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#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order consolidating lead executive authority for planning and conducting [targeted killings using remotely piloted aircraft systems] under the Department of Defense.

#### Solves the case.

[Micah Zenko](http://www.cfr.org/experts/national-security-conflict-prevention/micah-zenko/b15139), April 2013. Douglas Dillon Fellow @ CFR. “Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon,” Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 31, http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434.

The main obstacle to acknowledging the scope, legality, and oversight of U.S. targeted killings beyond traditional or "hot" battlefields is the division of lead executive authority between the[Joint](http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434) Special Operations Command (JSOC)—a subunit of the Department of Defense (DOD) Special Operations Command—and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In particular, the U.S. government cannot legally acknowledge covert actions undertaken by the CIA. The failure to answer the growing demands for transparency increases the risk that U.S. drone strikes will be curtailed or eliminated due to mounting domestic or international pressure. To take a meaningful first step toward greater transparency, President [Barack Obama](http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434) should sign a directive that consolidates lead executive authority for planning and conducting nonbattlefield targeted killings under DOD.

One Mission, Two Programs

U.S. targeted killings are needlessly made complex and opaque by their division between two separate entities: JSOC and the CIA. Although drone strikes carried out by the two organizations presumably target the same people, the organizations have different authorities, policies, accountability mechanisms, and oversight. Splitting the drone program between the JSOC and CIA is apparently intended to allow the plausible deniability of CIA strikes. Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 covert actions, defined as "activities of the United States Government . . . where it is intended that the role . . . will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional . . . military activities." As covert operations, the government cannot legally provide any information about how the CIA conducts targeted killings, while JSOC operations are guided by Title 10 "armed forces" operations and a publicly available military doctrine. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, details steps in the joint targeting cycle, including the processes, responsibilities, and collateral damage estimations intended to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. Unlike strikes carried out by the CIA, JSOC operations can be (and are) acknowledged by the U.S. government.

The different reporting requirements of JSOC and the CIA mean that congressional oversight of U.S. targeted killings is similarly murky. Sometimes oversight is duplicated among the committees; at other times, there is confusion over who is mandated to oversee which operations. CIA drone strikes are reported to the intelligence committees. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), has confirmed that the SSCI receives poststrike notifications, reviews video footage, and holds monthly meetings to "question every aspect of the program." Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), has said that he reviews both CIA and JSOC counterterrorism airstrikes. JSOC does not report to the HPSCI. As of March 2012, all JSOC counterterrorism operations are reported quarterly to the armed services committees. Meanwhile, the foreign relations committees—tasked with overseeing all U.S. foreign [policy](http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434) and counterterrorism strategies—have formally requested briefings on drone strikes that have been repeatedly denied by the White House. However, oversight should not be limited to ensuring compliance with the law and preventing abuses, but rather expanded to ensure that policies are consistent with strategic objectives and aligned with other ongoing military and diplomatic activities. This can only be accomplished by DOD operations because the foreign relations committees cannot hold hearings on covert CIA drone strikes.

Consolidating Executive Authority

In 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the "lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department" to avoid the "creation of redundant, overlapping capabilities and authorities in such sensitive work." The recommendation was never seriously considered because the CIA wanted to retain its covert action authorities and, more important, it was generally believed such operations would remain a rarity. (At the time, there had been only one nonbattlefield targeted killing.) Nearly a decade later, there is increasing bipartisan consensus that consolidating lead executive authority for drone strikes would pave the way for broader strategic reforms, including declassifying the relevant legal memoranda, explicitly stating which international legal principles apply, and providing information to the public on existing procedures that prevent harm to civilians. During his February 2013 nomination hearing, CIA director John O. Brennan welcomed the transfer of targeted killings to the DOD: "The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations."

The main objection to consolidating lead executive authority in DOD is that it would eliminate the possibility of deniability for U.S. covert operations. However, any diplomatic or public relations advantages from deniability that once existed are minimal or even nonexistent given the widely reported targeted killings in Pakistan and Yemen. For instance, because CIA drone strikes cannot be acknowledged, the United States has effectively ceded its strategic communications efforts to the Pakistani army and intelligence service, nongovernmental organizations, and the Taliban. Moreover, Pakistani and Yemeni militaries have often taken advantage of this communications vacuum by shifting the blame of civilian casualties caused by their own airstrikes (or others, like those reportedly conducted by Saudi Arabia in Yemen) to the U.S. government. This perpetuates and exacerbates animosity in civilian populations toward the United States. If the United States acknowledged its drone strikes and collateral damage—only possible under DOD Title 10 authorities—then it would not be held responsible for airstrikes conducted by other countries.

The CIA should, however, retain the ability it has had since 9/11 to conduct lethal covert actions in extremely rare circumstances, such as against immediate threats to the U.S. homeland or diplomatic outposts. Each would require a separate presidential finding, and should be fully and currently informed to the intelligence committees. Of the roughly 420 nonbattlefield targeted killings that the United States has conducted, very few would have met this criteria.

The president should direct that U.S. drone strikes be conducted as DOD Title 10 operations. That decision would enhance U.S. national security in the following ways:

Improve the transparency and legitimacy of targeted killings, including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm.

Focus the finite resources of the CIA on its original core missions of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. (There is no reason for the CIA to maintain a redundant fleet of armed drones, or to conduct military operations that are inherently better suited to JSOC, the premier specialized military organization. As "traditional military activities" under U.S. law, these belong under Title 10 operations.)

Place all drone strikes under a single international legal framework, which would be clearly delineated for military operations and can therefore be articulated publicly.

Unify congressional oversight of specific operations under the armed services committee, which would end the current situation whereby there is confusion over who has oversight responsibility.

Allow U.S. government officials to counter myths and misinformation about targeted killings at home and abroad by acknowledging responsibility for its own strikes.

Increase pressure on other states to be more transparent in their own conduct of military and paramilitary operations in nonbattlefield settings by establishing the precedent that the Obama administration claims can have a normative influence on how others use drones.

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#### NSA reforms will pass – found a sweet spot – Obama is key

ROLL CALL 3 – 25 – 14 [Hill’s Bipartisan Deadlock on Phone Records May Be Easing, <http://blogs.rollcall.com/hawkings/obama-nsa-reform-plan-could-ease-congressional-deadlock-on-spying/>]

Eight months ago, in one of its most important and fascinatingly nonpartisan votes of recent memory, the House came up just seven members short of eviscerating the government’s vast effort to keep tabs on American phone habits.

The roll call revealed a profound divide in Congress on how assertively the intelligence community should be allowed to probe into the personal lives of private citizens in the cause of thwarting terrorism. It is a split that has stymied legislative efforts to revamp the National Security Agency’s bulk data collection programs.

Until now, maybe. Senior members with jurisdiction over the surveillance efforts, in both parties and on both sides of the Hill, are signaling generalized and tentative but nonetheless clear support for the central elements of a proposed compromise that President Barack Obama previewed Tuesday and will formally unveil by week’s end.

The president, in other words, may be close to finding the congressional sweet spot on one of the most vexing problems he’s faced — an issue that surged onto Washington’s agenda after the secret phone records collection efforts were disclosed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

If Obama can seal the deal, which he’s pledged to push for by the end of June, it would almost surely rank among his most important second-term victories at the Capitol. It also would create an exception that proves the rule about the improbability of bipartisan agreement on hot-button issues in an election season.

“I recognize that people were concerned about what might happen in the future with that bulk data,” Obama said at a news conference in The Hague, where he’s been working to gain support for containing Russia from a group of European leaders who have their own complaints about U.S. spying on telephone calls. “This proposal that’s been presented to me would eliminate that concern.”

The top two members of the House Intelligence Committee, GOP Chairman Mike Rogers of Michigan and ranking Democrat C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland, introduced their own bill to revamp surveillance policy Tuesday — and declared they expect it would track very closely with the language coming from the administration. They said they had been negotiating with White House officials for several weeks and viewed the two proposals as compatible.

At their core, both the Obama and House bills would end the NSA practice of sucking up and storing for five years the date and time, duration and destination of many millions of phone calls placed or received by Americans. Instead, the phone companies would be required to retain this so-called metadata (and comparable information about email and Internet use) for 18 months, their current practice. And the government would have to obtain something like a search warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, meaning in each discreet case a judge would limit how deeply the telecom companies would have to query their databases in hopes of finding calling patterns that suggest national security threats.

Since both Rogers and Ruppersberger have been prominent defenders of the bulk collection system, any agreement they reach that has Obama’s blessing can be expected to pass the House.

It should garner support from a lopsided majority of the 217 House members (three-fifths of the Republicans and two-fifths of the Democrats) who voted to stick with the status quo last July. And it stands a chance to win over at least some on the other side — an unusual coalition of 94 mostly libertarian-leaning tea party Republicans and 111 liberal Democrats, who say NSA searches of the databases should be limited to information about existing targets of investigations.

But one leader of that camp vowed to work for the defeat of any measure that looks like either the Obama or Intelligence panel plans. Republican Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, who as chairman of House Judiciary a decade ago was instrumental in writing the Patriot Act, believes that law has been grossly misapplied by the NSA to invade personal privacy much too easily.

Sensenbrenner said he would continue to push his measure to almost entirely prevent the NSA from looking at telecommunications metadata. But the sponsor of the companion Senate bill, Judiciary Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., said he would remain open to finding the makings of a deal in the Obama plan. Leahy signaled the legislative negotiating would be much smoother if Obama suspended the bulk data collection during the talks.

Much more enthusiastic was Calfornia’s Dianne Feinstein, the Democratic chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who said she generally supports the House proposal and views Obama’s plan “a worthy effort.” Her committee’s top Republican, the retiring Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, was a bit more equivocal but gave a strong indication he was eager to cut a deal based on the ideas from the House and the White House.

There are plenty of important points over which to haggle: about the ways the metadata is to be retained, the format for FBI to view the information, the liability for the telecommunications companies, the specificity of the search requests and the reach and secrecy of the judicial oversight.

And the American Civil Liberties Union said it had already found enough differences between the two measures unveiled Tuesday to give its “crucial first step” blessing to the Obama plan while rejecting the Rogers-Ruppersberger bill. The ACLU said that proposal would end up expanding the FBI’s investigative reach instead of limiting it.

But in a year when all sides say they are still ready to share the credit for at least one more top-tier legislative accomplishment, the knot over surveillance may be starting to unravel.

#### PLAN slays Obama’s agenda

Loomis 07 Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University [Dr. Andrew J. Loomis, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

#### NSA scandal being unhandled risks a rupture in trans-atlantic ties

HEUSER 13 executive director of the Washington, DC-based Bertelsmann Foundation [Annette Heuser, Euractive, The erosion of the transatlantic trust, 10/25/13 http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/erosion-transatlantic-trust-analysis-531335]

Allegations of the NSA's tapping of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone have yet to be proved, but the agency's spying is already causing unprecedented damage to the trans-Atlantic relationship. The controversy has festered for five months, but it reached a new peak with yesterday's call from the chancellor to President Barack Obama. Her message to the president, who is increasingly besieged by his closest allies: Spying on her or her government is unacceptable.

Three things are remarkable about this recent development.

First, the chancellor is known to be a cautious political leader. She takes time to determine her course of action and then still proceeds carefully. But her quick and personal involvement in placing a call to her friend, Barack, would not have occurred if the German intelligence service had not provided her with robust information about US hacking.

Second, President Obama's reportedly cool response to the chancellor reconfirms the skepticism of European leaders and the broader European public about the commander-in-chief's commitment to the trans-Atlantic relationship. Mr Obama is increasingly perceived as a leader who does not see the need to nurture ties with his closest allies or even establish close political ties to his counterparts in Europe and elsewhere. The president is the first in the post-war era who does not appear to be a trans-Atlanticist at heart.

Third, the Obama administration continues to underestimate the short- and long-term effects of the NSA scandal on the trans-Atlantic relationship. Europe is now united in its repugnance of American spying practices, and this abhorrence goes beyond any personal targeting of the German chancellor or her government. Europeans feel that Washington has disregarded and disrespected their privacy, which they, in general, safeguard more than Americans do.

The latest allegations mean the US has likely crossed a line. A European response is now coming, and it will be a collective one. Negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) may be put on hold. There have already been calls among high-ranking European officials to do so.

A recent Bertelsmann Foundation study estimated a TTIP could create 740,000 new American jobs. Putting such a deal in jeopardy means the potential loss of a significant economic boon and the only prestigious project in which the US and Europe are currently engaged.

The NSA scandal and its (mis)management by the White House are causing a political tsunami in Europe. Until now it was the Iraq War that defined the recent nadir in trans-Atlantic relations. But that disagreement concerned military intervention. This time the fundamental issue of trust is at hand, and that means the consequences of a rupture are more severe. Americans and Europeans have been profoundly successful over the past seven decades establishing the close ties that, at least until recently, have bound them together. Nothing short of a profound and tragic break in that fragile tradition could now be unfolding.

#### Extinction

**Stivachtis 10** – Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University [Dr. Yannis. A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010, pg. http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/78.html]

There is no doubt that US-European relations are in a **period of transition**, and that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations.

The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time, international terrorism, the nuclearization of **North Korea** and especially **Iran**, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of **Russia** into a stable and cooperative member of the international community, the growing power of **China**, the political and economic transformation and integration of the **Caucasian** and **Central Asian** states, the integration and stabilization of the **Balkan** countries, the promotion of peace and stability in the **Mid**dle **East**, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require further cooperation among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels.

Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more **imperative** than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but the implications of success or failure will be global.

The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense.

Questions such as, the future role of NATO and its relationship to the common European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists are, have been added to the list of US-European disagreements.

There are two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First, if European leaders conclude that Europe must become **counterweight** to the U.S., rather than a partner, it will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a common ground than an elective partnership requires. Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it difficult even for leaders who want to forge a new relationship to make the necessary accommodations.

If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. A vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make the necessary political commitment.

There are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic.

Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one would expect from reading newspapers and magazines. But while elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of military force, biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight sharp differences over global leadership, defense spending, and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance.

There are other important, shared interests as well. The transformation of Russia into a stable cooperative member of the international community is a priority both for the U.S. and Europe. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime in Ukraine. It is necessary for the U.S. and EU to form a united front to meet these challenges because first, there is a risk that dangerous materials related to **WMD** will fall into the wrong hands; and second, the **spread of conflict** along those countries’ periphery could destabilize neighboring countries and provide **safe havens for terrorists** and other international criminal organizations. Likewise, in the Caucasus and Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting political and economic transformation and integrating these states into larger communities such as the OSCE.

This would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and prevent those countries of becoming havens for international terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans politically and economically. Dealing with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other **political issues in the Mid**dle **East** are also of a great concern for both sides although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, US-European cooperation will be more effective in dealing with the **rising power of China** through engagement but also containment.

The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer simply a question of adapting transatlantic institutions to new realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe implies that a new basis for the relationship must be found if transatlantic cooperation and partnership is to continue. The future course of relations will be **determined above all by U.S. policy towards Europe** and the Atlantic Alliance.

Wise policy can help forge a new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and opportunities of the evolving world together. But a policy that **takes Europe for granted** and routinely **ignores or** even **belittles Europe**an concerns, may force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance outweigh its benefits.

### K

#### The affirmative’s use of the law is a militaristic tactic that creates legal legitimacy to propel more violent interventions that ensure infrastructural violence that maims civilians. They actively displace moral questions in favor of pathologically detached questions of legality.

