kept African-American identity in a state of perpetual limbo, according to many scholars. White naming of enslaved Africans began a history of identity issues that have been kept on the front burner of research on African-Americans and their communities. If for nothing more than the assignment of a special social place, the names “colored,” “Negro,” “black,” “Afro-American,” “Black American,” and “African American” have come to constitute a tragic-comedy of identities and spaces of contention, while to a great extent the reality of the lives of those who have been so named remains, outside their communities, unnamed and unknown.

The social condition of contemporary Black Americans is not colonization, it is not slavery and it is not apartheid—but its features include characteristics of all of these conditions. Unable to fully take part in the national celebrations of American immigrants or the legacies of the American founding fathers, and almost totally alienated from any of the varieties of African culture and thought, Black Americans remain apart from immigrant communities, the white American mainstream and their African heritage while at the same time, to one degree or another, connected to them all. While this may be lamentable for some, it has enabled and empowered others to define themselves in multifaceted ways, including affiliations with religions other than Christianity, while still always participating in the protest against racism and its handmaidens. There seems to be, in that corridor reserved for criticism of white racism, an invisible security fence that, if breached, sets off alarm bells.

#### Islamophobia has zero causal explanatory power as a method and you can’t solve it because it’s so nebulous

Bleich, professor of political science – Middlebury, ‘11

(Erik, “What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept,” American Behavioral Scientist, 55(12) p. 1581-1600)

Islamophobia is a widely used concept in public and scholarly circles. It was originally developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s by political activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), public commentators, and international organizations to draw attention to harmful rhetoric and actions directed at Islam and Muslims in Western liberal democracies. For actors like these, the term not only identifies anti- Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments, it also provides a language for denouncing them. In recent years, Islamophobia has evolved from a primarily political concept toward one increasingly deployed for analytical purposes. Researchers have begun using the term to identify the history, presence, dimensions, intensity, causes, and consequences of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments. In short, Islamophobia is an emerging comparative concept in the social sciences. Yet, there is no widely accepted definition of the term. As a result, it is extremely difficult to compare levels of Islamophobia across time, location, or social group, or to levels of analogous categories such as racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia. Without a concept that applies across these comparative dimensions, it is also virtually impossible to identify the causes and consequences of Islamophobia with any precision.

#### Their author Daulatzai places an exclusive focus on the Nation of Islam – their 1AC cannot be separated from our critique

Ongiri, Associate Professor in the English Department and Film and Media Studies Program at the University of Florida, September 2012

(Amy Abugo, “Associate Professor in the English Department and Film and Media Studies Program at the University of Florida,” *Postmodern Culture*, Volume 23, Number 1, Muse)

*Black Star, Crescent Moon* thus makes explicit the joint destinies of African Americans, African American Muslims, and the Muslim International. Daulatzai writes, “the Muslim International is constituted within the context of incarceration and even despite it. For it also sees the world as a prison” (175). Further meditating on the cultural effects of this social reality, Daulatzai’s project importantly concludes, “for if prison is about disappearance and erasure, silence and violence, then epiphany, conversion, or politicization is a kind of ontological resurrection against social and civic death, redefining one’s existence and challenging the panoptic power of the state” (174).

Since the book is in many ways a “first,” it is hard to avoid wishing that it had done more. One wishes, perhaps, that there had been further time spent historically contextualizing the many rich trajectories of African American Islam, especially those of groups beyond the Nation of Islam. The philosophy of Five Percent Nation has had a tremendous impact on the lyrics of hip hop artists from Jeru the Damaja to Eric B and Rakim to Erykah Badu, and has contributed to the popularization of phrases like “What’s up, G?” and “word is bond” yet the group merits only a brief mention in Daulatzai’s study. Additionally, the Moorish Science Temple of America, a group founded by Noble Drew Ali in 1913, barely receives any attention, although there is much evidence to support the idea that its philosophy and structure were formative for the creation of the Nation of Islam. Jamal Al-Amin (formerly known as H. Rap Brown) is discussed at length, but the historic rift that created the powerful organization headed by Al-Amin before his arrest is not discussed. Without exploring these and other important variants of Islam that exist within the African American context, *Black Star, Crescent Moon* not only risks missing some of the significant nuances and debates that shaped the Islamic tradition in African American communities; it also risks framing Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam as the monolithic voice of African American Islam. This is less a critique of *Black Star, Crescent Moon* than it is an indication of the research that has yet to be conducted on this important topic.

#### That entrenches racism and conservative oppression and turns all aspects of the 1AC—

Smith, writer for the Socialist Review, April 1994

(Sharon, http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/sr174/smith.htm)

The hypocrisy of the political establishment's hostility toward Farrakhan has, if anything, raised his own credibility among blacks. While black politicians remain tied as a group to Clinton's coat tails, Farrakhan's black separatism gives voice to the anger felt by millions of blacks. Farrakhan's rallies have drawn tens of thousands in recent months. The Nation of Islam is viewed by many to be carrying on the tradition of Malcolm X, who was once a member. But Malcolm X broke with the Nation of Islam in 1964. At the time Louis Farrakhan, then known as Louis X, said that Malcolm was 'worthy of death'. In reality, Farrakhan carries on a tradition which Malcolm X ultimately rejected, mainly because the Nation of Islam refused to involve itself in political struggle.

Stripped of all its rhetoric, the programme of the Nation of Islam is not radical, but conservative--offering no way of confronting racism in society. The Nation of Islam is not anti-capitalist. Rather than seeing racism as stemming from the need for capitalists to create divisions among workers, it blames other racial groups--such as Koreans, Arabs, Jews, and whites in general--for preventing blacks from gaining economic equality. The Nation of Islam stands for black separatism, but not by fighting against the system. Rather, it seeks for blacks to develop themselves as capitalists who sell goods and services to other blacks.

The Nation of Islam holds positions which mirror those of US conservatives, including the Republican Party. Farrakhan attacks welfare for 'subsidising single women to have babies'. Farrakhan is part of the law and order crowd. He has written that Saudi Arabia has very little crime because the government is willing to cut off limbs or kill to punish those who break the law. But so far, he laments, 'America has not found a way to curb crime and reform those in her society who consistently break her laws, particularly in the black community.'

The Nation relegates women's concerns to housework and children. Farrakhan opposes abortion, but he argues that he is 'pro-choice'--in that he favours allowing women 'the right to choose to whom they will commit their lives.' Gay sexuality, he argues, is immoral, and 'we must change homosexual behaviour and get rid of the circumstances that bring it about.'

Rather than fight against police brutality, the Nation of Islam has managed to work alongside the police--for profit. The Nation formed two private security companies in 1990 which rent out security guards to private landlords and to high crime public housing complexes in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Chicago and Baltimore. Since June 1991 the Nation has taken in more than $1 million in government money for security.

Perhaps most importantly, the Nation of Islam believes that ending racism isn't possible. The emphasis is placed upon individual change--personal morality, clean living, and 'self help'. All of this fits nicely with Clinton's calls for the poor to take 'personal responsibility' for improving their lives--the flip side of blaming the victim.

#### Also turns their defense of Islam –

University of Southern California Muslim Students Association 1999

(https://web.archive.org/web/19990417165558/http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/notislam/)

Nation of Islam

The followers of the Nation Of Islam believe in (all quotes taken from their homepage or their publications):

...one God (Allah) and that Allah (God) appeared in the Person of Master W.Fard Muhammad, July, 1930; the long awaited 'Messiah' of the Christians and the 'Mahdi' of the Muslims...

However, the Qur`an states in chapter 4, verse 36, "Serve Allah, and join not Any partners with Him; ... ". And according to a hadith narrated by Masruq, in Sahih Bukhari, 'Aisha said, "If anyone tells you that Muhammad has seen his Lord, he is a liar, for Allah says (in 6:103), 'No vision can grasp Him.'...".

The followers of the Nation Of Islam further believe "in the resurrection of the dead--not in physical resurrection--but in mental resurrection. We also believe that the so-called Negroes are most in need of mental resurrection; therefore, they will be resurrected first." But the Qur`an states in chapter 20, verse 55, "From the earth did We Create you, and into it Shall We return you, and from it shall We bring you out once again." Even more pointedly, the Qur'an also states in 64:7,

The Unbelievers think that they will not be raised up (for Judgement). Say: "Yea, by my Lord, Ye shall surely be Raised up: then shall ye Be told (the truth) of All that ye did. And that is easy for Allah."

Besides the above two differences, the followers of the Nation of Islam also believe in other things contrary to Islam as defined in the Qur'an and Sunnah, such as:

[We, the Black Muslims, believe] "in the truth of the Bible, but we believe that it has been tampered with and must be reinterpreted so that mankind will not be snared by the falsehoods that have been added to it".

The problem with this belief: The true Prophet of Islam ordered Muslims to neither accept the Bible nor reject it - certainly there was no mention of reinterpretation.

