#### The Affirmatives invocation of people who are suffering is the based on the ethic of the “neighbor,” the saving of the proximal other.

Meister 2005 (Robert, Professor at the University of Santa Cruz, "Never Again": The Ethics of the Neighbor and the Logic of Genocide, http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.105/15.2meister.txt)

The primacy of ethics over politics implicitly presupposes, however, specific limitations on the field of ethics itself. Viewed broadly, the raw material of ethics concerns languages and bodies in the sense that these are what matter from the ethical perspective when considering questions of agency and choice.[2] Ethical discussion of languages (and cultural systems that resemble languages) are now commonly expected to focus on the problem of difference, and to prefer a baseline cultural relativism to the culturally imperialist danger of false universals. In ethical discussion of bodies--and especially bodies that suffer--the greater danger is now widely seen to be false relativism (Levinas, "Useless Suffering" 99). A principled resistance to moral relativism when it comes to the suffering of bodies is, thus, the specific ethical view that underlies the present-day politics of human rights. For proponents of this politics, the suffering body is the ultimate wellspring of moral value, the response to bodily suffering the ultimate test of moral responsibility. "The supreme ordeal of the will is not death, but suffering," said the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, who took the primacy of ethics to its extreme by putting it ahead, even, of ontology and God (the world itself and its Creator) (Totality and Infinity 239). He argued that the suffering of another is always "useless," always unjustified, and that attempting to rationalize "the neighbor's pain is certainly the source of all immorality"("Useless Suffering" 98- 9). 5. Levinas is not here referring primarily to the growing medicalization of humanitarian invention, although he does regard analgesia as a paradigmatically ethical response to physical pain (see Kennedy and Rieff). His point is that my ethical responsibility, which merely begins with first aid, does not arise from any previous relationship between sufferer and provider, or from a political history consisting of prior vows or crimes, but from "a past irreducible to a hypothetical present that it once was . . . . [and] without the remembered present of any past commitment"("Diachrony and Representation" 170). Our responsibility to alleviate suffering comes before the past in the sense in which ethics can be said to come before politics. The priority of ethics arises "from the fear of occupying someone's place in the Da of my Dasein": "My . . . 'place in the sun,'" he says, "my home--have they not been a usurpation of places which belong to the others already oppressed or . . . expelled by me into a third world" ("From the One to the Other" 144-5). Levinas's point is that in ethics, unlike politics, we do not ask who came first and what we have already done to (or for) each other. The distinctively ethical question is rather one of proximity--we are already here and so is the other, cheek-by-jowl with us in the same place. The neighbor is the figure of the other toward whom our only relationship is that of proximity. For Levinas, the global movement to give ethics primacy over politics must be accompanied, within ethics, by the effort to give primacy to the ethics of the neighbor--the local over the global. In this way, the global primacy of ethics crystallizes around our horror of the inhuman act (the "gross" violation of human rights) rather than, for example, around the international distribution of wealth or the effects of global climate change

#### Forcing us to create radical evil in order to save the “victim.”

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Since late in the twentieth century, political thought has seen a renewed interest in "radical evil" defined through the paradigm of genocide--often coded simply as "Auschwitz."[3] Theodor Adorno describes this reorientation of ethics as follows: A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler on unfree mankind; to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen. (Qtd. in Cohen, Interrupting Auschwitz 4) No one, however, has gone further than Levinas in dismantling the structure of pre-Auschwitz thought to articulate such a "new categorical imperative," and to restate the ethical a priori, what Derrida has called "the Ethics of Ethics" ("Violence and Metaphysics" 111). As Levinas says, It is . . . attention to the suffering of the other that, through the cruelties of our century (despite these cruelties, because of these cruelties) can be affirmed as the very nexus of human subjectivity, to the point of being raised to the level of supreme ethical principle--the only one it is impossible to question. (Qtd. in Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics" 94) According to Levinas, "the disproportion between suffering and every theodicy was shown at Auschwitz" ("Useless Suffering" 97). Auschwitz here stands for the proposition that we are all, even (or especially) the most civilized among us, capable of genocide and that building moral thought around this recognition changes everything: henceforward, we must never lose our fear of being victims of genocidal violence, but must fear even more our propensity to commit it. Moral thought since Auschwitz thus starts with the premise that every encounter with a neighbor carries with it, "despite the innocence of its intentions, . . . [t]he risk of occupying . . . the place of an other and thus, on the concrete level, of exiling him, of condemning him to a miserable condition in some 'third' or 'fourth' world, of bringing him death" (Levinas, Time 169; see also Totality and Infinity 194-247).