Thomas SMITH Gov’t & Int’l Affairs @ South Florida 2 [“The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence” *Int’l Studies Quarterly,* 46, p. 367-371]

The role of military lawyers in all this has, according to one study, “changed irrevocably” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Although liberal theorists point to the broad normative contours that law lends to international relations, the Pentagon wields law with technical precision. During the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign, JAGs opined on the legal status of multinational forces, the U.S. War Powers Resolution, rules of engagement and targeting, country fly-overs, maritime interceptions, treatment of prisoners, hostages and “human shields,” and methods used to gather intelligence. Long before the bombing began, lawyers had joined in the development and acquisition of weapons systems, tactical planning, and troop training. In the Gulf War, the U.S. deployed approximately 430 military lawyers, the allies far fewer, leading to some amusing but perhaps apposite observations about the legalistic culture of America ~Garratt, 1993!. Many lawyers reviewed daily Air Tasking Orders as well as land tactics. Others found themselves on the ground and at the front. According to Colonel Ruppert, the idea was to “put the lawyer as far forward as possible” ~Myrow, 1996–97!. During the Kosovo campaign, lawyers based at the Combined Allied Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, and at NATO headquarters in Brussels approved every single targeting decision. We do not know precisely how decisions were taken in either Iraq or Kosovo or the extent to which the lawyers reined in their masters. Some “corrections and adjustments” to the target lists were made ~Shotwell, 1993:26!, but by all accounts the lawyers—and the law—were extremely accommodating. The exigencies of war invite professional hazards as military lawyers seek to “find the law” and to determine their own responsibilities as legal counselors. A 1990 article in Military Law Review admonished judge advocates not to neglect their duty to point out breaches of the law, but not to become military ombudsmen either. The article acknowledged that the JAG faces pressure to demonstrate that he can be a “force multiplier” who can “show the tactical and political soundness of his interpretation of the law” ~Winter, 1990:8–9!. Some tension between law and necessity is inevitable, but over the past decade the focus has shifted visibly from restraining violence to legitimizing it. The Vietnam-era perception that law was a drag on operations has been replaced by a zealous “client culture” among judge advocates. Commanding officers “have come to realize that, as in the relationship of corporate counsel to CEO, the JAG’s role is not to create obstacles, but to find legal ways to achieve his client’s goals—even when those goals are to blow things up and kill people” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Lt. Col. Tony Montgomery, the JAG who approved the bombing of the Belgrade television studios, said recently that “judges don’t lay down the law. We take guidance from our government on how much of the consequences they are willing to accept” ~The Guardian, 2001!. Military necessity is undeterred. In a permissive legal atmosphere, hi-tech states can meet their goals and remain within the letter of the law. As noted, humanitarian law is firmest in areas of marginal military utility. When operational demands intrude, however, even fundamental rules begin to erode. The Defense Department’s final report to Congress on the Gulf War ~DOD, 1992! found nothing in the principle of noncombatant immunity to curb necessity. Heartened by the knowledge that civilian discrimination is “one of the least codified portions” of the law of war ~p. 611!, the authors argued that “to the degree possible and consistent with allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews,” munitions and delivery systems were chosen to reduce collateral damage ~p. 612!. “An attacker must exercise reasonable precautions to minimize incidental or collateral injury to the civilian population or damage to civilian objects, consistent with mission accomplishments and allowable risk to the attacking forces” ~p. 615!. The report notes that planners targeted “specific military objects in populated areas which the law of war permits” and acknowledges the “commingling” of civilian and military objects, yet the authors maintain that “at no time were civilian areas as such attacked” ~p. 613!. The report carefully constructed a precedent for future conflicts in which human shields might be deployed, noting “the presence of civilians will not render a target immune from attack” ~p. 615!. The report insisted ~pp. 606–607! that Protocol I as well as the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons “were not legally applicable” to the Gulf War because Iraq as well as some Coalition members had not ratified them. More to the point that law follows practice, the report claimed that certain provisions of Protocol I “are not a codification of the customary practice of nations,” and thus “ignore the realities of war” ~p. 616!. Nor can there be any doubt that a more elaborate legal regime has kept pace with evolving strategy and technology. Michael Ignatieff details in Virtual War ~2000! how targets were “developed” in 72-hour cycles that involved collecting and reviewing aerial reconnaissance, gauging military necessity, and coding anticipated collateral damage down to the directional spray of bomb debris. A judge advocate then vetted each target in light of the Geneva Conventions and calculated whether or not the overall advantage to be gained outweighed any expected civilian spillover. Ignatieff argues ~2000:198–199! that this elaborate symbiosis of law and technology has given birth to a “veritable casuistry of war.” Legal fine print, hand-in-hand with new technology, replaced deeper deliberation about the use of violence in war. The law provided “harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues of legality.” Astonishingly fine discrimination also meant that unintentional civilian casualties were assumed to have been unintentional, not foreseen tragedies to be justified under the rule of double effect or the fog of war. The crowning irony is that NATO went to such lengths to justify its targets and limit collateral damage, even as it assured long-term civilian harm by destroying the country’s infrastructure. Perhaps the most powerful justification was provided by law itself. War is often dressed up in patriotic abstractions—Periclean oratory, jingoistic newsreels, or heroic memorials. Bellum Americanum is cloaked in the stylized language of law. The DOD report is padded with references to treaty law, some of it obscure, that was “applicable” to the Gulf War, as if a surfeit of legal citation would convince skeptics of the propriety of the war. Instances of humane restraint invariably were presented as the rule of law in action. Thus the Allies did not gas Iraqi troops, torture POWs, or commit acts of perfidy. Most striking is the use of legal language to justify the erosion of noncombatant immunity. Hewing to the legalisms of double effect, the Allies never intentionally targeted civilians as such. As noted, by codifying double effect the law artificially bifurcates intentions. Harvard theologian Bryan Hehir ~1996:7! marveled at the Coalition’s legalistic wordplay, noting that the “briefers out of Riyadh sounded like Jesuits as they sought to defend the policy from any charge of attempting to directly attack civilians.” The Pentagon’s legal narrative is certainly detached from the carnage on the ground, but it also oversimplifies and even actively obscures the moral choices involved in aerial bombing. Lawyers and tacticians made very deliberate decisions about aircraft, flight altitudes, time of day, ordnance dropped, confidence in intelligence, and so forth. By expanding military necessity to encompass an extremely prudential reading of “force protection,” these choices were calculated to protect pilots and planes at the expense of civilians on the ground, departing from the just war tradition that combatants assume greater risks than civilians. While it is tempting to blame collateral damage on the fog of war, much of that uncertainty has been lifted by technology and precision law. Similarly, in Iraq and in Yugoslavia the focus was on “degrading” military capabilities, yet a loose view of dual use spelled the destruction of what were essentially social, economic, and political targets. Coalition and NATO officials were quick to apologize for accidental civilian casualties, but in hi-tech war most noncombatant suffering is by design. Does the law of war reduce death and destruction? International law certainly has helped to delegitimize, and in rare cases effectively criminalize, direct attacks on civilians. But in general humanitarian law has mirrored wartime practice. On the ad bellum side, the erosion of right authority and just cause has eased the path toward war. Today, foreign offices rarely even bother with formal declarations of war. Under the United Nations system it is the responsibility of the Security Council to denounce illegal war, but for a number of reasons its members have been extremely reluctant to brand states as aggressors. If the law were less accommodating, greater effort might be devoted to diplomacy and war might be averted. On the in bello side the ban on direct civilian strikes remains intact, but double effect and military demands have been contrived to justify unnecessary civilian deaths. Dual use law has been stretched to sanction new forms of violence against civilians. Though not as spectacular as the obliteration bombing to which it so often is favorably compared, infrastructural war is far deadlier than the rhetoric of a “clean and legal” conflict suggests. It is true that rough estimates of the ratio of bomb tonnage to civilian deaths in air attacks show remarkable reductions in immediate collateral damage. There were some 40.83 deaths per ton in the bombing of Guernica in 1937 and 50.33 deaths per ton in the bombing of Tokyo in 1945. In the Kosovo campaign, by contrast, there were between .077 and .084 deaths per ton. In Iraq there were a mere .034 ~Thomas, 2001:169!. According to the classical definition of collateral damage, civilian protection has improved dramatically, but if one takes into account the staggering long-term effects of the war in Iraq, for example, aerial bombing looks anything but humane. For aerial bombers themselves modern war does live up to its clean and legal image. While war and intervention have few steadfast constituents, the myth of immaculate warfare has eased fears that intervening soldiers may come to harm, which polls in the U.S., at least, rank as being of great public concern, and even greater military concern. A new survey of U.S. civilian and military attitudes found that soldiers were two to four times more casualty-averse than civilians thought they should be ~Feaver and Kohn, 2001!. By removing what is perhaps the greatest restraint on the use of force—the possibility of soldiers dying—law and technology have given rise to the novel moral hazards of a “postmodern, risk-free, painless war” ~Woollacott, 1999!. “We’ve come to expect the immaculate,” notes Martin Cook, who teaches ethics at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. “Precision-guided munitions make it very much easier to go to war than it ever has been historically.” Albert Pierce, director of the Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy argues, “standoff precision weapons give you the option to lower costs and risks . . . but you might be tempted to do things that you might otherwise not do” ~Belsie, 1999!.

Conclusion The utility of law to legitimize modern warfare should not be underestimated. Even in the midst of war, legal arguments retain an aura of legitimacy that is missing in “political” justifications. The aspirations of humanitarian law are sound. Rather, it is the instrumental use of law that has oiled the skids of hi-tech violence. Not only does the law defer to military necessity, even when very broadly defined, but more importantly it bestows on those same military demands all the moral and psychological trappings of legality. The result has been to legalize and thus to justify in the public mind “inhumane military methods and their consequences,” as violence against civilians is carried out “behind the protective veil of justice” ~af Jochnick and Normand, 1994a:50!. Hi-tech states can defend hugely destructive, essentially unopposed, aerial bombardment by citing the authority of seemingly secular and universal legal standards. The growing gap between hi- and low-tech means may exacerbate inequalities in moral capital as well, as the sheer barbarism of “premodern” violence committed by ethnic cleansers or atavistic warlords makes the methods employed by hi-tech warriors seem all the more clean and legal by contrast. This fusion of law and technology is likely to propel future American interventions. Despite assurances that the campaign against terrorism would differ from past conflicts, the allied air war in Afghanistan, marked by record numbers of unmanned drones and bomber flights at up to 35,000 feet, or nearly 7 miles aloft, rarely strayed from the hi-tech and legalistic script. While the attack on the World Trade Center confirmed a thousand times over the illegality and inhumanity of terrorism, the U.S. response has raised further issues of legality and inhumanity in conventional warfare. Civilian deaths in the campaign have been substantial because “military objects” have been targeted on the basis of extremely low-confidence intelligence. In several cases targets appear to have been chosen based on misinformation and even rank rumor. A liberal reading of dual use and the authorization of bombers to strike unvetted “targets of opportunity” also increased collateral damage. Although 10,000 of the 18,000 bombs, missiles, and other ordnance used in Afghanistan were precision-guided munitions, the war resulted in roughly 1000 to 4000 direct civilian deaths, and, according to the UNHCR, produced 900,000 new refugees and displaced persons. The Pentagon has nevertheless viewed the campaign as “a more antiseptic air war even than the one waged in Kosovo” ~Dao, 2001!. General Tommy Franks, who commanded the campaign, called it “the most accurate war ever fought in this nation’s history” ~Schmitt, 2002!.9 No fundamental change is in sight. Governments continue to justify collateral damage by citing the marvels of technology and the authority of international law. One does see a widening rift between governments and independent human rights and humanitarian relief groups over the interpretation of targeting and dual-use law. But these disputes have only underscored the ambiguities of humanitarian law. As long as interventionist states dominate the way that the rules of war are crafted and construed, hopes of rescuing law from politics will be dim indeed.

#### The focus on transparency and accountability is a ruse that obscures broader militarism and legitimates the institutional defense of drones

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My view is both narrow and wide. It is narrow because I discuss only the use of Predators and Reapers by the US Air Force in Afghanistan and Iraq, sometimes as part of Joint Special Operations Command, and their involvement in CIA-directed targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Other advanced militaries also operate drones, some of them armed and some for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as part of networked military violence, but it is even more difficult to detail their operations. The US Army and Marine Corps use drones too, but most of these are much smaller and limited to providing ISR for close combat and ground attack. Within these limits, my view is also wide, however, because I want to disclose the matrix of military violence that these remote platforms help to activate. Much of the critical response to drones is unduly preoccupied with the technical (or techno-cultural) object – the drone – and virtually ignores these wider dispositions and propensities. This is, I will argue, both an analytical and a political mistake.

Homeland insecurities

The first set of geographies is located within the United States, where the US Air Force describes its remote operations as ‘projecting power without vulnerability’. Its Predators and Reapers are based in or close to the conflict zone, where Launch and Recovery crews are stationed to handle take-off and landing via a C-band line-of-sight data link; given the technical problems that dog what Jordan Crandall calls ‘the wayward drone’, there are also large maintenance crews in-theatre to service the aircraft.3 Once airborne, however, control is usually handed to flight crews stationed in the continental United States via a Ku-band satellite link to a ground station at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and a fibre-optic cable across the Atlantic. The network also includes senior officers and military lawyers who monitor operations from US Central Command’s Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and specialized image analysts in the United States who scrutinize the full-motion video feeds from the aircraft and are linked in via the Air Force’s Distributed Common Ground System. Taken together, the suite of four aircraft that constitutes a Combat Air Patrol capable of providing coverage twenty-four hours a day seven days a week involves 192 personnel, and most of them (133) are located outside the combat zone and beyond immediate danger (Figure 1). This is risk-transfer war with a vengeance, where virtually all the risks are transferred to populations overseas.4 Those who live in the attack zones often criticize drone strikes as cowardly, but the fact that most of those flying these online missions do not put their own lives on the line has also sparked a series of domestic debates about military ethics and codes of honour. These have traditionally invoked a reciprocity of risk that gave war what Clausewitz saw as its moral force: to kill with honour, the soldier must be prepared to die. Now the remote warrior remains the vector of violence but is no longer its potential victim.5

Indeed, some critics have ridiculed the drone crews as ‘cubicle warriors’ who merely ‘commute’ to war.6 The remotely piloted aircraft can remain in the air for at least 18 hours – some have recorded flights of more than 40 hours – and this requires crews to work in shifts of 10–12 hours and to alternate between home and work. Many of them report considerable difficulty in this interdigitation. As in previous wars, crews of conventional aircraft are forward deployed at varying distances from the conflict, and when they return to their bases at the end of a mission they remain within a military space that enables them to maintain focus and ‘psychic integrity’. The same is true for the Launch and Recovery crews, but it is much harder for crews of Predators and Reapers in the United States, who, as one of them put it, ‘commute to work in rush-hour traffic, slip into a seat in front of a bank of computers, fly a warplane to shoot missiles at an enemy thousands of miles away, and then pick up the kids from school or a gallon of milk at the grocery store on [their] way home for dinner’. He described it as living ‘a schizophrenic existence between two worlds’; the sign at the entrance to Creech Air Force Base announced ‘You are now entering CENTCOM AOR [Area of Operations]’, but ‘it could just as easily have read “You are now entering C.S. Lewis’s Narnia” for all that my two worlds intersected.’7 ‘The weirdest thing for me’, one pilot admitted, is ‘getting up in the morning, driving my kids to school and killing people’.8 Another confirms ‘the peculiar new disconnect of fighting a telewar’ from ‘a padded seat in American suburbia’ and commuting home ‘always alone with what he has done’.9

Remote crews are perhaps most vulnerable to this form of post-traumatic stress disorder – a product not so much of what they have seen as what they have done, though the two are of course connected – and it must be aggravated by the constant switching between worlds. In George Brant’s play Grounded a pilot describes the difficulty of maintaining the separation necessary for her to decompress, and gradually and ever more insistently one space keeps superimposing itself over the other; the fixed, precise sensor of the Gorgon Stare yields to a blurred vision in which she finds it virtually impossible to know where (or who) she is. The two worlds begin to become one: the desert on the night drive home from Creech starts to look like the greyed-out desert landscape in Afghanistan, and the face of a little girl on the screen, the daughter of a High Value Target, turns into the face of her own child.10 Brant’s play is all the more powerful because public attention has been artfully orchestrated so that it does not make that connection: it too is insulated by a ‘remote split’. When critics of CIA-directed drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere demand to know about their legal basis and the rules and procedures that are followed, they divert the public gaze from Waziristan to Washington. Madiha Tahir has noted how what she calls the Obama administration’s ‘theatrical performance of faux secrecy’ over its drone war in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – a teasing dance in which the veil of official secrecy is deliberately let slip once, twice, three times – functions to draw its audience’s eye towards the American body politic and away from the Pakistani bodies on the ground. It has been a hideously effective sideshow, in which Obama and an army of barkers and hucksters – unnamed spokesmen ‘speaking on condition of anonymity’ because they are ‘not authorized to speak on the record’, and front-of-house spielers like Harold Koh and John Brennan11 – induce not only a faux secrecy but its obverse, a faux intimacy in which public debate is focused on transparency and accountability as the only ‘games’ worth playing. Yet when you ask people who live under the drones what they want, Tahir continues,

They do not say ‘transparency and accountability’. They say they want the killing to stop. They want to stop dying. They want to stop going to funerals – and being bombed even as they mourn. Transparency and accountability, for them, are abstract problems that have little to do with the concrete fact of regular, systematic death.12

#### Reducing war to a question of legal restrictions banalizes global imperial violence. Contemporary warfare is an interconnected process driven by the generation of militarized knowledge and subjectivities. It’s your foremost ethical task to investigate the affirmative’s imaginary of global war

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This essay addresses the lack of a post-colonial critique of emerging political and cultural theories of global war (Hardt and Negri 2004; Kaldor 2001; Held 2003; Clark 2003). With the exception of Paul Gilroy's study Postcolonial Melancholia (2005) and Gayatri Spivak's essay "Terror: A Speech After 9-11," which in part examine how discourses of racialized violence legitimize contemporary global wars and their "extreme" "civilizing mission" (Spivak 2004, 82), post-colonial theorists have so far been reluctant to engage in a sustained critique of global warfare. On the one hand, this reluctance might derive from the field's preferred critical engagement, as Tim Brennan observes, with Eurocentrism rather than questions of "military occupation" (2004, 132). On the other, such a reluctance seems surprising given that post-colonial studies is traditionally concerned with the ways in which past and contemporary forms of imperial, colonial, and racialized violence have shaped present subjectivities and political, economic, and social relationships. More importantly, the task of post-colonial studies remains the unsettling of contemporary configurations of what Diana Brydon identifies as "imperial and colonial habits of mind" (1995, 10-11), and along with David Goldberg and Ato Quayson, the "dismantling of the conditions that produce [social] violence and anguish" (2002, xiii). Thus, a critical post-colonial anatomy of the social and cultural logic of global civil warfare would seem intrinsic to the field's traditional research concerns. More specifically, while, amongst many others, such theorists and writers as Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Anne McClintock, Wole Soyinka, Ken Saro Wiva, and Bapsi Sidhwa have written extensively about civil and communal warfare, they have done so in the context of particular anti-colonial liberation struggles and post-colonial and neo-colonial nation formation. In part, these writers' works underlie but are not sufficiently acknowledged as a constitutive force in the articulation of dominant contemporary notions of global civil war.