#### Means no impact and no solvency

Bleich, professor of political science – Middlebury, ‘11

(Erik, “What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept,” American Behavioral Scientist, 55(12) p. 1581-1600)

Given the inherent difficulties in doing so, is it worth the effort to establish a definition and concrete measures of Islamophobia? It is both intellectually interesting and analytically important to bring rigor and clarity to a vague concept. But there is little point to this—at least for social scientists—if the goal is purely theoretical. Developing Islamophobia as a clear concept, however, is also the foundation for systematic comparison, and systematic comparison is the key to accurate causal analysis.22 Conceptualizing and measuring Islamophobia allows us to compare its levels over time within a geographic unit (such as a country, region, state, city, or neighborhood), its relative strength and manifestations across space (because the concept is applicable across geographic contexts), its dimensions and prevalence in different social groups (such as among people who differ by age, socioeconomic status, or education levels), and its intensity relative to negative attitudes and emotions directed at other groups, such as those defined by race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, immigration status, or other factors. Looking across these four dimensions is the first step toward answering descriptive questions such as: Is Islamophobia becoming more or less widespread and entrenched? Is it particularly acute in some places or among some types of people? Has Islamophobia become a more important vector of intolerance than that directed at Jews, Blacks, Roma, Pakistanis, North Africans, asylum seekers, and so on? Right now, we have no systematic way to know. Defining Islamophobia precisely and identifying its indicators are prerequisites to answering these kinds of comparative questions that are of tremendous interest to scholars, journalists, and citizens. If the concept of Islamophobia is useful for social scientists, though, it has to have value for causal analysis. Once we are able to measure Islamophobia across the four comparative dimensions, it is possible to analyze causes and effects from the macro to the micro levels. An aggregate index of Islamophobia that tracks rises and falls across time would be a valuable tool to help investigators understand the impact of major episodes of Islamist violence, the end of the Cold War, or levels of Muslim immigrants in particular countries, cities, or neighborhoods. It would also allow historians and social scientists to better understand the long-term, macrosocial processes that generate slow but significant change in how groups move up or down ethnoracial hierarchies.23 On the effects side of the equation, it may be possible to trace the impact of Islamophobia on outcomes such as foreign policy toward the Middle East or stances on Turkey’s joining the European Union, on differential patterns in employment or electoral prospects for Muslims, or even on rates of depression or suicide in different Muslim communities.24 Many scholars will be interested in the causes and effects of Islamophobia on a much smaller scale. They will need narrower measures of Islamophobia to isolate its precise relation to other variables they are investigating. Drawing on precedents from cognates to Islamophobia, one study has demonstrated a causal connection between news coverage of immigrants and anti-immigration attitudes (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2009). Another has correlated extreme right and racist violence with the role of political elites (Koopmans, 1996). It is easy to imagine a parallel research project examining the effect of far right party leaders’ Islamophobic statements on anti-Muslim hate crime. These kinds of targeted studies are emerging with respect to Islamophobia. One has examined in detail how job-related experiences (such as satisfaction, recognition, and responsibility) can affect German police officers’ attitudes toward and experiences with Muslims (Mescher, 2008). A second study correlated the propensity of Spanish respondents who expressed anti-Arab or Islamophobic statements with their willingness to act on their beliefs, as measured by their sending in a form supporting a fictitious association that stood for the defense of Western values against “the risk of Islamization as a consequence of the massive immigration of people from Arab countries” (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007, p. 1085). These meso- and microlevel studies examine more fine-grained and concrete variables that can serve as causes and effects of particular forms of Islamophobia. Yet if all such studies use a different starting point for conceptualizing and operationalizing Islamophobia, it will be impossible to evaluate the consistency of the findings and to aggregate knowledge. In short, we are at the beginning of the process of thinking through what Islamophobia is and how to measure it. The next step is to develop concrete and replicable ways to do so. Conclusion: What Is at Stake? Most people assume that Islamophobia exists. But we know less than we should about its dimensions, intensity, and prevalence across time, space, and social groups, and compared to other forms of intolerance. In part, this is because Islamophobia originated as a political term and is still frequently deployed for political ends. Yet scholars are increasingly using Islamophobia to designate the specific social reality of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments in Western liberal democracies today. Given the rising prevalence of the term in scholarly studies, it is important to theorize and measure Islamophobia as an emerging comparative concept in the social sciences. This article has offered a theoretically grounded definition of Islamophobia as indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims. It has also emphasized the importance of using direct noncausal indicators for measuring Islamophobia to the greatest extent possible. The utility of any definition of a concept depends on the research question at hand, and the definition offered here will not be optimal in all circumstances. Some scholars will seek to understand the history and politicized uses of the term itself. They will therefore rightly reject a fixed, transhistorical definition of the concept. Others will be more concerned with isolating and measuring subcomponents of Islamophobia. They may want to focus on the differences between anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments, between those who hold changeable Islamophobic opinions and those who hold inflexible biases, or between those whose Islamophobia manifests itself primarily through aversion and those who are motivated more by hostility. For these scholars, however, it may still be useful to situate their research questions in the context of an overarching definition of Islamophobia rather than to ignore or to redefine the concept itself. There are distinct advantages to developing a focal definition and consistent measures of Islamophobia. Doing so makes it easier to distinguish between debates that revolve around what Islamophobia is, what causes it, and what its consequences are. It also creates a standard for evaluating the directness or indirectness of specific measures of Islamophobia used by different researchers. This encourages studies that utilize the most direct measures and that replicate those measures in different settings. The effect for scholars will be more accurate comparisons of Islamophobia across time, place, and social groups, and compared to other forms of intolerance. In short, developing Islamophobia as a concept for social scientists is a first step toward a deeper understanding of the comparative and causal questions that interest us. There are also critical policy-making stakes linked to these questions. When civil society groups, antiracist bureaucracies, or politicians allocate their time and money to Islamophobia, they shift resources away from other serious concerns (such as racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Roma sentiments, anti-immigrant prejudice, sexism, homophobia, etc.). How much attention each of these issues receives should be dictated by the most accurate estimate possible of the extent of the problem. Developing Islamophobia as a concrete and usable social scientific concept is therefore not only the basis for meaningful comparative and causal analysis in academia; it is also the foundation for more informed public debates and for more effective policy decisions.

#### Not the root cause

Joppke, professor of politics – American University of Paris, PhD Sociology – Berkeley, ‘9

(Christian, “Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and Her Muslims,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Volume 35, Issue 3)

The Runnymede report defines Islamophobia as certain ‘closed’ views of Islam, which are distinguished from ‘open views’ in terms of eight binary oppositions, such as ‘monolithic/diverse’, ‘separate/interacting’, or ‘inferior/different’ (the first adjective always marking a ‘closed’, the second an ‘open’ view). This makes for an elastic definition of Islamophobia, with little that could not be packed into it. Consider the eighth binary opposition, ‘Criticism of West rejected/considered’. If ‘criticisms made by Islam of “The West” (are) rejected out of hand’, there is an instance of Islamophobia, the non-biased attitude being that ‘criticisms of “the West” and other cultures are considered and debated’. Is it reasonable to assume that people enter debate by putting their point of view to disposition? Under such demanding standards, only an advocate of Habermasian communicative rationality would go free of the charge of Islamophobia. However, the real problem is to leave unquestioned the exit position, ‘criticism of the West’. In being sweeping and undifferentiated, such a stance seems to be no less phobic than the incriminated opposite. If the point of the Runnymede report is to ‘counter Islamophobic assumptions that Islam is a single monolithic system’, it seems inconsistent to take for granted a similarly monolithic ‘criticism of “the West”’, which the ‘West’ is asked to ‘consider and debate’. There is a double standard here, in that ‘the West’ is asked to swallow what on the other side would qualify as phobia.

There is demonstrable progress in racial inequality—this is *not* to say that everything is perfect by any means, but it does prove that pragmatic change is possible within the current system

Feldscher, Harvard School of Public Health, 9/19/’13

(Karen, “Progress, but challenges in reducing racial disparities,” http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/progress-but-challenges-in-reducing-racial-disparities/)

September 19, 2013 — Disparities between blacks and whites in the U.S. remain pronounced—and health is no exception. A panel of experts at Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) discussed these disparities—what they are, why they persist, and what to do about them—at a September 12, 2013 event titled “Dialogue on Race, Justice, and Public Health.” The event was held in Kresge G-1 and featured panelists Lisa Coleman, Harvard University’s chief diversity officer; David Williams, Florence Sprague Norman and Laura Smart Norman Professor of Public Health in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences; Chandra Jackson, Yerby Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the HSPH Department of Nutrition; and Zinzi Bailey, a fifth-year doctoral student in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Robert Blendon, Richard L. Menschel Professor of Public Health and Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis at HSPH, moderated the discussion. Gains, but pains Health care disparities are troubling, Coleman said. One study found that doctors recommended coronary revascularization—bypass surgery that replaces blocked blood vessels with new ones—among white patients with heart disease 50% of the time, but just 23% of the time for blacks. Black women are less likely to be given a bone marrow density test than white women, even when it’s known they’ve had prior fractures. And the black infant mortality rate is 2.3 times higher than that of non-Hispanic whites. Each speaker acknowledged that racial minorities have made significant gains over the past half-century, but said there is much more work still to do. They cited statistics providing stark evidence of continuing disparities in health, wealth, education, income, arrest and incarceration rates, foreclosure rates, and poverty.

