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#### Restriction on authority must limit presidential discretion

**Lobel, 8** - Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School (Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War” 392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391, <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf>)

So  too, the congressional power to declare or authorize war has been long held to permit Congress to authorize and wage a limited war—“limited in place, in objects, and in time.” 63 When Congress places such restrictions on the President’s authority to wage war, it limits the President’s discretion to conduct battlefield operations. For example, Congress authorized President George H. W. Bush to attack Iraq in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but it confined the President’s authority to the use of U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions directed to force Iraqi troops to leave Kuwait. That restriction would not have permitted the President to march into Baghdad after the Iraqi army had been decisively ejected from Kuwait, a limitation recognized by President Bush himself.64

#### They don’t – president still gets to decide, the plan’s an after-the-fact correction.

#### Voting issue –

#### 1) Ground – all DAs and CPs like ESR, flexibility, and politics compete based off restrictions on the presidential decision-making process – skews the topic in favor of the aff.

#### 2) Limits – the plan amounts to deterrence of prez powers, not statutory limitations – that’s opens a floodgate of affs that just dissuade presidential expansion of power

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#### The affirmative’s use of the law is a militaristic tactic that creates legal legitimacy to propel more frequent, more deadly violent interventions that ensure infrastructural violence that maims civilians—they actively displace moral questions in favor of a pathologically detached question of legality

Thomas SMITH Gov’t & Int’l Affairs @ South Florida 2 [“The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence” *Int’l Studies Quarterly,* 46, p. 367-371]

The role of military lawyers in all this has, according to one study, “changed irrevocably” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Although liberal theorists point to the broad normative contours that law lends to international relations, the Pentagon wields law with technical precision. During the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign, JAGs opined on the legal status of multinational forces, the U.S. War Powers Resolution, rules of engagement and targeting, country fly-overs, maritime interceptions, treatment of prisoners, hostages and “human shields,” and methods used to gather intelligence. Long before the bombing began, lawyers had joined in the development and acquisition of weapons systems, tactical planning, and troop training. In the Gulf War, the U.S. deployed approximately 430 military lawyers, the allies far fewer, leading to some amusing but perhaps apposite observations about the legalistic culture of America ~Garratt, 1993!. Many lawyers reviewed daily Air Tasking Orders as well as land tactics. Others found themselves on the ground and at the front. According to Colonel Ruppert, the idea was to “put the lawyer as far forward as possible” ~Myrow, 1996–97!. During the Kosovo campaign, lawyers based at the Combined Allied Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, and at NATO headquarters in Brussels approved every single targeting decision. We do not know precisely how decisions were taken in either Iraq or Kosovo or the extent to which the lawyers reined in their masters. Some “corrections and adjustments” to the target lists were made ~Shotwell, 1993:26!, but by all accounts the lawyers—and the law—were extremely accommodating. The exigencies of war invite professional hazards as military lawyers seek to “find the law” and to determine their own responsibilities as legal counselors. A 1990 article in Military Law Review admonished judge advocates not to neglect their duty to point out breaches of the law, but not to become military ombudsmen either. The article acknowledged that the JAG faces pressure to demonstrate that he can be a “force multiplier” who can “show the tactical and political soundness of his interpretation of the law” ~Winter, 1990:8–9!. Some tension between law and necessity is inevitable, but over the past decade the focus has shifted visibly from restraining violence to legitimizing it. The Vietnam-era perception that law was a drag on operations has been replaced by a zealous “client culture” among judge advocates. Commanding officers “have come to realize that, as in the relationship of corporate counsel to CEO, the JAG’s role is not to create obstacles, but to find legal ways to achieve his client’s goals—even when those goals are to blow things up and kill people” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Lt. Col. Tony Montgomery, the JAG who approved the bombing of the Belgrade television studios, said recently that “judges don’t lay down the law. We take guidance from our government on how much of the consequences they are willing to accept” ~The Guardian, 2001!. Military necessity is undeterred. In a permissive legal atmosphere, hi-tech states can meet their goals and remain within the letter of the law. As noted, humanitarian law is firmest in areas of marginal military utility. When operational demands intrude, however, even fundamental rules begin to erode. The Defense Department’s final report to Congress on the Gulf War ~DOD, 1992! found nothing in the principle of noncombatant immunity to curb necessity. Heartened by the knowledge that civilian discrimination is “one of the least codified portions” of the law of war ~p. 611!, the authors argued that “to the degree possible and consistent with allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews,” munitions and delivery systems were chosen to reduce collateral damage ~p. 612!. “An attacker must exercise reasonable precautions to minimize incidental or collateral injury to the civilian population or damage to civilian objects, consistent with mission accomplishments and allowable risk to the attacking forces” ~p. 615!. The report notes that planners targeted “specific military objects in populated areas which the law of war permits” and acknowledges the “commingling” of civilian and military objects, yet the authors maintain that “at no time were civilian areas as such attacked” ~p. 613!. The report carefully constructed a precedent for future conflicts in which human shields might be deployed, noting “the presence of civilians will not render a target immune from attack” ~p. 615!. The report insisted ~pp. 606–607! that Protocol I as well as the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons “were not legally applicable” to the Gulf War because Iraq as well as some Coalition members had not ratified them. More to the point that law follows practice, the report claimed that certain provisions of Protocol I “are not a codification of the customary practice of nations,” and thus “ignore the realities of war” ~p. 616!. Nor can there be any doubt that a more elaborate legal regime has kept pace with evolving strategy and technology. Michael Ignatieff details in Virtual War ~2000! how targets were “developed” in 72-hour cycles that involved collecting and reviewing aerial reconnaissance, gauging military necessity, and coding anticipated collateral damage down to the directional spray of bomb debris. A judge advocate then vetted each target in light of the Geneva Conventions and calculated whether or not the overall advantage to be gained outweighed any expected civilian spillover. Ignatieff argues ~2000:198–199! that this elaborate symbiosis of law and technology has given birth to a “veritable casuistry of war.” Legal fine print, hand-in-hand with new technology, replaced deeper deliberation about the use of violence in war. The law provided “harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues of legality.” Astonishingly fine discrimination also meant that unintentional civilian casualties were assumed to have been unintentional, not foreseen tragedies to be justified under the rule of double effect or the fog of war. The crowning irony is that NATO went to such lengths to justify its targets and limit collateral damage, even as it assured long-term civilian harm by destroying the country’s infrastructure. Perhaps the most powerful justification was provided by law itself. War is often dressed up in patriotic abstractions—Periclean oratory, jingoistic newsreels, or heroic memorials. Bellum Americanum is cloaked in the stylized language of law. The DOD report is padded with references to treaty law, some of it obscure, that was “applicable” to the Gulf War, as if a surfeit of legal citation would convince skeptics of the propriety of the war. Instances of humane restraint invariably were presented as the rule of law in action. Thus the Allies did not gas Iraqi troops, torture POWs, or commit acts of perfidy. Most striking is the use of legal language to justify the erosion of noncombatant immunity. Hewing to the legalisms of double effect, the Allies never intentionally targeted civilians as such. As noted, by codifying double effect the law artificially bifurcates intentions. Harvard theologian Bryan Hehir ~1996:7! marveled at the Coalition’s legalistic wordplay, noting that the “briefers out of Riyadh sounded like Jesuits as they sought to defend the policy from any charge of attempting to directly attack civilians.” The Pentagon’s legal narrative is certainly detached from the carnage on the ground, but it also oversimplifies and even actively obscures the moral choices involved in aerial bombing. Lawyers and tacticians made very deliberate decisions about aircraft, flight altitudes, time of day, ordnance dropped, confidence in intelligence, and so forth. By expanding military necessity to encompass an extremely prudential reading of “force protection,” these choices were calculated to protect pilots and planes at the expense of civilians on the ground, departing from the just war tradition that combatants assume greater risks than civilians. While it is tempting to blame collateral damage on the fog of war, much of that uncertainty has been lifted by technology and precision law. Similarly, in Iraq and in Yugoslavia the focus was on “degrading” military capabilities, yet a loose view of dual use spelled the destruction of what were essentially social, economic, and political targets. Coalition and NATO officials were quick to apologize for accidental civilian casualties, but in hi-tech war most noncombatant suffering is by design. Does the law of war reduce death and destruction? International law certainly has helped to delegitimize, and in rare cases effectively criminalize, direct attacks on civilians. But in general humanitarian law has mirrored wartime practice. On the ad bellum side, the erosion of right authority and just cause has eased the path toward war. Today, foreign offices rarely even bother with formal declarations of war. Under the United Nations system it is the responsibility of the Security Council to denounce illegal war, but for a number of reasons its members have been extremely reluctant to brand states as aggressors. If the law were less accommodating, greater effort might be devoted to diplomacy and war might be averted. On the in bello side the ban on direct civilian strikes remains intact, but double effect and military demands have been contrived to justify unnecessary civilian deaths. Dual use law has been stretched to sanction new forms of violence against civilians. Though not as spectacular as the obliteration bombing to which it so often is favorably compared, infrastructural war is far deadlier than the rhetoric of a “clean and legal” conflict suggests. It is true that rough estimates of the ratio of bomb tonnage to civilian deaths in air attacks show remarkable reductions in immediate collateral damage. There were some 40.83 deaths per ton in the bombing of Guernica in 1937 and 50.33 deaths per ton in the bombing of Tokyo in 1945. In the Kosovo campaign, by contrast, there were between .077 and .084 deaths per ton. In Iraq there were a mere .034 ~Thomas, 2001:169!. According to the classical definition of collateral damage, civilian protection has improved dramatically, but if one takes into account the staggering long-term effects of the war in Iraq, for example, aerial bombing looks anything but humane. For aerial bombers themselves modern war does live up to its clean and legal image. While war and intervention have few steadfast constituents, the myth of immaculate warfare has eased fears that intervening soldiers may come to harm, which polls in the U.S., at least, rank as being of great public concern, and even greater military concern. A new survey of U.S. civilian and military attitudes found that soldiers were two to four times more casualty-averse than civilians thought they should be ~Feaver and Kohn, 2001!. By removing what is perhaps the greatest restraint on the use of force—the possibility of soldiers dying—law and technology have given rise to the novel moral hazards of a “postmodern, risk-free, painless war” ~Woollacott, 1999!. “We’ve come to expect the immaculate,” notes Martin Cook, who teaches ethics at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. “Precision-guided munitions make it very much easier to go to war than it ever has been historically.” Albert Pierce, director of the Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy argues, “standoff precision weapons give you the option to lower costs and risks . . . but you might be tempted to do things that you might otherwise not do” ~Belsie, 1999!.

