# 2AC

### 2AC Case Overview

#### Whiteness =/= R/C

Andersen 3—Margaret L. Andersen, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Delaware, 2003, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed Doane & Bonilla-Silva, p. 28]

Conceptually, one of the major problems in the whiteness literature is the reification of whiteness as a concept, as an experience, and as an identity. This practice not only leads to conceptual obfuscation but also impedes the possibility for empirical analysis. In this literature, "whiteness" comes to mean just about everything associated with racial domination. As such, whiteness becomes a slippery and elusive concept. Whiteness is presented as any or all of the following: identity, self-understanding, social practices, group beliefs, ideology, and a system of domination. As one critic writes, "If historical actors are said to have behaved the way they did mainly because they were white, then there's little room left for more nuanced analysis of their motives and meanings" (Stowe 1996:77). And Alastair Bonnett points out that whiteness "emerges from this critique as an omnipresent and all-powerful historical force. Whiteness is seen to be responsible for the failure of socialism to develop in America, for racism, for the impoverishment of humanity. With the 'blame' comes a new kind of centering: Whiteness, and White people, are turned into the key agents of historical change, the shapers of contemporary America" (1996b:153).

### Perm

#### And the permutation is able to confront white privilege – it allows us to enter black semiotic spaces but without corrupting it to serve the ends of racism – our form may be different but it isn’t exclusionary if we accept yours

Sullivan 04 (Shannon Sullivan, Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African and African American Studies—Penn State University, 2004¶ “White World-Traveling,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18.4 (2004) 300-304)

In his captivating essay in this issue of Journal of Speculative Philosophy, on Geneva Smitherman, African American Language, and Black resistance to white domination, George **Yancy issues an invitation to white philosophers, and by extension white people in general. "Regarding white philosophers**," he claims, "**I believe that it is the job of knowledgeable and responsible Black philosophers ... to invite them to enter African American semiotic spaces of discursive difference and overlap**" (Yancy 2004, 275). **Given the constitutive relationship of word and world, the existence of African American semiotic spaces is crucial to the representation, power, and survival of Black experiences. White people's recognition of the importance of African American Language thus** can be a sign that they value those experiences and wish to combat the racism that attempts to eliminate, assimilate, and "forget" them**. For white people to enter African American semiotic spaces can be a way for them to fight white privilege by helping "make 'inroads against the established power-lines of speech'**" (Yancy 2004, 274).

#### The permutation is the only hope to incorporate Nommo into a process of intersubjective communication that allows it to be used as means to an end to resolve oppression, not the other way around

Clarke 04 (Clarke, Communication Professor @ Vanderbilt, 2004¶ [Lynn, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol 18, No 4, p. 323-324]

**Despite the risks** that accompany the concept of Nommo as creative power, and those that attend a linguistic theory of AAL framed within it, **the promises of invention offer an important opportunity to rethink Nommo and the linguistic theory of AAL in ways that reduce the risks.** In this effort, **the paradox of creativity may be a resource insofar as it facilitates thinking Nommo in relation to what it appears to exclude: the argumentative dimensions of public speech.** Appealing, with some unease, to Benjamin’s (1986) linguistic theory, language speaks its potential to speak. With Agamben (1999), the potential may begin to avail itself of accountability when figured not as an occasion for choice. If so, **a choice appears between defining Nommo as creative power unhinged from communicative reason or as creative power linked to intersubjective speech by a “middle” that holds the two accountable to one another, keeping them in mutually responsible play. Prematurely excluded by the law of noncontradiction, the choice of linking Nommo to a middle deserves serious consideration. Figured as an attitude, or “ethos,” the “middle” is a name that speaks to the generative, relational, and practical rational potentials of logos** (Doxtader 2000).6 **In this speaking, the power to define reality and identity is both enacted and deferred. The middle opens up a space for individuals, groups, and communities to represent and debate competing definitions and identities,** in the name of collective choice and action**.** **On this account of public speech, advocates of particular definitions of self and world are expected to justify their terms by way of argument, and dissenting audience members are invited to provide reasons to back their disagreement and the interpretive frame(s) of reference in which the disagreement appears. Viewed from this perspective on Nommo, speakers and (individual) members of audiences within an AAL community would have a conceptual and practical opportunity to define and debate the warrants of definitions and identities offered in their name(s)**. Additionally, they may come to mutual agreement. In the concluding pages of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon wrote of several wishes, one of which expressed hope “That the tool never possess the man” (Fanon 1967, 371). Critically indebted to Hegel, who saw that language may be used practically in ways akin to a tool, Fanon expressed longing for a world in which humans are emancipated from the forms of domination they create, forms that, as Hegel (1979) also saw, can pit humans against each other as if in absolutely opposed relation. **Fanon** also **named** the danger of living according to a language in which humankind appears to exist for the power of speech, and not the other way around (Fanon 1967, 191–92). Significantly, **Yancy recognizes this danger and wants to survive it by talking about AAL in a way that illumines the capacity of speech to resist power’s terms. As crucial as this attempt is** to the lives and political possibilities of a socially disrespected people, **accounting for it through a concept of Nommo that removes itself from accountability to communicative reason creates a tool that may thwart its own potential.** An approach to conceptualizing AAL from the middle of public speech provides one possible way out of the dig**.** Where the path may lead remains a question for talk and debate among those in whose name it is proposed.

### 2AC Nommo Critique

#### Their K posits Nommo as the “power of the word” that moves Black folk toward a greater sense of community, they posit their identity and subjectivity as the foundation for authentic linguistic practices.

#### This however is essentializing. Identity is not the SOURCE of linguistic practices, but rather the product of our social and cultural interactions. Proven by individuals whose identities are ethnic, gender, racial, and national boundary crossing, there is no “shared” or “common” linguistic that unites an identity, but their attempt to use identity as the basis for language forces an identification upon an individual.

Busholtz & Hall 05 (MARY BUCHOLTZ¶ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA¶ KIRA HALL¶ UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, “Identity and interaction: a¶ sociocultural linguistic approach”, Discourse Studies 2005 7: 585)

The first principle that informs our perspective addresses a traditional scholarly¶ view of identity as housed primarily within an individual mind, so that the only¶ possible relationship between identity and language use is for language to reflect¶ an individual’s internal mental state. While individuals’ sense of self is certainly¶ an important element of identity, researchers of individuals’ language use (e.g.¶ Johnstone, 1996) have shown that the only way that such self-conceptions enter¶ the social world is via some form of discourse. Hence, accounts that locate¶ identity inside the mind may discount the social ground on which identity is¶ built, maintained, and altered.

Our own view draws from the sustained engagement with the concept of¶ emergence in linguistic anthropology and interactional linguistics. The idea of¶ emergence was promoted early on in linguistic anthropology by Dell Hymes,¶ whose view of artful linguistic performance as dialogic rather than monologic¶ led him to call for an understanding of ‘structure as sometimes emergent in¶ action’ (Hymes, 1975: 71). Subsequent anthropologists, notably Richard¶ Bauman and Charles Briggs, moved the field further away from the analysis of¶ performance as mere reiteration of an underlying textual structure that was¶ traditionally taken to be primary. In both their individual and collaborative work¶ (Bauman, 1977; Bauman and Briggs, 1990; Briggs, 1988), these scholars¶ demonstrated that performance is instead emergent in the course of its unfolding¶ in specific encounters. These ideas also inform Bruce Mannheim and Dennis¶ Tedlock’s (1995) view of culture as emergent through dialogical processes; that¶ is, culture is produced as speakers draw on multiple voices and texts in every¶ utterance (Bakhtin, 1981). Moreover, in functional and interactional linguistics,¶ scholars have argued against static structuralist and generativist formulations of¶ grammar, proposing instead that linguistic structure emerges in the course of¶ interaction (e.g. Bybee and Hopper, 2001; Ford et al., 2002; Hopper, 1987).¶ We extend the insights of this previous linguistic work on emergence to ¶ the analysis of identity. As with performance, culture, and grammar itself, ¶ we maintain that identity emerges from the specific conditions of linguistic¶ interaction:

1. Identity is best viewed as the emergent product rather than the pre-existing¶ source of linguistic and other semiotic practices and therefore as fundamentally a¶ social and cultural phenomenon.

This is a familiar idea within several very different branches of sociocultural¶ linguistics: the ethnomethodological concept of ‘doing’ various kinds of identity¶ (e.g. Fenstermaker and West, 2002; Garfinkel, 1967; West and Zimmerman,¶ 1987) and the related conversation-analytic notion of identity as an interactionally¶ relevant accomplishment (e.g. Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998; Aronsson,¶ 1998; Auer, 1998; Kitzinger, n.d.; Moerman, 1993; Sidnell, 2003); the poststructuralist¶ theory of performativity (Butler, 1990), developed from the work of¶ J.L. Austin (1962), as taken up by researchers of language, gender, and sexuality¶ (e.g. Barrett, 1999; Cameron, 1997; Livia and Hall, 1997); and more generally¶ the semiotic concepts of creative indexicality (Silverstein, 1979) and referee¶ design (Bell, 1984). Despite fundamental differences among these approaches,¶ all of them enable us to view identity not simply as a psychological mechanism¶ of self-classification that is reflected in people’s social behavior but rather as¶ something that is constituted through social action, and especially through¶ language. Of course, the property of emergence does not exclude the possibility¶ that resources for identity work in any given interaction may derive from¶ resources developed in earlier interactions (that is, they may draw on ‘structure’¶ – such as ideology, the linguistic system, or the relation between the two).