#### This ethical orientation to the other is the justification used in creating a new state of political privilege and domination, whereby the victim now has the undisputed right to rule. That is what “justice” means in the contemporary political sphere.

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Both arguments support the self-description of Tutsi-ruled post-genocide Rwanda as a victim-state, consciously modeled on the state that might have been created for the Jews after the Holocaust if it had been carved out of Germany rather than developed in Palestine (see Mamdani, ch. 8). To grasp the meaning of this, imagine that the fears that Goebbels invoked as propaganda during World War II had been descriptively correct-- that Germany faced invasion by a militarized form of international Jewry seeking to reverse the historic course of German nativism. This hypothetical scenario for understanding the Holocaust as a reaction by German "natives" against Jewish (and other) "settlers," already adumbrated in Mein Kampf, comes close to the actual scenario in Rwanda on the eve of genocide.[32] Assuming that this rationalization for a Holocaust must "never again" be condoned, the invasion of Tutsi exiles that triggered the genocide was justified as a humanitarian intervention to rescue Tutsi survivors using means that are supported, if not required, by international law. Thereafter, the history of genocide (and the fear of its repetition) becomes an ideology of post-traumatic rule, purporting to justify the suspension of the normal criteria of political judgment in the successor state. Tutsi minority rule in Rwanda is thus not justified as a form of racialized oppression any more than Jewish rule of post-War Germany would have been so justified. Why? Because the basis of the rule is not racial per se; rather it occurs through the transformation of racial identities into those of victim and perpetrator, a transformation that occurs in the foundational moment of the genocide itself. 47. This is analogous to arguing that surviving German Jewish victims of the Holocaust deserved to rule a defeated and disgraced Germany and that returning Jewish exiles were entitled to share that rule--perhaps in the name of the victims who did not survive or else in the name of the rescuers. The analogy with Rwanda brings out the pragmatic difficulty of basing claims for justice on Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's broad (but contested) description of ordinary Germans as "Hitler's willing executioners." In Rwanda, a country of six million, an estimated three to four million Hutus did in fact directly participate in the murder of perhaps 800,000 Tutsis and Hutu resisters. The appellation "willing executioners" could plausibly be applied to much of the surviving adult Hutu population of the country. A Nuremberg-style punishment of all Rwandans who were personally responsible for genocidal actions would come so close in its effect to another, legally sanctioned, genocide that it would be difficult to distinguish from collective vengeance. 48. What victimhood demanded, instead, is the right to rule-- or, at least, the right to have the state ruled in the victims' name. The argument for victims' rule, even if they were to rule as a minority, is that a state cannot live on after genocide as though the distribution of bodies within the majority and the minority were an untainted fact of biopolitics. In Rwanda today "justice" is the code-word for Tutsi minority rule, legitimated by the disgrace of the Hutu majority.