Conclusion The utility of law to legitimize modern warfare should not be underestimated. Even in the midst of war, legal arguments retain an aura of legitimacy that is missing in “political” justifications. The aspirations of humanitarian law are sound. Rather, it is the instrumental use of law that has oiled the skids of hi-tech violence. Not only does the law defer to military necessity, even when very broadly defined, but more importantly it bestows on those same military demands all the moral and psychological trappings of legality. The result has been to legalize and thus to justify in the public mind “inhumane military methods and their consequences,” as violence against civilians is carried out “behind the protective veil of justice” ~af Jochnick and Normand, 1994a:50!. Hi-tech states can defend hugely destructive, essentially unopposed, aerial bombardment by citing the authority of seemingly secular and universal legal standards. The growing gap between hi- and low-tech means may exacerbate inequalities in moral capital as well, as the sheer barbarism of “premodern” violence committed by ethnic cleansers or atavistic warlords makes the methods employed by hi-tech warriors seem all the more clean and legal by contrast. This fusion of law and technology is likely to propel future American interventions. Despite assurances that the campaign against terrorism would differ from past conflicts, the allied air war in Afghanistan, marked by record numbers of unmanned drones and bomber flights at up to 35,000 feet, or nearly 7 miles aloft, rarely strayed from the hi-tech and legalistic script. While the attack on the World Trade Center confirmed a thousand times over the illegality and inhumanity of terrorism, the U.S. response has raised further issues of legality and inhumanity in conventional warfare. Civilian deaths in the campaign have been substantial because “military objects” have been targeted on the basis of extremely low-confidence intelligence. In several cases targets appear to have been chosen based on misinformation and even rank rumor. A liberal reading of dual use and the authorization of bombers to strike unvetted “targets of opportunity” also increased collateral damage. Although 10,000 of the 18,000 bombs, missiles, and other ordnance used in Afghanistan were precision-guided munitions, the war resulted in roughly 1000 to 4000 direct civilian deaths, and, according to the UNHCR, produced 900,000 new refugees and displaced persons. The Pentagon has nevertheless viewed the campaign as “a more antiseptic air war even than the one waged in Kosovo” ~Dao, 2001!. General Tommy Franks, who commanded the campaign, called it “the most accurate war ever fought in this nation’s history” ~Schmitt, 2002!.9 No fundamental change is in sight. Governments continue to justify collateral damage by citing the marvels of technology and the authority of international law. One does see a widening rift between governments and independent human rights and humanitarian relief groups over the interpretation of targeting and dual-use law. But these disputes have only underscored the ambiguities of humanitarian law. As long as interventionist states dominate the way that the rules of war are crafted and construed, hopes of rescuing law from politics will be dim indeed.

#### Liberal institutionalism is an imperial ideology disguised by the language of science. Liberal institutionalism requires the elimination of non-liberal forms of life to achieve national security

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Writing in 1952, Reinhold Niebuhr expressed this point in what remains arguably the single best book on the United States in world affairs, The Irony of American History. 'There is a deep layer of Messianic consciousness in the mind of America,' the theologian wrote. Still, 'We were, as a matter of fact, always vague, as the whole liberal culture is fortunately vague, about how power is to be related to the allegedly universal values which we hold in trust for mankind' (Niebuhr 2008: 69). 'Fortunate vagueness', he explained, arose from the fact that 'in the liberal version of the dream of managing history, the problem of power is never fully elaborated' (Niebuhr 2008: 73). Here was a happy fact that distinguished us from the communists, who assumed, thanks to their ideology, that they could master history, and so were assured that the end would justify the means, such that world revolution under their auspices would bring about universal justice, freedom , and that most precious of promises, peace. In contrast, Niebuhr could write: On the whole, we have as a nation learned the lesson of history tolerably well. We have heeded the warning 'let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, let not the mighty man glory in his strength.' Though we are not without vainglorious delusions in regard to our power, we are saved by a certain grace inherent in common sense rather than in abstract theories from attempting to cut through the vast ambiguities of our historic situation and thereby bringing our destiny to a tragic conclusion by seeking to bring it to a neat and logical one ... This American experience is a refutation in parable of the whole effort to bring the vast forces of history under the control of any particular will, informed by a particular ideal ... [speaking of the communists] All such efforts are rooted in what seems at first glance to be a contradictory combination of voluntarism and determinism. These efforts are on the one hand excessively voluntaristic, assigning a power to the human will and the purity to the mind of some men which no mortal or group of mortals possesses. On the other, they are excessively deterministic since they regard most men as merely the creatures of an historical process. (Niebuhr 2008: 75, 79) The Irony of American History came out in January 1952, only months after the publication of Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, a book that reached a conclusion similar to his. Fundamentalist political systems of thought, Arendt (1966: 467-9) wrote, are known for their scientific character; they combine the scientific approach with results of philosophical relevance and pretend to be scientific philosophy . .. Ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process—the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the future—because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas ... they pretend to have found a way to establish the rule of justice on earth ... All laws have become laws of movement. And she warned: Ideologies are always oriented toward history .... The claim to total explanation promises to explain all historical happenings ... hence ideological thinking becomes emancipated from the reality that we perceive with our five senses, and insists on a ' truer' reality concealed behind all perceptible things, dominating them from this place of concealment and requiring a sixth sense that enables us to become aware of it. ... Once it has established its premise, its point of departure, experiences no longer interfere with ideological thinking, nor can it be taught by reality. (Arendt 1966: 470) For Arendt as for Niebuhr, then, a virtue of liberal democracy was its relative lack of certitude in terms of faith in an iron ideology that rested on a pseudoscientific authority that its worldwide propagation would fulfill some mandate of history, or to put it more concretely, that the United States had been selected by the logic of historical development to expand the perimeter of democratic government and free market capitalism to the ends of the earth, and that in doing so it would serve not only its own basic national security needs but the peace of the world as well. True, in his address to the Congress asking for a declaration of war against Germany in 1917, Wilson had asserted, 'the world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.' (Link 1982: 533). Yet just what this meant and how it might be achieved were issues that were not resolved intellectually—at least not before the 1990s. Reinhold Niebuhr died in 1971, Hannah Arendt in 1975, some two decades short of seeing the 'fortunate vagueness' Niebuhr had saluted during their prime be abandoned by the emergence of what can only be called a ' hard liberal internationalist ideology', one virtually the equal of Marxism- Leninism in its ability to read the logic of History and prescribe how human events might be changed by messianic intervention into a world order where finally justice, freedom , and peace might prevail. The authors of this neo-liberal, neo-Wilsonianism: left and liberal academics. Their place of residence: the United States, in leading universities such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford. Their purpose: the instruction of those who made foreign policy in Washington in the aftermath of the Cold War. Their ambition: to help America translate its 'unipolar moment' into a 'unipolar epoch' by providing American leaders with a conceptual blueprint for making the world safe for democracy by democratising the world, thereby realizing through 'democratic globalism' the century-old Wilsonian dream—the creation of a structure of world peace. Their method: the construction of the missing set of liberal internationalist concepts whose ideological complexity, coherence, and promise would be the essential equivalence of MarxismLeninism, something most liberal internationalists had always wanted to achieve but only now seemed possible. Democratic globalism as imperialism in the 1990s The tragedy of American foreign policy was now at hand. Rather than obeying the strictures of a ' fortunate vagueness' which might check its ' messianic consciousness', as Niebuhr had enjoined, liberal internationalism became possessed of just what Arendt had hoped it might never develop, 'a scientific character ... of philosophic relevance' that 'pretend[s] to know the mysteries of the whole historical process,' that 'pretend[s] to have found a way to establish the rule of justice on earth ' (Niebuhr 2008: 74; Arendt 1966: 470). Only in the aftermath of the Cold War, with the United States triumphant and democracy expanding seemingly of its own accord to many comers of the world—from Central Europe to different countries in Asia (South Korea and Taiwan), Africa (South Africa), and Latin America (Chile and Argentina)—had the moment arrived for democracy promotion to move into a distinctively new mode, one that was self-confidently imperialist. Wilsonians could now maintain that the study of history revealed that it was not so much that American power had won the epic contest with the Soviet Union as that the appeal of liberal internationalism had defeated proletarian internationalism. The victory was best understood, then, as one of ideas, values, and institutions—rather than of states and leaders. In this sense, America had been a vehicle of forces far greater than itself, the sponsor of an international convergence of disparate class, ethnic, and nationalist forces converging into a single movement that had created an historical watershed of extraordinary importance. For a new world, new ways of thinking were mandatory. As Hegel has instructed us, 'Minerva's owl flies out at dusk' , and liberal scholars of the 1990s applied themselves to the task of understanding the great victories of democratic government and open market economies over their adversaries between 1939 and 1989. What, rather exactly, were the virtues of democracy that made these amazing successes possible? How, rather explicitly, might the free world now protect, indeed expand, its perimeter of action? A new concept of power and purpose was called for. Primed by the growth of think-tanks and prestigious official appointments to be 'policy relevant' , shocked by murderous outbreaks witnessed in the Balkans and Central Africa, believing as the liberal left did that progress was possible, Wilsonians set out to formulate their thinking at a level of conceptual sophistication that was to be of fundamental importance to the making of American foreign policy after the year 2000.6 The jewel in the crown of neo-liberal internationalism as it emerged from the seminar rooms of the greatest American universities was known as ' democratic peace theory'. Encapsulated simply as ' democracies do not go to war with one another', the theory contended that liberal democratic governments breed peace among themselves based on their domestic practices of the rule of law, the increased integration of their economies through measures of market openness, and their participation in multilateral organisations to adjudicate conflicts among each other so as to keep the peace. The extraordinary success of the European Union since the announcement of the Marshall Plan in 1947, combined with the close relations between the United States and the world's other liberal democracies, was taken as conclusive evidence that global peace could be expanded should other countries join ' the pacific union ', ' the zone of democratic peace'. A thumb-nail sketch cannot do justice to the richness of the argument. Political scientists of an empirical bent demonstrated conclusively to their satisfaction that 'regime type matters ', that it is in the nature of liberal democracies to keep the peace with one another, especially when they are integrated together economically. Theoretically inclined political scientists then argued that liberal internationalism could be thought of as ' non-utopian and non-ideological ', a scientifically validated set of concepts that should be recognized not only as a new but also a dominant form of conceptual ising the behaviour of states (Moravcsik 1997). And liberal political philosophers could maintain on the basis of democratic peace theory that a Kantian (or Wilsonian) liberal world order was a morally just goal for progressives worldwide to seek so that the anarchy of states, the Hobbesian state of nature, could be superseded and a Golden Age of what some dared call 'post-history' could be inaugurated (Rawls 1999). Yet if it were desirable that the world's leading states be democratised, was it actually possible to achieve such a goal? Here a second group of liberal internationalists emerged, intellectuals who maintained that the transition from authoritarian to democratic government had become far easier to manage than at earlier historical moments. The blueprint of liberal democracy was now tried and proven in terms of values, interests, and institutions in a wide variety of countries. The seeds of democracy could be planted by courageous Great Men virtually anywhere in the world. Where an extra push was needed, then the liberal world could help with a wide variety of agencies from the governmental (such as the Agency for International Development or the National Endowment for Democracy in the United States) to the non-governmental (be it the Open Society Institute, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, or Freedom House). With the development of new concepts of democratic transition, the older ideas in democratization studies of 'sequences' and ' preconditions' could be jettisoned. No longer was it necessary to count on a long historical process during which the middle class came to see its interests represented in the creation of a democratic state, no longer did a people have to painfully work out a social contract of tolerance for diversity and the institutions of limited government under the rule of law for democracy to take root. Examples as distinct as those of Spain, South Korea, Poland, and South Africa demonstrated that a liberal transformation could be made with astonishing speed and success. When combined, democratic peace theory and democratic transition theory achieved a volatile synergy that neither alone possessed. Peace theory argued that the world would benefit incalculably from the spread of democratic institutions, but it could not say that such a development was likely. Transition theory argued that rapid democratisation was possible, but it could not establish that such changes would much matter for world politics. Combined, however, the two concepts came to be the equivalent of a Kantian moral imperative to push what early in the Clinton years was called ' democratic enlargement' as far as Washington could while it possessed the status of the globe's sole superpower. The result would be nothing less than to change the character of world affairs that gave rise to war—international anarchy system and the character of authoritarian states—into an order of peace premised on the character of democratic governments and their association in multilateral communities basing their conduct on the rule of law that would increasingly have a global constitutional character. The arrogant presumption was, in short, that an aggressively liberal America suddenly had the possibility to change the character of History itself toward the reign of perpetual peace through democracy promotion. Enter the liberal jurists. In their hands a 'right to intervene' against states or in situations where gross and systematic human rights were being violated or weapons of mass destruction accumulated became a 'duty to intervene' in the name of what eventually became called a state 's 'responsibility to protect.' (lCISS 200 I). The meaning of 'sovereignty' was now transformed. Like pirate ships of old, authoritarian states could be attacked by what Secretary of State Madeleine Albright first dubbed a 'Community of Democracies', practicing ' muscular multilateralism' in order to reconstruct them around democratic values and institutions for the sake of world peace. What the jurists thus accomplished was the redefinition not only of the meaning of sovereignty but also that of 'Just War'. Imperialism to enforce the norms a state needed to honor under the terms of its 'responsibility to protect' (or 'R2P' as its partisans liked to phrase it) was now deemed legitimate. And by moving the locus of decision-making on the question of war outside the United Nations (whose Security Council could not be counted on to act to enforce the democratic code) to a League, or Community, or Concert of Democracies (the term varied according to the theorist), a call to arms for the sake of a democratising crusade was much more likely to succeed.