Although nearly all contemporary linguistic research on identity takes this¶ general perspective at its starting point, it is perhaps easiest to recognize identity¶ as emergent in cases where speakers’ language use does not conform with the¶ social category to which they are normatively assigned. Cases of transgender¶ identity and cross-gender performance (Barrett, 1999; Besnier, 2003; Gaudio,¶ 1997; Hall and O’Donovan, 1996; Kulick, 1997; Manalansan, 2003) and¶ ethnic, racial, and national boundary crossing (Bucholtz, 1995, 1999a; Chun,¶ 2001; Cutler, 1999; Hewitt, 1986; Lo, 1999; Piller, 2002; Rampton, 1995;¶ Sweetland, 2002) illustrate in diverse ways that identities as social processes do¶ not precede the semiotic practices that call them into being in specific¶ interactions. Such cases are striking only because they sever the ideologically¶ expected mapping between language and biology or culture; that is, they subvert¶ essentialist preconceptions of linguistic ownership. While the emergent nature of¶ identity is especially stark in cases where a biologically male speaker uses¶ feminine gendered pronouns or a speaker phenotypically classified as nonblack uses African American English, identity is discursively produced even in the most¶ mundane and unremarkable situations.

#### Take the example of Korean Men who, without access to English, must borrow African American Vernacular. If the aff is right, their use of an “African American Language Ideology” takes on a position of power, they re-create the bad linguistic practices they criticize.

Busholtz & Hall 05 (MARY BUCHOLTZ¶ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA¶ KIRA HALL¶ UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, “Identity and interaction: a¶ sociocultural linguistic approach”, Discourse Studies 2005 7: 585)

The second example is taken from the work of Elaine Chun (2001) on Korean¶ American men’s identities. Chun points out that unlike African Americans, most¶ Asian Americans do not have access to a variety of English invested with¶ ethnically specific meaning. She argues that for this reason some of the Asian¶ American men in her study draw on elements of African American Vernacular¶ English (AAVE) in order to locate themselves against racial ideologies that¶ privilege whiteness. This phenomenon is illustrated in Example (2):

(2) (Chun, 2001: 60)

2368 Jin: i think white people just don’t keep it real and that’s why

2369 Dave: that is = that’s true man?

2370 Jin: cause that’s why they always back stabbin like my roommate who

wasn’t gonna pay the last month’s // rent

2371 JH: white.

2372 Jin: he kicks us out [of

2373 Eric: [the prototypical whitey.

2374 Jin: ye:::ah ma::n?

2375 JH: no social skills.

2376 Jin: but that’s not true for everyone i don’t think.

2377 EC: uh huh

2378 Jin: cause all those ghetto whiteys in my neighborhood i think they’re cool

The speakers use various elements associated with African American youth¶ language, including idiomatic phrases like keep it real (line 2368) and lexical¶ items like whitey (lines 2373, 2378), as well as a few emblematic grammatical¶ structures such as the zero copula (they always back stabbin, line 2370). None of¶ the participants in this interaction is a fluent speaker of AAVE, and indeed not all¶ participants use AAVE features. But in the context of this discussion – a critique¶ of whiteness – AAVE becomes an effective instrument for rejecting dominant¶ racial ideologies. At the same time, an antiracist Asian American identity¶ emerges in the discourse in alliance with other people of color.

Despite the vast difference in cultural contexts, this example bears a strong¶ resemblance to the hijra example above in that the speakers in both cases appropriate linguistic forms generally understood not to ‘belong’ to them. Both¶ the use of feminine grammatical gender forms by hijras, who are usually¶ assigned to the male sex at birth, and the use of African American youth style by¶ Korean Americans actively produce new forms of identity through language by¶ disrupting naturalized associations between specific linguistic forms and specific¶ social categories. Yet even these innovative identities should not be understood as¶ ontologically prior to the discourse that calls them forth. While the macro¶ categories of hijra and Korean American have a certain ideological coherence,¶ their actual manifestation in practice is dependent on the interactional demands¶ of the immediate social context. Such interactions therefore highlight what is¶ equally true of even the most predictable and non-innovative identities: that¶ they are only constituted as socially real through discourse, and especially¶ interaction.

#### The perm solves but the alt can’t – The Critiques idea of a “counterlanguage” creates a binary – either a linguistic practice is with them, or it’s against them, it ignores the complexity of identity – this also means the linguistic practice of the 1AC is incompatable with theirs – no alt solvency

Busholtz & Hall 05 (MARY BUCHOLTZ¶ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA¶ KIRA HALL¶ UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, “Identity and interaction: a¶ sociocultural linguistic approach”, Discourse Studies 2005 7: 585)

The first three principles we have discussed focus on the emergent, positional,¶ and indexical aspects of identity and its production. Building on these points, the¶ fourth principle emphasizes identity as a relational phenomenon. In calling¶ attention to relationality, we have two aims: first, to underscore the point that¶ identities are never autonomous or independent but always acquire social¶ meaning in relation to other available identity positions and other social actors;¶ and second, to call into question the widespread but oversimplified view of¶ identity relations as revolving around a single axis: sameness and difference. The¶ principle we propose here suggests a much broader range of relations that are¶ forged through identity processes:

4. Identities are intersubjectively constructed through several, often overlapping,¶ complementary relations, including similarity/difference, genuineness/artifice, and¶ authority/delegitimacy.

We have described these relations at length elsewhere as what we have termed¶ tactics of intersubjectivity (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004a, 2004b); we briefly summarize¶ those discussions here. The list of identity relations we outline in this and our¶ earlier work is not intended to be exhaustive but rather suggestive of the different¶ dimensions of relationality created through identity construction. In addition, it¶ is important to note that although we separate the concepts for purposes of¶ exposition we do not view them as mutually exclusive; indeed, since these are¶ relational processes two or more typically work in conjunction with one¶ another.5

### AT: Cap

Capital is important but not the root cause—sovereign decisions about what life is valuable are the key internal link

Markwick 10—Michael Markwick, Lecturer at Simon Fraser University, Ph.D candidate in philosophy at Simon Fraser University [Spring 2010, “Terror and Democratic Communication,” Ph.D Dissertation, http://summit.sfu.ca/item/9989]

The fact is that violence against Arabs, Muslims and South Asians in the United States after 9/11 wrote the trauma of the terrorist attacks into their flesh. The violence was about their bodies, racialized and reduced to bare life. The effect of the violence, as Sontag argues via Simone Weil, was not to aid in profit making of any kind, however indirectly, but to make persons into things. Although it certainly can be used to support a political economy, and there is without question a menacing synergy between racism and property, I do not believe capital itself can be said to be the author of race categories and race hatred. The money comes second. The principal issue is the arrogation by sovereign power of the authority to impose a taxonomy on the human species. This springs from its claim to ownership of life as such, to grant subjects the status of personhood—of inclusion in the political community—under the terms of a rule of law, and to suspend the rule of law, reducing its subject to bare life in the state of exception. Racism is therefore not an incidental result of market-driven propaganda; racism is a mode of propaganda’s biopolitical function as the voice of the state’s monopoly over violence.

### 2AC Exec Power Critique

#### We must institutionally challenge the premise of the hyper-able executive to demilitarize the war on terror and our larger politics.

Cerelia ATHANASSIOU PhD candidate School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) @ Bristol ‘12 <http://www.unrestmag.com/the-de-militarising-post-gwot-president/#sthash.9zCqFOeT.dpuf>

‘I’ve got a little bumper sticker for you: Osama bin Laden is dead and General Motors is alive’ - Joe Biden, 3 September 2012

I would like to pause here on the much-touted, yet largely uninterrogated, debate(s) surrounding Barack Obama’s ‘warrior’ credentials in much of the media commentary, especially since the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 (see Bergen 2012; cf. Greenwald 2012). I argue that this can give us a better understanding of the assumptions working to support a continuing Global War on Terror (GWOT) and can further reveal important insights on the consensus governing the political status quo. I thus also offer an evaluation of the challenge made to the GWOT by the Obama administration and whether this has delivered a much anticipated (in 2008) de-militarisation. Osama bin Laden’s killing marked a turning point of sorts for the post-9/11 era. As the President himself admitted, however, this was neither ‘the end of our effort’ (2011) nor the end of the US counterterrorist struggle; rather, it signified a major victory for ‘justice’ (2011) on the road to further ‘success’ for US national security. The linear causality informing this logic is in itself problematic and already indicative of the scope of continuity between two seemingly radically oppositional presidents, George W Bush and Barack Obama.

What has interested me especially over the past few years has been the continuing, if not strengthening, of the mutually constitutive realms of militarisation and masculinisation through the unending project of total war on ‘terrorism’ launched by the Bush administration post-9/11. By this, I mean a privileging of politics that evaluates key decision-makers (regardless of their gender or sexuality) according to their propensity to privilege a violent and militarised masculinity over others. Joe Biden’s abovementioned bumper sticker slogan is emblematic of this trajectory. Here, vast topics such as the problem posed by Osama bin Laden and his organisation, al-Qaeda, as well as the problem of the economic insecurity faced by millions of workers in the US and worldwide as a result of the global financial crisis, are presented as mere exercises that can be ticked off as ‘done’ by a hyper-able administration. My direction here is one of critique of a politics defined by a ‘can-do’ masculinity that sees political problems – whether figuring in the economic or security spheres – as easily identifiable and, if one has what it takes, solvable. ‘Osama bin Laden’ is thus operationalised as an easily understandable problem of ‘evil’ that has to be destroyed. Military force is not only seen as necessary but its deployment persists as the privileged way of understanding US national security and international politics: a ‘gutsy’ (Panetta 2011) administration emerges, one that is happy to maintain intact hyper-militarised anti-terrorist strategies characteristic of the GWOT era as the privileged solution to anything perceived a US national security threat. A pacifist presidency was, of course, far from Obama’s intentions; however, his explicit commitment to ‘change’ allows and provides us with a yardstick to test the defining features of contemporary political discourse and how we understand its framings of ‘war’, ‘peace’ and the constitutive in-between of ‘politics’. Crucially, such a test enables us to better understand the limits of certain ways of challenging the status quo and to review them.