Coleman called the data “disconcerting; in some cases, alarming.” Schools are desegregated, she said, but not integrated; median income is $50,000 per year for whites but $31,000 a year for blacks and $37,000 a year for Hispanics; since the 1960s, the unemployment rate among blacks has been two to two-and-a-half times higher than for whites; and one in three black men can expect to spend time in prison during their lifetimes. Blendon shared results from surveys that accentuate sharp differences of opinion about how well blacks are faring in the U.S. For instance, in a survey that asked participants if they thought that the lives of black Americans had changed dramatically over the past 50 years, 54% of whites said yes but only 29% of blacks did. Another survey asked whether or not people approved of the verdict in the George Zimmerman trial; 51% of whites approved but only 9% of blacks did. Reducing disparities through research, education Jackson talked about growing up in a segregated neighborhood in Atlanta and attending a school with 99% black students and inadequate resources. She became the first in her family to attend college. Now, through her research, she hopes to expose and reduce racial health disparities. In a recent study in the American Journal of Epidemiology, Jackson and colleagues reported that blacks—particularly black professionals—get less sleep than whites, which can have potentially negative impacts on health. Bailey discussed what’s known as the “school-to-prison pipeline”—a trajectory in which black teens do poorly in school, get held back a grade, drop out, commit a crime, then end up in jail. On the flip side, she said, there are “diversity pipelines” to recruit minority students into higher education. “Often these programs target students who have already avoided the school-to-prison pipeline,” Bailey said, noting that she would like to see higher education institutions connect with black students at earlier ages to steer them toward positive choices.

## 2nc

### at: w/m—WPA

“Statutory” requires a statute

Merriam Webster No Date

stat·u·to·ry adjective \ˈsta-chə-ˌtȯr-ē\

Definition of STATUTORY

1: of or relating to statutes

2: enacted, created, or regulated by statute <a statutory age limit>

Statutes are laws enacted by Congress

The Oxford Guide to the U.S. Government 2012

(Oxford University Press via Oxford Reference, Georgetown Library)

statute

A statute is a written law enacted by a legislature. **A federal statute is a law enacted by Congress**. State statutes are enacted by state legislatures; those that violate the U.S. Constitution may be struck down by the Supreme Court if the issue is appealed to the Court.

“War powers authority” covers military operations—

Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History 2012

(Oxford University Press via Oxford Reference, Georgetown University library)

**The War Power in the Twenty-First Century**.

The presumption of a dual war-making role appears to have been eclipsed since 2001, during which time it has been argued by some that the president stands supreme in his war-making capacity as **commander in chief** and that he has no obligation to share such power with Congress. This view assumes that the president has all the requisite and necessary **authority to order whatever he deems necessary in terms of military operations** and that Congress can claim only the power to declare war; the resulting operational conduct is strictly a presidential prerogative. Opponents of this interpretation point to all the additional powers dealing with the military that are vested in Congress.

“Restrictions on authority” must be openly enforced on the president

Opala, justice of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, majority opinion, 1979

(J., Oaks v. Motor Insurance Corporation, 1979 OK 77, Lexis)

Insurer also contends that any authority its agent may have had to extend time for payment of premium on renewal of the policy was limited by a certain express provision in the policy. 5 Though the powers of an agent may be limited by definite **restrictions on his authority**, the determination of their extent and consequently of the rights of the insured must rest, in the final analysis, on the principle that such powers are prima facie coextensive with the business entrusted to his care, **and will not be narrowed by limitations not communicated to the person with** [\*792] **whom he deals**. 6 The policy, silent as to the time for payment of premium, did not put Oaks on notice as to any limitation on agent's authority. **The ultimate question is not what power the agent had**, **but what power the company had held him out as having**. This, too, is a fact issue to be resolved by the trier.

### At: resolved

Only after the colon matters

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2k

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go one…If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, beginning the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

Resolved means enact policy

Words and Phrases 1964Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

### T version

Reform indefinite detention

Maira 9

Sunaina, Professor of Asian American Studies at the University of California, Davis, "Good" and "Bad" Muslim Citizens: Feminists, Terrorists, and U.S. Orientalisms”, Feminist Studies35: no. 3, Fall, http://www.uccnrs.ucsb.edu/sites/www.uccnrs.ucsb.edu/files/publications/Maira.FeministStudies.2009.pdf

The Lodi case was also based on the preemptive detention of individu-

als for political expression and alleged intentions of possible attacks, rather

than actual terrorist activity. These policies **parallel Bush’s doctrine** of pre -

emptive war overseas. **Preemptive detention** and deportation **policies**

under the guise of “homeland” security are used domestically to repress

and regulate immigrants, workers, and dissidents, justifying what is essen-

tially the racial management of populations. The **corollary** of this strategy

of “preemptive denunciation” is that Muslim and Arab Americans have

become increasingly reluctant to express dissenting political views, even

with others who are from the same communities, because the informants

often are insiders themselves, a twist on the logic of the “enemy within.”

### DA

War powers affect executive power – momentum of power

Weiner ’13 [Greg Weiner, 5/1/13, Liberty Forum, Liberty Forum is a platform for the discussion of the legal and philosophical principles that inform and govern a free people, “Congress and Deliberation in the Age of Woodrow Wilson: An Elegy,” http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/congress-and-deliberation-in-the-age-of-wilson-an-elegy/, accessed 6/30/13, JTF]

Wilson ultimately found a strong Presidency useful for Progressive aims; contemporary neoconservatives have tended to find it hospitable to their goals in national security and foreign affairs.[2] But they would do well to remember that the power inheres in the office, not the function. It is difficult to quarantine it to a single purpose. If Congress is emasculated on matters of foreign policy it can hardly assert itself on issues of domestic affairs, just as a President who possesses extraordinary powers to wage war on terror is sure to claim them to wage war on purported domestic crises too. President Obama already has, threatening Congress to its face in the State of the Union address that either it would act on climate change or he would, the two courses apparently being interchangeable.

Unconstrained presidential ruling is key to prevent financial crises---generates confidence in waning markets---2008 proves

Posner and Vermuele 9—Professor of Law, UChicago AND Professor of Law, Harvard Law School (Eric and Adrian, Fall 2009, “Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008,” University of Chicago Law Review, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1613, Accessed 06-27-2013)

Finally, we mention a dynamic that further tightens the political constraints in times of crisis. Precisely because markets expected the House to pass the EESA, the House's initial failure to do so created a perceived "crisis of authority," n202 suggesting a risk that dysfunctional political institutions would not be able to coordinate on any economic policy at all. That second-order crisis supervened on the underlying economic crisis, but acquired force independent of it. The Senate had [\*1665] to scramble to undo the damage and did so in world-record time. The House quickly fell into line. In this way, measures urged by the executive to cope with a crisis of unclear magnitude acquired a kind of self-created momentum. Rejection of those measures would themselves create a political crisis that might, in turn, reduce confidence and thus trigger or exacerbate the underlying financial crisis. A similar process occurred in the debates over the AUMF and the Patriot Act, where proponents of the bills urged that their rejection would send terrorist groups a devastating signal about American political will and unity, thereby encouraging more attacks. These political dynamics, in short, create a self-fulfilling crisis of authority that puts legislative institutions under tremendous pressure to accede to executive demands, at least where a crisis is even plausibly alleged. Critics of executive power contend that the executive exploits its focal role during crises in order to bully and manipulate Congress, defeating Madisonian deliberation when it is most needed. n203 On an alternative account, the legislature rationally submits to executive leadership because a crisis can be addressed only by a leader. Enemies are emboldened by institutional conflict or a divided government; financial markets are spooked by it. n204 A government riven by internal conflict will produce policy that varies as political coalitions rise and fall. Inconsistent policies can be exploited by enemies, and they generate uncertainty at a time that financial markets are especially sensitive to agents' predictions of future government action. It is a peculiar feature of the 2008 financial crises that a damaged president could not fulfill the necessary leadership role, but that role quickly devolved to the Treasury secretary and Fed chairman who, acting in tandem, did not once express disagreement publicly.

Kills global econ

**Caploe 9** (David Caploe is CEO of the Singapore-incorporated American Centre for Applied Liberal Arts and Humanities in Asia., “Focus still on America to lead global recovery”, April 7, The Strait Times, lexis)

IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that the global economy has in fact been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US. This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. At the same time, this deep inter-connection between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy - 'sub-prime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that there is no other engine for the world economy - and hasn't been for the last six decades. If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world. Consequently, it is a matter of global concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie' banks - technically alive but in reality dead. As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Team Obama seems reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which its policies at home are failing not just there but around the world as well. Which raises the question: If the US can't or won't or doesn't want to be the global economic engine, which country will? The obvious answer is China. But that is unrealistic for three reasons. First, China's economic health is more tied to America's than practically any other country in the world. Indeed, the reason China has so many dollars to invest everywhere - whether in US Treasury bonds or in Africa - is precisely that it has structured its own economy to complement America's. The only way China can serve as the engine of the global economy is if the US starts pulling it first. Second, the US-centred system began at a time when its domestic demand far outstripped that of the rest of the world. The fundamental source of its economic power is its ability to act as the global consumer of last resort. China, however, is a poor country, with low per capita income, even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest economy. There are real possibilities for growth in China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on a massive scale. Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European Union - in thinking about becoming the engine of the world economy - is monetary: What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency? This is an extremely complex issue that the US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of exchange has given the US some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and the global economic system. The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history. It will try to avoid the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it feels much more confident in its ability to handle the manifold currency problems that the US has grappled with for decades. Given all this, the US will remain the engine of global economic recovery for the foreseeable future, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began in the US - and it is going to have to be solved there too.