#### **Militarism is a fundamentally unsustainable system that is the root cause of all extinction threats and ensures mass structural violence – non-violence is the only possible response**

Dr. Joel KOVEL. Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2 [November 21, 2002, “The United States Military Machine,” http://joelkovel.com/the-united-states-military-machine/]

I want to talk to you this evening about war - not the immediate threat of us war against Iraq, but about how this conflict is an instance of a larger tendency toward war-making endemic to our society. In other words, the phrase from the folksong, “I ain’t gonna study war no more,” should be rethought. I think we do have to study war. Not to make war but to understand more deeply how it is put together and about the awful choices that are now being thrust upon us. These remarks have been stimulated by recent events, which have ancient roots, but have taken on a new shape since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the second Bush administration, and the inception of the so-called “War on Terror.” The shape is that of permanent warfare- war-making that has no particular strategic goal except total us dominance over global society. Hence, a war without end and whose internal logic is to perpetuate itself. We are, in other words, well into World War III, which will go on whether or not any other state such as Iraq is involved. It is quite probable that this administration will go to war in Iraq, inasmuch as certain very powerful people crave it. But it is not necessarily the case, given the fact that the war against Iraq is such a lunatic proposal that many other people in high places are against it and too many people are marching against it. And while war against Iraq is a very serious matter that needs to be checked by massive popular resistance, equally serious are the structures now in place in the United States dictating that whether or not the war in Iraq takes place, there will be another war to replace it, and others after that, unless some very basic changes take place. America Has Become a War-Making Machine The United States has always been a bellicose and expansive country, built on violent conquest and expropriation of native peoples. Since the forming of the American republic, military interventions have occurred at the rate of about once a year. Consider the case of Nicaragua, a country utterly incapable of being any kind of a threat to its giant northern neighbor. Yet prior to the Sandinista revolution in 1979 (which was eventually crushed by us proxy forces a decade later), our country had invaded Nicaragua no fewer than 14 times in the pursuit of its imperial interests. A considerable number of contemporary states, such as Britain, South Africa, Russia, and Israel, have been formed in just such a way. But one of the special conditions of the formation of America, despite its aggressivity, was an inhibition against a military machine as such. If you remember, no less a figure than George Washington warned us against having a standing army, and indeed the great bulk of us interventions prior to World War II were done without very much in the way of fixed military institutions. However, after WWII a basic change set in. War-weary America longed for demobilization, yet after a brief beginning in this direction, the process was halted and the permanent warfare state started to take shape. In part, this was because policy planners knew quite well that massive wartime mobilization had been the one measure that finally lifted America out of the Great Depression of the 1930s. One of the lessons of that time was that propounded by the British economist John Maynard Keynes, to the effect that capitalist societies could ameliorate chronic [economic] crises by infusions of government spending. The Great War had certified this wisdom, and permanent military expenditure readily became the received wisdom. This was greatly reinforced by the drastic realignment of capitalist power as a result of the war. America was essentially the only capitalist power in 1945 that did not lay in ruins and/or have its empire shattered. The world had been realigned and the United States had assumed a global imperial role. Policy planners like George Kennan lucidly realized that this meant safeguarding extreme inequalities in wealth, which implied a permanent garrison to preserve the order of things. The notion was especially compelling given that one other state, the Soviet Union, had emerged a great power from the war and was the bellwether of those forces that sought to break down the prevailing distribution of wealth. The final foundation stone for the new military order was the emergence of frightful weapons of mass destruction, dominance over which became an essential element for world hegemony. The Iron Triangle These factors crystallized into the Cold War, the nuclear arms race, and, domestically, into those structures that gave institutional stability and permanence to the system: the military-industrial complex (mic). Previously the us had used militarism to secure economic advantage. Now, two developments greatly transformed our militarism: the exigencies of global hegemony and the fact that militarism became a direct source of economic advantage, through the triangular relations of the mic with the great armament industries comprising one leg, the military establishment another, and the state apparatus the third, profits, power, and personnel could flow through the system and from the system. Clearly, this arrangement had the potential to greatly undermine American democracy. It was a “national security state” within the state but also extended beyond it into the economy and society at large, virtually insulated from popular input, and had the power to direct events and generate threats. Another conservative war hero-become-president, Dwight Eisenhower, warned the nation in a speech in 1961 against the emerging permanent war machine, but this time, the admonitions were not heeded.\* The machine made a kind of war against the Soviet system for 35 years. Although actual guns were not fired between the two adversaries, as many as 10 million people died in its varied peripheral conflicts, from Korea to Vietnam, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. The Cold War divided the world into bipolar imperial camps, directed by gigantic superpowers that lived off each other’s hostility. It was a terrible war whose immense suffering took place largely outside the view of the American people, but it also brought about an uneasy kind of stability in the world order, in part through the standoff in nuclear weapons. During the Ford and Carter administrations, another great crisis seized the world capitalist economy. Having matured past the rebuilding that followed the world war, a period of stagnation set in, which still has the global economy in its grip despite episodic flashes of vigor. Predictably, a spate of militarism was central to the response. A “Second Cold War” took place under Reagan, featuring an accelerated nuclear arms race, which was deliberately waged so as to encourage Soviet countermeasures in the hope that this would cause breakdown in the much weaker, bloated, and corrupt Russian system. The plan worked splendidly: by 1989-91, the mighty Soviet empire collapsed, and the bipolar world order became unipolar, setting a stage for the current phase. The fall of the Soviet Union was widely expected to bring a ìpeace dividend.î This would have been the case according to the official us line, parroted throughout the media and academe, that our military apparatus was purely defensive (after all, we have no Department of War, only one of "Defense") and reactive to Soviet expansionism and military/nuclear threat. As this was no longer a factor, so the reasoning wentóindeed, as the us now stood bestride the world militarily as had no power since the Roman Empireóconventional logic predicted a general diminution in American militarism after 1991, with corresponding benefits to society. The last decade has at least settled this question, for the effect on us aggression, interventionism, and the militarization of society has been precisely the opposite. In other words, instead of braking, the machine accelerated. Removal of Soviet power did not diminish Americaís imperial appetite: it removed inhibitions on its internally driven expansiveness. As a result, enhanced war-making has replaced the peace dividend. The object of this machine has passed from dealing with Soviet Communism to a more complex and dispersed set of oil wars (Iraq I and now II), police actions against international miscreants (Kosovo), and now the ubiquitous War Against Terror, aimed variously at Islamic fundamentalists, Islam as a whole, or anybody irritated enough with the ruling order to take up some kind of arms against it. The comparison with the Roman Empire is here very exact. As the eminent economist and sociologist Joseph Schumpeter described Rome in 1919: “There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack. If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Rome’s allies. And if Rome had no allies existed, the allies would be invented. The fight was always invested with the order of legality. Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbors.” The logic of constant threat meshes with that of ruthless expansion, which we see everywhere in this epoch of unipolar world dominion. Currently, the military budget of the us is 334 billion dollars. The budget for the next fiscal year is 379 billion dollars- an increase of more than 10 percent. By 2007, the projected military budget of the us is to be an astounding 451 billion dollars: almost half a trillion dollars, without the presence of anything resembling a conventional war. The present military budget is greater than the sum of all other military budgets. In fact, it is greater than the entire federal budget of Russia, once America's immortal adversary, and comprises more than half - 52 percent of all discretionary spending by the us government. (By comparison, education accounts for 8 percent of the federal budget.) A considerable portion of this is given over to "military Keynesianism," according to the well-established paths of the mic. Thus, although in the first years after the fall of the ussr certain firms like General Dynamics, which had played a large role in the nuclear arms race, suffered setbacks, that problem has been largely reversed for the entire class of firms fattening at the trough of militarism. It is fair to say, though, that the largesse is distributed over a wider scale, in accordance with the changing pattern of armaments. us Armies Taking Root Everywhere From having scarcely any standing army in 1940, American armies now stand everywhere. One feature of us military policy since WWII is to make war and then stay where war was made, rooting itself in foreign territory. Currently, the us has military bases in 113 countries, with 11 new ones formed since the beginning of the War Against Terror. The us now has bases in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kurdistan, encircling China and creating new sources of military tension. On these bases, the us military has erected some 800,000 buildings. Imagine that: 800,000 buildings in foreign countries that are now occupied by us military establishments. And America still maintains large forces in Germany, Japan, and Korea, with tens of thousands of troops permanently on duty (and making mischief, as two us servicemen recently ran over and killed two Korean girls, provoking massive demonstrations). After the first Gulf War the us military became installed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in which latter place it currently occupies one quarter of the country - 750 square miles devoted to military activity. This huge investment is no doubt determined by proximity to Iraq. Again, after going to war in Kosovo, the us left behind an enormous base in a place called Bondsteel. These self-expanding sites of militarism are permanent goads to terrorist organizations. Recall that one of Osama bin Laden's professed motivations for al-Qaeda's attacks on American facilities was the presence of us bases in his home country of Saudi Arabia. The bases are also permanent hazards to the environment - indeed, the us, with some 800,000 buildings on these military sites, is the world's largest polluter and the largest consumer of fossil fuels. With territorial expansion of the us military apparatus, there is a corresponding expansion of mission. For instance, in Colombia, where billions of us dollars are spent in the "War on Drugs," us troops are now being asked to take care of pipelines through which vital oil reserves are passing. In addition, the War on Drugs is now subsumed into the War Against Terror. The signifier of Terror has virtually unlimited elasticity, for once an apparatus reaches the size of the us military machine, threats can be seen anywhere. With the inauguration of the new hard-line president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, the us authorized the use of 1.7 billion dollars in military aid hitherto limited to anti-drug operations for direct attacks on deeply entrenched farc guerrillas. This redirection of aid came after Colombian officials and their American supporters in the Congress and Bush administration argued that the change was needed as part of the global campaign against terrorism. Within this overall picture, American armed forces are undergoing a qualitative shift of enormous proportion. In words read by President Bush: “Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and must require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power over long distances in days or weeks rather than months. On land our heavy forces must be lighter, our light forces must be more lethal. All must be easier to deploy.” Crossing Weapons Boundaries - Both Nuclear and Conventional As a result, many boundaries and limits of the bipolar era have been breached. For example, the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons had always constituted a radical barrier. The standoff between the us and the ussr was epitomized by mind-numbing hydrogen bomb-missiles facing each other in a scenario called “Mutual Assured Destruction.