The central argument of this paper builds on the understanding of global civil war which Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri advance in their study Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, the sequel to Empire. They suggest that global civil war designates both an absolute "regime of biopower" (2004, 13) and a form of warfare that is no longer fought between two sovereign states but on one, steadily expanding territory not demarcated by conventional national boundaries. In this sense, global civil war is intrinsic to what the two theorists call empire, namely the formation of a new global sovereignty that supersedes colonialism and imperialism, is dissociated from national and supranational institutions, and emerges from the autonomous and immanent logic of capital expansion and management. By the same logic of immanence, empire is a cultural, economic, and political formation that gives rise to its own movement of resistance or counter-empire.1 In contrast to Hardt and Negri's at times limited notion of global civil war, I suggest to conceptualize global civil war as a social and historical formation rooted in the history of imperial and colonial modernity. As with imperial wars, global civil wars both appropriate the guerilla tactics of insurgency warfare ??? an argument also made by Hardt and Negri ??? and, in contrast to their theory of global civil war, rely on the historical deployment of racialized violence and the perpetual brutalization and surveillance of civil society, often ??? but not exclusively ??? in the name of a humanitarian, peacekeeping, or protective cause.2 The notion of the "civil" in "global civil war" is thus frequently synonymous with the dismantling of civil rights and an internationally condoned assignment to "civilize" so-called rogue or failed nation states. In this sense, we may call the US-led "war against terror" a "global civil war" without, however, reducing the latter concept to a post-9-11 phenomenon. For, polemically speaking, despite its involvement of a wide range of global actors, the "war on terror" remains a national project of the United States. It mobilizes patriotic sentiments of US-American national destiny on a global scale and depends on the simultaneous denial and reinvention of the United States' imperial past.

Contextualizing the notion of global civil war in the history of imperial modernity and violence, then, seeks to adumbrate some of the ways in which contemporary theories of global civil war tend to eclipse the post-colonial moment of these wars. In particular, I wish to ask how contemporary representations of war contribute to the construction of a normalizing global imaginary of war. I use the latter term to refer to those hegemonic narratives through which the West comes to imagine itself as a civilizing bulwark against the violent forces of unruly and terrorist rogue states and to accept global war and racial violence as a historical inevitability of the rule of neo-liberal globalization. Furthermore, how should we conceptualize the post-colonial moment of global civil war, and how does identifying and problematizing such a moment expand and trouble present concepts of global warfare?

To engage with these questions, the first part of this paper provides a brief survey of the ways in which a number of post-colonial theorists have begun to address the particular phenomena of global armed conflict but, by and large, refrained from a systematic discussion of global civil warfare. The paper's second part elaborates my critique of dominant notions of global civil war through a discussion of Hardt and Negri's and, to a lesser extent, Jean-Luc Nancy's writings on globalization and war. Their work, I argue, situates global civil war outside earlier narratives of violence, resistance, and imperialism, when, in fact, all of these narratives either underlie or bleed into the present causes, investments, and media representations of global civil war. In order to develop a post-colonial understanding of global civil war that helps us think beyond presentist models of global war, parts four and five of this paper draw from Jean Arasanayagam's and Michael Ondaatje's fictional accounts of Sri Lanka's prolonged civil war to question received ways of legitimizing violence and to reread the putatively biopolitical character of global civil wars through, what Achille Mbembe calls, the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of global imperialism. Such a rereading, I propose, emphasizes how global civil war operates through the long-term militarization and brutalization of former colonial societies. The sixth and last part of this paper suggests a post-colonial reading of the ways in which the assumed state of a permanent global emergency relies on routinized forms of racial violence and extreme violent global warfare in order to generate disposable human beings and, to use Giorgio Agamben's phrase, "politicize death" (1998, 160).

Post-colonial Readings of Global War

Recent developments in post-colonial studies suggest, according to Brennan, that scholars in the field had to "retool" themselves as "globalization theorists" and consider themselves "as functioning in a larger division of intellectual labor" (2004, 138). What does this "retooling" look like? In particular, how do post-colonial scholars enter and shape debates on global war and violence?3 While there has been prolific research on the construction of diasporic, hybrid, and cosmopolitan subjectivities and transnational imaginaries, or on what Simon Gikandi sees as globalization's discourse of cultural "celebration" (2001, 629), less attention has been paid to globalization as "a discourse of failure and atrophy" (ibid., 638). To understand the latter, for example, Gikandi argues, we have to track back the death of two young Guinean men "whose bodies were found in the cargo hold of a plane in Brussels in August 1998" (ibid., 630) to particular Enlightenment discourses of autonomy and rationality, time, and progress that inform colonial and global modernities. In Gikandi's reading ??? which would warrant a much more detailed analysis than I can offer here ??? the death of these two young African men provides the opportunity to conceptualize globalization as a new version of post-colonialism's critique of Eurocentrism and the failure of the post-colonial nation-state. The global, he maintains, "had to be reinvented as a substitute for nationalism" and the ideologically and politically "vanishing 'Third World'" (ibid., 646) in the wake of the post-Cold War era. In this context, globalization is a violent process that erases the political, historical and cultural presence of the erstwhile colonized from the global present. Their presence seems to be registered only with reference to the ways in which it upsets Eurocentric notions of the nation, belonging, affect, and subjectivity.

Similarly, yet from a different political perspective, Neil Larsen enters the debate on globalization through a "material genealogy of postcolonialism" (2000, 33) and foregrounds the historical and economic continuities between imperialism, colonialism, post-colonialism, and globalization. Larsen traces the role of the nation as the grounding figure that binds all of these terms. Yet, in contrast to those who tend to announce globalization as a new post-national era, Larsen suggests that imperialism and its culmination in World War I and II, along with the wars' concomitant mass migrations, made it impossible, if not obsolete, to reflect on the "world" in terms of homogenous, "particular national histories and experiences" (ibid., 32). Rather, the violent crises of imperialism (WW I and II, Bandung era) gave rise to both a "transeuropean" (ibid., 31) configuration of anti-imperial and revolutionary movements and a cultural conceptualization of the nation as a space of liberation, reflected in national liberation struggles that "re-essentialized, or de-europeanized national space or imaginary" (ibid., 34). Under today's economic pressures of globalization, the Fanonian and Marxian ideal of a transeuropean nation ??? an ideal, which, as Fanon argues, has always been threatened by the co-optation of the colonial elites into a neo-colonial European appropriation of the newly independent nation-state ??? has collapsed. In particular, the transeuropean nation is being transformed into "an institutional/ideological entity that, precisely because it has been rendered inoperative as a site of the accumulation and control of capital, seeks to compensate for this in undergoing a radical reparticularization verging, in the most extreme cases (e.g., Afghanistan, Serbia) on a desecularization" (ibid., 43). In other words, Larsen suggests that contemporary ethnic and civil wars are both a result of the financial restructuring of the globe and its attending disintegration of the nation-state. Yet, what remains troubling and unexplained is why the disintegration of the nation should automatically lead to a violent return to cultural and religious particularism and essentialism. Are we to assume that in all cases of global civil war we are confronted with a return of archaic and primordialist attitudes of ethnic absolutism, to use Paul Gilroy's term, previously kept in check by the authoritative rather than emancipatory operations of the post-colonial nation-state? Indeed, to what extent does a culturalist ??? if not primordialist ??? reading of global war account for the at once global and local politicization and racialization of violence? Larsen, however, reminds us that the destruction of the "nationalized economic regimes in the third (and former 'second' world)" presents a global crisis whose consequences are also "dire" for the "global hegemons [US, Western Europe, Japan]" (ibid., 42). Thus, rather than abandoning the nation-state as politically compromised and ineffective in a global world, he affords it a central and by far not yet resolved role in dealing with the production of a new global order.

If Larsen sees contemporary wars as a product of the economic disempowerment of nation-states, Arjun Appadurai locates the extreme violence of contemporary global civil wars in larger cultural and ideological formations. Although Appadurai concedes that these wars must be read within the context of the crisis of legitimation of the nation-state (1996, 157) and the biopolitics of the colonial and modern nation-state, he suggests that they are culturalist in that they operate through the "conscious mobilization of cultural differences in the service of a larger national and transnational politics" (ibid., 15). Culturalist movements, he suggests, create communities of sentiment that are "comprehensible only within specific cultural frames of meaning and style and larger historical frames of power and discipline" (ibid., 148), the distribution of images, and the "imagination" (ibid., 149). Culturalist or ethnic violence, he argues, should not be conceptualized as a "primordial sentiment" (ibid., 149). Instead, understanding such violence involves addressing the local, social, and cultural construction of intimacy and the physical and psychic embodiment of rage and pain. Here, Appadurai's insistence on a social critique of the embodiment and localization of culturalist violence in a post-national or global context can serve as a possible trajectory for a post-colonial critique of global civil war. Indeed, as I will argue in section three, it is the historical production of pain and death, or of what Mbembe describes as the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of modernity, that allows us to understand global civil war in localized and historically situated terms.

What all these post-colonial readings of global civil war have in common is their desire to respond to war in an ethical fashion. What does this entail? In her essay "Terror: A Speech After 9-11," Spivak considers the "war on terror" as synonymous with global civil war and emphasizes its archaic and coercive rhetoric of cultural incommensurability. Here the term global war distracts from the fact that the war on terror, despite its involvement of the Northern alliance, refers to an imperial war fought unilaterally by the United States without UN sanction. "The war," Spivak explains, "is part of an alibi every imperialism has given itself, a civilising mission carried to the extreme, as it always must be. It is a war on terrorism reduced at home to due process, to a criminal case???a war zoomed down to a lawsuit and zoomed up to face an abstraction" (2004, 82). In this sense, Spivak's assessment coincides with Hardt and Negri's (2000, 13) observation that the primordialist and Manichaean rhetoric global civil war banalizes war as a form of "police action," creates an absolute enemy, and "sacrilizes" war by grounding military pursuits in putatively ethical claims that protect and reinstate democracy, "order and peace." In other words, global civil war depends on the construction of an enemy by mobilizing and criminalizing cultural Otherness. For this reason, the humanities have an important role to play in responding to and containing global civil war. The foremost pedagogical task, Spivak argues, consists in training "for the eruption of the ethical [understood as] an interruption of the epistemological, which is the attempt to construct the other as object of knowledge" (2004, 83). In other words, a post-colonial critique of global civil war ought to examine how global civil war generates human subjects differentially on a global scale. Thus, what post-colonial studies needs to bring to bear on globalization studies is, first, a detailed analysis of the ways in which post-colonial writing participates in the cultural production of competing narratives of global civil warfare, and, second, a critique of global civil war that accounts for the racialized violence and identity politics that frequently fuel global conflict or are mobilized in its service. Analyzing the ways in which global war generates particular subjectivities is of great importance since global capitalism thrives and depends on both the violent production and commodification of identity and the total militarization of national and global social relationships.

The next section of this paper examines the ways in which a number of cultural narratives of global civil war rearticulate traditional concepts of war. However, by contextualizing war in a presentist and, at times, Eurocentric understanding of globalization, these narratives risk reinforcing rather than destabilizing dominant legitimizing practices of global warfare.

Situating Global Civil War

If globalization refers to the uneven process of restructuring social, political, and economic space within and beyond the nation-state, then a change of the concept of war, its means and purposes, as well as its present ubiquity seem logical effects of globalization. For example, in Empire, Hardt and Negri suggest that although the world has never been at peace, presently war seems to be the single most characteristic feature of "Empire." The latter, they argue, is continuously embroiled in bloodshed, yet "always dedicated to peace ??? a perpetual and universal peace outside of history" (2000, xv). The Kantian allusion provides a first glimpse at how we might begin to address the complex phenomenon of global war. As a preliminary hypothesis, I wish to suggest that global civil war cannot be reduced to exceptional forms of extreme violence enacted in different or unconnected theatres of war. Rather, it relates to indirect yet systemic forms of political and economic coercion. Practically, the concept of global civil war, as, for example, Mary Kaldor suggests, has three characteristics: first, global civil war works through the strategic as well as indiscriminate abuse of human rights, frequently legitimized on grounds of exclusive identity politics; second, the war is not winnable but serves to rally the population around political causes; third, global war generates an economy of plunder and piracy while the state maintains and defends its stakes by deploying mercenaries and engaging in illegal global arms trade. Although this description helps elucidate the global aspects of such historically prolonged armed conflicts as Sri Lanka's and Rwanda's, it brushes over the epistemological dimension of global warfare, namely its frequently dehistoricized conceptualization and its need to mobilize exclusionary identity politics. What remains invisible is that global civil war is intrinsic to predatory global capitalism and aims at maintaining a historically received global order of unequal power relationships. Moreover, the extreme and often genocidal violence of global civil war ??? a phenomenon that connects old and new theatres of war ??? frequently "attempts to eradicate the concept of human altogether, replacing it with the idea of an irrevocable progress towards the eradication of superfluous human beings" (Razack 2004, 160).

Hardt and Negri, then, examine the capitalist, biopolitical, and cultural logic of contemporary warfare by relating global war to both the development of digital technologies for military uses and the increasing importance of immaterial labour, namely, labour engaged in the production of ideas, knowledge, and subjectivities. Their analysis primarily serves to navigate a way out of what they see as a permanent state of exception and to map strategies of resistance for the multitude, their term for a new global class of people loosely and strategically united in their struggle against globalization. Hardt and Negri's reading of global civil war is instructive for its delineation of the ways in which the "war machinery" ??? to use Hardt and Negri's Deleuzean terminology ??? of the United States and its allied partners has appropriated methods of guerrilla and liberation warfare, formerly used in the struggle against colonialism. It seems to me, however, that this kind of appropriation cannot be reduced to the ways in which the non-hierarchical organization of guerrilla troops and warfare have been transformed into an authoritarian chain of command structure, characteristic of conventional armies.

Moreover, emphasizing that war is quickly "becoming a general phenomenon, global and interminable" (2004, 3), they propose to read all contemporary wars as "global civil wars" (ibid., 4) or "netwars" (ibid., 55). Thus, Hardt and Negri tend to conceptualize these wars as postmodern phenomena rather than wars that either pursue particular imperial projects of reordering current global geopolitics or that have long-standing post-colonial roots but have mutated into global civil warfare. Understood as "counterinsurgencies" (ibid., 37), global civil wars change a people's entire social and political makeup, are connected with other war zones, and designate a process in which the distinction between war and civil society has become obsolete. Unlike conventional civil wars, which are considered atavistic remnants of modernity and effects of imperial forms of nation-formation (Horowitz 1985) and emerge out of competing claims to territorial sovereignty, global civil wars are fought by mercenary forces across a global rather than national terrain and aim at population control rather than territorial autonomy.

What, then, is new about global civil war? If war is presumably no longer bound to territorial control and direct conquest but, instead, has become a reflection of media velocity, high-tech combat (Der Derian 2001) and capitalism's need to restructure the planet's markets and geopolitics of resource control, to what extent, we may ask, does global civil war present a qualitatively new phenomenon, rather than, say, a quantitative change of the intensity of warfare, depending on technological development. Furthermore, is global civil war merely another term for the recently revived rhetoric of just wars in a global context? What differentiates Hardt and Negri's notion of "global civil war" from Michael Ignatieff's (1998, 5) notion of "postmodern war," since both terms refer to changes in the organization and modes of contemporary ethnic civil war? Or, how does the term relate to Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of the "confronted community" (2003a, 23)? For, Nancy vehemently opposes such primordialist explanations of contemporary warfare as put forward by Samuel Huntington. Instead, global civil war designates an epistemological and material war of a specific yet globalized civilization, namely of the West, whose values of monotheism, self-presence, and truth have exhausted themselves. Nancy's approach to global war not only makes legible the ways in which global civil war arises as an epistemological problem of Western metaphysics but, by the same token, situates global war within a particularly localized critique of Eurocentrism.