Turns the case

Hart, politicalscience @ the University of Michigan, March/April ‘9

(Ronald, Foreign Affairs, How Development Leads to Democracy, p. 26-38)

Thus, other things being equal, high levels of economic development tend to make people more tolerant and trusting, bringing more emphasis on self-expression and more participation in decisionmaking**.** This process is not deterministic, and any forecasts can only be probabilistic, since economic factors are not the only influence; a given country's leaders and nation-specific events also shape what happens. Moreover, modernization is not irreversible. Severe economic collapse can reverse it, as happened during the Great Depression in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain and during the 1990s in most of the Soviet successor states. Similarly, if the current economic crisis becomes a twenty-first-century Great Depression, the world could face a new struggle against renewed xenophobia and authoritarianism.

Gigantic colonial wars

David Harvey, Professor of Political Economy – Cambridge U, ‘82

(The Limits To Capital, p. 451)

At times of savage devaluation, interregional rivalries typically degenerate into struggles over who is to bear the burden of devaluation. The export of unemployment, of inflation, of idle productive capacity become the stakes in the game. Trade wars, dumping, interest rate wars, restrictions on capital flow and foreign exchange, immigration policies, colonial conquest, the subjugation of the division of labour within economic empires, and, finally, the physical destruction and forced devaluation of a rival’s capital through war are some of the methods at hand. Each entails the aggressive manipulation of some aspect of economic, financial or state power. The politics of imperialism, the sense that the contradictions of capitalism can be cured through world domination by some omnipotent power, surges to the forefront. The ills of capitalism cannot so easily be contained. Yet the degeneration of economic into political struggles play its part in the long-run stabilization of capitalism, provided enough capital is destroyed *en route*. Patriotism and nationalism have many functions in the contemporary world and may arise for diverse reasons; but they frequently provide a most convenient cover for the devaluation of both capital and labour. We will shortly return to this aspect of matters since it is, I believe, by far the most serious threat, not only to the survival of capitalism (which matters not a jot), but to the survival of the human race.

### 2nc at: roleplaying bad

Arguing that a current government policy is bad is not roleplaying

Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

Analysis of policy is particularly empowering, even if we’re not the USFG

**Shulock 99**

Nancy, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY --- professor of Public Policy and Administration and director of the Institute for Higher Education Leadership & Policy (IHELP) at Sacramento State University, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2, 226–244 (1999)

In my view, none of these radical changes is necessary. **As interesting as our politics might be with the kinds of changes outlined by proponents of** participatory and **critical policy analysis,** **we do not need these changes to justify our investment in policy analysis.** **Policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas** into politics, **and affects policy outcomes**. The problem is not that policymakers refuse to understand the value of traditional policy analysis or that policy analysts have not learned to be properly interactive with stakeholders and reflective of multiple and nontechnocratic perspectives. The problem, in my view, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. **Policy analysis has changed**, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment. Regardless of what the textbooks say, there does not need to be a client in order for ideas from policy analysis to resonate through the policy environment.10¶ Certainly there is room to make our politics more inclusive. But **those critics who see policy analysis as a tool of the power elite might be less concerned if they understood that analysts are only adding to the debate**—they are unlikely to be handing ready-made policy solutions to elite decisionmakers for implementation. Analysts themselves might be more contented if they started appreciating the appropriation of their ideas by the whole gamut of policy participants and stopped counting the number of times their clients acted upon their proposed solutions. And **the cynics disdainful of the purported objectivism of analysis might relax if analysts themselves would acknowledge that they are seeking not truth**, **but to elevate the level of debate with a compelling, evidence-based presentation of their perspectives. Whereas critics call**, **unrealistically** in my view, **for analysts to** present competing perspectives on an issue or to “**design a discourse among multiple perspectives,” I see no reason why an individual analyst must do this** when multiple perspectives are already in abundance, brought by multiple analysts. If we would acknowledge that policy analysis does not occur under a private, contractual process whereby hired hands advise only their clients, we would not worry that clients get only one perspective.¶ **Policy analysis is used, far more extensively than is commonly believed**. Its **use could be appreciated and expanded if policymakers, citizens, and analysts themselves began to present it more accuratel**y, not as a comprehensive, problem-solving, scientific enterprise, but **as a contributor to informed discourse**. For years Lindblom [1965, 1968, 1979, 1986, 1990] has argued that we should understand policy analysis for the limited tool that it is—just one of several routes to social problem solving, and an inferior route at that. Although I have learned much from Lindblom on this odyssey from traditional to interpretive policy analysis, my point is different. Lindblom sees analysis as having a very limited impact on policy change due to its ill-conceived reliance on science and its deluded attempts to impose comprehensive rationality on an incremental policy process. I, with the benefit of recent insights of Baumgartner, Jones, and others into the dynamics of policy change, see that **even with** these **limitations, policy analysis can have a major impact on policy. Ideas, aided by institutions and embraced by citizens, can reshape the policy landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.**

### Social death

No social death – history proves

Vincent **Brown**, Prof. of History and African and African-American Studies @ Harvard Univ., December 20**09**, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery," American Historical Review, p. 1231-1249

THE PREMISE OF ORLANDO PATTERSON’S MAJOR WORK, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with “survivals” or “retentions” of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park’s view of “the Negro” predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds.32 Herskovits ex- amined “Africanisms”—any practices that seemed to be identifiably African—as useful symbols of cultural survival that would help him to analyze change and continuity in African American culture.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Park’s, who empha- sized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More recently, a number of scholars have built on Herskovits’s line of thought, enhancing our understanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more precise demonstrations of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa to America. For these scholars, the preservation of distinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself. 35

Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death. The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a civilizing institution threatened by “slave crime.”36 Soon after, studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved—indeed, they often equated acts of will with humanity itself. As these writ- ers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of “the slave” with what they were learning about the en- slaved.37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Patterson’s definition of slavery. “If slaves were in fact ‘generally dishonored,’ ” Craton asked, “how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slaves—that is, the scale of ‘reputation’ and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike?” How could they have formed the fragile families documented by social historians if they had been “natally alienated” by definition? Finally, and per- haps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to “permanent violent domination,” they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the “varied manifestations of their resistance” that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes “fatally.”38 The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified Patterson’s description of slavery even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men, women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their “tropical temperament.”

The cultural continuity and resistance schools of thought come together pow- erfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Re- sistance, Culture, and Identity Formation in Early America. In Rucker’s analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cul- tural metaphors play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom “the rupture was the story” of slavery, Rucker aims to reveal the “perseverance of African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creoles.”39 He looks again at some familiar events in North America—New York City’s 1712 Coromantee revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina, as well as the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner—deftly teasing out the African origins of many of the attitudes and actions of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a “shared cultural heritage” that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the “various steps Africans made in the process of becoming ‘African American’ in culture, orientation, and identity.”40

### Body cards

We should debate collective structures that produced the origins for oppression—appeals to experience alone can’t be refuted

Craig Ireland, Assistant Professor, Dept. Of American Culture and Literature Bilkent University, 2004, The Subaltern Appeal to Experience: Self-Identity, Late Modernity, and the Politics of Immediacy, p. 162-77

Such subaltern theorizing, however, paints itself into an epistemological corner and partakes of the culture of immediacy when it conflates the disruptiveness of experience with its perceived immediacy. When carried out to its logical conclusion, such a conflation ends up fetishizing the supposed immediacy of the spatial and the material (such as that of the body), as if such material immediacy were the last possible enclave of resistance to the temporally extended ways of dominant metanarratives and as if it were the only legitimate ground from which counterhistories might be erected or counterhegemonic action mustered.

Now what is puzzling in all this is that subaltern theorizing should so insist on immediacy just as a culture of immediacy already seems all too ubiquitous and that immediacy should be expected to buttress the temporal extension of counterhegemonic micronarratives in the first place. More puzzling still is that the very concept of experience, beset as it has been by ambiguous political ramifications, should be so vehemently insisted upon by theories professing to be politically minded and that the role of experience in self-formation, subject as it is to the vicissitudes of historical change, should be paraded as the panacea for all subaltern ailments regardless of sociohistorical context. Because the temporal extension and mediation presupposed by experience can no longer be taken as given and seem instead to have shifted over the last few decades to a culture of immediacy, it is legitimate at this point to ask the following question: is it not possible that the subaltern appeal to immediate experience, instead of representing a laudable attempt to foil dominant discursive mediation and instead of proposing immediate experience as the material out of which is to be inductively constructed temporally extended counterhistory, in fact symptomatically represents an eroded capacity for sustaining mediation and temporal extension tout court?

