# China

**Securitizing cyber space is the ONLY way to prevent large scale cyber war – the alt can’t solve fast enough or change US doctrine – vulnerability creates a Unique need for it**

Pickin 12 (Matthew, MA War Stuides – Kings College, “What is the securitization of cyberspace? Is it a problem?”, <http://www.academia.edu/3100313/What_is_the_securitization_of_cyberspace_Is_it_a_problem>)

In analysing the problems of securitization, major issues have been raised. Threat inflation, surveillance, militarisation and the military-industrial complex are only some of the most prominent issues. There are benefits of securitization however, and at the very end of this analysis it will be explained why securitization is necessary for now. The main supporting arguments for securitization include, the future of cyber-attacks in conflicts, protecting critical infrastructure and cyber-crime.

The 2010 National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment stated that the United States was under a severe threat of cyber-attacks (Blair, 2010). Due to the amount of infrastructure connected to the internet in the United States targets for cyber-attacks are nearly unlimited, as a superpower the United States presents a valuable target. “As the world’s hegemonic power, the United States is also the main target state that dissident groups, terrorists, and rogue states wish to damage (Valeriano & Maness, 2011, p. 145).” Therefore, the United States must have some defence, or offensive capability in order to protect itself from future conflicts and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Foreign Affairs William J Lynn the former deputy secretary of defence wrote that the centrality of information technology in the United States makes it a prime target. He argued that extending advanced cyber-defences was crucial for the American economy, and also stated that failure of critical infrastructure would compromise national defence, “Our assessment is that cyber-attacks will be a significant component of future conflicts (Lynn, 2011).” Therefore in order to protect the United States, the government has been forced to securitize the issue. According to William J Lynn an attack could compromise national defence; therefore the issue is very high in the national security agenda. In the article, he also addresses the critics who argue that cyberspace is at risk of being militarized and states that US cyber strategy has been designed to prevent this from happening, “Far from militarizing cyberspace, U.S. cyber-strategy will make it more difficult for military actors to use cyberspace for hostile purposes (Lynn, 2011).” In securitizing cyberspace and creating advanced cyber-defences and cyber-weapons the United States is preparing for any future conflict or attack. If such an attack or conflict is a real existing threat then it is beneficial to prepare through securitization, otherwise the disadvantages clearly outweigh any advantage.

The other main benefit of securitizing cyberspace would be tackling cyber-crime. According to the security company Sophos, in the first six months of 2010 it received 60,000 new malware samples every day. Apart from malware, cyber-crime covers many different areas such as financial, piracy, hacking and cyber-terrorism. These crimes are growing due to the constantly evolving communications system of social sharing of data, online data storage and social networking, “Although cybercrime has formed a hidden shadow and a kind of evil doppelganger to every step of the Internet’s long history from its very origins, its growth has suddenly become explosive in recent years by virtually any estimate (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 28).” Both Deibert and Rohozinski argue that the rise is cyber-crime has become a big problem for states, in 2011 counterfeiting and copying cost the Asia-Pacific region almost $21 billion. Certainly cyber-space has become a rewarding way to commit crimes with little risk of prosecution, “Cybercrime has elicited so little prosecution from the world’s law enforcement agencies it makes one wonder a de facto decriminalization has occurred (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 29).” Due to the trouble of cyber-crime, the only way of combating it effectively would be greater state regulation and intervention. With the whole of cyber-space effectively securitized by the United States due to the threat to national security by technological and social shifts, the government is asserting itself increasingly to counter these threats.

Conclusion

In analysing what was the securitization of cyberspace, the beginnings of the cyber-debate in the United States have been examined; this country was used due to reliance on information technology and the status as a superpower. The securitization model from the Copenhagen school of thought was used to understand how issues are non-politicized, politicized and eventually securitized. A different range of security bills have been examined with this model to understand what was needed for cyberspace to become a securitized issue. With the definition of securitization dependent on the terms of national security, the changing definition of this concept was also examined. Securitization has occurred due to an evolving history whereby the military have understood the potential of information technologies in warfare and where vulnerabilities have been recognised that could damage national security.

In evaluating whether securitization of cyberspace is a problem, it is very clear that securitization is a growing concern with many complications. There are many issues including privacy, regulation, surveillance, internet regulation and the growing tension in the international system. However, because the United States is a superpower contesting with other cyber-heavyweights such as Iran, Russia and China the issue will not be de-securitized in the short term. With the discovery and use of cyber-weapons, many states are in the process of making their own for defensive and offensive purposes. The government of the United States will not de-securitize the issue of cyberspace while there are rival states and groups which prove a threat to the national security agenda. These problems will continue to exist until there is no defensive agenda and the issue is de-securitized, for now securitization is a necessary evil.

**Discourse not first – their in-round contradiction proves**

**Hyde-Price, 2001** (Adrian, Professor of International Politics at Bath, “Europes new security challenges” p. 39)

Securitization thus focuses almost exclusively on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems. Instead, it suggests that security studies – or what Waever calls securitization studies –should focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the “speech acts” that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed bgy politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, at best, securitization studies can contribute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is its epistemological hypochondria. That is, its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it isimportant to understand the discursive moves involved in perception of security in, say, the Middle East, it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers.

# T-Restrict Not Consultation

**Counterinterp --- restrict is to limit not to prohibit**

**Oklahoma Attorney General 04** Opinions - 3/19/2004, Question Submitted by: The Honorable Mark Campbell, District Attorney, 19th District; The Honorable Jay Paul Gumm, State Senator, District 6, 2004 OK AG 7, [http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=43849](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=438494" \t "_blank)

Accordingly, we must look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.*Webster's New International Dictionary*defines restrictions as follows: "something that restricts" and "a regulation that restricts or restrains." *Id.* at 1937 (3d ed. 1993). Restrict is defined as follows: "to set bounds or limits to: hold within bounds: as a : to check free activity, motion, progress, or departure." Id. Restrain is defined as to "prevent from doing something." *Id.* at 1936. Therefore, as used in Section 1125, "restrictions" is meant to describe those conditions of parole or probation which are intended to restrain or prevent certain conduct of the person subject thereto.

**And authority is the permission to act not the ability to act**

**Taylor, 1996**  (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online)

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given(permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

**We meet and CI -- statutory restrictions include 5 things**

**KAISER 80 The Official Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress** [Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the Legislative Veto; Kaiser, Frederick M., 32 Admin. L. Rev. 667 (1980)]

In addition to direct statutory overrides, there are a variety of statutory and nonstatutory techniques that have the effect of overturning rules, that prevent their enforcement, or that seriously impede or even preempt the promulgation of projected rules. For instance, a statute may alter the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency or extend the exemptions to its authority, thereby affecting existing or anticipated rules. Legislation that affects an agency's funding may be used to prevent enforcement of particular rules or to revoke funding discretion for rulemaking activity or both. Still other actions, less direct but potentially significant, are mandating agency consultation with other federal or state authorities and requiring prior congressional review of proposed rules (separate from the legislative veto sanctions). These last two provisions may change or even halt proposed rules by interjecting novel procedural requirements along with different perspectives and influences into the process.

It is also valuable to examine nonstatutory controls available to the Congress:

1. legislative, oversight, investigative, and confirmation hearings;

2. establishment of select committees and specialized subcommittees to oversee agency rulemaking and enforcement; 3. directives in committee reports, especially those accompanying legislation, authorizations, and appropriations, regarding rules or their implementation; 4. House and Senate floor statements critical of proposed, projected, or ongoing administrative action; and 5. direct contact between a congressional office and the agency or office in question. Such mechanisms are all indirect influences; unlike statutory provisions, they are neither self-enforcing nor legally binding by themselves. Nonetheless, nonstatutory devices are more readily available and more easily effectuated than controls imposed by statute. And some observers have attributed substantial influence to nonstatutory controls in regulatory as well as other matters.3 It is impossible, in a limited space, to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive listing of congressional actions that override, have the effect of overturning, or prevent the promulgation of administrative rules. Consequently, this report concentrates upon the more direct statutory devices, although it also encompasses committee reports accompanying bills, the one nonstatutory instrument that is frequently most authoritatively connected with the final legislative product. The statutory mechanisms surveyed here cross a wide spectrum of possible congressional action: 1. single-purpose provisions to overturn or preempt a specific rule; 2. alterations in program authority that remove jurisdiction from an agency; 3. agency authorization and appropriation limitations; 4. inter-agency consultation requirements; and 5. congressional prior notification provisions

# CP

**XO links to politics**

Phillip J. Cooper, 2002. Professor of Liberal Arts @ University of Vermont. By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action, p. 74

Even more broadly, the decision to act by executive order rather than through a cabinet agency by rulemaking, for example, often makes the White House the lightning rod for criticism. It is one thing for critics to fight limited conflicts with agencies over particular actions, but quite another when the White House decides to interpose itself into the fray.