To Nancy, then, contemporary global warfare is symptomatic of the ways in which the idea of community is confronted with itself, with its insistence on and desire for essence, unequivocal identity, propriety, omnipresence, and purity. Indeed, global civil war suggests that Western civilization, understood, in Nancy's words, as a "work of death" (2003a, 24), is finally confronted with its own spiritual emptiness and self-destructive logic of sameness. In this context, global civil war is symptomatic for the disintegration of Western values and truth claims and is interpreted solely as a critique of Eurocentrism, an argument that inadvertently remains indebted to the idea that civil wars result from the disintegration of the nation-state and its attendant epistemologies of belonging. What we find at the horizon of Nancy's critique, then, is the hope of inventing new ways in which the "Euro-Mediterranean world" relates to itself as "Other," to "'value', to the 'absolute', to 'truth'" (2003b, 53). Such a critique of contemporary warfare, however, can think global civil war neither beyond the West's concern with itself nor within different genealogies of both failed and ongoing processes of decolonization. Instead, it begs the question of what or who is the "global" in "global civil war." Indeed, as I argue throughout this essay, the way in which we define the "global" in the context of global war largely determines how we read the particular political investments and interests that underlie global war. For example, if global war is primarily a byproduct of and intrinsic to Empire and its consolidation, it appears to be inevitable and takes place outside discourses of political legitimization and accountability. From a different perspective, conceptualizing global civil war as being engineered by the Global North, that is, predominantly by the United States and its allied nations, reveals the ways in which global war deeply invests in and ensures the continuous accumulation of global capital and centralized practices of uneven capital distribution. Furthermore, if "the global" designates ??? as I think it does ??? a cultural and social space inhabited by those who are impoverished, dispossessed, and violated by the economic and geopolitical restructuring of the world, then the "global" also delineates a process of subject constitution governed by the construction of absolute difference, abjection, and dehumanization.

With its implication of having superseded national politics and interests, the term global civil war appears to require that we accept Hardt and Negri's often criticized assumption that the nation-state no longer mediates claims to sovereignty and power (Tilly 2003; Brennan 2003). For the moment, however, I will refrain from participating in the controversy over the role of the nation in Hardt and Negri's work. Instead, I suggest that while their understanding of global civil war does not explicitly engage in a critique of global violence, but instead focuses on an analysis of the structures of command and strategies of contemporary warfare, it helps raise questions through which to sketch a post-colonial critique of global violence. More specifically, in the next three parts of this paper, I wish to relocate three aspects of their argument in a post-colonial framework: first, the preponderance of biopolitics in their notion of global civil war; second, the construction of normalizing narratives of global civil war, specifically the rhetoric of the archaic; and third, the relationship between global civil war and the notion of the state of exception or emergency. As Hannah Arendt already implied in 1963, the terms global civil war and the state of exception function in tandem as signs and instruments of modern totalitarianism. Today, the state of exception has become globalization's most coercive instrument in regulating the limits of global citizenship and the legal status of particular individuals such as prisoners of war and refugees. More specifically, I suggest that the term "global civil war," specifically when understood as a version of the US-led "war against terror," serves to normalize and legitimize the transformation of constitutional democracy into a permanent but unacknowledged state of exception. The latter is either smothered in a propagandistic rhetoric of fear or shrouded in a misleading public debate over political prevention. From a post-colonial perspective, however, the state of exception, as I propose in the last section of this paper, also designates a cultural and intellectual disposition toward accepting global war and its reliance on the operations of racialized violence as a historical norm and inevitable outcome of Western history. The next part shifts a predominantly biopolitical understanding of global civil war towards an analysis of the necropolitics of these wars.

#### Alternative—Challenge to *conceptual* framework of national security. Only our alternative displaces the source of executive overreach. Legal restraint without conceptual change is futile.

Aziz RANA Law at Cornell 11 [“Who Decides on Security?” Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper 87, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops\_papers/87 p. 45-51]

The prevalence of these continuities between Frankfurter’s vision and contemporary judicial arguments raise serious concerns with today’s conceptual framework. Certainly, Frankfurter’s role during World War II in defending and promoting a number of infamous judicial decisions highlights the potential abuses embedded in a legal discourse premised on the specially-situated knowledge of executive officials and military personnel. As the example of Japanese internment dramatizes, too strong an assumption of expert understanding can easily allow elite prejudices—and with it state violence—to run rampant and unconstrained. For the present, it hints at an obvious question: How skeptical should we be of current assertions of expertise and, indeed, of the dominant security framework itself? One claim, repeated especially in the wake of September 11, has been that regardless of normative legitimacy, the prevailing security concept—with its account of unique knowledge, insulation, and hierarchy—is simply an unavoidable consequence of existing global dangers. Even if Herring and Frankfurter may have been wrong in principle about their answer to the question “who decides in matters of security?” they nevertheless were right to believe that complexity and endemic threat make it impossible to defend the old Lockean sensibility. In the final pages of the article, I explore this basic question of the degree to which objective conditions justify the conceptual shifts and offer some initial reflections on what might be required to limit the government’s expansive security powers. VI. CONCLUSION: THE OPENNESS OF THREATS The ideological transformation in the meaning of security has helped to generate a massive and largely secret infrastructure of overlapping executive agencies, all tasked with gathering information and keeping the country safe from perceived threats. In 2010, The Washington Post produced a series of articles outlining the buildings, personnel, and companies that make up this hidden national security apparatus. According to journalists Dana Priest and William Arkin, there exist “some 1271 government organizations and 1931 private companies” across 10,000 locations in the United States, all working on “counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence.”180 This apparatus is especially concentrated in the Washington, D.C. area, which amounts to “the capital of an alternative geography of the United States.”181 Employed by these hidden agencies and bureaucratic entities are some 854,000 people (approximately 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington itself) who hold topsecret clearances.182 As Priest and Arkin make clear, the most elite of those with such clearance are highly trained experts, ranging from scientists and economists to regional specialists. “To do what it does, the NSA relies on the largest number of mathematicians in the world. It needs linguists and technology experts, as well as cryptologists, known as ‘crippies.’”183 These professionals cluster together in neighborhoods that are among the wealthiest in the country—six of the ten richest counties in the United States according to Census Bureau data.184 As the executive of Howard County, Virginia, one such community, declared, “These are some of the most brilliant people in the world. . . . They demand good schools and a high quality of life.”185 School excellence is particularly important, as education holds the key to sustaining elevated professional and financial status across generations. In fact, some schools are even “adopting a curriculum . . . that will teach students as young as 10 what kind of lifestyle it takes to get a security clearance and what kind of behavior would disqualify them.”186 The implicit aim of this curriculum is to ensure that the children of NSA mathematicians and Defense Department linguists can one day succeed their parents on the job. In effect, what Priest and Arkin detail is a striking illustration of how security has transformed from a matter of ordinary judgment into one of elite skill. They also underscore how this transformation is bound to a related set of developments regarding social privilege and status—developments that would have been welcome to Frankfurter but deeply disillusioning to Brownson, Lincoln, and Taney. Such changes highlight how one’s professional standing increasingly drives who has a right to make key institutional choices. Lost in the process, however, is the longstanding belief that issues of war and peace are fundamentally a domain of common care, marked by democratic intelligence and shared responsibility. Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states.187 Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike—at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides—and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be—remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers.189 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view—such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have—at times unwittingly—reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.”190 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.”191 Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion.193 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers—which have been consistent in recent years—place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger—requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization—such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions—like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home—shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate.196 These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm—the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,197 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’—marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact—than policymakers admit. If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars—emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness—is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants—danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently—it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

### 1NC Drones Bad—Terrorism

#### Turn—Drones cause terrorism—ideological gains for insurgents outweigh tactical kinetic victories

Groves 13—Major Bryan Groves is currently the Deputy Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. A graduate from Yale University's Masters of Arts in IR program, he is a Special Forces Officer and has served in Iraq and Bosnia [“America's Trajectory in the Long War1: Redirecting Our Efforts Toward Strategic Effects Versus Simply Tactical Gains,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 2013, Taylor & Francis, Accessed through Emory Libraries]

Stuck at the Tactical and Operational Levels

During the Long War the American effort has been stuck at the tactical and operational levels. The reason for this is that American leaders have had their attention focused too narrowly, missing that the “center of gravity” in the struggle resides in the non-fighting populations of both sides. To effect lasting change, America needs to address the ideological battle, point out inconsistencies in enemy narratives and actions, and stem the flow of new recruits into the terrorist groups.

Instead, the United States has been focused on making a series of changes that have been tactical or operational in scope. One is the significant intelligence collection effort and reorganization among the U.S. intelligence apparatus. President George W. Bush's creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and alignment of some twenty agencies under it is another. The government's passage of the Patriot Act to authorize more robust counterterrorism measures was a third new counterterrorism measure. Fourth and for better or worse, the United States used the prison facilities at Guantanamo Bay, along with renditions, to handle the difficult aspects of the legal battle against terrorists that democracies face. The primary focus of each of these aspects of the fight has been to keep America safe and prevent terror attacks against U.S. interests.

This objective is strategic in nature, but there has been an ends–means mismatch. The main means by which the government has sought to accomplish its counterterrorism goals have been to kill or capture and prosecute bad guys. By its very nature, gains won through these means are likely to be temporary because of the resilient nature and tremendous regenerative capacity of the enemy. For each operative that America kills or put behind bars, Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other like-minded groups have proven capable in maintaining a rate of new recruits that has the potential to keep pace with their losses. Whether they actually are able to do so depends on a number of factors. Some of the variables include the level of resources the U.S. levies against the group in a particular region, the resonance of their message with the local population, and the host nation's capacity and willingness to counter the organization.

A common way in which terrorist groups are able to maintain their numerical strength is because they have become exceptionally good at the “new media,” which facilitates a steady flow of recruits, their radicalization, and effective mobilization toward violence on behalf of the group's objective. This is especially true of Al Qaeda. Instead of relying on “old media” or traditional television and radio outlets, Al Qaeda has developed the ability to produce and disseminate its own first-rate videos. 28 This allows them to control the message, both in its creation and in its distribution. Recognizing the need to send nuanced versions of their message to different audiences, Al Qaeda has become quite sophisticated in its approach, eclipsing other terrorist organizations and serving as a model for them. 29

The enemy's decentralized network and metamorphosis into an ideological movement (a “network of networks”) are other reasons they have rendered our kinetic victories to be of limited duration. America's military pressure definitely disrupts the enemy's ability to plan, coordinate, and conduct successful attacks—especially spectacular attacks. But they also contribute to further radicalizing elements of the Ummah (global Muslim population), especially when civilian casualties result from military strikes, though inadvertent on the American part, the perception is substantially different among some Muslim segments. Global jihadists view our strikes as a justification for their struggle. They argue their case to illicit fence sitters among the Ummah to join in solidarity with them and recognize armed jihad as the only solution. And, without other efforts to build bridges with Muslim communities domestically, the United States is in danger of furthering a polarizing trend among average Americans that could lead us in an opposite direction of our long-held “melting pot” identity. Government at all levels needs to address this issue to foster greater integration and prevent fracturing along religious, ethnic, or socioeconomic lines. 30

### Terror threat low

#### Terror threat has markedly declined—most recent study proves

**Bergen 12/3**/13 - CNN's national security analyst [Peter Bergen, “Hyping the terror threat?,” CNN, updated 2:16 PM EST, Tue December 3, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/03/opinion/bergen-u-s-terror-risk/]

Both Feinstein and Rogers are able public servants who, as the heads of the two U.S. intelligence oversight committees, are paid to worry about the collective safety of Americans, and they are two of the most prominent defenders of the NSA's controversial surveillance programs, which they defend as necessary for American security.

But is there any real reason to think that Americans are no safer than was the case a couple of years back? Not according to a study by the New America Foundation of every militant indicted in the United States who is affiliated with al Qaeda or with a like-minded group or is motivated by al Qaeda's ideology.

In fact, the total number of such indicted extremists has declined substantially from 33 in 2010 to nine in 2013. And the number of individuals indicted for plotting attacks within the United States, as opposed to being indicted for traveling to join a terrorist group overseas or for sending money to a foreign terrorist group, also declined from 12 in 2011 to only three in 2013.

Of course, a declining number of indictments doesn't mean that the militant threat has disappeared. One of the militants indicted in 2013 was Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is one of the brothers alleged to be responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings in April. But a sharply declining number of indictments does suggest that fewer and fewer militants are targeting the United States.

Recent attack plots in the United States also do not show signs of direction from foreign terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, but instead are conducted by individuals who are influenced by the ideology of violent jihad, usually because of what they read or watch on the Internet.

None of the 21 homegrown extremists known to have been involved in plots against the United States between 2011 and 2013 received training abroad from a terrorist organization -- the kind of training that can turn an angry, young man into a deadly, well-trained, angry, young man.

Of these extremists, only Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the alleged Boston bombers, is known to have had any contact with militants overseas, but it is unclear to what extent, if any, these contacts played in the Boston Marathon bombings.

In short, the data on al-Qaeda-linked or -influenced militants indicted in the United States suggests that the threat of terrorism has actually markedly declined over the past couple of years.

Where Feinstein and Rogers were on much firmer ground in their interview with Crowley was when they pointed to the resurgence of a number of al Qaeda groups in the Middle East.

Al Qaeda's affiliates in Syria control much of the north of the country and are the most effective forces fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

In neighboring Iraq, al Qaeda has enjoyed a renaissance of late, which partly accounts for the fact that the violence in Iraq today is as bad as it was in 2008.

The Syrian war is certainly a magnet for militants from across the Muslim world, including hundreds from Europe, and European governments are rightly concerned that returning veterans of the Syrian conflict could foment terrorism in Europe.

But, at least for the moment, these al Qaeda groups in Syria and Iraq are completely focused on overthrowing the Assad regime or attacking what they regard as the Shia-dominated government of Iraq. And, at least so far, these groups have shown no ability to attack in Europe, let alone in the United States.

### No Nuke Terror

#### No risk of nuclear terror

Topychkanov 1/25/14 (Pyotr PhD in History, Associate in the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, “Nuclear Terrorism: Bogeyman or Real Threat?”, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id\_4=3045&active\_id\_11=39#top)

Nuclear terrorism involves using fissile weapons-grade materials: Uranium-235 enriched to over 90% and plutonium-239 with an isotopic purity of at least 94%. According to current estimates, in the five countries that have nuclear weapons, building a nuclear device requires 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU); although some specialists suggest 4kg to 5kg of plutonium or 16kg of HEU would be sufficient. With 20% enriched uranium, it would take 800kg of material to reach the critical mass needed for a nuclear explosion, which is believed to be technically implausible [3].

Obtaining fissile weapons grade materials is no easy matter for terrorists, chiefly for the following reasons.

Enriching uranium or producing the necessary quantity of plutonium requires scientific and technological facilities that no terrorist organisation has.

Acquiring the necessary quantities of fissile weapons-grade materials on the black market would require the relevant supply, which is not currently there (the IAEA receives about 150-200 reports from Member States each year of fissile materials that are lost, stolen or otherwise out of their control, but, first, most incidents are unrelated to weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and, secondly, in all reported incidents the fissile materials are returned under proper control).

Should terrorists nevertheless succeed in obtaining the requisite quantity of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, as a study commissioned in 1977 by US Congress showed, a small group of people who had never had any access to classified information could develop and build a primitive nuclear explosive device [4]. To do so, according to estimates at that time, they would need up to US$ 1 million, a medium-size workshop, at least one specialist who is conversant with the relevant literature, and an engineer.

Today, some solutions are within an easier reach for terrorists compared to the 1970s, largely thanks to information technologies. However, any active application of such technologies leads to higher risk of detection. Queries regarding nuclear weapons development made using internet browsers can be traced by intelligence services [5].

Importantly, nuclear devices built under such conditions can hardly be expected to be reliable, since given the lack of specialists, high-precision equipment, and testing capabilities, it would be difficult to avoid errors during the development or assembly of any such device. In addition, handling major amounts of cash or sourcing fissile weapons-grade materials in the required quantities would inevitably put the terrorist cell on the radars of the intelligence services of a number of countries. As a result, having risked substantial amounts of money and possible detection, an organisation planning to commit an act of nuclear terrorism would have to accept that the outcome is uncertain, at best.