î”In short, a strategic condition of deterrence prevailed, which made nuclear weapons seem unthinkable. With the demise of the ussr, deterrence no longer inhibits us nuclear weaponry, and the weapons themselves have proliferated downward, becoming miniaturized and increasingly tactical rather than strategic. Meanwhile, the genie of the weapons industries has developed ever more destructive “conventional” weapons. These include non-explosive devices of awesome power, such as laser beams, microwaves, and large-scale climate manipulation, along with a new generation of super-powerful explosive devices. Thus the strongest non-nuclear weapons are now considerably more lethal than the least powerful nuclear weapons, making the latter thinkable and eliminating a major barrier against their employment. These so-called conventional bombs have already been used, for example, in Afghanistan, where the us employed a gigantic explosive weapon, called a “Bunker Buster” to root out al-Qaeda combatants in underground bunkers. They are based upon the “daisy cutter,” a giant bomb about the size of a Volkswagen Beetle and capable of destroying everything within a square kilometer. Significantly, the model used in Afghanistan, the B61-11, already employs nuclear technology, the infamous depleted uranium warhead, capable by virtue of its extreme density, of great penetrating power. Depleted uranium (du) is a by-product of the nuclear power industry (chiefly being U-238 created in the extraction of U-235 from naturally occurring uranium ore). Over 500,000 tons of deadly du have accumulated and 4-5,000 more tons are being produced every year. Like all products of the nuclear power industry, du poses immense challenges of disposal. It has this peculiar property of being almost twice as dense as lead and it is radioactive with a half-life of 4.5 billion years. Wherever depleted uranium is used, it has another peculiar property of exploding, vaporizing at 56 degrees centigrade, which is just like a little more than half the way to boiling water. So it is very volatile, it explodes, it forms dust and powders that are inhaled, disburses widely, and produces lethal cancers, birth defects, and so forth for 4.5 billion years. In the case of depleted uranium, the challenge of disposal was met by incorporating the refuse from the “peaceful” branch of nuclear technology into the war-making branch. Already used in anti-tank projectiles in the first Iraq war (approximately 300 tons worth) and again in Yugoslavia (approximately 10-15 tons were used in each of the various Yugoslav wars), it is presumed, although the defense department coyly denies it, that this material was also used in the Afghanistan war. Depleted uranium has spread a plague of radioactivity and further rationalized the use of nuclear weapons as such. Consequently, the B61-11 is about to be replaced with the BLU113, where the bunker buster will now be a small nuclear weapon, almost certainly spear-tipped with du. Pollutants to Earth and Space To the boundaries crossed between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and between the peaceful and militaristic uses of atomic technology, we need to add those between earth and its lower atmosphere on the one hand, and space on the other. The administration is poised to realize the crackpot and deadly schemes of the Reagan administration to militarize space and to draw the rest of the world into the scheme, as client and victim. In November 2002, Bush proposed that nato allies build missile defense systems, with components purchased, needless to add, from Boeing, Raytheon, etc, even as Congress was approving a fiscal 2003 defense budget containing $7.8 billion authorization for missile defense research and procurement, as part of the $238 billion set aside for Star Wars over the next 20 years. The administration now is poised to realize the crackpot and deadly schemes of the Reagan administration to militarize space and to draw the rest of the world into the scheme, as client and victim. A new missile defense system bureaucracy has risen. It is currently developing such wild items as something called ìbrilliant pebblesî which involves the release of endless numbers of mini satellites into outer space. All of this was to protect the world against the threat of rogue states such as North Korea. As the Seattle Times reported, the us expects the final declaration to, “express the need to examine options to protect allied forces, territories, and population centers against the full range of missile threats.” As an official put it, "This will establish the framework within which nato allies could work cooperatively toward fielding the required capabilities. With the us withdrawal this year from the anti-ballistic treaty with Russia, it is no longer a question of whether missile defenses will be deployed. The relevant questions are now what, how, and when. The train is about to pull out of the station; we invite our friends, allies, and the Russian Federation to climb on board." The destination of this train is defensive only in the Orwellian sense, as the missiles will be used to defend us troops in the field. In other words, they will be used to defend armies engaged in offensive activities. What is being “defended” by the Strategic Defense Initiative (sdi), therefore, is the initiative to make war everywhere. Space has now become the ultimate battlefield. And not just with use of these missiles. The High Frequency Active Aural Research Program (haarp) is also part of sdi. This amounts to weather warfare: deliberately manipulating climate to harm and destroy adversaries. A very dubious enterprise, to say the least, in an age when global warming and climate instability are already looming as two of the greatest problems facing civilization. The chief feature is a network of powerful antennas capable of creating controlled local modifications of the ionosphere and hence producing weather disturbances and so forth. All of these technical interventions are accompanied by many kinds of institutional and political changes. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, nasa, for instance, is now a partner in the development of this strategic defense initiative. The very way in which the United Nations was drawn into the resolution in the war against Iraq is a breach and a violation of the original un Charter, which is to never make war, never to threaten to make war on any member state. The un was a peacemaking institution, but now the Super power has forced it into its orbit. The scrapping of the abm and other elements of the treaty structure (non- proliferation, test-ban) that had organized the world of the Cold War is one part of a process of shedding whatever might inhibit the cancerous growth of militarism. It also creates an atmosphere of general lawlessness in the world. This is felt at all levels, from the rise of an ultra-militarist clique in the White House to the formal renunciation of no-first-use nuclear strategy, the flouting of numerous un regulations, the doctrine of pre-emptive war, and, as the logical outcome of all these developments, the condition of Permanent War and its accompaniment of general lawlessness, media slavishness, and a wave of repression for whose parallel we have to go back to the Alien and Sedition acts of the 1790s, or Trumanís loyalty oaths of 1947. Militarism cannot be reduced to politics, economics, technology, culture, or psychology. All these are parts of the machine, make the machine go around, and are themselves produced by the actions of the machine. There is no doubt, in this regard, that the machine runs on natural resources (which have to be secured by economic, political, and military action), and that it is deeply embedded in the ruling corporate order. There is no contradiction here, but a set of meshing parts, driven by an insensate demand for fossil fuel energy. As a man from Amarillo, Texas put it when interviewed by npr as to the correctness of Bush’s plan to go to war in Iraq: “I agree with the president, because how else are we going to get the oil to fly the F-16s?” We go to war, in other words, to get the oil needed to go to war. A Who's Who List of MIC Beneficiaries The fact that our government is front-loaded with oil magnates is another part of the machine. It is of interest, therefore, that Unocal, for example, celebrated Condoleezza Riceís ascendancy to the post of National Security Advisor by naming an oil tanker after her. Or that Dick Cheney, originally a poor boy, became a rich man after the first Gulf War, when he switched from being Secretary of Defense, in charge of destroying the Kuwait oil fields, to ceo of a then-smallish company, Halliburton, in charge of rebuilding the same oil fields. Or that G.W. Bush himself, aside from his failed venture with Harken Oil, is scion of a family and a dynasty that controls the Carlyle Group, founded in 1987 by a former Carter administration official. Carlyle is now worth over $13 billion and its high officials include President Bush I, his Secretary of State (and fixer of the coup that put Bush II in power) James Baker, Reaganís Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former British Prime Minister John Major, and former Phillipine President Fidel Ramos, among others. The Carlyle Group has its fingers everywhere, including ìdefenseî, where it controls firms making vertical missile launch systems currently in use on us Navy ships in the Arabian sea, as well as a range of other weapons delivery systems and combat vehicles. And as a final touch which the worldís people would be much better off for knowing, there are very definite connections between Carlyle and the family of Osama bin Laden - a Saudi power whose fortunes have been fused with those of the United States since the end of World War II. Thus the military-industrial complex lives, breathes, and takes on new dimensions. There is a deep structural reason for the present explosion of us militarism, most clearly traceable in the activities of Vice President Cheney, made clear in the energy report that he introduced with the generous assistance of Enron executives in May 2001. According to the report, American reliance on imported oil will rise by from about 52 percent of total consumption in 2001 to an estimated 66 percent in 2020. The reason for this is that world production, in general, and domestic production in particular are going to remain flat (and, although the report does not discuss this, begin dropping within the next 20 years). Meanwhile consumptionówhich is a direct function of the relentless drive of capitalism to expand commodity productionóis to grow by some two- thirds. Because the usage of oil must rise in the worldview of a Cheney, the us will actually have to import 60 percent more oil in 2020 to keep itself going than it does today. This means that imports will have to rise from their current rate of about 10.4 million barrels per day to about 16.7 million barrels per day. In the words of the report: “The only way to do this is persuade foreign suppliers to increase their production to sell more of their output to the us.” The meaning of these words depends of course on the interpretation of “persuade”, which in the us lexicon is to be read, I should think, as requiring a sufficient military machine to coerce foreign suppliers. At that point they might not even have to sell their output to the us, as it would already be possessed by the superpower. Here we locate the root material fact underlying recent us expansionism. This may seem an extravagant conclusion. However an explicit connection to militarismóand Iraqóhad been supplied the month before, in April 2001, in another report prepared by James Baker and submitted to the Bush cabinet. This document, called “Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century,” concludes with refreshing candor that ìthe us remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma, Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East, Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets, therefore the us should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political diplomatic assessments. Note the absence of reference to “weapons of mass destruction,” or aid to terrorism, convenient rationalizations that can be filled in later. Clearly, however things turn out with Iraq, the fundamental structural dilemma driving the military machine pertains to the contradictions of an empire that drives toward the invasion of all social space and the total control over nature. Since the former goal meets up with unending resistance and the latter crashes against the finitude of the material world, there is no recourse except the ever-widening resort to force. But this, the military monster itself, ever seeking threats to feed upon, becomes a fresh source of danger, whether of nuclear war, terror, or ecological breakdown. The situation is plainly unsustainable, a series of disasters waiting to happen. It can only be checked and brought to rationality by a global uprising of people who demand an end to the regime of endless war. This is the only possible path by which we can pull ourselves away from the abyss into which the military machine is about to plunge, dragging us all down with it.

