# 1AC

## plan

The United States federal government should limit the war power authority of the president for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict.

## legal regimes adv

The administration has asserted TK is legally justified under armed conflict AND self-defense authority

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As to the jus ad bellum, 124 the government based its authority to attack 125 targets outside of the armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan on three concepts.126 The government has not articulated which of these principles it relied upon or how the three concepts legally interacted.127 First, the U.S. is engaged in an ongoing non-international armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces around the world, authorized by the AUMF.128 Second, the U.S. may be operating within a given territorial state, such as Yemen or Pakistan, with that state’s consent. That consent may take the form of inviting the U.S. to support that nation in its own preexisting NIAC with a particular purported branch or associated force of al Qaeda or the Taliban.129 Such a framework tracks the same logic as the multinational/transnational NIACs of Iraq and Afghanistan, where the sovereign territorial states have invited the U.S. to remain on their territory. Alternatively, that consent may be given simply to allow the U.S. to intervene on the sovereign territory of the state in order to pursue the U.S.’s armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and/or associated forces in that particular instance. This consent need not be public; it need not be officially or formally articulated; it may be construed by silence; and it may indeed be gleaned from lack of objection after the attack has occurred.130 Third, the U.S. maintains a seemingly separate legal justification for attacks against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and/or associated forces targets in any country based on self-defense. Such self-defense would allow the United States to attack if the territorial state is “unable or unwilling” to obviate the threat from terrorists on its territory. Furthermore, a self-defense claim may be legally sound if a state cannot control its own territory, or is a “failed state.”131 Meanwhile, some American academics began to argue for a theory—reportedly developed by Koh132—of “elongated imminence” based on “battered spouse syndrome.”133

• As to jus in bello rules applicable to the geographically unbounded NIAC against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and/or associated forces, and associated targeting operations, including against U.S. citizens, the government “takes great care to adhere to the principles” of distinction and proportionality, as defined in IHL.134 While the CIA and any military agencies acting under its orders or authority are to act in accordance with IHL “principles” in their targeting, it is not clear whether the CIA can or will be held accountable for any violations of IHL, or whether, particularly when acting in “covert operations,” they would be subject to criminal liability under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the War Crimes Act.135

• In February 2013, an unsigned and undated Department of Justice White Paper on “The Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or an Associated Force" publicly surfaced.136 While the While Paper does not provide the DOJ's comprehensive legal analysis, it does serve as a sort of "folk international law" primer, conflating concepts, rules, and principles from IHL, IHRL, and jus ad bellum. For instance, the White Paper invokes a concept of imminence that appears to be unrecognizable under longstanding IHRL and jus ad bellum11 It also seems to take an extraordinarily narrow view under international law of the Administration's obligation to seek the capture of terrorists away from "hot" battlefields before using lethal force.138 Finally, it argues for territorially unbounded NIAC by way of analogy.139

Combined, this remarkably opaque collection of purported international legal bases for the CIA and, perhaps less so, the military to target members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces in any country at any time may make some nostalgic for the days when the government simply rejected the applicability of international law to the war on terror. These legal arguments and positions indicate that while the Bush Administration coined and regularly used the term "war on terror," the Obama Administration much more actively pursues an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces in & global context}40 That is, it extends the conduct of hostilities, as opposed to detention operations or CIA capture operations, to multiple sites around the world, and explicitly states that it is doing so pursuant to an armed conflict with a terrorist organization and its associates. In doing so, the Obama Administration purportedly expands the scope of the applicability of IHL to any place that the United States targets these individuals, typically with only a passing reference to the “sovereignty” of the state on which the terrorist is being targeted.141 It then states that certain IHL principles are being applied—or at least considered—by a clandestine branch of the government whose accountability to the rules of IHL is unclear.142

Whether or not it is meaningfully different, and whether or not Obama Administration officials lament the condition in which they found the country and the government, it is certainly the case that President Obama made the “war against al Qaeda” much more than a rhetorical flourish or a tool that is mainly used to capture individuals abroad and bring them into secretive prisons or Guantánamo. The upshot is that the Obama Administration treats the war against al Qaeda and associated forces much more as a war in the sense of actual armed attacks against targets all over the world than did the Bush Administration. While there had been several instances of such treatment during the Bush Administration, perhaps most infamously the 2002 attack in Yemen, the scale and speed of the attacks under President Obama is far greater than anything carried out by his predecessor.

The Obama Administration’s policy shift occurs within an entirely different rhetorical environment and in a context in which this approach— which one could reasonably call “global war”—is articulated through the language of IHL. After the profound dismay felt by many in the legal profession and academia over the legal memoranda provided to President Bush, the Obama Administration appoints some of the country’s finest international lawyers, many of them well known to the IHL and human rights lawyers who have been fighting against the war on terror throughout this story.143 Indeed, many of the international lawyers who join the Obama Administration have been involved in legal or scholarly efforts to curtail the Bush Administration’s pursuit of the global war on terror. In this sense, as we head into the reactions by IHL and IHRL to these positions, there seems to be far more benefit of the doubt granted to this Administration’s approach to the conflict.144

In a strange coda to the arguments and positions taken by the government throughout these debates, a number of officials suggest by the end of this phase that killing suspected terrorists has become legally and logistically easier than detaining them. Indeed, many have argued that this is precisely what is happening in various situations around the world— whether in Iraq and Afghanistan, as troop drawdown is contemplated in earnest, or in Somalia,145 Yemen,146 and Pakistan 147— with members of the armed forces and drone operators reportedly finding it easier to kill targets148 than to take them into U.S. custody.149

That erodes international norm development for both humanitarian and human rights law

Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf

As noted in the introduction to this article, maintaining the separation between and independence of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is vital for the effective application of the law and protection of persons in conflict. The discussion that follows will refer to both the LOAC and the law of self-defense extensively in a range of situations in order to analyze and highlight the risks of blurring the lines between the two paradigms. However, it is important to note that the purpose here is not to conflate the two paradigms, but to emphasize the risks inherent in blurring these lines. Preserving the historic separation remains central to the application of both bodies of law, to the maintenance of international security, and to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities.

III. BLURRING THE LINES

The nature of the terrorist threat the United States and other states face does indeed raise the possibility that both the armed conflict and the self-defense paradigms are relevant to the use of targeted strikes overall. The United States has maintained for the past ten years that it is engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda66 and, notwithstanding continued resistance to the notion of an armed conflict between a state and a transnational terrorist group in certain quarters, there is general acceptance that the scope of armed conflict can indeed encompass such a state versus non-state conflict. Not all U.S. counterterrorism measures fit within the confines of this armed conflict, however, with the result that many of the U.S. targeted strikes over the past several years may well fit more appropriately within the self-defense paradigm. The existence of both paradigms as relevant to targeted strikes is not inherently problematic. It is the United States’ insistence on using reference to both paradigms as justification for individual attacks and the broader program of targeted strikes that raises significant concerns for the use of international law and the protection of individuals by blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms.

A. Location of Attacks: International Law and the Scope of the Battlefield

The distinct differences between the targeting regimes in armed conflict and in self-defense and who can be targeted in which circumstances makes understanding the differentiation between the two paradigms essential to lawful conduct in both situations. The United States has launched targeted strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria during the past several years. The broad geographic range of the strike locations has produced significant questions—as yet mostly unanswered— and debate regarding the parameters of the conflict with al Qaeda.67 The U.S. armed conflict with al Qaeda and other terrorist groups has focused on Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan, but the United States has launched an extensive campaign of targeted strikes in Yemen and some strikes in Somalia in the past year as well. In the early days of the conflict, the United States seemed to trumpet the notion of a global battlefield, in which the conflict with al Qaeda extended to every corner of the world.68 Others have argued that conflict, even one with a transnational terrorist group, can only take place in limited, defined geographic areas.69 At present, the United States has stepped back from the notion of a global battlefield, although there is little guidance to determine precisely what factors influence the parameters of the zone of combat in the conflict with al Qaeda.70

Traditionally, the law of neutrality provided the guiding framework for the parameters of the battlespace in an international armed conflict. When two or more states are fighting and certain other states remain neutral, the line between the two forms the divider between the application of the laws of war and the law of neutrality.71 The law of neutrality is based on the fundamental principle that neutral territory is inviolable72 and focuses on three main goals: (1) contain the spread of hostilities, particularly by keeping down the number of participants; (2) define the legal rights of parties and nonparties to the conflict; and (3) limit the impact of war on nonparticipants, especially with regard to commerce.73 In this way, neutrality law leads to a geographic-based framework in which belligerents can fight on belligerent territory or the commons, but must refrain from any operations on neutral territory. In essence, the battlespace in a traditional armed conflict between two or more states is anywhere outside the sovereign territory of any of the neutral states.74 The language of the Geneva Conventions tracks this concept fairly closely. Common Article 2, which sets forth the definition of international armed conflict, states that such conflict occurs in “all cases of declared war or . . . any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.”75 In Common Article 3, noninternational armed conflicts include conflicts between a state and non-state armed groups that are “occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”76 Both of these formulations tie the location of the armed conflict directly to the territory of one or more belligerent parties.

The neutrality framework as a geographic parameter is left wanting in today’s conflicts with terrorist groups, however. First, as a formal matter, the law of neutrality technically only applies in cases of international armed conflict.77 Even analogizing to the situations we face today is highly problematic, however, because today’s conflicts not only pit states against non-state actors, but because those actors and groups often do not have any territorial nexus beyond wherever they can find safe haven from government intrusion. As state and non-state actors have often shifted unpredictably and irregularly between acts characteristic of wartime and those characteristic of not-wartime[, t]he unpredictable and irregular nature of these shifts makes it difficult to know whether at any given moment one should understand them as armies and their enemies or as police forces and their criminal adversaries.78

Simply locating terrorist groups and operatives does not therefore identify the parameters of the battlefield—the fact that the United States and other states use a combination of military operations and law enforcement measures to combat terrorism blurs the lines one might look for in defining the battlefield. In many situations, “the fight against transnational jihadi groups . . . largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield.”79

Second, a look at U.S. jurisprudence in the past and today demonstrates a clear break between the framework applied in past wars and the views courts are taking today. U.S. courts during World War I viewed “the port of New York [as] within the field of active [military] operations.”80 Similarly, a 1942 decision upholding the lawfulness of an order evacuating JapaneseAmericans to a military area stated plainly that the field of military operation is not confined to the scene of actual physical combat. Our cities and transportation systems, our coastline, our harbors, and even our agricultural areas are all vitally important in the all-out war effort in which our country must engage if our form of government is to survive.81

In each of those cases, the United States was a belligerent in an international armed conflict; the law of neutrality mandated that U.S. territory was belligerent territory and therefore part of the battlefield or combat zone. The courts take a decidedly different view in today’s conflicts, however, consistently referring to the United States as “outside a zone of combat,”82 “distant from a zone of combat,”83 or not within any “active [or formal] theater of war,”84 even while recognizing the novel geographic nature of the conflict. Even more recently, in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals distinguished between Afghanistan, “a theater of active military combat,”85 and other areas (including the United States), which are described as “far removed from any battlefield.”86 In a traditional belligerency-neutrality framework, one would expect to see U.S. territory viewed as part of the battlefield; the fact that courts consistently trend the other way highlights both the difference in approach and the uncertainty involved in defining today’s conflicts.

The current U.S. approach of using both the armed conflict paradigm and the self-defense paradigm as justifications for targeted strikes without further clarification serves to exacerbate the legal challenges posed by the geography of the conflict, at both a theoretical and a practical level. First, at the most fundamental level, uncertainty regarding the parameters of the battlefield has significant consequences for the safety and security of individuals. During armed conflict, the LOAC authorizes the use of force as a first resort against those identified as the enemy, whether insurgents, terrorists or the armed forces of another state. In contrast, human rights law, which would be the dominant legal framework in areas where there is no armed conflict, authorizes the use of force only as a last resort.87 Apart from questions regarding the application of human rights law during times of war, which are outside the scope of this article, the distinction between the two regimes is nonetheless starkest in this regard. The former permits targeting of individuals based on their status as members of a hostile force; the latter—human rights law—permits lethal force against individuals only on the basis of their conduct posing a direct threat at that time. The LOAC also accepts the incidental loss of civilian lives as collateral damage, within the bounds of the principle of proportionality;88 human rights law contemplates no such casualties. These contrasts can literally mean the difference between life and death in many situations. Indeed, “If it is often permissible to deliberately kill large numbers of humans in times of armed conflict, even though such an act would be considered mass murder in times of peace, then it is essential that politicians and courts be able to distinguish readily between conflict and nonconflict, between war and peace.”89 However, the overreliance on flexibility at present means that U.S. officials do not distinguish between conflict and non-conflict areas but rather simply use the broad sweep of armed conflict and/or self-defense to cover all areas without further delineation.

Second, on a broader level of legal application and interpretation, the development of the law itself is affected by the failure to delineate between relevant legal paradigms. “Emerging technologies of potentially great geographic reach raise the issue of what regime of law regulates these activities as they spread,”90 and emphasize the need to foster, rather than hinder, development of the law in these areas. Many argue that the ability to use armed drones across state borders without risk to personnel who could be shot down or captured across those borders has an expansive effect on the location of conflict and hostilities. In effect, they suggest that it is somehow “easier” to send unmanned aircraft across sovereign borders because there is no risk of a pilot being shot down and captured, making the escalation and spillover of conflict more likely.91 Understanding the parameters of a conflict with terrorist groups is important, for a variety of reasons, none perhaps more important than the life-and-death issues detailed above. By the same measure, understanding the authorities for and limits on a state’s use of force in self-defense is essential to maintaining orderly relations between states and to the ability of states to defend against attacks, from whatever quarter. The extensive debates in the academic and policy worlds highlight the fundamental nature of both inquiries. However, the repeated assurances from the U.S. government that targeted strikes are lawful in the course of armed conflict or in exercise of the legitimate right of self-defense—without further elaboration and specificity—allows for a significantly less nuanced approach. As long as a strike seems to fit into the overarching framework of helping to defend the United States against terrorism, there no longer would be a need to carefully delineate the parameters of armed conflict and self-defense, where the outer boundaries of each lie and how they differ from each other. From a purely theoretical standpoint, this limits the development and implementation of the law. Even from a more practical policy standpoint, the United States may well find that the blurred lines prove detrimental in the future when it seeks sharper delineations for other purposes.

The impact is unrestrained use of force in conflict

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The central purpose of the convergence of IHL and IHRL is to increase the protection of individuals in armed conflict. The notion behind the insistence that IHL and IHRL are part of the same discipline suggests that IHL is part of the far larger and more broadly applicable legal realm of IHRL. Indeed, the very idea of the “humanization of humanitarian law”159 is that the cold, brutal balancing of IHL, its perceived deference to the military and the needs of the state is opened up and mitigated by a body of law that protects the individual’s human rights against the state. Yet here the story flips: It is IHRL that seems to become part of IHL. It is IHRL that, by the end of our narrative, seems to be brought into the service of conflict, to act not as a powerful check on the brute force of the sovereign, not as the voice of the international community against those who wish to prioritize national security over individual liberties, but rather as a means to regulate the use of lethal violence. Having argued vociferously that IHRL applies in all situations of armed conflict at all times in order to protect individuals, the argument suddenly turns in the other direction. It becomes possible to say that IHRL can be utilized to allow for one state to invade another state’s territory in order to murder individuals without an attempt to arrest, detain, charge, and try these individuals. What is so striking in this view is how well—if that is the right word—the convergence argument worked, or at least how much work convergence ended up doing. Remarkably, many who wish to justify a far broader and even more aggressive CIA drone program cite convergence as a basis for doing so.160

For the application of IHL, on the other hand, the dominant assumption of convergence—that human rights law and IHL are part of the same general field, that they apply simultaneously, and that they are part of the same conversation—may have had the effect of loosening the boundaries around the field of application of IHL. As the two bodies of law began to be used interchangeably—as an attack utilizing a five hundred pound bomb is analogized to a police officer using a weapon when faced with the imminent danger of a hostage situation—one effect on the perception of IHL may be that it is no longer seen as a tightly controlled body of law. As many leading IHL lawyers warned in 2001 and 2002, once IHL is applied, many ugly things that we generally see as illegal, as outside the realm of rule of law, suddenly become lawful. Those IHRL lawyers who argued that IHRL applies simultaneously to IHL during armed conflict may have contributed to the blurring of the line between war and not-war.

That causes global war

Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12

A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance.

In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression.

4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ‘desirable wars’

A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be more concerned about the prospect of future Kosovos – ambitious military actions without clear legal authority – or future Rwandas – inaction and deadlock at the Security Council. Indeed, various institutional designs will tend to favor one of those outcomes over the other. In 1999, Kofi Annan delivered a powerful statement that appeared to consider the prospect of repeat Rwandas the greater concern; and he issued a call to arms to support the ‘developing international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’.95 Ifoneassumesthatthereis,indeed,aneedforcontinuedorgreatersupport for humanitarian uses of force, Type I erosions of the separation principle pose a serious threat to that vision. And the threat is not limited to unilateral uses of force. It also applies to military operations authorized by the Security Council. In short, all ‘interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected.

Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach. The scheme imposes greater requirements on armed forces engaged in a humanitarian mission with respect to safeguarding civilian ives.96 If that scheme is intended to smoke out illicit intent,97 it is likely to have perverse effects: suppressing sincere humanitarian efforts at least on the margins. Actors engaged in a bona fide humanitarian intervention generally tend to be more protective of their own armed forces than in other conflicts. It is instructive to consider, for instance, the precipitous US withdrawal from the UN mission in Somalia – code-named Operation Restore Hope – after the loss of eighteen American soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, and the ‘lesson’ that policymakers drew from that conflict.98 Additionally, the Kosovoc ampaign – code-named Operation Noble Anvil – was designed to be a ‘zero-casualty war’ for US soldiers, because domestic public support for the campaign was shallow and unstable. The important point is that the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach would impose additional costs on genuine humanitarian efforts, for which it is already difficult to build and sustain popular support. As a result, we can expect to see fewer bona fide interventions to protect civilians from atrocities.99 Notably, such results are more likely to affect two types of states: states with robust, democratic institutions that effectively reflect public opinion and states that highly value compliance with jus in bello. Both of those are the very states that one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions.

The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the British House of Lords decision in Al-Jedda which cast doubt on the validity of derogations taken in peacekeeping operations as well as other military efforts in which the homeland is not directly at stake and the state could similarly withdraw. The scheme imposes a tax on such interventions by precluding the government from adopting measures that would otherwise be considered lawful and necessary to meet exigent circumstances related to the conflict. Such extraordinary constraints in wartime may very well temper the resolve to engage in altruistic intervention and military efforts that involve similar forms of voluntarism on the part of the state. Such a legal scheme may thus yield fewer such operations and the participation of fewer states in such multilateral efforts. And, the impact of the scheme should disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously.

Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties: states that decide whether and to what degree to participate in a coalition with the principal intervener. It is to be expected that the commitment on the part of the principal intervener will be stronger, and thus not as easily shifted by the erosion of the separation principle. The ability, however, to hold together a coalition of states is made much more difficult by these added burdens. Indeed, as the United States learned in the Kosovo campaign, important European allies were wary about the intervention, in part due to its lack of an international legal pedigree. And the weakness of the alliance, including German and Italian calls for an early suspension of the bombing campaign, impeded the ability to wage war in the first place. It may be these third party states and their decision whether to join a humanitarian intervention where the international legal regime matters most. Without such backing of important allies, the intervention itself is less likely to occur. It is also those states – the more democratic, the more rights respecting, and the more law abiding – that the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions.

The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ‘undesirable wars’ more likely. In previous writing, I argue that encouraging states to frame their resort to force through humanitarian objectives rather than other rationales would, in the aggregate, reduce the overall level of disputes that result in uncontrolled escalation and war.100 A reverse relationship also holds true. That is, encouraging states to forego humanitarian rationales in favor of other justifications for using force may culminate in more international disputes ending in uncontrolled escalation and war. This outcome is especially likely to result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle.

First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach) and ‘wars of choice’ (the Al-Jedda approach) would encourage states to justify their resort to force on alternative grounds. For example, states would be incentivized to invoke other legitimated frameworks – such as security rationales involving the right to self-defense, collective self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, and traditional threats to international peace and security. And, even if military action is pursued through the Security Council, states may be reluctant to adopt language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives.

Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over humanitarian ones is more likely to lead to uncontrolled escalation and war. A growing body of social science scholarship demonstrates that the type of issue in dispute can constitute an important variable in shaping the course of interstate hostilities. The first generation of empirical scholarship on the origins of war did not consider this dimension. Political scientists instead concentrated on features of the international system (for example, the distribution of power among states) and on the characteristics of states (for example, forms of domestic governance structures) as the key explanatory variables. Research agendas broadened considerably, however, in subsequent years. More recently, ‘[s]everal studies have identified substantial differences in conflict behavior over different types of issues’.101 The available evidence shows that states are significantly more inclined to fight over particular types of issues that are elevated in a dispute, despite likely overall material and strategic losses.102 Academic studies have also illuminated possible causal explanations for these empirical patterns. Specifically, domestic (popular and elite) constituencies more readily support bellicose behavior by their government when certain salient cultural or ideological issues are in contention. Particular issue areas may also determine the expert communities (humanitarian versus security mindsets) that gain influence in governmental circles – a development that can shape the hard-line or soft-line strategies adopted in the course of the dispute. In short, these links between domestic political processes and the framing of international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war.

Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in interstate disputes with rivals and that those disputes which are framed through security and strategic rationales are more likely to escalate to war. Indeed, the inclusion of a humanitarian rationale provides windows of opportunity to control and deescalate a conflict. Thus, eliminating or demoting a humanitarian rationale from a mix of justifications (even if it is not replaced by another rationale) can be independently destabilizing. Espousing or promoting security rationales, on the other hand, is more likely to culminate in public demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103

Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of international law to influence state behavior directly. It is reasonable to assume that international law is unlikely to alter the determination of a state to wage war, and that international law is far more likely to influence only the justificatory discourse states employ while proceeding down the warpath. However, as I argue in my earlier work, leaders (of democratic and nondemocratic) states become caught in their official justifications for military campaigns. Consequently, framing the resort to force as a pursuit of security objectives, or adding such issues to an ongoing conflict, can reshape domestic political arrangements, which narrows the subsequent range of policy options. Issues that initially enter a conflict due to disingenuous representations by political leaders can become an authentic part of the dispute over time. Indeed, the available social science research, primarily qualitative case studies, is even more relevant here. A range of empirical studies demonstrate such unintended consequences primarily in the case of leaders employing security-based and strategic rationales to justify bellicose behavior.104 A central finding is that pretextual and superficial justifications can meaningfully influence later stages of the process that shape popular and elite conceptions of the international dispute. And it is those understandings that affect national security strategies and the ladder of escalation to war. Indeed, one set of studies – of empires – suggests these are mechanisms for powerful states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend.