### Jackson

#### Hegemony is based on an ideological fantasy of US exceptionalism which necessitates permanent war-making—you should look at the benefits of hegemony from the outside-looking-in. Their theoretically scary impacts obscure the real consequences of hegemony.

Richard JACKSON, Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 11 [July 2, 2011, “The World’s Most Warring Nation,” http://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/02/the-world%E2%80%99s-most-warring-nation/]

The history of US foreign policy is a violent and bloody one, although this is not necessarily the dominant perception of most Americans. From the frontier wars of subjugation against Native Peoples to colonial wars against Mexico, Spain and the Philippines, the Cold War interventions in Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Libya and elsewhere, the post-Cold War interventions in Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, and the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and Libya today, the US has an unrivaled record of war and foreign military intervention. There are in fact, few periods in its history when the US has not been engaged in war or military attacks on other countries. In addition, the US is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of military weapons, and has a military budget several times greater than all its nearest rivals combined. It is in fact, the most warring nation in modern history. It is in this historical context that we have to try and understand its current military involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa and Libya.

Although it is sometimes argued by apologists that these military actions are always defensive in nature rather than proactive and expansionist, and are the result of real and serious threats to US security or the wider international system, the virtually impregnable security position of the US, notwithstanding the 9/11 attacks a decade ago, makes this argument unconvincing. The reality is that the size of the US landmass and population, the vast oceans to its eastern and western borders and the friendly countries to its north and south, and the extent of its economic and military power, means that there are no serious obstacles to the adoption of an isolationist foreign policy or even the adoption of a pacifist role in international affairs. In other words, there is nothing inevitable or predetermined about its long record of war and intervention. Explaining the historical record of US foreign intervention requires a careful evaluation of both its strategic interests and its ideological system, as it is the almost unique combination of these factors and the way in which they underpin and interact with each other which helps to explain why the US continues to be the most violent state in the international system today.

Strategically, the US is today the world’s dominant power. In order to maintain this hegemonic position in the international system, which is the primary and preeminent goal of all US foreign policy (or at least, no major foreign policy initiative can seriously contradict this first principle goal), necessitates a number of key measures, such as: maintaining military advantage over rivals, which in turn requires a permanent internal military-industrial complex; a system of allies and a military presence in bases stretched around the globe, especially in strategic regions like the Middle East and the Horn of Africa; influence over or control of strategic resources such as oil; domination or at least influence over the global economic and trading system; significant influence in international institutions; and preventing the rise of serious challengers to its overall hegemony.

At the same time, the US has evolved since the founding of the republic a core set of ideological beliefs which are now deeply embedded culturally and accepted by both the political elite and the wider society. Some of these beliefs are necessitated by, and functional to, the military power of the US: maintaining a costly and permanent military-industrial complex capable of staying ahead of its rivals, for example, requires a supporting set of cultural values which valorize military prowess, patriotism and sacrifice in war. These values are now part of the military-industrial-media complex in which video games and movies, among others, serve as recruitment tools for the military, narrative frames for interpreting foreign threats and as propaganda for generating support for foreign military intervention. Importantly, this military-industrial-media complex has come to generate its own material and political interests, in part because it requires actual wars to reproduce and sustain itself.

Other important ideological values include the strongly-held belief that the US has been called by history (or God) to protect the so-called free world from major threats. Thus, it is believed that the US was first called to defeat the threat posed by the Axis powers, then the communist threat, and today, the global threat of terrorism. This ideological belief rests on the notion that the US is uniquely placed – by virtue of its military and economic power, and its moral values – to ensure the safety of the civilized world; it is the ‘exceptional nation’ which must lead the world. Related to this, the US has come to believe that its core values of liberty and democracy are actually universal values which is it bound to protect at home and spread///

 abroad. As with its military values, these ideological beliefs are ubiquitous in popular and political culture.

It is the combination of the US’s strategic interests and its ideological dispositions in the past two hundred years or more which explains the frequency and geographical distribution of its military interventions. In some cases, interventions have been launched primarily to protect perceived strategic interests, such as the case of the first Gulf War in which Iraq took control of Kuwait oil reserves and appeared to seriously threaten Saudi oil reserves. In other cases, the US’s strategic interests coincided with strong ideological imperatives, such as the Libyan intervention today where the presence of significant oil reserves and the desire to create a pro-US regime in a strategic region has combined with the US ideological value of spreading democracy and overthrowing a long-term dictator and US opponent. The key point however, is that ideological values such as democracy promotion only rarely generate sufficient will by themselves for military intervention, although Somalia and Kosovo may be considered exceptions (although there were strategic interests involved in both cases). In many other cases, such as Rwanda in the 1990s and Syria today, such ideological imperatives are insufficient on their own to generate US-led military intervention. At the same time, no wars can be justified or defended to the American public, except by claiming that they fit US ideological values; US politicians cannot admit that they are ever at war solely to secure strategic advantage.

Of course, during some periods such as the cold war and to a lesser degree the war on terror, US strategic interests simply overrode ideological commitments to human rights or democracy promotion, as it supported a series of brutal dictatorships in places like Latin America, Asia and Africa. In some cases, the US even approved of mass murder, such as the Indonesian government’s suppression of Communists in 1965 which killed 500,000 people, its support for the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and its support for Latin American death squad activities in places like Chile and El Salvador. In other special cases, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, US strategic interests override ideological commitment entirely and little real effort is made to promote values-based policies.

The war on terror, particularly the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, demonstrates the interplay of these two factors, with both strategic interests – dealing with the threat of terrorism, the securing of Iraq’s oil and Afghanistan’s potential role as an access-point to Central Asian oil reserves, fashioning pro-US regimes, and the construction of military bases in strategic regions to put pressure on countries like Iran – and ideological imperatives – bringing liberty and democracy to countries wracked by human rights abuses – driving the interventions. Paradoxically, of course, the war on terror, like many previous US interventions, has resulted in massive human rights abuses around the world and the denial of liberty to millions, with torture, rendition, and the denial of civil rights commonplace, among others. At the same time, it has also endangered US strategic interests: the attack on Iraq strengthened and emboldened Iran, destabilized Pakistan, and greatly damaged the reputation and standing of the US in the Middle East and large parts of the Muslim world.

In the end, the culturally and politically embedded ideology of the US – its militarized patriotism – blinds its leaders and public to the interests and consequences of its military interventions, and sustains the likelihood of future interventions. Few Americans accept that its country’s wars have killed, injured and displaced literally millions of people in the last few decades, most often for little or no positive result in either strategic or ideological terms – that in fact the real-world consequences of its interventions are virtually always the denial of its own stated values of liberty and democracy. Fewer still question why the US is willing to sacrifice thousands or even millions of lives to secure its strategic interests, or why the US population is so perennially vulnerable to ideological appeals by leaders which mask the deeper strategic reasons for violent intervention. While it is unlikely that its strategic interests will change any time soon or that the military-industrial complex can be significantly reduced in size, there is always the hope that new leaders might arise and peace movements might emerge which are able to challenge, and perhaps even change, the militarized patriotism and deeply-embedded culture of violence which makes the US the most violent state in the world.

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### Finish Jackson

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### AT: Peace Rising/Pinker

#### Pinker is a flawed vision of historical violence. Use of his study within debate elides the negative consequences of human progress masking over structural violence and environmental destruction.

Carlson 12—R. Carlson, Ph.D in physiological psychology from University of Illinois, worked for UMass [September 10, 2012, “Steven Pinker’s Liberal Humanist Blind Spot by R. Carlson,” http://www.sciy.org/2012/09/10/pinkers-blind-spot-a-review-of-the-better-angels-of-our-nature-by-r-carlson/]

Pinker’s linear narrative of human progress in which he employs the extensive use of statistical charts and graphs to make his quantitative case for the per-capita decline of violence in human history is formulated as a proof that the values system derived from the European Enlightenment namely those of reason and scientific inquiry have made us into better human beings. (note: The aggregate number of deaths by violence has continued to rise through the past centuries -the 20th century has been the bloodiest- as did the worlds population)

What is disconcerting in ones reading of Pinker is not so much what he includes to support his contention of declining per-capita violence but is what he omits in his study. The most glaring omission is that he lacks a comprehensive definition of what violence actually is. Pinker also does not consider the work of scholars who have documented the replacement of the systematic deployment of physical violence by the state and its institutions as a means to subjugate populations to methods of cohesion that control populations by invoking subtler disciplinary tactics.

The shift in the use of violence as a means of controlling populations was well documented by Michel Foucault. Pinker ignores the evolution of disciplinary techniques in which a centralized all seeing Panopticon operates within the spaces of institutional enclosures to oversee the molding of docile bodies and facilitates the self-disciplining of subjects who move from one institutional enclosure to the other, such as the school, factory, barracks, hospital, and especially the prison, under the all seeing authoritarian gaze of the state or institutional apparatus. This new form of discipline through centralized monitoring replaced the need for the actual assertion of physical violence as wielded by the Sovereign in the pre-modernist “Societies of the Sovereign”.

Gilles Deleuze extends this analysis of the replacement of violence by other means in his Postscript on Societies of Control. In it he describes the evolution of control from an analog to a digital world. Deleuze describes how extremely rapid decentralized free floating and continuous forms of control that rely on information technology under the sign of the Corporation allow for the supervision of individuals (dividuals) in more open non-structured environments. In contemporary society electronic monitoring replaces the need for the centralized gaze of a State or Institutional apparatus to compel our behavior. In control societies people even freely surrender their privacy to corporations and the state who tag and track their movements as they travel across a cybernetic landscape.

Bernard Stiegler performs a similar analysis of this evolution from disciplinary to control societies –although the two actually overlap- in “From Bio-power to Psycho-power”…. http://antwerp.academia.edu/NathanVanCamp/Papers/360709/From\_bio-power\_to\_psycho-power.\_The\_pharmacology\_of\_disciplinary\_technologies

In his study of violence and violent crimes Pinker fixates on murder as his main yardstick because it is something that can be measured to neatly support his progressive liberal humanist narrative. But does the reduction of per capita murders or per capita violent crime rates mean we should congratulate ourselves for our evolutionary expertise? I would argue that would be a false conclusion to draw.

Among other the things Pinker refuses to admit as violence, are those phenomena that are actually credited in most instances as its instigator namely: social inequality, societal neglect and inescapable poverty. Nor does he take into consideration the present incarceration rates in the American prison-industrial complex, –the vast majority of whose inmates are African Americans - that is unprecedented in history.

These incarcerations themselves stem from inequality, neglect, poverty and its resultant despair. According to the New Yorker: “In 1980, there were about two hundred and twenty people incarcerated for every hundred thousand Americans; by 2010, the number had more than tripled, to seven hundred and thirty-one….. No other country even approaches that. Six million people are under correctional supervision in the U.S. more than were in Stalin’s gulags”

http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat\_atlarge\_gopnik#ixzz25K8Nec00

Pinker would perhaps cheer the fact that so many potential violent offenders are no longer on the street and would seem to support the very policing efforts that have led to the incarceration of so many at the lower end of the socio-economic strata as consistent with liberal humanist values. In the following quote he seems to endorse programs like the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) “stop and frisk policy” which in especially targeting young African American and Latino males result in a disproportionate number of them imprisoned for minor possession of street drugs like marijuana. Pinker writes:

“A regime that trawls for drug users or other petty delinquents will net a certain number of violent people as a by-catch, further thinning the ranks of the violent people who remain on the streets.”

Moreover in detaching violence from its causes Pinker fails to account for the injustices that are the consequences of liberal humanist economics. Although world poverty figures have been incrementally reduced over the past three decades there has also been an exponential acceleration of the increasing gap in wealth between the rich and the poor. Consider:

- In 1900, people in the ten richest nations earned nine times as much per capita as did people in the ten poorest nations. This gap increased to thirty to one in 1960 and to seventy-two to one in 2001.

- The top fifth of nations possess 86 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, 68 percent of direct foreign investment, and 74 percent of the world’s telephone lines.

- The richest 20 percent of the world’s people receive at least 150 times more income than the poorest 20 percent.

- The top 20 percent consume 86 percent of the world’s goods and services, while the poorest fifth consumes only 1 percent.

- The three richest people on Earth have wealth that exceeds the combined economic output of the 47 least-developed countries. The richest 200 people have more money than the combined income of the lowest 40 percent of the world’s population, or about 2.4 billion people.

http://www.angelfire.com/nv/verbigerate/poverty\_and\_wealth.html

Even if world poverty has been incrementally receding over the past 30 years it is not diminishing as rapidly as the wealth of the rich and super rich has been increasing. Consider the extent of poverty in the world today:

Total Percentage of World Population that lives on less than $2.50 a day 50%

Total number of people that live on less than $2.50 a day 3 Billion

Total Percentage of People that live on less than $10 a day 80%

Total percent of World Populations that live where income differentials are widening 80%

Total Percentage of World Income the richest 20% account for 75%

Total Number of children that die each day due to Poverty 22,000

Total Number of People in Developing Countries with Inadequate Access to Water 1.1 billion

Total Number of School Days lost to Water Related Illness 443 million school days

http://www.statisticbrain.com/world-poverty-statistics/

Might then the increase in economic disparity, in which the wealthy grow exponentially wealthier while all too many of the poor still wallow in poverty and despair also be considered a type of violence?

Moreover, isn’t debt itself and form of it that has been imposed on the world by the Austrian-Anglo-American economic model of neo liberal capitalism also a form of violence? Coupled with the indebtedness of so many it may just be that the forms of violent crimes have merely shifted to what we now refer to as non-violent or white collar crimes such as those that are the result of crony capitalism inebriated by the streaming steroids of information networks. Since the amount of money that have been lost in the past few years are in the trillions of dollars -which is also unprecedented in human history- shouldn’t we credit our liberal humanist heritage with the lack of “mass learning capabilities” for these as well?

Pinker’s championing of the Enlightenment and liberal humanism as somehow the pinnacle of civilizational progress also ignores the consequence of its civilizing mission that contains the specter of colonialism, genocide, totalitarianism, not to mention the very development and application of technologies of mass destruction that have made the past century the actual bloodiest on record.

Even if Pinker skirts the issue of the past century largely by talking in terms of per capita rather than aggregate deaths or the sheer numbers of people killed in such a short time in both world wars (50 to 70 million alone in the six years of WWII) indicates that a linear analysis of per capita violence in human history is insufficient to yield a result that is meaningful in anticipating the future or for championing a “advance in mass species learning”.

In fact human history is better describes as non-linear. Perhaps the evolution of human reason may constrain our impulse toward violence but its instrumental application that allows it to harness the power of nature through technology has created an arsenal of weapons that if ever were deployed on a planetary scale could end the evolution of humanity once and for all.

The question that follows from this fact cant be subsequently ignored namely, is the advance of liberal humanist values along with its program of scientific progress actually making the world a more dangerous place?