Many of my colleagues might say that I am unnecessarily focusing on the predictable non-change of the non-radical Obama administration; that the killing of Osama bin Laden was in fact on the cards from the beginning of Obama’s candidacy; that the war in Afghanistan has long been presented as the ‘right war’; that this administration never questioned US superiority and in fact have celebrated its global dominance; that it became obvious from early on that very little was going to be done by way of addressing the wrongs of the system of indefinite detention symbolised by Guantanamo Bay; that torture may have been outlawed as an interrogation tactic, but it persists in many insidious ways and its use for US interests by US ‘partners’ is still very much a continuing reality.

I want to, however, additionally take my critique of the Obama administration on what might appear to be a tangent and interrogate the popular assumptions fueling and forgiving these reprehensible policies; those popular, taken-for-granted understandings that act as important foundations and explanations of policy decisions and directions. An example of this is to be found in the celebration of the killing of Osama bin Laden and the logic accompanying it, which states that extrajudicial killing of ‘enemies’ is a necessary part of ‘security’. It is precisely through challenging such assumptions about what constitutes ‘security’ – as Barack Obama arguably did with his anti-GWOT stance – that we can begin to really think about change; not the type offered by Obama in the end, which certainly presented the tempting idea that he has truly brought about a form of de-militarisation, but one that would enable conceptualising and acting on different political possibilities to achieve the radical promise of change.

The de-militarisation of the GWOT – and, ultimately, politics! – cannot be achieved without challenging the fundamental understandings fueling it. This would require challenging the validity of the established causal link between militarisation and security – a highly contestable, yet prevailing, link. A crucial factor in this is the continuing understanding of the US president as a sovereign ‘warrior’ figure, responsible for defining and guaranteeing the nation’s security. As I elaborate in the following section, with this understanding lies also the acceptance of the nation-state’s role as primary decision-maker on determining what counts as ‘security’ and its default solution of militarisation.

Conceptualising de/militarisation

Feminist approaches to International Relations (IR) have pointed to masculinity and masculinised practices as crucial constitutive aspects of ‘national security’ (Tickner 1992; Peterson and Runyan 1993; Enloe 2000 [1989]; Elshtain 1987; Hooper 2001; Carver 2008) and have thus been dedicated to excavating the interrelated subjectivities that make up dominant understandings of masculinised international politics. Crucially, scholars within this field have observed that masculinising tactics work to prevent other constitutions or identifications of the sphere of international politics from prevailing. Specifically relevant to the Obama administration and their ambiguous relationship with George W Bush’s project of the Global War on Terror has been the conceptualisation of ‘de/militarisation’.

Cynthia Enloe brought attention to the issue of de/militarisation in her analysis of developments of the post-Cold-War period in 1993, suggesting that the end of militarism that might be said to characterise the period could be tested by tracing the changing politics of femininity and masculinity (252); she dedicated her study to pinpointing attitudes and behaviours that may account for what she noticed was more of a continuity between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ than might be immediately visible. Militarisation, then, is more of an attitude that permeates ‘security studies’ as well as ‘serious’ (and thus masculine, see also Hutchings 2007) spheres like ‘politics’ and ‘security’. In this formulation of militarisation, the process is not a clearcut phenomenon that can be easily separated from other episodes of ‘politics’; rather, it is a dynamic that can also thrive in times of ostensible ‘peace’. One becomes militarised when one is prone to adopt militaristic values (e.g., a belief in hierarchy, obedience, and the use of force) and priorities as one’s own, to see military solutions as particularly effective, to see the world as a dangerous place best approached with militaristic attitudes (2007: 4).

Importantly, militarisation bears close correlation to ‘masculinising’ practices and discourses, where masculinity is positioned as the unquestioned, de-gendered ‘norm’ and all other differences are problematic, complex, ‘other’ (see Carver 2008: 83; Masters 2008: 94-95; Enloe 2007: 60-61). Against this background, feminist approaches conceive the still largely uninterrogated warrior masculinity that is expected to underlie ‘serious’ decisions on ‘security’ as the one central and unchanging factor of national security. The striking connection with the Obama administration’s militarised ‘can-do’ attitude must be visible by now.

The figure of what I call the ‘warrior decision-maker’, which emerges from the present analysis of ‘change’ and is tied to this version of de-militarisation, is a singularity which conforms to the idea that key actors of the national security sphere should think, act and defend like a warrior. At the same time, what emerges especially from current developments in the Obama administration is that the ‘warrior’ figure is propped up by a ‘rational’ masculinity, which shoulders the responsibilities of the authoritative decision-maker and is entrusted with the responsibility of ‘protecting’ a feminised citizenry, thereby perpetuating the idea that gender hierarchy accurately reflects the various demands of modern democracy’s ‘security’. As Iris Young has conceptualised it in her theorisation of the ‘security regime’, the understanding between populations and their governments currently prevalent in modern (Western) democracies subscribes to the following script:

The gallantly masculine man faces the world’s difficulties and dangers in order to shield women from men. The role of this courageous, responsible, virtuous and “good” man is that of a protector. Good men can only appear in their goodness if we assume that lurking outside the warm familial walls are aggressors, the “bad” men, who wish to attack them (2003: 224).

The consequence arising from this rationale furthers gender inequality on the basis that one type of citizen (the masculine man) is better and more adequately suited to protect other types of citizen (feminised ‘non-men’); indeed, Young infers that ‘on this alternative account, then, patriarchal right emerges from male specialization in security’ (2003: 224), thus corroborating the observation that ‘national security’ really is a masculinised sphere. This is, of course, complicated by the fact that this masculinity is not simply characteristic of men, but can be, and is, also displayed by key female players, like Hillary Clinton (see Anderson et al. 2010: 12; Eisenstein 2008). Young focuses on the particular instance of post-9/11, but she is careful enough to couch her critique within an appreciation of the historical manifestation of the ‘security regime’; this is a recurring phenomenon that will remain as long as the main factors, attitudes and subjectivities informing it are left unquestioned.

How, then, can the GWOT’s radical militarisation and its dismissal of securities other than the executive’s definition of what can be defined as ‘national’ be effectively tackled without addressing its masculinised core? The Obama administration’s failure to maintain an anti-GWOT momentum shows that the concern with the national security state’s constitutive masculinity is not an issue reserved only for feminist analysts but should be central to interrogations of, and approaches to, change. The crucial question here is whether the socio-political status quo should reflect a ‘security regime’ that only has as effect the betterment of the powerful, or in contrast, whether a new status quo could be geared towards deepening understandings and practices of democracy.

It is this question of the ‘how’ of government that motivates my interest in Obama’s discourse of ‘change’, and especially its application to the narrow script of ‘national security’ and its de-militarisation. Obama’s election signaled to many a return to pre-GWOT ‘normality’, where the ‘rule of law’ had come to signify the brunt of the articulations intended to counter the GWOT’s militarised ‘exception’. Against the master signifier of the GWOT – centred on militarism, the idea of warring civilisations, and a disregard of international conventions – Obama has been engaged in emphasising rhetorically the importance of legal, ethical and considered processes (i.e. ‘rule of law’) to unsettle the GWOT and its destructive characteristics. The very idea of having to make a choice between ‘safety’ and ‘ideals’ was rejected as ‘false’ (Obama 2009 Inaugural); rather, it was time to move on to less exaggerated treatments of ‘national security’ after eight years of intense militarisation.

In many ways, change has been on the horizon, but not in any way counteracting this militarisation. Mark Neocleous put it rightly when he warned against placing too much faith in the ‘rule of law’ as the effective counter-weight to the GWOT’s militarisation:

From the Korematsu case, in which the US Supreme Court held that the internment of some 70,000 US citizens was legally acceptable, to the more recent Middle Eastern adventures on the part of Western powers, virtually every exercise of violence conducted in the name of emergency has been justified and legitimized on legal grounds. […] To criticize the use of emergency powers in terms of a suspension of the law, then, is to make the mistake of counterpoising normality and emergency, law and violence (2006: 206).

I draw out this argument further by analysing Obama’s newly found ‘warrior’ masculinity, indicative of the greater continuity rather than break between militarisation (‘war’) and its supposed opposite, the normality of politics (‘peace’).

The importance of warrior credentials

On 1 May 2012, Barack Obama’s re-election campaign released a video entitled ‘One Chance’ to mark the one-year anniversary of the killing of Osama bin Laden. The video presents a short narrative by former President Bill Clinton centred on his assessment of Obama’s decision to have bin Laden killed. From the beginning, Clinton makes it clear that Obama is to be evaluated against, and in contrast to, his predecessor, George W Bush. ‘That’s one thing George Bush said that was right’, says Clinton, ‘The president is the decider-in-chief’. Played out on the back of the threat/problem of ‘Osama bin Laden’, this ‘fact’ is justified: after all, as Clinton expands, there are situations where singular executive decisions are necessary to ensure security: ‘You hire the president to make the calls that no one else can do’. Disappointingly, for those subscribing to the promised discourse of ‘change’, Clinton’s narrative makes explicit one key factor contributing to the stubborn perseverance of the GWOT’s presuppositions and effects: the notion that executive discretion and power are the crucial elements of what makes a nation and its inhabitants secure. The sphere of national security decision-making is thus reaffirmed as one which only strong individuals can inhabit, who are capable of making difficult decisions. Additionally, the ability to make these decisions is informed by one’s ability to straddle the ‘warrior’ – ‘rational man’ divide to deliver on the promise to protect.