Congressional oversight gaps cause confusion and hampers cyber counterterror – plan solves

Brennan 12 (Lt Colonel John – US Army, “United States Counter Terrorism Cyber Law and Policy, Enabling or Disabling?” 15 March 2012, Civilian Research Project; U.S. Army War College)

Although indentifying international terrorists in cyberspace is critical to successful counterterrorism operations, it is only half of the battle in bringing them to justice. Monitoring terrorists’ electronic communications is extremely important, but further work is required by the CT community to isolate, and eventually kill or capture the terrorists overseas. Manipulation or disruption of a terrorist organization’s computer networks is a potential means to this end, and it is also a possible tactic that is employed to preempt a cyber or kinetic terrorist attack.37 The laws that govern the actual manipulation of terrorists’ electronic accounts and devices in order to make them more targetable, are not explicit or simply do not exist. The primary document that gives the President of the United States the authority to conduct offensive CT cyber operations overseas is the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force, which gives the president the authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force” to protect the country for further attacks.38 The extrapolation of this authority which permits the targeting of al-Qa’ida and its adherents, was employed in order to legally kill Anwar al Awlaki (an American citizen) in Yemen, and was invoked in permitting the planned (but not executed) computer network attack against his online magazine, Inspire.39 Regardless of these authorities, General Keith B. Alexander, the Commander of U. S. Cyber Command, has expressed similar misgivings as Mr. O’Connell in response to Congressional inquiries concerning the efficacy of cyber laws. During his confirmation hearings that resulted in his appointment to the post of the commander of U. S. Cyber Command in 2010, General Alexander stated that there is a, “mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies.”40 When he assumed the mantle of command of this first-ever joint and interagency cyber unit, General Alexander retained his title and position as the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA). This dual command role placed him in the unique position to not only locate and intercept enemy internet communications, but to also conduct computer network attacks on the terrorists’ networks as well.41 The essence of this new command permits a more efficient cyber warfare capability which can theoretically operate seamlessly under both Titles 10 and 50 of the U. S. Code.42 With over 1.8 billion Internet users and 4.6 billion cellular phone subscribers who generate approximately 90 trillion emails per annum, the establishment of U. S. Cyber Command from within the NSA was an extremely useful beginning.43 A subordinate command to the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Cyber Command was delegated Title 10 authority over military operations in cyberspace.44 On the other hand, Cyber Command also possesses the ability to conduct covert actions within cyber space under Title 50.45 This duplicitous legal framework is a result of current cyber policies and can create confusion over who is permitted to actually authorize a cyber operation.46 In the end, this policy friction can translate into delays while the required approvals are garnered, and could result in missing a fleeting opportunity to kill or capture a terrorist. U. S. Computer Network Operations Policy As a matter of current U. S. policy, the decision to label a computer network operation (CNO) as a traditional military activity (TMA), thereby falling under the purview of Title 10 of the United States Code (USC), or as a covert action under Title 50 of the USC, has spurred a great deal of discussion at the highest levels of the U. S. Government.47 Although cyber warfare is only one aspect of the overall current Title 10/50 debate that is raging within Congress and the various departments within the executive branch, one cannot legitimately discuss the policies that govern the approvals to conduct CNOs without touching upon this current source of friction.48 Much of the policy concerning the details of computer network operations is classified, but is gaining in importance such that many policy experts are speaking about it, some albeit from under the cloak of anonymity.49 As Andru E. Wall suggests, the confusion over Title 10 and Title 50 authorities appears to have, “…more to do with congressional oversight and its attendant internecine power struggles than with operational or statutory authorities,” despite the fact that by design, Title 10 and 50 authorities are mutually supporting and were not intended to be competing.50 Retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair (former ODNI) proclaimed that, “This infuriating business about who’s in charge and who gets to call the shots is just making us look muscle-bound.” ADM Blair went on to bemoan the “over-legalistic” approach to CT cyber--despite the fact that current cyber laws are woefully inadequate to address the, …”complexity of the global information network.”51(Wall 2011101) Current media reports indicate that the use of specially-designed cyber tools in order to target states or non-state actors requires presidential approval. An example of this approval policy was seen last year when media reports indicated that the Stuxnet cyber-worm was allegedly implanted in an Iranian nuclear facility, an act that American military cyber warriors will not publicly confirm.52 This computer virus subtly attacked the computers that controlled the enormous Iranian nuclear centrifuges and caused them to self-destruct. Although the Stuxnet infestation in Natanz was a major attack with immense international political consequences, media reporting suggests that less contentious operations against terrorists’ computer networks have taken on a similarly hierarchical approval process, even though these computer network operations support the local war fighters in Afghanistan or Iraq.53 For instance, in the early years of the Iraq war, numerous attempts to hack into terrorists’ email accounts and send erroneous information from them, in order to expose other members of AQI or cause potential organizational rifts was strictly forbidden without the approval of the CENTCOM Commander.54 The reasoning behind this elevated approval policy centers upon the fact that terrorists frequently use American or allied internet service providers (ISPs) to access and manipulate the internet during the conduct of their own cyber operations.55 The consequences of this arrangement, which could ultimately involve the U. S. Government manipulating an American or allied server network in order affect a terrorist organization, makes many national leaders leery of employing the capability in the first place.56 The ongoing debate between elements of the DoD, who feel that certain cyber operations are a traditional military activity and should be governed by the laws of armed conflict and Title 10 of the U.S. Code, and leaders within the Intelligence Community (IC) who contend that any and all cyber operations are inherently covert and should be under the purview of Title 50, shows no signs of abating. An example of this conundrum occurred in June, 2010 when the U. S. was allegedly contemplating a cyber attack on Insipire Magazine.57 The U. K.’s GCHQ Intelligence Service actually conducted an attack, dubbed “Operation Cupcake” while the CIA and Cyber Command were reportedly still haggling over whether attacking the site was a traditional military activity (TMA), thereby considered a Title 10 action, or a covert action under Title 50.58 Although this operation had little kinetic effect, it was disruptive as GCHQ managed to effectively replace the bomb-making recipes on the Inspire site with actual cupcake baking recipes.59 The delay caused by the policy debate within the executive branch ultimately led to a missed opportunity. The effect of a potential delay could have been much more significant had the stakes been higher, particularly if the purpose of the proposed CT cyber operation was to thwart an impending attack.60 Another potential genesis for the policy debate is the inconsistent verbiage used between the Military and the IC when categorizing operations in cyberspace. For example, if any data within an enemy computer network is modified, then the operation is labeled a Computer Network Attack (CNA) by the military.61 The IC considers data manipulation as an Offensive Cyber Operation (OCO), a title which is much more palatable to CT lawyers than the term Computer Network Attack, even though the intent and outcome of the operations are identical.62 The differences between these labels are frequently referenced in policy debates, which ultimately slow down the process of finding and interdicting terrorists.

Goes nuclear

Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, <http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf>)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

# 2AC Anthro

**1. TURN – the alternative leads to more animal death**

Pollan, ‘6 – Knight Professor of Journalism at UC Berkeley. “An Animal’s Place,” 11-10, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500efd7153ef933a25752c1a9649c8b63&pagewanted=6>.

