## 2AC

### 2AC Case

#### Structural Tensions make conflict inevitable

Colby et al. 13  (Elbridge A. Colby, graduate of¶ Harvard College and Yale Law School and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (term)¶ and of the International Institute of Strategic Studies., Abraham M. Denmark, M.A. in international security from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University¶ of Denver and has studied at China’s Foreign Affairs University and Peking University., John K. Warden, After receiving a B.A. in history and political science from Northwestern¶ University, he joined CSIS as a recipient of the William J. Taylor debate internship., James M. Acton, He holds a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Cambridge University., Jay K. Brotz, M.S. in electrical and¶ computer engineering from Carnegie Mellon University., Michael S. Chase, M.A. in China studies from SAIS and a B.A. in politics from Brandeis University., AND more, “Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A way forward,” <http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf>)

Underlying Structural Tensions

■■ Established and rising power. Beyond specific disputes and exacerbating factors, tensions¶ between the United States and China are likely to persist for the simple reason that a rising¶ great power such as China is bound to cause friction as its expanding objectives and growing¶ strength rub against the interests of other nations in its region, including the long-established¶ dominant power—the United States. The study of international relations has long suggested¶ that such “power transitions” are especially fraught with the danger of conflict for reasons¶ having to do both with concrete calculations of power and wealth and with more ineffable¶ factors of honor and pride.17 Historically, a rising nation usually expects to be granted greater¶ influence and respect in accordance with its growing stature, but nations that already possess¶ that influence are generally reluctant to part with it, especially if they do not trust or share¶ basic values with the rising state. Thus tensions can grow. The basic structural problems of¶ how China’s rise can be squared with the U.S. established position and the existing regional¶ order Washington has underwritten are intensified by the ideological tensions between a global¶ power structure established and overseen by liberal democratic powers and a rising power with¶ an avowedly authoritarian government. Again, such tensions do not need to lead to conflict and¶ war, but they might.

■■ Security dilemma. Within this broader dynamic, there is a real danger that the emerging structural¶ dynamics between the United States and China are generating a classic security dilemma,¶ in which the actions taken by one side to increase its defensive strength are interpreted as¶ hostile or threatening by the other side, thereby eliciting a defensive response that the first side¶ views as hostile or threatening, and so forth.18 Although it appears that this dynamic already¶ exists in some respects in the arena of conventional military competition—for example, China’s conventional ballistic and cruise missile program, undertaken at least in part in response to improved

U.S. conventional capabilities, is now leading to a countervailing U.S. response—such¶ a dynamic has thus far had a limited effect on U.S.-China nuclear dynamics. This is fortunate¶ because a security dilemma in the nuclear realm would be destabilizing, intensify suspicions,¶ and potentially raise the danger of conflict escalation. The conditions do, however, exist for¶ such a dynamic to develop: China’s significant missile buildup (conventional and nuclear), the¶ gradual expansion of its nuclear force in the last decade, and its development of asymmetric¶ capabilities—combined with Chinese concerns about the U.S. development of new ballistic¶ missile defense (BMD) and conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capabilities—provide¶ the ingredients for a security dilemma in the strategic arena.19 Several Chinese scholars already¶ claim that the expansion of China’s nuclear missile force is designed to compensate for advances¶ in U.S. BMD, CPGS, and strategic strike capabilities.20 Meanwhile, some U.S. voices point to¶ China’s expansion of its nuclear and missile forces as proof of hostile intent and the need for¶ improved U.S. capabilities.

### 2AC Vagueness

#### 2) Congress can do it

KAISER 80 The Official Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress [Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the Legislative Veto; Kaiser, Frederick M., 32 Admin. L. Rev. 667 (1980)]

In addition to direct statutory overrides, there are a variety of statutory and nonstatutory techniques that have the effect of overturning rules, that prevent their enforcement, or that seriously impede or even preempt the promulgation of projected rules. For instance, a statute may alter the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency or extend the exemptions to its authority, thereby affecting existing or anticipated rules. Legislation that affects an agency's funding may be used to prevent enforcement of particular rules or to revoke funding discretion for rulemaking activity or both. Still other actions, less direct but potentially significant, are mandating agency consultation with other federal or state authorities and requiring prior congressional review of proposed rules (separate from the legislative veto sanctions). These last two provisions may change or even halt proposed rules by interjecting novel procedural requirements along with different perspectives and influences into the process.

It is also valuable to examine nonstatutory controls available to the Congress:

1. legislative, oversight, investigative, and confirmation hearings;

2. establishment of select committees and specialized subcommittees to oversee agency rulemaking and enforcement; 3. directives in committee reports, especially those accompanying legislation, authorizations, and appropriations, regarding rules or their implementation; 4. House and Senate floor statements critical of proposed, projected, or ongoing administrative action; and 5. direct contact between a congressional office and the agency or office in question. Such mechanisms are all indirect influences; unlike statutory provisions, they are neither self-enforcing nor legally binding by themselves. Nonetheless, nonstatutory devices are more readily available and more easily effectuated than controls imposed by statute. And some observers have attributed substantial influence to nonstatutory controls in regulatory as well as other matters.3 It is impossible, in a limited space, to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive listing of congressional actions that override, have the effect of overturning, or prevent the promulgation of administrative rules. Consequently, this report concentrates upon the more direct statutory devices, although it also encompasses committee reports accompanying bills, the one nonstatutory instrument that is frequently most authoritatively connected with the final legislative product. The statutory mechanisms surveyed here cross a wide spectrum of possible congressional action: 1. single-purpose provisions to overturn or preempt a specific rule; 2. alterations in program authority that remove jurisdiction from an agency; 3. agency authorization and appropriation limitations; 4. inter-agency consultation requirements; and 5. congressional prior notification provisions.

#### 2) Courts could do it

Singer 07 (Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force).

#### Decreasing authority requires reducing the permission to act, not the ability to act.

Taylor, 1996 (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online)

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

### 2AC Word PIC

#### A catch all security possibly makes action impossible and matters worse – we must combine cyber policy with the alternative strategically – conceptualizing security in terms of intention is a viable vision for change

NICHOLAS D. ANDERSON Georgetown University M.A., Security Studies, 2012, ““Re re defining” International Security”, The Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies Summer 2012, Volume 4, PDF, <http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume4/volume4_anderson.pdf>, KENTUCKY

First, too expansive a definition for security would make comparing similar policies essentially impossible, and distinguishing between different policy options inherently difficult (Baldwin 1997, 6). Take, for instance, the types of discussions surrounding counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism policies for the war in Afghanistan, with counterinsurgency being more people centered and counterterrorism being more threat centered. It is important to note that both are centrally concerned with security . But security for whom? And security fro m what? This is where a catch all security concept becomes problematic, for those advocating different positions will, in effect, be arguing for the same thing. Andthose makingthese ominous,life and death decisions will be left without the requisite clarity to make prudent, rational, and at times moral, judgments. Secondly, the human security concept has a bearing on bureaucratic questionsconcerning areas and responsibilities . Should we expect, for instance, the Department of Defense to be putting together clim ate change legislation proposals or running HIV/AIDS relief centers? Conversely, would it be wise to have the State Department, USAID, or the U.S. Geological Survey conducting operational planning? This isn’t to say that there shouldn’t be cross departmental collaboration and exchange, for today’s most complex security problems are often too much to handle for any one department alone. But these different agencies are designed, funded, and staffed according to different criteria and for different purposes. While more holistic approaches are undoubtedly necessary, a more clearly circumscribed security concept will help ensure that agency overlap won’t lead to detrimental results. Third,unlike academics, policymakers are tasked with the difficult requirement of allocating resources. Considering these requirements, if everything is a security threat, it is difficult to set priorities or single out areas of particular concern (Koblentz 2010, 108; Paris 2001, 92). If we conceive of such disparate issues as defic it spending, illegal immigration, the H1N1 virus, and the receding Arctic ice cap as “vital” security threats, right alongside the rise of China in Asia, Iranian nuclear proliferation, and al Qaeda training camps, knowing what matters when will be next to impossible. Fourth, if what constitutes a security problem or security threat is too broad, problems will be subject to incompatible policy solutions that could undercut each other, or will be paralyzed by competing demands, relegating them to lowest comm on denominator compromises (Koblentz 2010, 108). At the best of times, as thebureaucratic politics literature points out, this “pulling and hauling” in inter and intra agency battle leads to less than optimal outcomes, generally far from what would be decided upon according to more rational calculation (Allison 1969). If the meaning of what is being battled over lacks consensus, and the means to solve such problems come from every different direction, matters will be made far worse. F inally and perhaps mo st importantly, it is worth pointing out that security threats are used to justify the suspension of civil liberties, waging war, and legitimizing the reallocation of vast resources. In many cases , thisis a necessary cost for maintaining securityand part of the burden we must bear as citizens and members of democratic societies. And yet, even in the healthiest of democracies, we would be ill advised to provide the government an exponentially expanding list of “vital” security threats to protect against (B aldwin 1997, 8; Caldwell and Williams, Jr., 2006, 12). One can easily see how this is a potential first step on the road toward an Orwellian world much like that described in 1984: Oce ania being at war with Eurasia, and having always been at war with Euras ia (Orwell 2004). “Re redefinition”: Bringing Intent Back In How then, are we to define international security and what should be categorized as international security threats ? Arguably, the most intelligent way of narrowing the definition of internatio nal security is to accept the wide variety of possible threatened agents, but to restrict allowable threats to those with international implications that include the fundamental aspect of human agency or intent. This circumscription of the concept will hel p avoid many of the critical theoretical and policy problems outlined above. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between tangible international security problems and what might be termed “ latent security problems.” Adherents to the human security p aradigm may argue that this distinction is not worth making, but it is important to recognize that nearly anything can have international security implications if the causal chain is drawn long enough. A useful rule of thumb is the more deliberate an inter national threat, the more justifiably it can be classified as a security issue (Caldwell and Williams, Jr., 2006, 11). Under this definition then, many of the modern era’s purported rising “nontraditional threats” (Mathews 1997, 51) do not necessarily me rit classification as international security problems. Rather than being vital security issues in and of themselves, those that exclude the important aspect of human agency are better classified as “latent . ” Climate change in the developing world, for inst ance, promises to bring food and water shortages, catastrophic natural disasters, deadly disease, mass human migration, and resource competition (Podesta and Ogden 2007 2008, 116). And yet, while it certainly poses an international threat, it does not meri t classification as a vital security threat in itself, because of the absence of intent. Deadly infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS or the Avian flu are another such example. While they are clearly important problems posing potentially grave threats to individuals around the globe, classifying them as threats to international security will only cloud the necessary clarity needed to think and act intelligently in dealing with these problems (McInnes and Rushton 2010, 225). A great number of other examples that are often raised, such as poverty, economic recession, drug abuse, declining natural resources, and rapid urbanization and population growth, simply are what they are , and are not definitively vital issues of international security. While each has the potential to lead to serious international problems, even security problems, they are simply too many steps removed from posing a direct security threat to states, governments, militaries, communities, and individuals in the international system. A number of today’s oft cited threats to international security, on the other hand, are rightly categorized as such. The traditional issues of interstate conflict, military threats, arms races, nuclear deterrence, and contestation of the commons obviously continue to fit the definition. Some of the more recent threats , too, such as nuclear proliferation among “rogue” and weak states (Litwak 2007), increased international piracy, expanding organized crime rings, and international terrorism (Byman 2008; Cronin 2006; Rob erts 2005) all include human agency and have international implications, therefore befit ting the classification as international security problems. Even many emerging threats can be considered as such . Cyber threats, for instance, fit this classificat ion if they are carried out with the intent to threaten the state, its military, or its people (Diebert and Rohozinski 2010). For example, Chinese hackers stealing trade secrets is not an international security issue, whereas cyber penetration of classifie d intelligence files or online te rrorist recruitment and funding are. Biosecurity threats , too, can be justifiably classified as international security problems, but only if they include the fundamental issue of intent. Bio warfare, bio terrorism, maliciou s dual use biological research, and bio crime with violent intent or consequences are all obvious threats to international security. Laboratory accidents, pandemic and epidemic diseases, and agricultural blights, on the other hand, are not (Koblentz 2008, 111). 7 Admittedly, the lines are not nearly as clear as they have been made out to be here. Issues like military accidents, inadvertent missile launches, and abandoned mine fields fit within a grey area between tangible and potential international security problems. But these problems , among many others, can still be traced back to the key concept of intent. Militaries, missiles, and landmines are created and maintained with the intent of deterring, threatening, or even harming governments, militaries, co mmunities, and individuals, and although the harms they may happen to commit may not be intentional on given occasions, they still carry with them this important aspect of intentionality. And so an accidental nuclear weapon detonation should certainly be considered a true international security problem, but nuclear reactor accidents, even meltdowns, no matter how threatening, should not.