The video’s focus on Obama’s deliberative side confirms that he fulfills the role of the warrior decision-maker. A shot of Obama, with his back to the camera and looking through a window onto a natural setting, confirms his ultimate aim as maintaining a peaceful status quo, even if this has to be done through war. This is an objective that viewers can relate to. His is not a self-generating war-making; rather, it is one with clear and tangible aims that the average citizen demands. Ironically, however, it is the ready acceptance of Obama’s ‘noble’ war-making that is most problematic here, particularly because it perpetuates blind trust in a system which, on paper, has done much to widen executive authority to capture, interrogate and kill ‘suspects’ without recourse to the law or any democratic process. Yet, these effects of the reigning ‘warrior’ masculinity are silenced precisely because Obama can carry out the performance of deliberative (masculine) ‘rationality’ so well. His ‘warrior’ credentials are celebrated not in and of themselves, but rather because they are operationalised through this rational and logical framework. In this masculinising and militarising rationale, there are no surprises, and the solution is to be found in the defence of the status quo.

### Political Race

#### Perm -- Starting point of political race is more effective than a focus on anti-blackness. Our framework respects identity boundaries and better generates cross-race coalitions.

Lani GUINIER Law @ Harvard AND Gerald TORRES Law @ Texas ‘2 *The Miner’s Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy* p. 11-14

Race, for us, is like the miner's canary. 1 Miners often carried a canary into the mine alongside them. The canary's more fragile respiratory system would cause it to collapse from noxious gases long before humans were affected, thus alerting the miners to danger. The canary's distress signaled that it was time to get out of the mine because the air was becoming too poisonous to breathe. Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner's canary: their distress is the first sign of a danger that threatens us all. It is easy enough to think that when we sacrifice this canary, the only harm is to communities of color. Yet others ignore problems that converge around racial minorities at their own peril, for these problems are symptoms warning us that we are all at risk. Achieving racial justice and ensuring a healthy democratic process are independently knotty problems; at points where the two problems intersect, they have seemed intractable. Yet we believe progress can be made. Our goal is to explore how racialized identities may be put to service to achieve social change through democratic renewal. We also seek to revive a cross-racial project of social change. Toward these ends, we link the metaphor of the canary with a conceptual project we call political race, and in so doing we propose a new, twenty-first-century way of talking about this distinctly American challenge. The metaphor of the miner's canary captures the association between those who are left out and social justice deficiencies in the larger community. The concept of political race captures the association between those who are raced black-and thus often left out-and a democratic social movement aimed at bringing about constructive change within the larger community. One might say that the canary is diagnostic, signaling the need for more systemic critique. Political race, on the other hand, is not only diagnostic; it is also aspirational and activist, signaling the need to rebuild a movement for social change informed by the canary's critique. Political race seeks to construct a new language to discuss race, in order to rebuild a progressive democratic movement led by people of color but joined by others. The political dimension of the political race project seeks to reconnect individual experiences to democratic faith, to social critique, and to meaningful action that improves the lives of the canary and the miners by ameliorating the air quality in the mines. The miner's canary metaphor helps us understand why and how race continues to be salient. Racialized communities signal problems with the ways we have structured power and privilege. These pathologies are not located in the canary. Indeed, we reject the incrementalist approach that locates complex social and political problems in the individual. Such an approach would solve the problems of the mines by outfitting the canary with a tiny gas mask to withstand the toxic atmosphere. Political race as a concept encompasses the view that race still matters because racialized communities provide the early warning signs of poison in the social atmosphere. And then it encourages us to do something different from what has been done in the past with that understanding. Political race tells us that we need to change the air in the mines. If you care to look, you can see the canary alerting us to both danger and promise. The project of political race challenges both those on the right who say race is not real as well as those on the left who say it is real but we cannot talk about it. Political race illustrates how the lived experience of race in America continues to serve an important function in the construction of individual selves as well as in the construction of social policy. Political race is therefore a motivational project. Rebuilding a movement for change can happen only if we reclaim our democratic imagination. Because such a project requires faith in the unseen, we find an inspired comparison in the literary movement known as magical realism. This movement also began as a project to liberate a democratic imagination. We will explore the connections with magical realism shortly, but first we would like to explain the genealogy of the concept of political race. At its genesis, we referred to this concept as "political blackness:' Our effort to develop a terminology arose in reaction to the neoliberal and neoconservative attempts to reduce race to its biological and thus scientifically irrational and morally reprehensible origins-that is, to eliminate race as a meaningful or useful concept. But it was also a reaction to the civil rights advocates' inadequate response, which tended to embrace race as skin color and thus to limit the radical political dynamism of the civil rights movement to persons "of color." In the view of the neoconservatives, race is merely skin color and is thus meaningless and ignorable. In the view of the civil rights advocates, race is skin color plus a legacy of slavery and Jim Crow that is now realized through stigma, discrimination, or prejudice. But to those outside this subtle debate, it often appears that both sides see race primarily as being about skin color. They differ simply on whether such a definition of race is meaningless and thus should be abandoned or is meaningful and thus should be at least temporarily acknowledged. The word "political" in the term political blackness was an attempt to dislodge race from this color-of-one's-skin terminology and to extend its social meaning from a moral calculus that assesses blame as a precondition for action to a political framework that cultivates and inspires action directly. It was also an attempt to dislodge race from simple identity politics; it was a reaction to the cultural or race nationalists for whom one's personal identity constitutes one's political project. We sought a phrase that would name the association between race and power that is lost in the current debate. But in responding to inquiries about the meaning of political blackness, we found ourselves bombarded by boundary questions: Who is inside and who is outside the category? For example, one graduate student persisted in seeing political blackness as a membership category. "Is a black woman lesbian middle manager inside the political blackness idea?" she asked. We responded that the term covers three elements: it has a diagnostic function; it embraces an aspirational goal; and it hopes to jumpstart an activist project. We then insisted that it was up to each person to determine whether she was part of this project. Action and commitment, not predetermined descriptors, would be the guide. We were not gatekeepers. Meanwhile, we also discovered that many black Americans were offended by the substitution of "political blackness" for "race" because, by opening up the category "black" to anyone who wished to enter, this semantic move discounted the material reality black Americans faced every day and misappropriated the cultural community they experienced. In our view, these were all substantial reasons to find another term. Thus we substituted the term political race project. This terminology is also subject to ambiguity, but it seemed to minimize these specific confusions and liabilities. And while we moved to the more inclusive nomenclature of political race, blackness-and the experience of black people-is nevertheless at the heart of our argument.

### 2AC AT: The State is evil

#### Voting aff is a form of *demosprudence* – a legal bridge between aggrieved communities and existing institutions. Becoming role-literate participants in legal debates builds public momentum for social change.

Lani GUINIER Law @ Harvard **‘**9 “BEYOND LEGISLATURES: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF DEMOSPRUDENCE” 89 B.U. L. Rev. 539 2009 p.544-554