#### This necessarily creates the condition of murder and genocide

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Writing both after Auschwitz and during an era of anti-colonial revolutions, Levinas argues that all totalizing projects are grounded in imagining the death of the other--that is, murder. He includes here even the totalizing project that grounds ethics, as Richard Rorty does, on the shared qualities of all homo sapiens (and perhaps companion species) capable of conscious suffering.[15] The American philosopher Hilary Putnam restates Levinas's concern as a concern about the vulnerability of the human rights culture to assertions of the "inhumanity" of other homo sapiens: "the danger in grounding ethics in the idea that we are all 'fundamentally the same' is that a door is opened for a Holocaust. One only has to believe that some people are not 'really' the same to destroy all the force of such a grounding" (35). At the pragmatic level, Rorty concedes "that everything turns on who counts as a fellow human being" (124)-- indeed he stresses it--but the more fundamental claim made by Levinas (and Putnam) is against the ethical assumption that arguments appealing to our shared humanity could count at all in ethical justifications of human rights.[16] The meaning of Auschwitz, they suggest, is that ethics must now be based, not on a common humanity that we share, but rather on the mere fact of occupying common ground with those with whom we do not presume any (other) affinity or relationship. Thus conceived, Auschwitz reveals the limits of the ethical project that teaches us to treat the other under the aspect of the same. Ethics--the ethics that is not subordinate to politics--must now begin with the damage that our mere presence causes to others whom we displace, and whom we must treat as genuinely exterior to the "other" who inhabits our own mind as an outward projection of the "self."

#### The alternative is to dwell with the other, to embrace radical evil into our own homes and our own hearts to embrace the idea that we are just as much victims as we are perpetrators.

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49. In Mamdani's account, however, the deeper choice is between a presumption of forgiveness on the one hand, and victims' rule on the other. Rather than make this choice, post-genocide Rwanda claims to be an example of both. The journalist Philip Gourevitch describes the return of "a certain Girumuhatse" to share a house with the surviving members of the family he butchered during the 1994 genocide: But why should survivors be asked to live next door to killers-- or even, as happened in Girumuhatse's house, under the same roof? Why put off confronting the problem? To keep things calm, General Kagame told me. (Gourevitch 308) Behind this pragmatic avoidance of confrontation, however, lies the assumption that where everyone has sinned in either deed or wish, the only way forward is through an ethics of the neighbor. 50. To invoke an ethics of the neighbor in the aftermath of sin, outside commentators sometimes describe Rwanda in the terms used by St. Paul to describe the world. Rwanda is a place in which the difference between sins actually committed and sins of the heart is merely the difference between "could have" and "would have." Some have argued that Rwanda is an ideal case for the Pauline solution of confession, forgiveness, and rebirth.[33] Forgiveness in Rwanda would, presumably, be based on recognizing that the fear of genocide makes committing genocide thinkable, and that in wish, if not in deed, all are sinners. In a Christian context, however, the sinners are already potentially forgiven. This is why they struggled then, and can now stop sinning. 51. But what could it possibly mean in a secular, constitutional context to believe that one is already potentially forgiven? It means, presumably, that one has not yet been judged, and may never be--that the resumption of useless suffering has been postponed. Unlike the Christian sinner who can be reborn, the secular survivor of radical evil--Auschwitz, Rwanda--is simply not yet dead. The "postponement" of death, as Levinas calls it, is the gift of time (Totality and Infinity 224). Secular survivorship after Auschwitz does not make past suffering meaningful in the Pauline way, the way of theodicy, where the sinner is forgiven and the sin is, thus, redeemed (felix culpa). What Levinasian survivors get is time that is always more time, an aftermath--time to apologize, to "correct the instant" and still be conscious of "the pain that is yet to come" (238). "To be temporal," according to Levinas, "is both to be for death and to still have time, to be against death" (235).

### Race ID 1nc

#### Racialized bodies only become static and the locus for political action (positive or negative) once we politicize those bodies and establish them as uniquely proximal.