#### Securitizing cyber space is the ONLY way to prevent large scale cyber war – the alt can’t solve fast enough or change US doctrine – vulnerability creates a Unique need for it

Pickin 12 (Matthew, MA War Stuides – Kings College, “What is the securitization of cyberspace? Is it a problem?”, http://www.academia.edu/3100313/What\_is\_the\_securitization\_of\_cyberspace\_Is\_it\_a\_problem)

In analysing the problems of securitization, major issues have been raised. Threat inflation, surveillance, militarisation and the military-industrial complex are only some of the most prominent issues. There are benefits of securitization however, and at the very end of this analysis it will be explained why securitization is necessary for now. The main supporting arguments for securitization include, the future of cyber-attacks in conflicts, protecting critical infrastructure and cyber-crime.

The 2010 National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment stated that the United States was under a severe threat of cyber-attacks (Blair, 2010). Due to the amount of infrastructure connected to the internet in the United States targets for cyber-attacks are nearly unlimited, as a superpower the United States presents a valuable target. “As the world’s hegemonic power, the United States is also the main target state that dissident groups, terrorists, and rogue states wish to damage (Valeriano & Maness, 2011, p. 145).” Therefore, the United States must have some defence, or offensive capability in order to protect itself from future conflicts and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Foreign Affairs William J Lynn the former deputy secretary of defence wrote that the centrality of information technology in the United States makes it a prime target. He argued that extending advanced cyber-defences was crucial for the American economy, and also stated that failure of critical infrastructure would compromise national defence, “Our assessment is that cyber-attacks will be a significant component of future conflicts (Lynn, 2011).” Therefore in order to protect the United States, the government has been forced to securitize the issue. According to William J Lynn an attack could compromise national defence; therefore the issue is very high in the national security agenda. In the article, he also addresses the critics who argue that cyberspace is at risk of being militarized and states that US cyber strategy has been designed to prevent this from happening, “Far from militarizing cyberspace, U.S. cyber-strategy will make it more difficult for military actors to use cyberspace for hostile purposes (Lynn, 2011).” In securitizing cyberspace and creating advanced cyber-defences and cyber-weapons the United States is preparing for any future conflict or attack. If such an attack or conflict is a real existing threat then it is beneficial to prepare through securitization, otherwise the disadvantages clearly outweigh any advantage.

The other main benefit of securitizing cyberspace would be tackling cyber-crime. According to the security company Sophos, in the first six months of 2010 it received 60,000 new malware samples every day. Apart from malware, cyber-crime covers many different areas such as financial, piracy, hacking and cyber-terrorism. These crimes are growing due to the constantly evolving communications system of social sharing of data, online data storage and social networking, “Although cybercrime has formed a hidden shadow and a kind of evil doppelganger to every step of the Internet’s long history from its very origins, its growth has suddenly become explosive in recent years by virtually any estimate (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 28).” Both Deibert and Rohozinski argue that the rise is cyber-crime has become a big problem for states, in 2011 counterfeiting and copying cost the Asia-Pacific region almost $21 billion. Certainly cyber-space has become a rewarding way to commit crimes with little risk of prosecution, “Cybercrime has elicited so little prosecution from the world’s law enforcement agencies it makes one wonder a de facto decriminalization has occurred (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 29).” Due to the trouble of cyber-crime, the only way of combating it effectively would be greater state regulation and intervention. With the whole of cyber-space effectively securitized by the United States due to the threat to national security by technological and social shifts, the government is asserting itself increasingly to counter these threats.

Conclusion

In analysing what was the securitization of cyberspace, the beginnings of the cyber-debate in the United States have been examined; this country was used due to reliance on information technology and the status as a superpower. The securitization model from the Copenhagen school of thought was used to understand how issues are non-politicized, politicized and eventually securitized. A different range of security bills have been examined with this model to understand what was needed for cyberspace to become a securitized issue. With the definition of securitization dependent on the terms of national security, the changing definition of this concept was also examined. Securitization has occurred due to an evolving history whereby the military have understood the potential of information technologies in warfare and where vulnerabilities have been recognised that could damage national security.

In evaluating whether securitization of cyberspace is a problem, it is very clear that securitization is a growing concern with many complications. There are many issues including privacy, regulation, surveillance, internet regulation and the growing tension in the international system. However, because the United States is a superpower contesting with other cyber-heavyweights such as Iran, Russia and China the issue will not be de-securitized in the short term. With the discovery and use of cyber-weapons, many states are in the process of making their own for defensive and offensive purposes. The government of the United States will not de-securitize the issue of cyberspace while there are rival states and groups which prove a threat to the national security agenda. These problems will continue to exist until there is no defensive agenda and the issue is de-securitized, for now securitization is a necessary evil.

#### 4. Exorcism DA – dirty words only serves as a mask for aggressive humiliation; it is not the words which wound, but how we make them mean

Zizek 1999 [Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies(Ljubljana), *The Ticklish Subject*, p.253-4]

Take politically correct probing into hate speech and sexual harassment: **the trap into which this effort falls is not only that it makes us** aware of (and thus generates) new forms and layers of humiliation and harassment (we learn that 'fat', 'stupid', 'short-sighted' …are to be replaced by 'weight-challenged', etc.); the catch is, rather, that this censoring activity itself, by a kind of devilish dialectical reversal, starts to participate in what it purports to censor and fight - is it not immediately evident how, in designating somebody as 'mentally challenged' instead of 'stupid', an ironic distance can always creep in and give rise to an excess of **humiliating** **aggressivity** - **one adds insult to injury**, as it were, by the supplementary polite patronizing distension (it is well known that aggres­**sivity coated in politeness can be much more painful than directly abusive words, since violence is heightened by the additional contrast between the aggressive content and the polite surface form** ...). In short, what Fou­cault's account of the discourses that discipline and regulate sexuality leaves out of consideration is the process by means of which the power mechanism itself becomes eroticized, that is, contaminated by what it endeavours to 'repress'. It is not enough to claim that the ascetic Christian subject who, in order to fight temptation, enumerates and categorizes tile various forms of temptation, actually proliferates the object he tries to combat: the point is, rather, to conceive of how the ascetic who flagellates in order to resist temptation finds sexual pleasure in this very act of inflicting wounds on himself.