TK self-defense norms modeled globally --- causes global war

Fisk & Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk --- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos-- PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, “Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm” 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)

Conclusion

Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in order to prevent a suspected enemy from changing the status quo in an unfavorable direction. Prevention is acting in anticipation of a suspected latent threat that might fully emerge someday. One might rightfully point out that preventive strikes are nothing new—the Iraq War is simply a more recent example in a long history of the preventive use of force. The strategic theorist Colin Gray (2007:27), for example, argues that “far from being a rare and awful crime against an historical norm, preventive war is, and has always been, so common, that its occurrence seems remarkable only to those who do not know their history.” Prevention may be common throughout history, but this does not change the fact that it became increasingly difficult to justify after World War II, as the international community developed a core set of normative principles to guide state behavior, including war as a last resort. The threshold for war was set high, imposing a stringent standard for states acting in self-defense. Gray concedes that there has been a “slow and erratic, but nevertheless genuine, growth of a global norm that regards the resort to war as an extraordinary and even desperate measure” and that the Iraq war set a “dangerous precedent” (44). Although our cases do not provide a definitive answer for whether a preventive self-defense norm is diffusing, they do provide some initial evidence that states are re-orienting their military and strategic doctrines toward offense. In addition, these states have all either acquired or developed unmanned aerial vehicles for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting.

Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm regarding the use of force as a last resort is waning, and that **a preventive self-defense norm is emerging and cascading following the example set by the U**nited **S**tates. At the same time, there is variation among our cases in the extent to which they apply the strategy of self-defense. China, for example, has limited their adaption of this strategy to targeted killings, while Russia has declared their strategy to include the possibility of a preventive nuclear war. Yet, the preventive self-defense strategy is not just for powerful actors. Lesser powers may choose to adopt it as well, though perhaps only implementing the strategy against actors with equal or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein.

With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter of time before countries that do not have drone technology are in the minority. While preventive self-defense strategies and drones are not inherently linked, current rhetoric and practice do tie them together. Though it is likely far into the future**, it is all the more important to consider the final stage of norm evolution—internalization—for this particular norm**. While scholars tend to think of norms as “good,” this one is not so clear-cut. If the preventive self-defense norm is taken for granted, integrated into practice without further consideration, it inherently changes the functioning of international relations. And unmanned aerial vehicles, by reducing the costs of war, make claims of preventive self-defense more palatable to the public. Yet **a global norm of preventive self-defense is likely to be** destabilizing**,** leading to more war **in the international system**, not less. It clearly violates notions of just war principles—jus ad bellum. **The U**nited **S**tates **has set a dangerous precedent, and by continuing its preventive strike policy it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.**

Self-defense regime collapse causes every hot spot to escalate

William Bradford, Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, July 2004, SYMPOSIUM: THE CHANGING LAWS OF WAR: DO WE NEED A NEW LEGAL REGIME AFTER SEPTEMBER 11?: "THE DUTY TO DEFEND THEM": n1 A NATURAL LAW JUSTIFICATION FOR THE BUSH DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1365

For restrictivists, n67 anticipatory self-defense, despite its pedigree, is "fertile ground for torturing the self-defense concept" n68 and a dangerous warrant for manipulative, self-serving states to engage in prima facie illegal aggression while cloaking their actions under the guise of anticipatory self-defense and claiming legal legitimacy. n69 Analysis of the legitimacy of an act of anticipatory self-defense requires replacing the objectively verifiable prerequisite of an "armed attack" under Article 51 with the subjective perception of a "threat" of such an attack as perceived by the state believing itself a target, and thus determination of whether a state has demonstrated imminence before engaging in anticipatory self-defense lends itself to post hoc judgments of an infinite number of potential scenarios, spanning a continuum from the most innocuous of putatively civilian acts, including building roads and performing scientific research, to the most threatening, including the overt marshaling of thousands of combat troops in offensive dispositions along a contested border. Establishing the necessity of anticipatory self-defense in response to a pattern of isolated incidents over a period of time is an equally subjective task susceptible to multiple determinations and without empirical standards to guide judgment. n70 History is replete with examples of aggression masquerading as anticipatory self-defense, n71 including the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in [\*1385] 1931 n72 and the German invasion of Poland in 1939, n73 and by simply recharacterizing their actions as anticipatory self-defense rather than aggression dedicated to territorial revanchism or fulfillment of religious obligations, **self-interested states such as China, North Korea, Pakistan, or members of the Arab League,** restrictivists warn, **might claim the legal entitlement to attack**, respectively, **Taiwan, South Korea, India, and Israel**. n74 Moreover, taken to its logical extreme the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense might be interpreted as authorizing a state under the leadership of a paranoid decisionmaker to attack the entire world on the false suspicion of threats emanating from every corner. n75

**A strong, adaptive LOAC regime is key to regulate inevitable autonomous weapons – the impact is global war**

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Since the first lethal drone strike in 2001, the US use of remotely operated robotic weapons has dramatically expanded. Along with the broader use of robots for surveillance, ordnance disposal, logistics, and other military tasks, robotic weapons have spread rapidly to many nations, captured public attention, and sparked protest and debate. Meanwhile, every dimension of the technology is being vigorously explored. From stealthy, unmanned jets like the X-47B and its Chinese and European counterparts, to intelligent missiles, sub-hunting robot ships, and machine gun-wielding micro-tanks, robotics is now the most dynamic and destabilizing component of the global arms race.

Drones and robots are enabled by embedded autonomous subsystems that keep engines in tune and antennas pointed at satellites, and some can navigate, walk, and maneuver in complex environments autonomously. But with few exceptions, the targeting and firing decisions of armed robotic systems remain tightly under the control of human operators. This may soon change.

Autonomous weapons are robotic systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator (Defense Department, 2012). Examples include drones or missiles that hunt for their targets, using their onboard sensors and computers. Based on a computer’s decision that an appropriate target has been located, that target will then be engaged. Sentry systems may have the capability to detect intruders, order them to halt, and fire if the order is not followed. Future robot soldiers may patrol occupied cities. Swarms of autonomous weapons may enable a preemptive attack on an adversary’s strategic forces. Autonomous weapons may fight each other.

Just as the emergence of low-cost, high-performance information technology has been the most important driver of technological advance over the past half-century—including the revolution in military affairs already seen in the 1980s and displayed to the world during the 1991 Gulf War—so the emergence of artificial intelligence and autonomous robotics will likely be the most important development in both civilian and military technology to unfold over the next few decades.

Proponents of autonomous weapons argue that technology will gradually take over combat decision making: “Detecting, analyzing and firing on targets will become increasingly automated, and the contexts of when such force is used will expand. As the machines become increasingly adept, the role of humans will gradually shift from full command, to partial command, to oversight and so on” (Anderson and Waxman, 2013). Automated systems are already used to plan campaigns and logistics, and to assemble intelligence and disseminate lethal commands; in some cases, humans march to orders generated by machines. If, in the future, machines are to act with superhuman speed and perhaps even superhuman intelligence, how can humans remain in control? As former Army Lt. Colonel T. K. Adams observed more than a decade ago (2001), “Humans may retain symbolic authority, but automated systems move too fast, and the factors involved are too complex for real human comprehension.”

Almost nobody favors a future in which humans have lost control over war machines. But proponents of autonomous weapons argue that effective arms control would be unattainable. Many of the same claims that propelled the Cold War are being recycled to argue that autonomous weapons are inevitable, that international law will remain weak, and that there is no point in seeking restraint since adversaries will not agree—or would cheat on agreements. This is the ideology of any arms race.

Is autonomous warfare inevitable?

Challenging the assumption of the inevitability of autonomous weapons and building on the work of earlier activists, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations, was launched in April 2013. This effort has made remarkable progress in its first year. In May, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, Christof Heyns, recommended that nations immediately declare moratoriums on their own development of lethal autonomous robotics (Heyns, 2013). Heyns also called for a high-level study of the issue, a recommendation seconded in July by the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. At the UN General Assembly’s First Committee meeting in October, a flood of countries began to express interest or concern, including China, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. France called for a mandate to discuss the issue under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, a global treaty that restricts excessively injurious or indiscriminate weapons. Meeting in Geneva in November, the state parties to the Convention agreed to formal discussions on autonomous weapons, with a first round in May 2014. The issue has been placed firmly on the global public and diplomatic agenda.

Despite this impressive record of progress on an issue that was until recently virtually unknown—or scorned as a mixture of science fiction and paranoia—there seems little chance that a strong arms control regime banning autonomous weapons will soon emerge from Geneva. Unlike glass shrapnel, blinding lasers, or even landmines and cluster munitions, autonomous weapon systems are not niche armaments of negligible strategic importance and unarguable cost to humanity. Instead of the haunting eyes of children with missing limbs, autonomous weapons present an abstract, unrealized horror, one that some might hope will simply go away.

Unless there is a strong push from civil society and from governments that have decided against pursuing autonomous weapons, those that have decided in favor of them—including the United States (Gubrud, 2013)—will seek to manage the issue as a public relations problem. They will likely offer assurances that humans will remain in control, while continually updating what they mean by control as technology advances. Proponents already argue that humans are never really out of the loop because humans will have programmed a robot and set the parameters of its mission (Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013). But autonomy removes humans from decision making, and even the assumption that autonomous weapons will be programmed by humans is ultimately in doubt.

Diplomats and public spokesmen may speak in one voice; warriors, engineers, and their creations will speak in another. The development and acquisition of autonomous weapons will push ahead if there is no well-defined, immovable, no-go red line. The clearest and most natural place to draw that line is at the point when a machine pulls the trigger, making the decision on whether, when, and against whom or what to use violent force. Invoking a well-established tenet of international humanitarian law, opponents can argue that this is already contrary to principles of humanity, and thus inherently unlawful. Equally important, opponents must point out the threat to peace and security posed by the prospect of a global arms race toward robotic arsenals that are increasingly out of human control.

Humanitarian law vs. killer robots

The public discussion launched by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has mostly centered on questions of legality under international humanitarian law, also called the law of war. “Losing Humanity,” a report released by Human Rights Watch in November 2012—coincidentally just days before the Pentagon made public the world’s first open policy directive for developing, acquiring, and using autonomous weapons—laid out arguments that fully autonomous weapons could not satisfy basic requirements of the law, largely on the basis of assumed limitations of artificial intelligence (Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, 2012).

The principle of distinction, as enshrined in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions—and viewed as customary international law, thus binding even on states that have not ratified the treaty—demands that parties to a conflict distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks must be directed against combatants and military objectives only; weapons not capable of being so directed are considered to be indiscriminate and therefore prohibited. Furthermore, those who make attack decisions must not allow attacks that may be expected to cause excessive harm to civilians, in comparison with the military gains expected from the attack. This is known as the principle of proportionality.

“Losing Humanity” argues that technical limitations mean robots could not reliably distinguish civilians from combatants, particularly in irregular warfare, and could not fulfill the requirement to judge proportionality.1 Distinction is clearly a challenge for current technology; face-recognition technology can rapidly identify individuals from a limited list of potential targets, but more general classification of persons as combatants or noncombatants based on observation is well beyond the state of the art. How long this may remain so is less clear. The capabilities to be expected of artificial intelligence systems 10, 20, or 40 years from now are unknown and highly controversial within both expert and lay communities.

While it may not satisfy the reified principle of distinction, proponents of autonomous weapons argue that some capability for discrimination is better than none at all. This assumes that an indiscriminate weapon would be used if a less indiscriminate one were not available; for example, it is often argued that drone strikes are better than carpet bombing. Yet at some point autonomous discrimination capabilities may be good enough to persuade many people that their use in weapons is a net benefit.

Judgment of proportionality seems at first an even greater challenge, and some argue that it is beyond technology in principle (Asaro, 2012). However, the military already uses an algorithmic “collateral damage estimation methodology” (Defense Department, 2009) to estimate incidental harm to civilians that may be expected from missile and drone strikes. A similar scheme could be developed to formalize the value of military gains expected from attacks, allowing two numbers to be compared. Human commanders applying such protocols could defend their decisions, if later questioned, by citing such calculations. But the cost of this would be to degrade human judgment almost to the level of machines.

On the other hand, IBM’s Watson computer (Ferruci et al., 2010) has demonstrated the ability to sift through millions of pages of natural language and weigh hundreds of hypotheses to answer ambiguous questions. While some of Watson’s responses suggest it is not yet a trustworthy model, it seems likely that similar systems, given semantic information about combat situations, including uncertainties, might be capable of making military decisions that most people would judge as reasonable, most of the time.

“Losing Humanity” also argues that robots, necessarily lacking emotion,2 would be unable to empathize and thus unable to accurately interpret human behavior or be affected by compassion. An important case of the latter is when soldiers refuse orders to put down rebellions. Robots would be ideal tools of repression and dictatorship.

If robot soldiers become available on the world market, it is likely that repressive regimes will acquire them, either by purchase or indigenous production. While it is theoretically possible for such systems to be safeguarded with tamper-proof programming against human rights abuses, in the event that the world fails to prohibit robot soldiers, unsafeguarded or poorly safeguarded versions will likely be available. A strong prohibition has the best chance of keeping killer robots out of the hands of dictators, both by restricting their availability and stigmatizing their use.

Accountability is another much-discussed issue. Clearly, a robot cannot be held responsible for its actions, but human commanders and operators—or even manufacturers, programmers, and engineers—might be held responsible for negligence or malfeasance. In practice, however, the robot is likely to be a convenient scapegoat in case of an unintended atrocity—a technical failure occurred, it was unintended and unforeseen, so nobody is to blame. Going further, David Akerson (2013) argues that since a robot cannot be punished, it cannot be a legal combatant.

These are some of the issues most likely to be discussed within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. However, US Defense Department policy (2012) preemptively addresses many of these issues by directing that “[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”

Under the US policy, commanders and operators are responsible for using autonomous weapons in accordance with the laws of war and relevant treaties, safety rules, and rules of engagement. For example, an autonomous weapon may be sent on a hunt-and-kill mission if tactics, techniques, and procedures ensure that the area in which it is directed to search contains no objects, other than the intended targets, that the weapon might decide to attack. In this case, the policy regards the targets as having been selected by humans and the weapon as merely semi-autonomous, even if the weapon is operating fully autonomously when it decides that a given radar return or warm object is its intended target. The policy pre-approves the immediate development, acquisition, and use of such weapons.

Although the policy does not define “appropriate levels,” it applies this rubric even in the case of fully autonomous lethal weapons targeting human beings without immediate human supervision. This makes it clear that appropriate levels, as understood within the policy, do not necessarily require direct human involvement in the decision to kill a human being (Gubrud, 2013). It seems likely that the United States will press other states to accept this paradigm as the basis for international regulation of autonomous weapons, leaving it to individual states to determine what levels of human judgment are appropriate.

Demanding human control and responsibility

As diplomatic discussions about killer robot regulation get under way, a good deal of time is apt to be lost in confusion about terms, definitions, and scope. “Losing Humanity” seeks to ban “fully autonomous weapons,” and Heyns’s report used the term “lethal autonomous robotics.” The US policy directive speaks of “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems,” and the distinction between these is ambiguous (Gubrud, 2013). The Geneva mandate is to discuss “lethal autonomous weapon systems.”

Substantive questions include whether non-lethal weapons and those that target only matériel are within the scope of discussion. Legacy weapons such as simple mines may be regarded as autonomous, or distinguished as merely automatic, on grounds that their behavior is fully predictable by designers.3 Human-supervised autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, as defined by the United States, raise issues that, like fractal shapes, appear more complex the more closely they are examined.

Instead of arguing about how to define what weapons should be banned, it may be better to agree on basic principles. One is that any use of violent force, lethal or non-lethal, must be by human decision and must at all times be under human control. Implementing this principle as strictly as possible implies that the command to engage an individual target (person or object) must be given by a human being, and only after the target is being reliably tracked by a targeting system and a human has determined that it is an appropriate and legal target.

A second principle is that a human commander must be responsible and accountable for the decision, and if the commander acts through another person who operates a weapon system, that person must be responsible and accountable for maintaining control of the system. “Responsible” refers here to a moral and legal obligation, and “accountable” refers to a formal system for accounting of actions. Both elements are essential to the approach.

Responsibility implies that commanders and operators may not blame inadequacies of technological systems for any failure to exercise judgment and control over the use of violent force. A commander must ensure compliance with the law and rules of engagement independently of any machine decision, either as to the identity of a target or the appropriateness of an attack, or else must not authorize the attack. Similarly, if a system does not give an operator sufficient control over the weapon to prevent unintended engagements, the operator must refuse to operate the system.

Accountability can be demonstrated by states that comply with this principle. They need only maintain records showing that each engagement was properly authorized and executed. If a violation is alleged, selected records can be unsealed in a closed inquiry conducted by an international body (Gubrud and Altmann, 2013).4

This framing, which focuses on human control and responsibility for the decision to use violent force, is both conceptually simple and morally compelling. What remains then is to set standards for adequate information to be presented to commanders, and to require positive action by operators of a weapon system. Those standards should also address any circumstances under which other parties—designers and manufacturers, for instance—might be held responsible for an unintended engagement.

There is at least one exceptional circumstance in which human control may be applied less strictly. Fully autonomous systems are already used to engage incoming missiles and artillery rounds; examples include the Israeli Iron Dome and the US Patriot and Aegis missile defense systems, as well as the Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar system. The timeline for response in such systems is often so short that the requirement for positive human decision might impose an unacceptable risk of failure. Another principle—the protection of life from immediate threats—comes into play here. An allowance seems reasonable, if it is strictly limited. In particular, autonomous return fire should not be permitted, but only engagement of unmanned munitions directed against human-occupied territory or vehicles. Each such system should have an accountable human operator, and autonomous response should be delayed as long as possible to allow time for an override decision.

The strategic need for robot arms control

Principles of humanity may be the strongest foundation for an effective ban of autonomous weapons, but they are not necessarily the most compelling reason why a ban must be sought. The perceived military advantages of autonomy are so great that major powers are likely to strongly resist prohibition, but by the same token, autonomous weapons pose a severe threat to global peace and security.

Although humans have (for now) superior capabilities for perception in complex environments and for interpretation of ambiguous information, machines have the edge in speed and precision. If allowed to return fire or initiate it, they would undoubtedly prevail over humans in many combat situations. Humans have a limited tolerance of the physical extremes of acceleration, temperature, and radiation, are vulnerable to biological and chemical weapons, and require rest, food, breathable air, and drinkable water. Machines are expendable; their loss does not cause emotional pain or political backlash. Humans are expensive, and their replacement by robots is expected to yield cost savings.

While today’s relatively sparse use of drones, in undefended airspace, to target irregular forces can be carried out by remote control, large-scale use of robotic weapons to attack modern military forces would require greater autonomy, due to the burdens and vulnerabilities of communications links, the need for stealth, and the sheer numbers of robots likely to be involved. The US Navy is particularly interested in autonomy for undersea systems, where communications are especially problematic. Civilians are sparse on the high seas and absent on submarines, casting doubt on the relevance of humanitarian law. As the Navy contemplates future conflict with a peer competitor, it projects drone-versus-drone warfare in the skies above and waters below, and the use of sea-based drones to attack targets inland as well.

In a cold war, small robots could be used for covert infiltration, surveillance, sabotage, or assassination. In an open attack, they could find ways of getting into underground bunkers or attacking bases and ships in swarms. Because robots can be sent on one-way missions, they are potential enablers of aggression or preemption. Because they can be more precise and less destructive than nuclear weapons, they may be more likely to be used. In fact, the US Air Force’s Long Range Strike Bomber is planned to be both nuclear-capable and potentially unmanned, which would almost certainly mean autonomous.

There can be no real game-changers in the nuclear stalemate. Yet the new wave of robotics and artificial intelligence-enabled systems threatens to drive a new strategic competition between the United States and other major powers—and lesser powers, too. Unlike the specialized technologies of high-performance military systems at the end of the Cold War, robotics, information technology, and even advanced sensors are today globally available, driven as much by civilian as military uses. An autonomous weapons arms race would be global in scope, as the drone race already is.

Since robots are regarded as expendable, they may be risked in provocative adventures. Recently, China has warned that if Japan makes good on threats to shoot down Chinese drones that approach disputed islands, it could be regarded as an act of war. Similarly, forward-basing of missile interceptors (Lewis and Postol, 2010) or other strategic weapons on unmanned platforms would risk misinterpretation as a signal of imminent attack, and could invite preemption.

Engineering the stability of a robot confrontation would be a wickedly hard problem even for a single team working together in trust and cooperation, let alone hostile teams of competing and imperfectly coordinated sub-teams. Complex, interacting systems-of-systems are prone to sudden unexpected behavior and breakdowns, such as the May 6, 2010 stock market crash caused by interacting exchanges with slightly different rules (Nanex, 2010). Even assuming that limiting escalation would be a design objective, avoiding defeat by preemption would be an imperative, and this implies a constant tuning to the edge of instability. The history of the Cold War contains many well-known examples in which military response was interrupted by the judgment of human beings. But when tactical decisions are made with inhuman speed, the potential for events to spiral out of control is obvious.

The way out

Given the military significance of autonomous weapons, substantial pressure from civil society will be needed before the major powers will seriously consider accepting hard limits, let alone prohibition. The goal is as radical as, and no less necessary than, the control and abolition of nuclear weapons.

The principle of humanity is an old concept in the law of war. It is often cited as forbidding the infliction of needless suffering, but at its deepest level it is a demand that even in conflict, people should not lose sight of their shared humanity. There is something inhumane about allowing technology to decide the fate of human lives, whether through individual targeting decisions or through a conflagration initiated by the unexpected interactions of machines. The recognition of this is already deeply rooted. A scientific poll (Carpenter, 2013) found that Americans opposed to autonomous weapons outnumbered supporters two to one, in contrast to an equally strong consensus in the United States supporting the use of drones. The rest of the world leans heavily against the drone strikes (Pew Research Center, 2012), making it seem likely that global public opinion will be strongly against autonomous weapons, both on humanitarian grounds and out of concern for the dangers of a new arms race.

In the diplomatic discussions now under way, opponents of autonomous weapons should emphasize a well-established principle of international humanitarian law. Seeking to resolve a diplomatic impasse at the Hague Conference in 1899, Russian diplomat Friedrich Martens proposed that for issues not yet formally resolved, conduct in war was still subject to “principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience.” Known as the Martens Clause, it reappeared in the second Hague Convention (1907), the Tehran Conference on Human Rights (1968), and the Geneva Convention additional protocols (1977). It has been invoked as the source of authority for retroactive liability in war crimes and for preemptive bans on inhumane weapons, implying that a strong public consensus has legal force in anticipation of an explicit law (Meron, 2000).

Autonomous weapons are a threat to global peace and therefore a matter of concern under the UN Charter. They are contrary to established custom, principles of humanity, and dictates of public conscience, and so should be considered as preemptively banned by the Martens Clause. These considerations establish the legal basis for formal international action to prohibit machine decision in the use of force. But for such action to occur, global civil society will need to present major-power governments with an irresistible demand: Stop killer robots.

China models US self-defense precedent --- they’ll strike the South China Sea

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China

Though scholars debate the strategic culture of China, the dominant view has been one that emphasizes the defensive nature of Chinese military strategy (for an alternative view, see Johnston 1995; Feng 2007; Silverstone 2009). In this view, China prefers diplomacy over the use of force to achieve its objectives, and is more focused on defending against aggressors than acting as one. Seemingly consistent with this view, in 2003, China publically declared its position against states seeking to legitimize preventive self-defense. From China's perspective, the US-led war in Iraq was an example of America's hegemonic lust for power (Silverstone 2009). It was an act of aggression that violated the international norm that China holds dear—the norm of sovereignty. **However, the country's position on this may be evolving**, or at least **contingent on its own geo-political interests**. In 2005, the People's Congress of China passed an anti-secession law, clearly with an eye toward Taiwan. This law includes language that allows “non-peaceful means” in the case that reunification goals are not achieved (Reisman and Armstrong 2006). This suggests that China leaves open the possibility of some kind of military action to thwart Taiwan's formal secession—a preventive move. Still, China considers the Taiwan “problem” a domestic issue, thus the anti-secession law is not compelling evidence that China is buying into the norm of preventive self-defense.