The farmer would point out that even vegans have a ''serious clash of interests'' with other animals. The grain that the vegan eats is harvested with a combine that shreds field mice, while the farmer's tractor crushes woodchucks in their burrows, and his pesticides drop songbirds from the sky. Steve Davis, an animal scientist at Oregon State University, has estimated that if America were to adopt a strictly vegetarian diet, the total number of animals killed every year would actually increase, as animal pasture gave way to row crops. Davis contends that if our goal is to kill as few animals as possible, then people should eat the largest possible animal that can live on the least intensively cultivated land: grass-fed beef for everybody. It would appear that killing animals is unavoidable no matter what we choose to eat.  When I talked to Joel Salatin about the vegetarian utopia, he pointed out that it would also condemn him and his neighbors to importing their food from distant places, since the Shenandoah Valley receives too little rainfall to grow many row crops. Much the same would hold true where I live, in New England. We get plenty of rain, but the hilliness of the land has dictated an agriculture based on animals since the time of the Pilgrims. The world is full of places where the best, if not the only, way to obtain food from the land is by grazing animals on it -- especially ruminants, which alone can transform grass into protein and whose presence can actually improve the health of the land.  The vegetarian utopia would make us even more dependent than we already are on an industrialized national food chain. That food chain would in turn be even more dependent than it already is on fossil fuels and chemical fertilizer, since food would need to travel farther and manure would be in short supply. Indeed, it is doubtful that you can build a more sustainable agriculture without animals to cycle nutrients and support local food production. If our concern is for the health of nature -- rather than, say, the internal consistency of our moral code or the condition of our souls -- then eating animals may sometimes be the most ethical thing to do.  There is, too, the fact that we humans have been eating animals as long as we have lived on this earth. Humans may not need to eat meat in order to survive, yet doing so is part of our evolutionary heritage, reflected in the design of our teeth and the structure of our digestion. Eating meat helped make us what we are, in a social and biological sense. Under the pressure of the hunt, the human brain grew in size and complexity, and around the fire where the meat was cooked, human culture first flourished. Granting rights to animals may lift us up from the brutal world of predation, but it will entail the sacrifice of part of our identity -- our own animality.  Surely this is one of the odder paradoxes of animal rights doctrine. It asks us to recognize all that we share with animals and then demands that we act toward them in a most unanimalistic way. Whether or not this is a good idea, we should at least acknowledge that our desire to eat meat is not a trivial matter, no mere ''gastronomic preference.'' We might as well call sex -- also now technically unnecessary -- a mere ''recreational preference.'' Whatever else it is, our meat eating is something very deep indeed.

**2. Case is a DA – human-centeredness is key to environmental sustainability**

David Schmidtz, 2k. Philosophy, University of Arizona, Environmental Ethics, p. 379-408

Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about equilibria and perturbations that keep systems from converging on equilibria. Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about competition and unintended consequences, and the internal logic of systems, a logic that dictates how a system responds to attempts to manipulate it. Environmental activism and regulation do not automatically improve the environment. It is a truism in ecology, as in economics, that well-intentioned interventions do not necessarily translate into good results. Ecology (human and nonhuman) is complicated, our knowledge is limited, and environmentalists are themselves only human. Intervention that works with the system’s logic rather than against it can have good consequences. Even in a centrally planned economy, the shape taken by the economy mainly is a function not of the central plan but of how people respond to it, and people respond to central plans in ways that best serve their purposes, not the central planner’s. Therefore, even a dictator is in no position simply to decide how things are going to go. Ecologists understand that this same point applies in their own discipline. They understand that an ecology’s internal logic limits the directions in which it can be taken by would-be ecological engineers. Within environmental philosophy, most of us have come around to something like Aldo Leopold’s view of humans as plain citizens of the biotic community.[[21]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn22) As Bryan Norton notes, the contrast between anthropocentrism and biocentrism obscures the fact that we increasingly need to be nature-centered to be properly human-centered; we need to focus on "saving the ecological systems that are the context of human cultural and economic activities." [[22]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn23) If we do not tend to what is good for nature, we will not be tending to what is good for people either. As Gary Varner recently put it, on purely anthropocentric grounds we have reason to think biocentrically.[[23]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn24) I completely agree. What I wish to add is that the converse is also true: on purely biocentric grounds, we have reason to think anthropocentrically. We need to be human-centered to be properly nature-centered, for if we do not tend to what is good for people, we will not be tending to what is good for nature either. From a biocentric perspective, preservationists sometimes are not anthropocentric enough. They sometimes advocate policies and regulations with no concern for values and priorities that differ from their own. Even from a purely biocentric perspective, such slights are illegitimate. Policy makers who ignore human values and human priorities that differ from their own will, in effect, be committed to mismanaging the ecology of which those ignored values and priorities are an integral part.

**3. Species egalitarianism causes mass die-off**

Timothy Luke, ’97. Poly Sci, Virginia Polytechnic, Ecocritique, pg 26-27.

Deep ecology’s acceptance of otherness in nonhuman life and inanimate entities in the ecosphere is an important contribution. Deep ecologists identify a new normative ethic of personal responsibility in caring for Nature that has basic merit. Yet, as political philosophy, deep ecology has failed thus far to demonstrate how it can be implemented anywhere today. Like many revolutionary programs, deep ecology lacks a theory of the transition. There are no practicable means for changing the everyday life of everyone in the stage of advanced industrialism into an ecotopian community without tremendous costs. Many would agree with Snyder that “we must change the very foundations of our society and our minds. Nothing short of total transformation will do much good.”76 But, how does the United States with 250 million people, living because of the imports and exports of transnational corporate capitalism in and out of huge metroplexes, reinhabit its bioregions such that “the human population lives harmoniously and dynamically by employing a sophisticated and unobtrusive technology in a world environment which is “left nature”? Current world urbanism assumes an obtrusive technology that renders the organic into the inorganic. What happens to Los Angeles, Chicago, New York? Where do these millions go and what will they do? If their corporate agricultural or municipal service supports are cut simply to return the L.A. Basin, Lake Michigan’s South Shores, and Manhattan to Nature, then Nature does know best how to cope—these immense human populations will suffer and/or die. Deep ecological justice is postdistributional. It defines away distribution systems with human norms of fairness or equality as the apparatus of corrupt technoindustrial society. By calling for biospherical egalitarianism, deep ecology extends the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (as the freedom of self-realization) to nonhuman life and inanimate entities so that humans, for the first time, can truly enjoy their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in emancipated Nature. Justice is made into an attribute of all-selves-in-Self working toward their peculiar self-realization. Therefore, humans must alter their hitherto anthropocentric modes of existence, out of the new sense of “fairness” to otherness and other humans growing from ecosophical consciousness, to promote this new biocentric justice.

**4. Humans and animals are similar but humans are superior**

Linker, ‘5 – Damon, Animal Rights: Contemporary Issues (Compilation), Thompson-Gale, p. below in < >

That such arguments have found an audience at this particular cultural moment is not so hard to explain. Our popular and elite media are saturated with scientific and quasi-scientific reports claiming to prove the basic thesis of the animal-rights movement. Having once believed ourselves to be made in the image of God, we now learnfrom the human genome project, the speculations of evolutionary psychologists, and numerous other sources-that humankind, too, is determined by genetic predispositions and the drive to reproduce. We are cleverer than other animals, to be sure, but the difference is one of degree, not of kind. As Verlyn Klinkenborg wrote on the editorial page of the New York Times, "Again and again, after starting from an ancient premise of radical differences between humans and other creatures, scientists have discovered profound similarities." But have they? Genetics and evolutionary biology may be, indeed, extremely effective at identifying the traits we share with other species. But chemistry, for its part, can tell us about the ways in which we resemble chunks of charcoal, and physics can point to fundamental similarities between a man and all the matter in the universe. The problem with these observations is not that they are untrue. It is that they shed no light whatsoever on, or rather they are designed to obfuscate, what makes humanity unique as a species-the point on which an answer to the likes of Peter Singer and Steven Wise must hinge. For his part, Singer commits the same error that John Stuart Mill found in the system of Jeremy Bentham: he makes no distinction among kinds of pleasure and pain. That animals feel emotions can hardly be doubted; but human beings experience life, even at its most "animalistic" level, in a way that fundamentally differs from other creatures. Thus, Singer can account for the pain that humans and animals alike experience when they are hungry and the pleasure they feel when they eat, but he cannot explain, for example, a person's choice to starve himself for a cause. He understands that human beings, like animals, derive pleasure from sex and sometimes endure pangs of longing when they are deprived of it, but he cannot explain how or why, unlike animals, some choose to embrace celibacy for the sake of its noble purity. He is certainly attuned to the tendency we share with animals to fear and avoid pain and bodily harm, but he is incapable of understanding a man's willingness to face certain death on the battlefield when called upon to do so by his country. Still less can he explain why stories of such sacrifice sometimes move us to tears. In much the same way, the evidence adduced by Steven Wise to suggest that primates are capable of forming rudimentary plans and expectations fails to demonstrate they are equal to human beings in any significant sense. Men and women use their "autonomy" in a world defined not by the simple imperatives of survival but by ideas of virtue and vice, beauty and ugliness, right and wrong. Modern scientific methods, including those of evolutionary psychology, have so far proved incapable of detecting and measuring this world, but that does not make any less real the experience that takes place within it. Western civilization has tended to regard animals as resembling things more than human beings precisely because, like jnanimate objects, and unlike the authors of the real Magna Carta, animals have no perception of morality. Until the day when a single animal stands up and, led by a love of justice and a sense of self-worth, insists that the world recognize and respect its dignity, all the philosophical gyrations of the activists will remain so much sophistry. Putting Human Interests First None of this, of course, exempts human beings from behaving decently toward animals, but it does provide a foundation, when necessary, for giving pride of place to the interests of human beings. This has particular relevance for biomedical research. Among the most vociferous critics of the USDA's capitulation to the animal-rights movement were the nation's leading centers of medical science. The National Association for BiOlnedical Research estimated that the new regulations would cost universities alone as much as $280 million a year. Nor is the issue simply one of dollars. As Estelle Fishbein, counsel for Johns Hopkins University, recently argued in the SHOULD ANIMALS HAVE THE SAME STATUS AS PEOPLE? Journal of the American Medical Association, Genetic research promises to bring new therapies to alleviate human suffering from the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, Parkinson's disease and other neurological diseases, and virtually all other human and animal diseases. However, the promise of this new era of medical research is highly dependent on the ready availability of mice, rats, and birds. 2S Far from being a mere administrative hassle, she concluded, the new regulations would "divert scarce grant funds from actual research use, distract researchers from their scientific work, and overload them with documentation requirements. II Serious as this threat is, a still more troubling one is the effect that the arguments of animal-rights proponents may have, in the long term, on our regard for human life itself. Peter Singer's apPOintment at Princeton caused a stir not because of his writings about animals but because of his endorsement of euthanasia, unrestricted abortion, and, in some instances, infanticide. But all of his views, as he himself maintains, are of a piece. The idea that "human infants and retarded adults II are superior to animaLs can only be based, he writes, on "a bare-faced-and morally indefensible-prejudice for members of our own species. II In much the same way, Steven Wise urges us to reject absolute demarcations between species and instead focus on the capacities of individual humans and individual apes. If we do that, we will find that many adult chimpanzees and bonobos are far more "human" than newborn and mentally disabled human beings, and thus just as worthy of being recognized as IIpersons." Though Wise's inference is the opposite of Singer's-he does not wish to deprive underdeveloped humans of rights so much as to extend those rights to primates-he is playing the same game of baitand- switch: in this case projecting the noblest human attributes onto animals while quietly limiting his sample of human beings to newborns and the mentally disabled. When raising animals to our level proves to be impossible, as it inevitably must, equal consideration can only be won by attempting to lower us to theirs. <23-25>