But before we can answer this question, we must first consider yet another one: what is it that distinguishes the subaltern appeal to immediacy from similar theoretical enterprises? The hope that immediacy somehow holds the promise of the ideologically irreducible, after all, no less subtends other currents in theory of the Erfahrungshunger decades —currents that, by sharing a common concern for immediacy in spite of their otherwise incompatible tenets, suggest that the subaltern wager on immediate experience is not just the result of some Anglo-American empiricist heritage traceable to Locke. The appeal to immediacy seems instead to involve a more encompassing problem to which even recent currents in German aesthetics, for all their notorious disdain, since Hegel, for anything smacking of premature immediacy, themselves also testify. The Wareniisthetik of the 197os, for example, maintains that since temporal mediation itself harbours the potential for reification and commodification, resistance ought to be sought in the immediate and the punctual2 — a sentiment later echoed in Karl Heinz Bohrer's attempt of the 198os to reinstate the counterhegemonic potential of aesthetic experience with the category of "suddenness" (Plötzlichkeit), which he describes as "a discontinuity in the consciousness of time."3 Minimalism has likewise advocated a dissolute and decentred subject whose disparate punctual experiences, by the fact of their immediacy, can resist the coercive temporal sequentiality of social mediation,4 and of course for many of those who could be loosely referred to as poststructuralist, duration and temporal extension are but coercive operations bent on manhandling the singular and muffling heterogeneities, as can be seen from Lyotard's neo-Nietzschean defense of ephemeral "libidinal intensities" to Deleuze and Guattari's later celebration of "the schizophrenic fragmentation of experience and loss of identity ... as a liberation from the self forged by the Oedipus complex."5 But although subaltern experience-oriented theories and certain currents in aesthetics and French philosophy all wager on immediacy, subaltern cultural theory of the Thompsonian vein stands out on one crucial point: immediacy is not proposed as a new summum bonum that would allow for an anti-oedipal self to punctually escape commodification or as a novum organism that would foster what some, in reference to the more extreme of poststructuralist excesses, have called "the ontologisation of irreducible plurality."6 Immediacy is proposed instead as but p. 164 a moment (whether "strategic" or not) to which must be appended the retrospective devising of counterhistories — histories without which an agent of political change cannot emerge and without which subaltern specificity cannot yield a sense of identity. John Berger, Thompson, and others, to whom much of subaltern theory is in debt, tirelessly stress that a people or a class which is cut off from its own past is far less free to choose and act as a people or class than one that has been able to situate itself in history"7 and that "if we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences."8 The immediacy advocated by certain strains of cultural, North American feminist, and subaltern theory is not meant to supplant or evade temporal extension as such, and even less does it propose a new postmodern self dispersed within punctual immediacy; it wagers instead on immediate experience in the hope that such a disruption of dominant historiography and ideology might assist in the forging and consolidation of subaltern counterhistories. Since such subaltern experience-oriented theories are after all concerned with problems of agency, it is to be expected that they should have little sympathy for the temporally dispersed self proposed by some as a subversive alternative to temporally extended phallocracy or logophilia. A self so dispersed, however deferential it might be to the heterogeneity of the irreducibly particular, is not exactly amenable to even the semblance of concerted political action — indeed, "such an agent, in some of its versions at least," as Terry Eagleton wryly puts it, "would hardly seem self-collected enough to topple a bottle off a wall, let alone bring down the state."9 However subversive it claims to be and whatever it exactly is that it claims to subvert, the logophobic fetishization of discontinuity and dispersal has little in common with the sort of self-formation that subaltern appeals to experience hope to foster. Such appeals to experience indeed seek to reinforce, and not dissipate, the temporal continuity required for forging counterhistories. But at hand in the subaltern appeal to experience is not just the proclivity of a certain school of thought for the temporal extension needed for praxis and agency. By the fact of their popularization and prevalence in mainstream discourse, let alone their concrete embodiment by new social movements, such experience-oriented theories also testify to a generalized social demand for the sustaining, not the "subverting," of temporal extension. It is indeed significant that while theories of experience of the Erfahrungshunger decades have all been concerned with immediacy and temporality in one form or another, it has not been the celebration of immediacy for its own sake that has caught or driven the popular imagination: the frisson of libidinal intensities, the titillation of anti-oedipal schizophrenic depersonalization and pliitzlich aesthetic experiences have aroused the euphoric enthusiasm of only a very few — an academic and artistic few, at that — and have galvanized yet fewer into taking to the streets in their defense or tossing about confetti in their celebration. What has galvanized entire populations, on the other hand, and what is seductive about various social movements, whether in the neoconservative-traditionalist vein of national history and foundational myths, in the subaltern vein of counterhistories, or even in the regressive neo-eschatological vein of other-worldly cults, from born again Christian fundamentalists to Solar Temple initiates, has been the semblance of temporal extension provided by such social movements — an extension without which not only are national history, counterhistory and history tout court unlikely but also without which the very structure of the modern self becomes precarious at best. Andreas Huyssen rightly observes that current obsessions with the past — museum mania, returns to Tradition, ethnic tales of origins and genealogy, or even the recent fad of historical films catering to literary classics or to legends — turn out to be but "an expression of the basic human need to live in extended structures of temporality, however they be organized."' The magnetism of many of the new social movements resides less in the resistance to hegemony such movements claim to offer than in the semblance of temporal extension they provide. Rather than perpetuate the notion that various forms of identity politics are attempts at cultural resistance, it is perhaps more appropriate to view them instead as a response to an increasingly generalized condition, namely, the erosion of the sociohistorical preconditions for a modern sense of self. It is this latter problem that is both at work and at stake in the subaltern appeal to experience, and not some poststructuralist stance that celebrates, with much fanfare but little substance, the subversive potential of a self that, presumably p. 166 unshackled from the manhandling ways of temporal extension, logophilia, and other insidious ontotheological schemes, can at long last say "Yea" to Dionysian becoming within an ubiquitous immediacy." That a certain obsession with temporal extension should so permeate academic and para-academic identity politics ought not to surprise: although the self of the last few decades may not have reached the state of disorganization comically portrayed above by Eagleton, it has nevertheless become more dispersed than its modern homologue. An extended present indeed so narrows the temporal horizon and thus so fosters a culture of immediacy that the diachronically extended temporality of modernity unavoidably gives way to what Daniel Bell was the first to diagnose some four decades ago as an "end of linearity."2 Such a situadon is hardly conducive to forging a sustained sense of self across the temporal manifold. In the synchronous space of an extended present, which is marked by the evacuation of all but immediate or short-term considerations and where the past is consigned to a mere archival record unrelated to present concerns, individuals, let alone the larger entities of ethnic groups and classes, readily lend themselves to dispersal into a "series of pure and unrelated presents in time."13 It is to such changes in the organization of a sense of self that various theorists of (late) modernity point when they remind us of parallel changes in the dominant patterns of late-modern psychopathology: dysfunctions in the typically modern depth/surface opposition at work in the conflict between a tyrannical superego and a hapless ego in the face of a yet insufficiently tamed id, expressed in such Victorian pathologies as the hysteria that Freud studied at length, have been lately displaced by an increased incidence of pathologies not of a strong ego but of depersonalization, such as anxiety, schizophrenia, and psychosis.14 With good reason it has repeatedly been suggested that the dispersed self of poststructuralism ought to be seen less as a desideratum to be cultivated and still less as a subversive entity to be celebrated than as a factual description of how the self, over the last three decades, has increasingly become organized (or rather, disorganized) into a temporally uncoordinated aggregate of the disparate.15 At this point, Lacan's clinical definition of schizophrenia as a breakdown in the syntagmatic chain of signifiers that constitute meaning and Deleuze and Guatttari's subsequent edification of this definition into the regulative ideal of a new and presumably subversive form of subjectivity seem useful less as a diagnostic tool for psychopathology or as an emancipatory ideal than as a suggestive metaphor for the current state of the self. But that the past, present, and future may be tenuously related to one another, if not altogether engulfed in an extended present, does not entail that narratives can no longer be mustered and deployed. What it does imply, however, is that without the selectivity provided by a future-oriented temporality, without a means to reduce complexity, modern temporal divergence and extension can so contract that narratives may no longer truly help in the organization of the self beyond the immediate and the short term. The paradox of the temporality of late modernity, which Huyssen, Jameson, and others rightly prefer to call late capitalism, is indeed that "the more the present of advanced consumer p. 168 capitalism prevails over past and future, sucking both into an expanding synchronous space ... the weaker is its grip on itself, the less stability or identity it provides for contemporary subjects."' 6 For subaltern experience-oriented theories and their para-academic homologues, then, resistance to dominant mediation is to be mustered by an appeal to, and certainly not the appeal of immediate experience: a group's immediate experiences are sought not for their own sake but as a means to the inductive construction of counterhistories, which, in turn, will "empower" a group by articulating its interests and enabling its agency. But just as the dispersed poststructuralist self is more a description of the current state of the self than it is a subversive ideal to be reached, likewise is the subaltern insistence on immediate experience less a programmatic statement than it is a symptom of the current state of temporality. When invoked as a counterdiscursive and counterhegemonic ground for resistance, the perceived immediacy of experience, as we saw earlier, becomes readily endowed with the palpable concreteness of materiality, the very resilience of which is seen as a source of resistance to the meddlesome ways of temporally extended dominant discursive regimes. But this very insistence on nondiscursive and material immediacy, and this even to the point of retreating to the perceived irreducible immediacy of material bodily experiences (or, in a para-academic parallel, to the physical marks of ethnicity), underscores the increased disconnection of such immediacy from the second term of the subaltern equation, namely, that such immediacy lend itself to the mediating operations of temporally extended counterhistories. The presumed spatial immediacy of the materially concrete can indeed only tenuously lend itself to temporal mediation, however local the operation or subversive the manoeuver, if temporal extension itself has been narrowed, as it has in an extended present, to the point of an ubiquitous immediacy. Since the result, after all, of an ubiquitous immediacy is that we are left to wallow in an aggregate of the disparate (in the manner of a Lacanian schizophrenic reduced to "pure material signifiers" bereft of signification or to a series of "pure and unrelated presents in time") and since an extended present has increasingly become the dominant mode of temporality over the last few decades, then it seems that the appeal to immediate experience is less a categorical imperative enjoining us to boycott the ideologically tainted schemes of temporally extended mediation than it is instead a symptom of the result, already at hand, of an ubiquitous immediacy. The subaltern appeal to immediate experience is not merely a reaction to the swashbuckling ways of dominant discursive regimes, nor is it a matter of purifying or cleansing mediation by inductively or empirically reconstructing it anew, grass-roots style, from the material ground (of a groupuscule's immediate experiences) upwards; still less is it an attempt to flee a proliferation of disembodied media images by seeking refuge in palpable nondiscursive materiality; nor, finally, is it a nostalgic yearning for "presence" within a long and ignominious history of metaphysics. If anything, the subaltern insistence on immediate experience instead symptomatically testifies to the inability to go beyond inchoate immediacy, and the wager on immediate experience ought accordingly to be seen less as an attempt to foster the immediate than as a testimony to the growing incapacity of the late-modern self, today, to be otherwise than immediate. After all, an extended present not only narrows temporal horizons and, in so doing, undermines the role of experience in the modern diachronically extended sense of self; by so undermining future-orientedness, which for the last two centuries has assured a horizon from which selections can be made, complexity contained, and a sense of self maintained, the extended present also erodes the capacity for reckoning with what is temporally distant and extended, whether towards the past or towards the future and whether in the name of metanarratives or of biographical narratives. As Gadamer put it, "he who is without horizon is he who cannot see far enough and who thus overestimates what is close at hand."'