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The problem of Tutsi minority rule in post-genocide Rwanda illustrates the unresolved conflict between the Wilsonian theory of democratic rule and fidelity to the ethical meaning of Auschwitz. Even before becoming victims of genocide, Tutsis were frequently described as the Jews of Central Africa. Originally a pastoralist caste, they were dispersed throughout the region-- unlike the cultivators (Hutus), who had customary roots in a tribal homeland. In the pre-colonial regime of Rwanda's mwami (king), those who intermediated between the kingdom and the tribes were considered to be Tutsis, but these same individuals might have been considered Hutus if they acquired customary rights in a particular homeland. Prior to colonialism, the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was not binary (either/or), and not totalizing in Levinas's sense. 44. It was not until Belgian colonial rule that the caste distinction between pastoralists and cultivators was redescribed as a colonial distinction between "natives" and "settlers." The natives' identity is based on place (they preceded the settlers as occupants the territory to be settled). In contrast, the settlers' identity, insofar as it is translocal, can be said to be based on race. A race, unlike a tribe, was conceived by colonial rulers to be essentially migratory--it becomes aware of having origins because it also has a destination (see Mamdani, "Race and Ethnicity" and Solnit). The Belgian rulers of Rwanda thus described Tutsis as a migratory race of "Hamites," a migratory race of "white" negroes, who had earlier settled on Hutu tribal lands Tutsi identity was thus racialized at the same time Hutu identity was ethnicized--the difference between the two indigenous groups was analogized to that between colonial settlers and native tribes, and Tutsis were, thus, conceived to be appropriate agents (and minor beneficiaries) of Belgian rule over Hutus. When Belgium's rule of Rwanda was about to end, its plan to turn power over to the Tutsi race was blocked by a Hutu Revolution demanding majority rule. The ideology of "Hutu Power" embraced the Belgian view of Tutsis as a stateless race of settlers, and now sought to expel them as an alien elite that had always been parasitical on the Hutu majority and had become, more recently, the principal collaborator in colonial rule. At this point, an individual was considered to be either Tutsi or Hutu--once the distinction had been politicized (in Schmitt's sense) one could not be both.[30]

#### The logic of minority, or the victim, is in fact what produces the state of subjugation or oppression.

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Although many twentieth-century thinkers held this view, it is most widely associated with Woodrow Wilson. Unlike other heirs to Jefferson who stress the relation between popular sovereignty and individual rights, Wilson focused on the relation between the state and the nation. States were created by sovereign "peoples," he believed, who decided thereafter to impose limitations on the powers of the governments thus created. Liberalism might define the relation of ruler and ruled within a people, but nationalism--in this case ethno- nationalism--would create that people and define its boundaries.[24] If all nation-states functioned in world politics as the virtual representatives of their own "peoples" in diaspora, so Wilson's logic goes, then each national state would protect its permanent minorities out of fear that members of its own "people" might suffer retaliation while living as minorities elsewhere.[25] As Wilson conceives it, the post- imperial relation between national and international politics is in effect a kind of hostage arrangement based on the tacit acknowledgment that the "peoples" of the world are already dispersed, and that their potential ingathering is a legal fiction needed to protect their rights wherever they might be.[26] 35. At the level of political psychology, however, the "ingathering" of the group is far from fictitious--it is a necessary form of self-idealization that can be an effective defense against well-founded fears of persecution.[27] In Wilson's terms, groups asserting protected minority status anywhere have to imagine themselves both as potential victims where they are and as potentially hegemonic somewhere else. To their current oppressors they thus become hypothetical threats (people who could do the same to "us"), thereby also allowing their continuing oppression to be rationalized on the grounds of self-defense. 36. Within a Wilsonian framework, the danger of ethno-national violence is, thus, an unavoidable structural feature of the interstate system itself. On the one hand, this danger is the national majority's excuse for the repression of outsiders who live under the regime; on the other hand, that repression becomes a further reason for insurrection. Adding to these internal conflicts, nation-states based on victimhood feel entitled to use their sovereign status in the international community to protect co-nationals who live as minorities elsewhere. That is often what it means to say "Never Again." The obvious problem here is that any state created to allow a previously subjugated minority to rule in the name of former victims almost inevitably has permanent minorities of its own.[28] Therefore, the claim of victimhood to nationhood is as much a cause of victimization as it is a remedy. But if the point of demanding nationhood is to protect a people from further victimization, it follows that a state based on the promise of "never again" does not violate Wilsonian principles by resisting, at least up to a point, attempts at self-help by separatist minority groups that threaten to "strand" members of the present "majority" within a smaller state in which the present "minority" rules. Democratic theory has never really traversed the difference between (1) democracy as a truth procedure (like the scientific method) in which individual minds are changed by the result,[29] and (2) democracy as a form of rule in which no minds are expected to change through the process itself. In this second conception of democracy, majority and minority identities are not produced by the actual vote; they pre-exist the vote, and are merely affirmed by it. This second conception of democracy has been thoroughly described by social scientists, but it is not well-theorized. To fill this theoretical gap, we must turn not to the forms of political thought modeled on interest aggregation in the market but rather to those specifically concerned with the moral psychology of victimhood. When the moral psychology of victimhood dominates the political sphere, the addition or subtraction of bodies becomes the essence of the democratic project. This addition and subtraction can take place by expelling bodies, by ignoring them or, in the worst case, by killing them.