**5. Perm – do the plan and the alt in all other instances**

**6. Alt fails; this instance is enough**

**7. Perm do the aff without the representations. Turn: Language-based frameworks guarantee speciesm**

Newmyer, ‘6 – Stephen, Professor of Classics @ Duquesne, Animals, Rights, and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics, p. # below in

The purposeful use of tools had long been believed to be a skill that humans shared at most with their ape and monkey relatives, until ethologists beginning in the 1950s challenged this assumption. Elephants, they noted, use sticks to scratch parts of their bodies that they cannot easily reach, while herons drop berries and even inedible objects into water to attract fishes which they spear when the fishes d>me to inspect rhe ohjects.31 In light of such evidence, behavioral scientists who rejected the idea that animals think or plan were forced to alter their position to maintain instead that, while animals may after all use tools, rhey cannot make tools. This claim too has been challenged. Capuchin monkeys, for example, have beeJ,1 observed to strike stones against hard sutfaces an,d to use the stone flakes that result to scrape flesh from bones and to cut through objects." The intellectual faculty which philosophers have most jealously guarded as the exclusive province of human beings, indeed as the embodiment of what it means to be human, separating man irrevocably from the rest of animal creation, is the ability to learn and use language. In his study of animal thought, psychologist Joseph Mortenson eloquently expresses the importance of this faculty to man's view of himself as the pinnacle of creation, "Language is the most highly regarded human trait. Man is the speaker, the listener, the reader, the symbol-user."33 Entire ethical systems have been constructed on the proposition that man has the ability to invent and use language because he is rational, while animals do not possess language because they are irrational. Influential philosopher R. G. Frey is most closely associated with the stance that the ability to engage in symbolic communication constitutes the essence of morality. As the author of the first systematic treatise in recent decades that attacks the concept of animal rights on moral grounds, Frey maintains that animals cannot have rights because they cannot have interests, and they cannot have interests because they cannot have desires. This is in turn the case because animals cannot reflect on what their desires might be, and this is so because they do not have language. Since animals have no interests, they cannot be harmed.34 <15>

**The alternative is not politically viable – prefer the affirmative’s** material **protection of the environment**

Light 2 – Professor of environmental philosophy

Andrew Light, professor of environmental philosophy and director of the Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002, Applied Philosophy Group at New York University, METAPHILOSOPHY, v33, n4, July, p. 441

Even if Katz and Oechsli's arguments are technically correct as a possible statement of the implications of anthropocentrism in environmental policy and environmental activism, the facts of the case do not bear out their worries. And we can imagine this to be so in many other cases. Even if sound nonanthropocentric motivations can be described for other policies or acts of environmental heroism, at best we would expect that any moti­vation for any action would be mixed, especially when it is a human performing that action. An environmental ethic that ignored this lesson would be one that would be ill fitted to participate in policy decisions where the context always involves an appeal to a variety of intuitions and not only to a discrete set. We must ask ourselves eventually: What is more important, settling debates in value theory correct or actually motivating people to act, with the commitment of someone like Mendes, to preserve nature? The pressing timeframe of environmental problems should at least warrant a consideration of the latter.

# Press TV

**Their impact card is literally propaganda**

ADL 13, Anti-Defamation League, “Iran's Press TV: Broadcasting Anti-Semitism To English-Speaking World”, 10-21, <http://www.adl.org/anti-semitism/united-states/c/press-tv-iran.html>

Press TV, Iran's government-run English-language satellite news network, has emerged as the Iranian government's primary propaganda tool to promote a wide range of pernicious anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in English to a worldwide audience. Operated by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), a significant amount of Press TV programing provides a platform for American anti-Semites, conspiracy theorists and Holocaust deniers, who help amplify the Iranian regime's hateful messages. The station not only misleadingly presents these hatemongers as serious and credible "experts" or "analysts" on international economic and political issues, but also enables their bigoted perspectives to reach a significant new audience. Launched in 2007 and based in Tehran, the station is broadcast in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia and parts of Africa and Latin America via a number of satellite television providers. In addition to promoting classic anti-Semitic myths of global Jewish domination, Press TV presents a pervasively negative perspective on Western society, emphasizing what it views as the West's imperialism, faltering economies, lack of justice, political corruption and racial and class divisions. Its programs, interviews, and articles are available on the network's website and further distributed through social media, including on Facebook and Twitter. In July 2013, Press TV sought to further expand its viewership by live streaming its content on YouTube. ADL con­tacted YouTube to inform them that the content on Press TV may violate their terms of service, also noting that providing such communication services may be viewed as violating the Iran Sanctions Act. YouTube subsequently disabled Press TV’s ability to live stream their content. Although YouTube disabled Press TV’s live stream after ADL exposed it, Hispan TV, Press TV’s Spanish-language sister-station, similarly started live streaming its content from the station’s YouTube account, and was subsequently shutdown after YouTube was altered.

# 2ac Iran Strikes

**Zero risk of Iran strikes**

Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Saban Center Senior Fellow, 1/13/14, Six Myths about Iran Sanctions, [www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-saban/posts/2014/01/7-iran-sanctions-nuclear-deal-myths?utm\_content=bufferb5045&utm\_medium=social&utm\_source=twitter.com&utm\_campaign=buffer#](http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-saban/posts/2014/01/7-iran-sanctions-nuclear-deal-myths?utm_content=bufferb5045&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)

Myth 6. Support for additional Iran sanctions is the equivalent of support for war.

No. With all due respect to the Obama administration officials who have been making this argument, it is an overstatement and, in many cases, patently untrue and unfair. It may be effective domestic politics, given the country's understandable weariness of Middle Eastern conflicts, but it is an ugly smear to accuse all those who are skeptical about the current diplomacy or who seek additional pressure on Iran of war-mongering.

More to the point, the outcome of new sanctions is almost certainly not war. Tehran has come to the negotiating table despite, and because of, severe economic pressure. Rouhani's determination to achieve a deal, the speed with which he has advanced this agenda, and the flimsy pushback (by the rough-and-tumble standards of Iranian internal politics) he has received from hard-liners suggests that there is a broad and deep consensus around ending the nuclear stand-off with the West. No one should doubt Foreign Minister Zarif's sincerity when he says sanctions will end the talks, but there is a reasonable chance that Tehran will continue to seek a diplomatic resolution under almost any circumstances — there simply is no better alternative for Iranian interests.

