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#### Restriction on authority must limit presidential discretion

**Lobel, 8** - Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School (Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War” 392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel\_.pdf)

So  too, the congressional power to declare or authorize war has been long held to permit Congress to authorize and wage a limited war—“limited in place, in objects, and in time.” 63 When Congress places such restrictions on the President’s authority to wage war, it limits the President’s discretion to conduct battlefield operations. For example, Congress authorized President George H. W. Bush to attack Iraq in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but it confined the President’s authority to the use of U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions directed to force Iraqi troops to leave Kuwait. That restriction would not have permitted the President to march into Baghdad after the Iraqi army had been decisively ejected from Kuwait, a limitation recognized by President Bush himself.64

#### They don’t – president still gets to decide, the plan’s an after-the-fact correction.

#### Voting issue –

#### 1) Ground – all DAs and CPs like ESR, flexibility, and politics compete based off restrictions on the presidential decision-making process – skews the topic in favor of the aff.

#### 2) Limits – the plan amounts to deterrence of prez powers, not statutory limitations – that’s opens a floodgate of affs that just dissuade presidential expansion of power

### 1NC CP 1

#### The Executive branch should publicly articulate its legal rationale for its targeted killing policy, including the process and safeguards in place for target selection.

#### The CP’s the best middle ground—preserves the vital counter-terror role of targeted killings while resolving all their downsides

Byman 13—Daniel Byman is a Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution [“Why Drones Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92 Issue 4, p. 32-43, EBSCO]

Despite President Barack Obama's recent call to reduce the United States' reliance on drones, they will likely remain his administration's weapon of choice. Whereas President George W. Bush oversaw fewer than 50 drone strikes during his tenure, Obama has signed off on over 400 of them in the last four years, making the program the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The drones have done their job remarkably well: by killing key leaders and denying terrorists sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and, to a lesser degree, Somalia, drones have devastated al Qaeda and associated anti-American militant groups. And they have done so at little financial cost, at no risk to U.S. forces, and with fewer civilian casualties than many alternative methods would have caused.

Critics, however, remain skeptical. They claim that drones kill thousands of innocent civilians, alienate allied governments, anger foreign publics, illegally target Americans, and set a dangerous precedent that irresponsible governments will abuse. Some of these criticisms are valid; others, less so. In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterterrorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a comparatively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral damage.

So drone warfare is here to stay, and it is likely to expand in the years to come as other countries' capabilities catch up with those of the United States. But Washington must continue to improve its drone policy, spelling out clearer rules for extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings so that tyrannical regimes will have a harder time pointing to the U.S. drone program to justify attacks against political opponents. At the same time, even as it solidifies the drone program, Washington must remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid.

### 1NC CP 2

#### The President of the United States should issue an executive order ending signature strike operations in Yemen, and ending targeting killing operations in Pakistan.

#### Their Manning and Boyle evidence in the 1ac says that removing sig strikes and TK operation in these areas solve.

### 1NC DA

#### Farm Bill will pass now – has momentum

THE HILL 10 – 20 – 13 Lawmakers seek truce with farm bill, http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/agriculture/329413-lawmakers-seek-truce-with-farm-bill

 “I really think we are on a separate track,” one aide said. “There is momentum.”

“We want to be prepared and get it wrapped up as soon as possible for whatever comes,” a Senate aide said.

For farm lobbyists, the budget conference presents both opportunity and danger.

The House farm bill cuts some $54 billion from the deficit over 10 years, while the Senate bill cuts $23 billion. The spending cuts could be used to offset a reversal of part of the $91 billion in sequestration cuts that have slashed the discretionary agency budgets this year.

One lobbyist was hopeful that a budget compromise could carry the farm bill to Obama’s desk.

“That could also be the saving grace. That is something we could attach it to,” the lobbyist said. “I don’t think we can pass it as a standalone bill.”

#### He’ll use capital to push the farm bill negotiations

REUTERS 10 – 18 – 13 Obama says Americans 'completely fed up' with Washington, http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/obama-says-americans-completely-fed-up-washington-5652654?ref=rss

President Barack Obama has scolded congressional Republicans, hours after a fiscal crisis was narrowly averted and called on his opponents to help repair the economic damage caused by a 16-day US government shutdown and a close brush with a debt default.

Obama stressed that he is willing to work with lawmakers wherever they can agree, but the tone he struck amounted to a rebuke of Republicans, whom Americans largely blame for pushing the United States to the brink of an economic calamity.

"The American people are completely fed up with Washington," said Obama in a White House speech attended by many of the aides who worked day and night through the various stages of the latest fiscal stalemate.

Hours after he signed into law a bill hastily cobbled together to end the crisis, Obama said events over the past two weeks had inflicted "completely unnecessary" damage on the US economy.

An increase in borrowing costs caused by the near-debt default was harmful and consumers cut back on spending with hundreds of thousands of government workers suddenly idled, he said.

"There was no economic rationale for all of this," he said.

Though bruised by the battle, Obama emerged as the clear winner. He immediately sought to use the political capital gained to advance a domestic policy agenda centered around a fresh round of budget talks and an effort to win approval of two stalled items, immigration reform and a farm bill.

#### Plan kills Obama’s agenda

KRINER 10 Assistant professor of political science at Boston University [Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, page 276-77]

One of the mechanisms by which congressional opposition influences presidential cost-benefit calculations is by sending signals of American disunity to the target state. Measuring the effects of such congressional signals on the calculations of the target state is always difficult. In the case of Iraq it is exceedingly so, given the lack of data on the non-state insurgent actors who were the true “target” of the American occupation after the fall of the Hussein regime. Similarly, in the absence of archival documents, such as those from the Reagan Presidential Library presented in chapter 5, it is all but impossible to measure the effects of congressional signals on the administration’s perceptions of the military costs it would have to pay to achieve its objectives militarily.

By contrast. measuring the domestic political costs of congressional opposition, while still difficult, is at least a tractable endeavor. Chapter 2 posited two primary pathways through which congressional opposition could raise the political costs of staying the course militarily for the president. First. high-profile congressional challenges to a use of force can affect real or anticipated public opinion and bring popular pressures to bear on the president to change course. Second, congressional opposition to the president’s conduct of military affairs can compel him to spend considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major items on his programmatic agenda. On both of these dimensions, congressional opposition to the war in Iraq appears to have had the predicted effect.

#### New farm bill key to prevent a food price spike – massive economic damage

NELSON 10 – 17 – 13 Staff Writer [Joe Nelson, Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill, http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html]

With the government shutdown over, farmers are still waiting for a deal to be made.

President Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.

“We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.

Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike, force some out of the industry and damage the economy.

“If the milk price falls below a certain level, the Farm bill does help support farmers during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry Clark

The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, a new one is needed.

“Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.

Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says not having a new farm bill and reverting to a bill from 1949 could cut down profits or even force some farmers to quit or retire.

#### High food prices cause Russian instability ---- forces the Kremlin to force dietary changes which was at the core of past revolutions

Stratfor in ‘8

(“Russia: Problems in the Winners' Circle”, 6-13, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia\_problems\_winners\_circle, Google Cache)

As an energy and grain exporter, Russia is one of the clear winners in the current global energy and food markets. However, the recent changes within Russia will present the Kremlin with some tough choices about how to prioritize its political and economic goals. Analysis Related Special Topic Pages \* The Russian Resurgence \* The Mounting Global Food Crisis \* Oil Prices’ Unprecedented Rise As Stratfor follows the tumult in the energy and food markets and its effects on the global balance of power, a line has been drawn between the countries that are “winners” and which are “losers” in the short and long terms. Those countries that rely on food and oil imports are in a lose-lose situation and those that export seem to not only be comfortable, but reaping all the political and financial power that accompanies such a position. There is also a gray area full of those countries that export one strategic resource and import the other. Russia seems to fit squarely in the category of clear winners, since it holds and exports some of the world’s largest energy supplies and is also a minor grain exporter. Russia also has been swimming in the financial windfall that comes with being such a large energy exporter. Moreover, Russia has been discussing how it can expand its agricultural sector in order to meet the increased global demand for foodstuffs. But there is a downside to being a winner. Russia has been changing internally, and that transformation is creating new burdens to bear and testing the Kremlin’s ability to carry the weight. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia went through different economic models that were like a series of social, political and economic earthquakes. Under the stress of those changes and the global recession of the late 1990s, Russia’s economy nearly collapsed in the 1998 ruble crisis. During that time, the average monthly income in Russia was between $20 and $70, and the Russian people’s standard of living depended on the availability of bare necessities. In the past decade, though, as the Russian economy has recovered and the country has begun seeing the state use its petrodollars, the standard of living inside Russia has risen dramatically. Chart - Russian wages However, as the Russian people have grown richer, their basic consumption patterns — including food consumption — have changed. Their food consumption has shifted from the cheaper grains and potatoes to more expensive foods, like meat and dairy. Russia’s consumption of meat has nearly doubled since 2000 and has risen 5 percent since the start of 2008. Chart - Russian meat consumption The issue is that meat prices are in the mix of commodities whose prices are skyrocketing. Meat and dairy have grown more expensive for a slew of reasons, including high transportation costs and higher prices for the grain needed to feed the livestock. Depending on the region, prices for meat and dairy in Russia have risen between 7 percent and 22 percent since the beginning of the year. In a poll, most Russians placed food prices and security as their current top concern. The Kremlin has acknowledged these concerns and, in the past six months, placed three price freezes on certain strategic food items, like meat and dairy. One of the main reasons for the swift response from the government is that the Kremlin did not want to face criticism during an election cycle. But the Kremlin is now looking at the long term and is considering an indefinite price freeze for “socially important” foodstuffs. The Russian government is not worried about people starving, as many other countries are; after all, Russia is a net exporter of grains. Moreover, it is technically possible to change a population’s food consumption pattern back to what it was seven years ago pretty quickly. What could be problematic are the social and political implications of a massive dietary change in a country where food consumption patterns are a major form of social status and differentiation. Dietary patterns mark today’s Russians as rich and powerful domestically, as opposed to their position seven years ago when their country was weak and in economic disarray. Politically, Russia’s leaders pride themselves on high domestic approval ratings and control over a consolidated society. This could rapidly change if people are forced back to eating habits from their dire past — after all, who likes to switch from steak to gruel? Keep in mind that a series of food crises hit Russia in the early 1900s and created one of the pillars of the 1905 and 1917 Russian revolutions. This does not mean that a revolution is on the way, but that social unrest and food scarcity have caused such things in the past. The Russian government today is wealthy enough to absorb some of the high costs of food. The Russian gross domestic product has risen nearly tenfold since 2000 due to the inflow of petrodollars. Moreover, Russia has several rainy day funds amounting to approximately $160 billion that are sitting idle. But the Kremlin wants to keep that cash aside for real crises and to help its ambitious plans to reshape Russia’s national economy and recreate its global presence. Chart - Russian GDP Chart - Russian Meat Imports Russia’s current food consumption problems could create another problem: If Russians continue eating more expensive items, like meat, Russia will either have to continue relying on imports of such goods or grow its own husbandry sector. Russia’s meat industry is minor; the country currently imports more than 76 percent of its meat, mostly from the European Union. Increased meat consumption in Russia has been supported by increasing imports. This does not mean that Russia cannot expand its own husbandry industry. The country has enough land and water resources available to boost both that and agriculture. However, it would be a massive long-term and expensive undertaking to develop the industry and infrastructure needed, and it is unclear whether Russia has the necessary domestic work force or if it would need to import that as well. Regardless, the Russian government under Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev has made it its goal to prevent dependence on other countries for strategic items, such as energy or food, and see its dependence on the European Union for meat as a possible vulnerability. Moscow has used the export of its strategic goods — particularly energy — as a tool or weapon against Europe and others in the past, and there are quite a few countries that would be interested in returning the favor. As long as food prices remain high, the Kremlin will have to make some hard choices between social instability, diverting money intended to rebuild a strong Russia or depending on its neighbors in Europe, though Moscow wants to be the dominant partner in that relationship.

#### The impact is nuclear war

David in ‘99

(Steven, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, “Saving America from the coming civil wars”, Vol. 28, Iss. 1, Proquest)

AT NO TIME since the civil war of 1918-Zo has Russia been closer to bloody conflict than it is today. The fledgling government confronts a vast array of problems without the power to take effective action. For 70 years, the Soviet Union operated a strong state apparatus, anchored by the KGB and the Communist Party. Now its disintegration has created a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Unable to rely on popular ideology or coercion to establish control, the government must prove itself to the people and establish its authority on the basis of its performance. But the Yeltsin administration has abjectly failed to do so, and it cannot meet the most basic needs of the Russian people. Russians know they can no longer look to the state for personal security, law enforcement, education, sanitation, health care, or even electrical power. In the place of government authority, criminal groups-the Russian Mafia-increasingly hold sway. Expectations raised by the collapse of communism have been bitterly disappointed, and Moscow's inability to govern coherently raises the specter of civil unrest. If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 5o percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation-personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia-even though in decline-does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,ooo nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

## Norms

### 1NC—Hege

#### No regional rebalancing or security dilemmas—the only empirical data goes our way.

Fettweis 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]

The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 This belief is a variant of what is known as the “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability.

First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: It overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. **The U.S. military** may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so.

Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

Third, if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of **trust** in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be **without precedent in** international **history**. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction.

Furthermore, in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly.

Finally, while believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence.

The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No defense establishments were enhanced** to address power vacuums; **no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred** after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated.

These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.