Indeed, a year later (in 2006), China released a national defense report that articulates a strategy of “active defense” for the twenty-first century, in which China moves to an offensive defensive strategy (Yang 2008). Within this report, China declares a policy that prohibits the first use of nuclear weapons “at any time and under any circumstances.” This is consistent with its general orientation against preventive strikes, though it only specifies this idea with regard to nuclear weapons, and may leave the door open to a first use strategy with other types of weapons, but it is not clear from the report. China is likely to be tested in several key areas beyond the Taiwan situation mentioned earlier.71 **China is quite aggressive regarding its claims to territories in the South China Sea**. One of the most hotly disputed assertions is its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and areas close to the Philippine island of Palawan, which is contested by the Philippines among other countries (Beckman 2012). With Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's recent statement regarding the necessity of possessing a military that could win “local wars under information age conditions,” it is not surprising that **states in the region are on edge**.72 Last October, **Chinese news reported that states with which China has territorial disputes should “mentally prepare for the** sounds of cannons.”73

Beyond the territorial disputes, also consider the recent terrorist attacks within China and their connection to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is responsible for several deadly attacks in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, driving Chinese officials to “go all out to counter the violence” that originates from both ETIM terrorist training camps in Pakistan and remote areas in Xinjiang.74 The significance of these threats to China is reflected in its continuing military modernization efforts, including increasing defense spending by more than 11%.75 Amid investment in aircraft carriers and stealth fighter jets, **China is focused on the development of drone technology, hoping to rival that of the U**nited **S**tates.76 Such technology would likely be used in preventive self-defense against terrorists along China's borders.77 Reports suggest that after seeing the critical use of drones by the United States in its engagements abroad, **China has prioritized drone technology acquisition and production**. 78 In sum, these developments in Chinese defense strategy point to a quite offensive posture—one consistent with a commitment to a norm of preventive use of force (though not as clear-cut as in the India and Russia cases).

In each of the cases under review, **the military has shifted in its orientation from defense to offense**. In India, for example, where UAV development is further along compared to the other cases, there have been notable changes in defense strategy. The strategies in all four cases are tied to a concurrent trend toward states’ acquiring unmanned systems, or drones for precision strikes and real-time surveillance. Political and military elites have demonstrated a desire to successfully harness sophisticated new RMA technology, after having observed US success in this area.

Alongside our analysis of state rhetoric, **these changes in strategies** and high-tech tactical weaponry **suggest the diffusion of a preventive use of force norm** across cases, though to varying degrees, depending on their geostrategic interests. India is largely focused on fighting terrorism abroad, whereas Russia's main terrorist concern is within its own borders. China is concerned about terrorism from domestic and foreign sources. Thus, India is more compelled to espouse the norm of preventive self-defense as a legitimate norm governing international state behavior than Russia. China's commitment to such a norm is evolving, perhaps somewhere in between that of Russia and India. Unlike the cases of India, Russia, and China, Germany's military modernization and interest in drones stems largely from pressure from the United States to take on a larger, global role in promoting security and stability, particularly within NATO. In 2008, for example, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates scolded “defensive players” who “sometimes…have to focus on offense.”79 At the time, Germany had troops in Afghanistan—but they were located in the safest part of the country (the north) while the United States, Canada and Britain fought in the volatile south. Directing his criticism toward Germany in particular, Gates stated, “In NATO, some allies ought not to have the luxury of opting only for stability and civilian operations, thus forcing other allies to bear a disproportionate share of the fighting and dying.”79 As stated above, one of the ways in which norm entrepreneurs promote norms is by invoking a state's reputation or “international image.” This has certainly been the case with Germany, which took on a direct role in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2009—by borrowing American drones.

Taken together, though, in terms of their position on the idea of preventive self-defense, our findings suggest two similarities. First, **in all** four **cases** reviewed here, leaders invoked the US example to justify their actions. Particularly in India, similarities to 9/11 were drawn in an effort to legitimize moves toward offensive strategies. Second, asymmetric tactics are not only a tool of the weak, but also of stronger states**. We found a strong correlation between strategies of preventive self-defense and the acquisition of drone technology. Because of their precision-strike capability, drones are an obvious choice for states committed to preventive self-defense.**

SCS conflict causes extinction

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While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

High risk of escalation

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Yet none of this should be comforting to China’s potential military adversaries. It is precisely China’s military weakness that makes it so dangerous. Take the PLA’s lack of combat experience, for example. A few minor border scraps aside, the PLA hasn’t seen real combat since the Korean War. This appears to be a major factor leading it to act so brazenly in the East and South China Seas. Indeed, **China’s navy** now **appears to be itching for a fight anywhere it can find one**. Experienced combat veterans almost never act this way. Indeed, history shows that military commanders that have gone to war are significantly less hawkish than their inexperienced counterparts. Lacking the somber wisdom that comes from combat experience, **today’s PLA is** all hawk **and no dove**.

The Chinese military is dangerous in another way as well. Recognizing that it will never be able to compete with the U.S. and its allies using traditional methods of war fighting, **the PLA has turned to unconventional “asymmetric”** first-strike weapons and capabilities to make up for its lack of conventional firepower, professionalism and experience. **These weapons** include more than 1,600 **offensive ballistic and cruise** missiles**, whose very nature is** so strategically destabilizing **that the U.S. and Russia decided to outlaw them** with the INF Treaty some **25 years ago**.

In concert with its strategic missile forces, **China has** also **developed** a broad array of **space weapons** designed to destroy satellites used to verify arms control treaties, provide military communications, and warn of enemy attacks. China has also built the world’s largest army of **cyber warriors**, **and** the planet’s second largest fleet of **drones**, to exploit areas where the U.S. and its allies are under-defended. All of **these capabilities make it** more **likely that China could one day be tempted to start a war, and** none **come** with **any built in** escalation control.

Yet while there is ample and growing evidence to suggest **China could, through malice or mistake, start a devastating war in the Pacific**, it is highly improbable that the PLA’s strategy could actually win a war. Take a Taiwan invasion scenario, which is the PLA’s top operational planning priority. While much hand-wringing has been done in recent years about the shifting military balance in the Taiwan Strait, so far no one has been able to explain how any invading PLA force would be able to cross over 100 nautical miles of exceedingly rough water and successfully land on the world’s most inhospitable beaches, let alone capture the capital and pacify the rest of the rugged island.

Prefer new evidence – China thinks they can win

David Axe 2-1, freelance military correspondent, China Thinks It Can Defeat America in Battle, <https://medium.com/war-is-boring/874bffe1b1b9>

That was then. But after two decades of sustained military modernization, **the Chinese military has fundamentally changed its strategy** in just the last year or so. According to Fuell, **recent writings by PLA officers indicate “a growing confidence within the PLA that they can** more-readily **withstand U.S. involvement**.”

The preemptive strike is off the table—and with it, the risk of a full-scale American counterattack. Instead, Beijing believes it can attack Taiwan or another neighbor while also bloodlessly deterring U.S. intervention. It would do so by deploying such overwhelmingly strong military forces—ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers, jet fighters and the like—that Washington dare not get involved.

**The knock-on effects** of deterring America **could be world-changing**. “Backing away from our commitments to protect Taiwan, Japan or the Philippines would be tantamount to **ceding East Asia** to China’s domination,” Roger Cliff, a fellow at the Atlantic Council, said at the same U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on Jan. 30.

Worse, **the** world’s liberal **economic order—and** indeed, the whole notion of **democracy—could suffer irreparable harm**. “The United States has both a moral and a material interest in a world in which democratic nations can survive and thrive,” Cliff asserted.

**States choose to follow LOAC based on a system of incentives – studies prove that solves violence**

**Prorock and Appel ’13** (Alyssa, and Benjamin, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, “Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Democratic Third Parties and Civilian Targeting in Interstate War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0) 1-28)

Coercion is a strategy of statecraft involving the threat or use of positive inducements and negative sanctions to alter a target state’s behavior. It influences the decision making of governments by altering the payoffs of pursuing various policies. Recent studies demonstrate, for example, that third-party states have used the carrot of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to induce better human rights outcomes in target states (Hafner-Burton 2005, 2009), while the World Bank has withheld aid to states with poor human rights records as a form of coercive punishment (Lebovic and Voeten 2009).

We focus theoretically and empirically on the **expectation of coercion**. As Thompson (2009) argues, coercion has already failed once an actor has to carry through on its coercive threat. Thus, an accurate understanding of coercion’s impact must account for **the expectation rather than the implementation** **of overt penalties** or benefits. It follows that leaders likely incorporate the expected reactions of third parties into their decision making when they weigh the costs/benefits of complying with international law (Goodliffe and Hawkins 2009; Goodliffe et al. 2012). Because governments care about the ‘‘economic, security, and political goods their network partners provide, they anticipate likely reactions of their partners and behave in ways they expect their partners will approve’’ (Goodliffe et al. 2012, 132).8 Anticipated positive third-party reactions for compliance increase the expected payoffs for adhering to legal obligations, while anticipated negative responses to violation decrease the expected payoffs for that course of action. Coercion succeeds, therefore, when states comply with the law because the expected reactions of third parties alter payoffs such that compliance has a higher utility than violating the law. Based on this logic, we focus on the conditions under which states expect third parties to engage in coercive statecraft. We identify when combatant states will anticipate coercion and when that expectation will alter payoffs sufficiently to induce compliance with the law.

While a **growing body of literature** recognizes that international coercion can **induce compliance and contribute to international cooperation** more generally (Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Hafner-Burton 2005; Thompson 2009; Von Stein 2010), many scholars remain skeptical about coercion’s effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism. Skeptics argue that coercion is costly to implement; third parties value the economic, political, and military ties they share with target states and may suffer along with the target from cutting those ties. This may undermine the credibility of coercive threats and a third party’s ability to induce compliance through this enforcement mechanism.

While acknowledging this critique of coercion, we argue that it can act as an **effective enforcement mechanism** under certain conditions. Specifically, successful coercion requires that third parties have (1) the incentive to commit to and implement their coercive threats and (2) sufficient leverage over target states in order to meaningfully alter payoffs for compliance. This suggests that only some third parties can engage in successful coercion and that it is necessary to identify the specific conditions under which third parties can generate credible coercive threats to enforce compliance with international humanitarian law. In the following sections, we argue that third-party states are most likely to effectively use coercion to alter the behavior of combatants when they have both the willingness and opportunity to coerce (e.g., Most and Starr 1989; Siverson and Starr 1990; Starr 1978).

Willingness: Clarity, Democracy, and the Salience of International Humanitarian Law

Enforcement through the coercion mechanism is only likely when at least one third-party state has a substantial enough interest in another party’s compliance that it is willing to act (Von Stein 2010). Third-party willingness, in turn, depends upon two conditions: (1) legal principles must be clearly defined, making violations easily identifiable and (2) third parties must regard the legal obligation as highly salient.

First, scholars have long recognized that there is significant variation in the precision and clarity of legal rules, and that clarity contributes to compliance with the law (e.g., Abbott et al. 2000; Huth, Croco, and Appel 2011; Morrow 2007; Wallace 2013**). Precise rules increase the effectiveness of the law** by **narrowing the range of possible interpretations** and allowing all states to clearly identify acceptable versus unacceptable conduct. By clearly proscribing unacceptable behavior, clear legal obligations allow states to more precisely respond to compliant versus noncompliant behavior. In contrast, **ambiguous legal principle**s often lead to **multiple interpretations** among relevant actors, **impeding a convergence of expectations** and increasing uncertainty about the payoffs for violating (complying with) the law. Thus, the clarity of the law shapes states’ expectations by allowing them to predict the reactions of other states with greater confidence. In particular, they can expect **greater cooperation and rewards following compliance** and more punishment and sanctions for violating the law when legal obligations are clearly defined.

While some bodies of law are imprecise, i**nternational humanitarian law establishes a comprehensive code of conduct** regarding the intentional targeting of noncombatants during war (e.g., Murphy 2006; Shaw 2003). Starting with the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and continuing through the 1949 Geneva Convention (Protocol IV), the law clearly prohibits the intentional targeting of noncombatants in war.

This clarity **allows international humanitarian law to serve as a “bright line”** **that coordinates the expectations of both war combatants and third parties** (Morrow 2007). By creating a **common set of standards,** it reduces uncertainty, narrowing the range of interpretations of the law and allowing both combatants and third parties to readily recognize violations of these standards. Third parties are, as a result, more likely to expend resources to punish conduct that transgresses legal standards or to support behavior in accordance with them. This, in turn, alters the expectations of war combatants who can expect greater support for abiding by the law and greater punishment for violating it when the clarity condition is met.

## solvency

Only restricting self-defense prevents collapse of norms

Beau Barnes, J.D., Boston University School of Law, Spring 2012, REAUTHORIZING THE “WAR ON TERROR”: THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE AUMF’S COMING OBSOLESCENCE, https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/DOCLIBS/MILITARYLAWREVIEW.NSF/20a66345129fe3d885256e5b00571830/b7396120928e9d5e85257a700042abb5/$FILE/By%20Beau%20D.%20Barnes.pdf

Therefore, the more likely result is that the Executive Branch, grappling with the absence of explicit legal authority for a critical policy, would need to make increasingly strained legal arguments to support its actions.121 Thus, the Obama Administration will soon be forced to rationalize ongoing operations under existing legal authorities, which, I argue below, will have significant harmful consequences for the United States. Indeed, the administration faces a Catch-22—its efforts to destroy Al Qaeda as a functioning organization will lead directly to the vitiation of the AUMF. The administration is “starting with a result and finding the legal and policy justifications for it,” which often leads to poor policy formulation.122 Potential legal rationales would perforce rest on exceedingly strained legal arguments based on the AUMF itself, the President’s Commander in Chief powers, or the international law of selfdefense.123 Besides the inherent damage to U.S. credibility attendant to unconvincing legal rationales, each alternative option would prove legally fragile, destabilizing to the international political order, or both.

1. Effect on Domestic Law and Policy

Congress’s failure to reauthorize military force would lead to bad domestic law and even worse national security policy. First, a legal rationale based on the AUMF itself will increasingly be difficult to sustain. Fewer and fewer terrorists will have any plausible connection to the September 11 attacks or Al Qaeda, and arguments for finding those connections are already logically attenuated. The definition of those individuals who may lawfully be targeted and detained could be expanded incrementally from the current definition, defining more and more groups as Al Qaeda’s “co-belligerents” and “associated forces.”124 But this approach, apart from its obvious logical weakness, would likely be rejected by the courts at some point.125 The policy of the United States should not be to continue to rely on the September 18, 2001, AUMF.

Second, basing U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief is legally unstable, and therefore unsound national security policy, because a combination of legal difficulties and political considerations make it unlikely that such a rationale could be sustained. This type of strategy would likely run afoul of the courts and risk destabilizing judicial intervention,126 because the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to step in and assert a more proactive role to strike down excessive claims of presidential authority.127 Politically, using an overly robust theory of the Commander in Chief’s powers to justify counterterrorism efforts would, ultimately, be difficult to sustain. President Obama, who ran for office in large part on the promise of repudiating the excesses of the Bush Administration, and indeed any president, would likely face political pressure to reject the claims of executive authority made “politically toxic” by the writings of John Yoo.128 Because of the likely judicial resistance and political difficulties, claiming increased executive authority to prosecute the armed conflict against Al Qaeda would prove a specious and ultimately futile legal strategy. Simply put, forcing the Supreme Court to intervene and overrule the Executive’s national security policy is anathema to good public policy. In such a world, U.S. national security policy would lack stability—confounding cooperation with allies and hindering negotiations with adversaries.

There are, of course, many situations where the president’s position as Commander in Chief provides entirely uncontroversial authority for military actions against terrorists. In 1998, President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes against Al Qaeda-related targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. In 1986, President Reagan ordered air strikes against Libyan targets after U.S. intelligence linked the bombing of a Berlin discotheque to Libyan operatives.129 Executive authority to launch these operations without congressional approval was not seriously questioned, and no congressional approval was sought.130 To be sure, many of the targeted killing operations carried out today fall squarely within the precedent of past practice supplied by these and other valid exercises of presidential authority. Notwithstanding disagreement about the scope of Congress’s and the president’s “war powers,” few would disagree with the proposition that the president needs no authorization to act in selfdefense on behalf of the country. However, it is equally clear that not all terrorists pose such a threat to the United States, and thus the on terror,”137 further distancing counterterrorism operations from democratic oversight would exacerbate this problem.138 Indeed, congressional oversight of covert operations—which, presumably, operates with full information—is already considered insufficient by many.139 By operating entirely on a covert basis, “the Executive can initiate more conflict than the public might otherwise [be] willing to support.”140

In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued worldwide counterterrorism operations on various alternative domestic legal authorities. All of these alternative bases, however, carry with them significant costs—detrimental to U.S. security and democracy. The foreign and national security policy of the United States should rest on “a comprehensive legal regime to support its actions, one that [has] the blessings of Congress and to which a court would defer as the collective judgment of the American political system about a novel set of problems.”141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate.

2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense

A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international level as well. Denying the Executive Branch the authority to carry out military operations in the armed conflict against Al Qaeda would force the President to find authorization elsewhere, most likely in the international law of selfdefense—the jus ad bellum.142 Finding sufficient legal authority for the United States’s ongoing counterterrorism operations in the international law of self-defense, however, is problematic for several reasons. As a preliminary matter, relying on this rationale usurps Congress’s role in regulating the contours of U.S. foreign and national security policy. If the Executive Branch can assert “self-defense against a continuing threat” to target and detain terrorists worldwide, it will almost always be able to find such a threat.143 Indeed, the Obama Administration’s broad understanding of the concept of “imminence” illustrates the danger of allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144

This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous “slippery slopes.” Once the President authorizes a targeted killing of an individual who does not pose an imminent threat in the strict law enforcement sense of “imminence,”145 there are few potential targets that would be off-limits to the Executive Branch. Overly malleable concepts are not the proper bases for the consistent use of military force in a democracy. Although the Obama Administration has disclaimed this manner of broad authority because the AUMF “does not authorize military force against anyone the Executive labels a ‘terrorist,’”146 relying solely on the international law of self defense would likely lead to precisely such a result.

The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s military actions and the issue of domestic control. The creation of international norms is an iterative process, one to which the United States makes significant contributions. Because of this outsized influence, the United States should not claim international legal rights that it is not prepared to see proliferate around the globe. Scholars have observed that the Obama Administration’s “expansive and open-ended interpretation of the right to self-defence threatens to destroy the prohibition on the use of armed force . . . .”147 Indeed, “[i]f other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States does, to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos.”148

Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only be harmful to U.S. national security and global stability, but it would also directly contravene the Obama Administration’s national security policy, sapping U.S. credibility. The Administration’s National Security Strategy emphasizes U.S. “moral leadership,” basing its approach to U.S. security in large part on “pursu[ing] a rules-based international system that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests.”149 Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson has argued that “[a]gainst an unconventional enemy that observes no borders and does not play by the rules, we must guard against aggressive interpretations of our authorities that will discredit our efforts, provoke controversy and invite challenge.”150 Cognizant of the risk of establishing unwise international legal norms, Johnson argued that the United States “must not make [legal authority] up to suit the moment.”151 The Obama Administration’s global counterterrorism strategy is to “adher[e] to a stricter interpretation of the rule of law as an essential part of the wider strategy” of “turning the page on the past [and rooting] counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation.”152

Widely accepted legal arguments also facilitate cooperation from U.S. allies, especially from the United States’ European allies, who have been wary of expansive U.S. legal interpretations.153 Moreover, U.S. strategy vis-à-vis China focuses on binding that nation to international norms as it gains power in East Asia.154 The United States is an international “standard-bearer” that “sets norms that are mimicked by others,”155 and the Obama Administration acknowledges that its drone strikes act in a quasi-precedential fashion.156 Risking the obsolescence of the AUMF would force the United States into an “aggressive interpretation” of international legal authority,157 not just discrediting its own rationale, but facilitating that rationale’s destabilizing adoption by nations around the world.158

Congress is key

Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html

In the wake of the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, an analogous phenomenon of feeling safe has occurred in a recent U.S. national security policy: America’s explicit use of targeted killings to eliminate terrorists, under the legal doctrines of selfdefense and the law of war. Legal scholars define targeted killing as the use of lethal force by a state4 or its agents with the intent, premeditation, and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them.5 In layman’s terms, targeted killing is used by the United States to eliminate individuals it views as a threat.6 Targeted killings, for better or for worse, have become “a defining doctrine of American strategic policy.”7 Although many U.S. Presidents have reserved the right to use targeted killings in unique circumstances, making this option a formal part of American foreign policy incurs risks that, unless adroitly controlled and defined in concert with Congress, could drive our practices in the use of force in a direction that is not wise for the long-term health of the rule of law.

This article traces the history of targeted killing from a U.S. perspective. It next explains how terrorism has traditionally been handled as a domestic law enforcement action within the United States and why this departure in policy to handle terrorists like al Qaeda under the law of war—that is, declaring war against a terrorist organization—is novel. While this policy is not an ill-conceived course of action given the global nature of al Qaeda, there are practical limitations on how this war against terrorism can be conducted under the orders of the President. Within the authority to target individuals who are terrorists, there are two facets of Presidential power that the United States must grapple with: first, how narrow and tailored the President’s authority should be when ordering a targeted killing under the rubric of self-defense; and second, whether the President must adhere to concepts within the law of war, specifically the targeting of individuals who do not don a uniform. The gatekeeper of these Presidential powers and the prevention of their overreach is Congress. The Constitution demands nothing less, but thus far, Congress’s silence is deafening.