The same is true for Washington. Few in Congress are truly eager for another costly Middle Eastern conflict, and despite the tough talk from successive U.S. presidents on preventing a nuclear Iran, there is nothing automatic about military action. Even if the current diplomacy collapses, Washington and the world will have an array of alternatives for blunting Iran's nuclear advances, including many that fall short of war.

# 2ac Israeli Strike

**No Israeli strikes. Strategic incentives and institutional checks**

Zachary Keck, 11/28/13. Associate editor of The Diplomat. “Five Reasons Israel Won't Attack Iran,” The National Interest, <http://server1.nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-reasons-israel-wont-attack-iran-9469?page=2>.

Although not a member of the P5+1 itself, Israel has always loomed large over the negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear program. For example, in explaining French opposition to a possible nuclear deal earlier this month, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius stated: “The security concerns of Israel and all the countries of the region have to be taken into account.”

Part of Fabius’ concern derives from the long-held fear that Israel will launch a preventive strike against Iran to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. For some, this possibility remains all too real despite the important interim agreement the P5+1 and Iran reached this weekend. For example, when asked on ABC’s This Week whether Israel would attack Iran while the interim deal is in place,William Kristol responded: “I don't think the prime minister will think he is constrained by the U.S. deciding to have a six-month deal. […] six months, one year, I mean, if they're going to break out, they're going to break out.”

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has done little to dispel this notion. Besides blasting the deal as a “historic mistake,” Netanyahu said Israel “is not obliged to the agreement” and warned “the regime in Iran is dedicated to destroying Israel and Israel has the right and obligation to defend itself with its own forces against every threat.”

Many dismiss this talk as bluster, however. Over at Bloomberg View, for instance, Jeffrey Goldberg argues that the nuclear deal has “boxed-in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu so comprehensively that it's unimaginable Israel will strike Iran in the foreseeable future.” Eurasia Group's Cliff Kupchan similarly argued: “The chance of Israeli strikes during the period of the interim agreement drops to virtually zero.”

Although the interim deal does further reduce Israel’s propensity to attack, the truth is that the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has always been greatly exaggerated. There are at least five reasons why Israel isn’t likely to attack Iran.

1. You Snooze, You Lose

First, if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted proactively to thwart security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single nuclear reactor. According to ABC News, Israel struck Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark about the reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one.

Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has expanded into two fully operational nuclear facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected and -dispersed sites. Furthermore, America’s extreme reluctance to initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat.

2. Bombing Iran Makes an Iranian Bomb More Likely

Much like a U.S. strike, only with much less tactical impact, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would only increase the likelihood that Iran would build the bomb. At home, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts.

Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors. If Tehran’s membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with which to rebuild its nuclear facilities.

3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel

Relatedly, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and a huge loss for Tel Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the Arab street and increase the pressure against Arab rulers. As noted above, it would also lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an outpouring of sympathy for Iran in many countries around the world.

Meanwhile, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position. Were Iran to respond by attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israel’s ties with the United States at both the elite and mass levels. Indeed, a war-weary American public is adamantly opposed to its own leaders dragging it into another conflict in the Middle East. Americans would be even more hostile to an ally taking actions that they fully understood would put the U.S. in danger.

Furthermore, the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations against Iran would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries would secretly support Israel’s action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of time. Israel’s reputation would also take a further blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv.

4. Israel’s Veto Players

Although Netanyahu may be ready to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, he operates within a democracy with a strong elite structure, particularly in the field of national security. It seems unlikely that he would have enough elite support for him to seriously consider such a daring and risky operation.

For one thing, Israel has strong institutional checks on using military force. As then vice prime minister and current defense minister Moshe Yaalon explained last year: “In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet… the decision is not made by two people, nor three, nor eight.” It’s far from clear Netanyahu, a fairly divisive figure in Israeli politics, could gain this support. In fact, Menachem Begin struggled to gain sufficient support for the 1981 attack on Iraq even though Baghdad presented a more clear and present danger to Israel than Iran does today.

What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israel’s highly respected national security establishment. Many former top intelligence and military officials have spoken out publicly against Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking a nuclear weapon. Another former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces told The Independent that, “It is quite clear that much if not all of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] leadership do not support military action at this point…. In the past the advice of the head of the IDF and the head of Mossad had led to military action being stopped.”

5. A Deal is Better Than No Deal

Finally, Israel won’t attack Iran because it is ultimately in its interests for the US and Iran to reach an agreement, even if it is a less than an ideal one. To begin with, an agreement is the only way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons short of an invasion and occupation of the country. Moreover, Israel would benefit both directly and indirectly from a U.S.-Iranian nuclear deal and especially larger rapprochement. Israel would gain a number of direct benefits from a larger warming of U.S.-Iranian relations, which a nuclear deal could help facilitate. Iran currently pays no costs while benefiting significantly from its anti-Israeli tirades and actions. A rapprochement with the U.S. would force Iranian leaders to constrain their anti-Israeli rhetoric and actions, or risk losing their new partner. While Israel and Iran might not enjoy the same relationship they did under the Shah or the first decade of the Islamic Republic, a U.S.-allied Iran would be much less of a burden for Israel. History is quite clear on this point: U.S. Middle Eastern allies—notable Egypt under Sadat—have been much less hostile to the Jewish state than countries that have been U.S. adversaries.

Tel Aviv would also benefit indirectly from a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and possible rapprochement. That’s because either of these agreements would spark panic in Sunni Arab capitals. For the foreseeable future, then, Israel would enjoy some breathing room, which would obtain as these governments would be preoccupied with Iran for the foreseeable future. Indeed, just the possibility of an interim nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran has created rumors of Saudi Arabia seeking tighter cooperation with Israel.

For these reasons, the interim nuclear deal has made it less likely that Israel will attack Iran. That being said, the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran was already remote long before Iran and the P5+1 held their talks in Geneva last month.

# 2AC US-Iran War

**No Iran war – regime surivival is too important to them**

**Carpenter 12** (Ted Galen – senior fellow at the Cato Institute, April 12, "The Pernicious Myth That Iran Can’t Be Deterred", CATO Institute, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pernicious-myth-iran-cant-be-deterred>)

Rumblings about possible war with Iran have grown louder in Washington and other Western capitals in the past few months. Speculation has centered on the likelihood that Israel will launch preemptive air strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations, but there is also considerable talk that the United States might join in such strikes or even take on the primary mission to make certain that the key sites are destroyed.

Most advocates of military action against Iran contend that the system of international economic sanctions against the clerical regime is not halting progress on the country’s nuclear program and that the world simply cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran. President Obama has stated repeatedly that it would be “unacceptable” for Tehran to have nuclear weapons, and Mitt Romney, the President’s likely opponent in the November election, says flatly that he will never allow the emergence of a nuclear Iran on his watch.

The reason that a growing number of politicians and pundits embrace the war option, even though most of them concede that such a step could create dangerous instability in an already turbulent region, is that they explicitly or implicitly believe that Iran is undeterrable. The typical allegation is that if Iran builds nuclear weapons, it will use them — certainly against Israel, and possibly against the United States or its NATO allies. Most realists dispute that notion, pointing out that the United States has several thousand nuclear weapons and successfully deterred such difficult actors as the Soviet Union and Maoist China. They also note that Israel has between 150 and 300 nuclear weapons — an extremely credible deterrent.

None of that matters, hawks contend, because the Iranian leadership is not rational and, therefore, the normal logic of deterrence does not apply. Several war advocates stress Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s obsession with the return of the “12th Imam,” an event in Islamic lore that is to be accompanied by an apocalypse. Clifford May, the head of the neo-conservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, argues that “more than a few of Iran’s rulers hold the theological conviction that the return of the Mahdi, the savior, can be brought about only by an apocalypse.” He goes on to cite ultra-hawkish Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis, who asserts that for those who share Ahmadinejad’s vision, “mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent. It’s an inducement.”

There are several problems with that thesis. First, Ahmadinejad is hardly the most powerful figure in the Iranian political system. That’s why the all-too-frequent comparisons of Ahmadinejad to Adolf Hitler are especially absurd. The real power in Iran is held by the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his inner circle of senior clerics. And members of that leadership elite have publicly rebuked Ahmadinejad for devoting too much time and energy to the issue of the 12th Imam.

Second, the return of the Mahdi in the midst of an apocalypse is scarcely a unique religious myth. Most major religions have an “end of the world” mystic scenario involving a savior. Christianity, for example, has the Book of Revelations, with the appearance of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse, Armageddon, and the second coming of Jesus Christ. Given the influence of Christianity among American political leaders, foreign critics could make the case that the United States cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons, because a devout Christian leader who believed Revelations would be tempted to bring about Armageddon.

