**Link: The aff willing and justify the action for doing the plan is based on the Reason, which is centered on the ethical realm of existence, where paradoxical natural is interweave into.**

**LaTour 10** ( Amee, The Absurd: Camus and Kierkegaard, Amateur philosopher) http://voices.yahoo.com/the-absurd-camus-kierkegaard-6733394.html

One of the most striking features of Fear and Trembling and its treatment of faith is the resulting approach toward the ethical. I find it unfortunate that Kierkegaard simply adopted the Kantian notion of ethics as "the universal" without elaborating or providing a foundation for this definition, but this is what we are given. We must, then, consider his idea of ethical action as that which can be willed universal action. The story of Abraham poses a great problem: Would Isaac be the victim of sacrifice or murder? If the latter, then Abraham, that great man of God, is unethical; if the former, then **acts of faith are beyond the ethical.** Kierkegaard says that if we grant **the absurd**, if we can leap over the understanding into faith, then there is such a thing as the "teleological suspension of the ethical." (83) The ethical, as the universal, demands that the individual sacrifice his individuality for the sake of the universal. It is only possible to justifiably disobey this demand if there is in fact something higher than the universal. For Kierkegaard, this something higher is the individual who attains to a direct relation to the absolute, to God. God is higher than all men or the universal; as such, one man with a relation to God is higher than all men without this relation. If we grant the unknown and the possibility of this relationship, then and only then can Abraham be justified; he is not unethical, but beyond ethical.

Drone Link. The aff creates of the drone policy base on a universal ethical be on the government.

Cross apply the the Byman 13 card which warrant “the administration is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow. the United States can still influence how they are used. The coming proliferation means that Washington needs to set forth a clear policy now”

The link is super charge with their Boyle 13 card that says “Establishing norms establishes international norms – doing it publicly is key”. They are creating this norm base on a universal claim of what ought to and should be done. They justify are based on earth and temporal justification which cause despair.

They say establishing procedure is key, we control the internal link to this question on the ontological level. We first have to create the right procedure on how one self-get to their ethic and how one goes about in the world.

**Internal Link: Despair as ignorance, Despair in weakness, and Despair in defiance.**

**Smith 04** ( Dr Graham M,. Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Leeds, Kierkegaard from the point of view of the political) http://his.library.nenu.edu.cn/upload/soft/haoli/119/29.pdf

Anti-Climacus turns ﬁrst to **despair as ignorance**. This form of despair amounts to the ignorance of being a self.28 The individual is neither aware that despair exists (as they do not understand what selfhood means), nor are they aware that they are in despair. In such a situation the individual is **conditioned by their surroundings, and especially by other people**.29 As we will see, this form of despair is ubiquitous with the Crowd and modern politics. Whilst this form of despair might not be considered despair at all (as it does not have the qualiﬁcation of consciousness), Anti-Climacus points out that the ‘ignorance’ of despair merely compounds the fact of despair with ‘error’.30 In the second form of **despair (weakness)** the individual is aware that they can become a self, but despair of becoming that self. **The individual wants to take on another identity** that would be an acceptable self which entails a rejection of the self that the individual currently is, and the self-constituted through faith, which the individual should be.31 The ﬁnal form of **despair (deﬁance)** sees the individual both recognizing that they are a self, but **wanting to take command of their self-setting** it free from its relation with God. Thus in some sense this is the ‘highest’ form of despair as it involves the greatest degree of consciousness (the individual is conscious of both being a self, and being in despair), and the greatest degree of deﬁance (the individual wills to not only be a self, but to the author of their own self, thus usurping the place of God).32

**Internal Link: Current modern democracy of statutory and judicial law all fail to represent the true potential of the self.**

**Smith 04** ( Dr Graham M,. Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Leeds, Kierkegaard from the point of view of the political) http://his.library.nenu.edu.cn/upload/soft/haoli/119/29.pdf

This article considers Kierkegaard’s contribution to our understanding of the political. Building on previous scholarship exploring the social dimensions of Kierkegaard’s thought, I argue that for Kierkegaard the modern understanding and practice of politics should be understood as ‘despair’. Thus, whilst Kierkegaard’s criticisms of politics might have been produced in an ad hoc fashion, this article argues that there is an underlying principle which guides these criticisms: that politics is subordinate to, and must be grounded in, spiritual or religious selfhood. In this way the modern phenomena of democracy, liberalism, the press, and the crowd can all be seen as representative of a form of community which falls far short of the potential that human beings can and should achieve. Such a community would see individuals recognising themselves and each other as spiritual beings, and taking responsibility for themselves and others. That modern politics fails to understand the human being as an essentially spiritual entity related to others through God can only lead us to conclude that, from Kierkegaard’s point of view, **modern politics suffers from the sickness of despair**. Whilst Kierkegaard might be criticised for failing to provide us with a more detailed picture of a polity shaped by the religious contours he promotes, he clearly offers an intriguing and suggestive contribution to our understanding not only of the limitations of politics, but also the relationship between a normative human and political ontology, with the former providing the basis for the latter.