History of Targeted Killing During the Cold War, the United States used covert operations to target certain political leaders with deadly force.8 These covert operations, such as assassination plots against Fidel Castro of Cuba and Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, came to light in the waning days of the Richard Nixon administration in 1974. In response to the public outrage at this tactic, the Senate created a select committee in 1975, chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho, to “Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.”9 This committee, which took the name of its chairman, harshly condemned such targeting, which is referred to in the report as assassination: “We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy.”10 In response to the Church Committee’s findings, President Gerald R. Ford issued an Executive order in 1976 prohibiting assassinations: “No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in political assassination.”11 The order, which is still in force today as Executive Order 12333, “was issued primarily to preempt pending congressional legislation banning political assassination.”12 President Ford did not want legislation that would impinge upon his unilateral ability as Commander in Chief to decide on the measures that were necessary for national security. 13 In the end, no legislation on assassinations was passed; national security remained under the President’s purview. Congress did mandate, however, that the President submit findings to select Members of Congress before a covert operation commences or in a timely fashion afterward.14 This requirement remains to this day. Targeted killings have again come to center stage with the Barack Obama administration’s extraordinary step of acknowledging the targeting of the radical Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen who lived in Yemen and was a member of an Islamic terrorist organization, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.15 Al-Awlaki played a significant role in an attack conducted by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian Muslim who attempted to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.16 According to U.S. officials, al-Awlaki was no longer merely encouraging terrorist activities against the United States; he was “acting for or on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula . . . and providing financial, material or technological support for . . . acts of terrorism.”17 Al-Awlaki’s involvement in these activities, according to the United States, made him a belligerent and therefore a legitimate target. The context of the fierce debates in the 1970s is different from the al-Awlaki debate. The targeted killing of an individual for a political purpose, as investigated by the Church Committee, was the use of lethal force during peacetime, not during an armed conflict. During armed conflict, the use of targeted killing is quite expansive.18 But in peacetime, the use of any lethal force is highly governed and limited by both domestic law and international legal norms. The presumption is that, in peacetime, all use of force by the state, especially lethal force, must be necessary. The Law Enforcement Paradigm Before 9/11, the United States treated terrorists under the law enforcement paradigm—that is, as suspected criminals.19 This meant that a terrorist was protected from lethal force so long as his or her conduct did not require the state to respond to a threat or the indication of one. The law enforcement paradigm assumes that the preference is not to use lethal force but rather to arrest the terrorist and then to investigate and try him before a court of law.20 The presumption during peacetime is that the use of lethal force by a state is not justified unless necessary. Necessity assumes that “only the amount of force required to meet the threat and restore the status quo ante may be employed against [the] source of the threat, thereby limiting the force that may be lawfully applied by the state actor.”21 The taking of life in peacetime is only justified “when lesser means for reducing the threat were ineffective.”22 Under both domestic and international law, the civilian population has the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life. Geoff Corn makes this point by highlighting that a law enforcement officer could not use deadly force “against suspected criminals based solely on a determination an individual was a member of a criminal group.”23 Under the law enforcement paradigm, “a country cannot target any individual in its own territory unless there is no other way to avert a great danger.”24 It is the individual’s conduct at the time of the threat that gives the state the right to respond with lethal force. The state’s responding force must be reasonable given the situation known at the time. This reasonableness standard is a “commonsense evaluation of what an objectively reasonable officer might have done in the same circumstances.”25 The U.S. Supreme Court has opined that this reasonableness is subjective: “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowances for the fact that police officers often are forced to make split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”26 The law enforcement paradigm attempts to “minimize the use of lethal force to the extent feasible in the circumstances.”27 This approach is the starting point for many commentators when discussing targeted killing: “It may be legal for law enforcement personnel to shoot to kill based on the imminence of the threat, but the goal of the operation, from its inception, should not be to kill.”28 The presumption is that intentional killing by the state is unlawful unless it is necessary for self-defense or defense of others.29 Like the soldier who acts under the authority of self-defense, if one acts reasonably based on the nature of the threat, the action is justified and legal. What the law enforcement paradigm never contemplates is a terrorist who works outside the state and cannot be arrested. These terrorists hide in areas of the world where law enforcement is weak or nonexistent. The terrorists behind 9/11 were lethal and lived in ungovernable areas; these factors compelled the United States to rethink its law enforcement paradigm. The Law of War Paradigm The damage wrought by the 9/11 terrorists gave President George W. Bush the political capital to ask Congress for authorization to go to war with these architects of terror, namely al Qaeda. Seven days later, Congress gave the President the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against those “nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.”30 For the first time in modern U.S. history, the country was engaged in an armed conflict with members of an organization, al Qaeda, versus a state. The legal justification to use force, which includes targeted killings, against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces is twofold: self-defense and the law of war.31 In armed conflict, the rules governing when an individual can be killed are starkly different than in peacetime. The law enforcement paradigm does not apply in armed conflict. Rather, designated terrorists may be targeted and killed because of their status as enemy belligerents. That status is determined solely by the President under the AUMF. Unlike the law enforcement paradigm, the law of war requires neither a certain conduct nor an analysis of the reasonable amount of force to engage belligerents. In armed conflict, it is wholly permissible to inflict “death on enemy personnel irrespective of the actual risk they present.”32 Killing enemy belligerents is legal unless specifically prohibited—for example, enemy personnel out of combat like the wounded, the sick, or the shipwrecked.33 Armed conflict also negates the law enforcement presumption that lethal force against an individual is justified only when necessary. If an individual is an enemy, then “soldiers are not constrained by the law of war from applying the full range of lawful weapons.”34 Now the soldier is told by the state that an enemy is hostile and he may engage that individual without any consideration of the threat currently posed. The enemy is declared hostile; the enemy is now targetable. Anticipatory Self-defense

This paradigm shift is novel for the United States. The President’s authority to order targeted killings is clear under domestic law; it stems from the AUMF. Legal ambiguity of the U.S. authority to order targeted killings emerges, however, when it is required to interpret international legal norms like self-defense and the law of war. The United States has been a historic champion of these international norms, but now they are hampering its desires to target and kill terrorists.

Skeptics of targeted killing admit that “[t]he decision to target specific individuals with lethal force after September 11 was neither unprecedented nor surprising.”35 Mary Ellen O’Connell has conceded, for example, that targeted killing against enemy combatants in Afghanistan is not an issue because “[t]he United States is currently engaged in an armed conflict” there.36 But when the United States targets individuals outside a zone of conflict, as it did with alAwlaki in Yemen,37 it runs into turbulence because a state of war does not exist between the United States and Yemen.38 A formidable fault line that is emerging between the Obama administration’s position and many academics, international organizations,39 and even some foreign governments40 is where these targeted killings can be conducted.41

According to the U.S. critics, if armed conflict between the states is not present at a location, then the law of war is never triggered, and the state reverts to a peacetime paradigm. In other words, the targeted individual cannot be killed merely because of his or her status as an enemy, since there is no armed conflict. Instead, the United States, as in peacetime, must look to the threat the individual possesses at the time of the targeting. There is a profound shift of the burden upon the state: the presumption now is that the targeted killing must be necessary. When, for example, the United States targeted and killed six al Qaeda members in Yemen in 2002, the international reaction was extremely negative: the strike constituted “a clear case of extrajudicial killing.”42

The Obama administration, like its predecessor, disagrees. Its legal justification for targeted killings outside a current zone of armed conflict is anticipatory self-defense. The administration cites the inherent and unilateral right every nation has to engage in anticipatory self-defense. This right is codified in the United Nations charter43 and is also part of the U.S. interpretation of customary international law stemming from the Caroline case in 1837. A British warship entered U.S. territory and destroyed an American steamboat, the Caroline. In response, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated the lasting acid test for anticipatory self-defense: “[N]ecessity of self defense [must be] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation . . . [and] the necessity of self defense, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.”44

A state can act under the guise of anticipatory self-defense. This truism, however, leaves domestic policymakers to struggle with two critical quandaries: first, the factual predicate required by the state to invoke anticipatory self-defense, on the one hand; and second, the protections the state’s soldiers possess when they act under this authority, on the other. As to the first issue, there is simply no guidance from Congress to the President; the threshold for triggering anticipatory self-defense is ad hoc. As to the second issue, under the law of war, a soldier who kills an enemy has immunity for these precapture or warlike acts.45 This “combatant immunity” attaches only when the law of war has been triggered. Does combatant immunity attach when the stated legal authority is self-defense? There is no clear answer.

The administration is blurring the contours of the right of the state to act in Yemen under self-defense and the law of war protections afforded its soldiers when so acting. Therefore, what protections do U.S. Airmen enjoy when operating the drone that killed an individual in Yemen, Somalia, or Libya?

If they are indicted by a Spanish court for murder, what is the defense? Under the law of war, it is combatant immunity. But if the law of war is not triggered because the killing occurred outside the zone of armed conflict, the policy could expose Airmen to prosecution for murder. In order to alleviate both of these quandaries, Congress must step in with legislative guidance. Congress has the constitutional obligation to fund and oversee military operations.46 The goal of congressional action must not be to thwart the President from protecting the United States from the dangers of a very hostile world. As the debates of the Church Committee demonstrated, however, the President’s unfettered authority in the realm of national security is a cause for concern. Clarification is required because the AUMF gave the President a blank check to use targeted killing under domestic law, but it never set parameters on the President’s authority when international legal norms intersect and potentially conflict with measures stemming from domestic law.

But there’s no uniqueness for their DA’s – TK operational policy is already restricted more than the plan mandates

Robert Chesney 14, law prof at UT, “Postwar”, <http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Chesney-Final.pdf>

Would shifting to a postwar framework impact the status quo regarding the use of lethal force more so than it does detention? Surprisingly, no.

That some amount of targeting authority would remain even under the postwar rubric is not in doubt. Jeh Johnson said as much, after all, when he indicated that military options would remain available in the postwar period for “continuing and imminent threats.” 35 But that is not the interesting question. The interesting question is whether postwar targeting authority would be narrower than the scope of authority currently asserted by the government even under the armed-conflict model, such that drone strikes—and other exercises of lethal force—in the postwar world would have to be eliminated or at least curtailed substantially as compared to the status quo.

A. Policy Constraints on Attacks Outside the Hot Battlefield

It is tempting to assume that the answer must be yes, that the postwar model surely would be a narrower affair—a much narrower affair —than the status quo when it comes to lethal force. On close inspection, however, that proves not to be the case. Why? For two seemingly contradictory reasons. First, **the government** for reasons of policy **already embraces an approach** that is more restrictive **than the armed-conflict model** arguably **would require**. Second, **the legal framework the government** most likely **would apply in the absence of** the **armed-conflict** model **is** considerably less restrictive than one might expect. Indeed, it is the same **framework that applies already as a matter of policy**.

There’s also link uq – Obama’s openly called for restrictions on authority

Christopher Preble 13, vice president for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, How to End the War on Terrorism Properly, June 10, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-end-war-terrorism-properly?utm_source=Cato+Institute+Emails&utm_campaign=d7856100b8-Cato_Today&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_395878584c-d7856100b8-141711634&mc_cid=d7856100b8&mc_eid=719812f23e>

In his speech on counterterrorism last month, President Barack Obama said something both profound and overdue — the war underway since 2001 **should** **end, not just factually but also legally**. Outlining his views, the president said he **wanted to** “refine, and ultimately repeal,” the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the main legislative vehicle governing U.S. counterterrorism operations around the world. **He also** pledged not to sign **laws designed to expand this mandate further.**

“The most successful counterterrorism operations involve timely intelligence collection and analysis, not open-ended military operations involving large deployments of U.S. troops.”

But to make that goal a concrete reality, the president should have called for legislation repealing the administration’s authority for war — sunsetting the AUMF, which provides the legal authorization for our troops in Afghanistan, once combat operations there conclude at the end of 2014. Future counterterrorism operations can rely on the plentiful authorities the executive branch already has, including some that have been added since 9/11. And if this president — or any other in the future — needs greater war powers to deal with a threat, they can return to Congress and ask for specific, limited authorities tailored to address the future challenge.

Executive “clarification” fails

Laurie Blank, Emory International Humanitarian Law Clinic Director, Professor, 10/10/13, “Raid Watching” and Trying to Discern Law from Policy, today.law.utah.edu/projects/raid-watching-and-trying-to-discern-law-from-policy/

Trying to identify and understand the legal framework the United States believes is applicable to counterterrorism operations abroad sometimes seems quite similar to “Fed watching,” the predictive game of trying to figure out what the Federal Reserve is likely to do based on the hidden meaning behind even the shortest or most cryptic of comments from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. With whom exactly does the United States consider itself to be in an armed conflict? Al Qaeda, certainly, but what groups fall within that umbrella and what are associated forces? And to where does the United States believe its authority derived from this conflict reaches?

On Saturday, U.S. Special Forces came ashore in Somalia and engaged in a firefight with militants at the home of a senior leader of al Shabaab; it is unknown whether the target of the raid was killed. I must admit, my initial reaction was to wonder whether official information about the raid would give us any hints — who was the target and why was he the target? What were the rules of engagement (ROE) for the raid (in broad strokes, because anything specific is classified, of course)? And can we make any conclusions about whether the United States considers that its armed conflict with al Qaeda extends to Somalia or whether it believes that al Shabaab is a party to that armed conflict or another independent armed conflict?

The reality, however, is that this latest counterterrorism operation highlights once again the conflation of law and policy that exemplifies the entire discourse about the United States conflict with al Qaeda and other U.S. counterterrorism operations as well. And that using policy to discern law is a highly risky venture.

The remarkable series of public speeches by top Obama Administration legal advisors and national security advisors, the Department of Justice White Paper, and the May 2013 White House fact sheet on U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities all appear to offer extensive explanations of the international legal principles governing the use of drone strikes against al-Qaeda operatives in various locations around the globe, as well as related counterterrorism measures. In actuality, they offer an excellent example of the conflation of law and policy and the consequences of that conflation.

Policy and strategic considerations are without a doubt an essential component of understanding contemporary military operations and the application of international law. However, it is equally important to distinguish between law and policy, and to recognize when one is driving analysis versus the other.

The law regarding the use of force against an individual or group outside the borders of the state relies on one of two legal frameworks: the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and the international law of self-defense (jus ad bellum). During armed conflict, LOAC applies and lethal force can be used as a first resort against legitimate targets, a category that includes all members of the enemy forces (the regular military of a state or members of an organized armed group) and civilians who are directly participating in hostilities. Outside of armed conflict, lethal force can be used in self-defense against an individual or group who has engaged in an armed attack – or poses an imminent threat of such an attack, where the use of force is necessary and proportionate to repel or deter the attack or threat.

The United States has consistently blurred these two legal justifications for the use of force, regularly stating that it has the authority to use force either as part of an ongoing armed conflict or under self-defense, without differentiating between the two or delineating when one or the other justification applies. From the perspective of the policymaker, the use of both justifications without further distinction surely offers greater flexibility and potential for action in a range of circumstances. From the perspective of careful legal analysis, however, it can prove problematic.

In effect, it is U.S. policy to eliminate “bad guys” — whether by use of lethal force or detention — who are attacking or posing a threat to the United States or U.S. interests. Some of these “bad guys” are part of a group with whom we are in an armed conflict (such as al Qaeda); some pose an imminent threat irrespective of the armed conflict; some are part of a group that shares an ideology with al Qaeda or is linked in some more comprehensive way. Drone strikes, Special Forces raids, capture — each situation involves its own tactical plans and twists.

But do any of these specific tactical choices tell us anything in particular about whether LOAC applies to a specific operation? Whether the United States believes it applies? Unfortunately, not really. Take Saturday’s raid in Somalia, for example. Some would take the use of lethal force by the United States against a member of al Shabaab in Somalia to suggest that the United States views al Shabaab as part of the conflict with al Qaeda, or that the United States views the geographical arena of the conflict as extending at least into Somalia. Others analyze it through the lens of self-defense, because news reports suggest that U.S. forces sought to capture the militant leader and used deadly force in the process of trying to effectuate that capture.

Ultimately, however, the only certain information is that the United States viewed this senior leader of al Shabaab as a threat – but whether that threat is due to participation in an armed conflict or due to ongoing or imminent attacks on the United States is not possible to discern. Why? Because more than law guides the planning and execution of the mission. Rules of engagement (ROE) are based on law, strategy and policy: the law forms the outer parameters for any action; ROE operate within that framework to set the rules for the use of force in the circumstances of the particular military mission at hand, the operational imperatives and national command policy.

The fact that the operation may have had capture as its goal, if feasible, does not mean that it could only have occurred outside the framework of LOAC. Although LOAC does not include an obligation to capture rather than kill an enemy operative — it is the law enforcement paradigm applicable outside of armed conflict that mandates that the use of force must be a last resort — ROE during an armed conflict may require attempt to capture for any number of reasons, including the desire to interrogate the target of the raid for intelligence information. Likewise, the use of military personnel and the fact that the raid resulted in a lengthy firefight does not automatically mean that armed conflict is the applicable framework — law enforcement in the self-defense context does narrowly prescribe the use of lethal force, but that use of force may nonetheless be robust when necessary.

“Raid-watching” — trying to predict the applicable legal framework from reports of United States strikes and raids on targets abroad — highlights the challenges of the conflation of law and policy and the concomitant risks of trying to sift the law out from the policy conversation. First, determining the applicable legal framework when two alternate, and even opposing, frameworks are presented as the governing paradigm at all times is extraordinarily complicated. This means that assessing the legality of any particular action or operation can be difficult at best and likely infeasible, hampering efforts to ensure compliance with the rule of law. Second, conflating law and policy risks either diluting or unnecessarily constraining the legal regimes. The former undermines the law’s ability to protect persons in the course of military operations; the latter places undue limits on the lawful strategic options for defending U.S. interests and degrading or eliminating enemy threats. Policy can and should be debated and law must be interpreted and applied, but substituting policy for legal analysis ultimately substitutes policy’s flexibility for the law’s normative foundations.

Simualted national security law debates inculcate agency and decision-making skills—that enables activism and avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/13, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying doctrinal material and creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. This is the most important determination, because the substance of the doctrinal portion of the course and the simulation follows from this decision. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. This, then, becomes a guide for the doctrinal part of the course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised in the current conversation. Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion simulations, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may provide an important way forward. Such simulations also cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it does provide a starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

**Simulating the plan creates unique pedagogical benefits by forcing us to build expertise on the details of national security policy—the simulation iself activates agency and enables change—it also builds problem-solving and decision-making skills**

Laura K. **Donohue**, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/**13**, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

2. Factual Chaos and Uncertainty

One of the most important skills for students going into national security law is the ability to deal with factual chaos. The presentation of factual chaos significantly differs from the traditional model of legal education, in which students are provided a set of facts which they must analyze. Lawyers working in national security law must figure out what information they need, integrate enormous amounts of data from numerous sources, determine which information is reliable and relevant, and proceed with analysis and recommendations. Their recommendations, moreover, must be based on contingent conditions: facts may be classified and unavailable to the legal analyst, or facts may change as new information emerges. This is as true for government lawyers as it is for those outside of governmental structures. They must be aware of what is known, what is unsure, what is unknown, and the possibility of changing circumstances, and they must advise their clients, from the beginning, how the legal analysis might shift if the factual basis alters.

a. Chaos. Concern about information overload in the national security environment is not new: in the 1970s scholars discussed and debated how to handle the sequential phases of intelligence gathering and analysis in a manner that yielded an optimal result.132 But the digital revolution has exponentially transformed the quantitative terms of reference, the technical means of collection and analysis, and the volume of information available. The number of sources of information – not least in the online world – is staggering.

Added to this is the rapid expansion in national security law itself: myriad new Executive Orders, Presidential Directives, institutions, programs, statutes, regulations, lawsuits, and judicial decisions mean that national security law itself is rapidly changing. Lawyers inside and outside of government must keep abreast of constantly evolving authorities.

The international arena too is in flux, as global entities, such as the United Nations, the European Court of Human Rights, the G-7/G-8, and other countries, introduce new instruments whose reach includes U.S. interests. Rapid geopolitical changes relating to critical national security concerns, such as worldwide financial flows, the Middle East, the Arab Spring, South American drug cartels, North Korea, the former Soviet Union, China, and other issues require lawyers to keep up on what is happening globally as a way of understanding domestic concerns. Further expanding the information overload is the changing nature of what constitutes national security itself.133

In sum, the sheer amount of information the national security lawyer needs to assimilate is significant. The basic skills required in the 1970s thus may be similar – such as the ability (a) to know where to look for relevant and reliable information; (b) to obtain the necessary information in the most efficient manner possible; (c) to quickly discern reliable from unreliable information; (d) to know what data is critical; and (e) to ascertain what is as yet unknown or contingent on other conditions. But the volume of information, the diversity of information sources, and the heavy reliance on technology requires lawyers to develop new skills. They must be able to obtain the right information and to ignore chaos to focus on the critical issues. These features point in opposite directions – i.e., a broadening of knowledge and a narrowing of focus.

A law school system built on the gradual and incremental advance of law, bolstered or defeated by judicial decisions and solidified through the adhesive nature of stare decisis appears particularly inapposite for this rapidly-changing environment. An important question that will thus confront students upon leaving the legal academy is how to keep abreast of rapidly changing national security and geopolitical concerns in an information-rich world in a manner that allows for capture of relevant information, while retaining the ability to focus on the immediate task at hand.

Staying ahead of the curve requires developing a sense of timing – when to respond to important legal and factual shifts – and identifying the best means of doing so. Again, this applies to government and non-government employees. How should students prioritize certain information and then act upon it? This, too, is an aspect of information overload.

b. Uncertainty. National security law proves an information-rich, factuallydriven environment. The ability to deal with such chaos may be hampered by gaps in the information available and the difficulty of engaging in complex fact-finding – a skill often under-taught in law school. Investigation of relevant information may need to reach far afield in order to generate careful legal analysis. Uncertainty here plays a key role.

In determining, for instance, the contours of quarantine authority, lawyers may need to understand how the pandemic in question works, where there have been outbreaks, how it will spread, what treatments are available, which social distancing measures may prove most effective, what steps are being taken locally, at a state-level, and internationally, and the like. Lawyers in non-profit organizations, legal academics, in-house attorneys, and others, in turn, working in the field, must learn how to find out the relevant information before commenting on new programs and initiatives, agreeing to contractual terms, or advising clients on the best course of action. For both government and non-government lawyers, the secrecy inherent in the field is of great consequence. The key here is learning to ask intelligent questions to generate the best legal analysis possible.

It may be the case that national security lawyers are not aware of the facts they are missing – facts that would be central to legal analysis. This phenomenon front-loads the type of advice and discussions in which national security lawyers must engage. It means that analysis must be given in a transparent manner, contingent on a set of facts currently known, with indication given up front as to how that analysis might change, should the factual basis shift. This is particularly true of government attorneys, who may be advising policymakers who may or may not have a background in the law and who may have access to more information than the attorney. Signaling the key facts on which the legal decision rests with the caveat that the legal analysis of the situation might change if the facts change, provides for more robust consideration of critically important issues.

c. Creative Problem Solving. Part of dealing with factual uncertainty in a rapidly changing environment is learning how to construct new ways to address emerging issues. Admittedly, much has been made in the academy about the importance of problem-based learning as a method in developing students’ critical thinking skills.134 Problem-solving, however, is not merely a method of teaching. It is itself a goal for the type of activities in which lawyers will be engaged. The means-ends distinction is an important one to make here. Problemsolving in a classroom environment may be merely a conduit for learning a specific area of the law or a limited set of skills. But problem-solving as an end suggests the accumulation of a broader set of tools, such as familiarity with multidisciplinary approaches, creativity and originality, sequencing, collaboration, identification of contributors’ expertise, and how to leverage each skill set.

This goal presents itself in the context of fact-finding, but it draws equally on strong understanding of legal authorities and practices, the Washington context, and policy considerations. Similarly, like the factors highlighted in the first pedagogical goal, adding to the tensions inherent in factual analysis is the abbreviated timeline in which national security attorneys must operate. Time may not be a commodity in surplus. This means that national security legal education must not only develop students’ complex fact-finding skills and their ability to provide contingent analysis, but it must teach them how to swiftly and efficiently engage in these activities.

3. Critical Distance

As was recognized more than a century ago, analytical skills by themselves are insufficient training for individuals moving into the legal profession.135 Critical thinking provides the necessary distance from the law that is required in order to move the legal system forward. Critical thought, influenced by the Ancient Greek tradition, finds itself bound up in the Socratic method of dialogue that continues to define the legal academy. But it goes beyond such constructs as well.