#### 5. Theres structures now – plan solves structures ALL of our 1AC is about breaking down the existing order.

#### Agency DA – People don’t just buy into government words Audiences are smart and reach their own conclusions. Any other interp kills agency

Kraus ‘89(et al – Sidney Kraus is a professor in the Department of Communication at Cleveland State University and Dennis Giles is also in the Department of Communication at Cleveland State University. Reviewed work(s):

Constructing the Political Spectacle by Murray Edelman Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 517-525 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791366>)

Edelman assumes (like the early Frankfurt School) that viewers/audi- tors of the spectacle (here, the political spectacle) have only two choices- they can accept the terms (rules) of the game or reject them. There is no room for a negotiated reading of political discourse or the appropriation of politi- cal "problems" by individuals to serve their interests-their legitimate well- being as they define it. In this theory, spectators/participants are presented with a crude dualism: accept it all, reject it all. Ignored in the discussion are the so-called "cultural" studies published during the past decade [e.g., Hall (1980), Morely (1980, 1981), Radway (1984, 1986), Fiske (1986), Giles (1986); cf. two recent studies not available to Edel- man: Steiner (1988), and Giles (1989)], which have extended "reception the- ory"[e.g., Iser (1978), Suleiman and Crosma (1980), Jauss (1982) with an introduction by Paul de Man)]. This major theoretical perspective of cul- ture, literary, film and television studies in the United States and Britain re- jects the notion of a universally passive appropriation of a text on its own terms (political or otherwise) to explore the actual pragmatics of the act of viewing/reading a "spectacle." These studies present alternatives to the either/or stance of Edelman. While assuming that any practice of discourse constructs its own illusionary "world" (in Nelson's terms) and is potentially mystifying, these critics stress the ability and freedom of viewers/auditors and spectators/participants to construct their "own" meanings (like Edel- man's). This developing body of theory and analysis posits and describes the ability of viewers of the "spectacle" to negotiate the meaning of texts-to read and realize (Iser's term) meanings which often diverge from the "dominant" readings preferred by the political and media institutions.

#### AT: Zero Point

#### The “violence” of technical rationality is a fiction – and their alternative links anyway

**Jarvis, 2000** (D.S.L., Lecturer in Government at the University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline, p. 111-113)

Ashley's commitment to transformational politics necessarily made his scholarship secondary to that goal. Many of the ambiguities and contradictions in his scholarship could therefore be explained in terms of pragmatic opportunism. For example, while Ashley opposed technical realism he preserved practical realism, arguing that the latter's cognitive interest in instrumental power politics was useful for revolutionary purposes and its intersubjective understanding helpful in realizing an emancipatory problematic. The job of the revolutionary, he noted, was not to repudiate the community of power politics and abnegate a revolutionary resource, but to exploit and strengthen this community and do "violence to a tradition notorious for its celebration of violence." Making new worlds apparently required the use of old tools and Ashley was not averse to the appropriation of violent means to that end. It was therefore ironic that Ashley should have been so outraged by those "conspicuous displays of violence" against "students, junior faculty, scholars of color, feminists, and other disciplinary marginals" that he alleged of realists, when he himself was so quick to advocate revolutionary violence on a global scale. Indeed, Ashley's condemnation of so-called technical theory seemed curious in view of its commitment to the aversion of international violence through greater theoretical insight, informed practice and enhanced control. Calling for massive revolutionary action to correct the abstract, if not fictitious, violence of technical rationality was thus a contrived and spurious justification at best. Likewise, while committed to global transformational change—a universal project or master-narrative by anyone's definition—he attacked positivist theory for its metatheoretical commitments and universalist aspirations. Universalism in pursuit of an emancipatory problematic was perfectly acceptable, but in pursuit of science whose cognitive interest was control, Ashley labeled it dangerous. Moreover, while he derided realism's technical interest, he failed to acknowledge that his own emancipatory interest shared many of the same commitments. Ashley's ambition to erect a reflective knowledge, for example, could also be seen as a quest for technical knowledge, especially since reflective knowledge sought to engineer. or at the very least contribute to, the technical project of global transformation. Reflective knowledge was not benign as Ashley freely admitted. It had a "practical cognitive interest" that endeavored to facilitate an interpretivist or contemplative space and apprise subjectivities of the means to political action. Surely this also was a masterplan to shape the course of history, a desire to control and technically manipulate historical events and secure outcomes much like the community of science. Similarly, while Ashley advocated contextualism and rejected absolutism in knowledge, his project was clearly foundationalist if not absolutist. It had to be, or how else could Ashley claim emancipation ontologically and ethically superior to all other cognitive interests? And while he rejected structuralism for its analytical shortcomings, his own critique relied upon structuralist conceptions of power and oppression; understood the state as a structural entity constituted by practice; used structural categories like class to objectify interests; and used structural notions of instrumental power politics as a means of informing political praxis.

### 2AC Critique

#### Universalism is wrong and bad – ends up being MIRED in reductionism – perm solves best.

Hughes 07 (Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University Bill Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies Disability & Society 22.7 Taylor & Francis)

In summary, **the universalistic approach to ontology in disability studies** that I have sketched above **is inadequate** on at least three counts. Firstly, **in treating the body as a limit it fails to recognize that disabled bodies embody** potential and possibility **and thus leaves unchallenged the profoundly invalidating vision of disability that haunts the non‐disabled imaginary.** Secondly, **it fails to treat the body as a body subject. As a consequence of the loss of the ‘lived body’, the materialist ontology** proposed by our main protagonists as they labour to map out an anthropology of frailty **ends up mechanistic and mired in reductionism.** Thirdly**, in appealing to a universal human subject** the approach taken by **Turner and Shakespeare and Watson annihilates disability as an identity and conceals the discrimination and exclusion that is the ubiquitous experience of people who embrace disability as a subject position.** The argument is Rousseauesque. We are all the same. There is no room for difference and diversity. In reflecting on this argument, however, perhaps we need to listen to Baudrillard’s (1993, p. 125) claim that **‘it is our undifferentiated concept of man that gives rise to discrimination’.** In my view **disability studies is best served,** at least in the present conjuncture, **by a critical social ontology that focuses in the first instance on the ‘pathologies of non‐disablement’** (Hughes, 1999, p. 164) **that regularly misrepresent and sometimes destroy disabled peoples lives.**

#### That’s biological reductionism – turns their critiuqe

Hughes 09 (Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University Bill Wounded/monstrous/abject: a critique of the disabled body in the sociological imaginary Disability & Society 24.4)

The position taken by Turner (2001) and Shakespeare and Watson (2002), in which vulnerability is universal and frailty the fate of all, suggests, in Timpanaro’s (1975, 20) words, ‘a common morality, based on the solidarity of all men [sic] in the struggle against nature’. The common morality derived from the essential ontological identity of all, egalitarian though it is, seems to me to be unable to escape from the problem of biological reductionism, a charge that is regularly levelled at the medical model of disability. Not only does the category of disability disappear into the universal siblinghood of our wounded lives – lives inevitably tarnished by physical and mental limitation – but also the issues of exclusion, discrimination and oppression that are associated with a disabled identity become superfluous. They can no longer be constituted as experiences of specific political import to disabled people. If we are all fragile/wounded, ergo disabled, then either all or none of us are oppressed, and if it is the former, then perhaps we can be content with our poor but equal treatment. It may be ‘good for the soul’ to admit to ourselves that we are, or one day might become, the other that we (once) despised, but such moral clarity is unlikely to improve disabled people’s standard of living or bring down the barriers that exclude them from participation in social and economic life. Furthermore, the appeal to vulnerability as an essence of being human should be rejected on the grounds that it is an attempt ‘to normalise disability at an anthropological level by invoking the empirical universality of impairment’, where impairment finds itself thrust into a ‘sociological limbo dominated by a pre‐social notion of life as limit’ (Hughes 2007, 679). One can appreciate that the emphasis placed on the natural limits of the body is an attempt to ward off the crass relativism of strong forms of social constructionism, but even if one is sympathetic to the backlash against postmodernism, there is a mistake inherent in the argument that makes disabled people of us all. It assumes that because the body declines and calls time on everyone, it is the perfect example of that which is beyond discourse and represents the final moment when human matter reveals itself unambiguously as nothing but nature. However, it is important to argue that, despite its vulnerability, the body’s materiality is indeterminate and its limits negotiable (James and Hockey 2007). Furthermore, the body is not just a limit. It also embodies a set of possibilities. It is clear that the disabled body is ubiquitously represented in negative ontological terms and its limitation and deficits dominate the literature. It is difficult to escape the representation of the disabled life as doomed and tragic or to avoid the melancholia that surrounds non‐disabled people’s accounts of disabled people’s lives. To make disabled people of us all adds pessimism to essentialist naturalism. Would it not be better – as recent proponents of the ‘rhizomatic’ potential of people with learning disabilities have done (Goodley 2007; Braidotti 2002) – to admit that all of us, disabled or not, are bursting with possibilities and capabilities? In the universalist discourse ‘lack’ haunts us all. For those who embrace the tropes of monstrosity and abjection ‘lack’ is a status reserved for disability.

#### We should treat war differently than structural violence. The tradeoff only goes in the other direction – we lose what is distinctive about organized violence.

Tarak **BARKAWI** Associate Professor of Politics at the New School for Social Research **’12** “Of Camps and Critiques: A Reply to ‘Security, War, Violence’” *Millennium* 41 (1) p. 129-130

A final totalising move in ‘Security, War, Violence’ is the idea that the study of war should be subsumed under the category of ‘violence’. The reasons offered for this are: violence does not entail a hierarchy in which war is privileged; a focus on violence encourages us to see war in relational terms and makes visible other kinds of violence besides that of war; and that the analysis of violence somehow enables the disentangling of politics from war and a proper critique of liberal violence.22 I have no particular objection to the study of violence, and I certainly think there should be more of it in the social sciences. However, why and how this obviates or subsumes the study of war is obscure to me. Is war not historically significant enough to justify inquiry into it? War is a more specific category relative to violence in general, referring to reciprocal organised violence between political entities. I make no claims that the study of war should be privileged over that of other forms of violence. Both the violence of war, and that of, say, patriarchy, demand scholarly attention, but they are also distinct if related topics requiring different forms of theorisation and inquiry. As for relationality, the category of war is already inherently relational; one does not need the concept of violence in general to see this. What precisely distinguishes war from many other kinds of violence, such as genocide or massacre, is that war is a relational form of violence in which the other side shoots back. This is ultimately the source of war’s generative social powers, for it is amidst the clash of arms that the truths which define social and political orders are brought into question. A broader focus on violence in general risks losing this central, distinctive character of the violence of war. Is it really more theoretically or politically adequate to start referring to the Second World War as an instance of ‘violence’? Equally, while I am all for the analysis of liberal violence, another broad category which would include issues of ‘structural violence’, I also think we have far from exhausted the subject of liberalism and war, an important area of inquiry now dominated by the mostly self-serving nostrums of the liberal peace debates.