The reality is that leaders in any political system usually prefer to enjoy the riches and other perks of this life rather than seek to bring about prematurely the speculative benefits of a next life. There is no credible evidence that the Iranian leadership deviates from that norm. And those leaders certainly know that a nuclear attack on Israel, the United States, or Washington’s NATO allies would trigger a devastating counter-attack that would end their rule and obliterate Iran as a functioning society.

It is appropriate to demand that hawks produce evidence — not just allegations — that deterrence is inapplicable because Iranian leaders are suicidal. But one will search in vain for such evidence in the thirty-three years that the clerical regime has held power.

There is, in fact, an abundance of counter-evidence. Meir Dagan, the former head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency, has stated that he considers Iran’s leaders — including Ahmadinejad — “very rational”. Tehran’s behavior over the years confirms that assessment. During the early stages of the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, the Ayatollah Khomeini said that he would “never make peace” with Saddam Hussein. But when the war dragged on for years and the correlation of forces turned against Iran, the country’s military leaders persuaded Khomeini and the clerical elite to conclude a compromise peace. That’s hardly the behavior of an irrational, suicidal political system.

Indeed, there is strong evidence that Iranian leaders understand that there are red lines that they dare not cross. One of the specters that Western hawks create is that Iran would transfer nuclear weapons to non-state terrorist groups. But Iran has had chemical weapons in its arsenal since the days of the Shah. There is not a shred of evidence that Tehran has passed on such weapons to any of its political clients, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Given the visceral hatred those organizations harbor toward Israel, it is nearly certain that they would have used chemical weapons against Israeli targets if Iran had ever put them in their hands. Again, it certainly appears that deterrence neutralized any temptation Tehran might have had to engage in reckless conduct.

A more rational fear than the notion that Iran would commit suicide by launching a nuclear attack against adversaries who have vast nuclear arsenals, or even that Iran would court a similar fate by supplying terrorist groups with nukes, is the thesis that Tehran would exploit a nuclear shield to then bully its neighbors. But even that fear is greatly exaggerated. As Cato Institute scholar Justin Logan points out in the April issue of The American Conservative, Iran’s conventional forces are weak and the country’s power projection capabilities are meager. A nuclear Iran likely would be capable of deterring a US attack on its homeland — attacks that the United States has a habit of launching against non-nuclear adversaries like Serbia, Iraq and Libya — but such a capability would not translate into Iranian domination of the Middle East. That nightmare scenario is only a little less overwrought than the other theories about the “Iranian threat.”

# 2AC Prolif

**Sanctions don’t solve prolif**

PHILLIPS 1 – 15 – 14 Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs [James Phillips, Iran: More Sanctions Pressure Needed to Salvage an Acceptable Nuclear Deal, <http://blog.heritage.org/2014/01/15/iran-sanctions-pressure-needed-salvage-acceptable-nuclear-deal/>]

The Obama Administration, which signed an agreement with Iran on Saturday on how to implement its November 24 interim nuclear deal, is now seeking to suppress bipartisan congressional efforts to strengthen sanctions against Iran if it violates the interim agreement.

Although the text of the most recent agreement has not been publicly released, there is mounting congressional criticism over the flawed interim deal, which relaxes sanctions pressure on Iran over the next six months in return for easily reversible Iranian pledges, some of which Iran has given before but subsequently reneged on.

The nuclear deal requires Iran to curb some, but not all, of its nuclear activities in return for what the Administration initially claimed was about $7 billion in sanctions relief over six months. Administration officials subsequently admitted to their Israeli counterparts that the sanctions relief was closer to $20 billion over six months.

The problem is that the Administration’s ill-considered easing of sanctions will make it more difficult to reach an acceptable final agreement. To force Tehran to make the necessary deeper concessions in a final deal, more pressure is required.

Ed Royce (R–CA), the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, hit the nail on the head when he warned:

I’m concerned that this agreement takes us down that path where sanctions pressure is relieved, but Iran maintains its ability to produce a nuclear weapon.… Given these stakes, it’s regrettable that the President does not want to work with Congress to bolster his negotiating hand with additional sanctions, which would go into effect should Iran fail to meet its commitments.

Such sanctions would be an “insurance policy,” in the words of Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Robert Menendez (D–NJ), that would increase the Administration’s bargaining leverage by raising the potential costs Tehran would have to pay if it fails to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomacy.

Instead, the White House has bowed to Iranian threats to withdraw from the talks in the event that Congress passes more sanctions and has escalated pressure on congressional advocates of sanctions rather than on Iran.

Meanwhile, there is growing concern that the Administration’s relaxation of U.S. sanctions is eroding the strength of international sanctions against Iran. Russia is reportedly negotiating a $1.5 billion per month oil-for-goods swap that would further undermine sanctions.

Iran’s oil exports have also surged after the signing of the November interim agreement, rising from 789,292 barrels per day in November to 1,059,605 per day in December.

If current trends continue, Iran not only will escape the full brunt of sanctions but will retain the infrastructure to build nuclear weapons at its own convenience.

Congress has an opportunity to put sanctions in place that will force Iran and its potential trade partners to pay a heavy price if Iran continues down its nuclear path.

# \*2AC Iran

**U overwhelms - Bill won’t get a vote**

MSNBC 2 – 4 – 14 [Senate effectively scraps Iran sanctions bill, <http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/senate-effectively-scraps-iran-sanctions-bill>]

A month ago, proponents of a bipartisan bill on new Iranian sanctions had reason to be optimistic. Despite White House arguments that the bill risked sabotaging delicate international diplomacy, the Senate bill had 59 co-sponsors. The question wasn’t whether the bill would pass the Senate, but rather, whether it could garner a veto-proof super-majority.

The tide turned quickly. Last week, some of the Senate Democrats who had endorsed the legislation began backing off. And this week, supporters effectively shelved the entire bill.

Proponents of Iran sanctions have all but abandoned their search for a highly symbolic 60th co-sponsor who would give their bill a filibuster-proof majority and reverse the push against immediate action.

The number of Democrats and Republicans on the bill has been stuck at 59 for more than three weeks, with the White House effectively locking up the Democratic Caucus with a threat to veto a bill it says could doom nuclear talks and precipitate war.

Even the list of 59 co-sponsors is misleading given recent developments. Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) told MSNBC’s Chris Matthews last week, “I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating,”, adding, “[W]e’ve got to give peace a chance here and we’ve got to support this process.” Soon after, Sens. Chris Coons (D-Del.) and Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) said they, too, were prepared to give the Obama administration time to pursue a peaceful solution. By the end of the weeks, Sens. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) were also comfortable with a delay.

All are technically still considered co-sponsors, but it’s clear that support for the sanctions bill has slowly collapsed. It’s not that the legislation is poised for defeat; it’s that the measure won’t even get a vote anytime soon.

**NO deal till July – means all the thumpers thump**

CARNEY 2 – 18 – 14 National Journal Staff [Jordain Carney, Iranian Official Blames Senate's Sanctions Threats for Hurting Nuclear Negotiations The country’s foreign minister said a final agreement could pave the way for cooperation in other areas. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/iranian-official-blames-senate-s-sanctions-threats-for-hurting-nuclear-negotiations-20140218>]

Under an interim agreement diplomats reached in November, officials have until late July to agree on a long-term deal, but Zarif dismissed a specific time frame, noting that "there is no end date" because of the "common objective" the countries have.

Although the six-month period can be extended, Zarif said he is hopeful a final agreement can be reached by the July 20 deadline, but that it would take more than "one or two sittings".

Zarif largely sidestepped what other topics Iran and the West could tackle if a long-term agreement is reached, saying that he is "realistic enough to focus on this particular project," but he did suggest that the two sides could cooperate on a rise in extremism.

**Lots of thumpers**

McCLATCHY 1 – 27 – 14 [Congress back, Reid agenda includes farm bill, jobless aid, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/01/27/215872/congress-back-reid-agenda-includes.html]

Congress is back in session after a 10 day break for the Martin Luther King birthday holiday, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid Monday promised an ambitious agenda.

Among his priorities: A farm bill, combatting sexual assault in the military, more presidential nominations and another effort to extend emergency unemployment insurance benefits.

Congress plans to work for about three weeks before recessing for President's Day in mid-February.

Reid, D-Nevada, praised the farm bill as having the potential to "reduce the deficit and cut waste and fraud, all while protecting hungry children and families."