Scholars and educators disagree, of course, on what exactly critical thinking entails.136 For purposes of our present discussion, I understand it as the metaconversation in the law. Whereas legal analysis and substantive knowledge focus on the law as it is and how to work within the existing structures, critical thought provides distance and allows students to engage in purposeful discussion of theoretical constructs that deepen our understanding of both the actual and potential constructs of law. It is inherently reflective.

For the purpose of practicing national security law, critical thought is paramount. This is true partly because of the unique conditions that tend to accompany the introduction of national security provisions: these are often introduced in the midst of an emergency. Their creation of new powers frequently has significant implications for distribution of authority at a federal level, a diminished role for state and local government in the federalism realm, and a direct impact on individual rights.137 Constitutional implications demand careful scrutiny.

Yet at the time of an attack, enormous pressure is on officials and legislators to act and to be seen to act to respond.138 With the impact on rights, in particular, foremost in legislators’ minds, the first recourse often is to make any new powers temporary. However, they rarely turn out to be so, instead becoming embedded in the legislative framework and providing a baseline on which further measures are built.139 In order to withdraw them, legislators must demonstrate either that the provisions are not effective or that no violence will ensue upon their withdrawal (either way, a demanding proof). Alternatively, legislators would have to acknowledge that some level of violence may be tolerated – a step no politician is willing to take.

Any new powers, introduced in the heat of the moment, may become a permanent part of the statutory and regulatory regime. They may not operate the way in which they were intended. They may impact certain groups in a disparate manner. They may have unintended and detrimental consequences. Therefore, it is necessary for national security lawyers to be able to view such provisions, and related policy decisions, from a distance and to be able to think through them outside of the contemporary context.

There are many other reasons such critical analysis matters that reflect in other areas of the law. The ability to recognize problems, articulate underlying assumptions and values, understand how language is being used, assess whether argument is logical, test conclusions, and determine and analyze pertinent information depends on critical thinking skills. Indeed, one could draw argue that **it is the goal of higher education to build the capacity to engage in critical thought**. Deeply humanistic theories underlie this approach. The ability to develop discerning judgment – the very meaning of the Greek term, 􏰀􏰁􏰂􏰃􏰄􏰅􏰆 – provides the basis for advancing the human condition through reason and intellectual engagement.

Critical thought as used in practicing national security law may seem somewhat antithetical to the general legal enterprise in certain particulars. For government lawyers and consultants, there may be times in which not providing legal advice, when asked for it, may be as important as providing it. That is, it may be important not to put certain options on the table, with legal justifications behind them. Questions whether to advise or not to advise are bound up in considerations of policy, professional responsibility, and ethics. They may also relate to questions as to who one’s client is in the world of national security law.140 It may be unclear whether and at what point one’s client is a supervisor, the legal (or political) head of an agency, a cross-agency organization, the White House, the Constitution, or the American public. Depending upon this determination, the national security lawyer may or may not want to provide legal advice to one of the potential clients. Alternatively, such a lawyer may want to call attention to certain analyses to other clients. Determining when and how to act in these circumstances requires critical distance.

4. Nontraditional Written and Oral Communication Skills

Law schools have long focused on written and oral communication skills that are central to the practice of law. Brief writing, scholarly analysis, criminal complaints, contractual agreements, trial advocacy, and appellate arguments constitute standard fare. What is perhaps unique about the way communication skills are used in the national security world is the importance of non-traditional modes of legal communication such as concise (and precise) oral briefings, email exchanges, private and passing conversations, agenda setting, meeting changed circumstances, and communications built on swiftly evolving and uncertain information.

For many of these types of communications speed may be of the essence – and unlike the significant amounts of time that accompany preparation of lengthy legal documents (and the painstaking preparation for oral argument that marks moot court preparations.) Much of the activity that goes on within the Executive Branch occurs within a hierarchical system, wherein those closest to the issues have exceedingly short amounts of time to deliver the key points to those with the authority to exercise government power. Unexpected events, shifting conditions on the ground, and deadlines require immediate input, without the opportunity for lengthy consideration of the different facets of the issue presented. This is a different type of activity from the preparation of an appellate brief, for instance, involving a fuller exposition of the issues involved. It is closer to a blend of Supreme Court oral argument and witness crossexamination – although national security lawyers often may not have the luxury of the months, indeed, years, that cases take to evolve to address the myriad legal questions involved.

Facts on which the legal analysis rests, moreover, as discussed above, may not be known. This has substantive implications for written and oral communications. Tension between the level of legal analysis possible and the national security process itself may lead to a different norm than in other areas of the law. Chief Judge Baker explains,

If lawyers insist on knowing all the facts all the time, before they are willing to render advice, or, if they insist on preparing a written legal opinion in response to every question, then national security process would become dysfunctional. The delay alone would cause the policymaker to avoid, and perhaps evade, legal review.141

Simultaneously, lawyers cannot function without some opportunity to look carefully at the questions presented and to consult authoritative sources. “The art of lawyering in such context,” Baker explains, “lies in spotting the issue, accurately identifying the timeline for decision, and applying a meaningful degree of formal or informal review in response.”142 The lawyer providing advice must resist the pressure of the moment and yet still be responsive to the demand for swift action. The resulting written and oral communications thus may be shaped in different ways. Unwilling to bind clients’ hands, particularly in light of rapidly-changing facts and conditions, the potential for nuance to be lost is considerable.

The political and historical overlay of national security law here matters. In some circumstances, even where written advice is not formally required, it may be in the national security lawyer’s best interests to commit informal advice to paper in the form of an email, notation, or short memo. The process may serve to provide an external check on the pressures that have been internalized, by allowing the lawyer to separate from the material and read it. It may give the lawyer the opportunity to have someone subject it to scrutiny. Baker suggests that “on issues of importance, even where the law is clear, as well as situations where novel positions are taken, lawyers should record their informal advice in a formal manner so that they may be held accountable for what they say, and what they don’t say.”143

Written and oral communication may occur at highly irregular moments – yet it is at these moments (in the elevator, during an email exchange, at a meeting, in the course of a telephone call), that critical legal and constitutional decisions are made. This model departs from the formalized nature of legal writing and research. Yet it is important that students are prepared for these types of written and oral communication as an ends in and of themselves.

5. Leadership, Integrity and Good Judgment

National security law often takes place in a high stakes environment. There is tremendous pressure on attorneys operating in the field – not least because of the coercive nature of the authorities in question. The classified environment also plays a key role: many of the decisions made will never be known publicly, nor will they be examined outside of a small group of individuals – much less in a court of law. In this context, leadership, integrity, and good judgment stand paramount.

The types of powers at issue in national security law are among the most coercive authorities available to the government. Decisions may result in the death of one or many human beings, the abridgment of rights, and the bypassing of protections otherwise incorporated into the law. The amount of pressure under which this situation places attorneys is of a higher magnitude than many other areas of the law. Added to this pressure is the highly political nature of national security law and the necessity of understanding the broader Washington context, within which individual decision-making, power relations, and institutional authorities compete. Policy concerns similarly dominate the landscape. It is not enough for national security attorneys to claim that they simply deal in legal advice. Their analyses carry consequences for those exercising power, for those who are the targets of such power, and for the public at large. The function of leadership in this context may be more about process than substantive authority. It may be a willingness to act on critical thought and to accept the impact of legal analysis. It is closely bound to integrity and professional responsibility and the ability to retain good judgment in extraordinary circumstances.

Equally critical in the national security realm is the classified nature of so much of what is done in national security law. All data, for instance, relating to the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of special nuclear material, or the use of nuclear material in the production of energy is classified from birth.144 NSI, the bread and butter of the practice of national security law, is similarly classified. U.S. law defines NSI as “information which pertains to the national defense and foreign relations (National Security) of the United States and is classified in accordance with an Executive Order.” Nine primary Executive Orders and two subsidiary orders have been issued in this realm.145

The sheer amount of information incorporated within the classification scheme is here relevant. While original classification authorities have steadily decreased since 1980, and the number of original classification decisions is beginning to fall, the numbers are still high: in fiscal year 2010, for instance, there were nearly 2,300 original classification authorities and almost 225,000 original classification decisions.146

The classification realm, moreover, in which national security lawyers are most active, is expanding. Derivative classification decisions – classification resulting from the incorporation, paraphrasing, restating, or generation of classified information in some new form – is increasing. In FY 2010, there were more than seventy-six million such decisions made.147 This number is triple what it was in FY 2008. Legal decisions and advice tend to be based on information already classified relating to programs, initiatives, facts, intelligence, and previously classified legal opinions.

The key issue here is that with so much of the essential information, decisionmaking, and executive branch jurisprudence necessarily secret, lawyers are limited in their opportunity for outside appraisal and review.

Even within the executive branch, stove-piping occurs. The use of secure compartmentalized information (SCI) further compounds this problem as only a limited number of individuals – much less lawyers – may be read into a program. This diminishes the opportunity to identify and correct errors or to engage in debate and discussion over the law. Once a legal opinion is drafted, the opportunity to expose it to other lawyers may be restricted. The effect may be felt for decades, as successive Administrations reference prior legal decisions within certain agencies. The Office of Legal Counsel, for instance, has an entire body of jurisprudence that has never been made public, which continues to inform the legal analysis provided to the President. Only a handful of people at OLC may be aware of the previous decisions. They are prevented by classification authorities from revealing these decisions. This results in a sort of generational secret jurisprudence. Questions related to professional responsibility thus place the national security lawyer in a difficult position: not only may opportunities to check factual data or to consult with other attorneys be limited, but the impact of legal advice rendered may be felt for years to come.

The problem extends beyond the executive branch. There are limited opportunities, for instance, for external judicial review. Two elements are at work here: first, very few cases involving national security concerns make it into court. Much of what is happening is simply not known. Even when it is known, it may be impossible to demonstrate standing – a persistent problem with regard to challenging, for instance, surveillance programs. Second, courts have historically proved particularly reluctant to intervene in national security matters. Judicially-created devices such as political question doctrine and state secrets underscore the reluctance of the judiciary to second-guess the executive in this realm. The exercise of these doctrines is increasing in the post-9/11 environment. Consider state secrets. While much was made of some five to seven state secrets cases that came to court during the Bush administration, in more than 100 cases the executive branch formally invoked state secrets, which the courts accepted.148 Many times judges did not even bother to look at the evidence in question before blocking it and/or dismissing the suit. In numerous additional cases, the courts treated the claims as though state secrets had been asserted – even where the doctrine had not been formally invoked.149

In light of these pressures – the profound consequences of many national security decisions, the existence of stovepiping even within the executive branch, and limited opportunity for external review – the practice of national security law requires a particularly rigorous and committed adherence to ethical standards and professional responsibility. This is a unique world in which there are enormous pressures, with potentially few external consequences for not acting in accordance with high standards. It thus becomes particularly important, from a pedagogical perspective, to think through the types of situations that national security attorneys may face, and to address the types of questions related to professional responsibility that will confront them in the course of their careers.

Good judgment and leadership similarly stand paramount. These skills, like many of those discussed, may also be relevant to other areas of the law; however, the way in which they become manifest in national security law may be different in important ways. Good judgment, for instance, may mean any number of things, depending upon the attorney’s position within the political hierarchy. Policymaking positions will be considerably different from the provision of legal advice to policymakers. Leadership, too, may mean something different in this field intimately tied to political circumstance. It may mean breaking ranks with the political hierarchy, visibly adopting unpopular public or private positions, or resigning when faced by unethical situations. It may mean creating new bureaucratic structures to more effectively respond to threats. It may mean holding off clients until the attorneys within one’s group have the opportunity to look at issues while still being sensitive to the political needs of the institution. Recourse in such situations may be political, either through public statements and use of the media, or by going to different branches of government for a solution.

6. Creating Opportunities for Learning

In addition to the above skills, national security lawyers must be able to engage in continuous self-learning in order to improve their performance. They must be able to identify new and emerging legal and political authorities and processes, systems for handling factual chaos and uncertainty, mechanisms to ensure critical distance, evaluating written and oral performance, and analyzing leadership skills. Law schools do not traditionally focus on how to teach students to continue their learning beyond the walls of academia. Yet it is vital for their future success to give students the ability to create conditions of learning.

The best scholarship validates our theory of international norms—US lead is key

Robert Farley 11, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, Over the Horizon: U.S. Drone Use Sets Global Precedent, October 12, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10311/over-the-horizon-u-s-drone-use-sets-global-precedent

Is the world about to see a "drone race" among the United States, China and several other major powers? Writing in the New York Times, Scott Shane argued that just such an arms race is already happening and that it is largely a result of the widespread use of drones in a counterterror role by the United States. Shane suggests that an international norm of drone usage is developing around how the United States has decided to employ drones. In the future, we may expect that China, Russia and India will employ advanced drone technologies against similar enemies, perhaps in Xinjiang or Chechnya. Kenneth Anderson agrees that the drone race is on, but disagrees about its cause, arguing that improvements in the various drone component technologies made such an arms race inevitable. Had the United States not pursued advanced drone technology or launched an aggressive drone campaign, some other country would have taken the lead in drone capabilities.

So which is it? Has the United States sparked a drone race, or was a race with the Chinese and Russians inevitable? While there's truth on both sides, on balance Shane is correct. Arms races don't just "happen" because of outside technological developments. Rather, they are embedded in political dynamics associated with public perception, international prestige and bureaucratic conflict. China and Russia pursued the development of drones before the United States showed the world what the Predator could do, but they are pursuing capabilities more vigorously because of the U.S. example. Understanding this is necessary to developing expectations of what lies ahead as well as a strategy for regulating drone warfare.

States run arms races for a variety of reasons. The best-known reason is a sense of fear: The developing capabilities of an opponent leave a state feeling vulnerable. The Germany's build-up of battleships in the years prior to World War I made Britain feel vulnerable, necessitating the expansion of the Royal Navy, and vice versa. Similarly, the threat posed by Soviet missiles during the Cold War required an increase in U.S. nuclear capabilities, and so forth. However, states also "race" in response to public pressure, bureaucratic politics and the desire for prestige. Sometimes, for instance, states feel the need to procure the same type of weapon another state has developed in order to maintain their relative position, even if they do not feel directly threatened by the weapon. Alternatively, bureaucrats and generals might use the existence of foreign weapons to argue for their own pet systems. All of these reasons share common characteristics, however: They are both social and strategic, and they depend on the behavior of other countries.

Improvements in technology do not make the procurement of any given weapon necessary; rather, geostrategic interest creates the need for a system. So while there's a degree of truth to Anderson's argument about the availability of drone technology, he ignores the degree to which dramatic precedent can affect state policy. The technologies that made HMS Dreadnought such a revolutionary warship in 1906 were available before it was built; its dramatic appearance nevertheless transformed the major naval powers' procurement plans. Similarly, the Soviet Union and the United States accelerated nuclear arms procurement following the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the USSR in particular increasing its missile forces by nearly 20 times, partially in response to perceptions of vulnerability. So while a drone "race" may have taken place even without the large-scale Predator and Reaper campaign in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, the extent and character of the race now on display has been driven by U.S. behavior. Other states, observing the effectiveness -- or at least the capabilities -- of U.S. drones will work to create their own counterparts with an enthusiasm that they would not have had in absence of the U.S. example.

What is undeniable, however, is that we face a drone race, which inevitably evokes the question of arms control. Because they vary widely in technical characteristics, appearance and even definition, drones are poor candidates for "traditional" arms control of the variety that places strict limits on number of vehicles constructed, fielded and so forth. Rather, to the extent that any regulation of drone warfare is likely, it will come through treaties limiting how drones are used.

Such a treaty would require either deep concern on the part of the major powers that advances in drone capabilities threatened their interests and survival, or widespread revulsion among the global public against the practice of drone warfare. The latter is somewhat more likely than the former, as drone construction at this point seems unlikely to dominate state defense budgets to the same degree as battleships in the 1920s or nuclear weapons in the 1970s. However, for now, drones are used mainly to kill unpleasant people in places distant from media attention. So creating the public outrage necessary to force global elites to limit drone usage may also prove difficult, although the specter of "out of control robots" killing humans with impunity might change that. P.W. Singer, author of "Wired for War," argues that new robot technologies will require a new approach to the legal regulation of war. Robots, both in the sky and on the ground, not to mention in the sea, already have killing capabilities that rival those of humans. Any approach to legally managing drone warfare will likely come as part of a more general effort to regulate the operation of robots in war.

However, even in the unlikely event of global public outrage, any serious effort at regulating the use of drones will require U.S. acquiescence. Landmines are a remarkably unpopular form of weapon, but the United States continues to resist the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. If the United States sees unrestricted drone warfare as being to its advantage -- and it is likely to do so even if China, Russia and India develop similar drone capabilities -- then even global outrage may not be sufficient to make the U.S. budge on its position. This simply reaffirms the original point: Arms races don't just "happen," but rather are a direct, if unexpected outcome of state policy. Like it or not, the behavior of the United States right now is structuring how the world will think about, build and use drones for the foreseeable future. Given this, U.S. policymakers should perhaps devote a touch more attention to the precedent they're setting.

# 2AC

## at: china threats

**Rigid rejection of “China threat” gets warped into a new orthodoxy and fuels extremism. Recognizing plural interpretations and linkages is more productive.**

**Callahan 5** (William A., Professor of Politics – University of Manchester, “How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power”, Review of International Studies, 31)

Although ‘China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. Refutations of ‘China threat theory’ do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of ‘threat’ as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute ‘Chinese’ threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China’s national identity. Unfortunately, by refuting China threat in this bellicose way – that is by generating a new series of threats – the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China’s protests of peace.43 Moreover, the estrangement produced and circulated in China threat theory is not just among nation-states. The recent shift in the focus of the discourse from security issues to more economic and cultural issues suggests that China is estranged from the ‘international standards’ of the ‘international community’. After a long process of difficult negotiations, China entered the WTO in December 2001. Joining the WTO was not just an economic or a political event; it was an issue of Chinese identity.44 As Breslin, Shih and Zha describe in their articles in this Forum, this process was painful for China as WTO membership subjects the PRC to binding rules that are not the product of Chinese diplomacy or culture. Thus although China enters international organisations like the WTO based on shared values and rules, China also needs to distinguish itself from the undifferentiated mass of the globalised world. Since 2002, a large proportion of the China threat theory articles have been published in economics, trade, investment, and general business journals – rather than in international politics, area studies and ideological journals as in the 1990s. Hence China threat theory is one way to differentiate China from these international standards, which critics see as neo-colonial.45 Another way is for China to assert ownership over international standards to affirm its national identity through participation in globalisation.46 Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: ‘There is a consensus within mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up in a word: ‘‘Madness’’ ’.47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a ‘China threat theory syndrome’.48 This brings us back to Foucault’s logic of ‘rationality’ being constructed through the exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as ‘madness’. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Like Joseph Nye’s concern that warnings of a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say. Conclusion The argument of this essay is not that China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the image of China as a peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of East Asia. It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce ‘China threat theory’ as the misguided product of the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake, because depending on circumstances anything – from rising powers to civilian aircraft – can be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than war-like), but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of each perception of threat. Indeed, ‘China threat’ has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions (in both the West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic.

But the fact that US and Chinese policymakers employ a realist lens is another reason our impact is true and the alt can’t solve

Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell 12, Andrew J. Nathan is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, Andrew Scobell is Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, “How China Sees America”, Foreign Affairs, September / October

Third, American theories of international relations have become popular among younger Chinese policy analysts, many of whom have earned advanced degrees in the United States. The most influential body of international relations theory in China is so-called offensive realism, which holds that a country will try to control its security environment to the full extent that its capabilities permit. According to this theory, the United States cannot be satisfied with the existence of a powerful China and therefore seeks to make the ruling regime there weaker and more pro-American. Chinese analysts see evidence of this intent in Washington's calls for democracy and its support for what China sees as separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

Whether they see the United States primarily through a culturalist, Marxist, or realist lens, most Chinese strategists assume that a country as powerful as the United States will use its power to preserve and enhance its privileges and will treat efforts by other countries to protect their interests as threats to its own security. This assumption leads to a pessimistic conclusion: as China rises, the United States will resist. The United States uses soothing words; casts its actions as a search for peace, human rights, and a level playing field; and sometimes offers China genuine assistance. But the United States is two-faced. It intends to remain the global hegemon and prevent China from growing strong enough to challenge it. In a 2011 interview with Liaowang, a state-run Chinese newsmagazine, Ni Feng, the deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of American Studies, summed up this view. "On the one hand, the United States realizes that it needs China's help on many regional and global issues," he said. "On the other hand, the United States is worried about a more powerful China and uses multiple means to delay its development and to remake China with U.S. values."

A small group of mostly younger Chinese analysts who have closely studied the United States argues that Chinese and American interests are not totally at odds. In their view, the two countries are sufficiently remote from each other that their core security interests need not clash. They can gain mutual benefit from trade and other common interests.

But those holding such views are outnumbered by strategists on the other side of the spectrum, mostly personnel from the military and security agencies, who take a dim view of U.S. policy and have more confrontational ideas about how China should respond to it. They believe that China must stand up to the United States militarily and that it can win a conflict, should one occur, by outpacing U.S. military technology and taking advantage of what they believe to be superior morale within China's armed forces. Their views are usually kept out of sight to avoid frightening both China's rivals and its friends.

## ss

Obama complies with war power statutes

Beau Barnes, J.D., Boston University School of Law, Spring 2012, REAUTHORIZING THE “WAR ON TERROR”: THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE AUMF’S COMING OBSOLESCENCE, https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/DOCLIBS/MILITARYLAWREVIEW.NSF/20a66345129fe3d885256e5b00571830/b7396120928e9d5e85257a700042abb5/$FILE/By%20Beau%20D.%20Barnes.pdf

Unsurprisingly, this article embraces an interpretation of the Constitution that is at odds with the Vesting Clause thesis, and instead hews closer to the view expressed in Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in the 1952 Steel Seizure case.13 The Constitution explicitly empowers Congress in the area of foreign affairs to, among other actions, approve treaties,14 declare war,15 and regulate the armed forces.16 These textual grants of authority would be vitiated if Congress were unable, in the exercise of these powers, to “wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in time.”17 A full exposition of this oft-addressed topic is beyond the scope of this article, however, and it suffices for present purposes to merely align it with the overwhelming majority of scholars who conceive of a Constitution where Congress may authorize limited military force in a manner which is binding on the Executive Branch.18

Furthermore, the Vesting Clause thesis and all-powerful views of the Commander in Chief Clause have been rejected in large part by the judiciary and the current administration.20 Indeed, **one significant reason for considering the AUMF to be an actual limit on Presidential power, and a relevant subject for legal analysis, is because that is how the Obama Administration understands the statute**. State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh, in his March 25, 2010, speech to the American Society of International Law, clarified that “as a matter of domestic law” the Obama Administration relies on the AUMF for its authority to detain and use force against terrorist organizations.21 Furthermore, Koh specifically disclaimed the previous administration’s reliance on an expansive reading of the Constitution’s Commander in Chief Clause.22 Roughly stated, the AUMF matters, at least in part, because the Obama Administration says it matters.