#### Great power wars are unthinkable—unipolarity just results in minor power wars.

Jervis 11—Professor of International Politics @ Columbia University [Robert Jervis (On the board of nine scholarly journals & Former president of the American Political Science Association), “Force in Our Times,” Saltzman Working Paper No. 15, July 2011, pg. http://www.siwps.com/news.attachment/saltzmanworkingpaper15-842/SaltzmanWorkingPaper15.PDF]

FORCE TODAY - Two dramatic and seemingly-contradictory trends are central. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War if not before, the amount of inter-state and even civil war has drastically declined. Of course much depends on the time periods selected and the counting rules employed, but **by any measure international wars are** scarce if not **vanishing**, and civil wars, after blossoming in the 1990s, have greatly diminished.32 Significant instances of civil strife remain and are made salient by the horrific examples that appear in the newspapers every day, but in fact all inventories that I know of conclude that they are fewer than they used to be. Ironically, although realism stresses the conflict–inducing power of international anarchy, the barriers and inhibitions against international war now seem significantly more robust than those limiting civil wars. But even the latter are stronger than they were in the past. Although a central question is whether these trends will be reversed, they truly are startling, of great importance, and were largely unpredicted. They also remain insufficiently appreciated; one rarely reads statements about how fortunate we are to live in such a peaceful era. Perhaps the reasons are that optimism is generally derided in the cynical academic community, peace is not the sort of dramatic event that seizes public (and media) attention, and in the absence of major wars, we all find other things to worry about.

But Plato was not entirely wrong to say that “only the dead have seen the end of war.”33 Force, even when deeply recessed, can come to the surface again. Discussions in the US and Europe about relations with Iran often debate whether force should be “taken off the table.” But, regardless of whether it would be desirable to do so, would this be possible? As long as important disputes with Iran remain, with even the best will in the world there are limits to how far thoughts of the use of force could be pushed out of the minds of all the participants, especially those in Tehran. It is interesting that Tony Blair told the Chilcot commission that with respect to Iraq “even prior to September 11, 2001…. You know, the fact is [that] force was always an option.”34

Don’t try to tell Bashar al-Assad or Muammar Qaddafi that force is no longer important. As Osgood and Tucker noted in their important study over 40 years ago, “if force has lost its utility, its condemnation on moral grounds is superfluous.”35 Libya, in fact, represents the other trend. **Since the end of the Cold War, the US**, and to a lesser but significant extent Britain and France, **have used force more often** than they did before. **Panama, the Gulf War, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya are unmatched in the Cold War era.** The US is now fighting three wars, although by the time this article appears in print its military role in Libya and Iraq may be over. Of course these military adventures are all small by comparison with most wars, and certainly by the standards of Korea and Vietnam, let alone the wars between Iran and Iraq and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Nevertheless, they cannot be dismissed.

It is beyond my scope to explore all the possible explanations for either of these trends, but it does seem clear that the rise in American military activity was caused at least in part by the end of the Cold War and the related fact that the US is now the sole superpower. The new configuration means that the US is no longer deterred from entering local conflicts by the fear of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, makes others rely even more on the US to be a policeman (if often a misguided one), and elevates the salience of both threats and values that were previously trumped by the superpower rivalry. Opportunities loom larger for the US and the UK than they did during the Cold War, and new threats calling for military intervention have increased in visibility if not in actual occurrence. To start with the latter, although terrorism was a concern during the Cold War, it played nothing like the role that it does now. Of course the US never suffered an attack like 9/11 before, but while I will briefly discuss the extent of the danger of terrorism later, here I want to argue that the common placement of terrorism at the top of the list of threats is a product not only of the attacks over the past decade, but also of the paucity of other threats. The felt need to use force against terrorists, states that support them and even countries that might work with them in the future in part stems from a security environment that is remarkably benign.

THE SECURITY COMMUNITY - Alongside and in part responsible for the two contrasting trends in the use of force is the existence of a security community among the world’s leading powers. Although I can be brief because I have discussed this elsewhere,40 the point is of fundamental importance. **For the first time in history, the leading states of the world** (the US, most of Europe, and Japan) not only are at peace with each other, butfind the idea of war within this group literally unthinkable (which is the definition of a security community).41 Although Russia and China remain outside the community (which is not to say that war with or between them is highly likely, but only that it is within the realm of possibility), the change in world politics is enormous. War among the leading powers of the world and, at least as much, fear of war, preparation for war, and the desire to avoid such wars if possible--and prevail in them if not--has been the driving motor of international politics for centuries. At the risk of hyperbole, I think we can say that turning off this motor is the greatest change in international politics that we have ever seen. Its implications remain hard to grasp, and indeed how citizens and leaders come to understand this new world will strongly shape how they behave. But even now it is clear that the existence of the security community is crucial to world politics, international relations theory, and our lives.

Obvious questions are what caused the community to form, what could lead it to be replicated elsewhere, and what if anything could lead it to unravel. I have discussed the first question in my earlier writings and so will discuss only the latter two topics here. Of course speculations about what could bring the community to an end are not unrelated to analysis of its causes despite the fact that path-dependence could be at work and the possibility that the community could survive an end to the factors that brought it into being. Nevertheless, just as the community was formed by changes in domestic regimes, ruling values and ideas, and the costs and benefits of war and peace, so factors in these categories might bring us back to earlier and less fortunate relations. On top of all the normal unknowns in dealing with possible futures, our speculations are limited by the fact that the security community is particularly psychological in that it is defined by the unthinkability of war among the members. If we know little about how events move from being seen as possible to actually coming about, we know even less about what forces and processes move them from being unthinkable to being seen as possible.42

Here it is worth stressing that the fact that war among the members is unthinkable has real consequences beyond the fact that peace is maintained. When I ask my undergraduates whether they think they will live to see a war with another leading power, they look at me as though I have lost my mind because such an idea has never crossed theirs. What—among other things—they fail to realize is that their state of mind is without precedent and that the ability to go about their lives without the slightest concern that they or their country might—just might—have to fight another leading power shapes a good deal of their lives and our society. This is not to say that their lives are now free from worry, but only that their freedom from worrying about what used to be considered the greatest scourge of the human race gives them freedom to worry about other things.

On a larger scale, societies and governments within the community can go about their business without thinking about how this might affect the prospects for peace or the outcome of war with other members. Like my students’ lack of concern, we take this for granted, but in fact it represents a sharp break from the past. Rivalries, concern for relative position, and the desire for bargaining advantages still remain, but the intensity and consequences are quite different when war is out of the question. The whole tenor of inter-state relations and fundamental attitudes toward conflict and cooperation are different from the time a century ago when a British observer could return from a trip to Germany saying “Every one of those new factory chimneys is a gun pointed at England.”43

I see no reason to expect the community to come to an end. Indeed, the fact that it is defined by the participants’ beliefs that war cannot occur means that if they thought it would end, then in fact it would be dissolved (although war might not actually occur). More broadly, **just as** I noted earlier that **expectations of war can be** self-fulfilling**, so can expectations of peace**. But since academic musings have little impact, it is safe to pursue our scholarly duty of asking about what developments, currently unforeseen, might destroy the community.

Just as one pillar of the community was the transformation of the old idea that war was honorable and glorious by the almost universal repugnance of it44 (and this is one reason why any war now has to be carefully sold to the public), the community would be at least weakened if this attitude changed. Is it conceivable that war could come back into fashion? It is literally unimaginable that slavery or monarchical rule could return to favor. The current replacements for these ideas are deeply woven into the fabric of the social order, and the current conception of war as a terrible enterprise similarly does not stand alone and presumably could not change without wide-ranging alteration of our societies. **One dreadful** but I think unlikely **possibility would be that the** success of a series of **military interventions** of the type **we have seen recently could lead to a general reevaluation of not only the utility of this kind of force, but of its fundamental role in human endeavors**. Even without this, might values change in a cyclical fashion? Might boredom lead to a resurrection of the idea that force is noble? Could males, finding themselves losing power and status in their societies, seek a return to a world in which the arena of violence in which they have a comparative advantage is seen more positively? If it impossible to say that this cannot occur, it seems at least as difficult to foresee a chain of events that would bring this about. (But it is worth noting that before September 11, 2001 few of us believed that torture might come back into the inventory of state behavior.) Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes?45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed—states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

In the past, the conflict of interest that has sparked war has involved territory more often than economic issues, although of course the two are often linked.46 Thus the rise of the security community has been accompanied by a decline in territorial conflicts, and reciprocal causation is surely at work here. Could territorial conflicts resume a salient place in relations among the leading power? Territory in the guise of self-determination continues, as the likely coming of a referendum on Scottish independence indicates. But a reduced attachment to territory is indicated by the fact that the rest of the UK is not willing to fight to prevent this, just as it would be willing to part with Northern Ireland if the majority of the inhabitants desired to join the Irish Republic. Indeed, the existence of a security community and the related decline in traditional security threats makes it easier for sub-national units to split off.

Concern for territory has not entirely disappeared, of course, and the recent Danish claim on large portions of the Arctic reminds us that changes in climate and technology can endow areas with new value.47 But the virulent disputes we see around the world stem from the break-up of states or the partition of areas of the globe previously ruled by others, and within the community it is hard to see either likely candidate territorial disputes or general trends that would return to traditional values. Could anything occur that would lead Germany to feel that it was vital to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine? If this were to happen, we would be in a different world. But to turn this around, we would have to be in a very different world for this to occur.

The security community is underpinned not only by the benefits it is believed to bring, but also by the perceived high costs of war. If large-scale conventional war would be very destructive, the presence of nuclear weapons pushes the costs off the scale (and it is worth remembering that although Germany and Japan do not have nuclear weapons, they could develop them very quickly). One does not have to accept all the precepts of standard deterrence theory to believe that it would take extraordinary incentives for the states to contemplate war with so many nuclear weapons scattered around. The other side of the coin is that the security community might be weakened if the costs of war were to become much less. The good news—from this perspective—is that there are few prospects of this. Even President Obama, who has stressed the need to abolish nuclear weapons, admits that this cannot be done in his lifetime. Missile defenses, endorsed by all American presidents since Reagan, remain out of reach, and no technologies or tactics are in sight that could render conventional war quick and relatively bloodless.

A more likely change would be an erosion of American hegemony. Among the leading powers, all are not equally leading. The strength, interests, and military presence of the US remain sufficient to see that others in the community do not challenge either it or each other. A decline in American power and a partial withdrawal of its influence are certainly possible, and at minimum, American troops might be withdrawn from Europe in the coming years. But would this matter? **Even if American dominance played a large role in forming the community, it may not be necessary for the community’s** maintenance. Path dependence **may operate strongly here**, and although firm evidence is hard to come by, I would argue that in the absence of other changes of the kind I have discussed, **it is** very unlikely **that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war**. (On the level of policy prescription, however, I am cautious enough not to want to run the experiment.)Pg. 13-20

\*Expectations for peace are self-fulfilling

\*Path dependence prevents heg from disrupting the trend

\*Their ev is media/academic hype

\*Bringing other countries (Russia/China) into the group will make war unthinkable for them

\*Unipolar small wars make great power wars thinkable

#### US Decline facilitates US multilateralism—paves the way for a soft landing that prevents their transition impacts.

He 10—Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (2009–2010) and a Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (2009–2010), “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pg. 1121–1143]

When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of the US in part because of the ‘lust for power’ driven by human nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security.

US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.

During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

However, the US ‘new economy’ based on information technology and computers revived policymakers’ confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states.

The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. The ‘lust for power’ without constraints from anarchy drove US policymakers to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.

What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.

If historical learning can help US policymakers cultivate a prudent perception regarding US hegemony, the early implementation of offshore balancing and **multilateralism may facilitate the soft-landing** **of declining US hegemony**. More importantly, the real danger is whether the US can make a right choice between power and security when US hegemony begins to decline. If US policymakers cannot learn from history but insist on seeking more power instead of security even though US hegemony is in decline, the likelihood of hegemonic war will increase. However, if US policymakers choose security over power when US hegemony is in decline, offshore balancing and multilateralism can help the US maximise security in the future anarchic, multipolar world. Pg. 1141-1143

\*Heg encourages power maximization

\*Decline forces them to worry about security. Leads to multilateralism/OSB

\*US willing to pay lock-in price to constrain peer competitor

\*1990’s prove

\*Multilateralism creates a soft landing during decline

#### Unipolarity is destroying bipartisan compact needed to sustain support for multilateralism—makes our policies erratic and incoherent.

Kupchan & Trubowitz 7—Professor of International Affairs @ Georgetown University & Professor of Government @ University of Texas-Austin [Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, and Henry A. Kissinger Scholar at the Library of Congress) & Peter L. Trubowitz (Senior Fellow @ Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law), “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 7–44]

The conditions that sustained liberal internationalism have of late been rapidly disappearing, dramatically weakening its grip on the nation’s politics. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. primacy has reduced the incentives for Republicans and Democrats alike to adhere to the liberal internationalist compact. Unipolarity has heightened the geopolitical appeal of unilateralism, a trend that even the threat of transnational terrorism has not reversed. Unipolarity has also loosened the political discipline engendered by the Cold War threat, leaving U.S. foreign policy more vulnerable to growing partisanship at home. “Red” and “Blue” America disagree about the nature of U.S. engagement in the world; growing disparities in wealth have reawakened class tensions; and political pragmatism has been losing ground to ideological extremism.