There are two very good counters to Pinker which I will provide links to here the first by John Gray includes in his response to Pinker’s claims that increasing standards of Western wealth can be directly correlated with the decrease in violence, is critiqued as follows:

“The formation of democratic nation-states was one of the principal drivers of violence of the last century, involving ethnic cleansing in inter-war Europe, post-colonial states and the post-communist Balkans. Steadily-growing prosperity may act as a kind of tranquilliser, but there is no reason to think the increase of wealth can go on indefinitely — and when it falters violence will surely return. In quite different ways, attacks on minorities and immigrants by neo-fascists in Europe, the popular demonstrations against austerity in Greece and the English riots of the past summer show the disruptive and dangerous impact of sudden economic slowdown on social peace”

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/john-gray-steven-pinker-violence-review/

The second review by Ben Law called “Against Pinker’s Violence” takes issue with the very definition of Pinker applies to Violence as well as the way he uncritically applies it to societies that existed hundreds and Thousands of years before ours. Here he also quotes Foucault:

“What do we achieve by placing our morality and values onto the Romans, Greeks, Egyptians, Victorians, Byzantines, Mayans etc? Is it attempting to compare the incomparable? But, is this not, how a misguided history beings? It assumes that ‘words have kept their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas retained their logic, [and it ignores the fact that] the world of speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys.’ [8] Indeed, to comprehend and interpret the ideas of a period we have to stare into the face of the singularity of individual events — without sating that tempting urge for finality, for grand themes across the evidence. “

http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=702

Finally, the violence that humans have inflicted on the planet and its environment since the Enlightenment should be tallied in any quantitative assessment of human violence, since the destruction of our habitat also impinges on human well being as well as its future development. So lets also consider humans are in the process of causing the sixth great extinction of other species in the history of the planet:

“Mass extinctions include events in which 75 percent of the species on Earth disappear within a geologically short time period, usually on the order of a few hundred thousand to a couple million years. It’s happened only five times before in the past 540 million years of multicellular life on Earth. (The last great extinction occurred 65 million years ago, when the dinosaurs were wiped out.) At current rates of extinction, the study found, Earth will enter its sixth mass extinction within the next 300 to 2,000 years.”

http://www.livescience.com/13038-humans-causing-sixth-mass-extinction.html

“The world’s oceans are faced with an unprecedented loss of species comparable to the great mass extinctions of prehistory, a major report suggests today. The seas are degenerating far faster than anyone has predicted, the report says, because of the cumulative impact of a number of severe individual stresses, ranging from climate warming and sea-water acidification, to widespread chemical pollution and gross overfishing.”

http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/oceans-on-brink-of-catastrophe-2300272.html

During the past 40 years, close to 20 percent of the Amazon rain forest has been cut down—more than in all the previous 450 years since European colonization began. The percentage could well be far higher; the figure fails to account for selective logging, which causes significant damage but is less easily observable than clear-cuts. Scientists fear that an additional 20 percent of the trees will be lost over the next two decades

http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press\_factsh\_mitigation.pdf

The concentration of the gas in the atmosphere has jumped 40 percent since the Industrial Revolution, and scientists fear it could double or even triple this century, with profound consequences.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/science/earth/01forest.html?pagewanted=all

It is not surprising that Pinker ignores the violence humans have inflicted on the natural world. The humanist values derived from the European Enlightenment that Pinker celebrates in his study on violence bestows on humanity a central place in the natural world and ascribes to it a universal essence to humans that privileges humanity above all other forms of life in the natural world. It also champions a view of the human as a rational agent operating with free will in the world. These uncritical perspective of Humanism have long been undermined by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger who was critical of Humanism’s metaphysical pretensions as well as by psychologist such as Sigmund Freud whose work demonstrated that humans are as much driven by unconscious irrational desires as their actions are structured by reason.

The uncritical use of Pinker’s statistical study of human on human violence by those championing liberal humanist values or by those spouting new age ideologies in support their view of a progressive species evolution may serve to puff up our collective egoism but like all forms of egoism they ignore its co-dependent blind spot, an area of darkness that undermines the peaceful coexistence of humanity with itself and with nature.

### 2NC—K Prior

#### In situations where we are confronted with immoral people, we will either beat them or join them. The affirmative’s political strategy is fundamentally reactive because it’s invested in whether or not actions are legal or illegal, rather than are they right or wrong. This leaves them impotent in confrontations with folks like Bush and Cheney who justify invasion, torture, and assassination in the guise of legality. The affirmative’s framing of restrictions as a *means* to achieve security turns their restriction into a force multiplier

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Kennedy begins by coldly contradicting those opponents of the Bush administration ‘that have routinely claimed that the United States has disregarded these rules’ (p. 40) by pointing out that both opponents and supporters of the Iraq war as well as both opponents and supporters of the great panoply of US legal measures related to the war on terror ‘were playing with the same deck’ (p. 40) in presenting ‘professional arguments about how recognised rules and standards, as well as recognised exceptions and jurisdictional limitations, should be interpreted’ (p. 40). The author’s only concession with reference to the Bush administration’s legal advisers is to point out that ‘as professionals, these lawyers failed to advise their client adequately about the consequences of the interpretations they proposed, and about the way others would read the same texts – and their memoranda’ (p. 39).Thus Kennedy does not adopt any legal position to the detriment of any other, as his assessment does not seemingly pretend to persuade his reader at the level of the world of legal validity presented in the vocabulary of the UN Charter. The extent to which that excludes the author from the category of being a ‘true jus-internationalist’, according to A. Canc¸ado Trindade’s understanding of those who actually ‘comply with the ineluctable duty to stand against the apology of the use of force which is manifested in our days through distinct “doctrinal” elaborations’,42 is not for us to judge. Suffice it to note that the starting point of Kennedy’s convoluted perspective on the matter is that ‘the law of force’ is a form of ‘vocabulary for assessing the legitimacy’ (p. 41) of a form of conduct (e.g. amilitary campaign) or ‘for defending as well as attacking the “legality”’ (p. 41) of an act (e.g. distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate targets) in which the same law of force becomes a two-edged sword, everybody’s and no one’s strategic partner in a contemporary world where ‘legitimacy has become the currency of power’ (p. 45). For the author, in today’s age of ‘lawfare’ (p. 12), ‘to resist war in the name of law . . . is to misunderstand the delicate partnership of war and law’ (p. 167). In Kennedy’s view, therefore, ‘there is little comfort in knowing that law has become the vernacular for evaluating the legitimacy of war and politics where it has done so by itself becoming a strategic instrument of war and the continuation of politics by similar means’ (p. 132). 3. LAW AS A MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTION Of War and Law seems, indeed, to be animated by a certain philosophical perplexity regarding the ambiguous relation between the apparently antithetical nature of the terms appearing in its title. Since antiquity both jurists and philosophers have taught that the law’s raison d’eˆ tre is that of making social peace possible, of overcoming what would later be commonly known as the Hobbesian state of nature: bellum omnium contra omnes. Kant noted that law should be perceived first and foremost as a pacifying tool – in other words, ‘the establishment of peace constitutes, not a part of, but the whole purpose of the doctrine of law’43 – and Lauterpacht projected that same principle onto the international sphere: ‘the primordial duty’ of international law is to ensure that ‘there shall be no violence among states’.44 The paradox lies, of course, in that law performs its pacifying function not by means of edifying advice, but by the threat of the use of force. In this sense, as Kennedy points out, ‘to use law is also to invoke violence, at least the violence that stands behind legal authority’ (p. 22). Hobbes himself never concealed the fact that the state, ‘that mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God our peace and defence’,would succeed in eradicating inter-individual violence precisely due to its ability to ‘inspire terror’;45 but Weber – ‘the State is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’46 – Godwin,47 and Kelsen48 have also provided support for the same proposition. This ambivalent and paradoxical relationship between law and violence,which is obvious in the domestic or intra-state realm, becomes even more obvious in the interstate domain with its classical twin antinomy of ubi jus, ibi pax and inter arma leges silent until the law in war emerges as a bold normative sector which dares to defy this conceptual incompatibility; even war can be regulated, be submitted to conditions and limitations. The hesitations of Kant in addressing jus in bello49 or the very fact that the Latin terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello were coined, as R. Kolb has pointed out,50 at relatively recent dates, seem to confirm that this has never been per se an evident aspiration.51 Kennedy explains his own calling as international lawyer as being partly inspired by his will to participate in the law’s civilizing mission (p. 29)52 as something utterly distinct from war: We think of these rules [law in war] as coming from ‘outside’ war, limiting and restricting the military. We think of international law as a broadly humanist and civilizing force, standing back from war, judging it as just or unjust, while offering itself as a code of conduct to limit violence on the battlefield. (p. 167) The author notes how this virginal confidence in the pacifying efficiency of international law – its presumed ability to forbid, limit, humanize war ‘from outside’ – becomes progressively nuanced, eroded, almost discredited by a series of considerations. The disquieting image of the ‘delicate partnership of war and law’ becomes more and more evidenced; the lawyer who attempts to regulate warfare inevitably also becomes its accomplice. As Kennedy puts it, The laws of force provide the vocabulary not only for restraining the violence and incidence of war – but also for waging war and deciding to go to war. . . . [L]aw no longer stands outside violence, silent or prohibitive. Law also permits injury, as it privileges, channels, structures, legitimates, and facilitates acts of war. (p. 167) Unable to suppress all violence, law typifies certain forms of violence as legally admissible, thus ‘privileging’ them with regard to others and investing some agents with a ‘privilege to kill’ (p. 115). Law thereby becomes, in Kennedy’s view, a tool not so much for the restriction of war as for the legal construction of war.53 Elsewhere we have labeled Kennedy ‘a relative outsider’54 who, peering from the edge of the vocabulary of international law, tries to ‘highlight its inherent structural limits, gaps, dogmas, blind spots and biases’, as someone ‘specialised in speaking the unspeakable, disclosing ambivalences and asking awkward questions’.55 The ‘unspeakable’, in the case of the ‘law of force’, is precisely, in Kennedy’s view, this process of involuntary complicity with the very phenomenon one supposedly wants to prohibit. Prepared to ‘stain his hands’ a` la Sartre, in his attempt to humanize the military machine from within, to walk one step behind the soldier reminding him constantly, as an imaginary CNN camera, of the legal limits of the legitimate use of force, the lawyer starts to realize, in the author’s view, that he is becoming but an accessory to the war machine. Kennedy maintains that law, in its attempt to subject war to its rule, has been absorbed by it and has now become but another war instrument (p. 32);56 law has been weaponized (p. 37).57 Contemporary war is by definition a legally organized war: ‘no ship moves, no weapon is fired, no target selected without some review for compliance with regulation – not because the military has gone soft, but because there is simply no other way to make modern warfare work. Warfare has become rule and regulation’ (p. 33).War ‘has become a modern legal institution’ (p. 5), with the result that the international lawyer finds himself before an evident instance of Marxian reification, in other words ‘the consolidation of our own products as a material power erected above us beyond our control that raises a wall in front of our expectations and destroys our calculations’.58 Ideas and institutions develop ‘a life of their own’, an autonomous, perverted dynamism.

#### Debating the rhetorical *frame* for war-fighting decisions is the only way to address the source of war-fighting abuses. Debate should focus on how we think about problems and not just on particular policy. You should look at systems of militarism and not the singular event of their impact scenarios.

#### The alt is a technique for addressing how war has come to be a naturalized condition. If our process of rhetorical criticism is good, you should endorse and adopt it as a way of reading future policy research.

Jeremy ENGELS Communications @ Penn St. AND William SAAS PhD Candidate Comm. @ Penn ST. 13 [“On Acquiescence and Ends-Less War: An Inquiry into the New War Rhetoric” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 99 (2) p. 230-231]

The framing of public discussion facilitates acquiescence in contemporary wartime: thus, both the grounds on which war has been justified and the ends toward which war is adjusted are bracketed and hence made infandous. The rhetorics of acquiescence bury the grounds for war under nearly impermeable layers of political presentism and keep the ends of war in a state of perpetual flux so that they cannot be challenged. Specific details of the war effort are excised from the public realm through the rhetorical maneuver of ‘‘occultatio,’’ and the authors of such violence\*the president, his administration, and the broader national security establishment\*use a wide range of techniques to displace their own responsibility in the orchestration of war.28 Freed from the need to cultivate assent, acquiescent rhetorics take the form of a status update: hence, President Obama’s March 28, 2011 speech on Libya, framed as an ‘‘update’’ to Americans ten days after the bombs of ‘‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’’ had begun to fall. Such post facto discourse is a new norm: Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made and actions already taken. The Obama Administration has obscured the very definition of ‘‘war’’ with euphemisms like ‘‘limited kinetic action.’’ The original obfuscation, the ‘‘war on terror,’’ is a perpetually shifting, ends-less conflict that denies the very status of war. How do you dissent from something that seems so overwhelming, so inexorable? It’s hard to hit a perpetually shifting target. Moreover, as the government has become increasingly secretive about the details of war, crucial information is kept from citizens\*or its revelation is branded ‘‘treason,’’ as in the WikiLeaks case\*making it much more challenging to dissent. Furthermore, government surveillance of citizens cows citizens into quietism. So what’s the point of dissent? After all, this, too, will pass. Thus even the most critical citizens come to rest in peace with war. The confidence game of the new war rhetoric is one of perpetually shifting ends. In this ‘‘post-9/11’’ paradigm of war rhetoric, citizens are rarely asked to harness their civic energy to support the war effort, but instead are called to passively cede their wills to a greater Logos, the machinery of ends-less war. President Obama has embodied the dramatic role of wartime caretaker more adeptly than his predecessor, repeatedly exhorting citizens to ‘‘look forward’’ rather than to examine the historical grounds upon which the present state of ends-less war was founded and institutionalized.29 All the while, that forward horizon is constantly being reshaped\*from retribution, to prevention, to disarmament, to democratization, to intervention, and so on, as needed. What Max Weber called ‘‘charisma of office’’\*the phenomenon whereby extraordinary political power is passed on between charismatically inflected leaders\*is here cast in bold relief: until and unless the grounds of the new war rhetoric are meaningfully represented and unapologetically challenged, ends-less war can only continue unabated.30 War rhetoric is a mode of display that aims to dispose audiences to certain ways and states of being in the world. This, in turn, is the essence of the new war rhetoric: authorities tell us, don’t worry, we’ve got this, just go about your everyday business, go to the mall, and take a vacation. What we are calling acquiescent rhetorics aim to disempower citizens by cultivating passivity and numbness. Acquiescent rhetorics facilitate war by shutting down inquiry and deliberation and, as such, are anathema to rhetoric’s nobler, democratic ends. Rhetorical scholars thus have an important job to do.We must bring the objective violence of war out into the open so that all affected by war can meaningfully question the grounds, means, and ends of battle.We can do this by describing, and demobilizing, the rhetorics used to promote acquiescence. In sum, we believe that by making the seemingly uncontestable contestable, rhetorical critics can and should begin to invent a pedagogy that would reactivate an acquiescent public by creating space for talk where we have previously been content to remain silent.

### 2NC—Impact

#### Prioritize addressing structural violence. It locks in social and environmental tension—culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable

Tamás SZENTES is a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest, and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 8 [April 22, 2008, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf, (Gender modified—Sigalos)]

(1) It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but

• numerous local wars took place,

• terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries,

• arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development,

• many “invisible wars”1 are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that

• the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life.

Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intra society inequities and distorted development patterns 2 , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars.

It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system.

Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development.

“Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with over exhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced.

Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism.

When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”.

While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe.

One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution.

Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, well- fed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other.

Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

### Terror

#### Apocalyptic terrorism scenarios are grounded in vested political interests and violent modes of national-identity formation in which political reforms like the plan are used to carve the world into liberal and illiberal spheres—the impact is a racist extermination of alterity and expansive structural violence

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New Terrorism vs. Old Terrorism

The opening sentence of a textbook on terrorism states, “Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behavior since the dawn of recorded history” (Martin, 2010, 3). If this is the case, what makes the ‘new terrorism’ different from the old? According to the mainstream orthodoxy on terrorism, the old terrorism was generally characterized by: left wing ideology; the use of small scale, conventional weapons; clearly identifiable organizations or movements with equally clear political and social messages; specific selection of targets and “explicit grievances championing specific classes or ethnonational groups” (Martin, 2010, 28).

Also according to the orthodoxy, the shift to the new terrorism, on the other hand, is thought to have emerged in the early 1990s (Jackson, 2011) and took root in mass consciousness with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. (Martin, 2010, 3). The new terrorism is characterized by: “loose, cell-based networks with minimal lines of command and control,” “desired acquisition of high-intensity weapons and weapons of mass destruction” (Martin, 2010, 27), “motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology and it is aimed at causing mass causality and maximum destruction” (Jackson, 2007, 179-180).

However, these dichotomous definitions of the old and new types of terrorism are not without problems. The first major problem is that terrorism has been characterized by the same fundamental qualities throughout history. Some of the superficial characteristics, the means of implementation (e.g. the invention of the Internet or dynamite) or the discourse (communism vs. Islam) may have evolved, but the central components remain the same. The second major problem is that the characterization of new terrorism is, at best, rooted in a particular political ideology, biased and inaccurate. At worst, it is racist, promotes war mongering and has contributed to millions of deaths. As David Rapoport states:

Many contemporary studies begin … by stating that although terrorism has always been a feature of social existence, it became ‘significant’ … when it ‘increased in frequency’ and took on ‘novel dimensions’ as an international or transnational activity, creating in the process a new ‘mode of conflict’ (1984, 658).

Isabelle Duyvesteyn points out that this would indicate evidence for the emergence of a new type of terrorism, if it were not for the fact that the article was written in 1984 and described a situation from the 1960s (Duyvesteyn, 2004, 439). It seems that there have been many new phases of terrorism over the years. So many so that the definition of ‘new’ has been stretched significantly and applied relatively across decades. Nevertheless, the idea that this terrorism, that which the War on Terror (WoT) is directed against, is the most significant and unique form of terrorism that has taken hold in the popular and political discourse. Therefore, it is useful to address each of the so-called new characteristics in turn.