In her Ledbetter dissent and subsequent remarks, Justice Ginsburg was courting the people to reverse the decision of a Supreme Court majority and thereby limit its effect. In Robert Cover's "jurisgenerative" sense,36 she claimed a space for citizens to advance alternative interpretations of the law. Her oral dissent and public remarks represented a set of *demosprudential* practices for instantiating and reinforcing the relationship between public engagement and institutional legitimacy. In Justice Ginsburg's oral dissent we see the possibilities of a more democratically-oriented jurisprudence, or what Gerald Torres and I term demosprudence. 37 Demosprudence builds on the idea that lawmaking is a collaborative enterprise between formal elites - whether judges, legislators or lawyers - and ordinary people. The foundational hypothesis of demosprudence is that the wisdom of the people should inform the lawmaking enterprise in a democracy. From a demosprudential perspective, the Court gains a new source of democratic authority when its members engage ordinary people in a productive dialogue about the potential role of "We the People" in lawmaking.38 Demosprudence is a term Professor Torres and I initially coined to describe the process of making and interpreting law from an external - not just internal - perspective. That perspective emphasizes the role of informal democratic mobilizations and wide-ranging social movements that serve to make formal institutions, including those that regulate legal culture, more democratic. 39 Demosprudence focuses on the ways that "the demos" (especially through social movements) can contribute to the meaning of law. Justice Ginsburg acted demosprudentially when she invited a wider audience into the conversation about one of the core conflicts at the heart of our democracy. 40 She grounded her oral dissent and her public remarks in a set of demosprudential practices that linked public engagement with institutional legitimacy. Those practices are part of a larger demosprudential claim: that the Constitution belongs to the people, not just to the Supreme Court. The dissenting opinions, especially the oral dissents, of Justice Ginsburg and other members of the Court are the subject of my 2008 Supreme Court foreword, *Demosprudence Through Dissent.41* The foreword was addressed to judges, especially those speaking out in dissent, urging them to "engage dialogically with nonjudicial actors and to encourage them to act democratically. '42 The foreword focuses on oral dissents because of the special power of the spoken word, but Justices can issue demosprudential concurrences and even majority opinions, written as well as spoken.43 Moreover, true to its origins, demosprudence is not limited to reconceptualizing the judicial role. Lawyers and nonlawyers alike can be demosprudential, a claim that I foreshadow in the foreword and which Torres and I are developing in other work on law and social movements. 44 Supreme Court Justices can play a democracy-enhancing role by expanding the audience for their opinions to include those unlearned in the law. Of the current Justices, Justice Antonin Scalia has a particular knack for attracting and holding the attention of a nonlegal audience. His dissents are "deliberate exercises in advocacy" that "chart new paths for changing the law."'45 Just as Justice Ginsburg welcomed women's rights activists into the public sphere in response to the Court majority's decision in *Ledbetter,* Justice Scalia's dissents are often in conversation with a conservative constituency of accountability. 46 By writing dissents like these, both Justices have acknowledged that their audience is not just their colleagues or the litigants in the cases before them. Both exemplify the potential power of demosprudential dissents when the dissenter is aligned with a social movement or constituency that "mobilizes to change the meaning of the Constitution over time. '47 Thus, Justice Ginsburg speaks in her "clearest voice" when she addresses issues of gender equality.48 Similarly, Justice Scalia effectively uses his originalist jurisprudence as "a language that a political movement can both understand and rally around. 4 9 Both Justices Ginsburg and Scalia are at their best as demosprudential dissenters when they encourage a "social movement to fight on." 50 Robert Post, writing in this symposium, reads my argument exactly right: "[C]ourts do not end democratic debate about the meaning of rights and the law; they are participants within that debate." 51 As Post explains, I argue that the "meaning of constitutional principles are forged within the cauldron of political debate," a debate in which judges are often important, though not necessarily central, actors. 52 Law and politics are in continuous dialogue, and the goal of a demosprudential dissenter is to ensure that the views of a judicial majority do not preempt political dialogue. When Justice Ginsburg spoke in a voice more conversational than technical, she did more than declare her disagreement with the majority's holding. By vigorously speaking out during the opinion announcement, she also appealed to citizens in terms that laypersons could understand and to Congress directly. 53 This is demosprudence. Robert Post eloquently summarizes and contextualizes the argument I make about demosprudence. He also corrects the misunderstanding of the law/politics divide that beats at the heart of Gerald Rosenberg's criticisms of that argument.54 Post neatly restates my premise: "Law inspires and provokes the claims of politically engaged agents, as it simultaneously emerges from these claims. '55 In his companion essay, Professor Rosenberg polices the law/politics distinction to create a false binary. Rosenberg dismisses the possibility of an ongoing and recursive conversation between law and politics that *may* produce changes in the law and eventually in our "constitutional culture," meaning changes in the popular as well as elite understanding of what the law means. Constitutional culture is the fish tank in which the beliefs and actions of judicial as well as nonjudicial participants swim. It is the "dynamic sociopolitical environment" in which ideas about legal meanings circulate, ferment, compete and ultimately surface in formal venues such as legal advocacy or legislative actions.56 As political scientist Daniel HoSang explains, the goal of demosprudence is "to open up analytic and political possibility to build and sustain more dynamic and politically potent relationships between [legal elites] and aggrieved communities. 57 Professor Rosenberg's critique of demosprudence rests on several misunderstandings of my work and that of other legal scholars.58 First, Professor Rosenberg wrongly assumes that my claims are descriptive rather than aspirational.5 9 Second, Professor Rosenberg's concern about my "Courtcentric" analysis overlooks the occasion for my argument;60 that is, the traditions associated with the Supreme Court foreword published every year in the November issue of the *Harvard Law Review.* Third, he orients his entire critique around polling data and other social science research to trivialize the relationship of narrative to culture, to exaggerate the predictive capacity of a data-driven approach to quantify causation and to preempt other useful analytic approaches. 6 1 First, my foreword posits that judges *can* play a demosprudential role and that oral dissents are one *potential* vehicle for allowing them to do so. 6 2 While it is true that oral dissents *currently* face obstacles to their demosprudential efficacy, those obstacles need not be insurmountable. Moreover, Rosenberg's critique arguably makes my point. He is saying "people don't pay attention, 63 while **I** am saying "yes, they can!" Indeed, they might pay more attention if Justices took the time to talk to them.64 He characterizes the past; I aim to sketch out the contours of a different future. Rosenberg is absolutely right that one next step might be to deploy the tools of social science to explore the extent to which this claim has been realized.65 But the foreword is suggestive, not predictive. Justices of the Supreme Court can be demosprudential when they use their opinions to engage nonlegal actors in the process of making and interpreting law over time. They have democratically-based reasons to seek to inspire a mobilized constituency; it is not that they invariably *will* cause a social movement to emerge. Similarly, the idea that Court opinions do not invariably inspire social movements does not mean they cannot have this effect. Nor do I argue that oral dissents are the only, or even the single most important, communication tool at the Court's disposal. When the Supreme Court announced *Brown v. Board of Education66* in 1954, there were no dissents. Moreover, the orality of the opinion announcement was not a central feature of the event. No one heard the voice of Earl Warren reading his decision on the radio. Nevertheless, the decision had a powerful effect, in part because it was purposely drafted to speak to "the people. '67 Justice Warren consciously intended that the *Brown* opinion should be short and readable by the lay public. 68 In his work, Professor Rosenberg focuses on the white backlash the Brown decision inspired.69 But a demosprudential analysis also focuses on the frontlash, the way that Brown helped inspire the civil rights movement. *Brown's* accessibility and forcefulness helped inspire a social movement that in turn gave the opinion its legs. 70 In 1955, Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus in Montgomery. She was arrested. Four days later, when she was formally arraigned and convicted, a one-day bus boycott by the black citizens of Montgomery was unexpectedly, amazingly, successful. 71 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered a sermon that evening before a mass meeting of 5000 people gathered at and around Holt Street Baptist Church. 72 He prepared his audience to take the bold step of continuing the boycott indefinitely. He did so by brilliantly fusing two great texts: the Supreme Court's pronouncement a year earlier in *Brown* and the Bible.73 Dr. King roused the crowd at that first mass meeting in Montgomery with a spirited refrain: "If we are wrong - the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong God Almighty was wrong. In the foreword, I argue that Dr. King was a classic example of a "role literate participant.