Here's more of Reid's remarks to the Senate:

"The Senate will also debate legislation to effectively prevent and punish sexual assault in the nation’s Armed Forces.

"And Democrats will continue our fight to restore benefits to 1.6 million Americans looking for work during difficult economic times. In the two weeks since Republicans filibustered a bill to restore this important lifeline, an additional 150,000 Americans have lost their emergency unemployment benefits"

Republicans counter that they've been willing to pass an extension but Democrats have rejected their proposals to pay for the plan.

**Waivers solve the impact**

Adam Kredo, 1/21/14, White House Seeks to Bypass Congress on Iran Deal, freebeacon.com/white-house-seeks-to-bypass-congress-on-iran-deal/

The White House has been exploring ways to circumvent Congress and unilaterally lift sanctions on Iran once a final nuclear agreement is reached, according to sources with knowledge of White House conversations and congressional insiders familiar with its strategy.

The issue of sanctions relief has become one of the key sticking points in the Iran debate, with lawmakers pushing for increased economic penalties and the White House fighting to roll back regulations.

While many in Congress insist that only the legislative branch can legally repeal sanctions, senior White House officials have been examining strategies to skirt Congress, according to those familiar with internal conversations.

Sen. Mark Kirk (R., Ill.), who is leading the charge on new sanctions legislation, said that it is unacceptable for the White House to try to bypass Congress on such a critical global issue.

“The American people must get a say in any final nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure the mullahs never get the bomb,” Kirk told the Washington Free Beacon. “The administration cannot just ignore U.S. law and lift sanctions unilaterally.”

Congressional insiders say that the White House is worried Congress will exert oversight of the deal and demand tougher nuclear restrictions on Tehran in exchange for sanctions relief.

Top White House aides have been “talking about ways to do that [lift sanctions] without Congress and we have no idea yet what that means,” said one senior congressional aide who works on sanctions. “They’re looking for a way to lift them by fiat, overrule U.S. law, drive over the sanctions, and declare that they are lifted.”

Under the interim nuclear deal with Iran that began on Monday, Tehran will receive more than $4 billion in cash, according to the White House.

President Barack Obama could unilaterally unravel sanctions through several executive channels, according to former government officials and legal experts.

Executive orders grant the president significant leverage in the how sanctions are implemented, meaning that Obama could choose to stop enforcing many of the laws on the books, according to government insiders.

Those familiar with the ins and outs of sanctions enforcement say that the White House has long been lax with its enforcement of sanctions regulations already on the books.

“It’s no secret that the president, with executive power, can determine sanctions implementation, particularly with waivers and the decision not to sanction certain entities,” said Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, which is responsible for enforcing sanctions.

“The financial pressure has always been about closing loopholes and identifying new ones to close,” Schanzer added. “If you stop that process of constant gardening, you leave a backdoor open.”

Obama could also use executive waivers to “bypass restrictions imposed by the law,” according to a report by Patrick Clawson, director of research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).

The president has a lot of leverage when it comes to sanctions and could effectively “turn a blind eye” to Iranian infractions.

“In the case of Iran, such an approach could allow Washington to reach a nuclear accord without Congress having to vote on rescinding, even temporarily or conditionally, certain sanctions,” Clawson wrote. “No matter how stiff and far-reaching sanctions may be as embodied in U.S. law, they would have less bite if the administration stopped enforcing them.”

One former senior government official said that President Obama’s legal team has likely been investigating the issue for quite some time.

“I’d be shocked if they weren’t putting the various sanctions laws under a microscope to see how they can waive them or work around them in order to deliver to Iran sanctions relief without having to worry about Congress standing in their way,” said Stephen Rademaker, who served as deputy legal adviser to former President George H.W. Bush’s National Security Council (NSC).

Executive branch lawyers are often tasked with finding ways to get around existing legislation, Rademaker said.

“I’m sure pretty early in the negotiating process they developed a roadmap” to ensure the president has the authority to promise Iran significant relief from sanctions, said Rademaker, who also served as chief council for the House Committee on International Relations. “I’m sure they’ve come up with an in depth analysis of what they can do relying exclusively on the president’s legal authority.”

The White House has been known to disregard portions of the sanctions laws that it disagrees with, according to Schanzer.

**Deal collapse doesn’t cause a strike**

Yousaf Butt, a nuclear physicist, is director of the Emerging Technologies Program at the Cultural Intelligence Institute, 1/17/14, Eight Ways You're Wrong About Iran's Nuclear Program, nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/eight-ways-youre-wrong-about-irans-nuclear-program-9723

Meme 1: “If the world powers fail to reach a deal with Tehran the alternative is bombing.”

An incarnation of this shopworn meme appears in [4]Matthew Kroenig's recent piece in Foreign Affairs [4]. He states “A truly comprehensive diplomatic settlement between Iran and the West is still the best possible outcome, but there is little reason to believe that one can be achieved. And that means the United States may still have to choose between bombing Iran and allowing it to acquire a nuclear bomb.” Er, no. That's a false choice. Iran is not acquiring a nuclear bomb—the [6]US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has a “high level of confidence” [6] that no decision to weaponize has yet been taken in Tehran. This conclusion of the DNI is not based on an absence of evidence but on actual information [7] that whatever weaponization research Iran may have been doing up to about 2003 has been wrapped up a decade ago.

The P5+1 nations—the five permanent members of the Security Council: the US, UK, France, Russia and China, plus Germany—are not negotiating with Iran to stop it from making a nuclear bomb. They are negotiating with Iran on how to continue to keep its nuclear program peaceful. The discussion is about the methods used to verify that Iran continues its peaceful nuclear program. Even if the nuclear talks fall apart the IAEA inspectors would still continue to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities.

If we—or our allies—bomb Iran the IAEA inspectors would most certainly be expelled, Iran would likely leave the NPT, and Tehran would likely kick off a full-blown nuclear weapons development project. Iraq's nuclear weapons project also started in earnest after Israel bombed [8] Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981.

To sum up: The negotiations with Iran are about the methods to use to continue to make sure Iran's nuclear program is peaceful. Not reaching a deal is not the end of the world. And if we do bomb Iran, it is likely to bring about the very thing the bombs were trying to prevent: a full-blown nuclear weapons program.

**Plan causes agenda crowd-out---kills the vote on Iran**

Donna Cassata 13 is AP Staff Reporter, “Health care dispute could delay Iran sanctions,” 11-15-13, <http://www.morningjournal.com/general-news/20131115/health-care-dispute-could-delay-iran-sanctions>, DOA: 1-17-14, y2k

A Senate delay over an unrelated health care issue could be the silver lining for President Barack Obama in his appeal to Congress to hold off on a new round of Iran sanctions. Republican Sen. David Vitter of Louisiana wants a vote on his measure to make lawmakers disclose which of their aides are enrolling in the president's new health care law as part of an ongoing effort to discredit "Obamacare." He wants a vote as part of the pharmaceutical bill. That could delay Senate action next week on the annual defense policy bill that is certain to attract an amendment to impose a new round of penalties on Iran. Obama has spoken to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and other senators in a plea to hold off on sanctions. Earlier, Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said the administration needs more time — without new sanctions — to pursue a deal with Iran.

# WW (:18)

**No Capital now – and winners-win**

BISTAGNE 2 – 3 – 14 Laloyolan Contributor [Adam Bistagne, State of the Union address falls short, <http://www.laloyolan.com/opinion/state-of-the-union-address-falls-short/article_37260576-8c4c-11e3-afb2-001a4bcf6878.html>]

In 2013, a slew of problems damaged the Obama Administration: the National Security Agency (NSA) leaks by Edward Snowden, health care rollout errors and a U-6 unemployment rate that’s still over 13 percent. Obama’s 2013 was so dreadful that Julie Pace of the Associated Press asked Obama whether 2013 had been the worst year of his presidency at a White House press conference.

Obama’s State of the Union address was the first opportunity to change the tone for the coming year, to dig his feet into the ground and sway the national conversation. I think Obama’s address failed to meet these goals and instead highlighted the flaws of his time of office.

The speech was Obama’s chance to say something significant about Edward Snowden, yet he missed his opportunity. Obama had a chance to reconcile abuses of privacy with a proposal to grant Snowden amnesty. Such a 180-turn on an issue fraught with serious domestic and international problems would have helped Obama reestablish his credibility.

For American citizens, it would have provided us with some hope that our informational privacy would be protected. For the U.S.’s international allies, it would have made substantial progress in repairing torn relationships. For example, the Brazilian president turned down a White House dinner last year because of the revelations about the NSA spying, a grievous snub to the administration. In addition, the European Union-United States trade deal negotiations have also been seriously derailed by the NSA fiasco.