#### The aff utilizes a dialectical perspective that produces the totalized other and forces contestation of proximal space with the other producing the conditions of erasure.

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Race, this identification with an ethnicity also imagined as an origin, has for the last century tended to generate a kind of ethnic nationalism whose insistency on the inseparability of race and place is itself mystical. . . . Israel itself was founded on the idea that the legacy of blood entitled the Jews to a legacy of land . . . I've always been as much appalled as awestruck that a people . . . could remain so attached to an absent place of origin that everyplace else could be framed as a temporary exile, . . . no matter how long they stayed. Becoming native is a process of forgetting and embracing where you are. (114-15) 22. To understand the phenomenon, we can call upon Melanie Klein's concept of "projective identification."[13] Klein's idea is that the settler re-experiences his own aggression toward the native as fear of the native's hostility toward him. In fearing the native's "primitive" racism (which is already a response to colonization), the settler defends against guilt for displacing the native. By identifying himself as the object of his own feelings toward the native, the settler re-experiences them as feelings of racial antipathy on the part of the natives. In the dialectic of race and place, the role of the colonist is to think, "these people hate us because of our [. . .]." "Race" is the term of art that fills in the political blank: it acquires whatever biological, religious, linguistic, or cultural content is necessary to describe a difference between the settler and the native placeholder that precedes the settler's occupation of the native's place (Mamdani, "Race and Ethnicity" 4-8). The settler perfectly understands the depth of these ascribed feelings of racialized hatred, for they are merely his own original feelings projected onto others. 23. It should be noted that there are two imaginaries of genocide embedded in such an account of projective identification.[14] The first is the genocide of the native against the settler--the racially-motivated "massacres" of innocents by savages that are the foundation of settler colonialist lore. The second is the revolt of the native against the settler. The unconscious moral logic of the colonial experience bases the settlers' genocide against the native on the settlers' repressed fear or fantasy of being subjected to genocidal actions by the native. In his now-classic Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon theorized that in order to liberate himself from colonialism the (black) native must embrace this projected willingness to exterminate the (white) settler (see also Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks). Fanon urges the "good native" to embrace the "bad" identity that embodies the settler's terror. Jean-Paul Sartre famously read this claim as the next stage in revolutionary consciousness, and saw the native's will to fight the colonist to the death as a higher form of the totalizing dialectic of master and slave described by Hegel and Marx (see "Preface" to Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth). 24. Viewed from Levinas's perspective, as set forth above, however, Fanon's argument is not that racially-based murder is justified as a condition of self-liberation. Fanon demonstrates, rather, that colonial subjugation--the problematic Da in the Dasein--is the conceptual root of genocide. For Levinas, the "totalizing discourse" of white/black, master/slave, self/other is itself a formula for murder because, in their quest for mutual recognition, those who struggle do not acknowledge their prior lack-of-relation as mutually exterior occupants of the same ground (see the Preface to Totality and Infinity). In this respect, the willingness of the native to exterminate or expel the settler is simply a return-to-sender of the genocidal message of colonialism itself. 25. The point here is emphatically not that racialized citizens of settler colonialist states are actual or would-be genocidaires. The settler colonialist is not always, and almost never merely, a ruthless exploiter--and can also be a developer, a civilizer, an educator. To be any or all of these things, however, is entirely consistent with the possibility of being paranoid about one's own status as successor to the "Native." The settler's question is, "how can we live among these savages without civilizing them?" The essence of Fanon's argument is that living without the "savages" is always a conceivable option within colonial discourse that precedes (and to some extent informs) the project of "civilization," and thus that living without the settler must also be imaginable for liberation to occur as an outcome of the totalizing project of colonialism-- and presumably of any other totalizing project that focuses on the relations of race and place (blood and soil).