**Internal Link : They aff create a this “universal ethic pill” in which prescribed to the mass to cause the sickness unto death.**

**Smith 04** ( Dr Graham M,. Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Leeds, Kierkegaard from the point of view of the political) http://his.library.nenu.edu.cn/upload/soft/haoli/119/29.pdf

If we are to understand Kierkegaard’s criticisms of modern politics we must ﬁrst turn to his account of the self. This is necessary as it is Kierkegaard’s account of the process of achieving and maintaining selfhood which enables him to situate the individual relationally and socially, thus providing the grounds for his criticisms of modern forms of sociality. In rehearsing Kierkegaard’s account of selfhood we come to see that his criticisms of modern politics is not simply a reactionary attack on forms of democracy and liberalism. On the contrary, Kierkegaard provides the basis for an alternative form of religious sociality which bases his criticisms of modern politics and the modern individual on a religiously conceived relationship between God, self, and others. Kierkegaard’s account of selfhood enables him to achieve this as his formulation of the normative form of selfhood explores the situation of the vast majority: the failed form of selfhood which Kierkegaard characterises as ‘despair’

Contention Two: Impacts

**Impact: Sickness unto death**

**Anti-Climacus 49** (Christian existentialism, The Sickness Unto Death)

Yet in another and still more definite sense despair is the sickness unto death. It is indeed very far from being true that, literally understood, one dies of this sickness, or that this sickness ends with bodily death. On the contrary, the torment of despair is precisely this, not to be able to die So it has much in common with the situation of the moribund when he lies and struggles with death, and cannot die. So to be sick unto death is, not to be able to die -- yet not as though there were hope of life; no the hopelessness in this case is that even the last hope, death, is not available. When death is the greatest danger, one hopes for life; but when one becomes acquainted with an even more dreadful danger, one hopes for death. So when the danger is so great that death has become one’s hope**, despair is the disconsolateness of not being able to die.**

 \*Moribund: of a person at the point of death

\* Disconsolate: Seeming beyond consolation; extremely dejected: disconsolate at the loss of the dog.

**Impact: Emptiness and nothingness of the self.**

**Silentio 43** (Johannes de, Saint John the Silence. Bishop of Colonia in Palestine and a hermit and lived for seventy-five years as a silent recluse, Fear and Trembling)

So for the first thing, the knight will have power to concentrate the whole content of life and the whole significance of reality in one single wish. If a man lacks this concentration, this intensity, if his soul from the beginning is dispersed in the multifarious, he never comes to the point of making the movement, he will deal shrewdly in life like the capitalists who invest their money in all sorts of securities, so as to gain on the one what they lose on the other–in short, he is not a knight. In the next place the knight will have the power to concentrate the whole result of the operations of thought in one act of consciousness. If he lacks this intensity, if his soul from the beginning is dispersed in the multifarious, he will never get time to make the movements, he will be constantly running errands in life, never enter into eternity, for even at the instant when he is closest to it he will suddenly discover that he has forgotten something for which he must go back. He will think that to enter eternity is possible the next instant, and that also is perfectly true, but by such considerations **one never reaches the point of making the movements, but by their aid one sinks deeper and deeper into the mire**.

Mire: a situation or state of difficulty, distress, or embarrassment from which it is hard to extricate oneself.

**Impact: The ontologically destruction**

**Bookbinder 45**( Hilarius, Stage on life’s way. Studies by various persons)

There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious. The metaphysical is abstraction, and there is no human being who exists metaphysically. The metaphysical, the ontological, is [er], but it does not exist [er ikke til], for when it exists it does so in the esthetic, in the ethical, in the religious, and when it is, it is the abstraction from or a prius [something prior] to the esthetic, the ethical, the religious. The ethical sphere is only a transition sphere, and therefore its highest expression is repentance as a negative action. The esthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement (and **this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt**), the religious the sphere of fulfillment, but, please note, not a fulfillment such as when one fills an alms box or a sack with gold, for repentance has specifically created a boundless space, and as a consequence the religious contradiction: simultaneously to be out on 70,000 fathoms of water and yet be joyful.