The polarization of the United States has dealt a severe blow to the bipartisan compact between power and cooperation. Instead of adhering to the vital center, the country’s elected officials, along with the public, are backing away from the liberal internationalist compact, supporting either U.S. power or international cooperation, but rarely both. President Bush and many Republicans have abandoned one side of the liberal internationalist compact: multilateralism has received little but contempt on their watch. Meanwhile, the Democrats have neglected the other side: many party stalwarts are uneasy with the assertive use of U.S. power. As the partisan gyre in Washington widens, the political center is dying out, and support for **liberal internationalism is dying with it**. According to Jim Leach, one of the Republican moderates to lose his House seat in the 2006 midterm elections, “[The United States’] middle has virtually collapsed. And how to reconstruct a principled center, a center of gravity in American politics, may be the hardest single thing at this particular time.”5

Prominent voices from across the political spectrum have called for the restoration of a robust bipartisan center that can put U.S. grand strategy back on track.6 According to Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton, “For more than a half a century, we know that we prospered because of a bipartisan consensus on defense and foreign policy. We must do more than return to that sensible, cooperative approach.” Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney echoes this sentiment: “It seems that concern aboutWashington’s divisiveness and capability to meet today’s challenges is the one thing that unites us all. We need new thinking on foreign policy and an overarching strategy that can unite the United States and its allies.”7

These exhortations are in vain. The halcyon era of liberal internationalism is over; the bipartisan compact between power and partnership has been effectively dismantled. If left unattended, the **political foundations of U.S. statecraft will** continue to **disintegrate**, exposing the country to the dangers of an erratic and incoherent foreign policy. To avoid this fate, U.S. leaders will have to fashion a new brand of internationalism—one that will necessarily entail less power and less partnership if it is to have a chance of securing broad domestic support. To find a new equilibrium between the nation’s commitments abroad and its polarized politics at home, the United States will need a grand strategy that is as selective and judicious as it is purposeful. Pg. 8-10

#### Multilat leads to global coop and power sharing—it creates shared framework of interaction changes the way states interpret global politics

Pouliot 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ McGill University [Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26]

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons.

First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage.

The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a **shared framework of interaction**—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement.

In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘**While conflicts**, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, **will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within** a global background context of norms and **institutions based on mutual recognition**, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits **of global cooperation**, **and power-sharing** in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks.

Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of moderation in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to avoid radical solutions in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share similar analytical lenses that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).

Third and related, multilateralism lends legitimacy to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more efficient implementation, because actors feel invested in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, **multilateralism as a global governance routine** also **creates** self-reinforcing dynamics and new focal points for strategic interaction**. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions** with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

#### That cooperation is key to planetary survival—weak regulations risk extinction.

Masciulli 11—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such **effective global leadership** **and governance** with robust enforcement powers **alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones**. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.

I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010)

Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And **our dilemma is that** the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions **are not likely to be strengthened because** of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the **great** and major **powers**. They **seek** their **national** or alliance **superiority**, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the great powers will most likely, recklessly and tragically, leave global survival and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5

#### AND, unipolarity directly trades off with US leadership.

Ikenberry 6—Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University [G. John Ikenberry, Liberal International Theory in the Wake of 911 and American Unipolarity, 22 January 2006, pg. http://tinyurl.com/6v3vtyy]

Liberalism and American Hegemony - A final crisis point in liberal internationalism is that the postwar liberal project depended on enlightened American hegemony—and now that hegemony is more problematic. Like the balance of power, American hegemony has been more of a pre-condition for the emergence of liberal order than its champions might admit. But the character of that hegemony is under strain and changing.

For half a century, the United States held the keys to global order—and in many ways it still does today. If America engages in the right amount of commitment and restraint—anchoring its power in partnerships, alliances, multilateral institutions///

, "special relationships," and governance regimes -- the overall international system will tend to remain stable, open, and integrated. The world has, in effect, "contracted out" to the United States to provide global governance. The United States provides public goods, frameworks of cooperation, "good offices," and an enlightened but U.S.-centered system of rules and modes of doing geopolitical business. In return, the world "bandwagons" with the U.S. rather than resists or balances against it. This special type of open or liberal American hegemony trumps any other type of rival global order—and all the key players in world politics know this to be true. So no great power or regional grouping has an incentive to challenge or overturn the current order. It is a quintessential American vision—the great diversity of peoples and societies around the world will together troop down a grand pathway to modernity. Again, if the United States understands the logic of its own system and runs it correctly, this American-style liberal hegemonic order can last indefinitely.

A grand bargain stands behind this American-led liberal order. In the past, the United States provided global “services”—such as security protection and support for open markets—which made other states willing to work with rather than resist American preeminence. The public goods provision tended to make it worthwhile for these states to endure the day-to-day irritations of American foreign policy. But the trade-off seems to be shifting. Today, the United States appears to be providing fewer global public goods while at the same time the irritations associate with American dominance appear to be are growing.

It might be useful to think of this dynamic this way: the United States is unique in that it is simultaneously both the provider of “global governance” -- through what has tended in the past to be the exercise of “liberal” hegemony—and it is a great power that pursues its own national interest. America’s liberal hegemonic role is manifest when it champions the WTO, engages in international rule or regime creation, or reaffirms its commitment to cooperative security in Asia and Europe. Its great power role is manifest, for example, when it seeks to protect its domestic steel or textile industry. **When it acts as a liberal hegemon, it is seeking to lead or manage the global system of rules and institutions; when it is acting as a nationalist great power, it is seeking to respond** to domestic interests and **its relative power position**. My point is that today, these two roles—liberal hegemon and traditional great power—are increasingly in conflict.30

So **the danger to liberal internationalism lies with its greatest champion.** The United States does not appear to be doing as much today as in the past to sponsor and operate within a system of consensual rule-based governance. Why the United States is less willing to do so is actually a complex issue. Some of it is very specifically about the Bush administration—and therefore these biases and viewpoints will pass from the scene eventually as Bush and his team leave office. But America’s global position and the structure of incentives that this setting generates is also part of the explanation. American unipolarity seems to have created problems in how the U.S. thinks about the provision of international rules, institutions, and public goods.

CONCLUSION - The United States, together with allied European and East Asian partners, created a distinctive type of international order—organized around open markets, social bargains, intergovernmental institutions, and cooperative security. This political order was cemented by both the hegemonic power of the United States and the unusual bonds of cooperation that are possible among democracies. Today this order is in jeopardy. The United States is deeply ambivalent about making institutional commitments and binding itself to other states—ambivalence and hesitation that has been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, American unipolarity, and new security threats. But the United States still possesses profound incentives to build and operate within a liberal rule-based order. Just as importantly, that order is now not simply an extension of American power and interests—it has taken on a life of its own. American power may rise or fall and its foreign policy ideology may wax and wane between multilateral and imperial impulses—but the wider and deeper liberal global order is now a reality that America itself must accommodate itself to.

\*US key - US provides the framework of cooperation

\*Multilat allows the world to bandwagon instead of resist

\*Multilat = open market, intergovernmental institutions, & cooperative security

### AT: Drone Prolif—No Escalation

#### No risk of drone wars

Joseph Singh 12, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2eSvaZnfQ

In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.

Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.

What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security—countries like China—are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.

Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.

Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.

Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

### AT: SCS Miscalc

#### SCS tension inevitable but won’t escalate, even if they win a huge internal link

Michal Meidan 12, China Analyst at the Eurasia Group, 8/7/12, “Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea,” http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2Cbw54ORc

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea.¶ Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict.¶ First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky.¶ Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

### AT: Drone Norms—China

#### China will inevitably use drones

Max Boot 11, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/9/11, “We Cannot Afford to Stop Drone Strikes,” Commentary Magazine, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/10/09/drone-arms-race/

The New York Times engages in some scare-mongering today about a drone ams race. Scott Shane notes correctly other nations such as China are building their own drones and in the future U.S. forces could be attacked by them–our forces will not have a monopoly on their use forever. Fair enough, but he goes further, suggesting our current use of drones to target terrorists will backfire:

If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them.

“The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh and author of Missile Contagion, who has called for tougher export controls on American drone technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.”

This is a familiar trope of liberal critics who are always claiming we should forego “X” weapons system or capability, otherwise our enemies will adopt it too. We have heard this with regard to ballistic missile defense, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, land mines, exploding bullets, and other fearsome weapons. Some have even suggested the U.S. should abjure the first use of nuclear weapons–and cut down our own arsenal–to encourage similar restraint from Iran.

The argument falls apart rather quickly because it is founded on a false premise: that other nations will follow our example. In point of fact, Iran is hell-bent on getting nuclear weapons no matter what we do; China is hell-bent on getting drones; and so forth. Whether and under what circumstances they will use those weapons remains an open question–but there is little reason to think self-restraint on our part will be matched by equal self-restraint on theirs. Is Pakistan avoiding nuking India because we haven’t used nuclear weapons since 1945? Hardly. The reason is that India has a powerful nuclear deterrent to use against Pakistan. If there is one lesson of history it is a strong deterrent is a better upholder of peace than is unilateral disarmament–which is what the New York Times implicitly suggests.

Imagine if we did refrain from drone strikes against al-Qaeda–what would be the consequence? If we were to stop the strikes, would China really decide to take a softer line on Uighurs or Russia on Chechen separatists? That seems unlikely given the viciousness those states already employ in their battles against ethnic separatists–which at least in Russia’s case already includes the suspected assassination of Chechen leaders abroad. What’s the difference between sending a hit team and sending a drone?

While a decision on our part to stop drone strikes would be unlikely to alter Russian or Chinese thinking, it would have one immediate consequence: al-Qaeda would be strengthened and could regenerate the ability to attack our homeland. Drone strikes are the only effective weapon we have to combat terrorist groups in places like Pakistan or Yemen where we don’t have a lot of boots on the ground or a lot of cooperation from local authorities. We cannot afford to give them up in the vain hope it will encourage disarmament on the part of dictatorial states.

## Accountability

### AT: Yemen

#### Abosaq says a billion other reasons lead to Yemeni state failure.

Colonel Hassan Abosaq 12, US Army War College, master of strategic studies degree candidate, 2012, "The Implications of Unstable on Saudi Arabia," Strategy Research Project, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA560581

Yemen is one of the poorest Arab states. Unemployment, corruption, total illiteracy, overpopulation, poverty, and lawlessness draw quite a gloomy picture. Yemen has a rapidly growing population with limited resources, with one third of its budget coming from its declining oil revenue which most economists expect will be exhaust by 2017. Yemen has a critical water shortage worsened by the excessive use of it to cultivate qat, which is chewed for stimulant and other effects but has no nutritional value. A recent World Bank report estimates that up to 25 percent of potential working hours are lost to qat chewing.13

There has been a rise in the recent past in the number and intensity of street protests, tribal clashes, kidnapping, terrorist attacks, insurrection in the North, growing tension in the South, and clashes between security forces and defected army units. Power in Yemen is concentrated in the hands of the few. President Ali Saleh has been in power since 1978, ruling by manipulative methods with which he creates conflicts between tribes to keep them engaged in fighting each other and, at the same time, putting his relatives in key and powerful positions in order to preserve his power and control of the government. President Saleh’s primary concern is his own survival. He has awarded key army posts to relatives and allies within his own Sanhan tribe. His son Ahmad is the commander of the Republican Guard, while his nephews Tarik and Yahya control private presidential security and the central security forces. President Saleh rules by maintaining a precarious balance among several competing forces including the military, main tribes, religious clerics, and political parties. Saleh rules by buying loyalty through patronage and through a combination of cooperation, inclusion and coercion. Therefore he has built a feudal system of government which has become a kleptomaniac and plutocratic system. Corruption and mismanagement make the implementation of reforms and the absorption of any external assistance very difficult. The central government control over the hinterland is minimal. The hinterlands are usually under tribal control. Feelings of tribal identity are very strong in Yemen, where intertribal strife and conflicts between the central authority and tribes have been common for centuries. The central authority in what is today corresponds to Yemen has never been strong. Disputes are often driven by competition for scarce resources, whether it is water, funds for infrastructure and basic services, or access to patronage networks.

After the North victory over the South in the 1994 civil war, the Northerners strengthened their grip over the South and dominated both the government and the economy. The Southerners, feeling alienated and resented in their own country, started what is called al-Hirak al-Janoubi demanding equal opportunities in the government and the economy. The government used force to suppress this movement and the relationship between the South and the government has been on a hazardous path since. The Southern Movement is now calling for secession from Yemen. Southern break from the North could lead to further breaks in the South. Different parts of Southern Yemen may seek independence from the South following any break with the North. This possibility is particularly serious with the Hadhramout province, whose people view themselves distinct from the rest of Yemen. In the North, the Huthi rebellion is fueled by bitter local grievances over economic marginalization, market access, and the lack of services and infrastructure in Sa’ada region. The Huthis are calling for freedom of worship and social justice. They accuse the government of corruption and meddling with the delicate religious balance between Zaidi Shias and Salafi Sunnis. This rebellion, started in 2004, hails from the area around the Northern Province of Sa’ada, which is close to the Saudi border. This conflict led to the Huthis seeking and getting financial and arms support from Iran and former Libyan government.14 The conflict became regional in late 2009, when the Huthis crossed the Saudi border and occupied a mountain in southern Saudi Arabia in order to surround the Yemeni forces. Saudi Arabian forces intervened and attacked the Huthi rebel positions and also imposed a naval blockade on the northwestern coast of Yemen to prevent weapons from reaching the Huthis.