#### Speifically – appeals to personal experience replace analysis of group oppression with personal testimony. As a result, politics becomes a policing operation—those not in an identity group are denied intellectual access and those within the group who don’t conform to the aff’s terms are excluded. Over time, this strategy LIMITS politics to ONLY the personal. This devastates structural change, and turns the case—it demands that political performance assimilate to very limited norms of experience

Joan SCOTT Harold F. Linder Professor at the School of Social Science in the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton 92 [“Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity” *October* Summer p. 16-19]

The logic of individualism has structured the approach to multiculturalism in many ways. The call for tolerance of difference is framed in terms of respect for individual characteristics and attitudes; group differences are conceived categorically and not relationally, as distinct entities rather than interconnected structures or systems created through repeated processes of the enunciation of difference. Administrators have hired psychological consulting firms to hold diversity workshops which teach that conflict resolution is a negotation between dissatisfied individuals. Disciplinary codes that punish "hate-speech" justify prohibitions in terms of the protection of individuals from abuse by other individuals, not in terms of the protection of members of historically mistreated groups from discrimination, nor in terms of the ways language is used to construct and reproduce asymmetries of power. The language of protection, moreover, is conceptualized in terms of victimization; the way to make a claim or to justify one's protest against perceived mistreatment these days is to take on the mantle of the victim. (The so-called Men's Movement is the latest comer to this scene.) Everyone-whether an insulted minority or the perpetrator of the insult who feels he is being unjustly accused-now claims to be an equal victim before the law. Here we have not only an extreme form of individualizing, but a conception of individuals without agency. There is nothing wrong, on the face of it, with teaching individuals about how to behave decently in relation to others and about how to empathize with each other's pain. The problem is that difficult analyses of how history and social standing, privilege, and subordination are involved in personal behavior entirely drop out. Chandra Mohanty puts it this way: There has been an erosion of the politics of collectivity through the reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms. The 1960s and '70s slogan "the personal is political" has been recrafted in the 1980s as "the political is personal." In other words, all politics is collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-styles stand in for political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legitimate form of political struggle.5 Paradoxically, individuals then generalize their perceptions and claim to speak for a whole group, but the groups are also conceived as unitary and autonomous. This individualizing, personalizing conception has also been be- hind some of the recent identity politics of minorities; indeed it gave rise to the intolerant, doctrinaire behavior that was dubbed, initially by its internal critics, "political correctness." It is particularly in the notion of "experience" that one sees this operating. In much current usage of "experience," references to structure and history are implied but not made explicit; instead, personal testimony of oppression re- places analysis, and this testimony comes to stand for the experience of the whole group. The fact of belonging to an identity group is taken as authority enough for one's speech; the direct experience of a group or culture-that is, membership in it-becomes the only test of true knowledge. The exclusionary implications of this are twofold: all those not of the group are denied even intellectual access to it, and those within the group whose experiences or interpretations do not conform to the established terms of identity must either suppress their views or drop out. An appeal to "experience" of this kind forecloses discussion and criticism and turns politics into a policing operation: the borders of identity are patrolled for signs of nonconformity; the test of membership in a group becomes less one's willingness to endorse certain principles and engage in specific political actions, less one's positioning in specific relationships of power, than one's ability to use the prescribed languages that are taken as signs that one is inherently “of” the group. That all of this isn't recognized as a highly political process that produces identities is troubling indeed, especially because it so closely mimics the politics of the powerful, naturalizing and deeming as discernably objective facts the prerequisites for inclusion in any group. Indeed, I would argue more generally that separatism, with its strong insistence on an exclusive relationship between group identity and access to specialized knowledge (the argument that only women can teach women's literature or only African-Americans can teach African-American history, for example), is a simultaneous refusal and imitation of the powerful in the present ideological context. At least in universities, the relationship between identity- group membership and access to specialized knowledge has been framed as an objection to the control by the disciplines of the terms that establish what counts as (important, mainstream, useful, collective) knowledge and what does not. This has had an enormously important critical impact, exposing the exclusions that have structured claims to universal or comprehensive knowledge. When one asks not only where the women or African-Americans are in the history curriculum (for example), but why they have been left out and what are the effects of their exclusion, one exposes the process by which difference is enunciated. But one of the complicated and contradictory effects of the implementation of programs in women's studies, African-American studies, Chicano studies, and now gay and lesbian studies is to totalize the identity that is the object of study, reiterating its binary opposition as minority (or subaltern) in relation to whatever is taken as majority or dominant.

#### 2. Personal experience isn’t bad for debate, but debate is bad for personal experience—it forces you, the judge, to render the value of a person’s intimate and many times traumatic experiences—this is epistemically violent and turns the case

Judith BUTLER is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley, 1 [“Giving an Account of Oneself,” *Diacritics* 31.4 (2001) 22-40, Project Muse]

But here, and for the time being, my concern is with a suspect coherence that sometimes attaches to narrative and, specifically, with the way in which narrative coherence may foreclose upon an ethical resource, namely, an acceptance of the limits of knowability in oneself and others. It may even be that to hold a person accountable for his or her life in narrative form is to require a falsification of that life in the name of a certain conception of ethics. Indeed, if we require that someone be able to tell in story form the reasons why his or her life has taken the path it has, that is, to be a coherent autobiographer, it may be that we prefer the seamlessness of the story to something we might tentatively call the truth of the person, a truth which, to a certain degree, and for reasons we have already suggested, is indicated more radically as an interruption. It may be that stories have to be interrupted, and that for interruption to take place, a story has to be underway. This brings me closer to the account of the transference I would like to offer, a transference that might be understood as a repeated ethical practice. Indeed, [End Page 34] if, in the name of ethics, we require that another do a certain violence to herself, and do it in front of us, offering a narrative account or, indeed, a confession, then, conversely, it may be that by permitting, sustaining, accommodating the interruption, a certain practice of nonviolence precisely follows. If violence is the act by which a subject seeks to reinstall its mastery and unity, then nonviolence may well follow from living the persistent challenge to mastery that our obligations to others require.

Although some would say that to be a split subject, or a subject whose access to itself is opaque and not self-grounding, is precisely not to have the grounds for agency and the conditions for accountability, it may be that this way in which we are, from the start, interrupted by alterity and not fully recoverable to ourselves, indicates the way in which we are, from the start, ethically implicated in the lives of others. The point here is not to celebrate a certain notion of incoherence, but only to consider that our incoherence is ineradicable but nontotalizing, and that it establishes the way in which we are implicated, beholden, derived, constituted by what is beyond us and before us. If we say that the self must be narrated, that only the narrated self can be intelligible, survivable, then we say that we cannot survive with an unconscious. We say, in effect, that the unconscious threatens us with an insupportable unintelligibility, and for that reason we must oppose it. The "I" who makes such an utterance will surely, in one form or another, be besieged precisely by what it disavows. This stand, and it is a stand, it must be a stand, an upright, wakeful, knowing stand, believes that it survives without the unconscious or, if it accepts an unconscious, accepts it as something which is thoroughly recuperable by the knowing "I," as a possession perhaps, believing that the unconscious can be fully and exhaustively translated into what is conscious. It is easy to see this as a defended stance, for it remains to be known in what this particular defense consists. It is, after all, the stand that many make against psychoanalysis itself. In the language which articulates the opposition to a non-narrativizable beginning resides the fear that the absence of narrative will spell a certain threat, a threat to life, and will pose the risk, if not the certainty, of a certain kind of death, the death of a subject who cannot, who can never, fully recuperate the conditions of its own emergence.

But this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of a fantasy, and so a loss of what one never had.

One goes to analysis, I presume, to have someone receive one's words, and this produces a quandary, since the one who might receive the words is unknown in large part, and so the one who receives becomes, in a certain way, an allegory for reception itself, for the phantasmatic relation to receiving that is articulated to, or at least in the face of, an Other. But if this is an allegory, it is not reducible to a structure of reception that would apply equally well to everyone, although it would give us the general structures within which a particular life might be understood. We, as subjects who narrate ourselves in the first person, encounter in common something of a predicament. Since I cannot tell the story in a straight line, and I lose my thread, and I start again, and I forget something crucial, and it is to hard to think about how to weave it in, and I start thinking, thinking, there must be some conceptual thread that will provide a narrative here, some lost link, some possibility for chronology, and the "I" becomes increasingly conceptual, increasingly awake, focused, determined, it is at this point that the thread must fall apart. The "I" who narrates finds that it cannot direct its narration, finds that it cannot give an account of its inability to narrate, why its narration breaks down, and so it comes to experience itself, or, rather, reexperience itself, as radically, if not irretrievably, unknowing about who it is. And then the "I" is no longer imparting a narrative to a receiving analyst or Other. The "I" is breaking down in certain very specific ways in front of the Other or, to anticipate Levinas, in the face of the Other (originally I wrote, [End Page 35] "the in face of the Other," indicating that my syntax was already breaking down) or, indeed, by virtue of the Other's face. The "I" finds that, in the face of an Other, it is breaking down. It does not know itself, and perhaps it never will. But is that the task, to know itself, to achieve an adequate narrative account of a life? And should it be? Is the task to cover over the breakage, the rupture, which is constitutive of the "I" through a narrative means that quite forcefully binds the elements together in a narration that is enacted as if it were perfectly possible, as if the break could be mended and defensive mastery restored?