Contention Three: Alt

**Faith outside the realm of Reason**

**1) Moran 06**(Jamie, Senior lecturer at University in London, Faith as the ‘Leap of Passion’) http://www.koed.hu/neighbour/jamie.pdf

Faith is not a matter of reflection or thinking. Faith starts where thinking ends. You cannot think yourself into faith, because faith is an action—Kierkegaard will call this action the leap of passion— and no thinking can bring about this action required by faith.

 Kierkegaard refers to passion as a movement we make. In my writings, this is described as a movement of the heart; only passion can move the heart: only passion is the heart making its move, going into action, laying itself open, putting itself forth, giving its sweat, tears, and blood, to existence. This is a leap because it is a step out of the safe and known and a step into the dangerous and the unknown. Passion leaps into an abyss.

 Kierkegaard says that the movement involved in faith “requires passion. **Every movement of infinity occurs with passion, and no reflection can bring about a movement.** That is the ... leap in life which [accounts for] the movement. ... What we lack today is not reflection but passion. For that reason our age is really ... too tenacious of life to die, for dying is one of the most remarkable leaps.”

**Alt solvency: Faith transcend the paradoxical natural of the universal/ethical**

**LaTour 10** ( Amee, The Absurd: Camus and Kierkegaard, Amateur philosopher) http://voices.yahoo.com/the-absurd-camus-kierkegaard-6733394.html

"Sacrifice:" a fine segue into the discussion of Fear and Trembling! The focal point of this book is the story of Abraham. Abraham is for Kierkegaard the personification of faith. Faith is a manifestation of the absurd. It involves knowing something for certain and believing, in spite of this certainty, that the impossible will happen. Referred to Abraham's trial, this means that Abraham puts Isaac under the knife, fully intent on sacrificing him, while having faith that he will not have to sacrifice him. **The inner turmoil of the will, the self-contradictory will toward and against something, the tension between the ethical and Word of God - these paradoxes surpass comprehension.** The key component of faith for Kierkegaard is its focus on the temporal, on this world and what happens therein. This means that those who appeal to eternal justice and reconciliation in the afterlife are not representatives of true faith, for faith would require the conviction that justice and reconciliation are present here and now, in spite of all we experience to the contrary. It is precisely the incongruence of the actual and the ideal that makes faith great; it demands that we believe in the impossible.

Kierkegaard's approach to the incommensurable is to leap from one term to the other - from man's understanding to that which cannot be thought. Perhaps that is misleading of me, though; Kierkegaard says himself that he is unable to do this. "I cannot close my eyes and hurl myself trustingly into the absurd, for me it is impossible, but I do not praise myself on that account." (63) He describes faith as an act of immense courage, a courage which he lacks. He speaks of his conviction that God is love, then says that this idea opposes reality. He cannot transcend that reality and trust completely in God's love. This inability to leap over the understanding is a weakness in his view, an example of cowardice.

**Alt solvency: The leap of faith toward the divine suspend the ethical**

**Silentio 43** (Johannes de, Saint John the Silence. Bishop of Colonia in Palestine and a hermit and lived for seventy-five years as a silent recluse, Fear and Trembling)

**The paradox of faith is** this, that **the individual is higher than the universal**, that the individual (to recall a dogmatic distinction now rather seldom heard) determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his relation to the universal. The paradox can also be expressed by saying that there is an absolute duty toward God; for in this relationship of duty the individual as an individual stands related absolutely to the absolute. So when in this connection it is said that it is a duty to love God, something different is said from that in the foregoing; for if this duty is absolute, the ethical is reduced to a position of relativity. From this, however, it does not follow that the ethical is to be abolished, but it acquires an entirely different expression, the paradoxical expression–that, for example, love to God may cause the knight of faith to give his love to his neighbor the opposite expression to that which, ethically speaking, is required by duty

Framework 1NC 1/2

**1)** Role of the Ballet**, Who best creates a methodology to fixing the despair, and must best acted upon fixing it, to become an authentic self.**

**Anti-Climacus 49** (Christian existentialism, The Sickness Unto Death)

This is the situation in despair. And however thoroughly it eludes the attention of the despairer, and however thoroughly the despairer may succeed (as in the case of that kind of despair which is characterized by unawareness of being in despair) in losing himself entirely, and losing himself in such a way that it is not noticed in the least -- eternity nevertheless will make it manifest that his situation was despair, and it will so nail him to himself that the torment nevertheless remains that he cannot get rid of himself, and **it becomes manifest that he was deluded in thinking that he succeeded**. And thus it is eternity must act, because to have a self, to be a self, is the greatest concession made to man, but at the same time it is eternity’s demand upon him.