#### Alternative—Challenge to *conceptual* framework of national security. Only our alternative displaces the source of executive overreach. Legal restraint without conceptual change is futile.

Aziz RANA Law at Cornell 11 [“Who Decides on Security?” Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper 87, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops\_papers/87 p. 45-51]

The prevalence of these continuities between Frankfurter’s vision and contemporary judicial arguments raise serious concerns with today’s conceptual framework. Certainly, Frankfurter’s role during World War II in defending and promoting a number of infamous judicial decisions highlights the potential abuses embedded in a legal discourse premised on the specially-situated knowledge of executive officials and military personnel. As the example of Japanese internment dramatizes, too strong an assumption of expert understanding can easily allow elite prejudices—and with it state violence—to run rampant and unconstrained. For the present, it hints at an obvious question: How skeptical should we be of current assertions of expertise and, indeed, of the dominant security framework itself? One claim, repeated especially in the wake of September 11, has been that regardless of normative legitimacy, the prevailing security concept—with its account of unique knowledge, insulation, and hierarchy—is simply an unavoidable consequence of existing global dangers. Even if Herring and Frankfurter may have been wrong in principle about their answer to the question “who decides in matters of security?” they nevertheless were right to believe that complexity and endemic threat make it impossible to defend the old Lockean sensibility. In the final pages of the article, I explore this basic question of the degree to which objective conditions justify the conceptual shifts and offer some initial reflections on what might be required to limit the government’s expansive security powers. VI. CONCLUSION: THE OPENNESS OF THREATS The ideological transformation in the meaning of security has helped to generate a massive and largely secret infrastructure of overlapping executive agencies, all tasked with gathering information and keeping the country safe from perceived threats. In 2010, The Washington Post produced a series of articles outlining the buildings, personnel, and companies that make up this hidden national security apparatus. According to journalists Dana Priest and William Arkin, there exist “some 1271 government organizations and 1931 private companies” across 10,000 locations in the United States, all working on “counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence.”180 This apparatus is especially concentrated in the Washington, D.C. area, which amounts to “the capital of an alternative geography of the United States.”181 Employed by these hidden agencies and bureaucratic entities are some 854,000 people (approximately 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington itself) who hold topsecret clearances.182 As Priest and Arkin make clear, the most elite of those with such clearance are highly trained experts, ranging from scientists and economists to regional specialists. “To do what it does, the NSA relies on the largest number of mathematicians in the world. It needs linguists and technology experts, as well as cryptologists, known as ‘crippies.’”183 These professionals cluster together in neighborhoods that are among the wealthiest in the country—six of the ten richest counties in the United States according to Census Bureau data.184 As the executive of Howard County, Virginia, one such community, declared, “These are some of the most brilliant people in the world. . . . They demand good schools and a high quality of life.”185 School excellence is particularly important, as education holds the key to sustaining elevated professional and financial status across generations. In fact, some schools are even “adopting a curriculum . . . that will teach students as young as 10 what kind of lifestyle it takes to get a security clearance and what kind of behavior would disqualify them.”186 The implicit aim of this curriculum is to ensure that the children of NSA mathematicians and Defense Department linguists can one day succeed their parents on the job. In effect, what Priest and Arkin detail is a striking illustration of how security has transformed from a matter of ordinary judgment into one of elite skill. They also underscore how this transformation is bound to a related set of developments regarding social privilege and status—developments that would have been welcome to Frankfurter but deeply disillusioning to Brownson, Lincoln, and Taney. Such changes highlight how one’s professional standing increasingly drives who has a right to make key institutional choices. Lost in the process, however, is the longstanding belief that issues of war and peace are fundamentally a domain of common care, marked by democratic intelligence and shared responsibility. Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states.187 Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike—at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides—and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be—remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers.189 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view—such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have—at times unwittingly—reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.”190 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.”191 Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion.193 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers—which have been consistent in recent years—place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger—requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization—such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions—like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home—shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate.196 These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm—the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,197 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’—marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact—than policymakers admit. If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars—emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness—is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants—danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently—it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

### 1NC Allies

#### Allied terror coop is high now, despite frictions

Archick 9/4—Kristin Archick, European affairs specialist at CRS [September 4, 2013, “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf]

As part of the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism since September 11, 2001, the EU made improving law enforcement and intelligence cooperation with the United States a top priority. The previous George W. Bush Administration and many Members of Congress largely welcomed this EU initiative in the hopes that it would help root out terrorist cells in Europe and beyond that could be planning other attacks against the United States or its interests. Such growing U.S.-EU cooperation was in line with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations that the United States should develop a “comprehensive coalition strategy” against Islamist terrorism, “exchange terrorist information with trusted allies,” and improve border security through better international cooperation. Some measures in the resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) and in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) mirrored these sentiments and were consistent with U.S.-EU counterterrorism efforts, especially those aimed at improving border controls and transport security. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Despite some frictions, most U.S. policymakers and analysts view the developing partnership in these areas as positive. Like its predecessor, the Obama Administration has supported U.S. cooperation with the EU in the areas of counterterrorism, border controls, and transport security. At the November 2009 U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, DC, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to work together to combat terrorism and enhance cooperation in the broader JHA field. In June 2010, the United States and the EU adopted a new “Declaration on Counterterrorism” aimed at deepening the already close U.S.-EU counterterrorism relationship and highlighting the commitment of both sides to combat terrorism within the rule of law. In June 2011, President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism asserted that in addition to working with European allies bilaterally, “the United States will continue to partner with the European Parliament and European Union to maintain and advance CT efforts that provide mutual security and protection to citizens of all nations while also upholding individual rights.”