#### 4. These case arguments are a net benefit to our framework—we must move beyond first-person agony stories to allow for rejoinder

Daniel SUBOTNIK, Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 98 [Spring, 1998, “WHAT'S WRONG WITH CRITICAL RACE THEORY?: REOPENING THE CASE FOR MIDDLE CLASS VALUES,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681, Lexis]

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [\*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

C. What is to be Done

Since such a situation cannot be salutary, we need what Williams has so substantially contributed to, and what she has called, that "long- overdue national dialogue about race, gender... and all the other divisive issues that block the full possibility of American community." n81 Williams recognizes, as many others surely will, that such discourse will be painful. But "we must get beyond the stage of halting conversations filled with the superficialities of hurt feelings." n82

In sum, what is needed is to crack the "hermetic bravado celebrating victimization and stylized marginalization" n83 that leads to the virtual hegemony on the discussion of race relations that the academic community [\*699] has ceded to CRATs. No matter how raw sensibilities might understandably be after centuries of slavery and racism, a position must be staked out that allows for a rejoinder to a Derrick Bell when he says self-mutilating things like "while slavery is over, a racist society continues to exert dominion over black men and their maleness in ways more subtle but hardly less castrating...." n84 Locating that position is precisely what is attempted here.

CRT encompasses the works of a great many authors. Accordingly, I quote as many sources as my reading and space permit. At the same time, in the interests of a more consistent and thematic exposition, I focus particularly on the oeuvre of two notable CRATs, Patricia Williams and Regina Austin. n85

Why Professor Williams? Most importantly because she is, according to Cornel West, "a towering public intellectual of our time [who] articulates a synoptic vision, synthetic analysis, and moral courage with great power." n86 And why The Rooster's Egg in particular? Harvard Professor Sacvan Bercovitch calls it "a stunning achievement... a prophetic [\*700] testament... It bears much the same relation to the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s which The Souls of Black Folk does to the era of Reconstruction... It deserves national attention." n87 To be sure, these accolades appear on the book jacket and must be construed in that light. But even when subjected to the ordinary discount, they suggest that wrestling with Williams can offer great spiritual, as well as intellectual, rewards. Regina Austin's prominence, meanwhile, is evidenced by her recent appointment to the William A. Schnader chair at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and her central role in a major controversy at the Harvard Law School. n88

Towards the end of The Rooster's Egg, Williams recounts a story first told by black New York Times columnist Brent Staples, then a student at the University of Chicago. n89 Staples liked to take walks at night near the lake on the south side of the city. He realized early on that these strolls, which gave him much pleasure, were terrifying to the whites he would encounter. Being basically a man of peace, he was much distressed. He tried first to be "innocuous" in his gait. Then he began whistling Vivaldi so people would hear him coming and take him for the student he was. All this, however, came at a price.

Then I changed... The man and the woman walking toward me were laughing and talking but clammed up when they saw me... I veered toward them and aimed myself so that they'd have to part to avoid walking into me. The man stiffened, threw back his head and assumed the stare: eyes ahead, mouth open. I suppressed the urge to scream into his face. Instead, I glided between them, my shoulder nearly brushing his. A few steps beyond them I stopped and howled with laughter. I came to call this game "Scatter the Pigeons." n90

Williams laments, "The gentle journalist who stands on a streetcorner and howls... What upside-down craziness, this paradoxical logic of having to debase oneself in order to retrieve one's sanity...." n91 And yet, we may ask, how far should our hearts go out to Williams, who articulates such anguish, and to the extent they are at one with her, to her fellow CRATs? For in describing their lives as one extended I hurt, CRATs, as has been suggested, disconcert and disjoin their alleged vic [\*701] timizers. n92 And so, is it not conceivable that at this very moment in a convention hall somewhere, Williams and her friends are doubled over, convulsed with laughter, delighting in their own versions of "Scatter the Pigeons"? n93

#### 5. Pure critique is just fuel for academics—proposing tangible political alternatives is necessary

Bryant 12—Levi, professor of philosophy at Collin College [McKenzie Wark: How Do You Occupy an Abstraction? larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/mckenzie-wark-how-do-you-occupy-an-abstraction/#more-6320]

In the language of my machine-oriented ontology or onticology, we would say that we only ever encounter local manifestations of hyperobjects, local events or appearances of hyperobjects, and never the hyperobject as such. Hyperobjects as such are purely virtual or withdrawn. They can’t be directly touched. And what’s worse, contrary to Locke’s principle of individuation whereby an individual is individuated by virtue of its location in a particular place and at a particular time, hyperobjects are without a site or place. They are, as Morton says, non-local. This, then, is a central problem, for how do you combat something that is everywhere and nowhere? How do you engage something that is non-local? If an army is over there I can readily target it. If a particular munitions factor is over here, then I can readily target it. But how do we target something that is non-local and that is incorporeal? This is the problem with occupying an abstraction. read on!

Second, contemporary capitalism is massively redundant. This, I think, is what Wark is getting at when he speaks of contemporary power as “vectoral”. Under what Wark calls “vector power”, we have configurations of power where attacks at one site have very little impact insofar as flows can simply be re-channeled through another set of nodes in the network. Like a hydra, you cut off one head only to have another head appear in its place. The head can never be cut off once and for all because there is no single head.

The crisis of contemporary politics is thus the crisis of the erasure of site. In the age of hyperobjects, we come to dwell in a world where there is no clear site of political antagonism and therefore no real sense of how and where to engage.

Here I’m also inclined to say that we need to be clear about system references in our political theorizing and action. We think a lot about the content of our political theorizing and positions, but I don’t think we think a lot about how our political theories are supposed to actually act in the world. As a result, much contemporary leftist political theory ends up in a performative contradiction. It claims, following Marx, that it’s aim is not to represent the world but to change it, yet it never escapes the burrows of academic journals, conferences, and presses to actually do so. Like the Rat-Man’s obsessional neurosis where his actions in returning the glasses were actually designed to fail, there seems to be a built in tendency in these forms of theorization to unconsciously organize their own failure. And here I can’t resist suggesting that this comes as no surprise given that, in Lacanian terms, the left is the position of the hysteric and as such has “a desire for an unsatisfied desire”. In such circumstances the worst thing consists in getting what you want. We on the left need to traverse our fantasy so as to avoid this sterile and self-defeating repetition; and this entails shifting from the position of political critique (hysterical protest), to political construction– actually envisioning and building alternatives.

So what’s the issue with system-reference? The great autopoietic sociological systems theorist, Niklas Luhmann, makes this point nicely. For Luhmann, there are intra-systemic references and inter-systemic references. Intra-systemic references refer to processes that are strictly for the sake of reproducing or maintaining the system in question. Take the example of a cell. A cell, for-itself, is not for anything beyond itself. The processes that take place within the cell are simply for continuing the existence of the cell across time. While the cell might certainly emit various chemicals and hormones as a result of these processes, from its own intra-systemic perspective, it is not for the sake of affecting these other cells with those hormones. They’re simply by-products. Capitalism or economy is similar. Capitalists talk a good game about benefiting the rest of the world through the technologies they produce, the medicines they create (though usually it’s government and universities that invent these medicines), the jobs they create, etc., but really the sole aim of any corporation is identical to that of a cell: to endure through time or reproduce itself through the production of capital. This production of capital is not for anything and does not refer to anything outside itself. These operations of capital production are intra-systemic. By contrast, inter-systemic operations would refer to something outside the system and its auto-reproduction. They would be for something else.

Luhmann argues that every autopoietic system has this sort of intra-systemic dimension. Autopoietic systems are, above all, organized around maintaining themselves or enduring. This raises serious questions about academic political theory. Academia is an autopoietic system. As an autopoietic system, it aims to endure, reproduce itself, etc. It must engage in operations or procedures from moment to moment to do so. These operations consist in the production of students that eventually become scholars or professors, the writing of articles, the giving of conferences, the production of books and classes, etc. All of these are operations through which the academic system maintains itself across time. The horrifying consequence of this is that the reasons we might give for why we do what we do might (and often) have little to do with what’s actually taking place in system continuance. We say that our articles are designed to demolish capital, inequality, sexism, homophobia, climate disaster, etc., but if we look at how this system actually functions we suspect that the references here are only intra-systemic, that they are only addressing the choir or other academics, that they are only about maintaining that system, and that they never proliferate through the broader world. Indeed, our very style is often a big fuck you to the rest of the world as it requires expert knowledge to be comprehended, thereby insuring that it can have no impact on broader collectives to produce change. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that our talk about changing the world is a sort of alibi, a sort of rationalization, for a very different set of operations that are taking place. Just as the capitalist says he’s trying to benefit the world, the academic tries to say he’s trying to change the world when all he’s really doing is maintaining a particular operationally closed autopoietic system. How to break this closure is a key question for any truly engaged political theory. And part of breaking that closure will entail eating some humble pie. Adam Kotsko wrote a wonderful and hilarious post on the absurdities of some political theorizing and its self-importance today. We’ve failed horribly with university politics and defending the humanities, yet in our holier-than-thou attitudes we call for a direct move to communism. Perhaps we need to reflect a bit on ourselves and our strategies and what political theory should be about.

Setting all this aside, I think there’s a danger in Wark’s claims about abstraction (though I think he’s asking the right sort of question). The danger in treating hyperobjects like capitalism as being everywhere and nowhere is that our ability to act becomes paralyzed. As a materialist, I’m committed to the thesis that everything is ultimately material and requires some sort of material embodiment. If that’s true, it follows that there are points of purchase on every object, even where that object is a hyperobject. This is why, given the current form that power takes or the age of hyperobjects, I believe that forms of theory such as new materialism, object-oriented ontology, and actor-network theory are more important than ever (clearly the Whiteheadians are out as they see everything as internally related, as an organism, and therefore have no way of theorizing change and political engagement; they’re quasi-Hegelian, justifying even the discord in the world as a part of “god’s” selection and harmonization of intensities).