Delude: impose a misleading belief upon (someone); deceive; fool

**2)** Role of the ballet solvency**: As soon as the illusion is broken then it is clear that despair was lying underneath the whole time. Ignorance of despair is a negativity that you have to pass through to cure the despair.**

**Anti-Climacus 49** (Christian existentialism, The Sickness Unto Death)

Compared with the person who is conscious of his despair, the despairing individual who is ignorant of despair is simply negativity further away from the truth and deliverance. Despair itself is a negativity; ignorance of it, a new negativity. However, to reach the truth, one must go through every negativity, for the old legends about breaking certain magic spell is true: the piece has to be played through backwards or the spell is not broken. However, it is in only one sense, in purely dialectic sense, that the individual who is ignorant of his despair is further form the truth and deliverance than one who knows it and yet remains in despair, for in another sense, an ethical-dialectical sense **the person who is conscious of his despair and remain in it is further form deliverance** because his despair is more intensive. Yet ignorance is so far form breaking the despair or changing despair to nondespair that it can in fact be the most dangerous form of despair, To his own demoralization, the individual who is ignorance is in despair is in a way secured against becoming aware- that is, he is altogether secure in the power of despair.

**The Role of the Judge is to be a reflection of the Teacher, to trust back the learner toward God.**

**Climacus 44** (Johannes, Also known as John of the Ladder, Philosophical Fragments)

 Such a Teacher the learner will never be able to forget. For the moment he forgets him he sinks back again into himself, just as one who while in original possession of the condition forgot that God exists, and thereby sank into bondage. If they should happen to meet in another life, the Teacher would again be able to give the condition to anyone who had not yet received it; but to one who had once received the condition he would stand in a different relation. The condition was a trust, for which the recipient would always be required to render an account. But what shall we call such a Teacher? A teacher may determine whether the pupil makes progress or not, but he cannot judge him; for he ought to have Socratic insight enough to perceive that he cannot give him what is essential. **This Teacher is thus not so much teacher as Judge**. Even when the learner has most completely appropriated the condition, and most profoundly apprehended the Truth, he cannot forget this Teacher, or let him vanish Socratically, although this is far more profound than illusory sentimentality or untimely pettiness of spirit. It is indeed the highest, unless that other be the Truth.

 And now the moment. Such a moment has a peculiar character. It is brief and temporal indeed, like every moment; it is transient as all moments are; it is past, like every moment in the next moment. And yet it is decisive, and filled with the Eternal. Such a moment ought to have a distinctive name; let us call it the Fullness of Time.

**Role of Judge Solvency: The teacher break the bondage the enchained self from bondage.**

**Climacus 44** (Johannes, Also known as John of the Ladder, Philosophical Fragments)

The Teacher, then, is the God, and he gives the learner the requisite condition and the Truth. What shall we call such a Teacher? -- for we are surely agreed that we have already far transcended the ordinary functions of a teacher. In so far as the learner is in Error, but in consequence of his own act (and in no other way can he possibly be in this state, as we have shown above), he might seem to be free; for to be what one is by one’s own act is freedom. And yet he is in reality unfree and bound and exiled; for to be free from the Truth is to be exiled from the Truth, and to be exiled by one’s own self is to be bound. But since he is bound by himself, may he not loose his bonds and set himself free? For whatever binds me, the same should be able to set me free when it wills; and since this power is here his own self, he should be able to liberate himself. But first at any rate he must will it. Suppose him now to be so profoundly impressed by what the Teacher gave him occasion to remember (and this must not be omitted from the reckoning); suppose that he wills his freedom. In that case, i.e., if by willing to be free he could by himself became free, the fact that he had been bound would become a state of the past, tracelessly vanishing in the moment of liberation; the moment would not be charged with decisive significance. He was not aware that he had bound himself, and now he had freed himself.4 Thus interpreted the moment receives no decisive significance, and yet this was the hypothesis we proposed to ourselves in the beginning. By the terms of our hypothesis, therefore, he will not be able to set himself free -- And so it is in very truth; for he forges the chains of his bondage with the strength of his freedom, since he exists in it without compulsion; and thus his bonds grow strong, and all his powers unite to make him the slave of sin. -- What now shall we call such **a Teacher, one who restores the lost condition and gives the learner the Truth**? Let us call him Saviour, for he saves the learner from his bondage and from himself; let us call him Redeemer, for he redeems the learner from the captivity into which he had plunged himself, and no captivity is so terrible and so impossible to break, as that in which the individual keeps himself. And still we have not said all that is necessary; for by his self-imposed bondage the learner has brought upon himself a burden of guilt, and when the Teacher gives him the condition and the Truth he constitutes himself an Atonement, taking away the wrath impending upon that of which the learner has made himself guilty