The scope of the AUMF is also important for any future judicial opinion that might rely in part on Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure concurrence.23 Support from Congress places the President’s actions in Jackson’s first zone, where executive power is at its zenith, because it “includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”24 Express or implied congressional disapproval, discernible by identifying the outer limits of the AUMF’s authorization, would place the President’s “power . . . at its lowest ebb.”25 In this third zone, executive claims “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”26 Indeed, Jackson specifically rejected an overly powerful executive, observing that the Framers did not intend to fashion the President into an American monarch.27

Jackson’s concurrence has become the most significant guidepost in debates over the constitutionality of executive action in the realm of national security and foreign relations.28 Indeed, some have argued that it was given “the status of law”29 by then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist in Dames & Moore v. Regan.30 Speaking for the Court, Rehnquist applied Jackson’s tripartite framework to an executive order settling pending U.S. claims against Iran, noting that “[t]he parties and the lower courts . . . have all agreed that much relevant analysis is contained in [Youngstown].”31 More recently, Chief Justice John Roberts declared that “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in [the area of foreign relations law].”32 Should a future court adjudicate the nature or extent of the President’s authority to engage in military actions against terrorists, an applicable statute would confer upon such executive action “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”33 The AUMF therefore exercises a profound legal influence on the future of the United States’ struggle against terrorism, and its precise scope, authorization, and continuing vitality matter a great deal.

studies

Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 12-13

Without a credible threat of congressional action, why would presidents incorporate congressional preferences, either expressed or anticipated, into their strategic calculations? They will do so only if Congress is able to affect the costs and benefits more broadly that presidents stand to reap first for launching and then for continuing a military action. This book argues that through a variety of formal and informal actions taken on the chamber floors, in the committee rooms, and on the airwaves, members of Congress can affect both the political and the strategic costs of military action for the president, even when they cannot legally compel him to alter his preferred policy course.22 For example, by introducing legislation authorizing or seeking to curtail a use of force, holding oversight hearings, and engaging the debate over military policymaking in the public sphere, members of Congress can play a critically important role in shaping the public's reaction to a military mission. Congressional support can provide the president with invaluable political cover either to launch a new or to continue a current use of force. Conversely, vocal opposition to the president's policies from Capitol Hill can both forestall a rally in popular support behind a proposed military venture and erode public support for an ongoing overseas deployment. In these and other ways, Congress may play a critical role in either raising or lowering the domestic political costs the president stands to reap from his preferred military policy course.

In a similar vein, highly visible congressional actions send important signals of domestic resolve or unease to the target of a threatened or ongoing military action. The leaders of the target state can then incorporate this information about the state of the political climate in Washington into their strategic calculations when deciding whether to capitulate to or resist the president's demands. In this way, even informal actions taken in Congress may unintentionally shape the strategic costs of different military policy options for the president through their influence on the calculus of target state leaders. Finally, because presidents recognize the political and strategic costs that congressional opposition may generate, even when it cannot legislatively compel the administration to alter its preferred policy course, they face strong incentives to anticipate Congress's likely reaction to different policy options and to adjust their conduct of military policymaking accordingly. When making these calculations, Congress's partisan composition provides perhaps the best insight into its likely response.

Through each of these mechanisms, Congress and its members can serve as an important constraint on presidential policymaking and can retain a significant measure of influence over both the initiation and subsequent conduct of major military ventures. The empirical analyses in the chapters that follow **marshal extensive empirical, historical, and archival data** to examine these indirect pathways of congressional influence and the conditions in which Congress has proved most effective at exercising them to shape the course of American military policymaking from the end of Reconstruction to the ongoing war in Iraq.

## emergency

**Legal restraints work – the theory of the exception is self-serving and wrong**

William E. **Scheuerman 6**, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations, Volume 13, Issue 1

Yet this argument relies on Schmitt’s controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his famous Concept of the Political. To be sure, there are intense conflicts in which it is naïve to expect an easy resolution by legal or juridical means. But the argument suffers from a troubling circularity: **Schmitt** occasionally **wants to define “political” conflicts as those irresolvable by legal** or juridical **devices in order** then **to argue against** **legal** or juridical **solutions** to them. **The claim** also **suffers from** a certain **vagueness** and lack of conceptual precision. At times, it seems to be directed against trying to resolve conflicts in the courts or juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal regulation of intense conflict. The former argument is surely stronger than the latter. After all, **legal devices have undoubtedly played a positive role** **in taming** or at least minimizing the potential dangers of harsh **political antagonisms**. In the Cold War, for example, international law contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts which otherwise might have exploded into horrific violence, even if attempts to bring such conflicts before an international court or tribunal probably would have failed.22

Second, Schmitt dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from modifying the traditional state-centered system of international law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that irregular combatants logically enjoyed no protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include them, international law helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling? The most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent attempts to modify it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of suggesting that the project of regulating irregular combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to integrate incongruent models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the (state-centered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors.

This is a powerful argument, but it remains flawed. Every modern legal order rests on diverse and even conflicting normative elements and ideals, in part because human existence itself is always “in transition.” When one examines the so-called classical liberal legal systems of nineteenth-century England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily alongside paternalistic and authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as republican and communitarian moments. The same may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state, which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian and even Catholic (for example, in some European maternity policies) programmatic sources. In short, **it is by no means self-evident that trying to give coherent legal form to a transitional** political and social **moment is always doomed to fail**. Moreover, there may be sound reasons for claiming that the contemporary transitional juncture in the rules of war is by no means as incongruent as Schmitt asserts. In some recent accounts, **the general trend** towards extending basic protections to non-state actors **is** plausibly interpreted in a more **positive** – **and by no means incoherent** – light.24

Third, Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of a social world subject to permanent change: “The tendency to modify or even dissolve classical [legal] concepts…is general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely understandable” (12). Schmitt’s postwar writings include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars describe as the dilemma of legal obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the “great transformations and modifications” in the technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of regulating human affairs (17; see also 48–50). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of change in military technology, it inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos buried deep beneath the surface of the earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. “Or what does the requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of modern technology of war?” (17).

As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving of close scrutiny; Schmitt is probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special significance in the context of rapid-fire social change.26 Unfortunately, he seems uninterested in the slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to our dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the “motorization of lawmaking” in a fascinating 1950 publication, but only in order to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet **one** possible **resolution** of the dilemma he describes **would be** to figure how **to reform the process** whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order **to minimize the danger of** anachronistic or **out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt** simply **employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram** against the rule of law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.

## simulation

Reality exists independent of discourse

**Wendt, 1999**

Alexander Wendt, Professor of International Security at Ohio State University, 1999, “Social theory of international politics,” gbooks

The effects of holding a relational theory of meaning on theorizing about world politics are apparent in **David Campbell's** provocative study of US foreign policy, which **shows** how the **threats** posed by the Soviets, immigration, drugs, and so on, **were constructed** out of US national security discourse.29 The book clearly shows that material things in the world did not force US decision-makers to have particular representations of them - the picture theory of reference does not hold. In so doing it highlights the discursive aspects of truth and reference, the sense in which objects are relationally "constructed."30 On the other hand, while emphasizing several times that he is not denying the reality of, for example, Soviet actions, he specifically eschews (p. 4) any attempt to assess the extent to which they caused US representations. Thus **he cannot address the extent to which US representations of the Soviet threat were accurate or true** (questions of correspondence). **He can only focus on the nature and consequences of the representations**.31 Of course, there is nothing in the social science rule book which requires an interest in causal questions, and the nature and consequences of representations are important questions. In the terms discussed below he is engaging in a constitutive rather than causal inquiry. However, I suspect **Campbell thinks that any attempt to assess the correspondence of discourse to reality is inherently pointless.** According to the relational theory of reference **we simply have no access to what the Soviet threat "really" was, and as such its truth is established entirely within discourse**, not by the latter's correspondence to an extra-discursive reality 32 **The main problem** with the relational theory of reference **is that it cannot account for the resistance of the world to certain representations, and thus for representational failures or m/'sinterpretations**. Worldly resistance is most obvious in nature: whether our discourse says so or not, pigs can't fly. But examples abound in society too. **In 1519 Montezuma faced the same kind of epistemological problem facing social scientists today: how to refer to people who, in his case, called themselves Spaniards. Many representations were conceivable**, and no doubt the one he chose - that they were **gods - drew on the discursive materials available to him. So why was he killed and his empire destroyed by an army hundreds of times smaller than his own**? The realist answer is that **Montezuma was simply wrong: the Spaniards were not gods, and had come instead to conquer his empire. Had Montezuma adopted this alternative representation of what the Spanish were, he might have prevented this outcome because that representation would have corresponded more to reality. The reality of the conquistadores did not force him to have a true representation**, as the picture theory of reference would claim, **but it did have certain effects - whether his discourse allowed them or not.** The external world to which we ostensibly lack access, in other words. often frustrates or penalizes representations. **Postmodernism gives us no insight into why this is so, and indeed, rejects the question altogether.33** The description theory of reference favored by empiricists focuses on sense-data in the mind while the relational theory of the postmoderns emphasizes relations among words, but they are similar in at least one crucial respect: neither grounds meaning and truth in an external world that regulates their content.34 Both privilege epistemology over ontology. What is needed is a theory of reference that takes account of the contribution of mind and language yet is anchored to external reality. The realist answer is the causal theory of reference. According to the causal theory the meaning of terms is determined by a two-stage process.35 First there is a "baptism/' in which some new referent in the environment (say, a previously unknown animal) is given a name; then this connection of thing-to-term is handed down a chain of speakers to contemporary speakers. Both stages are causal, the first because the referent impressed itself upon someone's senses in such a way that they were induced to give it a name, the second because the handing down of meanings is a causal process of imitation and social learning. Both stages allow discourse to affect meaning, and as such do not preclude a role for "difference" as posited by the relational theory. Theory is underdetermined by reality, and as such the causal theory is not a picture theory of reference. However, conceding these points does not mean that meaning is entirely socially or mentally constructed. In the realist view beliefs are determined by discourse and nature.36 This solves the key problems of the description and relational theories: our ability to refer to the same object even if our descriptions are different or change, and the resistance of the world to certain representations. **Mind and language help determine meaning, but meaning is also regulated by a mind-independent, extra-linguistic world**.

Take a leap of faith – we should actively attempt to build meaning and truth in life even if it’s all simulation

Fawver, 8

[Kurt, Master of Arts Engilsh – Cleveland State University, “ DESTRUCTION IN SEARCH OF HOPE: BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATION, AND CHUCK PALAHNIUK’S CHOKE,” August 2008, <http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Fawver%20Kurt%20D.pdf?csu1219269969>]

If Palahniuk’s Choke was merely an excellent resource for understanding Baudrillardian theory, it would still be a valuable text. As it stands, however, Choke expands on the ideas of simulation and mediation and struggles to free itself from the snares of Baudrillard’s ultimate unreality. Through a regime of breakdown and disorder, the text fights to emerge from “the end or disappearance of… the real, the social, history, and other key features of modernity” (Best 133). It attempts to create a meaningful correspondence between signifiers and signifieds, between images and meanings. While Baudrillard posits that “everything can and has been done, and all we can do is to assemble the… pieces of our culture and proceed to its extremities,” Choke resists such reasoning and, in fact, runs through stages of assembly and extremism to demonstrate how utterly futile and pointless they are (Best 137). Choke seeks to blow apart those very reproductions that Baudrillard claims cause the implosion of meaning. Essentially, the text advocates a clean sweep of communication, a discarding of all mediated reality. In Choke, as in many other Palahniuk novels, the flow of true meaning can only return to society and individuals once all mediated, simulated, reproduced “meanings” are razed. Thus, the text does glorify destruction, but it is destruction in search of hope, destruction that will, presumably, lead to creation. Victor’s eventual identity collapse, and his subsequent rebuilding, is paradigmatic of Choke’s anti-Baudrillardian philosophy. Victor begins by compiling the persona of a dysfunctional, perpetually orphaned child-cum-adult from mediated symbols of “dysfunction.” His sex addiction and his compulsion to simulate choking in restaurants are symptoms of this poor attempt at constructing a workable identity. When the “traumatized child-now-in-adulthood” simulation fails, Victor turns to new mediated identities: Christ and Antichrist. These personas also lack any depth or connection to Victor’s core being and are, subsequently, discarded. As the text progresses, Victor drops all attempts at creating his identity from the palette of society’s mass-produced conceptions. He pleads for someone to “just show me one thing in this world that is what you’d think” (Choke 205). But, as no inherent realness exists in contemporary society, no one can show Victor a thing or an individual with inherent meaning. Therefore, his only option is to extricate himself from the culture of simulation by cutting himself off from his own history and other individuals’ mediated perceptions of his past. In a moment of clarity, Victor realizes that he must reduce his identity to its simplest, most immediate terms because “There’s no way you can get the past right. You can pretend. You can delude yourself, but you can’t re-create what’s over” (Choke 273). Thus, by the end of the novel, Victor is more a blank page than a fully fleshed character. Rather than continuing to allow his identity to be an ever-evolving reactive simulation that forms in reference to external mediation, he becomes a clean slate on which he can write his own self-generated identity. He slakes off most of the factors that traditionally 26 inform self; familial expectation, personal history, and even conventional emotion are all missing from his identity at the text’s close. As Victor explains, “For the first time in longer than I can remember, I feel peaceful. Not happy. Not sad. Not anxious. Not horny. Just all the higher parts of my brain closing up shop…. I’m simplifying myself” (Choke 282). The implication is that, in order to escape simulation, Victor must revert to a more primitive state. His thoughts are of an essentially basic order; he no longer seeks out “deeper” meanings or alternate referentials. Instead, events, feelings, people, and things simply are what they appear to be, without connection to external mediation. For Victor, the universe of multiple signified meanings for any given signifier is no longer relevant. He has destroyed his perception of alternate reference and, therefore, has limited his field of meaning to exclusively intrinsic values. Such perception comes at a price, however. Victor has to sacrifice a world of possibility, of variable signification, for concrete meaning. He can no longer ponder whether an image means one thing or another; rather, an image will, to Victor, always be fixed to one referent. In a sense, then, he has given up the parts of his “higher brain,” namely a rigorous intellect and boundless creativity, in order to gain a foothold into solid reality and flee Baudrillard’s infinite simulatory spiral. Whereas Baudrillard “critiques… representational thought which is confident that it is describing reality as it is,” Victor embraces such thoughts with open arms (Best 140). Victor is intelligent enough to understand that choosing a path of selfimposed communicative primitivism is the only measure of prevention against accruing a new body of simulacra. The polar opposite of Victor is Tracy, the woman to whom he loses his virginity. She is the prime example of an individual forever lost in Baudrillardian post27 structuralism, representing everything that Victor, or any person, may become when nihilistic acceptance of simulation has infiltrated every aspect of self. Victor meets her on an airplane, in an unlocked bathroom. She takes flights, enters the restroom, leaves the door unlocked, then waits until someone walks in on her and attempts to engage them in a sexual encounter. When Victor questions her aberrant behavior, she replies that “the answer is there is no answer… when you think about it, there’s no good reason to do anything. There is no point… people… don’t want an orgasm as much as they just want to forget. Everything.” (Choke 256-7). Clearly, life in the Baudrillardian void has taken its toll on this woman. Tracy ponders “Why do I do anything? …I’m educated enough to talk myself out of any plan. To deconstruct any fantasy. Explain away any goal. I’m so smart I can negate any dream.” (Choke 257). She is the essence of Baudrillard’s postconstructionist theory; in her, the text introduces an embodiment of hyper-intellectualism that has cut away all the joy, fulfillment, and meaning from life and reality and, subsequently, sees only a vacuum underlying all existence. Her nihilism leads into a quest for extrication from the ultimate emptiness and, thus, works as the catalyst for her sexual addiction. She wants to find meaning and absolute reality but will always be forced, due to her intelligence and her deconstructive ability, to undermine the very goal she is trying to achieve. For Tracy, meaning is impossible not because it has objectively disappeared, but because she cannot accept simple truths or non-multiplicitous signifiers. She thrives on the complexity of reality and, therefore, will never be satisfied by a simplistic interpretation, even if the simplistic interpretation is that for which she yearns. Through Tracy’s unsatisfied, perpetually-wandering nature, the text puts forth the implication that 28 maintaining such an unflinching post-constructionist mindset has no future other than disappointment, dysfunction, and existential despair. Indeed, Choke implicitly attacks Baudrillard’s blasé acceptance of simulation and attempts to show the ramifications of such acceptance. Hence, while the critical perspective from which Baudrillard’s theory stems is akin to a scalpel, cutting deeper and deeper into the body of reality to reveal unending layers of nothingness, Choke advocates a return to a bandaged surface; it strives toward the revitalization of easily accessible signifieds, and, thus, shuns Tracy’s (see also Baudrillard’s) system of thought that only seeks to forever prove the disappearance of meaning. Therefore, the text is ultimately moving beyond Baudrillard by “emphasizing creation over destruction” and promoting the deemphasization of post-constructionist critical inquiry as a means of understanding reality (Kavadlo 12). To further illustrate the resurrection of meaningful signifiers and images, the text introduces Denny, Victor’s best friend. Denny is a recovering sex addict who, throughout the text, earnestly seeks rehabilitation. As sex addictions in Choke seem to be symptomatic of a fatalistic surrender to the simulatory world, Denny is the one character who consistently seeks out a means of resistance. Strangely enough, this resistance takes the form of thousands of rocks. As the novel progresses, Denny builds an enormous rock collection and, with those rocks, embarks on the construction of a mystery structure in an empty field. He enlists Victor’s help and, when a local reporter comes to interview Victor and Denny about the construction project, Victor’s responses are veiled in a haze of ignorance. Victor recalls the dialogue between himself and the reporter, saying that she asked: “‘This structure you’re building, is it a house?’ And I say we don’t know. 29 ‘Is it a church of some kind?’ We don’t know. …‘What are you building, then?’ We won’t know until the very last rock is set. ‘But when will that be?’ We don’t know.” (Choke 263-4). Victor’s reticence with the reporter is not due to any particular stigma or grudge against the media. Rather, his unforthcoming answers are a result of a new (or perhaps ancient) mode of perception and, thus, communication. Instead of focusing on the possibilities of the stone structure or its eventual outcome, Denny instructs Victor to focus on the process of building, alone. He says that “the longer we can keep building, the longer we can keep creating, the more will be possible. The longer we can tolerate being incomplete,” the better (Choke 264). Initially, this statement appears to echo Baudrillard’s sentiments, with a perpetual process of building that leads nowhere and creation that actually creates nothing. Yet, precisely the opposite is true. By compelling the rock structure to remain a work-in-progress without a definitive end, Denny has squashed any simulatory nature the building may possess. He and Victor are not putting stones atop one another to create any of the long-mediated structures of society. The stone building is not a house or a church or any other structure of convention and, therefore, is not founded upon any previous referent. Denny’s rock building is not trying to simulate any other structure; it is simply allowed to rise and become whatever it eventually becomes. With the stone structure, Denny is attempting to introduce a product that holds inherent, unmediated meaning. As soon as Denny or Victor would conclude that the building is a house or a church, then it would, necessarily, begin to take on aspects of those structures. It would begin to simulate a house or a church. But, by allowing the structure to grow almost organically, Denny has set the 30 groundwork for a signifier that may finally be connected with an inherent meaning, with a concrete undeniable reality. The price for cultivating an unmediated, unsimulatory reality is high, however. Both Denny and Victor must discard the realm of speculation and conjecture. In order to maintain a sense of the real, all possibility outside a thing’s readily apparent meaning must vanish. Denny and Victor do not know what the stone building will be because they don’t want to know until it is finished. They choose a path of ignorance so that realness may reassert itself within the structure without being crushed by external mediated “reality.” Basically, Denny and Victor must become simple, single-minded individuals who have no need for multiplicitous signs and no desire for a constant outgrowth of discourse. Theirs is a reality that requires no mediation, no simulation, and, hence, no emptiness. Such a lifestyle choice flies in the face of our contemporary world, where formulating variable meanings for signifiers and expanding the possible field of referentials for images is second-nature. The very fiber of critical theory, or of practically any academic discipline, hinges on increased speculation, on infinitely sprawling discourses, and on the complication of texts, signifiers, and reality itself. Choke’s solution for escaping Baudrillard’s simulation is to escape that same incisively critical manner of thinking. In doing so, Denny and Victor become primitive postpostmodern men. The duo simultaneously evolve and devolve communication; they usher reality back into a signifier but cause the collapse of complexity. Indeed, “many of the seemingly random transgressive acts perpetrated by the characters in Palahniuk’s fiction,” such as Denny and Victor’s intentional ignorance, “fall within an understanding of entropy as a force for renewal and meaning” (Sartain 32). Thus, while Denny may 31 have set society on a course for a neo-stone age, his rock structure may actually be something that simply “is what it is.” Victor’s mother, Ida, is an individual who also manages to cut ties with simulation, but in a much different, and arguably more destructive, manner. Her perspective on reality, like the neo-primitivism of Victor and Denny, strives to attain communion with a long-lost realness. However, Ida takes a much more direct and assertive approach. She uses drugs to “simplify” her state of mind. As Ida explains, “Trichloroethane… All my extensive testing has shown this to be the best treatment for a dangerous excess of human knowledge” (Choke 148). She is attempting to clear away the debris of contemporary society’s all-consuming media (and with it mediation and simulation) by chemically altering her consciousness, thus allowing her to ignore its multiplicity of disembodied voices and images that would, otherwise, crush her unmediated, individual perception of reality. Ida claims that she can see things as they truly are when she is on drugs. She says that the trichloroethane makes the world appear “without the framework of language. Without the cage of associations… without looking through the lens of everything she knew was true…” (Choke 149). Through her druginduced highs, Ida is stripping away mediation and, therefore, making simulation impossible. Without a vast body of mediated meanings to draw upon, Ida is forced to view the world as it actually is, in its simplest terms. She has rid herself of simulation and allowed realness to seep back into images. However, the reality is fleeting and dissipates back into the cacophony of Baudrillard’s simulatory universe as soon as Ida is clean once more. Even worse, the constant drug use takes its toll on Ida; over the course of the text, she ends up with a perpetual bloody nose and, ultimately, is reduced to a 32 feeble, emaciated skeleton. Idea proves that, while escaping Baudrillard’s simulation may be possible in a number of ways, the return to reality can come at an indescribably steep price. Ida is also critical to understanding Choke’s postulation on the manner in which society may be galvanized into forsaking simulation. It is “Ida’s ideology of adventure, her belief in the restorative power of chaos [that] serves to unbalance comfortable homogeneity. She… seeks to create meaning and potential for change through random chaotic acts” (Sartain 33). Ida vandalizes merchandise in stores, kidnaps children, and causes public disturbances all in the service of disrupting complacent adherence to mediated reality. She knows that “a fire alarm is never about a fire, anymore” and tries to disseminate this knowledge across society, albeit obliquely and illegally (Choke 161). Ida challenges simulation by creating real panic and real excitement. Her acts of destruction are aimed squarely at bringing a sense of reality back into a populace that, normally, experiences events and emotions in a heavily mediated environment. Ida causes people to feel true fear, to experience events that are precisely what they appear to be: actual, unsimulated danger. However, there is no proof that Ida’s regime of philosophy-based crime alters the perception or behavior of anyone but Victor over the long term. For a brief moment, the victims of Ida’s crimes may experience a true, unmediated, unsimulated event, but as soon as the danger has been resolved, the contemporary culture of mass media creeps back in and continues to suffocate with its hollow signifiers. Therefore, Ida’s attempts to empower society may be entirely pointless. While her personal freedom from Baudrillard’s simulatory world is assured, she cannot force others to choose the same path of informed, intelligible ignorance. 33 Indeed, Ida’s failure to enact social change exhibits the textual implication that release from simulation must begin in the most intensely personal and introspective realms and radiate outward. Perhaps meaning can be reconnected with images, but, as Choke demonstrates, such reconnection must be instituted at the individual level long before it can solidify into an absolute reality upon which everyone agrees. If Choke’s resolution to the Baudrillardian dilemma seems somewhat perfunctory or abrupt, it would be in keeping with the theoretical concerns of the text. In a simulatory reality, where all information is produced and mediated to individuals at a hyperkinetic speed, it would be logical for a solution or paradigmatic rebellion to arise just as quickly, given that this solution would still, necessarily, have a point of emergence within a system that is unable to slow the production of information, images, and signifiers. Thus, the text’s resolution – an idea that works as a competing perception of reality – appears as quickly and as suddenly as any other random image or information structure; the system of mindless, endless generation has unwittingly generated its own demise. That Choke ends without much exploration of its resolution to simulatory reality is also reasonable, given that such an open-ended future is antithetical to the very principle of Baudrillardian nihilism. The text fights despair and a defeated acceptance of missing reality with unabashed romanticism. With the novel ending shortly after the characters have lain in place their newfound adherence to knowing ignorance, the future is uncertain. Anything could happen to reality following the close of the text; a reunion of images and meaning is as possible as the continuation of hollow simulation. Victor and Denny’s plan for identity-formation and reality-perception may lead to the eventual destruction of all simulacra or it may be entirely useless. The reader is left in a state of 34 unknowing, of hope for meaning-filled future. Such a conclusion is impossible in a Baudrillardian scheme of reality. Under Baudrillard’s critical eye, the world has reached a point where struggle against the forces of simulation is impossible. In Baudrillardian theory, there is no hope for the retrieval of meaning; rather, the process of simulacra will continue, unabated. In answer to this bleak nihilistic view, Choke presents an open space, an ending that is more the beginning of a competing discourse than a summation of all that has come before it. There is no definite success at the end of the text, nor is there assured defeat. The text’s concluding indeterminacy, its allowance for hope, separates it from Baudrillard’s nihilism and reinforces the supposition that escape from simulation is, in fact, possible.