President Saleh’s divide-and-rule strategy enabled him to govern by proxy through rival tribal sheikhs, but after 30 years in power, his reputation as a master of crisis management has begun to slip. In mid-January 2011, thousands of Yemenis protested in Sana’a demanding change of government. The protest spread through the country, in Sana’a, Tai’z, Dhamar, Aden, Hudaidah, Mukalla, and other major cities. It was more peaceful in the northern cities but more violent in the southern cities. The government reacted to these demonstrations in a violent way where many people lost their lives due to use of force by government security forces. The protesters, inspired by what happened in Tunisia and Egypt continued their protest and their numbers increased to hundreds of thousands. By March, some military troops joined the protesters. By the end of March the central government lost its control of Sa’ada and al- Jouf governorate to the Huthis. In the last week of March, the country’s top general, Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, commander of the First Division, sided with the protesters and positioned his troops to defend them from the government security and loyalist forces. By April protesters took the streets by the hundreds of thousands. April 5th, the USA called for Saleh to step down. In late April, Saleh agreed to a Gulf Cooperation Council brokered deal only to back away hours before the scheduled signing three times. On May 22nd, the GCC declared it was suspending its mediation efforts in Yemen. The next day, May 23rd, the chief of Hashed tribe, the largest and most powerful tribe in Yemen, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, declared support for the protesters, and few days later his armed supporters came into conflict with loyalist and security forces. On June 3rd, an explosion in the presidential compound mosque caused at least five deaths and the injury of president Saleh and several others. Saleh was flown to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment where he spent about three months before returning and resuming his authority. On July 30th, a group of anti-government tribes declared the formation of the Alliance of Yemeni Tribes. The Alliance is headed by Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, the leader of Hashid tribe, and is aligned with Yemen Army defectors under the leadership of General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar.15

The current situation in Yemen is as follows: the two northern governorates bordering Saudi Arabia, Sa’ada and al-Jouf, are under the full control of the Huthi Movement which is backed by Iran and hostile to Saudi Arabia. The central government is in a small-scale armed conflict in the major cities with the oppositions and the defected troops and the tribes supporting them. There is a strong presence of AQAP in Abyan Governorate and possible spread to the eastern governorate of Hadhramout. There is an increase in Southern ambition for secession. There is a strengthening of the tribal power in the North after the formation of the Alliance of Yemen Tribes. If this situation continues, Yemen will change from an unstable state to a failed state which will have a great negative impact on Saudi Arabia and other Arabian Peninsula states and also on the region’s security and economy. This requires action from Saudi Arabia and other influenced countries which will be impacted by the instability of Yemen. There is a prospect of a failed state in this strategic Arabian Peninsula country with high level of unemployment, rapid population growth and dwindling water resources. After eleven months of street protests, Saleh has signed the GCC proposal. But this has not satisfied the street protesters who want Saleh and other key regime officials to be brought to court. What is worrying is that all the different groups in Yemen agree on their hate for President Saleh whether they are the tribes, political organizations, youth movements, or defected military units. They are all in agreement that Saleh must go, but they are unable to work together and will have difficulties in transitioning to a new Yemeni leadership. This opposition is not a cohesive one. Impoverished people dreaming of better life, students, intellectuals, Muslim priesthood, al-Qaeda affiliates, Huthi rebels, Southern secessionists, and separate tribes. All of them want Saleh to leave, but all of them pursue their own goals. The situation in Yemen is more complicated than some might think. There are tribal feudalism, military rivalry, conflicts between North and South, Huthi rebels, religious extremism and al- Qaeda affiliates and supporters. All of this puts Yemen on the fringe of failure.

#### Huge disconnect between Abosaq and Cordesman. Internal link evidence says AQAP will “put pressure” on Saudi Arabia, and that instability might “spill over.” Cordesman says that U.S. posture in the Middle East depends on having a friendly Saudi Regime. No evidence says instability will cause regime change in Saudi Arabia.

#### Cordesman concedes Saudi regime is resilient. The best possible reading of this article is a structural alt caus.

Anthony Cordesman 11, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, former adjunct prof of national security studies at Georgetown, PhD from London University, Feb 26 2011, “Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability: A Very Different Nation,” http://csis.org/publication/understanding-saudi-stability-and-instability-very-different-nation

Saudi Arabia is scarcely immune to protest and dissent, and has long struggled with the challenges of reform. What is most striking about the Kingdom over the past weeks of crisis, however, has been the lack of any major challenge to government and the way it functions.

This may well not continue. More secular Saudi intellectuals and youth are already sending letters and petitions, and calling for more rapid reform. Some more extreme voices are going further and calling for “days of rage” – mirror imaging similar calls in Tunisia and Libya. In today’s Middle East, some demonstrations seem inevitable in every country, and no one can guarantee Saudi Arabia’s future stability in a time of turmoil.

At the same time, **there are good reasons to hope that Saudi Arabia will continue on the path to peaceful reform and change**. A small, highly vocal minority does not speak for a nation, and Saudi stability may well prove to be strong enough so that the end result is to aid reform rather than threaten the regime.

A History of Concerns versus a History of Stability

One reason is the Kingdom’s history. Every crisis in the Middle East since the time of Nasser has led to a new round of speculation about Saudi Arabia and the future of the monarchy. Yet, it has now been more than half a century since that speculation began and Saudi Arabia has not changed its regime. As other countries in the region have shown all too clearly, a history of stability is no guarantee for the future, but it is important to note that Saudi stability has been the product of the fact that **its government has dealt with each wave of change** by making the reforms that are critical to maintaining popular support.

The current King – King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz -- may be in his late 80s, he led a government that consistently pursued policies that made him a symbol of social, economic, and educational reform to many Saudis but long before the current crisis.  At the same time, he has dealt with the fact that the Saudi population and clergy are deeply committed to a puritanical form of Islam and resist social change when it seems to come into conflict with traditional religious and social practices, and that Saudi society is driven by its internal values and demands that are very different those of Western secularism.

It is striking that when this new wave of crises began, King Abdullah did not react with a wave of new security measures. Instead, his government issued a series of royal decrees that provided a multi-billion dollar investment in stability by meeting the people’s needs. The Saudi government has announced that these investments include:

$10.6 billion (SR 40 billion) in new funding for housing loans through the Real Estate Development Fund.

$7.9 billion (SR 20 billion) in funding to increase the capital of the Saudi Credit Bank

$266 million (SR 1 billion) to enable social insurance to increase the number of family members covered

$319.9 million (SR 1.2 billion) to expand social services.

$933 million (SR 3.5 billion) to help the needy repair their homes and pay utility bills

$126.9 million (SR 476 million) to support programs for needy students at the Ministry of Education.

$3.9 billion (SR 15 billion) to support the General Housing Authority

A 15% pay increases for state employees.

50 percent increase in the annual allocations for charitable organizations to $120 million  (SR 450 million).

$26.7 million ($100 million) annually allocation to projects of the National Charitable Fund will get SR 100 million

These investments total some $36 billion and they are obviously intended to defuse popular unrest. At the same time, they are not some sudden rush to invest in jobs, housing, medical services, and education. They reflect half a century of Saudi government investment in precisely the priorities that drove the core demands of the protesters in Egypt and Tunisia and the focus of social justice that has been the key to most of the current unrest in the Middle East.

**---NU’s Card Starts---**

History scarcely means we can take Saudi stability for granted. Saudi Arabia is simply too critical to US strategic interests and the world. Saudi petroleum exports play a critical role in the stability and growth of a steadily more global economy, and the latest projections by the Department of Energy do not project any major reductions in the direct level of US dependence on oil imports through 2025.

Saudi Arabia is as important to the region’s security and stability as it is to the world’s economy. It is the key to the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council to create local defenses, and for US strategic cooperation with the Southern Gulf states. It plays a critical role as a counterbalance to a radical and more aggressive Iran, it is the source of the Arab League plan for a peace with Israel, and it has become a key partner in the war on terrorism. The US strategic posture in the Middle East depends on Saudi Arabia having a friendly and moderate regime.

**---NU’s Card Ends---**

Finding the Balance

No one can ignore the fact that Saudi leaders face many challenges that might explode into popular unrest if they are not handled with great skill. They have to try to retain power and popular support while constantly adjusting their actions to find the right balance between modernization and social progress and the desires of a very conservative population. They have to seek the best balance between those who focus on secular needs and call for rapid change, and religious leaders whose primary focus is to preserve the values of a puritanical form of Islam.

Finding this balance means the monarchy, and Saudi elites and technocrats, must work within a political system and culture few Americans understand, and one that is hard to put in perspective. The Saudi monarchy is scarcely the representative democracy Americans are familiar with.  Its limited experiments with a carefully selected national assembly or Majlis, and representative local government, have moved slowly and been very limited. At the same time, the Saudi monarchy has proved more adaptive and responsive to popular demands than many Middle Eastern regimes that use the title of president, or whose leaders are the product of much more authoritarian post-colonial regimes.

The top leaders in the Saudi royal family may be firmly in charge, but they rely heavily on finding consensus within the entire royal family (now well over 5,000 members), with other leading families in Saudi Arabia, with technocrats and educators, and with its religious establishment and key leaders like the Al Shaikh family. Unlike most governments in the developing world, Saudi officials also provide direct access for complaints and petitions, and do have a good track record of anticipating and responding to popular demands.

Conservatism versus Reform

Outsiders need to understand just how much Saudi political and social dynamics also differ from those of any other nation in the Middle East. For well over half a century, each successive Saudi government has had to struggle with the tensions between religious and social custom and the need for change. The Saudi popular commitment to conservative Islamic values has steadily evolved in the process, but the Saudi monarchy must move slowly and carefully, it must constantly demonstrate its religious legitimacy and commitment to Islam, and every reform produces an inevitable series of challenges and resistance.

The King’s title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques is not a hollow honorific. The Saudi government’s success in honoring and supporting Islam, in support the global flow of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, and in honoring the Koran is absolutely critical to its popular legitimacy.

At the same time, **Saudi religious conservatism is not Islamic extremism, and also has a stabilizing effect**. The same Saudi religious conservatism that means the Saudi government must be cautious in making reforms, limits the prospect of sudden waves of popular demands for secular reform that emerged in Egypt and Tunisia. There are many in the Saudi elite that continue to push reform forward, but there are few signs that Saudi popular conservatism will suddenly give way to broad calls for a more secular society or form of government.

Legitimacy and the fight Against Extremism

**The government’s care in preserving its religious legitimacy is also a key to the government’s fight against terrorism** both within the Kingdom and outside it. Its success in keeping popular trust in its commitment to Islam helps explain why it could drive Al Qa’ida in the Peninsula out of the Kingdom and force it into Yemen.
It helps explain why Department of Defense reporting, and the State Department annual reports on terrorism, now consistently praise Saudi progress and cooperation in dealing with Al Qaida and the broader threat of terrorism.

This success in the struggle against extremism does pose challenges of its own. The Kingdom has a very different justice system. It is slow to modernize and both Saudi courts and internal security practices can be repressive and still have many problems. Yet, the annual State Department report on human rights is more favorable to Saudi Arabia than in its assessments of many other developing countries. Moreover, the Saudi regime relies far more on cooption than repression. It often brings moderate reformers and dissidents into the system, rather than simply silencing or repressing them. It may hunt down Al Qa’ida activists, **but it has one of them most outstanding programs to reeducate and reconcile young extremists in the Middle East**.

Maintaining the Commitment to Change

Every change in the monarchy does create a new round of fears that the next King will not allow Saudi Arabia to evolve at the pace it needs, and make enough reforms. Somewhat ironically, many feared that King Abdullah would be too conservative and resist reform before he became king. In practice, King Abdullah’s became a symbol of progress that now poses challenge of its own.

King Abdullah and other Saudi leaders of his generation are all old, and no one can guarantee that a new king with an equal emphasis on reform will replace him. At some point in the next few years, Saudi Arabia also must move from selecting a king form the sons of its founder -- Ibn Saud – to selecting one from the next generation in the royal family. The government has made important reform in defining how a new King should be chosen, and are many competent and experienced princes in the next generation. But, the choice of a new king is important and it is not clear how this political transition will take place.

That said, the royal family has shown a remarkable ability to deal with its internal politics, and has consistently made an underlying commitment to social and economic reform over all of its modern history. The monarchy is scarcely immune to self-advantage, but it has supported educational reform, the adoption of new technology, and public welfare measures ever since its founding.  These efforts have sharply accelerated since oil exports began to turn into “oil wealth” in the early 1970s.

The Quality of Governance

It is all too easy to focus on politics and ignore the quality of governance. The fact remains, however, that the way states actually spend their money is at least as critical a measure of their “legitimacy” as their politics. Saudi national budget and five year plans have consistently reflected the fact that Saudi leaders do not simply talk about reform and progress, they have made massive expenditures on every critical aspect of social welfare.

Any examination of Saudi budgets, five-year plans, and the reports of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency since the mid-1970s, shows that Saudi Arabia has not suffered from the “petroleum disease.” Money has gone where it is needed and where it helps preserve stability. The government has invested massive amounts of money in job creation and pushed hard to reduce its dependence on foreign labor. Its elite may be incredibly rich, but the vast majority of Saudi revenues have gone to national security and the broader population, including both the poor and a steadily expanding middle class.

This investment has included massive increases in key services like power and water. There has been an almost incredible expansion of education (now some 6% of the GDP), health care, and housing in the face of massive population growth. Government services have become much more effective while the barriers to private Saudi and outside investment have been sharply reduced.  The Saudi national oil company, ARAMCO, has become a model merit-based employee. The Kingdom has spent billions and billions to  create and expand industrial cities throughout the Kingdom, while it has opened up the rest of its economy, sought to replace foreign labor with Saudis, and begun to develop new sectors of the economy like mining and new sources of income like tourism.

Looking Towards the Future

This does not mean there are not reasons for concern – although **it seems unlikely that Saudi Arabia will face major popular unrest at this point in time**. Every shift at the top of the Saudi monarchy does raise questions. Human rights and the rule of law need modernization. Saudi Shi’ites face discrimination that needs to be eliminated -- although things have slowly improved and few see a far more repressive regime in Iran as much of a model.

The key reasons for concern, however, are structural, and economics and demographics may ultimately prove to be far more of an issue than politics. Saudi Arabia has to deal with the same demographic pressures, and “youth bulge,” that has threatened or toppled regimes elsewhere in the Middle East. Saudi society is still dealing with all of the radical social changes caused by moving from a small, poor population of some 3.8 million uneducated Bedouins in 1950 to a largely settled, urbanized, and far better educated nation that exists today.

No one has an exact figure for the rate of change that is still going on, but the CIA estimates that Saudi Arabia now has the same very young population that challenges every government in the Middle East. It estimates that some 38% of Saudi Arabia’s 25.7 million people are 14 years of age or younger, and that some 280,000 young men and 270,000 young women enter the job market every year.

In spite of Saudi government efforts, direct unemployment is close to 11% -- and this does not take account of lags in getting jobs, limits to the number of women seeking jobs, and disguised unemployment.  Moreover, the US census bureau estimates that Saudi Arabia will grow to 34 million in 2030, in spite of a sharp decline in its past rate of population growth.