'75 His theological and strategic acumen enabled him to invoke Brown as "authorization" and "legitimation" to sustain the actions that 50,000 blacks in Montgomery, Alabama would take for over thirteen months when they refused to ride the city's buses.76 But as Robert Post rightly points out, the word "authorize" meant something more like embolden or encourage. 77 My point is that Brown shows judicial actors can inspire or provoke "mass conversation." It is when the legal constitution is narrated through the experience of ordinary people in conversation with each other that legal interpretation becomes sustainable as a culture shift.78 And if a majority opinion can rouse, so too can a dissenting one. Thus, demosprudence through dissent emphasizes the use of narrative techniques and a clear appeal to shared values that make the legal claims transparent and accessible. Although demosprudence through dissent is prescriptive rather than descriptive, it was never my intent to suggest that the Court should be central to any social movement. Like Justice Ginsburg, I am not a proponent of juridification (the substitution of law for politics). 79 In Justice Ginsburg's words, "[t]he Constitution does not belong to the Supreme Court." 80 At the same time, I recognize that the Court has been deeply influential, albeit unintentionally at times, in some very important social movements. Studying the 1960s student movement in Atlanta, Tomiko Brown-Nagin argues that the lunch counter sit-ins were, in fact, a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision not because of what the Supreme Court said, but because of what it did not say. 81 The Court initially raised, then dashed expectations. It was the disappointment with "all deliberate speed" **-** the legal system's failure to live up to the promise of the Court's initial ruling- that inspired students to take to the streets and initiate some of the bold protest demonstrations at lunch counters and in streets in the 1960s.8 2 Brown-Nagin emphasizes the multiple ways in which courts, lawyers and social movement actors are engaged in a dialogic and recursive discourse.83 Rosenberg's second misunderstanding deserves both a concession and a clarification. Rosenberg's criticism that my argument is too Court-centric is fair as far as it goes.84 I appreciate (and to a great extent share) Rosenberg's skepticism regarding courts as the primary actors in forging the path of social change. Gerald Torres and I argue that social change involves denaturalizing prior assumptions, a process that must be continuously monitored under the watchful eye of engaged political and social actors. 85 Moreover, social change is only sustainable if it succeeds in changing cultural norms, is institutionalized through policy decisions and the oversight of administrative actors, and develops an internal and external constituency of accountability. I concede that courts are not necessarily central to social movement activism. Why then do I focus on the dialogic relationship between the Supreme Court and other essential social change actors in the foreword? The foreword is designed to be, and has always been, *about the Court's Term.86* In this venue, I developed the idea of demosprudence *in application* to this particular organ of government. The inherent structural limitation of this particular art form was challenging but ultimately, in my view, productive. It pushed me to explore the ways that judicial actors, in conjunction with mobilized constituencies, can redefine their roles consistently with ideas of democratic accountability. Indeed, because the format of the foreword encouraged me to approach demosprudence from this angle, I discovered something important about demosprudence: judges, not just lawyers or legislators, speak to constituencies of accountability in a democratically accountable and democracy-inspired legal system. I argued that oral dissents (like Justice Ginsburg's in *Ledbetter)* reveal the existence of an alternative, and relatively unnoticed, source of judicial authority.87 The Court's legitimacy in a democracy need not depend on the Court speaking with an "institutional voice" (that is, unanimously). Here I am influenced by Jane Mansbridge's idea that democratic power can be held to account through two-way interactions, a source of authority rooted in "deliberative accountability. '88 The demosprudential dissenter ideally provides greater transparency to the Court's internal deliberative process. 89 At the same time, the dissenter may disperse power "by appealing to the audience's own experience and by drafting or inspiring them to participate in a form of collective problem solving." 9° Thus, the Court gains constitutional authority when dissenters speak in a "democratic voice," potentially expanding their audience beyond legal elites. In Mark Tushnet's words, "the Constitution belongs to all of us collectively, *as we act together."9'* Third, Rosenberg's argument that oral dissents are ineffectual, are unlikely to ever be effectual, and should not be considered relevant, reflects his disciplinary allegiances. 92 His perspective depends on empirical evidence of causation. It has a substantive, a methodological and a technological dimension. Rosenberg's substantive argument seems to rest on the assumption that law almost never influences politics or vice versa. His skeptical certitude reduces to insignificance the recursive interactions between the courts and the activists in the 1950s and '60s over civil rights, in the 1970s over the meaning of gender equality, in the 1990s over affirmative action, and in the 2000s over the meaning of marriage. In addition, Professor Rosenberg's certitude goes well beyond the evidence he cites. He believes demosprudential dissents "are not necessary because if there is an active social movement in place then no judicial help is needed. '93 At the same time, he quotes McCann approvingly despite the fact that McCann concludes law can in fact make a difference under the right circumstances. 94 There is more than a friendly misunderstanding at work. Within Professor Rosenberg's critique of demosprudence lurks a deep disciplinary tension about the nature of causation and the primacy of uniform metrics of measurement, as well as the meaning of political participation and influence. 95 What I value about political engagement cannot simply be reduced to what can be measured. When judges participate openly in public discussion, whether through book tours or oral dissents, their words or ideas may have traction without causing measureable changes in public opinion. As Robert Post notes, I am of the school that values "the texture and substance of dialogue. '96 I do not define politics, more generally, primarily by election outcomes or polling data. As I write elsewhere, opportunities for participation enhance democratic legitimacy in part because "democracy involves justice-based commitments to voice, not just votes: participation cannot be reduced to a single moment of choice. '97 Opportunities for formal and informal deliberation are important because of "the texture and meaning of the relationships among political actors, as well as the texture and substance of the values that emerge from public discussion." 98 The methodological aspect of Rosenberg's critique involves his taste for numbers and other metrics of certainty. 99 Rosenberg would prefer that I treat the format of a dissent as something to be studied by literary critics but as irrelevant to political or public relationships.100 The notion that storytelling is not the stuff of politics ignores the important work of social psychologists and linguists who write at length about the processes by which the brain hears and evaluates information. For example, what people say they believe is not necessarily predictive of what they do.' 01 Indeed, attitudes are not recalled like USB memory sticks, but are reconstructed in relationship to the environment. 102 My argument assumes that the river of social change has many tributaries, from the strategic mobilization of diverse resources that Marshall Ganz identifies to the narratives of resistance that Fred Harris explores. 0 3 No single institution of government, acting alone, successfully controls or enables these mighty currents. For example, the Supreme Court, when it wields law to establish relationships of power and control, primarily legitimates rather than destabilizes existing relationships of power and control. 104 Thus I agree with Rosenberg that the Court rarely functions as the central power source for fundamental structural change. Nevertheless, I argue that members of the Court can catalyze change when they help craft or expand the narrative space in which mobilized constituencies navigate the currents of democracy. That role may be hard to measure, especially when demosprudential politics do not use the same language or framing devices as ordinary politics. 0 5 That role may also be inaccurately interpreted if the evaluation tool is survey data that asks open-ended questions or miscodes respondents' answers. 10 6 For example, after recalibrating the measurement tools on which conventional wisdom relies, Professors Gibson and Caldeira conclude that the American people may not be as woefully ignorant about the Court as has been consistently reported. 07 In addition, when members of the Court direct their dissents to social movement actors and other role-literate participants, the recursive nature of that discourse would be difficult to capture in national survey instruments.10 8