## death

Prioritization claims are counter-productive and illogical – you should evaluate the veracity of the 1ac’s claims about the world while embracing a plurality of (methods / ontologies / theories)

Andrew Bennett 13, government prof at Georgetown, The mother of all isms: Causal mechanisms and structured pluralism in International Relations theory, European Journal of International Relations 2013 19:459

The political science subfield of International Relations (IR) continues to undergo debates on whether and in what sense it is a 'science,1 how it should organize its inquiry into international politics, and how it should build and justify its theories. On one level, an 'inter-paradigm' debate, while less prominent than during the 1990s, has continued to limp along among researchers who identify their work as fitting within the research agenda of a grand school of thought, or 'ism,' and the scholar most closely associated with it, including neorealism (Waltz, 1979), neoliberalism (Keohane, 1984), constructivism (Wendt, 1992), or occasionally Marxism (Wallerstein, 1974) or feminism (Tickner, 1992). Scholars participating in this debate have often acted as if their preferred 4 ism' and its competitors were either "paradigms" (following Kuhn, 1962) or "research programs' (as defined by Lakatos, 19701. and some have explicitly framed their approach as paradigmatic or programmatic (Hopf, 1998).

A second level of the debate involves post-positivist critiques of IR as a "scientific' enterprise (Lapid, 1989). While the vague label "post-positivist, encompasses a diverse group of scholars, frequent post-positivist themes include arguments that observation is theory-laden (Kuhn, 1962), that knowledge claims are always part of mechanisms of power and that meaning is always social (Foucault, 1978), and that individual agents and social structures are mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1992). Taken together, these arguments indicate that the social sciences face even more daunting challenges than the physical sciences.

A third axis of contestation has been methodological, involving claims regarding the strengths and limits of statistical, formal, experimental, qualitative case study, narrative, and other methods. In the last two decades the argument that there is 'one logic of inference1 and that this logic is 'explicated and formalized clearly in discussions of quantitative research methods' (King et al., 1994: 3) has generated a useful debate that has clarified the similarities, differences, uses, and limits of alternative methods ( Brady and Collier, 2010; George and Bennett, 2005; Goertz and Mahoney, 2006).

These debates have each in their own way proved fruitful, increasing the theoretical, epistemological, and methodological diversity of the field (Jordan el al., 2009). The IR subfield has also achieved considerable progress in the last few decades in its theoretical and empirical understanding of important policy-relevant issues, including the inter-democratic peace, terrorism, peacekeeping, international trade, human rights, international law, international organizations, global environmental politics, economic sanctions, nuclear proliteration, military intervention, civil and ethnic conflicts, and many other topics.

Yet there is a widespread sense that this progress has arisen in spite of interparadigmatic debates rather than because of them. Several prominent scholars, including Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, have argued that although research cast within the framework of paradigmatic debates has contributed useful concepts and findings, framing the IR field around inter-paradigmatic debates is ultimately distracting and even counterproductive (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; see also David Lake, 2011, and in this special issue, and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, 2009, and in this special issue). These scholars agree that IR researchers have misapplied Kuhn's notion of paradigms in ways that imply that grand theories of tightly connected ideas — the isms — are the central focus of IR theorizing, and that such isms should compete until one wins general consensus. Sil and Katzenstein argue that the remedy for this is to draw on pragmatist philosophers and build upon an 'eclectic' mix of theories and methods to better understand the world (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). In this view, no single grand theory can capture the complexities of political life, and the real explanatory weight is carried by more fine-grained theories about 'causal mechanisms."

In this article I argue that those urging a pragmatic turn in IR are correct in their diagnosis of the drawbacks of paradigms and their prescription tor using theories about causal mechanisms as the basis for explanatory progress in IR. Yet scholars are understandably reluctant to jettison the "isms' and the inter-paradigmatic debate not only because they fear losing the theoretical and empirical contributions made in the name of the isms, but because framing the field around the isms has proven a useful shorthand for classroom teaching and field-wide discourse. The 'eclectic' label that Sil and Katzenstein propose can easily be misinterpreted in this regard, as the Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines 'eclectic\* as 'selecting what appears to be best in various doctrines, methods, or styles,' as Sil and Katzenstein clearly intend, but it also includes as synonyms "indiscriminate" and 'ragtag.'1 By using the term 'eclecticism' and eschewing any analytic structure for situating and translating among different examples of IR research, Sil and Katzenstein miss an opportunity to enable a discourse that is structured as well as pluralistic, and that reaches beyond IR to the rest of the social sciences.

I maintain that in order to sustain the genuine contributions made under the guise of the inter-paradigmatic debate and at the same time get beyond it to focus on causal mechanisms rather than grand theoretical isms, four additional moves are necessary. First, given that mechanism-based approaches are generally embedded within a scientific realist philosophy of science, it is essential to clarify the philosophical and definitional issues associated with scientific realism, as well as the benefits — and costs — of making hypothesized causal mechanisms the locus of explanatory theories. As Christian Reus-Smit argues in this special issue, IR theory cannot sidestep metatheoretical debates. Second, it is important to take post-positivist critiques seriously and to articulate standards for theoretical progress, other than paradigmatic revolutions, that are defensible even if they are fallible. Third, achieving a shift toward mechanismic explanations requires outlining the contributions that diverse methods can make to the study of causal mechanisms. Finally, it is vital to demonstrate that a focus on mechanisms can serve two key functional roles that paradigms played for the IR subfield: first, providing a framework for cumulative theoretical progress; and, second, constituting a useful, vivid, and structured vocabulary for communicating findings to fellow scholars, students, political actors, and the public (see also Stefano Guzzini's article in this special issue). I argue that the term 'structured pluralism' best captures this last move, as it conveys the sense that IR scholars can borrow the best ideas from different theoretical traditions and social science disciplines in ways that allow both intelligible discourse and cumulative progress.

Alter briefly outlining the problems associated with organizing the IR field around the "isms/ this article addresses each of these four tasks in turn. First, it takes on the challenges of defining "causal mechanisms' and using them as the basis of theoretical explanations. Second, it acknowledges the relevance and importance of post-positivist critiques of causal explanation, yet it argues that scientific realism and some approaches to interpretivism are compatible, and that there are standards upon which they can agree forjudging explanatory progress. Third, it very briefly clarifies the complementary roles that alternative methods can play in elucidating theories about causal mechanisms. Finally, the article presents a taxonomy of theories about social mechanisms to provide a pluralistic but structured framework for cumulative theorizing about politics. This taxonomy provides a platform for developing typological theories — or what others in this special issue, following Robert Merton, have called middle-range theories — on the ways in which combinations of mechanisms interact to produce outcomes. Here, I join Lake in this special issue in urging that IR theorizing be centered around middle-range theories, and I take issue with Jackson and Nexon's suggestion herein that such theorizing privileges correlational evidence, and their assertion that statistical evidence is inherently associated with Humean notions of causation. I argue that my taxonomy of mechanisms offers a conceptual bridge to the paradigmatic isms in IR. adopting and organizing their theoretical insights while leaving behind their paradigmatic pretensions. The article concludes that, among its other virtues, this taxonomy can help reinvigorate dialogues between IR theory and the fields of comparative and American politics, economics, sociology, psychology, and history, stimulating cross-disciplinary discourses that have been inhibited by the scholasticism of IR's ingrown 'isms.'

The aff’s relationship to death is one of up-front recognition and humility. By banishing the specter of death, they just make the sarcophagus invisible, turning confrontation into obsession

Dollimore, Sociology – U Sussex, ’98

(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pg. 221)

Jean Baudrillard presents the argument for the existence of a denial of death in its most extreme form. For him, this denial is not only deeply symptomatic of contemporary reality, but represents an insidious and pervasive form of ideological control. His account depends heavily upon a familiar critique of the Enlightenment's intellectual, cultural and political legacy. This critique has become influential in recent cultural theory, though Baudrillard's version of it is characteristically uncompromising and sweeping, and more reductive than most. The main claim is that Enlightenment rationality is an instrument not of freedom and democratic empowerment but, on the contrary, of repression and violence. Likewise with the Enlightenment's secular emphasis upon a common humanity; for Baudrillard this resulted in what he calls 'the cancer of the Human' - far from being an inclusive category of emancipation, the idea of a universal humanity made possible the demonizing of difference and the repressive privileging of the normal: the 'Human' is from the outset the institution of its structural double, the 'Inhuman\*. This is all it is: the progress of Humanity and Culture are simply the chain of discriminations with which to brand 'Others' with inhumanity, and therefore with nullity, {p. 125) Baudrillard acknowledges here the influence of Michel Foucault, but goes on to identify something more fundamental and determining than anything identified by Foucault: at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death, (p. 12.6) So total is this exclusion that, 'today, it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. To be dead is an unthinkable anomaly; nothing else is as offensive as this. Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy' (p. 126). He insists that the attempt to abolish death (especially through capitalist accumulation), to separate it from life, leads only to a culture permeated by death - 'quite simply, ours is a culture of death' (p. 127). Moreover, it is the repression of death which facilitates 'the repressive socialization of life'; all existing agencies of repression and control take root in the disastrous separation of death from life (p. 130). And, as if that were not enough, our very concept of reality has its origin in the same separation or disjunction (pp. 130-33). Modern culture is contrasted with that of the primitive and the savage, in which, allegedly, life and death were not separated; also with that of the Middle Ages, where, allegedly, there was still a collectivist, 'folkloric and joyous' conception of death. This and many other aspects of the argument are questionable, but perhaps the main objection to Baudrillard's case is his view of culture as a macro-conspiracy conducted by an insidious ideological prime-mover whose agency is always invisibly at work (rather like God). Thus (from just one page), the political economy supposedly ^intends\* to eliminate death through accumulation; and 'our whole culture is just one huge effort to dissociate life and death' {p. 147; my emphases). What those like Baudrillard find interesting about death is not the old conception of it as a pre-cultural constant which diminishes the significance of all cultural achievement, but, on the contrary, its function as a culturally relative - which is to say culturally formative - construct. And, if cultural relativism is on the one hand about relinquishing the comfort of the absolute, for those like Baudrillard it is also about the new strategies of intellectual mastery made possible by the very disappearance of the absolute. Such modern accounts of how death is allegedly denied, of how death is the supreme ideological fix, entail a new intensity and complexity of interpretation and decipherment, a kind of hermeneutics of death. To reinterpret death as a deep effect of ideology, even to the extent of regarding it as the most fundamental ideological adhesive of modern political repression and social control, is simultaneously to denounce it as in some sense a deception or an illusion, and to bring it within the domain of knowledge and analysis as never before. Death, for so long regarded as the ultimate reality - that which disempowers the human and obliterates all human achievement, including the achievements of knowledge - now becomes the object of a hugely empowering knowledge. Like omniscient seers, intellectuals like Baudrillard and Bauman relentlessly anatomize and diagnose the modern (or post-modern) human condition in relation to an ideology of death which becomes the key with which to unlock the secret workings of Western culture in all its insidiousness. Baudrillard in particular applies his theory relentlessly, steamrollering across the cultural significance of the quotidian and the contingent. His is an imperialist, omniscient analytic, a perpetual act of reductive generalization, a self-empowering intellectual performance which proceeds without qualification and without any sense that something might be mysterious or inexplicable. As such it constitutes a kind of interpretative, theoretical violence, an extreme but still representative instance of how the relentless anatomizing and diagnosis of death in the modern world has become a struggle for empowerment through masterful -i.e. reductive - critique. Occasionally one wonders if the advocates of the denial-of-death argument are not themselves in denial. They speak about death endlessly yet indirectly, analysing not death so much as our culture's attitude towards it. To that extent it is not the truth of death but the truth of our culture that they seek. But, even as they make death signify in this indirect way, it is still death that is compelling them to speak. And those like Baudrillard and Bauman speak urgently, performing intellectually a desperate mimicry of the omniscience which death denies. One senses that the entire modern enterprise of relativizing death, of understanding it culturally and socially, may be an attempt to disavow it in the very act of analysing and demystifying it. Ironically then, for all its rejection of the Enlightenment's arrogant belief in the power of rationality, this analysis of death remains indebted to a fundamental Enlightenment aspiration to mastery through knowledge. Nothing could be more 'Enlightenment', in the pejorative sense that Baudrillard describes, than his own almost megalomaniac wish to penetrate the truth of death, and the masterful controlling intellectual subject which that attempt presupposes. And this may be true to an extent for all of us more or less involved in the anthropological or quasi-anthropological accounts of death which assume that, by looking at how a culture handles death, we disclose things about a culture which it does not know about itself. So what has been said of sex in the nineteenth century may also be true of death in the twentieth: it has not been repressed so much as resignified in new, complex and productive ways which then legitimate a never-ending analysis of it. It is questionable whether the denial of death has ever really figured in our culture in the way that Baudrillard and Bauman suggest. Of course, the ways of dealing with and speaking about death have changed hugely, and have in some respects involved something like denial. But in philosophical and literary terms there has never been a denial of death.2 Moreover, however understood, the pre-modern period can hardly be said to have been characterized by the 'healthy\* attitude that advocates of the denial argument often claim, imply or assume. In fact it could be said that we can begin to understand the vital role of death in Western culture only when we accept death as profoundly, compellingly and irreducibly traumatic.

Our aff may contain an element of fear, but that’s not really the point – it’s about embracing freedom – their search for an authentic relationship to mortality recreates the worst kind of solipsism

Dollimore, Sociology – U Sussex, ’98

(Jonathan, Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, pg. 221)

But freedom cannot embrace death. Despite taking so much from modern philosophers of death like Heidegger and Kojeve, Sartre finally has to eliminate death from the finitude of being. He takes Heideggerian nothingness into self, making it the basis of freedom, but he also privileges selfhood in a way which Heidegger emphatically did not, and resists Heidegger's embrace of death. Sartre knows that to take death so profoundly into being, as did Heidegger and Kojeve, threatens the entire project of human freedom as praxis, which is the most important aspect of Sartre's existentialism. Certainly, for Heidegger, authenticity did not entail praxis, and in his Letter on Humanism' he actually repudiated Sartre's attempt to derive from his work a philosophical rationale for existential engagement; so far as Heidegger was concerned, such engagement was only another version of inauthentic 'social' existence, a social evasion of the truth of Being. But was Heidegger's own truth of Being ever more than a state of authenticity whose main objective is obsessively to know or insist on itself as authentic? For all his talk of freedom, there remains in Heidegger a sense in which authenticity remains a petrified sense of self, paralysed by the very effort of concentrating on the profundity of Being, which always seems to be also a condition of mystical impossibility: 'Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein\* (Being and Time, p. 294). Not so for Sartre. He recognizes the modern project whereby death is Snteriorizcd . . . humanized (and] individualized\*, and that Heidegger gave philosophical form to this process. On the face of it, this is an attractive development, since death as apparent limit on our freedom is reconceptualized as a support of freedom {Being and Nothingness, pp. 532-3). But, against Heidegger, Sartre argues that death, far from being the profound source of being and existential authenticity, is just a contingent fact like birth, and this, far from being a limit, is what guarantees one's freedom. Heidegger's entire account of death rests on an erroneous conflation of death and finitude; finitude is essentially internal to life and the grounds of our freedom - 'the very act of freedom is therefore the assumption and creation of finitude. If I make myself, I make myself finite and hence my life is unique' - whereas death is simply an external and factual limit of my subjectivity (pp. 546-7). Quite simply, 'It is absurd that we are born; it is absurd that we die' (p. 547). This perhaps entails a fear of death, since 'to be dead is to be a prey for the living': one is no longer in charge of one's own life; it is now in the hands of others, of the living (p. 543). It is true that death haunts me at the very heart of each of my human projects, as their inevitable reverse side. But this reverse side of death is just the end of my possibilities and, as such, 'it does not penetrate me. The freedom which is my freedom remains total and infinite . . . Since death is always beyond my subjectivity, there is no place for it in my subjectivity' (pp. 547-8).

The search for an authentic relationship to death devalues life

Theresa **Sanders 6**, theology prof at Georgetown, Tenebrae: Holy Week after the Holocaust, googlebooks

In her book Spirit of Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death, Edith Wyschogrod presents a history of how Western philosophers have thought of the meaning of death and its relation to life. She explains that for the most part, death has been viewed according to what she calls the “authenticity paradigm.” This paradigm is governed by “the assumption that a good death, even if not free of pain, is the measure of a good life.” The ultimate test of one’s life, according to this model, is whether one meets the inevitability of death with unflinching acceptance or with terror before the unknown. Wyschogrod offers two examples of the authenticity paradigm, one ancient and one more modern. The first comes from Plato’s Phaedo, which records the death of Socrates. According to the Phaedo, Socrates met his death not only with calm but with positive good cheer, taking time to instruct his disciples and to offer them words of encouragement even as the hemlock neared his lips. Because he had so thoroughly examined the nature of death while still alive, for him death held neither surprise nor sting. Socrates was able to accept the possibility that death would mean sinking into non-existence, even as he hoped that it might lead him to the freedom of the unimpaired soul, and the truth that is the goal of all philosophers. He underwent a “good death” because of the thoughtfulness and courageous quality of his life. Wyschogrod’s second example comes from the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke. For Rilke, she says, death is not so much a future event as it is a dimension of the present. She explains that for the poet, “Only by integrating death into the texture of life is an authentic living and dying possible.” In this view, life can only be experienced in its depths if death is not only accepted but is allowed to illuminate each moment. And yet death does not thereby become the victor over life. Instead, death is the very condition of life; it is what makes the intensity of each moment possible and what makes each moment worth living. This point is crucial to Wyschogrod’s argument, as she believes that it is what differentiates Rilke’s situation from our own. For Rilke, she explains, there is a continuity that binds the present and the future together. She cites the first of Rilke’s Duino Elegies: “True it is strange to inhabit the earth no longer, / to use no longer customs scarcely required, / not to interpret roses, and other things / that promise so much, in terms of a human future…and to lay aside / even one’s proper name like a broken toy.” Even as the poem contemplates the disruption between the cares of the living and the concerns of the dead, it asserts a continuity between them. Explains Wyschogrod, “For this reason the fundamental assumption, the hidden premise, which undergirds this verse is the indestructability of an accustomed field of reference – “the things that promise so much,’ ‘customs scarcely acquired,’ ‘roses,’ ‘the name laid aside’ – since these are the stuff through which any meaningful grasp of the future comes about.” However, says Wyschogrod, the possibility of anticipation, of “looking forward to,” is precisely what has been called into question by the twentieth century and the advent of mass death. The threat of annihilation made possible by nuclear holocaust overwhelms any poetic holding-in-balance of life and death. We face, she observes, the prospect of wiping not only ourselves but all earthly being out of existence. This possibility of pure annihilation opens up a breach between our present and our future. In contemplation of mass destruction, we can no longer imagine, as Rilke did, the dead gently laying aside their customs, their roses, and their names like so many broken toys. We do not have the luxury of imagining individual souls parting reluctantly from those whom they leave behind, and thus no one to weight the meaning of death with a counterbalancing intensity of life. Concludes Wyschogrod, “By destroying the system of meanings which rendered death-accepting behavior possible, the effect of man-made mass death has undercut the power of the authenticity paradigm which permitted mastery over death.” What can we say, then, about the Catholic admonition to remember that we are dust and that we will return to dust? Let us begin with what we cannot say. We cannot simply comfort ourselves with the idea that death is a part of life, that is always has been and always will be, and that our deaths will clear the way for the generation of new life. Not only has the projection towards “always” been called into question, but the notion that death contributes to life has been overshadowed by the possibility of the complete annihilation of all life. Moreover, death as the origin of life has been given sinister meaning by the calculations of Nazism: the use of human remains as fertilizer and stuffing for mattresses, among other things. Such economics turn imagery of the “cycle of life” into mockery.

**The death drive’s a useless label**

Havi **Carel 6**, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, “Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger”, googlebooks

Freud introduces the death drive in order to explain all behaviour that is not in accordance with the pleasure principle. He does so by offering a theoretical construct in the form of an aggressive drive but also posits the Nirvana principle as the aim of all organic systems to rid themselves of excitation and strive towards complete rest. This leads to contradictory formulations of the death drive. Part of the function of the death drive is to unify a variety of aggressive phenomena such as destructiveness, sadism, masochism and hate. But Freud is also proposing a more general metaphysical speculation about life as a conflict between life and death drives. This position raises serious problems: 1. **Positing the death drive reduces all forms of aggression to one source**. Could a single drive explain all types of aggression and destructiveness? Or are there vital details in the individual origins and characteristics of each aggressive phenomenon that are subsumed by the reductive hypothesis of the death drive? 2. **Even if we were to accept such a reductive concept, its explanatory value is not clear**. What does the notion of the death drive add to the already unifying concept of aggression? **Assembling various forces under the auspices of the death drive makes it an unstable category whose meaning can only be derived from the specific context of its application**. The death drive has no autonomous meaning. Since the death drive derives its meaning from the concrete situation, it does not contribute to an understanding of the given phenomenon (aggression or destructiveness). Rather, **it is the death drive that gets explained by its instances, but it ultimately lacks autonomous content**. Freud subsumes under the concept of the death drive two essentially contradictory tendencies: the Nirvana principle striving to eliminate all tension, and aggression creating tension. How can the death drive explain both the tendency towards elimination of tension and aggression that increases tension? A more specific problem is that of masochism (discussed in The Economic Problem of Masochism). If masochism is a manifestation of the death drive as self-directed aggression aiming at unpleasure, how does that square with Freud's view that the death drive is equivalent to the Nirvana principle, which aims to discharge all tension? Freud's attempts to posit a two-drive model arc unsuccessful both theoretically and empirically. Is there really a difference between Eros and Thanatos? If so, why do they keep collapsing into one another?