#### They need us more than we need them

Perry and Dodds 13—Nick Perry, AP Correspondent for New Zealand and the South Pacific, and Paisley Dodds, London Bureau Chief for AP [July 16, 2013, “Experts Say US Spy Alliance Will Survive Snowden,” http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/07/16/experts-say-us-spy-alliance-will-survive-snowden.html]

WELLINGTON, New Zealand—Britain needed U.S. intelligence to help thwart a major terror attack. New Zealand relied on it to send troops to Afghanistan. And Australia used it to help convict a would-be bomber. All feats were the result of a spying alliance known as Five Eyes that groups together five English-speaking democracies, and they point to a vital lesson: American information is so valuable, experts say, that no amount of global outrage over secret U.S. surveillance powers would cause Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to ditch the Five Eyes relationship. The broader message is that the revelations from NSA leaker Edward Snowden are unlikely to stop or even slow the global growth of secret-hunting—an increasingly critical factor in the security and prosperity of nations. "Information is like gold," Bruce Ferguson, the former head of New Zealand's foreign spy agency, the Government Communications Security Bureau, told The Associated Press. "If you don't have it, you don't survive." The Five Eyes arrangement underscores the value of this information—as well as the limitations of the information sharing. The collaboration began during World War II when the allies were trying to crack German and Japanese naval codes and has endured for more than 70 years. The alliance helps avoid duplication in some instances and allows for greater penetration in others. The five nations have agreed not to spy on each other, and in many outposts around the world, Five Eyes agencies work side by side, allowing for information to be shared quickly. But Richard Aldrich, who spent a decade researching a book on British surveillance, said some Five Eyes nations have spied on each other, violating their own rules. The five countries "generally know what's in each other's underwear drawers so you don't need to spy, but occasionally there will be issues when they don't agree"—and when that happens they snoop, Aldrich said. In Five Eyes, the U.S. boasts the most advanced technical abilities and the biggest budget. Britain is a leader in traditional spying, thanks in part to its reach into countries that were once part of the British Empire. Australia has excelled in gathering regional signals and intelligence, providing a window into the growing might of Asia. Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders can sometimes prove useful spies because they don't come under the same scrutiny as their British and American counterparts. "The United States doesn't share information," said Bob Ayers, a former CIA officer, "without an expectation of getting something in return." Britain is home to one of the world's largest eavesdropping centers, located about 300 kilometers (186 miles) northwest of London at Menwith Hill. It's run by the NSA but hundreds of British employees are employed there, including analysts from Britain's eavesdropping agency, the Government Communications Headquarters—or GCHQ. Australia is home to Pine Gap, a sprawling satellite tracking station located in the remote center of the country, where NSA officials work side-by-side with scores of locals. The U.S. also posts three or four analysts at a time in New Zealand, home to the small Waihopai and Tangimoana spy stations. The intelligence-sharing relationship enabled American and British security and law enforcement officials to thwart a major terror attack in 2006—the trans-Atlantic liquid bomb plot to blow up some 10 airliners. The collaboration, sometimes called ECHELON, takes place within strict parameters. Two U.S. intelligence officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to speak about the program to the news media, said only U.S. intelligence officers can directly access their own vast database. A Five Eyes ally can ask to cross-check, say, a suspicious phone number it has independently collected to see if there is any link to the U.S., the officials said. But the ally must first show the request is being made in response to a potential threat to Western interests. Ferguson said that in New Zealand, cooperation with the U.S. improved markedly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Still, he said, his agency was kept on a need-to-know basis. He said he never knew what information was being provided to other Five Eyes nations, and none of the countries would have shared all their intelligence anyway. Ferguson said a small country like New Zealand benefited by a ratio of about five-to-one in the information it received compared to what it provided. He said that as chief of the defense force, a role he held before taking over the spy agency in 2006, he could never have sent troops to Afghanistan without the on-the-ground intelligence provided by the U.S. and other allies. He said New Zealand continues to rely on Five Eyes information for most of its overseas deployments, from peacekeeping to humanitarian efforts. The intelligence is vital, he added, for thwarting potential cyber threats. In Australia, prosecutors in 2009 used evidence from a U.S. informant who had been at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan to help convict one of nine Muslim extremists found guilty of planning to bomb an unspecified Sydney target. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation wrote in an email to The AP that "intelligence sharing between countries is critical to identifying and preventing terrorism and other transnational security threats." Canada's Department of National Defence had a similar response, saying it "takes an active role in building relationships with allies. Collaborating with the personnel of the Five Eyes community in support of mutual defense and security issues is part of this relationship building." Both agencies declined requests to provide more specific information. In the decades since World War II, the allies have formed various other intelligence allegiances, although few as comprehensive or deep as Five Eyes. While the Snowden revelations will test the relationship, it has survived tests in the past. New Zealand has long asserted an independent foreign policy by banning nuclear ships, and some are now calling for the country to go further and opt out of Five Eyes. Lawmaker Russel Norman, co-leader of New Zealand's Green Party, is one of many people calling for a public review of the relationship. "I want to live in a free society, not a total surveillance state," he said. "The old Anglo-American gang of five no longer runs the world." But John Blaxland, a senior fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, said politicians Down Under have often criticized the security relationship until they've gotten into power and been briefed on its benefits. Then, he said, they tend to go silent. "The perception is that the advantages are so great, they'd be crazy to give it up," he said.

#### Spying is a larger internal link to collapse of allied coop on CT

Skinner 10/25/13—Kiron K. Skinner is the director of the Center for International Relations and Politics at Carnegie Mellon University and a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution [October 25, 2013, “Diplomacy Requires Trust Among Allies,” http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/24/if-were-spying-are-we-still-allies/diplomacy-requires-trust-among-allies]

Trust is so central to maintaining a healthy alliance that the alleged U.S. policy of monitoring the phone conversations or phone records of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French citizens should be curtailed.

Since the 1963 Elysée Treaty was signed, France and Germany have been the anchors for Europe’s democracies. Without these two leading economies, the European Union could not function and a peaceful Europe would be all but impossible to maintain.

Their membership in NATO is vital on both sides of the Atlantic. They have provided troops to the U.S.-led international security forces in Afghanistan. Even when they differ, they work together, as in the case of France’s intervention in Mali, when Germany ultimately offered the use of its cargo planes.

Diplomacy is based on trust, so when trust is compromised, cooperation -- no matter how longstanding -- gives way to discord. The Obama administration contends that a large portion of U.S. espionage activities are carried out to combat terrorism, but this does not justify the actions brought to light by the recent Edward Snowden-originated revelations. If Washington undermines its own leadership or that of its allies, the collective ability of the West to combat terrorism will be compromised. Allied leaders will have no incentive to put their own militaries at risk if they cannot trust U.S. leadership. Foreign leaders and their publics -- not just the ideological and murderous nonstate actors that have made terrorism a global phenomenon -- may demand retribution against Washington.

Robust U.S. counterterrorism policies are premised on credibility with those who join the U.S. on the front lines. Even though spying on allies has always occurred (U.S. spying on France provided important intelligence in World War II, for example), the digital age allows public revelations of classified behavior to happen in real time -- not decades after the fact. It is little wonder that President Obama has been on the phone with his European counterparts this week. U.S. credibility is on the line.

1NC AT: NATO

#### Their Brzezinski evidence doesn’t actually provide a warrant for NATO solving anything—it just lists a bunch of problems and then says “NATO is globally significant.”

NATO is redundant—other international organizations solve—NATO only creates free-riding and lowers over-all security

Hartung 13 (Farina Hartung, Master Thesis International and European Relations, Linköping University, “Case-study of NATO: Is NATO a redundant international organization or not?”, http://www.liu.se/utbildning/pabyggnad/F7MME/student/courses/733a27masterthesis/filarkiv/spring-2013/theses-june/1.464731/MasterThesisFinalVersionFarinaHartung.pdf)

Just as mentioned above, NATO has gone through a process of changes since it was first established. It can be said that the changes where necessary or as a matter of fact that they were not - it always depends on the view one takes. The position of this paper has been stated before that it is going to investigate the question if NATO is redundant and to show proof that it is. As history has shown, it can be argued that the organization is redundant and has survived much longer passed its due time. From this point of view, it can be argued that this is what hurts the organization; they need to reform before they have a chance to act.

It is quite difficult to claim that NATO is not redundant, but as mentioned before, this Thesis will take a look at the opposite side of this claim. Instead of trying to prove that NATO is needed, I will try to show that it is not needed and has long surpassed its duty. That has become clear over the past years. NATO has reformed itself in order to ensure that it will stay relevant enough in order to play an impacting role in politics and international relations. Although they have taken the initiative to stay relevant, they seem to have failed. There have been different voices, such as Theo Sommer and Kenneth Waltz, who claim and argue that NATO is as a matter of fact redundant.

One could always ask what is redundancy and how can it be measured. Redundancy is not self-evident, and it also cannot really be defined. Neither can redundancy be measured. Redundancy is what one makes out of it and what others understand of redundancy is left open for discussion. But in regards to this paper, redundancy is just the fact that NATO is not really needed any longer. The task it is currently doing, such as the peacekeeping, can be done by other international organizations, such as the United Nations There is no longer the need for just one international organization to have its sole focus and propose on collective security. Security is something that is desired by so many countries and there is no need that NATO needs to be the one organization that will provide this to all the countries in the world. And as mentioned before, NATO already goes outside its territorial borders in order to provide security to the world (“NATO in the 21st Century).

NATO is a redundant international organization simply because it has lost its endeavor. It strives to do so much in order to provide its member states with the necessary certainty that in case of a threat, there is a whole community that will act and protect each member state. But how should NATO really do that in reality? The member states have cut down their size of military they have. In time of great danger, one country might not want to act because there could be a conflict of interests. Currently, there is just not such a big threat as the Soviet Union was that there needs to be a military alliance. In case that such a great threat rises to the surface again, it is just simply as easy to create a new international military organization which can then function according to the actual needs, because it is always during the time of threat that new alliances are created.

As mentioned above, the main purpose of NATO has vanished when the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Since the Cold War and the threat that the Soviet Union posed so close to European borders dissolved in the beginning of the 1990s, NATO just has lost its main function. According to Theo Sommer, NATO has ever since then been in a constant stage of “transformation”, never really knowing what it should achieve and what its goal is (17). In addition to that, one could argue that NATO is facing more problems that seem to have come along with the problem of the lacking threat.