Only a bold, decisive move by Obama would have given him even a slight chance to repair the damage caused by the leaks. The task forces and panel recommendations have done nothing to heal the political wounds. While a drastic change is not easy in politics, I think a significant policy reform was necessary in this situation. Granting Snowden amnesty would allow progress on an E.U.-U.S. trade deal comparable to the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), something that would improve the American economy while providing Obama with political capital necessary to get Congress back working, if only somewhat.

Even if Congress does become more functional, Obama would likely fail on his promise to deliver higher economic growth. With millions of Americans discouraged from finding work, Obama’s promises to invest in infrastructure and research are great long-term solutions for the American economy, but will do nothing over the next year to put people back to work. When Obama entered office, he instituted a $1 trillion stimulus package to reboot the economy. He went around the country defending the stimulus package based on Keynesian economics; the fact that the economy was depressed meant the government had to increase spending.

Even though household income has stagnated during the past five years, Obama didn’t mention any serious macro-economic policies that could increase growth. Instead, Obama talked about his so-called “success” in cutting deficits, “success” that, in reality, is part of the cause of the middle class’ economic stagnation. When the government decreases spending in the economy, as when the government cuts its deficits, national income goes down. This simple behavior of an economy is a point that Obama has given up explaining to the American citizens because he has let the Republicans determine the conversation regarding government spending. Regarding macro-economic policies of the Federal Reserve System, Obama has appointed conservative members to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, appointed officials who will not promote greater economic growth.

The middle class is struggling, and that’s because the Obama administration has not pushed back against the narrative of austerity that Republicans are promoting. The State of the Union address was Obama’s chance to advocate for monetary and fiscal policy that would stimulate the economy. However, Obama chose to talk about inadequate measures for economic growth and an inadequate resolution to the NSA controversy, resulting in an inadequate State of the Union.

**---Plan divides the GOP**

**DICKERSON 13 Chief Political Correspondent at the Slate, Political Director of CBS News, Covered Politics for Time Magazine for 12 Years, Previous White House Correspondent** [John, , Go for the Throat!, 1/18/13 http://tinyurl.com/b7zvv4d]

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon.

Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day.

But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That **bipartisan** bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country.

The challenge for President Obama’s speech is the challenge of his second term: how to be great when the **environment stinks**. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s **partisan rancor**, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of **time** before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president who came into office speaking in lofty terms about **bipartisanship** and cooperation can only cement his legacy if he **destroys the GOP**. If he wants to transform American politics, he must **go for the throat**.

President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker.

How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the first administration might have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too.

That's the old way. **He has abandoned that**. He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name.

Obama’s **only remaining option is to pulverize**. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of **clarifying fights over controversial issues**, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.

This theory of political transformation rests on the weaponization (and slight bastardization) of the work by Yale political scientist Stephen Skowronek. Skowronek has written extensively about what distinguishes transformational presidents from caretaker presidents. In order for a president to be transformational, the old order has to fall as the orthodoxies that kept it in power exhaust themselves. Obama's gambit in 2009 was to build a new post-partisan consensus. That didn't work, but by exploiting the weaknesses of today’s Republican Party, Obama has an opportunity to hasten the demise of the old order by increasing the political cost of having the GOP coalition defined by Second Amendment absolutists, climate science deniers, supporters of “self-deportation” and the pure no-tax wing.

**Sanctions are good – would ratchet up pressure. Failure is war because Israel will strike.**

PHILLIPS 11 – 24 – 13 Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs [James Phillips, A Bad Nuclear Deal with Iran Could Lead to War, <http://blog.heritage.org/2013/11/24/bad-nuclear-deal-iran-lead-war/>]

The deal that the Obama Administration struck at the Geneva talks yesterday amounts to a flawed agreement that risks reducing sanctions pressure on Iran over next six months in return for easily reversible Iranian pledges, some of which Iran has given before but subsequently reneged on. The deal requires Iran to curb some, but not all, of its nuclear activities over the next six months in return for about $7 billion in sanctions relief.

Significantly, Iran is not required to comply with U.N. Security Council sanctions that require a total suspension of uranium enrichment. Instead, Iran is allowed to continue enriching uranium to 3.5 percent levels, ostensibly for its nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, despite the fact that Russia already has committed to fuel that facility.

Another problem is that the interim deal, which creates a six-month window for further negotiations, may hinder Washington’s ability to reach an acceptable final deal. The Obama Administration has been stung by strong criticism from Congress and from U.S. allies who fear that it has squandered its bargaining leverage by easing sanctions in return for marginal concessions from Iran that will not reduce the long-term threat of an Iranian nuclear breakout.

To force Tehran to make the necessary deeper concessions in a final deal, more—not fewer—sanctions are required. But Iran has warned that any further sanctions will prompt it to abandon the agreement. Despite that warning, a bipartisan coalition in Congress has announced that it will impose more sanctions.

The Administration claims that the easing of sanctions will be reversible if Iran defaults on its obligations, but as long as Iran keeps the talks alive, it will be difficult to re-impose the sanctions without being accused of sabotaging negotiations.

As columnist Charles Krauthammer has warned, there is concern that “A President desperate to change the subject and a Secretary of State desperate to make a name for himself” will succumb to “a sucker’s deal” with Iran.

The Administration has resisted bipartisan congressional efforts to impose new sanctions on Iran. White House spokesman Jay Carney has warned that additional pressure on Iran could derail diplomatic negotiations and put the U.S. on a “march to war.”

But as Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow Peter Brookes has noted: “On the contrary, not being tough enough on Iran—whether with new sanctions or at the Geneva talks—may actually propel the simmering crisis toward armed conflict despite intentions to do otherwise.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has claimed that the deal has recognized Iran’s “right” to uranium enrichment, although that language did not appear in the agreement. This sets the stage for Iran to back out of the deal in the future, claiming that the West reneged on its commitments.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denounced the deal as a “historic mistake” and warned that Israel “has the right and duty to defend itself by itself.” This is a signal that Israel could take preventive action to protect itself against Iran’s nuclear threat in the future.

Britain’s Sunday Times reported that Israeli and Saudi officials secretly have met to discuss cooperation against Iran, with Saudi Arabia agreeing to allow Israeli warplanes to cross Saudi airspace to attack Iran’s nuclear sites.

Recently, one of Netanyahu’s closest associates, former national security adviser Yaakov Amidror, told the Financial Times that Israel had the military capability to set back Iran’s nuclear program “for a very long time” and that there was “no question” that Netanyahu would act unilaterally if necessary.

If such a preventive strike occurs, Iran likely would strike back against both Israel and the U.S. In plain English, this means war.

**AND – don’t believe the hype – the deal sucks now. Even if sanctions mess things up, that’s a good thing.**

KESLO 12 – 15 – 13 Heritage Round Up [Maria Keslo, Iran Now Unhindered in Obtaining Nuclear Weapons, Experts Warn, http://blog.heritage.org/2013/12/15/iran-now-unhindered-obtaining-nuclear-weapons-experts-warn/]

The nuclear deal the Obama Administration negotiated with Iran is flawed by the premature easing of sanctions in return for easily reversed Iranian pledges that do not substantially set back Iran’s nuclear weapons program, according to a panel of experts who spoke at a recent Heritage event. The deal also implicitly recognizes Iran’s claim that it has a fundamental right to enrich uranium, the experts warned.

Heritage’s James Phillips, an expert on the Middle East, spoke at the event along with Patrick Clawson, director of research at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Fred Fleitz, a chief analyst of the Langley Intelligence Group Network.

They explained why the flawed agreement will make it more likely that Iran will obtain nuclear weapons.

According to Fleitz, “A deal like this is based on many questionable assumptions. It assumes Rouhani is a relative moderate. It also assumes Iran has a legitimate right to uranium enrichment.”

Phillips said the Obama Administration worked to block new sanctions being imposed on Iran, and he now worries about the consequences.

“I would argue,” Phillips said, “that not being tough enough on Iran, either with the sanctions or further talks at Geneva, could actually increase the chances of war, increase the chances that Israel will go it alone and launch a preventive strike at Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.”

Clawson explained that while the deal is initially set for a six-month period, it can be renewed indefinitely, effectively allowing Iran to go on for years without the world stopping them from obtaining nuclear weapons.

“That, indeed, is the greatest fear of many of the critiques around the country and around the world,” Clawson said. “This agreement is likely not to be the elements of a ‘first step,’ but instead the details of a last step.”