The important thing to remember is that hyperobjects like capitalism are unable to function without a material base. They require highways, shipping routes, trains and railroads, fiber optic cables for communication, and a host of other things besides. Without what Shannon Mattern calls “infrastructure”, it’s impossible for this particular hyperobject exists. Every hyperobject requires its arteries. Information, markets, trade, require the paths along which they travel and capitalism as we know it today would not be possible without its paths. The problem with so much political theory today is that it focuses on the semiosphere in the form of ideologies, discourses, narratives, laws, etc., ignoring the arteries required for the semiosphere to exercise its power. For example, we get OWS standing in front of Wall Street protesting– engaging in a speech act –yet one wonders if speech is an adequate way of addressing the sort of system we exist in. Returning to system’s theory, is the system of capital based on individual decisions of bankers and CEO’s, or does the system itself have its own cognition, it’s own mode of action, that they’re ineluctably trapped in? Isn’t there a sort of humanist prejudice embodied in this form of political engagement? It has value in that it might create larger collectives of people to fight these intelligent aliens that live amongst us (markets, corporations, etc), but it doesn’t address these aliens themselves because it doesn’t even acknowledge their existence.

What we need is a politics adequate to hyperobjects, and that is above all a politics that targets arteries. OOO, new materialism, and actor-network theory are often criticized for being “apolitical” by people who are fascinated with political declarations, who are obsessed with showing that your papers are in order, that you’ve chosen the right team, and that see critique and protest as the real mode of political engagement. But it is not clear what difference these theorists are making and how they are escaping intra-systemic self-reference and auto-reproduction. But the message of these orientations is “to the things themselves!”, “to the assemblages themselves!” “Quit your macho blather about where you stand, and actually map power and how it exercises itself!” And part of this re-orientation of politics, if it exists, consists in rendering deconstruction far more concrete. Deconstruction would no longer show merely the leaks in any system and its diacritical oppositions, it would go to the things themselves. What does that mean? It means that deconstruction would practice onto-cartography or identify the arteries by which capitalism perpetuates itself and find ways to block them. You want to topple the 1% and get their attention? Don’t stand in front of Wall Street and bitch at bankers and brokers, occupy a highway. Hack a satellite and shut down communications. Block a port. Erase data banks, etc. Block the arteries; block the paths that this hyperobject requires to sustain itself. This is the only way you will tilt the hands of power and create bargaining power with government organs of capital and corporations. You have to hit them where they live, in their arteries. Did anyone ever change their diet without being told that they would die? Your critique is an important and indispensable step, but if you really wish to produce change you need to find ways to create heart attacks and aneurysms. Short of that, your activity is just masturbation. But this requires coming to discern where the arteries are and doing a little less critique of cultural artifacts and ideologies. Yet choose your targets carefully. The problem with the Seattle protests was that they chose idiotic targets and simply acted on impotent rage. A window is not an artery. It doesn’t organize a flow of communication and capital. It’s the arteries that you need to locate. I guess this post will get Homeland Security after me.

#### 6. The affirmative is a claim to performativity rather than true performance. Their claim to having identified a truly liberating, anti-racist speech act substitutes for true anti-racist action and conceals their own privilege as subjects within debate. In this instance, their speech act is only liberatory for them at the expense of true action to help people other than themselves.

Sara AHMED, Reader in Race and Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 4 [“Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism,” Volume 3 Number 2, 2004, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no2\_2004/ahmed\_declarations.htm]

50. This might sound like an argument about the performativity of race. I am sympathetic with the idea that race is performative in Judith Butler’s (1993) sense of the term: race as a category is brought into existence by being repeated over time (race is an effect of racialisation). I have even argued for the performativity of race myself (Ahmed 2002). But throughout this paper I have insisted on the non-performativity of anti-racism. It might, seem now, a rather odd tactic. If race is performative, and is itself an effect of racism, then why isn’t anti-racism performative as well? Is anti-racism a form of ‘race trouble’ that is performative as it ‘exposes’ the performativity of race, and which by citing the terms of racism (such as ‘white’) allows those terms to acquire new meanings? I would suggest the potential ‘exposure’ of the performativity of race does not make ‘anti-racism’ performative as a speech act. As I stated in my introduction, I am using performativity in Austin’s sense as referring to a particular class of speech, where the issuing of the utterance ‘is the performing of an action’ (1975, 6). In such speech the saying is the doing; it is not that saying something leads to something, but that it does something at the moment of saying. It is important to note here that, for Austin, performativity is not a quality of a sign or an utterance; it does not reside within the sign, as if the sign was magical. For an utterance to be performative, certain conditions have to be met. When these conditions are met, then the performative is happy. This model introduces a class of ‘unhappy performatives’: utterances that would ‘do something’ if the right conditions had been met, but which do not do that thing, as the conditions have not been met.

51. I would hasten to add that in my view performativity has become rather banal and over-used within academic writing; it seems as if almost everything is performative, where performative is used as a way of indicating that something is ‘brought into existence’ through speech, representation, writing, law, practice, or discourse. Partly, I am critiquing this ‘banalisation’ of the performative, as well as how performativity as a concept can be used in a way that ‘forgets’ how performativity depends upon the repetition of conventions and prior acts of authorization (see Butler 1997). I am also suggesting that the logic that speech ‘brings things into existence’ (as a form for positive action) only goes so far, and indeed the claim that saying is doing can bypass that ways in which saying is not sufficient for an action, and can even be a substitute for action.

52. My concern with the non-performativity of anti-racism has hence been to examine how sayings are not always doings, or to put it more strongly, to show how the investment in saying as if saying was doing can actually extend rather than challenge racism. Implicitly, I am critiquing a claim that I have not properly attributed: that is, the claim that anti-racism is performative. I would argue that the six declarations of whiteness I have analysed function as implicit claims to the performativity of anti-racism. The claim to the performativity of anti-racism would be to presume that ‘being anti’ is transcendent, and that to declare oneself as being something shows that one is not the thing that one declares oneself to be. It might be assumed that the speech act of declaring oneself (to be white, or learned, or racist) ‘works’ as it brings into existence the non- or anti-racist subject or institution. None of these claims I have investigated operate as simple claims. None of them say ‘I/we are not racists’ or ‘I/we are anti-racists’, as if that was an action. They are more complex utterances, for sure. They have a very specific form: they define racism in a particular way, and then they imply ‘I am not’ or ‘we are not’ that.

53. So it is not that such speech acts say ‘we are anti-racists’ (and saying makes us so); rather they say ‘we are this’, whilst racism is ‘that’, so in being ‘this’ we are not ‘that’, where ‘that’ would be racist. So in saying we are raced as whites, then we are not racists, as racism operates through the unmarked nature of whiteness; or in saying we are racists, then we are not racists, as racists don’t know they are racists; or in expressing shame about racism, then we are not racists, as racists are shameless; or in saying we are positive about our racial identity, as an identity that is positive insofar as it involves a commitment to anti-racism, then we are not racists, as racists are unhappy, or in being self-critical about racism, then we are not racists, as racists are ignorant; or in saying we exist alongside others, then we are not racists, as racists see themselves as above others, and so on.

54. These statements function as claims to performativity rather than as performatives, whereby the declaration of whiteness is assumed to put in place the conditions in which racism can be transcended, or at the very least reduced in its power. Any presumption that such statements are forms of political action would be an overestimation of the power of saying, and even a performance of the very privilege that such statements claim they undo. The declarative mode, as a way of doing something, involves a fantasy of transcendence in which ‘what’ is transcended is the very thing ‘admitted to’ in the declaration: so, to put it simply, if we admit to being bad, then we show that we are good (see also paper by Hill and Riggs in this issue). So it is in this specific sense that I have argued that anti-racism is not performative. Or we could even say that anti-racist speech in a racist world is an ‘unhappy performative’: the conditions are not in place that would allow such ‘saying’ to ‘do’ what it ‘says’.

55. Our task is not to repeat anti-racist speech in the hope that it will acquire performativity. Nor should we be satisfied with the ‘terms’ of racism, or hope they will acquire new meanings, or even look for new terms. Instead, anti-racism requires much harder work, as it requires working with racism as an ongoing reality in the present. Anti-racism requires interventions in the political economy of race, and how racism distributes resources and capacities unequally amongst others. Those unequal distributions also affect the ‘business’ of speech, and who gets to say what, about whom, and where. We need to consider the intimacy between privilege and the work we do, even in the work we do on privilege.

56. You might not be surprised to hear that a white response to this paper has asked the question, ‘but what are white people to do’. That question is not necessarily misguided, although it does re-center on white agency, as a hope premised on lack rather than presence. It is a question asked persistently in response to hearing about racism and colonialism: I always remember being in an audience to a paper on the stolen generation and the first question asked was: ‘but what can we do’. The impulse towards action is understandable and complicated; it can be both a defense against the ‘shock’ of hearing about racism (and the shock of the complicity revealed by the very ‘shock’ that ‘this’ was a ‘shock’); it can be an impulse to reconciliation as a ‘re-covering’ of the past (the desire to feel better); it can be about making public one’s judgment (‘what happened was wrong’); or it can be an expression of solidarity (‘I am with you’); or it can simply an orientation towards the openness of the future (rephrased as: ‘what can be done?’). But the question, in all of these modes of utterance, can work to block hearing; in moving on from the present towards the future, it can also move away from the object of critique, or place the white subject ‘outside’ that critique in the present of the hearing. In other words, the desire to act, to move, or even to move on, can stop the message ‘getting through’.

57. To hear the work of exposure requires that white subjects inhabit the critique, with its lengthy duration, and to recognise the world that is re-described by the critique as one in which they live. The desire to act in a non-racist or anti-racist way when one hears about racism, in my view, can function as a defense against hearing how that racism implicates which subjects, in the sense that it shapes the spaces inhabited by white subjects in the unfinished present. Such a question can even allow the white subject to re-emerge as an agent in the face of the exposure of racism, by saying ‘I am not that’ (the racists of whom you speak), as an expression of ‘good faith’. The desire for action, or even the desire to be seen as the good white anti-racist subject, is not always a form of bad faith, that is, it does not necessarily involve the concealment of racism. But such a question rushes too quickly past the exposure of racism and hence ‘risks’ such concealment in the very ‘return’ of its address.