As is the case with every state in the Middle East, this means longer-term stability involves challenges that go far beyond political reform. Saudi Arabia must find better ways of giving men education for jobs, rather than in religion. It must bring women – who are a larger percentage of secondary school and university graduates than men – a full role in the labor force and society.

Finally, Saudi Arabia must cope with the fact that “oil wealth” is relative to the population. Successful governance and the search for stability must change an economy that now draws on petroleum income for 80% of its budget revenues, 45% of its GDP, and 90% of its export earnings. The US Department of Energy also estimates that this  “oil wealth” only amounted $5,500 per person in 2010, and this narrow base of wealth is why Saudi Arabia’s overall per capita income ranks 55th in the world.

This dependence on petroleum exports is scarcely poverty, but it helps explain why the total Saudi per capita income of around $24,000 compares to $145,000 per person for sparsely populated neighbors like Qatar, $51,000 for Kuwait, and $40,000 for the UAE (And $47,000 in the US). It also illustrates why continued Saudi investment in jobs, education, and development is so critical to giving the Kingdom a substantial higher level of stability than most countries in the region, and why the future quality of Saudi governance, and the ability to find the right balance between conservatism and reform, will remain more important than conventional politics.

### AT: Pakistan

#### Accountability doesn’t solve Pakistan --- Boyle says that the perception that Pakistan cannot stop U.S. drone strikes undermines legitimacy and risks a coup --- there is one line that references “operational tempo” but everything else is just about any strikes undermining sovereignty --- that was on the CP.

#### Big internal-link disconnect. Boyle says that there is a risk of a military coup, then O’Hanlon is about a total collapse. No evidence says military take-over will cause a failed state.

#### The paragraph directly before where they start their O’Hanlon card concedes that it is unlikely.

Michael O’Hanlon 5, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies PhD in public and international affairs from Princeton, Apr 27 2005, “Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State: The Cases of North Korea and Pakistan,” http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/ohanlon.pdf

**The Pakistani collapse scenario appears somewhat unlikely given its relatively pro-Western and secular officer corps**; 17however, the intelligence services, which created the Taliban and have condoned if not abetted Islamic extremists in Kashmir, are less dependable. The country as a whole is sufficiently infiltrated by fundamentalist groups – as the attempted assassinations against President Pervez Musharraf and other evidence make clear – that this terrifying scenario should not be dismissed.18

#### Pakistani nukes are safe. They are conscious of the security threat and take appropriate safeguards.

**Siddiqi, 2010** (Shahid R., Axis of Logic Columnist, former Paki Air Force and former Bureau Chief – Pakistan & Gulf Economist, “Critical Analysis Are Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear Assets Threatened by Terrorists?” 2-22, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article\_58619.shtml)

"This is all overblown rhetoric. Even if the country's leadership were to be incapacitated, Pakistan's protections are so strong that the arsenal could never slip from the hands of the country's National Command Authority”, General Kidwai told David Sangers of New York Times. Pakistan has successfully put its strategic weapons program under formalized institutional control and oversight. National Command Authority effectively controls, manages and monitors strategic organizations, prevents tangible and intangible transfers or leakage of sensitive technologies and material - measures in line with IAEA safeguards. An over 8000-men strong Security Division secures nuclear assets and materials and guards against malevolent activities. Supported by the strategic forces, it is fully capable of ensuring nuclear security of components even in transit. Prevention of theft of nuclear assets or fissile material Like other nuclear states, Pakistan also faces the security challenge of preventing Non-State Actors and terror groups from gaining access to nuclear assets. Its preventive measures are no less effective than those of others. Commenting on security of nuclear weapons, Congressional Research Service Report (RL-31589) on Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan; observes, “Fissile material components (pits) are thought to be kept separately from the rest of the warhead. Such a physical separation helps deter unauthorized use and complicates theft”. Pakistan is believed to have incorporated certain technical safety features into the weapon design which coupled with de-mated status of the weapons, wherein the warhead and the fissile core are stored in separate locations, discourages and denies seizure or theft of an intact nuclear device, guards against accidental or unauthorized launch and prevents diversion of fissile material in the form of weapon components. Pakistan’s nuclear controls also include the functional equivalent to the two-man rule and Permissive Action Links (PALs) that most nuclear states rely on to protect against loss of control, inadvertent weapons use, accidents, and other mishaps. Pakistan’s nuclear material or radioactive sources have remained safe from theft or pilferage nor has there been any attempt by terrorist elements to gain access to weapons or materials. Lamenting the Western attitude Peter Lavoy (National Intelligence for Analysis) states, “Since the 1998 tests, various pronouncements, publications in the Western press, and events in the region have eroded the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control, overshadowing the efforts that have been made since 1999 to harness a coherent command system to ensure management of its nuclear capabilities….” Guarav Kampani of Center for Nonproliferation Studies says, “Despite such speculative scenario building among policy and security analysts, there is little public evidence to suggest that the safety or the security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations or its nuclear command and control mechanism was ever in jeopardy from internal political instability or Islamists or terrorists forces inside Pakistan or nearby in Afghanistan, either during the American ‘War against Terrorism‘ in Afghanistan or during the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military standoff. In their analysis of threats from Islamic fundamentalism, Scott Parrish and William C. Potter of the WMD Commission opined, “……. while many states may view Islamic fundamentalism as a significant threat, there appears to be much less agreement on the nature of that threat and its relationship to nuclear terrorism or proliferation”.

#### Indo-pak won’t go nuclear

Enders 2 (Jan 30, David, Michigan Daily, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely)

**\* Ashutosh Varshney – Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan**

**\* Paul Huth – Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland**

**\* Kenneth Lieberthal – Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council**

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.¶ "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."¶ The worlds two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.¶ "The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.¶ "Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said.¶ Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war.¶ "India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."¶ Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal.¶ "American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."

## \*\*\* 2NC

### CP

#### Their Manning evidence says ending signature strikes solves Yemen.

Jacqueline Manning 12, Senior Editor of International Affairs Review, December 9 2012, “Free to Kill: How a Lack of Accountability in America’s Drone Campaign Threatens U.S. Efforts in Yemen,” http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/450.

Earlier this year White House counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan, named al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen the greatest threat to the U.S. Since 2009, the Obama administration has carried out an estimated 28 drone strikes and 13 air strikes targeting AQAP in Yemen, while the Yemeni Government has carried out 17 strikes, and another five strikes cannot be definitively attributed to either state . There is an ongoing debate over the effectiveness of targeted killings by drone strikes in the fight against al-Qaeda. However, what is clear is that the secrecy and unaccountability with which these drone strike are being carried out are undermining U.S. efforts in Yemen.

The drone campaign in Yemen is widely criticized by human rights activists, the local population and even the United Nations for its resulting civilian casualties. It is also credited with fostering animosity towards the U.S. and swaying public sentiment in Yemen in favor of AQAP. The long-term effects, as detailed by a 2012 report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict, seem to be particularly devastating. The resulting loss of life, disability, or loss of property of a bread-winner can have long-term impacts, not just on an individual, but on an entire family of dependents.

The effectiveness of drone technology in killing al-Qaeda militants, however, cannot be denied. Targeted killings by drone strikes have eliminated several key AQAP members such as Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir Khan, Abdul Mun’im Salim al Fatahani, and Fahd al-Quso . Advocates of the counterterrorism strategy point out that it is much less costly in terms of human lives and money than other military operations.

While there are strong arguments on both sides of the drone debate, both proponents and critics of targeted killings of AQAP operatives by drones agree that transparency and accountability are needed.

**Authorizing the CIA to carry out signature strikes is of particular concern**. In signature strikes, instead of targeting individual Al Qaeda leaders, the CIA targets locations without knowing the precise identity of the individuals targeted as long as the locations are linked to a “signature” or pattern of behavior by Al Qaeda officials observed over time. This arbitrary method of targeting often results in avoidable human casualties.

Secrecy surrounding the campaign often means that victims and families of victims receive no acknowledgement of their losses, much less compensation. There are also huge disparities in the reported number of deaths. In addition, according to The New York Times, Obama administration officials define “militants” as “all military-age males in a strike zone...unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent” **This definition leads to a lack of accountability** for those casualties **and inflames anti-American sentiment**.

In a report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council, Ben Emmerson, special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, asserted that, "Human rights abuses have all too often contributed to the grievances which cause people to make the wrong choices and to resort to terrorism….human rights compliant counter-terrorism measures help to prevent the recruitment of individuals to acts of terrorism." There is now statistical evidence that supports this claim. A 2010 opinion poll conducted by the New America Foundation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where U.S. drone strikes have been carried out on a much larger scale, shows an overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes coupled with a majority support for suicide attacks on U.S. forces under some circumstances.

It is clear that the drone debate is not simply a matter of morality and human rights; it is also a matter of ineffective tactics. At a minimum **the U.S. must implement a policy of transparency** and accountability in the use of drones. **Signature strikes take unacceptable risks with innocent lives**. Targets must be identified more responsibly, and risks of civilian casualties should be minimized. When civilian casualties do occur, the United States must not only acknowledge them, but also pay amends to families of the victims.

#### Boyle says that the perception that Pakistan cannot stop U.S. drone strikes is what undermines government legitimacy and creates instability --- CP obviously solves.

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf.

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. **The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks** on its territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that¶ what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76¶ **The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government**. **The growing perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks** is particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force.77

### 2NC Fettweis—Empirics

#### AND, their authors ignore the foreign policy options other countries—makes their theoretical predictions bankrupt.

Hurrell 6—Director of the Centre for International Studies @ University of Oxford [Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?” International Affairs 82, 1 (2006) 1‒19]

Neo-realist theory has generated an enormous and sophisticated literature with many subtheories and competing diagnoses. It is, however, limited in a number of important ways. In the first place, most of this literature is written from the perspective of the United States and is implicitly or explicitly preoccupied with the strategies that the US has adopted, or should adopt, to sustain its advantageous position in the system. Second, the foreign policy choices of second-tier states are arrived at deductively, irrespective of whether or not they correspond particularly closely either to policy options that have actually been adopted or to understandings of those choices within second-tier states themselves. Third, the options are underspecified: What precisely does ‘bandwagoning’ consist of, and what determines the choice among the very different forms that ‘alignment’ with the hegemon might take? Does bandwagoning describe a pattern of behaviour or a conscious policy choice? Is it useful to distinguish between hard and soft forms of balancing? What of other options such as ‘hiding’ or ‘hedging’? Finally, neo-realism sees the system only in terms of the distribution of power. Systemic forces are indeed crucial; but, as foreign policy analysis of the countries under consideration here clearly demonstrates, there is much more in the system than is contained in neo-realist theory, and **this matters not just for accurate empirical analysis but** also **for the development of successful theory**. Pg. 6

#### Their defense of unipolarity is plagued by conceptual confusion and methodological laziness.

Yang 10—Ph.D Candidate in the Politics & International Relations Program @ University of Southern California [Xiangfeng Yang, The Unipolar Challenge: Power, Culture and Authority and the Advent of War, March 25, 2010, pg. [http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Unipolar%20Challenge,%203rd%20Draft.pdf](http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Unipolar%20Challenge%2C%203rd%20Draft.pdf)]

Turning the conventional wisdom on its head, the positivist intellectual enterprise on unipolarity is seriously impeded by not just conceptual confusion but also the lack of methodological rigor. Conceptually, most researchers, many realists included, are slow to realize that the character of unipolarity is fundamentally different phenomenon from bipolarity and multipolarity and that the study of unipolarity presupposes a new set of analytical assumptions most of the time, if not always. Methodologically and theoretically, the obsession with contemporary US hegemony gives the impression that unipolarity is historically unprecedented, such that scholars use the evidence based on which their hypotheses are developed to test their theoretical propositions, a huge taboo in positivist research (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). The upshot is often that their policy projections leap far ahead of their theoretical and empirical analyses: the same evidence can be interpreted in rather divergent ways, or that the falsification of their theory still awaits what China or the United States will do in the future.8 pg. 13

#### US restraint is risk free—interdependence and institutions will keep the peace.

Fettweis 10—Professor of Political Science at Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, 2010]

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is U.S. the military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that **none of the other explanations for the decline of war—**nuclear weapons, complex economic **interdependence**, international and domestic **institutions, evolutions in** ideas and **norms**—**necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity**. Were America to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would bevirtually risk free**.** pg. 175-176

### 2NC Jervis—No GP war

#### AND, unipolarity directly trades off with US leadership.

Ikenberry 6—Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton University [G. John Ikenberry, Liberal International Theory in the Wake of 911 and American Unipolarity, 22 January 2006, pg. http://tinyurl.com/6v3vtyy]

Liberalism and American Hegemony - A final crisis point in liberal internationalism is that the postwar liberal project depended on enlightened American hegemony—and now that hegemony is more problematic. Like the balance of power, American hegemony has been more of a pre-condition for the emergence of liberal order than its champions might admit. But the character of that hegemony is under strain and changing.

For half a century, the United States held the keys to global order—and in many ways it still does today. If America engages in the right amount of commitment and restraint—anchoring its power in partnerships, alliances, multilateral institutions///

, "special relationships," and governance regimes -- the overall international system will tend to remain stable, open, and integrated. The world has, in effect, "contracted out" to the United States to provide global governance. The United States provides public goods, frameworks of cooperation, "good offices," and an enlightened but U.S.-centered system of rules and modes of doing geopolitical business. In return, the world "bandwagons" with the U.S. rather than resists or balances against it. This special type of open or liberal American hegemony trumps any other type of rival global order—and all the key players in world politics know this to be true. So no great power or regional grouping has an incentive to challenge or overturn the current order. It is a quintessential American vision—the great diversity of peoples and societies around the world will together troop down a grand pathway to modernity. Again, if the United States understands the logic of its own system and runs it correctly, this American-style liberal hegemonic order can last indefinitely.