#### Their alternative is fratricidal for both research and strategy. Critique of the racial state shouldn’t preclude appeals to state-based politics.

George LIPSITZ Black Studies @ UC SB ‘4 “Abolition democracy and global justice” *Comparative American Studies* 2 (3) p. 271-276

Abstract As new social relations produce new kinds of social subjects, scholars in American Studies and Area Studies experience anxieties about disciplinary as well as geographic borders. The Civil Rights tradition of the 14th Amendment plays an important role within progressive American Studies scholarship, but in the course of seeking equality and exclusion within the USA, this tradition runs the risk of occluding the role of the nation in the world and its central role in creating and preserving inequality and injustice in other nations. An emerging emphasis on struggles for social justice without seeking state power encapsulates many of the most progressive impulses within Area Studies and transnational studies, yet this perspective runs the risk of occluding the enduring importance of the nation-state in inflecting global developments with local histories and concerns. The present moment challenges us to draw on both traditions, and to use each to critique the shortcomings of the other, while at the same time promoting an inclusionary, nonsectarian, and mutually supportive dialogue about our differences. Keywords American Studies ● Area Studies ● inequality ● transnationalism In Jack Conroy’s 1935 short story ‘The Weed King’, a stubborn Missouri farmer wages a one person war against the weeds that spring up in his fields. Believing that farming would be an easy job if it were not for the weeds, he dedicates himself to their eradication with a zeal that astounds his fellow workers. The ‘weed king’ embraces his war against weeds as his reason for being. ‘His only vanity,’ Conroy tells us, is his belief that he has ‘put the quietus to more weeds than any man, woman, child or beast west of the Mississippi’ (Conroy, 1985: 101). Even in the winter time when snow covers the ground, the zealot worries night and day about the tiny seeds waiting to bloom in the spring. One of his neighbors points out that weeds have their uses too, that many of them have greatly-needed medicinal powers. However, the weed king is not deterred. He soon succeeds in suppressing most of the weeds on his property. His singleminded zealotry has its costs, however. The measures he takes to kill the weeds prove fatal to his crops as well. At the present moment of tumultuous transformation and change, scholars in American Studies and Area Studies might be tempted to emulate the weed king, to keep a keen eye on our fields to protect what we have been cultivating for so many years, to view each other’s work with trepidation and counter-insurgent zeal. American Studies scholars worry that the growing enthusiasm for transnational studies threatens to focus too much on exchanges across national boundaries, in the process occluding the unique, particular, and specific inflections given to those processes by distinct national histories, cultures, and politics. Area Studies specialists, many of whom have been part of a decades-long tradition dedicated to constructing epistemologies and ontologies that resist the hegemony of the monolingual, monocultural, and nationalist scholarship of the US academy, rightly fear that a transnational or postnational American Studies might simply project American Exceptionalism onto a broader geographic terrain. Outside the USA, specialists in both American Studies and Area Studies have reason to fear that (wittingly or unwittingly) scholars from the USA will use the power of US capital, communications media, and commerce to substitute a US-centric monologue masquerading as a dialogue for the greatly needed polylateral communication and collaboration that a transnational world requires. At a time when substantive changes in social structures, technology, and politics are radically reconfiguring the relations linking culture, time, and place, policing the boundaries of disciplines speaks to deep desires for continuity and certainty. It is possible to look at the current ferment in our fields and see only what is being lost, to become subsumed with melancholy about lost conversations and conventions. Yet scholarly research should be conducted out of conviction, rather than out of habit. If we are not careful, our work can come to resemble Swedish anthropologist Ulf Hannerz’s definition of Scandinavian cooking – something passed down from generation to generation for no apparent reason (Hannerz, 1992: 42). Like the weed king, we can worry night and day about the purity of our fields. As new social relations throw forth fundamentally new social subjects with new epistemologies, ontologies, archives, and imaginaries, new patterns of scholarly inquiry will inevitably emerge. Will shallow forms of cultural and ideological critique eclipse the grounded insights produced by ethnography or social history? Will the fetishes of archival and ethnographic research methods produce empiricist and myopic work lacking in self-reflexivity? Will comparative work lack the cultural and linguistic depth traditionally produced by primarily national studies? Will national studies ignore the ways in which nationalism itself is a transnational project? Will the proliferation of new social subjects and new objects of study come at the expense of marginalizing aggrieved social groups or will it teach us how social identities become conflated with power in richly generative and productive ways? It is understandable that these kinds of questions arise when we try to do our work. Anything worth doing can nonetheless be done badly, and principled questions from colleagues protect our interests as well as theirs. Yet counter-insurgency is a poor model for scholarly work, and too much attention to pulling out weeds can kill the crops. Even more important, weeds can have curative powers if we learn to use them correctly. The author of ‘The Weed King’ confided to his biographer that his mother believed that ‘weeds’ were simply plants for which no use had yet been found (Wixon, 1994: 32). The ‘weeds’ that invade a field can also inform it in crucially important ways if we learn to recognize their curative powers. Within American Studies, the tradition of 14th Amendment Americanism may seem like the quintessential expression of American exceptionalism. Forged from the freedom dreams and collective struggles of an enslaved people, the 14th Amendment stands as an enduring symbol of the accomplishments of the abolition democracy that ended slavery in the wake of the Civil War. More than a specific Constitutional provision promising equal treatment under law, the 14th Amendment has functioned as a widely shared social warrant authoring and authorizing new ways of knowing and new ways of being. In his indispensable work, Black Reconstruction in America, W.E.B. Du Bois demonstrated how slaves fighting for their freedom soon realized that it would not be enough to be merely ‘free’ in a society premised on their exclusion. In the course of staging a general strike in the fields, running away from slavery to swell the ranks of the Union army, and joining together to work land liberated by military force, they formulated a political perspective that Du Bois named ‘abolition democracy’ (Du Bois, 1995). They fought for the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution. At the Charleston Black Convention in 1865 they called for more than nominal freedom, for the development of their full being as humans. Between 1865 and 1877 they fashioned alliances with poor whites to elect progressive majorities to office, and their successes led to the first universal public education systems in the South, to governments that subsidized the general economic infrastructure rather than just the privileges and property of the elite. Although betrayed by the Compromise of 1877, by the removal of federal troops from the South, by the legal consolidation of the combination of sharecropping and Jim Crow Segregation, and by Supreme Court decisions that took protections away from black people and extended them to corporations, abolition democracy and the 14th Amendment successfully challenged the hegemony of white male Protestant propertied power. It opened the door for subsequent claims for social justice by immigrants and their children, religious minorities, women, workers and people with disabilities. From voting rights to affirmative action, from fair housing to fair hiring, the 14th Amendment is an enduring and abiding force for social justice in US society. Yet American Studies scholarship that subsumes social justice under the rubric of the 14th Amendment runs the risk of ignoring the position of the USA in the world. Celebrating struggles for citizenship inside the USA can work to strengthen the distinctions between citizens and aliens, providing legitimation for nationalist and nativist policies that impose enormous suffering on humans precisely because they are not US citizens. The legacy of the 14th Amendment has not prevented women and blacks in contemporary California from supporting anti-immigrant nativism through Proposition 187, aimed at denying immigrants and their children needed state services, or through Proposition 227, banning bilingual education in the state’s classrooms. Post-1965 immigrants from Asia, who owe their entry into to the USA to the civil rights movement and its exposure of previous national origin quotas as racist, have not been immune to pursuing the privileges of whiteness for themselves by opposing affirmative action and school desegregation policies vital to the well-being of blacks and Latinos. At the same time, the power inequalities that separate even the most aggrieved US citizens from the masses of poor and working people around the world can render struggles for full 14th Amendment rights by US citizens to be little more than what Martin Luther King, Jr used to describe as ‘an equal right to do wrong’. Certainly the prominence of Colin Powell and Condoleeza Rice in forging the rationale for the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq demonstrates the limits of this form of inclusion. If abolition democracy emblematizes the emancipatory tradition within American Studies, the idea of collective and linked struggles for change without aiming for control over any one state expresses the uniquely generative stance within transnational social movements and transnational scholarship. Articulated in the form of a manifesto in John Holloway’s Change the World Without Taking Power, this sensibility has taken on activist form in the work of the EZLN in Mexico, the Gabriela Network in the Philippines, and the Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence in that Japanese prefecture (Holloway, 2002). These movements make demands on the state and recognize the specificity of national histories, cultures and politics, but their aspirations and activities cannot be contained with any single national context. The activities of the Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) demonstrate the importance of a transnational perspective that goes beyond the history, culture, and politics of any single nation state (Fukumura and Matsuoka, 2002). Coming from a country that has been serially colonized since the 17th century and occupied militarily by both the USA and Japan, OWAAMV activists cannot solve their problems within a single national context. Disadvantaged by colonial status, race, and gender, they cannot turn to national liberation, anti-racism or feminism as their sole context for struggle. Coming from a small island with a limited population in a corner of the world far removed from metropolitan centers of power, they must forge alliances with outsiders based on political affinities and identifications, rather than counting on the solidarities of sameness that sustain most social movements. As eyewitnesses to brutal combat on the island in 1945 that killed more than 130,000 Okinawan civilians (one-third of the local population) and tens of thousands of Japanese and US military personnel, they find it impossible to celebrate organized violence and masculinist militarism (Hein and Selden, 2003: 13). As women confronted with the pervasive presence of commercial sex establishments, sex tourism and rapes of civilian women and girls by military personnel, they see gender as a central axis of power and struggle. The complicated history that brought the OWAAMV into existence, and which vexes them in so many ways, has produced new ways of being and new ways of knowing that contain enormous generative power for scholars in Ethnic Studies and American Studies. They do not seek to make their nation militarily superior to others. Instead, they argue that massive preparation for war increases rather than decreases the likelihood of violence. Moreover, they argue that military spending creates security for states and financial institutions but not for people. They charge that expenditures on war serve to contain and control people like themselves who oppose the global economic system, who challenge neoliberal policies designed to privatize state assets, lower barriers to trade and limit the power of local entities to regulate the environment. Perhaps most important, they call for a new definition of ‘security’, one that places the security of women, children and ordinary people before the security of the state and financial institutions. They ‘queer’ the nation – not because they take an explicit position on the rights of gays and lesbians, but because they interrupt and contest the narrative of patriarchal protection upon which the nation-state so often rests. By necessity, the OWAAMV go beyond the categories and cognitive mappings of area studies. They are citizens of Japan, but also victims of Japanese and US colonialism. On most issues, they feel more in solidarity with the indigenous Sovereignty Movement in Hawai’i or the Gabriela network mobilizing against sex tourism and sex work near military bases than they do with their fellow citizens of Japan. The nature of US imperialism forces them to seek alliances with pacifists and feminists in the USA, with Puerto Rican activists fighting against US military exercises on the island of Vieques, and with the Okinawans transported to Bolivia during the Cold War era when the Japanese and US governments relocated them in that South American nation so their land could be appropriated for military uses. They feel solidarity with witnesses to war and empire everywhere, recognizing that the things that have happened in their part of the Pacific cannot be contained within any one ‘area’ of study. Transnational organizing of mobilizations for change, without directly seeking to take state power, speak directly to the new circuits and networks of power emerging from new forms of production, consumption, communication and repression. They often display brilliant ingenuity in fashioning seemingly unlikely short-term alliances, affinities and identifications with people across class, gender, race and national lines. Yet this very tactical dexterity makes it difficult to turn temporary victories into long-term institutional changes. Strategies that manifest the mobility and dynamism required for challenging transnational corporations and financial institutions often lack the concentrated power needed to challenge the enduring power of the state and its control over the prisons, armies and police agencies deployed in support of private power everywhere. Even more important, flexible, fluid and dynamic coalitions often lack both the organic solidarity and the connecting ideology that make movements successful. Groups engaged in this kind of struggle can become unexpected allies in each other’s struggles, but they can also easily be manipulated into fighting against each other if they do not develop a systemic analysis of global power. Scholars can be pitted against each other as easily as aggrieved communities can. In an era of carefully orchestrated challenges to public education, scholarly independence and critical thinking, it is likely in the near future that every department, discipline and field will be encouraged to defend its own worth by belittling others, to compete for scarce and declining resources by inflating its own achievements at the expense of others. A losing proposition in politics, this ‘race to the bottom’ would be even more disastrous for scholarship because it encourages parochialism and defensive localism at precisely the moment when we most need dialogue, generosity and cosmopolitanism. It is important in this context to identify and learn from scholarly works that offer models of principled and productive synthesis between American Studies and Area Studies. Fortunately, both well established classics and promising new work in both American Studies and Area Studies contain this generative potential. The scholarly works of W.E.B. Du Bois and Walter Rodney provide especially useful and generative models from the past, while recent studies by Melani McAlister, Lise Waxer, Roderick Ferguson and Clyde Woods pose bold and exciting challenges in the present (Ferguson, 2004; McAlister, 2001; Waxer, 2002; Woods, 1998).