58. I am of course risking being seen as producing a ‘useless’ critique by not prescribing what an anti-racist whiteness studies would be, or by not offering some suggestions about ‘what white people can do’. I am happy to take that risk. At the same time, I think it is quite clear that my critique of ‘anti-racist whiteness’ is prescriptive. After all, I am arguing that whiteness studies, even in its critical form, should not be about re-describing the white subject as anti-racist, or constitute itself as a form of anti-racism, or even as providing the conditions for anti-racism. Whiteness studies should instead be about attending to forms of white racism and white privilege that are not undone, and may even be repeated and intensified, through declarations of whiteness, or through the recognition of privilege as privilege.

59. In making this prescription, it is important that I do not rush to ‘inhabit’ a ‘beyond’ to the work of exposing racism, as that which structures the present that we differently inhabit. At the same time, it is always tempting to end one’s work with an expression of political hope. Such hope is what makes the work of critique possible, in the sense that without hope, the future would be decided, and there would be nothing left to do. Perhaps its time to ‘return’ to the ‘turn’ of whiteness studies, by asking where else we might turn. If ‘whiteness studies’ turns towards white privilege, as that which enables and endures declarations of whiteness, then this does not simply involve turning towards the white subject, which would amount to the narcissism of a perpetual return. Rather, whiteness studies should involve at least a double turn: to turn towards whiteness is to turn towards and away from those bodies who have been afforded agency and mobility by such privilege. In other words, the task for white subjects would be to stay implicated in what they critique, but in turning towards their role and responsibility in these histories of racism, as histories of this present, to turn away from themselves, and towards others. This ‘double turn’ is not sufficient, but it clears some ground, upon which the work of exposing racism might provide the conditions for another kind of work. We don’t know, as yet, what such conditions might be, or whether we are even up to the task of recognizing them.

#### When mobility is viewed as a universal characteristic individual problems become de-characterized and the focus degenerates to anesthetization and exclusion of bodies – that’s how status quo transportation planning functions – it is entrenched in a universal model of ablism

Imrie 2k (Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 <http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf>)

Barnes et al (1999, page 121), for instance, note that UK households with a disabled person are half as likely as those without to own a car (also, see OPCS, 1993). In addition, most cars are designed for standardised bodies and few mobility-impaired or ambulant impaired disabled people are able to get into one. Specially adapted cars are expensive, and insurers regard disabled people as a risk and charge high motor insurance pre miums. These experiences are connected to the domination of medical discourses which are infused with conceptions of the incapacitated and immobile body, or the body which is malfunctioning due to a loss of functional capacity. Disabled people are portrayed as less than whole and as a population requiring particular forms of regulation, discipline, and control by state programmes and policies. Indeed, Levi-Strauss (1955) refers to modern societies as anthropoemic or, as Young (1999, page 56) defines it, societies that ``vomit out deviants, keeping them outside of society or enclosing them in special institutions''. Such discourses see disability as a social burden which is a private, not public, responsibility. The impairment is the focus of concern, and biological intervention and care are seen as the appropriate responses. The problem of immobility is seen as personal and specific to the impairment; that it is this that needs to be eradicated, rather than transformations in sociocultural attitudes and practices, if mobility is to be restored. In particular, political and policy assumptions about mobility and movement are premised on a universal, disembodied subject which is conceived of as neutered, that is without sex, gender, or any other attributed social or biological characteristic (see Hall, 1996; Imrie, 1994; Law, 1999; Whitelegg, 1997). The hegemony of what one might term the mobile body is decontextualised from the messy world of multiple and everchanging embodiments; where there is little or no recognition of bodily differences or capabilities. The mobile body, then, is conceived of in terms of independence of movement and bodily functions; a body without physical and mental impairments. The hegemony of the mobile body is also reinforced by professional discourses which seek to measure, characterise, and understand disability through the movement and mobility of disabled people's body parts. Such conceptions see disabled people as neither sick nor well but in a liminal state which is characterised by a (potential) movement from one bodily state to another (also, see Ellis, 2000; Leder, 1990; Paterson and Hughes, 1999). The underlying objective is the disciplining of the deviant or impaired body through the restoration of movement in body parts to facilitate independence of mobility (and the restoration of the `whole person'). For Ellis (2000), such (welfare) discourses emphasise the importance of individuals attaining an `independent body', or a body which revolves around self management, personal responsibility, and the projection of desirable bodily characteristics. As Ellis (2000, page 17) suggests, it is a carnality which propagates the aestheticisation of the body while seeking to exclude those (impaired) bodies which are, so some claim, a source of anxiety in contemporary culture (see, for instance, Lupton, 1994) Indeed, as Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 604) argue, ``the information that animates the world is dominated by non disabled bodies, by a specific hegemonic form of carnality which excludes as it constructs''. These send out specific signals or codes which favour the corporeal status of nonimpaired people, or at least do little to facilitate the independent ease of movement of people with physical and mental impairments. (5) This, for Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 606), is indicative of ``a subtle interplay of micro and macro relations of power'', where specific design features, for example, prioritise forms of movement based on the bodily needs of the neutered body (which is devoid of physical and mental impairments). In this sense, intercorporeal encounters between the hegemonic world of the mobile body and disabled people tend to reinforce the former's sense of presence and the latter's sense of absence, in other words a recognition of disabled people being there but being unable to interact with the social or physical structures which surround them. It is, in Leder's (1990) terms, a projection of the absent body or bodies which ``dys-appear'' when confronted with the embodied norms of everyday life [see Paterson and Hughes (1999) for an amplification of these points]. The dys-appearance of disabled people's bodies is not unconnected to the work of transportation planners and operators who, as Whitelegg (1997, page 14) notes, make ``decisions about what kinds of travel are important and which journey purposes and destinations are to be favoured''. In particular, the impaired body is largely invisible in transportation planning and policy or, as Law (1999, page 566) notes, ``bodies appear in conventional transportation models as discrete entities with independent trajectories''. As Whitelegg (1997) suggests, this leads to the provision of transportation infrastructure which tends to prioritise the movement and mobility of ``productive bodies'' between a limited range of destinations (also, see Marshall, 1999). Thus, mobility policies largely revolve around the provision of commuter networks between home and the workplace, seeking to facilitate movement which is limited to specific social, geographical, and temporal ranges. (6) The effect is, as Huxley (1997, page 2) observes, one of reducing mobility to ``predictable, purposeful trips, origins and destinations'' rather than seeking to conceive of mobility as ``a messy, unpredictable, diverse and changeable reality''.

## 1AR

### 1AR Critique

#### Our understanding of war is CONTEXTUAL,

Tarak **BARKAWI** Associate Professor of Politics at the New School for Social Research **’12** “Of Camps and Critiques: A Reply to ‘Security, War, Violence’” *Millennium* 41 (1) p. 129-130

A final totalising move in ‘Security, War, Violence’ is the idea that the study of war should be subsumed under the category of ‘violence’. The reasons offered for this are: violence does not entail a hierarchy in which war is privileged; a focus on violence encourages us to see war in relational terms and makes visible other kinds of violence besides that of war; and that the analysis of violence somehow enables the disentangling of politics from war and a proper critique of liberal violence.22 I have no particular objection to the study of violence, and I certainly think there should be more of it in the social sciences. However, why and how this obviates or subsumes the study of war is obscure to me. Is war not historically significant enough to justify inquiry into it? War is a more specific category relative to violence in general, referring to reciprocal organised violence between political entities. I make no claims that the study of war should be privileged over that of other forms of violence. Both the violence of war, and that of, say, patriarchy, demand scholarly attention, but they are also distinct if related topics requiring different forms of theorisation and inquiry. As for relationality, the category of war is already inherently relational; one does not need the concept of violence in general to see this. What precisely distinguishes war from many other kinds of violence, such as genocide or massacre, is that war is a relational form of violence in which the other side shoots back. This is ultimately the source of war’s generative social powers, for it is amidst the clash of arms that the truths which define social and political orders are brought into question. A broader focus on violence in general risks losing this central, distinctive character of the violence of war. Is it really more theoretically or politically adequate to start referring to the Second World War as an instance of ‘violence’? Equally, while I am all for the analysis of liberal violence, another broad category which would include issues of ‘structural violence’, I also think we have far from exhausted the subject of liberalism and war, an important area of inquiry now dominated by the mostly self-serving nostrums of the liberal peace debates.

### 1AR Personal Offense

#### NO discursive act can include everything; this doesn't mean we reject or marginalize these concerns

Rorty, Professor of Comparative Literature @ Stanford, `02 (Richard, Peace Review, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 152-153)

I have no quarrel with Cornell's and pivak's claim that "what is missing in a literary text or historical narrative leaves its mark through the traces of its expulsion." For that seems simply to say that any text will presupospe the existence of people, things, and institutions that it hardly mentions. So the readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: "Who prepared the sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?" "How did they get the money to afford that meal?" The reader of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. "Expulsion," however, seems too pejorative a term for the fact that no text can answer **all possible questions** about its own background and its own presuppositions. Consider Captain Birch, the agent of the East Indian Company charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly "expelling" Captain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try to find out much about Birch's early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. In the case of Birch, Spivak does not try to "gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape," nor does she speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. S.ivak has her own fish to and her own witness to bear just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary texts and historical narratives, and such texts and narratives should not alwa s be read as disingenuous exercises in repression. They should be read as one version of a story that could have been told, and should be told, in many other ways.