#### The alternative is to dwell with the other, to embrace radical evil into our own homes and our own hearts to embrace the idea that we are just as much victims as we are perpetrators

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### Terrorism 1NC

#### The aff utilizes a projective identification to label these bodies as violent and as an other that occupies a separate proximal space. In doing so we create the conditions for genocide

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#### Constructions of what a terrorist is based off of exceptionalist logic that undermines the violence committed by United States.

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Transitional justice assigns to historical enemies the task of living as neighbors in the same place. It employs techniques of reconciliation to create new and better relationships between previously warring groups, but the imperative to reconcile is ultimately ethical in Levinas's sense. That imperative is based on no relationship other than proximity and mutual vulnerability--the ever-present possibility that they will murder each other. If the subjects of transitional justice fail to reconcile, and mass murders occur, these atrocities are liable to be considered crimes against humanity that justify outside intervention. In the now-massive literature on transitional justice, gross violations of human rights are always assumed to be local, occurring between neighbors who occupy common ground, and the responders are treated as third parties who intervene (or fail to do so) from afar. Even if the responders have an historical connection to the site of intervention, perhaps as one-time colonizers, they are considered to be driven by ethics, as distinct from politics, in their willingness to respond on behalf of the world community that should never again stand by while neighbors murder each other. 8. It is implicit in this emerging conception that the site of ethics is the space of the neighbor (or neighborhood) and that the site of politics is global. Global intervention in the local can be justified in the name of universal human rights; but violence aimed at global causes of suffering (such as the Seattle riots against the WTO or the Chiapas rebellion against NAFTA) is not seen as a form of humanitarian direct action on a par with bombing Belgrade or Baghdad. In the emergent global discourse on human rights, "Nothing essential to a person's human essence is violated if he or she suffers as a consequence of military action or of market manipulation from beyond his own state when that is permitted by international law" (Asad, "Redeeming the 'Human'" 129). A perverse effect of the global "culture" of protecting local human rights is thus to take the global causes of human suffering off the political agenda. Any direct action taken against global forces runs the risk of being considered a violation of universal human rights (a violation such as "terrorism") in the locality where it occurs.

#### This forces us into the politics of Proximity. Where we are forced to always engage in a constant state of transitional justice.

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Proximity is, thus, the marker that distinguishes an ethics of the neighbor as a basis for human rights from global concerns about injustice that might also be considered ethical. Proximity is not itself a merely spatial concept--both space and time can be proximate or distant--but it is useful to think of the ethics of the neighbor as a spatializing discourse within ethics, as distinct from a "temporalizing" discourse that subordinates ethics to political rhetorics associated with memory and identity (Boyarin, "Space" 20). The latter is held accountable for the atrocities of the twentieth century because it suggests that the suffering of one's immediate neighbor can be justified through an historical narrative that links it to redeeming the suffering of someone else, perhaps an ancestor or a comrade, to whom one claims an historical relationship that is "closer" than relations among neighbors. To regard proximity of place as the ethical foundation of politics is to resist this tendency from the beginning, and thereby to set the stage for the fin-de- siecle project of transitional justice, which is both the alternative to human rights interventions and their professed aim. 7. Transitional justice assigns to historical enemies the task of living as neighbors in the same place. It employs techniques of reconciliation to create new and better relationships between previously warring groups, but the imperative to reconcile is ultimately ethical in Levinas's sense. That imperative is based on no relationship other than proximity and mutual vulnerability--the ever-present possibility that they will murder each other. If the subjects of transitional justice fail to reconcile, and mass murders occur, these atrocities are liable to be considered crimes against humanity that justify outside intervention. In the now-massive literature on transitional justice, gross violations of human rights are always assumed to be local, occurring between neighbors who occupy common ground, and the responders are treated as third parties who intervene (or fail to do so) from afar. Even if the responders have an historical connection to the site of intervention, perhaps as one-time colonizers, they are considered to be driven by ethics, as distinct from politics, in their willingness to respond on behalf of the world community that should never again stand by while neighbors murder each other.