? It is just such an overestimation of "what is close at hand" that informs the subaltern appeal to immediate experience. An extended present not only undermines the centrality of experience in self-formation; it also raises doubts about how the very structure of the modern self can last today under the guise that it has had for the preceding two centuries. The continuity suggested by Taylor between the late-eighteenth-century and the present sense of self spans, at best, the period from the late eighteenth century to the 197os. The last three decades have, after all, witnessed a shift from the temporally extended Fordism or Keynesianism of fixed capital to the narrowed temporal horizon of flexible accumulation and the unfettered laissez-faire of speculative (or "casino") capital and from the unproblematic presupposition of experience in self-formation to a vituperative defense of, hunger for, and appeal to experience. The appeal to immediate experience involves more than a concern for guaranteeing subaltern agency or for changing P. 170 the given: the very insistence with which this appeal is bandied about by both academic and para-academic politics of identity instead testifies to a more encompassing problem to which it attempts to respond but which it fails to directly name or thematize — the problem of the late-modern self and whether the role of experience in self-formation may no longer have been as predominant over the last three decades as it had been over the last two centuries. SOCIOHISTORICAL REPRISE Those who appeal to experience in the name of subaltern agency, no less than the neo-Althusserians and poststructuralists who deride such maneuvering, all point a leer insu to a historical issue that cannot be addressed by simply tinkering with current cultural problems or epistemological paradigms. But such a failure to historicize the role expected of experience in self-formation begets yet another unaddressed problem — the problem of socioeconomic class. We have earlier seen that modern future-oriented temporality, along with the accentuated role of experience in self-formation that it enables, is not only a historical phenomenon that surfaces with consistency at the turn of the eighteenth century — it is also a phenomenon that initially manifests itself within a very limited segment of the population, namely, the rising late-eighteenth-century industrial bourgeoisie. Although such an issue has yet to be dealt with by those most ensconced in debates over experience and agency, the class origins of an accentuated role of experience in self-formation has already been pointed out by various theorists of modernity, albeit only in periphery to their larger argument. Habermas's Habilitationschrift, concerned as it is with tracing the origin and prospects of rational argumentation within a public sphere, shows en passant that as a result of an interaction between the emergent Intimsphare of the bourgeois conjugal family and the budding literary public sphere, the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie could articulate its own experiences for itself and, in so doing, eventually consolidate itself and rise to prominence as a specific class with identifiable interests. '8 Others have since shown that it was only when the midto late-eighteenthcentury bourgeoisie, through the mediation at first of the literary and later of the political public sphere, began to understand itself as a specific class that a specifically bourgeois sense of self emerged — a sense of self characterized, inter alia, as an interior enclave of irreducible individuality opposed to an external world, as an inner core in need of future-oriented expressive development, and as a reflexive self-narration sustained by the integration and processing of the unexpected into a biographical narrative of cumulative experiences.'9 Others still have shown that early-nineteenth-century national literary historiography did much, with its tales of emergent nationhood, to manufacture what Jusdanis calls a "network of shared experiences" that in turn played no negligible role in the consolidation of that other bourgeois phenomenon, the modern nation-state." Beyond the specific issue of experience, numerous other theories concerned with the historical emergence of the modern self, from studies of the history of private life and civil society to works on the rise of the novel and aesthetic discourse, have likewise traced specifically to the late-eighteenth-century bourgeoisie that which, in certain quarters, often parades itself today as modern self-identity tout court. Such a focus on the historicity, as well as the class origins, of the modern self are not recent — they can be found no less in Lukács's later work and Goldmann's Pour une sociologic du roman than in the early work of Habermas and the recent work of Charles Taylor. Why, then, has such self-professed interdisciplinary and historically minded inquiry as that of E.P. Thompson and the History Workshops of the 197os, of the Alltagsgeschichte of the 198os, and of the subaltern inquiry of the 199os to this day so far failed to consider, in their attempts to foster counterhistory, the class origins of the very modern self to which their appeals to experience essentially cater? Does such an oversight represent a denial of the current self's prospects for agency, or does it simply point to the inevitable shortcomings of "presentist" tendencies in much of recent cultural and subaltern theory? Whatever the case may be, and although at this point such questions are best left open, it nevertheless remains that what is by convention called modern self-identity and modern temporality, far from representing a P. 172 generalized social phenomenon to be vaguely imputed to the advent of modernity, on the contrary turns out to have initially been a specifically bourgeois phenomenon. If it is within the midto late-eighteenth-century bourgeoisie that the contours of what many call the modern self or modern subjectivity were first delineated and if such an initially bourgeois phenomenon has frequently been equated by the history of ideas with the modern self as such, it has nevertheless been only gradually over the last two centuries that this sense of self and temporality eventually imposed itself upon the rest of the population, slowly percolating downward to an emergent working class no longer tied to (or rather ejected from) the land, migrating upward to a declining nobility that was eventually assimilated by the bourgeoisie through intermarriage and economic necessity, and finally, expanding laterally to Eastern Europe (and, later, to colonies across the globe) as a precondition at first for capital accumulation and, later, for cooperative entrepreneurial ventures." So while it is true, as Taylor puts it, that "by the turn of the eighteenth century, something recognizably like the modern self is in process of constitution," it is also no less true that those initially under its sway, as Taylor hastens to add, were "drawn from the educated classes of Europe and America, and were even a smaller proportion of these as one proceeded eastward, where these were in turn less significant in their societies. Our history since 1800 has been the slow spreading outward and downward of the new modes of thought and sensibility to new nations and classes."22 The future-oriented temporality initially at work within the emergent bourgeoisie, after all, differed not only from the temporality of the courtly and court-aspiring classes, whose vested interests lay in the perpetuation of the present social order through the continuing legitimation of the past; it also stood in sharp contrast with the temporality of the craftsman and artisan, who, well into the eighteenth century, were no less materially insecure and no less entrapped within a narrow temporal horizon than were the peasant or migrant labourer, as the work of Braudel has of course shown. The Verlagssystem, or "putting-out system," may well have shifted from domestic seasonal wage labour, as dictated by lulls in agricultural activity, to a more permanent form of wage labour during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century; yet those working in the new but increasingly predominant cash nexus differed little from their predecessors working in the framework of customary feudal law. So class specific has been bourgeois future-oriented temporality and the sense of self it informs, in fact, that before it became so hegemonic by the early to mid-twentieth century as to be conflated with the modern self as such, it tended to spark violent reactions during periods of revolutionary ferment, as can be seen by the routine shooting of clocks, whether in 1830 or 1848, and as can be seen more tellingly still in the first symbolic gesture, in 1871, of the Commune de Paris, which sought to establish a radically new form of nonbourgeois temporality by toppling the Colonne de VendOme — a move bemoaned by the Parnassian poet and anti-communard Catulle Mendes, who was of irreproachable bourgeois sympathies, as an abolishing of history that "makes for a timeless present, an annihilated past, and an uncertain future."23 Alternative forms both of temporality (such as exemplary, cyclical, or eschatological time) and of self-formation (such as that of the extended family of agricultural society or of the caste system of premodern society) persisted within the nonbourgeois population well beyond the late eighteenth century. Future-orientedness and the modern self it informs were, after all, not some cataclysmic mutation that suddenly ensnared a hapless population in its entirety: "if modernity was to mark a condition of experience," Peter Wagner reminds us, "then the qualifications required to show its existence were largely absent in the allegedly modern societies during the nineteenth century, and for a still fairly large number of people during the first half of the twentieth century."24 To be sure, with the intensification of enclosures in the seventeenth and eighteenth P. 174 centuries, with the resulting influx of landless migrant workers into burgeoning industrial zones, and with the generalization of functional differentiation as a mode of social organization, the circumscription of individual identity in terms of function instead of caste began to extend to increasingly large segments of the population. But such a process did not, overnight, extend the bourgeois sense of temporality and self to these increasing segments of the population: for many during this period, on the contrary, the migration from the country to the city changed very little with regard to their actual experience or expectations; one mode of labouring was merely exchanged for another, and, as David Landes remarks, the "factory worker could be, and usually was, as tradition-bound in his expectations for himself and his children as the peasant."25 And such tradition-bound milieux, as we have seen, hardly encouraged the opening of the future, and still less did they foster an accentuated role of experience in self-formation. Regarding this gradual extension of bourgeois subjectivity to the general population, Ehrenberg's work goes so far as to maintain that what in the early nineteenth century had remained the province of a few literati and a small bourgeois elite — that is, individual futureoriented itineraries based, inter alia, on expectations of upward social mobility and individual future-oriented self-development — was so gradual in its percolation to the population at large that it became a generalized phenomenon only during the trente glorieuses of welfare capitalism, at which point the future-oriented predictability of bourgeois returns from investments was duplicated in the worker's state-sponsored predictable pension plans, unemployment guarantees, and access to postsecondary education and at which point the last vestiges of traditional or premodern sociability and subjectivity gave way to their modern homologues.26 The relation between experience and self-formation ought not to be edified, then, from a sociohistorical phenomenon into an anthropological constant that ignores class boundaries. Yet it is just such an edification that has been at work in those strands of subaltern theory that most vocally appeal to experience. Just as much of subaltern theory anachronistically mimics early-modern nation-building by resorting to a Gramscian notion of subalternity that, in the name "of constructing a historical movement and providing for its self-awareness as a historical protagonist," as Terry Cochran notes, unknowingly "operates according to the same economy of hegemony as the state,"27 likewise do subaltern appeals to experience presume that the modern sense of self is a universal human condition instead of a historical product and that there is a necessary correlation between experience and group specificity. Such subaltern maneuvering essentially, but unintentionally, maintains that what initially applied to the emergent eighteenth-century bourgeoisie holds for today's subaltern groupuscule. Experience has been so inextricably entwined with issues of modern self-formation that, by retrospective projection, it appears to many as an anthropological constant beyond the vagaries of historical change. But even those who acknowledge the historicity of modes of self-formation have often fallen prey to yet another historical oversight: they implicitly endorse an association between, if not a conflation of, the bourgeois self and the modern self tout court. It is here that subaltern appeals of the Thompsonian persuasion most flagrantly err. By transposing into a current context or, worse, by naturalizing what took place at a specific historical juncture within a specific social class, such maneuvering fails to consider the extent to which may or may not be viable today those very sociohistorical vectors that, at first for the late-eighteenth-century bourgeoisie and, subsequently, for Western industrial populations at large, allowed for experience to play a constitutive role in self-formation to begin with.