### 2AC Levine

#### We must reject hopelessness—participating in democratic movements via solidarity with causes creates the CULTURAL and PSYCHOLOGICAL building blocks necessary for anti-authoritarian movements at home AND abroad—refusing this solidarity creates a cycle of pessimism, passivity, and mental slavery. The Aff, even if it cannot itself accomplish anything, is a psychological prerequisite for any change.

Levine 11 [Bruce, Bruce E. Levine, PhD, is a clinical [psychologist](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychologist) in private practice in [Cincinnati, Ohio](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cincinnati,_Ohio). He has been in practice for more than two decades.[[citation needed](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)Levine's most recent book is Get Up, Stand Up: Uniting Populists, Energizing the Defeated, and Battling the Corporate Elite (Chelsea Green Publishing, 2011, [ISBN 1603582983](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/1603582983)). It calls for a new kind of politics to help Americans overcome political demoralization. <http://october2011.org/blogs/kevin-zeese/how-anti-authoritarians-can-transcend-their-sense-hopelessness-and-fight-back>]

Critical thinking anti-authoritarians see the enormity of the military-industrial complex, the energy-industrial complex, and the financial-industrial complex. They see the overwhelming power of the U.S. ruling class. They see many Americans unaware of the true sources of their oppression or with little knowledge of the strategies and tactics necessary to overcome it. They see American society lacking the psychological and cultural building blocks necessary for democratic movements—the self-respect required to reject the role as a mere subject of power, the collective self-confidence that success is possible, courage, determination, anti-authoritarianism, and solidarity. They see how the corporatocracy pays back those few Americans who do question, challenge, and resist illegitimate authority with economic and political marginalization. Why bother with any kind of political activism? Isn’t it futile? Critical Thinking, Depression, and Political Passivity Research shows that a more accurate notion of one’s powerless can result in a greater feeling of helplessness and is associated with depression. Several classic studies show that moderately depressed people are more critically thinking than those who are not depressed. Researchers Lauren Alloy and Lyn Abramson, studying nondepressed and depressed subjects who played a rigged game in which they had no actual control, found that nondepressed subjects overestimated their contribution to winning, while depressed subjects more accurately evaluated their lack of control. If you are critical thinking enough to see the reality of just how much influence the corporatocracy has and how little power you have, then you are going to experience more pain than those who do not see these truths. To dull this pain, in addition to drugs and other diversions, human beings use depression and apathy. But these “shutdown strategies” weaken us and create passivity, immobilization, and what Bob Marley called “mental slavery,” which in itself can be humiliatingly painful. And in this vicious cycle, human beings use even more diversions and shutdown strategies to dull this ever-increasing pain. When one is in such a debilitating vicious cycle, painful truths about the cause of one’s malaise—the truths of how we are getting screwed—are not positively energizing. Instead, one may take such truths as confirmation that pessimism and hopelessness are warranted. The vicious cycle continues. When one is already in pain and immobilized, there is a reflexive negative reaction to any proposed solution. Solutions demand effort, and a demand for effort is painful for those with little energy. So, it’s much easier to reflexively dismiss any solution. Of course, many solutions do deserve to be dismissed, as they may well be naïve. The feeling of hopelessness is a legitimate one. And hopeless people are turned off by attempts to invalidate their feelings. Is it possible to validate that feeling of hopelessness while at the same time challenging the wisdom of inactions based on hopelessness? And is it possible to challenge it in a way that doesn’t insult the intelligence of critical thinkers? Critical Thinking about Critical Thinking The battle against the corporatocracy demands critical thinking, which results in seeing many ugly truths about reality. This critical thinking is absolutely necessary. Without it, one is more likely to engage in tactics that can make matters worse. Critical thinking also means the ability to think critically about one’s pessimism—realizing that pessimism can cripple the will. Critical thinkers who reflect on their own critical thinking recognize how negativism can cause inaction, which results in maintaining the status quo. Critical thinking anti-authoritarians who move into hopelessness can forget that while they may in fact be better at seeing ugly truths than are many other people, they cannot see everything. Simply put, critical thinkers sometimes lose their humility Abraham Lincoln, considered by many historians to be our most critical thinking president, was also a major depressive. When he was a young man, he became so depressed that twice his friends had to form suicide watches over him. In the 1850s in the United States, the major battle was less over abolishing slavery than merely stopping the spread of it. Lincoln, who fought politically to stop the spread of slavery, wrote in 1856 a pessimistic analysis of the North’s chances of winning this fight: This immense, palpable pecuniary interest, on the question of extending slavery, unites the Southern people, as one man. But it can not be demonstrated that the North will gain a dollar by restricting it. Moral principle is all, or nearly all, that unites us of the North. Pity ’tis, it is so, but this is a looser bond, than pecuniary interest. Right here is the plain cause of their perfect union and our want of it. That slavery would be abolished in the United States less than a decade after Lincoln’s pessimistic analysis of the difficulty of merely stopping its spread was one of those seeming impossibilities that became possible because of unforeseen historical events. In the North, there was certainly not enough concern for African Americans so as to end slavery. But less than a decade after Lincoln’s pessimistic analysis about merely stopping the spread of slavery, one unforeseen event after another resulted in the abolition of slavery. There are many examples from history of seeming impossibilities actually happening, examples that compel critical thinkers to rethink whether they are actually seeing all the possibilities. One recent example is, of course, the Arab spring. Many critical thinkers from that part of the world remain amazed at the huge revolts in Egypt that toppled the Mubarak tyranny. The collapse of the Soviet empire seemed impossible to most Americans up until shortly before it occurred. Most Americans saw only mass resignation within the Soviet Union and its sphere of control. But the shipyard workers in Gdansk, Poland, did not see their Soviet and Communist Party rulers as the all-powerful forces that Americans did. And so Polish workers’ Solidarity, by simply refusing to go away, provided a strong dose of morale across Eastern Europe at the same time other historical events—such as the Soviet Union’s Afghanistan war—weakened their empire. Why Not Just Wait for the Collapse? History tells us that not just the Soviet empire but all empires ultimately collapse, and so why not just wait for their fall? It is pretty safe to say that the U.S. military-industrial complex and other oppressive U.S. industrial complexes will ultimately fall. These may be transformed by our own efforts or, more likely—given Americans’ current state of political passivity—they will fall owing mostly under the weight of their own stupidity. So, if it is more likely that these will fall under the weight of their own stupidity, why bother with activism? One reason for democratic movements is that history tells us that not all empires and oppressive institutions fall under the weight of their own stupidity, as some are transformed by a combination of democratic movements and empire stupidity. There is another reason to work each day on the democracy battlefields at our workplace, schools, the media, the marketplace, etc. Whether an empire and its oppressive institutions fall under the weight of their own stupidity or with help from a democratic movement, there must be people around in the aftermath who have what it takes to create and maintain a democratic society. There must be people who have retained their individual self-respect, collective self-confidence, courage, determination, anti-authoritarianism, and solidarity. The lesson from history is that tyrannical and dehumanizing institutions are often more fragile than they appear. We never really know until it happens whether or not we are living in that time when historical variables are creating opportunities for seemingly impossible change. Maybe in our lifetime, or our kids’ lifetime, or their kids’ lifetime, the current corporatocracy will fall. It may fall because of the efforts of democratic movements or because of its own stupidity or some combination. But when it does fall, the likelihood that it will be replaced by an enduring democratic society rests on whether there are enough of us with practice in democracy, enough of us who **took** **seriously** the **psychological** and **cultural** **building** **blocks** of self-**respect**, collective self-**confidence**, **courage**, determination, **anti**-**authoritarianism**, and **solidarity**. And **democratic** **movements** are the **best** **place** to **practice** creating those **psychological** and **cultural** **building** **blocks** required for an enduring democracy.

### AT: No Fiat

#### Even illusory agency is productive. Imagining possible changes is necessary to motivate action.

Elizabeth SHOVE Sociology @ Lancaster AND Gordon WALKER Geography @ Lancaster ‘7 “CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management” *Environment and Planning C* 39 (4)

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an ‘illusion of agency’, and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues ‘illusions are productive because they motivate action and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved’ (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the dynamics of change: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are necessary to processes within. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

### AT: Whiteness is Fluid

#### Experimenting with different advocacies is not a tactic of whiteness---truly endorsing a politics of social locations means accepting the fact that political resistance requires multiple nodes of attack---only a broad-based account can give us an effective map with which to navigate politics

Rosi Braidotti 06, contemporary philosopher and feminist theoretician, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, 7-8

Secondly, the term 'transposition' refers to mobility and cross-referencing between disciplines and discursive levels. I rely on transposable notions that drift nomadically among different texts - including those I authored myself - while producing their own specific effects.Transposable concepts are 'nomadic notions' that weave a web connecting philosophy to social realities; theoretical speculations to concrete plans; concepts to imaginative figurations. Trans-disciplinary in structure, transposable concepts link bio-technology to ethics and connect them both with social and political philosophy. Moreover, I will inject feminism, anti-racism, environmental and human rights as an extra booster of theoretical energy and then let nomadic flows of becoming run loose through them all.

Thirdly, the notion of transposition describes the connection between the text and its social and historical context, in the material and discursive sense of the term. The passion that animates this book is a concern for my historical situation, in so-called advanced, post-industrial cultures at the start of the third millennium. A kind of amor fati motivates me, not as fatalism, but rather in the pragmatic mode of the cartographer. I am seeking modes of representation and forms of accountability that are adequate to the complexities of the real-life world I am living in. I want to think about what and where I live - not in a flight away from the embodied and embedded locations which I happen to inhabit. In Metamorphoses I argued that, if you do not like complexities you couldn't possibly feel at home in the third millennium. Transpositions enacts this notion by proposing creative links and zigzagging interconnections between discursive communities which are too often kept apart from each other. To name but a few significant ones: bio-technologies and ethics and political agency; the omnipresence of a state of crisis on the one hand and the possibility of sustainable futures on the other; the practice of nomadic politics of difference versus technological monoculture;the creative potential of hybrid subjectivity, in opposition to new and more virulent forms of ethnically fixed identities;

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cartographic accounts of locations and normative stances. Ultimately: post-structuralism and ethical norms or values.

More specifically, I will transpose nomadically from philosophical theory to ethical practice. Loyal to the feminist politics of locations, I remain committed to the task of providing politically informed maps of the present, convinced of the usefulness of a situated approach as a critical tool to achieve an enlarged sense of objectivity and a more empowering grasp of the social. Politically, a cartographic method based on the politics of locations results in the recognition that not one single central strategy of resistance is possible (Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Patton 2000; Massumi 1992b). A heterogeneous style of politics is needed instead, based on centrelessness. As a corollary, this implies a variety of possible political strategies and the non-dogmatic acceptance of potentially contradictory positions. A scattered, weblike system is now operational, which defies and denies any pretence at avant-garde leadership by any group. Resistance being as global as power, it is centreless and just as non-linear: contemporary politics is rhizomic.

# 1AR

#### It is important to contest the aff because it encourages education, strong community, and increases quality of work.

GILLESPIE AND GORDON 06(William and Elizabeth, Kennesaw State University, “Competition, Role-Playing, and Political Science Education,” Sep 1, <http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/5/1/0/0/pages151007/p151007-1.php>)

But, for the most part, coaches report that **the competitive element enhances learning in several ways**. First, many coaches perceive that **competition motivates their students to put in the time and do their best work**. Some indicate that **no other means of motivation is as effective. Engaging in competition allows students to measure their progress. It also provides a goal, raises the stakes of the activity, and provides more rewards**. Second, as one coach said, “**the activity faithfully recreates many of the dynamics of the adversarial model**, and my students report learning a lot.” **For the goal of substantive learning about how American law functions**, especially in litigation, **competition is an essential element**. Mock trial allows students to experience some of the processes, constraints, and emotions associated with competition in a courtroom. Third, **the stress of competition itself helps students gain flexibility and adaptability.** **Many coaches mention** **the ability to “think on one’s feet” as a skill that students acquire in the fluid environment of** a mock trial **competition. “Competition enhances the learning experience. The students seem to absorb lessons more quickly and thoroughly under fire**,” writes one coach. Another writes: “**They also learn to adjust and adapt quickly to the different evaluators. That is something they don't get from their regular classes**.” Fourth, some coaches explain that **competing against other schools allows their students to learn by seeing different approaches to the same case**. Representative comments along these lines include: “Students get to see what other teams do and learn from those experiences.” “[Competition] exposes the students to different techniques and approaches that the other teams use.” Fifth, many coaches explain that the **competition enhances camaraderie and teamwork among their students**. One coach explains that **competition “gives a sense of duty to fulfill an obligation to their fellow teammates.” “Students learn teamwork in an interactive and dynamic setting**,” reports another.

#### This is especially true with negative state action – surrounding is key – your author concedes

YANCY 2005, Yancy, Professor at Duquense University, 2005

(George, “Whiteness and the Return of the Black Body”, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 4, Project Muse, retrieved April 15, 2010) blh

Substituting the historical constructivity of whiteness for "manifest destiny," whites remain imprisoned within a space of white ethical solipsism (only whites possess needs and desires that are truly worthy of being respected [Sullivan 2001, 100]). It would seem that many whites would rather remain imprisoned within the ontology of sameness, refusing to reject the ideological structure of their identities as "superior." The call of the Other qua Other remains unheard within the space of whiteness's sameness. Locked within their self-enthralled structure of whiteness, whites occlude the possibility of developing new forms of ethical relationality to themselves and to non-whites.It is partly through the process of abandoning their hegemonic, monologistic discourse (functioning as the "oracle voice") that whites might reach across the chasm of (nonhierarchical) difference and embrace the non-white Other in his or her Otherness. "A true and worthy ideal," as Du Bois writes, "frees and uplifts a people" (1995b, 456). He adds, "But say to a people: 'The one virtue is to be white,' and people rush to the inevitable conclusion, "Kill the 'nigger'!" Of course, the idea that "the one virtue is white" is a false ideal, for it "imprisons and lowers" (456).