#### This puts us in the never-ending cycle of producing the conditions of genocide

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12. The political context within which genocide became all-too- thinkable within modernity is that of modern colonialism and the nationalist struggle against it.[4] The origins of this dialectic may lie in an act of military conquest or in an unopposed claim to possession of territory that is already inhabited.[5] Its domain is the spatial and temporal relation between a territory's prior inhabitants, its colonial possessors, and, perhaps, its future citizens in a future independent state. The dialectic of colonialism allows us to think of occupying a common territory as either a matter of cohabitation or succession. It enables all sides to imagine the spatial proximity of indigenous peoples and later arrivals as an eliminable problem, while focusing their direct attention on who is threatening to eliminate whom in the present or in the near future. 13. As a relatively recent moral trope for the murderous encounter with the Other, "Auschwitz" is now commonly read backwards into the history of colonialism, which it has become possible to describe as a prolonged Holocaust (see Churchill and Stannard). The colonial and the anti-colonial mind can conceive of genocide because they both can (and probably must) imagine the same territory without its current inhabitants. Relations among current occupants appear within the framework of colonialism to be essentially matters of temporal succession. Thus in the native/settler dialectic everything depends on who came first and who will remain. From the perspective of colonialism, any present time of simultaneous cohabitation of racialized ethnicities must be seen as historically abnormal, and perhaps ephemeral. The hortatory claim that genocide is now unthinkable points us toward a postcolonial future in which current spatial predicaments rather than historical relations among neighbors come to the foreground. A human rights discourse based on an ethics of the neighbor aims to bring this about through the technologies of transitional justice that put evil (and history itself) in the past. 14. This form of argument presupposes a radical shift of moral orientation after 1945 in which "the Holocaust" rather than "the Revolution"--French, Russian, or arguably Haitian[6]--becomes the event that defines the relation between ethics and politics in late modernity. Before Auschwitz, the argument goes, a distinctive (and ultimately Schmittian) concept of the "political" allowed us to overcome our natural sensitivity to the suffering of fellow humans when they were constructed as the intimate "other." This concept of the political produced the Holocaust as a horrifying endpoint to the genocidal logic of modernity that began in 1492.[7] 15. The new human rights discourse that has taken root since Auschwitz aims (when viewed in Schmittian terms) to depoliticize the distinction between who we are and who we are not (Rorty 128). By the century's end, the ethics8 of human rights, which were once the mottos of democratic revolution, became instruments of global order. They now require that one put the claims of spatial proximity ahead of those of historical destiny and that one value the virtues of political patience over those of revolutionary struggle. An "ethics" so conceived puts "politics" based on historical grievance at the root of "radical" evil in the world and severely limits the pursuit of justice based on backward-looking claims. 16. From the perspective of an ethics of proximity, genocide victims (as represented by survivors) are the quintessential suffering subjects, the ultimate source of ethical value.[8] Naming their plight as (actual or potential) genocide is now the duty of the rest of us, the first step in human rights intervention which is in turn defined by the ultimate moral duty to put humanitarianism ahead of all politics. Humanitarianism, thus, arises from a pre-political relationship between the victim of evil--he or she who suffers--and the spectator capable of discerning evil and willing to respond. 17. Human rights are not an afterthought to ethics in this fin- de-siecle discourse but rather its very foundation. The essence of human rights discourse is to "infinitize" evil by equating it to the situation of a hostage population subject to the sovereign power of a Schmittian state (Ranciere 307-8; see also Arendt, Origins, esp. ch. 9). The quintessential subject of human rights discourse is the neighbor who is viewed by the state as both an enemy and an alien, but who lacks the protection that "enemy aliens" enjoy under established international law. These domestic enemies may not only be interned by the state (arguably for their own protection), they are also subject to being exterminated by the state, and even by the neighbor next door.[9] At the end of such periods of gross violations of human rights, the immediate goal of what we now routinely call "transitional justice" (see Teitel), is to reduce domestic enmity itself to a problem of excessive proximity, the likelihood that hostile neighbors will kill each other. The excesses of proximity are, of course, what the world market needs to eliminate, and integration of the local economy into the global--rather than justice as such--becomes a promised reward of the desired transition. Instead of demanding justice, the subjects of transitional justice are expected to show patience. Patience, when treated as a virtue, presupposes that the ethical duty of neighbors is to assure each other that now is not the time for a historical reckoning. As an ideology, it presupposes that third parties may feel obliged to intervene if these assurances fail. From the perspective of a watching world, the real point of transitional justice is that it is not justice as such, but rather closure. Through trials, truth commissions, amnesties, and other techniques, it seeks to adjourn past history and to make new time.[10] (Now that these fin-de-siecle techniques of transitional justice can be studied and compared, Germany after Auschwitz has become another "case," as well as a paradigm of largely successful transition; see Sa'adeh.)