It is in just such a failure to recognize the class origins of this relation between experience and self-formation that the erring ways of much of subaltern theory are not only at their most flagrant but also at their most self-defeating. For all its claims to being historically minded and for all its initial debt to problems of class (later to shift to ethnic and gender issues), the subaltern appeal to experience itself remains beyond the reach of historical and class analysis. The ironic twist to this is that the structure of bourgeois (let alone of eurocentric or albinocratic) self-formation ends up being unwittingly reproduced and mimicked, albeit on a smaller and more regional scale, within those very counterhistories and micronarratives that were supposed to differentiate the subaltern from bourgeois hegemony to begin with. **At this point, the very raison d'être of the subaltern appeal to experience**, namely, **that subalternity** discover and **reinforce its own specificity**, **ends up effectively sabotaged** — unless, of course, such subaltern theory recognizes, which it rarely does, the extent to which subalternity may be increasingly difficult to demarcate from the bourgeois (or albinocratic or phallocratic) version of the self that over the last two centuries has, after all, no less supplanted alternative modes of self-formation than capitalism has replaced alternative economic systems.

**By failing to sufficiently** **historicize the association between experience and self-formation and, worse, by failing to consider the** class **origins of** such an **association**, much of **subaltern theorizing unsurprisingly finds itself increasingly disconnected from those in whose name it professes to speak**.28 In the case, say, of feminism — which has recently come under increased scrutiny by class-oriented and historically minded feminists themselves, from Rita Felski and Roxanne Rimstead to Barbara Ehrenreich — attempts at countering the effects of gender inequality by proposing, say, that seminars be renamed ovulars may have done much to appease the conscience of those concerned with being subversive, yet they have done little for improving the economic and social lot of those women who continue to earn roughly seventy cents for every dollar earned by their male counterparts for the same work and with the same qualifications and who, as members of a workforce only slightly cheaper and less docile than the child labour that the West now subcontracts for many of its industrial tasks, from Nike to Wall-Mart, continue to be nick-led and dimed to death, to use Ehrenreich expression.29

Cultural issues can, admittedly, help redress certain wrongs, but they can also shield those promoting such cultural redress, with their professional academic status and relatively stable salaries, from the socioeconomic realities of precisely those whom they claim to represent along ethnic or gender lines yet whom they neglect along class lines — from the socioeconomic realities of the secretaries, janitors, house cleaners, child day-care workers, and imported nannies who directly or indirectly serve them yet whose need for a less precarious living wage has been supported and publicized, tellingly enough, not by academic colloquia dealing with differance or postcolonial otherness, but by labour and student activism. Statistically and demographically speaking, few have been liberated by a tinkering with language and culture alone, and **cultural determinism is no less one-sided, hegemonic, and narrow-minded than the economic determinism** that it has diabolized over the last three decades. It is indeed important not to forget that many of the notions devised with the initially laudable intent, in the 196os and 197os, to "give a voice" to the oppressed have since the 1980s (and particularly glaringly since the iggos) become, as Masao Miyoshi somewhat caustically put it, little more than academic and middle class chic: self-proclaimed subversive theoretical disciplines such as subaltern studies and postcolonialism are indeed but "a luxury largely irrelevant to those who live under the most wretched conditions," for "neither nativism, nor pluralism are in their thoughts, only survival."3

## 1nr

### pics

#### Discursive analysis is productive in this context

Lorente, PhD, Social Anthropology – University of Granada, researcher – Casa Árabe e Instituto Internacional de Estudios Árabes y del Mundo Musulmán, ‘10

(Javier Rosón, “Discrepancies Around the Use of the Term “Islamophobia”,” HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, VIII, 2, Fall)

Terms/concepts are theoretical constructions derived from a given reality which can capture and synthesize aspects of that reality. They can respond to social constructions resulting from processes of interaction among different individuals (their own identity and practices) or to his- toric constructions which in an adjustable manner are organized and modified in time and in space. Presumably we should understand the term Islamophobia to be a way to ‘read’ what is going on, a way to express the (current) reality and account for its practices. In other words, Islamophobia is a term/concept we have constructed to weld together a ‘universal container’ of social practices and meanings, regardless of the contextual conditions upon which those built until present have been based. These conditions are diverse in their ‘form and content,’ such as the different degrees of associationism, technical components, inclusion policies, specific and differentiated mass media treatment, etc. They encompass5 an infinite number of acts and attitudes which have no need to be highlighted or signified according to the daily logic of ‘minorities and majorities,’ but which are rather clear acts of exclusion and a broad state of ‘uncertainty’ centred especially on the more significant ‘other’ and currently and historically essentialized per the keys of what we take to be Islamophobia. Attacks (verbal, physical, on private property of the ‘other,’ etc.), negative stereotypes, mimesis and comments in the discourse of various social players, job discrimination, bureaucratic disregard and delay regarding the construction of mosques, prayer rooms and cemeteries, etc., and even the non-recognition of a distinctive identity, both ethnic and religious, are examples of what all too often happens in our societies with respect to a certain population—a minority ‘we’ identify as foreign (even if Spanish), Arab and/or Muslim. Although the term in both its ‘practical’ and theoretical facet seems objectively defined, as to what is or is not an “Islamophobic” act and/or attitude, it is nevertheless roundly criticized by some analysts/ academics due to its ambiguity and the scant consensus over its definition, and to its application or general acknowledgment. This non-definition gives rise to three main currents of criticism, mostly interrelated: religious, racial and ethno-cultural. There is also another order of criticism which can involve etymology, identity, politics, freedom of expression and ideological discourse, etc., which complete and/or complement the distinct discrepant lines around its use.

#### The term is key—it both homogenizes oppression AND prevents criticism

Lorente, PhD, Social Anthropology – University of Granada, researcher – Casa Árabe e Instituto Internacional de Estudios Árabes y del Mundo Musulmán, ‘10

(Javier Rosón, “Discrepancies Around the Use of the Term “Islamophobia”,” HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, VIII, 2, Fall)

But we cannot put aside the ‘religious facet’ of Islam and the latter’s involvement in the religious, social, political and cultural aspects of Muslim individuals and communities. From the moment in which religious connotation enters into play another series of discrepancies of a ‘religious’ nature arises. In this regard, ‘religious criticism’ basically puts forward two postures: on the one hand, that Islamophobia can be used by some Muslims or communities to forbid all criticism of Islam as a religion, i.e., so that the religion they practice is not questioned in any way; on the other stand those who hold that the term may be misleading, as it implicitly presumes the pre-eminence of religious discrimination (phobia against a single, homogenous and unchangeable Islam), when there are other forms of discrimination which can be ethnic, ‘racial’ or class racism, etc., with much greater relevance or representation. For this reason the religious connotation which can accompany the term Islamophobia is rejected, given that in different countries religion is often seen as an obstacle to integration10. Criticism on this point is likewise related to aspects such as laicism or the construction of a secular society, wherein it is held that the representation of religion should mainly be undertaken in a private context.