A grand bargain stands behind this American-led liberal order. In the past, the United States provided global “services”—such as security protection and support for open markets—which made other states willing to work with rather than resist American preeminence. The public goods provision tended to make it worthwhile for these states to endure the day-to-day irritations of American foreign policy. But the trade-off seems to be shifting. Today, the United States appears to be providing fewer global public goods while at the same time the irritations associate with American dominance appear to be are growing.

It might be useful to think of this dynamic this way: the United States is unique in that it is simultaneously both the provider of “global governance” -- through what has tended in the past to be the exercise of “liberal” hegemony—and it is a great power that pursues its own national interest. America’s liberal hegemonic role is manifest when it champions the WTO, engages in international rule or regime creation, or reaffirms its commitment to cooperative security in Asia and Europe. Its great power role is manifest, for example, when it seeks to protect its domestic steel or textile industry. **When it acts as a liberal hegemon, it is seeking to lead or manage the global system of rules and institutions; when it is acting as a nationalist great power, it is seeking to respond** to domestic interests and **its relative power position**. My point is that today, these two roles—liberal hegemon and traditional great power—are increasingly in conflict.30

So **the danger to liberal internationalism lies with its greatest champion.** The United States does not appear to be doing as much today as in the past to sponsor and operate within a system of consensual rule-based governance. Why the United States is less willing to do so is actually a complex issue. Some of it is very specifically about the Bush administration—and therefore these biases and viewpoints will pass from the scene eventually as Bush and his team leave office. But America’s global position and the structure of incentives that this setting generates is also part of the explanation. American unipolarity seems to have created problems in how the U.S. thinks about the provision of international rules, institutions, and public goods.

CONCLUSION - The United States, together with allied European and East Asian partners, created a distinctive type of international order—organized around open markets, social bargains, intergovernmental institutions, and cooperative security. This political order was cemented by both the hegemonic power of the United States and the unusual bonds of cooperation that are possible among democracies. Today this order is in jeopardy. The United States is deeply ambivalent about making institutional commitments and binding itself to other states—ambivalence and hesitation that has been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, American unipolarity, and new security threats. But the United States still possesses profound incentives to build and operate within a liberal rule-based order. Just as importantly, that order is now not simply an extension of American power and interests—it has taken on a life of its own. American power may rise or fall and its foreign policy ideology may wax and wane between multilateral and imperial impulses—but the wider and deeper liberal global order is now a reality that America itself must accommodate itself to.

\*US key - US provides the framework of cooperation

\*Multilat allows the world to bandwagon instead of resist

\*Multilat = open market, intergovernmental institutions, & cooperative security

### 2NC AT: N/U—Reintervene/Latch-on

#### AND, a robust and statistically significant study proves.

Bafumi & Parent 12—Professor of Government at Dartmouth College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Joseph Bafumi & Joseph Parent “International polarity and America’s polarization,” International Politics (2012) 49, pg. 1–35]

We reach different predictions than rival views, and this makes falsifying our argument easier. American polarization will correlate with relative power, and the principal actors promoting or retarding polarization are potential peer competitors. There are several prime candidates: China, a unified Europe, and, more remotely, India and Russia. As any or all of these contenders approach America’s level of power, we predict that polarization should begin to level off and fall. Our optimism on polarization’s decline is based on the questionable but widely held assumption that China will rise to peer competitor status in the foreseeable future (Economist, 2007, p. 12). Although non-state threats (for example, terrorism, disease, environmental degradation, economic depression) may yet reveal themselves to be as influential as great power politics, our evidence suggests that traditional measures of power offer firm purchase for the present.

Conclusion: Unipolarized America - The central point of this article is that American polarization may have as much to do with what is going on outside the country as inside it. Scarcities of power thrust parties together, surpluses of power pushes parties apart. Across the best available data and various operationalizations, our findings are significant and robust. Certainly there are other factors at work, but the explanatory prowess of relative power deserves greater attention. We agree that the connection between security and unity is an introductory international relations insight, but it is apparently not prevalent in American politics because **no previous argument has centered on it or attempted to measure it**. Other major findings concern the international origins of domestic inequality and the insignificance of inequality as a provenance of polarization.

Today’s discussion on American inequality assumes it is the product of technology, social capital, the returns of hard work, education, and so on. We do not disagree these are contributors, yet we find these arguments incomplete and suggest that economic views be braced by political perspectives. Our evidence suggests that income inequality is partially the product of enemy states’ relative power, and that inequality is not the chief cause of polarization. A crucial upshot of our argument is that the United States faces a dilemma between conflict abroad and conflict at home. Without large dragons to contend with overseas, Americans will find domestic foes to demonize instead. The result is trading between problems, and the readers shall judge which problems are preferable. But we predict that as China becomes a peer competitor polarization will gradually diminish, institutional stalemates will abate, and American foreign policy will regain its luster.

The Founders based American government on the belief that concentrations of power corrupt. Yet through their skill and good fortune, they created a state that has become the largest concentration of international power in centuries. As some Americans strive for strength beyond challenge, they should be aware of the probable consequences. US unipolarity is not only a recipe for imperious international conduct; it is also a recipe for nastier domestic faction. The first action tends to provoke balancing coalitions, the second paves the path for internecine strife, but both crop hegemonic power. Naturally, neither outcome is inevitable, and much depends on how Americans use their anomalously large autonomy while it lasts. Nonetheless, sooner or later unipolarity will end; the lot left to decision-makers is how to make a virtue of this necessity. Pg. 26-28

#### The only comprehensive study proves no transition impact.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.

First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.

Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.

Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. Pg. 9-10

### 2NC Overview—Tech

#### AND, our impact is 100 million times greater than nuclear war—You should vote neg even if 99% of humanity will perish.

Ćirković 8—Professor of Physics @ University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Senior Research Associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade [Milan M. Ćirković Ph.D. (Fellow of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies), “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, September 17, 2008, pg. http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/print/2606]

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face evengreater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics “fade out” by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore’s Law.

Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society’s ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, “Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.”

Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction:

A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, **the stakes are** one million times greater **for extinction than for** the more modest **nuclear wars that kill “only” hundreds of millions** of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise.

There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.

#### A less than 1% risk of this impact wins the debate

Hughes 1—Executive Director of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies [James J. Hughes Ph.D (Professor of medical ethics and research methods @ Trinity College), “Relinquishment or Regulation: Dealing with Apocalyptic Technological Threats,” Prepared for the Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Co-Curricular Initiative, Trinity College, Fall 2001, November 14, 2001]

Many critics have dismissed Joy’s concerns as “science fiction,” meaning they do not believe in the possibility of super-plagues, nanorobots and self-willed AI. But even if these threats are of very low probability, we have to take seriously even the slightest threat of so huge a catastrophic effect. I agree with Bill Joy that the **apocalyptic threats from these technologies are very real**. It may be that the likelihood of self-destruction with these technologies is one reason for the apparent scarcity of intelligent life in the galaxy.

Before the first atomic chain weapon was tested at the Trinity site in Nevada, Edward Teller announced calculations showing that the test would ignite Earth’s atmosphere in an uncontrolled chain reaction. Robert Oppenheimer was so troubled that he consulted his mentor, Arthur Compton, who suggested a risk/benefit calculation that losing the war to the Nazis would be the better bet if the risk of destroying the Earth’s atmosphere was 3 in a million or more. By the time of the test, the Trinity team had proven that igniting the atmosphere was a theoretical impossibility. But how much of an impossibility is still too possible? How do we know when we have passed the three in a million chance, and is this even the appropriate level of risk to take with the future of life on the planet? How large must the potential rewards of some line of research be to gamble with human existence? Pg. 7

## \*\*\* 1NR

### Overview

#### Food shortages risk global nuclear war

Wenyu et al in ‘6

(Xie, Prof. Phil. @ Shandong U., Zhihe Wang, Prof. @ School of Phil. And Soc. Sci. @ Beijing Normal U., and George E. Derfer, School of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, and George E. Derfer, Prof. Emeritus @ Cal. Poly. Pomona, “Whitehead and China: Relevance and Relationship”, p. 28, Google Print)

The threats posed by war, imperialism, nuclear weapons, and terrorism are, furthermore, not the only threats to the continued existence of civilization for which global anarchy is responsible. There are also the interconnected threats of pollution, overpopulation, and resource shortages. Although there has been serious discussion of the population explosion since the 1960s, very little has been done tos top it. China is one of the few countries to have introduced effective measures to bring a halt to runaway population growth. In most of the rest of the world, continuation of the population explosion means that already struggling societies will, in the coming decades, be trying to meet the needs of twice as many people with the same resources, or even fewer. Resource wars, meaning wars in which natural resources are the primary cause, will surely become increasingly prevalent. As absolute shortages in food, water, and oil emerge, furthermore, the relative shortages, produced by the world’s highly inequitable allocation of resources, will become even more intolerable to disadvantaged groups, providing additional motivation for terrorism aagainst rich countries. Global apartheid combined with growing resource shortages combined with hatred of imperialism combined with nuclearism makes for a very volatile mixture.

#### Blips kill billions

Tampa Tribune in’ 96

(“Grain Shortage Growing Problem”, January 20, L/N)

"Even if they are merely blips, higher international prices can hurt poor countries that import a significant portion of their food," he said. "Rising prices can also quickly put food out of reach of the 1.1 billion people in the developing world who live on a dollar a day or less."

“he” is Per Pinstrup-Andersen, director of the International Food Policy Research Institute.

#### Food spikes will bring down Pakistan’s ruling coalition and bolster radicalism

#### Ganguly in ‘8

(Sumit, Director of Research @ Center on American and Global Security @ Indiana U., Newsweek, “The Other Threat to Pakistan”, 6-23, L/N)

The new aid, investments and remittances significantly buoyed Pakistan's economy. Yet Musharraf's military regime never used the opportunity to address the country's endemic underlying problems. Tax receipts remained low due to the government's reluctance to crack down on powerful business players, investment in infrastructure lagged, agricultural productivity stagnated and social services were neglected. Adult literacy is still only about 49 percent, and the Human Development Report ranks Pakistan 136 out of 177 countries. Foreign investors, who'd been flooding the country's booming service sector to cater to its growing ranks of nouveau riche, took note of these persistent flaws, and even the emergence of a democratically elected government in the February 2008 elections did little to allay their concerns. The worsening security situation--tragically underscored by the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007--made the country's future seem all the more uncertain. Foreign dollars thus soon started to dry up, and the underlying weakness of Pakistan's economy left it acutely vulnerable to other external shocks. When oil prices began to climb this spring, the country reeled, and as Pakistan's treasury faced a dramatic outflow of funds (Pakistan buys most of its oil abroad and has to pay in hard currency), confidence in the rupee fell precipitously. This, in turn, made imports more expensive. The rise in global food prices also hit ordinary Pakistanis hard and, as they cut back on consumption, sent the already shaky economy into a tailspin. All this bodes ill for the country's immediate future. The new coalition government has already deadlocked, mired in an unseemly squabble over the reinstatement of a number of Supreme Court judges arbitrarily dismissed by Musharraf. (Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister and leader of one half of the coalition, wants to reinstate them; Asif Zardari, Bhutto's widower and the head of the other faction, doesn't.) All these leaders are far too preoccupied with their own survival at the moment to deal with Pakistan's pressing economic ills. Yet this inattention could prove critical, for economic drift will only exacerbate the country's political woes. Widespread economic distress will lead to increased public demonstrations, strikes and turmoil. Under these conditions, Islamist forces could easily win broad support by promising facile remedies, such as the imposition of Sharia and an end to military cooperation with the United States.

#### Food spikes cause instability through the Muslim world, specifically Egypt and Saudi Arabia

#### Financial Times in ‘8

(Javier Blas and Carola Hoyos, “West rethinks strategic threats”, 6-21, Proquest)

For 30 years Washington has seen oil as an issue of national security, worrying that a rogue Middle East country would withhold America's lifeblood as Arab countries did during the 1973 oil embargo. Now US and European politicians are linking oil - and record food prices - to a new international strategic threat: instability in developing countries. During the past few weeks senior officials have quietly begun to shift their emphasis of the fuel and food crisis from viewing it as purely a humanitarian and social problem to a concern that governments could fall as hungry and fuel-deprived people take their anger to the streets. Haiti's prime minister was sacked by the national assembly earlier this year following food protests, Pakistan told Saudi Arabia it could not pay its oil bill this month, and this week China joined a growing number of Asian nations that have been forced to take the unpopular decision to slash costly fuel subsidies. Josette Sheeran, executive director of the World Food Programme, has warned that riots in more than 30 countries were "stark reminders that food insecurity threatens not only the hungry but peace and stability itself". She added that only seven meals separated civilisation from potential anarchy and that some of the world's "gold-standard, new, fledgling democracies" were under the most pressure. Lee Hsien Loong, prime minister of Singapore, said at last month's opening of a security conference attended by Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, that the stresses from hunger and famine could result in social upheaval and civil strife, exacerbating conditions that lead to failed states. "Between countries, competition for food supplies and displacement of people across borders could deepen tensions and provoke conflict and wars," Mr Lee said. But it is only now, with oil prices having flirted near $140 a barrel and with several agricultural commodities hitting record prices, that this thinking has transferred into foreign policy. The most visible signal of this move is tomorrow's oil summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. For the first time 40 ministers and 20 oil executives will meet to discuss what is causing high oil prices - which with high food prices have pushed inflation in many developing countries into double digits - and what can be done about them. Saudi Arabia has realised that it could be blamed for political upheaval in developing nations. The issue is especially acute when it comes to Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Morocco, Indonesia or Egypt, since Saudi Arabia regards itself as a leader in the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia fears it could be made the scapegoat for economic woes even in the developed world. In the US, the kingdom's most important customer and ally, Riyadh worries that it will beblamed for deepening the economic crisis as the candidates vying for the White House look to deflect responsibility and win voters in November's presidential election.