**No impact to threat con**

Eric A. **Posner and** Adrian **Vermeule 3**, law profs at Chicago and Harvard, Accommodating Emergencies, September, <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/48.eap-av.emergency.pdf>

Against the view that panicked government officials overreact to an emergency, and unnecessarily curtail civil liberties, we suggest a more constructive theory of the role of fear. Before the emergency, government officials are complacent. They do not think clearly or vigorously about the potential threats faced by the nation. After the terrorist attack or military intervention, their complacency is replaced by fear. Fear stimulates them to action. Action may be based on good decisions or bad: fear might cause officials to exaggerate future threats, but it also might arouse them to threats that they would otherwise not perceive. **It is impossible to say in the abstract whether decisions and actions provoked by fear are likely to be better than decisions and actions made in a state of calm**. But our limited point is that there is no reason to think that the fear-inspired decisions are likely to be worse. For that reason, the existence of fear during emergencies does not support the antiaccommodation theory that the Constitution should be enforced as strictly during emergencies as during non-emergencies.

C. The Influence of Fear during Emergencies

Suppose now that the simple view of fear is correct, and that it is an unambiguously negative influence on government decisionmaking. Critics of accommodation argue that this negative influence of fear justifies skepticism about emergency policies and strict enforcement of the Constitution. However, this argument is implausible. It is doubtful that fear, so understood, has more influence on decisionmaking during emergencies than decisionmaking during non-emergencies.

The panic thesis, implicit in much scholarship though rarely discussed in detail, holds that citizens and officials respond to terrorism and war in the same way that an individual in the jungle responds to a tiger or snake. The national response to emergency, because it is a standard fear response, is characterized by the same circumvention of ordinary deliberative processes: thus, (i) the response is instinctive rather than reasoned, and thus subject to error; and (ii) the error will be biased in the direction of overreaction. While the flight reaction was a good evolutionary strategy on the savannah, in a complex modern society the flight response is not suitable and can only interfere with judgment. Its advantage—speed—has minimal value for social decisionmaking. No national emergency requires an immediate reaction—except by trained professionals who execute policies established earlier—but instead over days, months, or years people make complex judgments about the appropriate institutional response. And the asymmetrical nature of fear guarantees that people will, during a national emergency, overweight the threat and underweight other things that people value, such as civil liberties.

But if decisionmakers rarely act immediately, then the tiger story cannot bear the metaphoric weight that is placed on it. Indeed, the flight response has nothing to do with the political response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the attack on September 11. The people who were there—the citizens and soldiers beneath the bombs, the office workers in the World Trade Center—no doubt felt fear, and most of them probably responded in the classic way. They experienced the standard physiological effects, and (with the exception of trained soldiers and security officials) fled without stopping to think. It is also true that in the days and weeks after the attacks, many people felt fear, although not the sort that produces a irresistible urge to flee. **But this kind of fear is not the kind in which cognition shuts down**. (Some people did have more severe mental reactions and, for example, shut themselves in their houses, but these reactions were rare.) The fear is probably better described as a general anxiety or jumpiness, an anxiety that was probably shared by government officials as well as ordinary citizens.53

While, as we have noted, there is psychological research suggesting that normal cognition partly shuts down in response to an immediate threat, we are aware of no research suggesting that people who feel anxious about a non-immediate threat are incapable of thinking, or thinking properly, or systematically overweight the threat relative to other values. Indeed, it would be surprising to find research that clearly distinguished “anxious thinking” and “calm thinking,” given that anxiety is a pervasive aspect of life. People are anxious about their children; about their health; about their job prospects; about their vacation arrangements; about walking home at night. No one argues that people’s anxiety about their health causes them to take too many precautions—to get too much exercise, to diet too aggressively, to go to the doctor too frequently—and to undervalue other things like leisure. So it is hard to see why anxiety about more remote threats, from terrorists or unfriendly countries with nuclear weapons, should cause the public, or elected officials, to place more emphasis on security than is justified, and to sacrifice civil liberties.

Fear generated by immediate threats, then, causes instinctive responses that are not rational in the cognitive sense, not always desirable, and not a good basis for public policy, but it is not this kind of fear that leads to restrictions of civil liberties during wartime. The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II may have been due to racial animus, or to a mistaken assessment of the risks; it was not the direct result of panic; indeed there was a delay of weeks before the policy was seriously considered.54 Post-9/11 curtailments of civil liberties, aside from immediate detentions, came after a significant delay and much deliberation. The civil libertarians’ argument that fear produces bad policy trades on the ambiguity of the word “panic,” which refers both to real fear that undermines rationality, and to collectively harmful outcomes that are driven by rational decisions, such as a bank run, where it is rational for all depositors to withdraw funds if they believe that enough other depositors are withdrawing funds. Once we eliminate the false concern about fear, it becomes clear that the panic thesis is indistinguishable from the argument that during an emergency people are likely to make mistakes. But if the only concern is that during emergencies people make mistakes, there would be no reason for demanding that the constitution be enforced normally during emergencies. Political errors occur during emergencies and nonemergencies, but the stakes are higher during emergencies, and that is the conventional reason why constitutional constraints should be relaxed.

**One speech act doesn’t cause securitization – it’s an ongoing process**

**Ghughunishvili 10**

Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

**Global extinction risks require a revision of the politics of compassion – survival is still paramount. New risks dictate embracing our ethic DEPSITE their impacts**

Winchester 94

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Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn

As uninformed as it is to assume that there is an easy connec- tion between his thought and National Socialism, it is neither diffi- cult nor misguided to consider his lack of social concern. Nietzsche saw one danger in our century, but failed to see a second. His critique of herd mentality reads like a prophetic warning against the dictatorships that have plagued and continue to haunt the twentieth cen- tury. But **the context of our world has changed in ways that Nietzsche never imagined**. We now have, as never before, the ability to destroy-the planet. The threat of the destruction of a society is not new. From the beginnings of Western literature in the Iliad and the Odyssey, the Western mind has contemplated the destruction that, for example, warfare has wrought. Although the Trojan war destroyed almost everyone involved, both the victors and the van- quished, it did not destroy the entire world. In the twentieth century, **what has changed is the scale of destruction.** If a few countries destroy the ozone layer, the whole world perishes, or if two countries fight a nuclear or biological war, the whole planet is threatened. This is something new in the history of the world/ The intercon- nectedness of the entire world has grown dramatically. We live, as never before, in a global community where our actions effect ever- larger numbers of the world's population. The earth's limits have become more apparent. Our survival depends on working together to solve problems like global pollution. **Granted** mass movements have instituted reigns of terror, **but** our survival as a planet is becoming ever-more predicated on community efforts of the sort that Nietzsche's thought seems to denigrate if not preclude. I do not criticize Nietzsche for failing to predict the rise of problems requiring communal efforts such as the disintegration of the ozone layer, acid rain, and the destruction of South American rain forests. Noting his lack of foresight and his occasional extrem- ism, I propose, in a Nietzschean spirit, to reconsider his particular tastes, without abandoning his aesthetic turn. Statements like "com- mon good is a self-contradiction" are extreme, even for Nietzsche. He was not always so radical. Yet **there is little room in** Nietzsche's **egoism for** the kind of cooperation and sense of community that is today **so important for our survival**. I am suggesting that **the time for** Nietzsche's **radical individualism is past. There are compelling prag- matic** and aesthetic reasons why we should now be more open to the positive possibilities of living in a community. There is nothing new about society's need to work together. What has changed is the level of interconnectedness that the technological age has pressed upon us.

The alternative fails – embrace compassion because it’s difficult and fraught with risk

Frazer 6

The Review of Politics (2006), 68: 49-78 Cambridge University Press

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There is a second way in which the painful experience of compassion can threaten human excellence. Not only do we risk developing contempt for all but the suffering masses, but we also risk developing contempt for the compassion that forces us to suffer with them. The terrible experience of shared suffering might lead some of the would-be great on a futile quest to abolish human misery. Others, however, are likely to conclude that their sympathetic pain could be most efficiently relieved by extirpating the faculties responsible for it. When we do not hate the suffering of others, but only our own sharing of this suffering, we seek only to banish compassion from our own breasts. Doing so, however, requires us to shield ourselves from the troubling awareness of our fellows' plight, to sever the imaginative and emotional bonds which connect us to others. It requires that we turn against our own strength of intelligence and imagination, that we sacrifice knowledge for ignorance by denying our insights into the human condition. Some of us might succeed in turning ourselves into such isolated, unthinking beings, but such individuals are not destined for creative achievement.

By contrast, the natural philosopher, poet, or psychologist—the born and inevitable unriddler of human souls—could no more destroy his own sense of compassion than he could abolish the human suffering which compassion compels him to share. A futile quest to extirpate his sympathetic sentiments would only turn such an individual against the world, against life, and against himself; in the end, it might even destroy him. Zarathustra does not pass the greatest test of his strength by purging compassion from his psyche. To the contrary, he affirms his painful experience of the emotion as creativity-enhancing and life-promoting. In doing so, Nietzsche's protagonist warns against those who unduly oppose compassion as well as those who unduly celebrate it. Both sides treat pain as something to be soothed away rather than harnessed for creative purposes; they differ only in whether the pain to be alleviated is our own or that of others. From the ethically authoritative perspective of life, both can be seen as opponents of human flourishing.

# 1AR

**case**

**They can’t solve pressure to mediocrity**

**Golomb 06** - (Jacob, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Autumn)

According to Nietzsche, the cry for personal authenticity appeared at the "twilight of the idols" and is an explicit expression of revolt against the spirit of objectivity. Thus it is inconceivable to have a fully authentic individual living in society, which by nature is founded on a set of objective norms and common ethos. To clarify this point I will draw an analogy from the domain of psychoanalysis. If neurosis is, as Freud claims, a natural outcome of the repressive society, which is founded on such repression, can we imagine a society where there are no neurotic people? This question remains valid even for a society in which all neurotic individuals have successfully undergone psychoanalytic treatment. But once they try to live in that society under, more or less, the same conditions that caused their neuroses in the first place, won't they to some degree regress? The same consideration is relevant to the individual whose quest for authenticity or for optimal positive power, that is, in the form of the Übermensch, is supposedly finally fulfilled. Because such a person continues to be a member of society, the processes of social conditioning and the assault from within on one's "pure power" will continue to exert their antiauthenticating and weakening effects. Moreover, imagine a society where authenticity became a general norm: such a society either would be destroyed or would destroy that authenticity, which would be manifested precisely in those individuals who attempt to overcome its ethic and exhibit the spirit of revolt. Hence the struggles to attain personal authenticity and Übermensch status face what seems to be a paradoxical situation: these lofty ideals cannot be materialized without society, but neither can they be lived within its framework.

**K**

**Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship**

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(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of **criticism, as a reductive passing over** the **empirical and analytic distinctness of** the **different** object **fields in complex societies.**

In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also **always in danger of passing over** the **salient differences** and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology.

We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a **multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary** critical **theory** that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. **It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines**, most of **whom** today **pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy,** neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

**Hostile narratives are nbd**

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(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

Life’s value is subjective, which means we can’t make overarching claims about it

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Ultimately, Aquinas' theory of personhood requires a metaphysical explanation that is rooted in an understanding of the primacy of the existence or esse of the human person. For humans beings, the upshot of this position is clear: while human personhood is intimately connected with a broad range of actions (including consciousness of oneself and others), the definition of personhood is not based upon any specific activity or capacity for action, but upon the primacy of esse. Indeed, human actions would have neither a cause nor any referent in the absence of a stable, abiding self that is rooted in the person's very being. A commitment to the primacy of esse, then, allows for an adequate recognition of the importance of actions in human life, while providing a principle for the unification and stabilizing of these behavioral features. In this respect, the human person is defined as a dynamic being which actualizes the potentiality for certain behavior or operations unique to his or her own existence. Esse thereby embraces all that the person is and is capable of doing.

In the final analysis, **any attempt to define the person in terms of a single attribute, activity, or capability** (e.g., consciousness) flies in the face of the depth and multi-dimensionality which is part and parcel of personhood itself. To do so **would abdicate the ontological core of the person and the very center which renders human activities intelligible**. And Aquinas' anthropology, I submit, provides an effective philosophical lens through which the depth and profundity of the human reality comes into sharp focus. In this respect, Kenneth Schmitz draws an illuminating distinction between "person" (a term which conveys such hidden depth and profundity) and "personality" (a term which pertains to surface impressions and one's public image).40 The preoccupation with the latter term, he shows, is very much an outgrowth of the eighteenth century emphasis upon a human individuality that is understood in terms of autonomy and privacy. This notion of the isolated, atomistic individual was closely linked with a subjective focus whereby the "self" became the ultimate referent for judging reality. By extension, such a presupposition led to the conviction that only self-consciousness provides a means of validating any claims to personhood and membership in a community of free moral agents capable of responsibilities and worthy of rights.

In contrast to such an isolated and enclosed conception (i.e., whereby one is a person by virtue of being "set apart" from others as a privatized entity), Schmitz focuses upon an intimacy which presupposes a certain relation between persons. From this standpoint, intimacy is only possible through genuine self-disclosure, and the sharing of self-disclosure that allows for an intimate knowledge of the other.41 For Schmitz, such a revelation of one's inner self transcends any specific attributes or any overt capacity the individual might possess.42 Ultimately, Schmitz argues, intimacy is rooted in the unique act of presencing, whereby the person reveals his or her personal existence. But such a mystery only admits of a metphysical explanation, rather than an epistemological theory of meaning which confines itself to what is observable on the basis of perception or sense experience. Intimacy, then, discloses a level of being that transcends any distinctive properties. Because intimacy has a unique capacity to disclose being, it places us in touch with the very core of personhood. Metaphysically speaking, intimacy is not grounded in the recognition of this or that characteristic a person has, but rather in the simple unqualified presence the person is.43

**Inevitability doesn’t justify extinction in the short term – future generations are intrinsically valuable and might solve the impacts anyway, BUT this is also silly because if death’s inev, it doesn’t matter if it’s good or bad**

Jason **Matheny**, Department of Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. **‘7**. Risk Analysis, Volume 27, Number 5, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction.” <http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html>

An extinction event today could cause the loss of thousands of generations. This matters to the extent we value future lives. Society places some value on future lives when it accepts the costs of long-term environmental policies or hazardous waste storage. Individuals place some value on future lives when they adopt measures, such as screening for genetic diseases, to ensure the health of children who do not yet exist. Disagreement, then, does not center on whether future lives matter, but on how much they matter.6 Valuing future lives less than current ones (“intergenerational discounting”) has been justified by arguments about time preference, growth in consumption, uncertainty about future existence, and opportunity costs. I will argue that none of these justifications applies to the benefits of delaying human extinction. Under time preference, a good enjoyed in the future is worth less, intrinsically, than a good enjoyed now. The typical justification for time preference is descriptive—most people make decisions that suggest that they value current goods more than future ones. However, it may be that people’s time preference applies only to instrumental goods, like money, whose value predictably decreases in time. In fact, it would be difficult to design an experiment in which time preference for an intrinsic good (like happiness), rather than an instrumental good (like money), is separated from the other forms of discounting discussed below. But even supposing individuals exhibit time preference within their own lives, it is not clear how this would ethically justify discounting across different lives and generations (Frederick, 2006; Schelling, 2000). In practice, discounting the value of future lives would lead to results few of us would accept as being ethical. For instance, if we discounted lives at a 5% annual rate, a life today would have greater intrinsic value than a billion lives 400 years hence (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Broome (1994) suggests most economists and philosophers recognize that this preference for ourselves over our descendents is unjustifiable and agree that ethical impartiality requires setting the intergenerational discount rate to zero. After all, if we reject spatial discounting and assign equal value to contemporary human lives, whatever their physical distance from us, we have similar reasons to reject temporal discounting, and assign equal value to human lives, whatever their temporal distance from us. I Parfit (1984), Cowen (1992), and Blackorby et al. (1995) have similarly argued that time preference across generations is not ethically defensible.7 There could still be other reasons to discount future generations. A common justification for discounting economic goods is that their abundance generally increases with time. Because there is diminishing marginal utility from consumption, future generations may gain less satisfaction from a dollar than we will (Schelling, 2000). This principle makes sense for intergenerational transfers of most economic goods but not for intergenerational transfers of existence. There is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed. There is no reason to believe existence matters less to a person 1,000 years hence than it does to a person 10 years hence. Discounting could be justified by our uncertainty about future generations’ existence. If we knew for certain that we would all die in 10 years, it would not make sense for us to spend money on asteroid defense. It would make more sense to live it up, until we become extinct. A discount scheme would be justified that devalued (to zero) anything beyond 10 years. Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 261–262) defend discounting on these grounds—we are uncertain about humanity’s long-term survival, so planning too far ahead is imprudent.8 Discounting is an approximate way to account for our uncertainty about survival (Ponthiere, 2003). But it is unnecessary—an analysis of extinction risk should equate the value of averting extinction at any given time with the expected value of humanity’s future from that moment forward, which includes the probabilities of extinction in all subsequent periods (Ng, 2005). If we discounted the expected value of humanity’s future, we would count future extinction risks twice—once in the discount rate and once in the undiscounted expected value—and underestimate the value of reducing current risks. In any case, Dasgupta and Heal’s argument does not justify traditional discounting at a constant rate, as the probability of human extinction is unlikely to be uniform in time.9 Because of nuclear and biological weapons, the probability of human extinction could be higher today than it was a century ago; and if humanity colonizes other planets, the probability of human extinction could be lower then than it is today. Even Rees’s (2003) pessimistic 50-50 odds on human extinction by 2100 would be equivalent to an annual discount rate under 1% for this century. (If we are 100% certain of a good’s existence in 2007 but only 50% certain of a good’s existence in 2100, then the expected value of the good decreases by 50% over 94 years, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.75%.) As Ng (1989) has pointed out, a constant annual discount rate of 1% implies that we are more than 99.99% certain of not surviving the next 1,000 years. Such pessimism seems unwarranted. A last argument for intergenerational discounting is from opportunity costs: without discounting, we would always invest our money rather than spend it now on important projects (Broome, 1994). For instance, if we invest our money now in a stock market with an average5%real annual return, in a century we will have 130 times more money to spend on extinction countermeasures (assuming we survive the century). This reasoning could be extended indefinitely (as long as we survive). This could be an argument for investing in stocks rather than extinction countermeasures if: the rate of return on capital is exogenous to the rate of social savings, the average rate of return on capital is higher than the rate of technological change in extinction countermeasures, and the marginal cost effectiveness of extinction countermeasures does not decrease at a rate equal to or greater than the return on capital. First, the assumption of exogeneity can be rejected. Funding extinction countermeasures would require spending large sums; if, instead, we invested those sums in the stock market, they would affect the average market rate of return (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Second, some spending on countermeasures, such as research on biodefense, has its own rate of return, since learning tends to accelerate as a knowledge base expands. This rate could be higher than the average rate of return on capital. Third, if the probability of human extinction significantly decreases after space colonization, there may be a small window of reducible risk: the period of maximum marginal cost effectiveness may be limited to the next few centuries. Discounting would be a crude way of accounting for opportunity costs, as cost effectiveness is probably not constant. A more precise approach would identify the optimal invest-and-spend path based on estimates of current and future extinction risks, the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, and market returns. In summary, there are good reasons not to discount the benefits of extinction countermeasures. Time preference is not justifiable in intergenerational problems, there is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed, and uncertainties about human existence should be represented by expected values. I thus assume that the value of future lives cannot be discounted. Since this position is controversial, I later show how acceptance of discounting would affect our conclusions.

**Life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures---its preservation should be an a priori goal**

**Kacou 8**

(Amien WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) [cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184](http://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184))

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: **there is pleasure in all consciousness** of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, **it is simply the very experience of liking things**, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, **there are many things the experience of which we like**. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is **irrelevant** in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable **in living**—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that **life has some** objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

Resisting ressentiment requires an ethics of the body

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 We now turn to the heart of the matter, the role of "external goods" in the good human life. And here we encounter a rather large surprise. There is no philosopher in the modern Western tradition who is more emphatic than Nietzsche is about the central importance of the body, and about the fact that we are bodily creatures. Again and again he charges Christian and Platonist moralities with making a false separation between our spiritual and our physical nature; against them, he insists that we are physical through and through. The surprise is that, having said so much and with such urgency, he really is very loathe to draw the conclusion that is naturally suggested by his position: that human beings need worldly goods in order to function. In all of Nietzsche's rather abstract and romantic praise of solitude and asceticism, we find no grasp of the simple truth that a hungry person cannot think well; that a person who lacks shelter, basic health care, and the basic necessities of life, is not likely to become a great philosopher or artist, no matter what her innate equipment. The solitude Nietzsche describes is comfortable bourgeois solitude, whatever its pains and loneli- ness. Who are his ascetic philosophers? "Heraclitus, Plato. Descartes, Spi- noza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer"—none a poor person, none a person who had to perform menial labor in order to survive. And because Nietzsche does not grasp the simple fact that if our abilities are physical abilities they have physical necessary conditions, he does not understand what the democratic and socialist movements of his day were all about. The pro-pity tradition, from Homer on, understood that one functions badly if one is hungry, that one thinks badly if one has to labor all day in work that does not involve the fully human use of one's faculties. I have suggested that such thoughts were made by Rousseau the basis for the modern development of democratic-socialist thinking. Since Nietzsche does not get the basic idea, he docs not see what socialism is trying to do. Since he probably never saw or knew an acutely hungry person, or a person performing hard physical labor, he never asked how human self-command is affected by such forms of life. And thus he can proceed as if it does not matter how people live front day to day, how they get their food. Who provides basic welfare support for Zarathustra? What are the "higher men" doing all the day long? The reader docs not know and the author does not seem to care. Now Nietzsche himself obviously was not a happy man. He was lonely, in bad health, scorned by many of his contemporaries. And yet, there still is a distinction to be drawn between the sort of vulnerability that Nietzsche's life contained and the sort we find if we examine the lives of truly impov- erished and hungry people. We might say. simplifying things a bit, that there are two sorts of vulnerability: what we might call bourgeois vulnerabil- ity—for example, the pains of solitude, loneliness, bad reputation, some ill health, pains that are painful enough but still compatible with thinking and doing philosophy—and what we might call basic vulnerability, which is a deprivation of resources so central to human functioning that thought and character are themselves impaired or not developed. Nietzsche, focuv ing on the first son of vulnerability, holds that it is not so bad; it may even be good for the philosopher.\*® The second sort. I claim, he simply ne- glects—believing, apparently, that even a beggar can be a Stoic hero, if only socialism does not inspire him with weakness.5"