But we’re link-turning its efficacy---only “anti-Muslimism” creates a coherent agenda for combating discrimination—you can only fear an actor (a Muslim), not an abstract concept (Islam)

Joppke, professor of politics – American University of Paris, PhD Sociology – Berkeley, ‘9

(Christian, “Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and Her Muslims,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Volume 35, Issue 3)

The notion of Islamophobia cannot be meaningfully decoupled from an actor's intent to harm or discriminate. A phobia, after all, is an irrational fear: this can only be the disposition of an actor. Islamophobia inherits this limitation from its closest historical progenitor, ‘anti-Semitism’. However, in its subject-centredness Islamophobia falls short of the model that it aspires to emulate, ‘racism’, which has increasingly come to denote an objective fact built into the anonymous workings of institutions. This weakness might well have been strength, because there are good reasons to be sceptical of the construct of ‘institutional racism’ in which ‘racism’ is an objective outcome separate from actors’ intentions. Unfortunately, the advocates of the concept of Islamophobia are generally not fond of conceptual subtleties, applying the latter, like ‘racism’, to generic discrimination that afflicts Muslims qua Muslims. Accordingly, the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia suggested the existence of ‘institutional Islamophobia’, analogous to the notion of institutional racism, defining the former as ‘those established laws, customs and practices which systematically reflect and produce inequalities in society between Muslims and non-Muslims’ (2004: 14).

Rejection solves—creates space for alternative languages

Lorente, PhD, Social Anthropology – University of Granada, researcher – Casa Árabe e Instituto Internacional de Estudios Árabes y del Mundo Musulmán, ‘10

(Javier Rosón, “Discrepancies Around the Use of the Term “Islamophobia”,” HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, VIII, 2, Fall)

Other terms which semantically attempt to approach the national particularities or ‘realities’ (besides the more extended ‘anti-Arab anti-Muslim racism’) are becoming alternative though critical lines vis-à-vis usage of the term Islamophobia. For example ‘Islamfeindichkeit’ in the German context literally means hostility to Islam, or its rejection, but not phobia in the sense of fear, or ‘*maurofobia/*morofobia’ in the Spanish case.

### case

Our argument is not to say that your conception of Islam is wrong, it’s that people conceive of Islam in different ways and we should acknowledge that by not making commonalities of faith the sole focal point for combatting oppression—their method papers over tons of material differences

Halliday, professor of international relations – London School of Economics, ‘99

(Fred, “`Islamophobia’ reconsidered,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Volume 22, Number 5, p. 892-902, September)

To the diversities of history can be added that of identity. All those who are Muslims certainly consider Islam as part of their identity. They respect the éve injunctions of Islam, they practise the rituals of life in an Islamic way, they celebrate Muslim festivals, they call their children by Muslim names. Equally importantly, and central to this issue, they experience a degree of common identity with Muslims who are oppressed elsewhere – be this in Palestine, Bosnia, or Kashmir. Yet these commonalities of faith, practice and solidarity are not the whole story. Islam may, in some contexts, be the prime form of political and social identity, but it is never the sole form and is often not the primary one: within Muslim societies divisions of ethnicity matter as much and often more than a shared religious identity; this is equally so in emigration. There is no lack of difference between genders and classes, between those with power and wealth and those without. No one can understand the politics of, say, Turkey, Pakistan or Indonesia on the basis of Islam alone. Despite rhetoric, Islam explains little of what happens in these societies. The claim of a shared Muslim identity is therefore a distortion if this is meant to imply the primacy of such an identity. It is equally distortion if it implies a common, or given, interpretation of that tradition. Perhaps the great disservice which invocations of ‘Islam’, of community and of tradition, indeed of the whole communitarian and identity rhetoric of today does, is to distort the degree to which what is presented as ‘Islam’, or any other religion, is itself diverse and changing. The claim of fundamentalisms, indeed of all, be they religious or nationalist élites, who claim to be interpreters of the perennial, is that they are representatives of a given: therein lies authority. But such is never the case. This is what is well explained in the essays in Der Islam und der Westen, and which is the core of the modernist account of Islamism and Islamic thought. Bobby Sayyid vigorously rejects a monist interpretation of Islam, but he offers no speciéc, researched, analysis of what Muslim thinkers have said or of their concepts. Indeed, his very rejection of reformers such as al-Afghani and Abduh would seem to imply the aspiration for a similar essentialist and unchanging view of Islam. What this implies for the study of Muslim soceties, and for the study of Muslims in western Europe, is an analysis of ‘Islam’, much less general and less absolute than has often been the case, and as is claimed by representatives, often patriarchal, sectarian and self-appointed, of Muslim societies. On the one hand, what is presented as ‘Islam’ may well be one, but by no means the only possible interpretation. Aziz al-Azmeh has shown well, for example, in Islam and Modernities how the apparently given symbol of Islamism, shariah law, is itself a modern creation and liable to many, contingent, interpretations: there is no one shariah which Islamists can invoke. The taliban interpretation of the place of women in society, or of the ban on images of the human égure, reèect one, but very much a minority, view. Similarly views by fundamentalists about the impropriety of Muslim women in the West training to be doctors or engineers are one, also very much a minority, variant. The mistake of those opposed to anti-Muslim prejudice has been to accept, as the one true Muslim answer, particular, and often conservative, versions of that tradition.3 Even more so, the identiécation of Muslims with supporters of terrorism or fundamentalist groups is a distortion: a work like that of the otherwise judicious Gilles Kepel, Allah in the West, misrepresents the Muslims of the UK, France and the USA as if they are in large measure adherents of the Bradford Council of Mosques or of the Black Muslims. In a more extreme vein, Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammad of al-Mohajirun was to claim in January 1999, during the controversy over British subjects being arrested in Yemen, that in every mosque in Britain and the Middle East young men were receiving military training.4 Allah is in the West, but in different forms. Most challenging from an analytic point of view is the analysis of the intersection of identities. It is easy to visit a Muslim country or study an immigrant community, and present all in terms of religion. But this is to miss the other identities – of work, location, ethnicity – and, not least, the ways in which different Muslims relate to each other. No one with the slightest acquaintance with the inner life of the Arabs in Britain, or the Pakistani and Bengali communities, will know there is as much difference as commonality.5 The repeated feuds over sites of worship – common to Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews – testify to the intrusion of other, secular, factors and to different interpretations of the tradition. The analytic challenge is to identify how the tradition and religion are shaped, how the modern is presented as the traditional, and how other factors of ethnicity, class and sect play a role. There may therefore be occasions on which ‘Islam’ is the main or sole identity, not least when people are attacked on that basis: but such occasions are rare. ‘Islam’ tells us only one part of how these peoples live and see the world: and that ‘Islam’ may vary greatly. To take the most divisive international issue of the 1990s: if there can be an Islamic solidarity with Saddam Hussein, there can also be one with countries that Iraq has attacked, Iran and Kuwait, just as there is a strong Islamic opposition by Iraqis to Saddam’s regime. Islamophobia or anti-Muslimism Such historicization and disaggregation is relevant to the issue of what to term prejudice against Muslims.6 That there is such a thing as denoted by the term ‘Islamophobia’ is undoubtedly true. Recent examples in the British press are not hard to énd.7 Elsewhere we can see similar trends: in Denmark the People’s Party has made such hostility central to its programme; 8 in 1998 Hollywood produced an alarmist élm, The Siege, focusing on Islamic terrorism, in marked contrast, be it said, to its indulgent treatment of Irish republicanism. Nor is this speciéc to the Christian or Jewish world: perhaps the most striking instance of hostility to Muslims today is to be found in India. The BJP ran for re-election in 1997 on three anti-Muslim issues: rebuilding the Temple at Ayodhya, removing separate legal codes for Muslims, and ending the special status of Kashmir. Other BJP policies – renaming Bombay after a Hindu goddess, rewriting history books – follow a similar logic. The positing of a continuous, historic, past of confrontation may not only be historically inaccurate but may ascribe cause to religion, an eternal factor, where other, more contingent and contemporary causes, may be at work. It also misses the point about what it is that is being attacked: ‘Islam’ as a religion was the enemy in the past: in the crusades or the reconquista . It is not the enemy now: Islam is not threatening to win large segments of western European society to its faith, as Communism did, nor is the polemic, in press, media or political statement, against the Islamic faith. There are no books coming out questioning the claims of Muhammad or the Koran. The attack now is against not Islam as a faith but Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all, especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term. Equally, the ‘Islamophobic’ attack is against states which may be among the most secular in the world, as Saddam Hussein’s is. If we take the study as one of negative stereotyping, of what in German is called the Feindbild, the enemy image, then the enemy is not a faith or a culture, but a people. Hence the more accurate term is not ‘Islamophobia’ but ‘anti-Muslimism’.