### 1nr Thumpers

#### Farm bill FIRST – big fight

THE HILL 10 – 20 – 13 Lawmakers seek truce with farm bill, <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/agriculture/329413-lawmakers-seek-truce-with-farm-bill>

The $1 trillion farm bill will serve as the first test of how deeply the shutdown fight has damaged relations in Washington.

Congress has made the legislation its first order of business as it pivots away from the battles over government funding and the debt ceiling.

The leaders of the agriculture committees in Congress and K Street lobbyists are eager to put the finishing touches on the bill, which could get wrapped into a year-end budget deal that replaces automatic sequestration cuts.

But some fear Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), who has vowed to complete the legislation, might be too wounded by the fiscal battle to finish the job.

The same conservative groups that thwarted Boehner’s plans during the shutdown fight — including Heritage Action — could be opposed to the farm bill if there is any compromise on food stamp cuts.

Supporters of the legislation also fear the raw relations between the White House and congressional Republicans will make bipartisan legislating difficult.

The renewed push for the **farm bill** didn’t get off to an auspicious start

President Obama on Thursday named the farm subsidy and food stamp bill one of his top three near-term priorities, along with a budget deal and immigration reform.

But he erroneously accused the House of having failed to pass its version of the legislation, drawing a rebuke from the House Agriculture Committee.

### A2: Food Conflicts Don’t Escalate

#### Riots will escalate ---- spills over to collapse international stability

#### Sinjela in ‘8

(Encyla, States News Service, “HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL CALLS FOR ALL STAKEHOLDERS TO TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE RIGHT TO FOOD IN FACE OF GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS”, 5-22, L/N)

ENCYLA M. SINJELA (Zambia) said that Zambia had co-sponsored the convening of this Special Session because it believed that it was timely. That was evident from the food-related riots that had taken place in more than 20 countries in different parts of the world as a result of the food crisis caused by high food prices. Zambia also believed that this session would provoke some thoughts for the High-Level Conference on World Food Security and the Challenges of Climate Change and Bionergy scheduled to take place from 3 to 5 June 2008 in Rome. If rising prices of food were not controlled, the riots they had witnessed over the past few months were bound to spread to other parts of the world, thus threatening international peace and security. The international community therefore had to make concerted and coordinated efforts to ensure that the situation was contained and that the causes of high food prices and their consequences were adequately addressed.

### A2: No Resource Wars

#### Even absent a sufficient causal relationship food scarcity is a key trigger factor for escalating pre-existing conflicts

#### Messer et al in ‘1

(Ellen, Visiting Associate Prof. Nutrition Science and Policy @ Tufts, Marc Cohen, Special Assistant to the Director General @ International Food Policy Research Institute, and Thomas Marchione, Nutrition advisor at the Bureau for Humanitarian Response @ USAID, “Conflict: A Cause and Effect of Hunger”, http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ECSP7-featurearticles-1.pdf)

There is a high correlation between a country's involvement in conflict and its classification by FAO as a “low-income food deficit” country. Such countries have high proportions of food-insecure households. And, as already noted, conflict is also highly correlated with high rates of child mortality (see Figure 2), which is a common index for food insecurity. Nevertheless, a number of analysts have challenged the notion that food insecurity is a causal factor in conflict. Paarlberg, for instance, argues that environmental scarcities such as land shortage, land degradation, and rapid population growth—what he refers to as “eco-Malthusian emiseration”—are not generally a factor in African conflicts. Rather, Paarlberg notes, the level of conflict in Africa has been relatively stable since the end of the colonial era. In his view, “[a] far more convincing explanation for violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa starts with the serious geographical mismatch, long noticed on the continent, between post-colonial national boundaries and ethnic boundaries.” (Paarlberg, 1999, page 1). More generally, Gleditsch (1998) has pointed out that most conflicts can be sufficiently explained as a result of political, economic, and cultural factors, without reference to environmental scarcities. In fact, neither viewpoint precludes a food-security connection. Even Homer-Dixon (1999), a leading figure in the environmental security field, concedes that environmental scarcity alone does not inevitably result in conflict. Instead, he stresses that resource constraints can have a profound influence on the social factors that eventually lead to conflict—as when elites monopolize control over scarce resources (such as water, cropland, or forests) and non-elites perceive themselves as unfairly deprived. As an example of how this works in practice, Uvin (1996b) argues persuasively that environmental factors in general—and food insecurity in particular—critically contributed to triggering the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Per capita food production and availability had declined dramatically in Rwanda over the preceding decade. The collapse of the world price of coffee in 1985 greatly reduced local and national government revenues and sapped rural households' purchasing power, even as urban job opportunities grew scarce and food prices rose. Deteriorating living conditions made many Rwandans into a ready audience for government appeals to ethnic hatred.

### LINK WALL – Drone Review

#### A Loss is a loss – even if they like the content – the authority means it’ll destroy the agenda for Obama

LILLIS & WASSON 9 – 7 – 13 [The Hill Staff, Mike & Erik, “Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote,” http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats]

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria.¶ Obama needs all the political capital he can muster heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling.¶ Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies.¶ But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights.¶ That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East.¶ “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said.¶ Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles.¶ "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "We need a maximally strong president to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."¶ “Clearly a loss is a loss,” a Senate Democratic aide noted.¶ Publicly, senior party members are seeking to put a firewall between a failed Syria vote — one that Democrats might have a hand in — and fiscal matters.¶ Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-Va.) said Friday that the fear of damaging Obama just eight months into his second term "probably is in the back of people's minds" heading into the Syria vote. But the issue has not percolated enough to influence the debate.¶ "So far it hasn't surfaced in people's thinking explicitly," Connolly told MSNBC. "People have pretty much been dealing with the merits of the case, not about the politics of it — on our side."¶ Moran said he doesn't think the political aftershocks would be the “deciding factor” in their Syria votes.¶ "I rather doubt that most of my colleagues are looking at the bigger picture," he said, "and even if they were, I don't think it would be the deciding factor."¶ Moran said the odds of passing the measure in the House looked slim as of Friday.¶ Other Democrats are arguing that the Syria vote should be viewed in isolation from other matters before Congress.¶ “I think it’s important each of these major issues be decided on its own — including this one,” Rep. Sander Levin (Mich.), senior Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee, said Friday.¶ With Obama scheduled to address the country Tuesday night, several Democrats said the fate of the Syria vote could very well hinge on the president's ability to change public opinion.¶ “This is going to be a fireside chat, somewhat like it was in the Thirties," Levin said. "I wasn’t old enough to know, one has to remember how difficult it was for President Roosevelt in WWII."¶ Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-Md.), who remains undecided on the Syria question, agreed.¶ "It's very, very important that the case for involvement in Syria not only be made to the members of Congress and the Senate, but it must also be made to the American people," Cummings said Friday in the Capitol.¶ Still other Democrats, meanwhile, are arguing that the ripple effects of a Syria vote are simply too complicated to game out in advance. Some said the GOP has shown little indication it will advance Obama’s agenda even after his reelection, so a Syria failure would do little damage.¶ “There is a constant wounding [of Obama] going on with the Tea Party on budgets, appropriations and the debt ceiling,” said Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Texas). “I am going to reach out to my colleagues, Tea Party or not, and ask is this really the way you want to project the political process?”¶ Jackson Lee said using Syria to score political points would be “frolicking and frivolity” by the Tea Party.¶ Yet others see a more serious threat to the Democrats' legislative agenda if the Syria vote fails.¶ A Democratic leadership aide argued that Republicans — some of whom are already fundraising on their opposition to the proposed Syria strikes — would only be emboldened in their fight against Obama's agenda if Congress shoots down the use-of-force resolution.¶ "It's just going to make things harder to do in Congress, that's for sure," the aide said Friday.¶ But other aides said Obama could also double down on fighting the cuts from sequestration if he becomes desperate for a win after Syria, and the net effect could be positive.¶ A leading Republican strategist echoed that idea.¶ “Should the President lose the vote in Congress, he will be severely weakened in the eyes of public opinion, the media, the international crowd and the legislative branch," The Hill columnist John Feehery said Friday on his blog.

#### Obama would fight back against any Review and Involvement in his Targeted Killing program

Elinor June Rushforth 12, J.D. candidate, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, Class of 2013, Fall 2012, “NOTE: THERE'S AN APP FOR THAT: IMPLICATIONS OF ARMED DRONE ATTACKS AND PERSONALITY STRIKES BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST NON-CITIZENS, 2004-2012,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 29 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 623, p. lexis

Because of staunch political and military support for the drone program, it is unlikely that these attacks will diminish in the near future. If that is indeed the case, it is more important than ever that the Executive, in conjunction with Congress and the judiciary, set out clear standards for these lethal operations. The nation has faced these difficult questions before and "[i]n keeping with the purpose and the pragmatism of Mathews v. Eldridge, this investigation should be as thorough, independent, and public as possible without damage to national security." n189 Specifically, a heightened and public standard of review is needed for the CIA drone program as the military operates within its own chain of command. There should be an open standard of selection that clearly delineates why an individual becomes a target, how long they may be targeted, and who reviews the information about the target. Though these standards are likely to remain classified based on national security concerns, there has been success in integrating national security cases into the judicial process; for example, in the Guantanamo detainee cases. n190 A federal court or panel should also be created, similar to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts that will aid in the targeting process and issue a warrant for a strike. n191¶ A. The Standard for a Lethal Targeting Operation¶ Because of the U.S. commitment to the rule of law, any lethal program not operated by a military branch should be subject to a more public and judicially overseen review. The CIA needs to define exactly who they are searching for; whether it is the "anyone who aids and abets" terrorism level of involvement or a mere scintilla of suspicion. By defining whom they are targeting, a level of credence will be lent to the program. Further, the United States should take a page out of Israel's playbook and declare that there must be actionable intelligence against the proposed target that identifies "the target as a person actively involved in acts of terrorism." n192 There must be an actual plan of attack (time, place, means) in place by that individual that is known through the [\*652] intelligence; n193 this will lessen the likelihood of opportunistic targeting that risks error and miscalculation. Further, an assessment of the distinction and proportionality of the attack should be tied into the decision to attack, n194 as well as a reflection on potential domestic political consequences n195 and foreign political blowback from an attack. n196 Then, supervisors should review a package of information about the proposed target and decide if the intelligence is good enough to continue up the chain of command. Due to the Executive's reassurances, a review process similar to this is already in place, however, without sacrificing national security interests this standard of selection should be made more public. Though the decision to attack terrorist organizations, and those providing material support, has already been made, n197 public support for the tactics used in the Overseas Contingency Operations should help guide the executive and legislative game plan. ¶ B. The Role of the Courts in Targeted Killing Operations¶ The next level of review should be a statutorily created court that is the last stop on the targeted killing process. Though there may be some grumbling among judges and politicians about overextended courts and full dockets, national security concerns and the risk of lethal mistakes should outweigh reluctance to introduce an important check on targeted killing. The President, and perhaps Congress, could also be reluctant to allow courts into what they deem a core executive function. n198 Attorney General Eric Holder gave the public another piece of the Obama administration's targeted killing model when he claimed that the Constitution "guarantees due process, not judicial process" and that "due process [\*653] takes into account the realities of combat." n199 This signals to the public that the Obama administration will remain wary of any encroachment and that the imposition of judicial process on targeted killing would be fought.

#### The only people who actually like the aff are SUPER ULTRA LIBERALs that would never compromise Obama’s capital. The loss of authority is unpopular with EVERYONE.

HUGHES 12 – 6 – 13 White House Correspondent - The Washington Examiner [Brian Hughes, Obama's base increasingly wary of drone program, <http://washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-base-increasingly-wary-of-drone-program/article/2520787>]

The heightened focus on President Obama's targeted killings of American terror suspects overseas has rattled members of his progressive base who have stayed mostly silent during an unprecedented use of secret drone strikes in recent years.

During the presidency of George W. Bush, Democrats, including then-Sen. Obama, hammered the administration for employing enhanced interrogation techniques, which critics labeled torture.

Liberals have hardly championed the president's drone campaign but have done little to force changes in the practice, even as the White House touts the growing number al Qaeda casualties in the covert war.

The issue grates on some Democrats who backed Obama over Hillary Clinton because of her vote in favor of the war in Iraq, only to see the president ignore a campaign promise to close the detainee holding camp in Guantanamo, Cuba, and mount a troop surge in Afghanistan.

With the confirmation hearing Thursday for John Brennan, Obama's nominee for CIA director -- and the architect of the drone program -- Democrats will have a high-profile opportunity to air their concerns over the controversial killings.

"You watch and see -- the left wing of the party will start targeting Obama over this," said Larry Sabato, a political scientist at the University of Virginia. "It's inevitable. The drumbeat will increase as time goes on, especially with each passing drone strike."

Obama late Wednesday decided to share with Congress' intelligence committees the government's legal reasoning for conducting drones strikes against suspected American terrorists abroad, the Associated Press reported. Lawmakers have long demanded to see the full document, accusing the Obama administration of stonewalling oversight efforts.

Earlier in the day, one Democrat even hinted at a possible filibuster of Brennan if given unsatisfactory answers about the drone program.

"I am going to pull out all the stops to get the actual legal analysis, because with out it, in effect, the administration is practicing secret law," said Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., a member of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. "This position is no different [than] that the Bush administration adhered to in this area, which is largely 'Trust us, we'll make the right judgments.' "

In a Justice Department memo released this week, the administration argued it could order the killing of a suspected American terrorist even with no imminent threat to the homeland.

White House press secretary Jay Carney insisted on Wednesday that the administration had provided an "unprecedented level of information to the public" about the drone operations. Yet, questions remain about who exactly orders the killings, or even how many operations have been conducted.

"There's been more noise from senators expressing increased discomfort [with the drone program]," said Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project. "For Brennan, there's going to be more opposition from Democrats than Republicans. It's not just drones but the issue of torture."

Facing concerns from liberals, Brennan had to withdraw his name from the running for the top CIA post in 2008 over his connections to waterboarding during the Bush administration.