#### The alternative is to dwell with the other, to embrace radical evil into our own homes and our own hearts to embrace the idea that we are just as much terrorists as we are terrorized.

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49. In Mamdani's account, however, the deeper choice is between a presumption of forgiveness on the one hand, and victims' rule on the other. Rather than make this choice, post-genocide Rwanda claims to be an example of both. The journalist Philip Gourevitch describes the return of "a certain Girumuhatse" to share a house with the surviving members of the family he butchered during the 1994 genocide: But why should survivors be asked to live next door to killers-- or even, as happened in Girumuhatse's house, under the same roof? Why put off confronting the problem? To keep things calm, General Kagame told me. (Gourevitch 308) Behind this pragmatic avoidance of confrontation, however, lies the assumption that where everyone has sinned in either deed or wish, the only way forward is through an ethics of the neighbor. 50. To invoke an ethics of the neighbor in the aftermath of sin, outside commentators sometimes describe Rwanda in the terms used by St. Paul to describe the world. Rwanda is a place in which the difference between sins actually committed and sins of the heart is merely the difference between "could have" and "would have." Some have argued that Rwanda is an ideal case for the Pauline solution of confession, forgiveness, and rebirth.[33] Forgiveness in Rwanda would, presumably, be based on recognizing that the fear of genocide makes committing genocide thinkable, and that in wish, if not in deed, all are sinners. In a Christian context, however, the sinners are already potentially forgiven. This is why they struggled then, and can now stop sinning. 51. But what could it possibly mean in a secular, constitutional context to believe that one is already potentially forgiven? It means, presumably, that one has not yet been judged, and may never be--that the resumption of useless suffering has been postponed. Unlike the Christian sinner who can be reborn, the secular survivor of radical evil--Auschwitz, Rwanda--is simply not yet dead. The "postponement" of death, as Levinas calls it, is the gift of time (Totality and Infinity 224). Secular survivorship after Auschwitz does not make past suffering meaningful in the Pauline way, the way of theodicy, where the sinner is forgiven and the sin is, thus, redeemed (felix culpa). What Levinasian survivors get is time that is always more time, an aftermath--time to apologize, to "correct the instant" and still be conscious of "the pain that is yet to come" (238). "To be temporal," according to Levinas, "is both to be for death and to still have time, to be against death" (235).

### Soft Power 1NC

#### Soft power exists as a form of colonialism. The basis of dimplomacy is still based off a proximal encounter. Even if the exchange is not overtly violent, it is still a conflict over proximity.

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The point here is emphatically not that racialized citizens of settler colonialist states are actual or would-be genocidaires. The settler colonialist is not always, and almost never merely, a ruthless exploiter--and can also be a developer, a civilizer, an educator. To be any or all of these things, however, is entirely consistent with the possibility of being paranoid about one's own status as successor to the "Native." The settler's question is, "how can we live among these savages without civilizing them?" The essence of Fanon's argument is that living without the "savages" is always a conceivable option within colonial discourse that precedes (and to some extent informs) the project of "civilization," and thus that living without the settler must also be imaginable for liberation to occur as an outcome of the totalizing project of colonialism-- and presumably of any other totalizing project that focuses on the relations of race and place (blood and soil).

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