The first characteristic is the idea that new terrorism is based on loosely organized cell-based networks as opposed to the traditional terrorist groups, which were highly localized and hierarchical in nature. An oft-cited example of a traditional terrorist group is the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who operated under a military structure and in a relatively (in contrast to the perceived transnational operations of al-Qaeda) localized capacity. However, some of the first modern terrorists were not highly organized groups but small fragmented groups of anarchists. These groups were heeding the call of revolutionary anarchist Mikhail Bakunin and other contemporary anarchists to achieve anarchism, collectivism and atheism via violent means (Morgan, 2001, 33). Despite the initial, self-described “amorphous” nature of these groups, they were a key force in the Russian Revolution (Maximoff, G.). Furthermore, leading anarchist philosophers of the Russian Revolution argued that terrorists “should organize themselves into small groups, or cells” (Martin, 2010, 217). These small groups cropped up all around Russia and Europe in subsequent years and formed an early form of a “loosely organized cell-based network” not unlike modern day al Qaeda. Duyvesteyn further notes that both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was founded in 1964, and Hezbollah, founded 1982, operate on a network structure with very little central control over groups (2004, 444).

The second problematic idea of new terrorism is that contemporary terrorist groups aim to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This belief is simply not supported by empirical evidence. One of the key problems with this theory is that WMDs are significantly more difficult to obtain and utilize than most people understand. Even if a terrorist group were to obtain a biological WMD, “Biologist Matthew Meselson calculates that it would take a ton of nerve gas or five tons of mustard gas to produce heavy causalities among unprotected people in an open area of one square kilometer” (Mueller, 2005, 488). And that’s only an example of the problem with the implementation of WMDs, assuming they are acquired, transported and desirable by a terrorist group in the first place. Additional problems, such as the fact that WMDs “are extremely difficult to deploy and control” (Mueller, 2005, 488) and that making a bomb “is an extraordinarily difficult task” (Mueller, 2005, 489), further diminish the risk. It is interesting to note that, while the potential dangers of WMDs are much lauded, the attacks of September 11th were low tech and had been technologically possible for more than 100 years. Mueller also states, “although nuclear weapons have been around for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state (much less a terrorist group) a nuclear weapon that the recipient could use independently” (2005, 490).

All of this talk about the difficultly of acquiring and deploying WMDs (by non-state agents), is not to diminish the question of what terrorists have to gain by utilizing these weapons. It is important to question whether it would even further the aims of terrorists to use WMDs. The evidence suggests otherwise. In the “Politics of Fear” Jackson states, “Mass casualties are most often counterproductive to terrorist aims – they alienate their supporters and can provoke harsh reprisals from the authorities […]” in addition, “[…] they would undermine community support, distort the terrorist’s political message, and invite over-whelming retaliation” (2007, 196-197). Despite popular rhetoric to the contrary, terrorists are “rational political actors and are acutely aware of these dangers” (Jackson, 2007, 197). Government appointed studies on this issue have supported these views.

This leads us to the third problem with new terrorism, which is the idea that we are facing a new era of terrorism motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology. As stated previously, earlier, so-called traditional forms of terrorism are associated with left wing, political ideology, whereas contemporary terrorists are described as having “anti-modern goals of returning society to an idealized version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-democratic, anti-progressive and, by implication, irrational” (Gunning and Jackson, 3). Rapoport argues the idea that religious terrorists are irrational, saying, “what seems to be distinctive about modern [religious] terrorists, their belief that terror can be organized rationally, represents or distorts a major theme peculiar to our own culture […]” (1984, 660). Conveniently for the interests of the political elites, as we shall see later, the idea of irrational fanaticism makes the notion of negotiation and listening to the demands of the other impossible. In light of this, it is interesting to note that the U.S. has, for decades, given billions of dollars in aid to the State of Israel, which could be argued to be a fundamentalist, religious organization that engages in the terrorization of a group of people. Further, it is difficult to speak of The Troubles in Northern Ireland without speaking of the religious conflict, yet it was never assumed that the IRA was “absolutist, inflexible, unrealistic, lacking in political pragmatism, and not amenable to negotiation” (Gunning and Jackson, 4). Rapaport further reinforces the idea that religious terrorism goes back centuries by saying, “Before the nineteenth century, religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror…” (1984, 659).

As we have seen here, problems with the discourse of new terrorism include the fact that these elements of terrorism are neither new nor are the popular beliefs of the discourse supported by empirical evidence. The question remains, then, why is the idea of new terrorism so popular? This question will be addressed next.

Political Investment in New Terrorism

There are two main categories that explain the popularity of new terrorism. The first category is government and political investment in the propagation of the idea that a distinct, historically unknown type of terrorism exists. The mainstream discourse [1] reinforces, through statements by political elites, media, entertainment and every other way imaginable, the culture of violence, militarism and feelings of fear. Through mass media, cultural norms and the integration of neoliberal ideology into society, people are becoming increasingly desensitized to human rights issues, war, social justice and social welfare, not to mention apathetic to the political process in general.

The discourse of the WoT is merely the contemporary incarnation of this culture of fear and violence. In the past, various threats have included American Indians, women, African Americans, communists, HIV/AIDS and drugs, to name but a few (Campbell, 1992). It can be argued that there are four main political functions of terrorism discourse. The first is as a distraction from other, more immediate and domestic social problems such as poverty, employment, racial inequality, health and the environment. The second, more sinister function is to control dissent. In looking at both of these issues Jackson states:

There are a number of clear political advantages to be gained from the creation of social anxiety and moral panics. In the first place, fear is a disciplining agent and can be effectively deployed to de-legitimise dissent, mute criticism, and constrain internal opponents. […] Either way, its primary function is to ease the pressures of accountability for political elites. As instrument of elite rule, political fear is in effect a political project aimed at reifying existing structures of power. (Politics of Fear, 2007, 185).

Giroux further reinforces the idea that a culture of fear creates conformity and deflects attention from government accountability by saying, “the ongoing appeal to jingoistic forms of patriotism divert the public from addressing a number of pressing domestic and foreign issues; it also contributes to the increasing suppression of dissent” (2003, 5).

Having a problem that is “ubiquitous, catastrophic, and fairly opaque” (Jackson, Politics of Fear, 2007, 185) is useful to political elites, because it is nearly impossible to address the efficacy of combating the problem. At least, empirical evaluation can be, and is, easily discouraged in academic circles through research funding directives. Domestic problems such as the unemployment rate or health care reform, on the other hand, are directly measurable and heavily monitored by domestic sources. It is possible to account for the success or failure of policies designed to address these types of problems and the (re)election of politicians often depends heavily on success in these areas. However, the public is neither involved on a participative level nor, often, socially aware of what is happening in murkier and unreachable areas like foreign policy.

The third political investment in maintaining the terrorism discourse has to do with economics. “At a material level, there are a great many vested interests in maintaining the widespread condition of fear, not least for the military-industrial complex which benefits directly from increased spending on national security” (Jackson, Politics of Fear, 2007, 186). This is true with all forms of crime and insecurity as all of them factor into the greater security-industrial complex. Not only do these industries employ millions of people and support their families, they boost the economy. Barry Buzan talks of these the importance of these issues to both the government and the public in terms of a ‘threat-deficit’ – meaning that U.S. policy and society is dependent on having an external threat (Buzan, 2007, 1101).

The fourth key political interest in terrorism discourse is constructing a national identity. This will be discussed more thoroughly in the following section, however, it is important to acknowledge the role the WoT (and previous threats) has had on constructing and reinforcing a collective identity. Examples of this can be seen in the discourse and the subsequent reaction to anyone daring to step outside the parameters of the Bush Administration-established narrative in the days immediately following the September 11th attacks. A number of journalists, teachers and university professors lost their jobs for daring to speak out in criticism of U.S. policy and actions following the attacks. In 2001, Lynne Cheney attacked the then deputy chancellor of the New York City Schools, Judith Rizzo, for saying “terrorist attacks demonstrated the importance of teaching about Muslim cultures” (Giroux, 2003, 22). According to Giroux, this form of jingoistic patriotism “becomes a euphemism for shutting down dissent, eliminating critical dialogue, and condemning critical citizenship in the interest of conformity and a dangerous departure from what it means to uphold a viable democracy” (2003, 24). The message is, we are not the other (Muslims), patriotism equals agreement and compliance and our identity is based on the shared values of liberty and justice.

According to Carol Winkler, “Negative ideographs contribute to our collective identity by branding behavior that is unacceptable … American society defines itself as much by its opposition to tyranny and slavery as it does by a commitment to liberty” (Winkler, 2006, 12). Terrorism, and by association in this case, Islam, functions as a negative ideograph of American values. It thereby tells us what our values and our identity are by telling us who the enemy is and who we are not. According to Jackson, “[…] some have argued that Western identity is dependent on the appropriation of a backward, illiberal, violent Islamic ‘other’ against which the West can organize a collective liberal, civilized ‘self’ and consolidate its cultural and political norms” (Jackson, Constructing Enemies, 2007, 420).

Through this analysis we can see there are four key ways in which the hegemonic system is invested in propagating a culture of fear and violence and terrorism discourse. Not only is it key for political elites to support this system, it is also crucial that there be an ever renewing threat that is uniquely different from past threats. These new threats allow for the investment of significantly more resources, the continuation of the economy, the renewal of a strong sense of cultural identity and the indoctrination and obedience of new generations of society. This essay will now look at how individual and collective psychology supports the popularity of the new terrorism discourse.

### ALT—Anti-Subordination Framing

#### Alt solves—their 1ac McCauley ev

However, opposition to drone attacks is high in other countries, and there seems to be growing segment of the US population that is against the use of drones to kill suspected terrorists. The greater consistency of US opponents of drone strikes may give them a political strength beyond their numbers in comparison to the supporters, whose polling numbers fluctuate more. Should drones' unpopularity in the United States continue to increase, and their unpopularity in other countries persist, they may well become politically impractical, no matter how convenient and cost-effective the technology may be.

#### Militarism may be a central value of modern Western culture, but it can be changed through criticism—multiple empirical examples prove

Duane CADY, Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University, 10 [*From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum*, p. 23-24]

The slow but persistent rise in awareness of racial, ethnic, gender, sexual- orientation, and class oppression in our time and the beginning efforts of liberation from within oppressed groups offer hope that even the most deeply held and least explicitly challenged predispositions of culture might be examined. Such examinations can lead to changes in the lives of the oppressed. Perhaps even those oppressed by warism will one day free themselves from accepting war as an inevitable condition of nature.

Two hundred years ago slavery was a common and well- established social institution in the United States. It had been an ordinary feature of many societies dating to ancient and perhaps prehistoric times. Slavery was taken for granted as a natural condition for beings thought to be inferior to members of the dominant group. And slavery was considered an essential feature of our nation’s economy. Within the past two centuries, attitudes toward slavery have changed dramatically. With these fundamental shifts in normative lenses came fundamental shifts in the practice and legality of slavery. These changes have been as difficult as they have been dramatic, for former slaves, for former slave- holders, and for culture at large. While deep racial prejudices persist to this day, slavery is no longer tolerated in modern societies. Slavery- like conditions of severe economic exploitation of labor have become embarrassments to dominant groups in part because slavery is universally condemned. The point is that the most central values of cultures— thought to be essential to the very survival of the society and allegedly grounded in the natural conditions of creation—can change in fundamental ways in relatively short periods of time with profound implications for individuals and societies. John Dewey beautifully links this point to the consideration of warism: “War is as much a social pattern [for us] as was the domestic slavery which the ancients thought to be immutable fact.”9

The civil rights movement has helped us see that human worth is not determined by a racial hierarchy. Feminism has helped us realize again that dominant attitudes about people are more likely values we choose rather than innate and determined features of human nature. [END PAGE 23] It is historically true that men have been more actively violent and have received more training and encouragement in violence than have women.10 Dominant attitudes of culture have explained this by reference to what is “natural” for males and “natural” for females. By questioning the traditional role models for men and women, all of us be- come more free to choose and create the selves we are to be; we need not be defined by hidden presumptions of gender roles.

Parallel to racial and gender liberation movements, pacifism questions taking warism for granted. Pacifists seek an examination of our unquestioned assumption of warism to expose it as racism and sexism have been examined and exposed. Just as opponents of racism and sex- ism consider the oppression of nonwhites and women, respectively, to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society, so opponents of warism— pacifists of various sorts— consider war to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society.

## \*\*\* 1NR

### Terror overview

#### Terrorism is a self-defeating tactic—letting them punch themselves out is a better strategy than drones

Groves 13—Major Bryan Groves is currently the Deputy Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. A graduate from Yale University's Masters of Arts in IR program, he is a Special Forces Officer and has served in Iraq and Bosnia [“America's Trajectory in the Long War1: Redirecting Our Efforts Toward Strategic Effects Versus Simply Tactical Gains,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 36, Issue 1, 2013, Taylor & Francis, Accessed through Emory Libraries]

Although Al Qaeda claims that they do not target Muslims, 14 the reality is that 85 percent of the victims from attacks claimed by AQAM from 2004 to 2008 are from Muslim majority countries, while the number climbs to 98 percent when looking at the years 2006–2008, thereby excluding the 2004 Madrid train and the 2005 London subway/bus bombings. 15 The various agencies of the federal government should articulate facets of the positive and negative message more clearly and more repeatedly as an underlying aspect of their responsibilities in the Overseas Contingency Operation. This can stretch from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to Treasury, the intelligence community, the National Counter Terrorism Center, and the Department of Justice. Agencies would, of course, be best served to focus on messages relevant to their “jurisdictions.” For instance, the Treasury Department should emphasize terrorists’ use of front charities to fundraise for their organizations and how Treasury's actions (and that of international partners) have made inroads at freezing terrorist bank accounts.

In addition to the responsibility that each agency has to communicate effectively, the United States needs a department whose mission is information campaigns and strategic communication. America would benefit from having a department whose sole job was to focus on these areas, even if it would require working through potentially problematic aspects of such an organization. 16 Instead of having a situation where strategic communication is neglected at best, if attempted at all, the United States would have a resourced institution that would help the country gain expertise in the field, plus have a recognized group of people to turn to for these vital tasks. Anwar al-Awlaki 17 and Samir Khan developed Inspire Magazine to reach an American audience with his radical message of violent Islamism. In the late summer of 2011, the United States established the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication (CSCC) as an interagency group housed at the State Department. The creation of this office demonstrates recognition by the Obama administration of the need for such an organization. However, a gap still remains to develop an entity that can help the country better dialogue with the Muslim and Arab world, 18 and for multiple purposes, not just for counterterrorism.

Fifth, increased domestic radicalization and polarization, especially visible in the spring and summer of 2010, along with a rising drumbeat of homegrown terrorist plots and attacks 19 has further frustrated any potential strategic efforts. Increased participation by Americans in the jihad, Americans serving as spokesmen for Al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, and two Americans travelling to Somalia to become suicide bombers are all examples of growing domestic radicalization. Additionally, an inability to de-radicalize Samir Khan, or at least prevent his mobilization and voluntary departure from the country, is a failure of leadership, understanding, and creativity. 20 The following incidents, plots, and groups offer further evidence: the 2002 arrest of the Lackawanna Six and the Portland Seven, the 2004 arrest of the Virginia Paintball Jihad Cell, the 2007 Fort Dix Plot, David Coleman Headley's reconnaissance of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the May 2009 Newburgh Plot to shoot down military planes and to bomb New York synagogues, Carlos Bledsoe's June 2009 drive-by shooting at a military recruiting station in Arkansas, the July 2009 arrest of the North Carolina terror group led by Daniel Patrick Boyd, the September 2009 Najibulla Zazi–New York City backpack (subway) plot, the November 2009 MAJ Nidal Hassan Fort Hood shooting, the December 2009 underwear bomber over Detroit, the May 2010 Times Square attempted bombing by Faisal Shahzad, and the November 2010 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) printer plot.

Finally, American leaders have failed to recognize that the “center of gravity” in the struggle resides in the non-fighting populations of both sides. Concern regarding which terrorist leaders America and its allies should target next consumes the intelligence and military apparatus, and to some degree it should. This is all the more reason, however, why national leaders in Washington must maintain a broader perspective, clearly define the political objectives, utilize appropriate means to reach them, and establish a new department to aid in areas of the struggle where the country is lacking.

From the global jihadists’ vantage point, they are dependent on a “renewable resource” (i.e., new Muslim recruits). The source will not remain “renewable” indefinitely if they continue to kill fellow Muslims at high rates and demonstrate substantial inconsistencies between word and deed. In fact, if left to their own devices one esteemed jihadi scholar believes international jihadis will precipitate their own demise. 21 Since either internal or external factors can lead to the end of a terrorist organization, 22 the relevant question in this case is: how can the United States best use external factors to precipitate the collapse of AQAM along its internal fault lines? 23

The United States must determine how lasting success will be made and then act accordingly. Its prioritization of the kinetic fight over the past ten years indicates that the United States has believed kill or capture missions is where the true payoff will occur—or at least that that aspect of the fight deserves the most resources. Presidents Bush and Obama, and the Congress, may really believe this. Alternatively, it may be that America's military and technical prowess facilitates a focus on military means. And, as a country that loves to experience immediate gratification and measure progress in tangible ways, a kinetic fight lends itself well to its audience. However, numbers of enemy killed or captured is ultimately an unsatisfying metric because it does not address the resonance of the American message versus that of Al Qaeda and likeminded affiliates. The metric also does not measure whether those individuals initially neutral or resistant to Al Qaeda's message are now more sympathetic of terrorist aims, favoring calls for armed jihad over the values they see America representing.