This Thesis argues that NATO is neither necessary to fulfill a defensive function or that of providing security for its members. NATO is an international organization that is in fact no longer permissible. It has surpassed its life expectancy by many years. Moreover, it can be said that since it has surpassed its reason of existence, it will step down from the position it holds in regards of an international security organization. It is no longer the main focus of the member states. NATO should also no longer be the main focus. Other organizations have emerged over the past decades that show that they are able to do the necessary work without having to go through a process of transformation. For example regional international organization, such as the European Union could take over this task, since most of the members are located on the European continent to begin with. Furthermore, it can be claimed that NATO should be able to see that they are no longer fit for modern times. Before NATO is able to act on any kind of problem or concern, it has to go through a process of transforming itself; otherwise, it might not be able to act. This point of view may seem a bit exaggerated; however, it is suitable for NATO since it is pragmatic. NATO is not the same since the end of the Cold War. It can be said that the main reason why the NATO was established was to be able to encounter the Soviet Union in a time of crisis. According to Lindley-French, NATO today is a strategic and defensive focal point that can project both military and partnership power worldwide (89). She continuous her argument by noting that the job the alliance has to done is the same as ever and has not changed (Ibid). The job of the alliance has always been to safeguard the freedom and security of its member nations through political and security needs, instituted by the values of “democracy, liberty, rule of law and the peaceful resolution to disputes” (Ibid). Yet another point he claims is that NATO provides a strategic forum for consultation between North Americans and Europeans on security issues of common concern and the facility for taking joint action to deal with them (Ibid).

To repeat, NATO has lost its power and maybe even its standpoint in the modern day time politics. There are many different international organizations that all could take over the work of NATO or even could continue it in a better manner than NATO is currently doing. Claiming that NATO is not redundant just does not seem to follow the actual fact of the position that NATO is currently in. They have missed indeed the point where it was time to either dissolve the whole international organization or the time to reform which would have actually created positive outcomes. The latter point, however, seems impossible now. It just is impossible for NATO to change yet again. In the time of its existence, NATO has undergone so many different changes and reforms, altogether a total of six. There is just no logical reason why NATO is able to successfully undergo another process of changes and transformation. New reforms always bring changes and if they actually will help NATO is left in the open.

As Theo Sommer puts it, NATO has served its time simply because the world has changed (9). The threats are no longer the same and to some extend may not even exist anymore. There are of course new threats, such as terrorism, piracy, and cyber-attacks, now that have emerged and rose to the surface of international politics. However, those are not really the same as they were when NATO was created. Hence, NATO is not suitable to tackle new issues and problems. They can try to reform, but it will never be the same because NATO itself will have to adjust to the new situation. But this is not what this once great military alliance was intended to do.

### 1NC—AT: Indo-Pak

#### No Pakistan collapse and it doesn't escalate

Dasgupta 13 [Sunil Dasgupta is Director of the University of Maryland Baltimore County Political Science Program at the Universities at Shady Grove and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, East Asia Forum, February 25, 2013, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan?", http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/]

As it is, India and Pakistan have gone down to the nuclear edge four times — in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001–02. In each case, India responded in a manner that did not escalate the conflict. Any incursion into Pakistan was extremely limited. An Indian intervention in a civil war in Pakistan would be subject to the same limitations — at least so long as the Pakistani army maintains its integrity.

Given the new US–India ties, the most important factor in determining the possibility and nature of Indian intervention in a possible Pakistani civil war is Washington. If the United States is able to get Kabul and Islamabad to work together against the Taliban, as it is trying to do now, then India is likely to continue its current policy or try to preserve some influence in Afghanistan, especially working with elements of the Northern Alliance.

India and Afghanistan already have a strategic partnership agreement in place that creates the framework for their bilateral relationship to grow, but the degree of actual cooperation will depend on how Pakistan and the Taliban react. If Indian interests in Afghanistan come under attack, New Delhi might have to pull back. The Indian government has been quite clear about not sending troops to Afghanistan.

If the United States shifts its policy to where it has to choose Kabul over Islamabad, in effect reviving the demand for an independent Pashtunistan, India is likely to be much more supportive of US and Afghan goals. The policy shift, however, carries the risk of a full-fledged proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan, but should not involve the prospect of a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan itself.

India is not likely to initiate an intervention that causes the Pakistani state to fail. Bill Keller of the New York Times has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis’. But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-scholar Anatol Lieven argues that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan, tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements — propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country.

Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements do not yet exist. Given the current conditions and those in the foreseeable future, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

#### Indo-pak won’t go nuclear

Enders 2 [Jan 30, David, Michigan Daily, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely]

\* Ashutosh Varshney – Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan

\* Paul Huth – Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland

\* Kenneth Lieberthal – Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

"Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."

The worlds two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.

"The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.

"Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said.

Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war.

"India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."

Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal.

"American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."

#### Peace process solves

**First Post 1/1**/14 [Peace process may make some headway before polls in India: Pakistan,” First Post India, Jan 1, 2014, pg. <http://www.firstpost.com/india/peace-process-may-make-some-headway-before-polls-in-india-pakistan-1318255.html?utm_source=ref_article>

Islamabad: Pakistan today said that though the full Indo-Pak composite dialogue may not start before the general elections in India, peace process will make some headway. Advisor to Pakistan Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs and National Security, Sartaj Aziz said initiative has been taken to improve relations with India. Tensions prevailed due to some incidents on the LOC but now situation has stabilised. The DGMOs of the two countries have met and peace is restored, he said.
In an interview to state-run Radio Pakistan, Aziz said full composite dialogue may not be started before elections in India but hoped that some groups will meet and peace process will make headway to some extent. He said peaceful neighbourhood is the first priority of the country's foreign policy and sufficient progress has been made in this direction. Aziz said without peaceful neighbourhood, Pakistan cannot achieve agenda of economic development. He said to achieve these objectives "some basic changes has been made in the foreign policy during the last six months".

### AT: Yemen

#### Alt cause to Yemeni state failure.

Colonel Hassan Abosaq 12, US Army War College, master of strategic studies degree candidate, 2012, "The Implications of Unstable on Saudi Arabia," Strategy Research Project, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA560581

Yemen is one of the poorest Arab states. Unemployment, corruption, total illiteracy, overpopulation, poverty, and lawlessness draw quite a gloomy picture. Yemen has a rapidly growing population with limited resources, with one third of its budget coming from its declining oil revenue which most economists expect will be exhaust by 2017. Yemen has a critical water shortage worsened by the excessive use of it to cultivate qat, which is chewed for stimulant and other effects but has no nutritional value. A recent World Bank report estimates that up to 25 percent of potential working hours are lost to qat chewing.13

There has been a rise in the recent past in the number and intensity of street protests, tribal clashes, kidnapping, terrorist attacks, insurrection in the North, growing tension in the South, and clashes between security forces and defected army units. Power in Yemen is concentrated in the hands of the few. President Ali Saleh has been in power since 1978, ruling by manipulative methods with which he creates conflicts between tribes to keep them engaged in fighting each other and, at the same time, putting his relatives in key and powerful positions in order to preserve his power and control of the government. President Saleh’s primary concern is his own survival. He has awarded key army posts to relatives and allies within his own Sanhan tribe. His son Ahmad is the commander of the Republican Guard, while his nephews Tarik and Yahya control private presidential security and the central security forces. President Saleh rules by maintaining a precarious balance among several competing forces including the military, main tribes, religious clerics, and political parties. Saleh rules by buying loyalty through patronage and through a combination of cooperation, inclusion and coercion. Therefore he has built a feudal system of government which has become a kleptomaniac and plutocratic system. Corruption and mismanagement make the implementation of reforms and the absorption of any external assistance very difficult. The central government control over the hinterland is minimal. The hinterlands are usually under tribal control. Feelings of tribal identity are very strong in Yemen, where intertribal strife and conflicts between the central authority and tribes have been common for centuries. The central authority in what is today corresponds to Yemen has never been strong. Disputes are often driven by competition for scarce resources, whether it is water, funds for infrastructure and basic services, or access to patronage networks.

After the North victory over the South in the 1994 civil war, the Northerners strengthened their grip over the South and dominated both the government and the economy. The Southerners, feeling alienated and resented in their own country, started what is called al-Hirak al-Janoubi demanding equal opportunities in the government and the economy. The government used force to suppress this movement and the relationship between the South and the government has been on a hazardous path since. The Southern Movement is now calling for secession from Yemen. Southern break from the North could lead to further breaks in the South. Different parts of Southern Yemen may seek independence from the South following any break with the North. This possibility is particularly serious with the Hadhramout province, whose people view themselves distinct from the rest of Yemen. In the North, the Huthi rebellion is fueled by bitter local grievances over economic marginalization, market access, and the lack of services and infrastructure in Sa’ada region. The Huthis are calling for freedom of worship and social justice. They accuse the government of corruption and meddling with the delicate religious balance between Zaidi Shias and Salafi Sunnis. This rebellion, started in 2004, hails from the area around the Northern Province of Sa’ada, which is close to the Saudi border. This conflict led to the Huthis seeking and getting financial and arms support from Iran and former Libyan government.14 The conflict became regional in late 2009, when the Huthis crossed the Saudi border and occupied a mountain in southern Saudi Arabia in order to surround the Yemeni forces. Saudi Arabian forces intervened and attacked the Huthi rebel positions and also imposed a naval blockade on the northwestern coast of Yemen to prevent weapons from reaching the Huthis.