Since becoming president, Obama has championed and expanded most of the Bush-era terror practices that he decried while running for the White House in 2008.

It's estimated that roughly 2,500 people have died in drone strikes conducted by the Obama administration.

However, most voters have embraced the president's expanded use of drone strikes. A recent Pew survey found 62 percent of Americans approved of the U.S. government's drone campaign against extremist leaders. And some analysts doubted whether Democratic lawmakers would challenged Obama and risk undermining his second-term agenda.

"Democrats, they're going to want the president to succeed on domestic priorities and don't want to do anything to erode his political capital," said Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. "It's just so partisan right now. An awful lot of [lawmakers] think the president should be able to do whatever he wants."

### Debate NOW - & Link

#### Big debate Wednesday – distractions bad

POLITICO 10 – 24 – 13 http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/farm-bill-gets-no-respect-98795.html

Celebrity chefs are busting out of cable television. Whole Foods Markets, with its trademark Austin-coastal chichi freshness, is now in 40 states including Alabama, Mississippi and Nebraska.

But the farm bill, amid America’s interest in all things food-related? It’s still Washington’s Rodney Dangerfield. It can’t get no respect.

After two years of struggle, House and Senate conferees will finally meet next Wednesday to try to salvage a compromise five-year plan. President Barack Obama is taking notice. But as quickly as the president mentioned the farm bill recently, Washington’s pundits dissed him for elevating something deemed unworthy.

Maureen Dowd looked down her nose in Sunday’s New York Times. The scene at Fox News was almost comical. Brit Hume heaved one of his damning sighs. AP’s Julie Pace wrote off passing a farm bill as “fairly easy” work. George Will said it’s all about welfare.

Maybe it was all the weeds in the First Lady’s vegetable garden after the government shutdown. But Obama’s great sin was that three times in as many days, he brought up the farm bill—something he never even mentioned in his State of the Union.

“We should pass a farm bill,” the president said. “One that America’s farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, and one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the longer-term certainty they deserve.”

This deserves such Washington scorn?

For sure, it’s not all bad to be dissed by Washington these days. Consider what most of America thinks of Washington.

But how did the nation’s capital become so disconnected from a farm and food debate that touches so much of America itself?

A farm bill is about more than corn and cotton futures. Beyond the nation’s vast croplands, it impacts the federal forests and millions of acres of prairie lands held in conservation. It is perhaps the single most important piece of legislation that addresses rural economic development. Its trade and food aid titles are a reminder of how important America’s agricultural power can be overseas. Even the beleaguered honey bee has a stake in new research provisions.

This year’s debate has provoked a singularly bitter but landmark fight over the nutrition title and future of the food stamp program.

House Republicans are insisting on cuts that together with already scheduled reductions next month would drive down spending on food stamp benefits by 12 percent in just two years—pushing millions of people off the rolls. The debate has been so partisan— without legislative hearings or any attempt to pump money back into reforms for the poor—that it has poisoned the farm bill well for many urban Democrats.

That said, even the most loyal supporters of food stamps admit it is a program asked to do too much during the great recession. The disparity in eligibility rules from one state to the next can be huge. Unlike Medicaid, Washington pays the full bill, and the questions raised in the farm bill debate are central for both parties if they are to preserve the social safety net.

What should the income threshold be for eligibility? What assets are counted? And should there be a work requirement?

House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) and his ranking Democrat, Minnesota Rep. Collin Peterson, attempted to address this last year but were plowed under by the Republican right and forces aligned with Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.). Freshman Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-Wash.), who will be part of the farm bill talks, offered her own alternative on income limits and an updated asset test. But she got little traction in her own party.

“This thing has been so politicized,” Peterson told POLITICO. “Everybody is focused on how many dollars it saves and not looking at the policy.”

When the farm bill conference meets Wednesday afternoon, it will be on a grand stage: the gilded Ways and Means Committee meeting room in Longworth with its sculpted eagles and history of past bargains.

The challenge for negotiators is to think as big and bold.

The Agriculture Committees argue—somewhat defensively— that they have already taken major steps. Both bills end the current system of direct cash payments to producers—costing about $4.5 billion annually. At the same time, organic and specialty crops gain modest ground. Much tighter payment limits are imposed on future subsidies. More of an effort is made to help only producers who have put seed in the ground, put themselves at risk and experienced a loss.

What that “loss” entails is still debated. The Senate’s “shallow loss” revenue protection program could end up distributing taxpayer funds to corn and soybean producers who are already making a profit. At the same time, critics would say the House goes off the deep end with a heavily subsidized supplemental coverage option— with only a 10 percent deductible.

The next few days could be pivotal as the Senate responds to new options outlined by the House. Time is running short, and given the erratic legislative schedule this fall, neither side can afford to allow matters to drift.

### PC Yes

#### Obama has capital

ALLARD & WEN 10 – 19 – 13 Sydney Morning Herald [Tom Allard, Philip Wen, The buck stopped, almost, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/the-buck-stopped-almost-20131018-2vs9l.html>]

The Republican retreat this week in Congress has been widely viewed in the US as a scarifying defeat.

The narrative that the party and its Tea Party wing held the nation - and the world - hostage in a mad attempt to cruel Obama's health- care reforms has resonated.

Polling is dreadful for the Republicans and there are upcoming mid-term congressional elections.

It would suggest Obama has some political capital to play with.

Joe Hockey, who was in Washington and New York this week as the negotiations started, stalled and then limped to the finish line, says the ''salient lesson'' for Australia is to take control of its budget, reduce debt and refocus on growing markets in Asia.

Asked about China's response, and the broader geopolitical fallout, Hockey repeats an observation he made to plenty of politicians, bankers and officials in the US.

''Washington is like being in a home where mum and dad are constantly fighting. The danger is, if it goes on, a time will come when the kids will be looking for another home. They look at moving into the home across the road.''

### A2 Impeachment Calls Hurt it

#### Impeachment strategy will fail – House leadership not on board

THE HILL 10 – 19 – 13 Dem: Republicans eye 'impeachment circus', <http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/329449-dem-gop-planning-impeachment-circus-to-thwart-immigration-reform>

A number of Republicans, including Texas Reps. Steve Stockman and Blake Farenthold, as well as Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) and Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-Minn.) have suggested that the House of Representatives could consider impeachment procedures.

Still, there's been no movement by House Republican leadership to pursue such a strategy.

McDermott predicted that even if Republicans fulfilled his prophecy and did undertake impeachment proceedings, they would not prevail.

"That`s exactly what they did to Clinton and they are going to fail at this," McDermott told MSNBC on Friday. "They simply believe that it`s an impeachable offense if they don't agree with it."

### 1nr U Wall

#### Insiders say it’ll get done – but it’ll be a fight

AP 10 – 18 – 13 Klobuchar thinks Congress will pass farm bill, <http://www.twincities.com/news/ci_24338332/klobuchar-thinks-congress-will-pass-farm-bill>

Fresh off helping to break the political stalemate that shut down the federal government, Sen. Amy Klobuchar said Friday she's optimistic that Congress will pass a long-stalled farm bill this year.

The Minnesota Democrat will sit on a House-Senate conference committee that meets for the first time Oct. 28 to start trying to craft a compromise package that would govern farm and food policy for the next five years. President Barack Obama on Thursday listed the farm bill as one of his top three priorities for passage by year's end.

Deep differences between the Republican-controlled House and the Democratic-controlled Senate over food assistance programs are the main reason the farm bill is more than a year late and the country is operating under a one-year extension of the 2008 farm bill that just ran out. The Senate's version cuts food stamps by $4 billion over 10 years while the House is seeking $40 billion in cuts. There are also significant differences over the structure of crop and dairy subsidy programs.

During a visit to a Second Harvest Heartland food bank warehouse, Klobuchar told reporters she thinks it was no coincidence that House leaders finally named their conference committee members last weekend.

"The country just got really, really angry at some people who are being obstructionists, and they're just crying out for people to get things done," she said.

Another reason Klobuchar said she's hopeful is that Congress needs to find significant savings if it's going to pass a long-term budget. The Senate's farm bill includes $24 billion in spending cuts over the next 10 years, so she said that should be an incentive.

But she acknowledged that bridging the large gap on food stamps in a way that can pass both houses won't be easy. Obama has said he won't accept cuts as deep as the House passed, and the senator declined to say what she thinks the magic number for a compromise might be.

"Negotiating on TV, in front of the press, I think we've learned over the last three weeks that is not the best way to handle things," she said.

#### Will pass – momentum & votes –

FARM GUIDE 10 – 24 – 13 http://www.minnesotafarmguide.com/news/crop/senators-host-roundtable-in-preparation-for-farm-bill-conference-committee/article\_63e179a8-3c27-11e3-a31c-0019bb2963f4.html

U.S. Senators John Hoeven (R-N.D.) and Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) drew a crowd of over 20 representatives from farm organizations and commodity groups on Oct. 22 as they gathered input and discussed priorities regarding farm legislation.

Information gleaned from the session will prove helpful when the House-Senate Farm Bill Conference Committee will convene the last week of October. Both Klobuchar and Hoeven have been appointed to that conference committee.

After holding recent meetings with House leadership and President Obama, Hoeven senses there is a desire to move forward on passing farm legislation.

“At this time we have some momentum and we want to continue that momentum,” Hoeven said. “We think this farm bill does some important things like strengthening crop insurance, continuing the sugar program and the programs for livestock disaster assistance.”

Klobuchar said she is more optimistic now about passing farm legislation than she has been for years. The proposed farm bill is in a good place for debt reduction, she noted, because they have made some smart changes that still keep the safety net in place, with a transition from the direct ag subsidies to crop insurance.

Another reason Klobuchar is feeling positive about passage of a farm bill is the fact that the people want to see some action from Congress.

#### Pressure is on – it’ll be a fight – but it’ll get worked out

FARM FUTURES 10 – 16 – 13 House Moves on Farm bill Bring Optimism, <http://farmfutures.com/story-house-moves-farm-bill-bring-optimism-0-103454>

House and Senate efforts to conference a new, five-year farm bill are certainly a step in the right direction, but continued pressure from farmers and ranchers and the groups representing their interests will be necessary to keep momentum going.

According to the American Farm Bureau Federation, both the Senate and House bills provide "adequate food and farm safety nets" for consumers and farmers, said AFBF President Bob Stallman in an Oct. 15 letter to conferees.

Stallman said in his comments that the two overarching goals of the farm bill conference are ensuring that permanent law is not repealed and a complete, unified bill continues.

"For some time, the threat of reinstatement of the long-outdated policies of the 1938 and 1949 acts has served as strong motivation for Congress to enact new farm bills," Stallman said, arguing that repealing those acts and making the 2013 farm bill commodity title permanent law could make it harder to generate political pressure for adjusting commodity safety nets as the conditions in production agriculture change.

If the farm bill expires after five years, Stallman said, other important farm and rural programs covered in different titles are at risk of not being reauthorized.

"Over the last two years, leadership of both Ag Committees have demonstrated their ability to forge bipartisan compromise to achieve a new five-year farm bill that meets farmers' and ranchers' needs while also contributing significant savings to reduce our federal deficit," Stallman said. "We only see these savings if Congress gets the bill done," he added.

Stallman also signaled support for the nutrition title in the farm bill, adding that if such provisions are not included, the House and Senate will be hard-pressed to reach an agreement on a final version of the farm bill that will be approved by President Obama.

Negotiations on the nutrition issue are expected to be contentious, as the House has proposed a $40 billion cut to food stamps while the Senate is pushing just a $4 billion cut.

### A2 Budget Thumps

#### FB Budget doesn’t thump

HAGSTROM 10 – 17 – 13 AgWeek Staff [Jerry Hagstrom, Shutdown ends, paving way for farm bill talks, http://www.grandforksherald.com/event/article/id/276286/group/homepage/

Stabenow said she is certain the farm bill conferees will come to an agreement, but not certain about the budget conferees. Whether the farm bill could be attached to the budget bill would depend on “how it is done,” she said.

Cochran said Oct. 16 on the Senate floor that he hopes Congress will pass the farm bill “as part of a sustainable budget plan,” but a spokesman said Cochran did not mention that the farm bill should necessarily be attached to a budget deal.

Cochran said, “As part of a sustainable budget plan, I hope we can reach a long-term agreement on a farm bill to provide producers and consumers with certainty, and to preserve the security Americans enjoy by our ability to generate independently (produced) food and fiber for ourselves and for the world. The farm bill this body adopted earlier this year would help accomplish those goals and save $23 billion over the next five years.”

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### AT: Wohlforth

#### Wohlforth doesn’t account for minor power dissatisfaction.

Monteiro 11—Professor of Political Science at Yale University [Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40]

This article has laid out a theory of unipolarity that accounts for how a unipolar structure of the international system provides significant incentives for conflict. In doing so, my argument corrects an important problem with extant research on unipolarity—the absence of scholarship questioning William Wohlforth’s view that a unipolar world is peaceful. In this respect, Wohlforth’s words ring as true of extant scholarship today as they did in 1999: “When balance-of-power theorists argue that the post–Cold War world is headed toward conflict, they are not claiming that unipolarity causes conflict. Rather, they are claiming that unipolarity leads quickly to bi- or multipolarity. It is not unipolarity’s peace but its durability that is in dispute.”112 Not anymore. It is not that the core of Wohlforth’s widely shared argument is wrong, however: great power conflict is impossible in a unipolar world. Rather, his claim that unipolarity is peaceful has two important limitations. First, it focuses on great powers. But because unipolarity prevents the aggregation of conflicts involving major and minor powers into conflict between great powers, scholars must look beyond great power interactions when analyzing the structural incentives for war. Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole’s only reasonable strategic option is defensive dominance. But given that unipolarity provides the unipole with ample room for defining its foreign policy, offensive dominance and disengagement are equally plausible strategies. This requires a look at how these two additional strategies facilitate conflict. Pg. 37