The United States is finally beginning to demonstrate an understanding that long-term progress will not come simply through sustained kinetic operations, but from actions that communicate the inconsistencies inherent in Al Qaeda's message and that stem the flow of recruits to its ranks. The U.S. government has recently developed a few interagency groups focused on countering violent extremism. These groups are thinking about the problem of domestic radicalization, especially among American Muslim communities, and how to develop effective local and national efforts to address it. Congress heard testimony during the second week in March 2011 regarding this phenomenon, an additional recognition of the potential problem that scholars once thought America's multiculturalism rendered a non issue. 24 Should America determine that this is an important way to affect its own security, and that of its allies around the world, it must make a concerted effort and do more in this arena.

But how will we know when we are succeeding? Daniel Byman lists three semi tangible indications of success in this war: (1) low levels of death, (2) the level of fear is reduced, and (3) counterterrorism is done at an acceptable cost. 25 In addition to these markers, a couple of the intangible indicators that will signal American success in the Long War will be the ability to treat terrorism as isolated crimes instead of part of a broader terrorist campaign, and an American psyche resilient not only against thwarted or failed terrorist attacks, but also against successful attacks. 26 A final condition for success is a society that is largely inoculated against radicalization. There will always be fringe elements in any society, but the key is that the radical messages on either side of an issue are unable to go main stream. 27

#### Prioritize strategic considerations over tactical ones

Cronin 13—Audrey Kurth Cronin is Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. Dr. Cronin was Specialist in Terrorism at the Congressional Research Service, where she was responsible for advising Members of Congress in the aftermath of 9/11. She has also served periodically in the Executive branch, including in the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy, where she drafted portions of the Secretary’s strategic plan; the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the American Embassy in Moscow. [July/August 2013, “Why Drones Fail,” *Foreign Affairs*, Accessed through Emory Libraries]

The war-weary United States, for which the phrase “boots on the ground” has become politically toxic, prefers to eliminate its terrorist foes from the skies. The tool of choice: unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones. In Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen -- often far away from any battlefield where American troops are engaged -- Washington has responded to budding threats with targeted killings.

Like any other weapon, armed drones can be tactically useful. But are they helping advance the strategic goals of U.S. counterterrorism? Although terrorism is a tactic, it can succeed only on the strategic level, by leveraging a shocking event for political gain. To be effective, counterterrorism must itself respond with a coherent strategy. The problem for Washington today is that its drone program has taken on a life of its own, to the point where tactics are driving strategy rather than the other way around.

The main goals of U.S. counterterrorism are threefold: the strategic defeat of al Qaeda and groups affiliated with it, the containment of local conflicts so that they do not breed new enemies, and the preservation of the security of the American people. Drones do not serve all these goals. Although they can protect the American people from attacks in the short term, they are not helping to defeat al Qaeda, and they may be creating sworn enemies out of a sea of local insurgents. It would be a mistake to embrace killer drones as the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism.

#### Even if drones quash one threat, they fuel many others. Terrorism is like a hydra, but we can’t keep cutting off heads

Cronin 13—Audrey Kurth Cronin is Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. Dr. Cronin was Specialist in Terrorism at the Congressional Research Service, where she was responsible for advising Members of Congress in the aftermath of 9/11. She has also served periodically in the Executive branch, including in the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy, where she drafted portions of the Secretary’s strategic plan; the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the American Embassy in Moscow. [July/August 2013, “Why Drones Fail,” *Foreign Affairs*, Accessed through Emory Libraries]

KEEPING LOCAL CONFLICTS LOCAL

Short of defeating al Qaeda altogether, a top strategic objective of U.S. counterterrorism should be to prevent fighters in local conflicts abroad from aligning with the movement and targeting the United States and its allies. Military strategists refer to this goal as “the conservation of enemies,” the attempt to keep the number of adversaries to a minimum.

Violent jihadism existed long before 9/11 and will endure long after the U.S. war on terrorism finally ends. The best way for the United States to prevent future acts of international terrorism on its soil is to make sure that local insurgencies remain local, to shore up its allies’ capacities, and to use short-term interventions such as drones rarely, selectively, transparently, and only against those who can realistically target the United States.

The problem is that the United States can conceivably justify an attack on any individual or group with some plausible link to al Qaeda. Washington would like to disrupt any potentially powerful militant network, but it risks turning relatively harmless local jihadist groups into stronger organizations with eager new recruits. If al Qaeda is indeed becoming a vast collective of local and regional insurgents, the United States should let those directly involved in the conflicts determine the outcome, keep itself out, provide resources only to offset funds provided to radical factions, and concentrate on protecting the homeland.

Following 9/11, the U.S. war on terrorism was framed in the congressional authorization to use force as a response to “those nations, organizations, or persons” responsible for the attacks. The name “al Qaeda,” which does not appear in the authorization, has since become an ill-defined shorthand, loosely employed by terrorist leaders, counterterrorism officials, and Western pundits alike to describe a shifting movement. The vagueness of the U.S. terminology at the time was partly deliberate: the authorization was worded to sidestep the long-standing problem of terrorist groups’ changing their names to evade U.S. sanctions. But Washington now finds itself in a permanent battle with an amorphous and geographically dispersed foe, one with an increasingly marginal connection to the original 9/11 plotters. In this endless contest, the United States risks multiplying its enemies and heightening their incentives to attack the country.

It is precisely because al Qaeda is a shifting adversary that drones have proved so tempting. Globalization has given terrorists potential worldwide reach, and Washington wants to destroy new elements in these networks before they can plan attacks. U.S. policymakers apparently believe that killing fighters before they target the American homeland beats invading another country in the aftermath of an attack. Al Qaeda–associated operatives have been trying to take advantage of unstable situations in Libya, Mali, Yemen, and, especially, Syria. Using drone strikes may allow Washington to keep jihadists from tipping the balance in sensitive places.

U.S. officials also claim that drone strikes have prevented or preempted numerous specific terrorist attacks that would have resulted in American casualties. These claims are hard to verify, but they are intuitive enough. Consider the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the source of several attempted attacks against the United States. In 2009, the effort of a would-be terrorist to ignite a bomb hidden in his underwear on a plane on Christmas Day was connected to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as was an October 2010 attempt to blow up bombs hidden in printer cartridges aboard two U.S. cargo planes. The drone campaign in Yemen directly responded to these dangers and has reduced the likelihood of similar dangers manifesting themselves in the future.

But other threats to the U.S. homeland have actually been sparked by outrage over the drone campaign. Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, tried to bomb Times Square in May 2010 by loading a car with explosives. A married financial analyst, Shahzad was an unlikely terrorist. When he pleaded guilty, however, he cited his anger about U.S. policies toward Muslim countries, especially drone strikes in his native Pakistan.

#### Violence can’t be controlled in a linear, predictable manner—you have to err ethically towards non-violence because the epistemological uncertainty surrounding the success of violence

Richard JACKSON, Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago and former Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 11 [August 7, 2011, “Amputations and Crocodiles: Counter-Analogies of Political Violence,” <http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2011/08/07/amputations-and-crocodiles-analogies-of-political-violence/>]

It is common for politicians and commentators to use analogies and metaphors to describe and explain acts of political violence. Medical analogies are particularly common, such as the notion that terrorism is a ‘cancer’ or that aerial bombing can be ‘surgical’. The problem is that these analogies can influence the way we think; for example, they can make us believe that a massive bombing campaign against a country – a series of ‘surgical strikes’ or military ‘operations’ – can destroy the ‘cancer’ of terrorism or cure a lack of democracy; they can make us think that violence can sometimes be an instrument of healing. Particularly when the analogy or metaphor is inaccurate or misleading, it can obscure the reality of political violence and cause us to accept its legitimacy without really questioning its real-world effects or true nature. It can, in other words, lead to destructive policy choices.

Although no analogy is perfect and will contain its own distortions of the thing being described, I want to suggest two analogies which will help us to think more clearly and realistically about contemporary political violence. First, following the popularity of medical analogies, I want to suggest that we should always think about political violence as amputation rather than as general surgical operations or medical intervention. Adopting this analogy can help us to face some important truths about violence, such as that while amputation (violence) may sometimes be necessary in an extreme emergency to save a person’s life, it is always disfiguring and it will leave the patient (victim) a less than whole person who will suffer forever afterwards, even if prosthetics and other therapies make their life easier. In other words, violence can never be good or noble or positive in itself; it will always be destructive and cause suffering to its victims, even if it is viewed as necessary. Violence is permanently damaging and disfiguring by its very nature, as anyone who has ever been victimized will testify.

Another principle to take from this analogy is that amputation (violence) should always be the very last option and viewed as an extreme measure that we must first take every possible step to avoid. Accepting this analogy would limit the frequency with which our leaders go to war or intervene militarily in other countries, and encourage them to try a great deal harder to find non-violent alternatives to the policy of political violence. If the leaders of the world’s nations accepted that violent military intervention would be analogous to doctors chopping off a patient’s legs or arms, they might be more cautious and not necessarily advocate it as an almost automatic policy response to the lack of democracy, acts of terrorism, or humanitarian crisis. If we’re lucky, it might also convince the leaders of social movements to reconsider the decision to escalate their campaign to include violent strategies and tactics when they feel frustrated by the lack of progress on social justice.

A second analogy is to think of political violence as a crocodile, rather than as a dog or a horse (as in unleashing the ‘dogs of war’ or ‘war horse’). The fact is that, unlike dogs or horses, crocodiles can never be tamed or controlled. This is because crocodiles have very small, primitive brains which can only respond to instinctual survival needs. In other words, no matter how often someone feeds and cares for a crocodile, the crocodile will fail to recognize that person as anything more than a potential meal and a moment of carelessness will see the crocodile try to eat them, even after twenty years of loving care. It also means that even if the crocodile owner were to take it for a walk through town and it was not to try and eat every small child it came across, this would not be proof of the tameness of the crocodile; it would just be luck on that particular occasion.

The importance of this analogy lies in its application to humanitarian intervention and the application of military force as a policy option. The fact is that military force (like the crocodile) will always be an untamed beast that will try and devour its owner if it senses the opportunity. It cannot be tamed or controlled like a dog on a leash. This is because war and violence has its own inbuilt tendencies towards extreme action and unpredictable consequences, as Clausewitz explained a long time ago. Sometimes the application of violence will provoke violent resistance and further escalation; other times it will result in capitulation. Most often, it leads to the distortion of our thinking and impedes learning, and in every case, it has incalculable opportunity costs. There is no way to predict which way the crocodile will go, except that it will be painful and damaging for someone. Therefore, any politician who says that military success is assured is only expressing the hope that the crocodile won’t eat any small children on this particular occasion.

The emerging quagmire in Libya, with its thousands of civilian victims (the very ones the crocodile was deployed to protect), the growing prospects of civil war between rebel factions, and the lack of any measureable success, is testament to the crocodile nature of applying military force – as is the ten years of war so far in Afghanistan, the seven years of war so far in Iraq, and the inglorious record of military intervention in places like Lebanon, Gaza, Somalia, DRC, the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Colombia, and a hundred other conveniently forgotten places.

In sum, the lessons to take from these analogies are: if you take your crocodile for a walk, don’t ever forget that it can never be tamed and it will usually try to eat the little children who cross its path; also, it is not advisable to use a crocodile in an operation of surgical amputation, even when it’s for democracy or human rights or some other noble ideal. Try to find another approach instead. After all, there are plenty of tried and tested non-violent alternatives to resolving conflict, just as there are usually medical alternatives to amputation.

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#### Threat is quite low. Their assessment is political hype

**Walt 12/4**/13 - Professor of international relations @ Harvard University [Stephen M. Walt, “The Embarrassing Debate Over the 'War on Terror' Foreign Policy, DECEMBER 4, 2013, pg. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/04/the\_embarrassing\_debate\_over\_the\_war\_on\_terror#sthash.Io11bI7s.dpuf

I raise this question because our leaders don't seem to be able to get their stories straight on this one. A good case can be made that the "war on terror" is mostly won -- in the sense that we've defanged the most dangerous anti-American types -- and that what's left are various copycats in various places that ultimately don't matter that much to the United States and are best dealt with by local authorities. If this view is correct, then President Barack Obama was right to suggest that the "war on terror" is over and to try to shift our attention back to other foreign-policy priorities. To say that is not to say the danger is zero -- indeed, there will be terrorist attacks in the future - it is just to say that it is more of a tragic nuisance than a Major Threat.

But now we're being told by Sen. Dianne Feinstein and Rep. Mike Rogers, the heads of the Senate and House Intelligence committees, that the terrorist threat is back and worse than it was a few years ago. In particular, they point to the growing jihadi role in places like Syria and to self-congratulatory statements from al Qaeda leaders like Ayman al-Zawahiri. The implication, as this New York Times story makes clear, is that the United States needs to get more directly involved in defeating this ever-expanding set of terrorist copycats.

I understand that terrorist groups like al Qaeda do operate in secret (to the extent that they can), and that gauging the actual level of the threat they pose is not an exact science. And I recognize that risk-averse politicians prefer to err on the side of caution. If you issue lots of scary warnings and nothing happens, you can take credit for having been prudent. But if you tell people the danger isn't that great and then an attack takes place, you sound naïve, credulous, and insufficiently devoted to national security. So when in doubt, politicians are inclined to oversell the danger.

Still, it really is important to get this right: Just how serious is the threat, some 12 years after the 9/11 attacks? In terms of the direct harm to Americans in the United States, the danger appears to be quite modest. So why are Feinstein and Rogers so animated by this latest set of developments? And doesn't Boston's defiant and resolute reaction to the city's marathon bombing in April suggest that the American population isn't nearly as querulous as politicians fear: If you explain to them that there is no such thing as 100 percent security, they don't go all wobbly. Instead, they display precisely the sort of calm resolution that causes terrorist campaigns to fail.

It is even more important to figure out how best to respond. If Islamic extremists using terrorist methods are trying to gain power in various countries, does it make sense for the United States to insert itself in these conflicts and inevitably invite their attention? Or is the country better off remaining aloof or just backing local authorities (if it can find any who seem reasonably competent)?

My larger concern is that we have also created a vast counterterrorism industry that has a vested interest in continuing this campaign. Those in the industry are the most prominent and visible experts, but fighting terrorists is also a meal ticket for many of them and self-interest might naturally incline them to hype the threat. The danger is that the United States will devote too much effort and energy to chasing relatively weak and obscure bad guys in various not-very-important places (see under: Afghanistan, Pakistan's frontier provinces, Somalia, etc., etc.,) while other problems get short shrift.

### No Use On Russia

#### No impact to nuclear detonation on Russian soil

Thompson 10—Nicholas Thompson is a senior editor at The New Yorker, senior fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, member of the Council on Foreign Relations [January 2, 2010, “Could Al Qaeda set off Russia’s Dead Hand nuclear system?” http://thehawkandthedove.nickthompson.com/index.php/2010/01/could-al-qaeda-set-off-russias-dead-hand-nuclear-system/]

Yesterday I got a good question from a reader: “what happens when someone like Al Qaeda detonates a bomb on Russian soil in an attempt to have a response triggered against the US?” The answer is: Likely nothing. Assuming the system works the same way as when it was constructed, there are three safeguards that would prevent this launch. The first is that the system lies idle most of the time. It has to be turned on specifically, during a crisis, when Russia is worried that the US is considering a strike. Secondly, if the system can communicate with the humans in command of the arsenal, it turns off. And, lastly, humans have to push the final button to launch. So, to succeed in starting a nuclear conflagration, Al Qaeda would have to strike when U.S. and Russian tensions were at an extraordinary level; it would have to blow up the main command and control centers in Moscow; and, somehow, the men manning the system in a bunker would have to be convinced that the strike came from the U.S. All of that happening is extremely unlikely.

### Pakistan

#### Collapses govt—causes a military coup

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76

#### No Pakistani collapse

Dasgupta 13 (Sunil Ph.D. in political science and the director of UMBC's Political Science Program and a senior fellow at Brookings, 2/25/13, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan," East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/)

Bill Keller of the New York Times has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis’. But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-scholar Anatol Lieven argues that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan, tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements — propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country.

Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements do not yet exist. Given the current conditions and those in the foreseeable future, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.