#### We should NOT reduce debate to JUST experience of the body. Fiat key

Roberts 2007 (Jeff Roberts, Bachelors in Communication Studies from Baylor, from his Master’s thesis – “The Rhetorical Structure of Disability: Bridging the Gap Between What is ‘Spoken’ and What is ‘Said’ with Song - Over-Signifying with Personhood Against the Backdrop of Disease-Centric Discourse”, <https://beardocs.baylor.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2104/5086/Jeff_Roberts_Masters.pdf?sequence=1>)

Although individual action which permutes the rejection of disease-centric discourse with a call for pragmatic state-based action towards equality rarely results in the automatic institutional or legislative change one wishes to see, individual resistance to disease-centric discourse can have a dramatic effect in “creating a better world,” or shaping a society free of stigma and discrimination. The arenas in which politics take place are not limited to spaces carved out within the institutional walls of the state. Local gatherings, academic debates and discussions are all critical arenas within the public sphere where political actions are advocated, rhetoric is deployed, and politics occur. In making the claim that individual action does not spur institutional change I do not wish to suggest that individual action within these public spheres of politics is futile or irrelevant, in contrast I wish to advance just the opposite position. Assuming each location of politics varies in its ability to bring about pragmatic state-based initiatives combating discrimination; individual action must be tailored to the specific location in which the individual fighting for equality speaks from. This requires individual activists fighting for disability rights to locate and analyze the position in which they speak in terms of the relative power and influence they wield, and then to formulate their strategies against discrimination and inequality accordingly. For example, if an individual activist holds a state position of power which allows that individual to shape state based legislation (both in terms of the course for pragmatic action and the choice in the rhetoric pertaining to disability) one need not dismiss individuals arguments outright which are framed according to the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse. In this situation it seems very simple for the individual to be able to embrace the logic or call for equality presented, while simultaneously severing the disease-centric discourse attached to the position and endorsing the underlying advocacy proposed under an ideologically pure framework of pursuing action while using exclusively people first language. In this situation, it may only be needed to point out that the individuals rhetoric is not the preferred rhetorical structure in which either people with disabilities or the institution enacting the policy ascribe to. This act alone may increase the awareness of the individual who deployed such rhetoric to the flawed nature of disease-centric discourse. In addition, if the activist committed to ideological purity in both rhetoric and action has the final say on the text of the action, there is virtually no risk that the legislation itself will send a counter-productive message of stigma and inferiority to people with disabilities. On the other hand, when activism is located within a public sphere of politics which does not directly effectuate or bring about the actual state-based pragmatic gains in equality being discussed and advocated, the necessity for rejecting positions framed within the structure disease-centric discourse takes on an increased importance. One example of such a political sphere can be found in academic debate and discussion, where individuals often “role-play” as state actors who advocate a given policy or social action as a way to facilitate education about given political acts through competition amongst their peers. Within this arena, and other similar spheres of political action, it becomes crucial for those assuming both the role of the individual activist and the intellectual who facilitates the exercise to hold the rejection of disease-centric discourse to a higher level of scrutiny. Given that the pragmatic gains in equality advocated by the individual deploying disease-centric discourse are merely hypothetical, and intellectual endorsement of the pragmatic advocacy advanced does not translate into any real gains in equality, there is only a real risk of decrease equality and increasing discriminatory attitudes by remaining complicit with the oppressive discourse. Within this sphere of politics it must be the activist and intellectual’s first priority to reject the entire premise of the position advanced with terms of disease-centric discourse. As an educational exercise in political advocacy, such a rejection is crucial in transforming the entire way disability is discussed and the interests of people with disabilities are advanced, not only within the sterile laboratory of the educational institution where the testing of policy options is taking place but through out society as a whole. As training grounds for future policy makers, activists and lawyers, a rejection of disease-centric discourse within this sphere of politics has the potential to spill over to into future rejections within the broader political realm. As these individuals begin to enter the positions of political power such exercises prepares them for they will be able to reject disease-centric discourse in the creation of actual political legislation, or at very least they will have the knowledge needed to advance political actions without using the discourse themselves. Absent the benefits to future politics, a rejection of disease centric discourse within this sphere is crucial on its own accord. Rejecting such a stigmatizing discourse is necessary within all educational arenas in order to foster inclusion within the activity itself and an element of fairness for students with disabilities. In claiming that this rejection should be the intellectual’s first priority there can be no endorsement of advocacy founded upon disease-centric discourse or endorsement of advocacy which only attaches and embraces people first language after criticism has taken place. Just as when students deploy racist or sexist rhetoric, a rejection of disease centric discourse within this sphere must completely shift the discussion of politics at hand to a discussion of the politics and actions the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse advances on its own accord, often without intent. Only such an explicit rejection can have the potential to impact the individuals deploying disease-centric discourse and prevent them from using it in the future. In addition, while an apology for using such rhetoric serves as an act of good form, it cannot serve as a justification for reverting to the discussion that was previously taking place. If this were to occur it would promote the kind of action criticized in chapter three related to Philip Wander and his omission of ideological action stemming from rhetorical structure alone. Any addendum to the advocacy which only rejects disease-centric rhetoric as an after thought, in an attempt to allow for one to return to the original discussion, endorses the same ideological assumptions that serve as the foundation for a universal call to action while omitting, co-opting, and masking the harms presented by the rhetoric structure of disease centric discourse itself. Finally, in acknowledging that disease-centric discourse is often deployed absent any knowledge of its stigmatizing qualities it is important to address the political sphere of action which took place in the past. While it is not always possible for individuals in their given position of political power to directly shape the rhetorical outcome of every legislative action, it is important that all individuals committed to the spirit of equality, and the affirmation of people first language as song, to constantly urge for previous formations of legislative texts written in disease-centric discourse to be revisited and revised. Just as framing a call for action according to a rhetorical structure which rejects disease-centric discourse does not necessitate a rejection of the entire pragmatic action itself, revisiting current legislation and revising the rhetoric used within its text does not invalidate the functioning of the law itself or its historic gains in equality. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, this strategy has been used to revise legislation originally written with rhetoric now deemed racist, and continues to be an important element of advocacy for many groups struggling for state recognition of identity.

### Truth

#### Lack of objectivity is irrelevant --- we can still make accurate claims about the world

Ferris 92 Timothy, Emeritus Prof @ Berkeley & Fellow at American Association for the Advancement of Science, The Mind's Sky: Human Intelligence in a Cosmic Context

This is not to say that every opinion about the universe deserves equal attention -- as if schoolteachers, in much the same way as they are being urged by fundamentalists to teach biblical creation myths alongside Darwinism, should also be enjoined to give equal weight to the flat-earth theory, ESP, or the notion that little Sally in the back row was empress dowager of China in a former life. That no one theory of the universe can deservedly gain permanent hegemony does not mean that all theories are equally valid. On the contrary: to understand the limitations of science (and art, and philosophy) can be a source of strength, emboldening us to renew our search for the objectively real even though we understand that the search will never end. I often reflect on a remark made to me one evening over dinner in a Padua restaurant by the English astrophysicist Dennis Sciama. . . . "The world is a fantasy," Sciama remarked, "so let's find out about it."

#### the possibility of some flawed theory construction is better than epistemological anarchy

Brown 11 [Vernon, Cadiff University, 2/27/11, “The Reflectivist Critique of Positivist IR Theory,” <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=7328> ]

There is a great deal of support for the positivist approach in IR despite the critiques presented above. As the survey by Maliniak et al. showed, seventy percent of American IR scholars still consider themselves as positivists with a number of the rest not yet reflectivist. This is significant as the United States is still considered to be the major force in IR scholarship. There are many reasons for this continued success of positivism in IR, the majority of which have to do with either the continued reliance on empirical methods or the failure of many reflectivists, especially the post-modernists, to offer any suggestions to fill the epistemological void left by their passing. David Houghton (2008, p.118) addresses both of these by writing that despite their critique, reflectivists continue to use empirical, observational methods and that it is not possible to be anything but positivist because, as he writes, ‘truth claims about the world have to come from somewhere’. He also suggests that reflectivists are essentially engaging in what can only be perceived as a negative exercise since by continually deconstructing theories one will eventually be left with nothing that is considered a legitimate theory. Another issue raised in response to the reflectivist critique focuses on the pluralism which scholars have called for in the face of epistemological relativism. Lapid (1989, p.249) warns that such pluralism, ‘If adopted uncritically or taken to its logical conclusion, [can] deteriorate into a condition of epistemological anarchy under which almost any position can legitimately claim equal hearing’, and that in such a state it would become nearly impossible to distinguish theoretical proliferation from theoretical growth. Positivism defends itself by claiming that scholarship is inherently observational, therefore empirical, and that if reflectivism is followed to its logical endpoint there would be no legitimate theories left because they would have been either deconstructed or created without a means of testing their legitimacy. Conclusion: The critique of positivism by the reflectivists is fundamentally an epistemological one. Each side can and does make compelling arguments showing the strength of their position. While it is important to acknowledge the positivists’ attempts to ground the discipline in a naturalist, scientific area there is still the obvious fact that the assumptions on which their epistemology is based are too easily deconstructed when they attempt to explain phenomena and make predictions in the socially constructed world which IR purports to study. As Milja Kurki (2009, p.442) suggests, positivism fails to acknowledge the possibility that all theories are at some level ‘politically and socially contextualized’. This creates the possibility for positivist theories to create predictions that are fundamentally flawed as they have failed to take into account the context within which their facts are constructed. This in turn allows the reflectivist theorists to deconstruct the predictions due to misunderstandings that arise from the lack of context in the positivists’ predictions. The question of what positivism has to say in a socially constructed and interpreted world is still an important one, however, since the study of IR is still in many ways observational and therefore empirical. There is also the valid claim that in the face of the possible anarchical pluralism or lack of legitimate theories left by reflectivist critiques there needs to be some sense of scientific and theoretical grounding, and that positivism provides that very thing. In the end, reflectivism performs a valuable service in widening the range of legitimate research that is possible by IR scholars and allowing such research to take into account the understanding that the issues studied are birthed by social conventions. There still must be, however, some framework within this study to prevent the anarchy that could follow in the wake of reflectivism and while positivism is in no ways perfect, or even close to it, it still provides such a framework that if made to be self-reflective and continually evolving, could provide the stability needed.