President Saleh’s divide-and-rule strategy enabled him to govern by proxy through rival tribal sheikhs, but after 30 years in power, his reputation as a master of crisis management has begun to slip. In mid-January 2011, thousands of Yemenis protested in Sana’a demanding change of government. The protest spread through the country, in Sana’a, Tai’z, Dhamar, Aden, Hudaidah, Mukalla, and other major cities. It was more peaceful in the northern cities but more violent in the southern cities. The government reacted to these demonstrations in a violent way where many people lost their lives due to use of force by government security forces. The protesters, inspired by what happened in Tunisia and Egypt continued their protest and their numbers increased to hundreds of thousands. By March, some military troops joined the protesters. By the end of March the central government lost its control of Sa’ada and al- Jouf governorate to the Huthis. In the last week of March, the country’s top general, Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, commander of the First Division, sided with the protesters and positioned his troops to defend them from the government security and loyalist forces. By April protesters took the streets by the hundreds of thousands. April 5th, the USA called for Saleh to step down. In late April, Saleh agreed to a Gulf Cooperation Council brokered deal only to back away hours before the scheduled signing three times. On May 22nd, the GCC declared it was suspending its mediation efforts in Yemen. The next day, May 23rd, the chief of Hashed tribe, the largest and most powerful tribe in Yemen, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, declared support for the protesters, and few days later his armed supporters came into conflict with loyalist and security forces. On June 3rd, an explosion in the presidential compound mosque caused at least five deaths and the injury of president Saleh and several others. Saleh was flown to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment where he spent about three months before returning and resuming his authority. On July 30th, a group of anti-government tribes declared the formation of the Alliance of Yemeni Tribes. The Alliance is headed by Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, the leader of Hashid tribe, and is aligned with Yemen Army defectors under the leadership of General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar.15

The current situation in Yemen is as follows: the two northern governorates bordering Saudi Arabia, Sa’ada and al-Jouf, are under the full control of the Huthi Movement which is backed by Iran and hostile to Saudi Arabia. The central government is in a small-scale armed conflict in the major cities with the oppositions and the defected troops and the tribes supporting them. There is a strong presence of AQAP in Abyan Governorate and possible spread to the eastern governorate of Hadhramout. There is an increase in Southern ambition for secession. There is a strengthening of the tribal power in the North after the formation of the Alliance of Yemen Tribes. If this situation continues, Yemen will change from an unstable state to a failed state which will have a great negative impact on Saudi Arabia and other Arabian Peninsula states and also on the region’s security and economy. This requires action from Saudi Arabia and other influenced countries which will be impacted by the instability of Yemen. There is a prospect of a failed state in this strategic Arabian Peninsula country with high level of unemployment, rapid population growth and dwindling water resources. After eleven months of street protests, Saleh has signed the GCC proposal. But this has not satisfied the street protesters who want Saleh and other key regime officials to be brought to court. What is worrying is that all the different groups in Yemen agree on their hate for President Saleh whether they are the tribes, political organizations, youth movements, or defected military units. They are all in agreement that Saleh must go, but they are unable to work together and will have difficulties in transitioning to a new Yemeni leadership. This opposition is not a cohesive one. Impoverished people dreaming of better life, students, intellectuals, Muslim priesthood, al-Qaeda affiliates, Huthi rebels, Southern secessionists, and separate tribes. All of them want Saleh to leave, but all of them pursue their own goals. The situation in Yemen is more complicated than some might think. There are tribal feudalism, military rivalry, conflicts between North and South, Huthi rebels, religious extremism and al- Qaeda affiliates and supporters. All of this puts Yemen on the fringe of failure.

### No Model

#### No one models US democracy or rule of law—their authors live in a fantasy

Black 12—Eric Black writes Eric Black Ink for MinnPost, analyzing politics and government of Minnesota and the United States, the historical background of topics and other issues [September 27, 2012, “Some ideas to limit the ‘supremacy’ of the U.S. Supreme Court,” http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2012/11/some-ideas-limit-supremacy-us-supreme-court]

It seems to be part of our national DNA. We see ourselves as so unlike the rest of the world that we have developed a semi-religious belief in what we call “American exceptionalism.” Maybe the upside is some kind of boost to our collective self-esteem. But one of the downsides is a reluctance to look around the world and see if anyone (especially not France) has a good idea from which we might benefit.

Especially on democracy. We see ourselves as the world’s model for democracy and the “rule of law.” We expect others to copy us, although they have long since stopped doing so with reference to the specifics of how to design a government. We grumble a good deal about the breakdowns in our system, but we are not much open to ideas for improving it.

University of Minnesota political scientist Lisa Hilbink, whose specialties include comparative constitutional systems around the world, said that basically, since the end of World War II, most of the world outside of Latin America came to the conclusion that the U.S. system was “pretty crazy.”

A great many new constitutions have been written since then, in emerging democracies and in old democracies that wrote new constitutions. In many ways, the foreign framers did benefit from our example, often in deciding what not to do. As I have mentioned in previous installments, no other country thinks our Electoral College example is worth following and likewise no one has designed a system of “veto points” like ours in which it is much easier to block action than to get anything done.

### 1NC No Backsliding

#### No empirical evidence for backsliding

Wolfgang Merkel, March 2010. Department of Democracy Research, Social Science Research Center, Berlin; and Department of Political Science, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. “Are dictatorships returning? Revisiting the ‘democratic rollback’ hypothesis,” Contemporary Politics 16.1, http://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/personen/merkel.wolfgang.289/contemporary-politics2010-merkel.pdf.

Since 2007 an increasing number of articles have diagnosed ‘freedom in retreat’ and predicted a ‘return to the authoritarian great powers’. Highly distinguished scholars warn against the ‘democratic rollback’, and articles on the resilience of authoritarian regimes have appeared in the best journals of political science. Is the tide of democratization turning, and do we have to expect a new reverse wave of autocratization? This article argues that **there is no hard empirical evidence that we are witnessing a trend towards re-autocratization** on a global scale. The optimism of the early 1990s of a seemingly irresistible trend towards democracy is partially due to an empirical artefact caused by inappropriate underlying theoretical concepts. The overestimation of human agency and political crafting on the one side and underestimation of structural impediments for democracy on the other side contributed to this optimism, as did the thin concept of ‘electoral democracy’ or teleological speculation about the end of history. Democratic rollback does not seem to be as widespread as is sometimes claimed.

### 1NC No Impact

#### Democratic peace is spurious—causal logic does not support the correlation.

Sebastian Rosato, November 2003. Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science. “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political Science Review 97.4.

Democratic peace theory—the claim that democ- racies rarely fight one another because they share common norms of live-and-let-live and domestic institutions that constrain the recourse to war—is probably the most powerful liberal contribu- tion to the debate on the causes of war and peace.1 If the theory is correct, it has important implications for both the study and the practice of international poli- tics. Within the academy it undermines both the realist claim that states are condemned to exist in a constant state of security competition and its assertion that the structure of the international system, rather than state type, should be central to our understanding of state behavior. In practical terms democratic peace theory provides the intellectual justification for the belief that spreading democracy abroad will perform the dual task of enhancing American national security and promot- ing world peace.

In this article I offer an assessment of democratic peace theory. Specifically, I examine the causal logics that underpin the theory to determine whether they offer compelling explanations for why democracies do not fight one another.

A theory is comprised of a hypothesis stipulating an association between an independent and a dependent variable and a causal logic that explains the connec- tion between those two variables. To test a theory fully, we should determine whether there is support for the hypothesis, that is, whether there is a correlation be- tween the independent and the dependent variables and whether there is a causal relationship between them.2 An evaluation of democratic peace theory, then, rests on answering two questions. First, do the data sup- port the claim that democracies rarely fight each other? Second, is there a compelling explanation for why this should be the case?

Democratic peace theorists have discovered a pow- erful empirical generalization: Democracies rarely go to war or engage in militarized disputes with one an- other. Although there have been several attempts to challenge these findings (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997; Layne 1994; Spiro 1994), the correlations remain ro- bust (e.g., Maoz 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Weart 1998). Nevertheless, some scholars argue that while there is certainly peace among democracies, **it may be caused by factors other than the democratic nature of those states** (Farber and Gowa 1997; Gartzke 1998; Layne 1994). Farber and Gowa (1997), for example, suggest that the Cold War largely explains the democratic peace finding. In essence, they are raising doubts about whether there is a convinc- ing causal logic that explains how democracies inter- act with each other in ways that lead to peace. To resolve this debate, we must take the next step in the testing process: determining the persuasiveness of the various causal logics offered by democratic peace theorists.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### 2NC—K Prior

#### Framing war powers restrictions as a *means* to achieve greater national security quashes political alternatives to unilateral war-fighting.

Francisco J. CONTRERAS Prf. Philosophy of Law @ Seville AND Ignacio de la RASILLA Ph.D. candidate in international law, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 8 “On War as Law and Law as War” Leiden Journal of International Law Vol. 21 Issue 3 p. 779-780 [**Gender paraphrased]**

War’s ubiquity, its discontinuity, and the blurring of its outline are not without psychological and moral consequences in the military: ‘Experts have long observed that when warfare itself seems to have no clear beginning or end, no clear battlefield, no clear enemy, military discipline, as well as morale, breaks down’ (p. 119). This dispiriting confusion that affects soldiers also concerns the international lawyer, who sees the old rules of jus belli evaporate and be replaced by much vaguer ‘standards’. The last pages of Of War and Law convey, in fact, a clear feeling of defeat or loss, showing the demoralization of the international lawyer who still tries to take the law of war seriously: ‘How can ethical absolutes and instrumental calculations be made to lie down peacefully together? How can one know what to do, how to judge, whom to denounce?’ (p. 117). The former categorical imperatives (‘thou shalt not bomb cities’, ‘thou shalt not execute prisoners’, etc.) give way to an elastic and blurred logic of more and less, within which instrumental might triumphs definitively over the ethical (p. 132).89 As the new flexible ‘standards’ seem more susceptible to strategic exploitation and modulation than do the old strict rules, the various actors will play with the labels of jus belli—now definitively versatile—according to their strategic needs: Ending conflict, calling it occupation, calling it sovereignty—then opening hostilities, calling it a police action, suspending the judicial requirements of policing, declaring a state of emergency, a zone of insurgency—all these are also tactics in the conflict. . . . All these assertions take the form of factual or legal assessments, but we should also understand them as arguments, at once messages and weapons. (p. 122)90 Kennedy reiterates a new aspect of the ‘weaponization of the law’: the legal qualification of facts appears as a means of conveying messages to the enemy and to public opinion alike, because in the age of immediate media coverage, wars are fought as much in the press and opinion polls as they are on the battlefield. The skilled handling of jus belli categories will benefit one side and prejudice the other (p. 127);91 as the coinage of the very term ‘lawfare’ seems to reflect, the legal battle has already become an extension of the military one (p. 126).92 In cataloguing some of the dark sides of the law of war, Kennedy also stresses how the legal debate tends to smother and displace discussions which would probably be more appropriate and necessary. Thus the controversy about the impending intervention in Iraq, which developed basically within the discursive domain of the law of war, largely deprived lawyers of participating in an in-depth discussion on the neo-conservative project of a ‘great Middle East’—more democratic and Western-friendly and less prone to tyranny and terrorism—the feasibility of ‘regime change’, an adequate means of fostering democracy in the region, and so on: We never needed to ask, how should regimes in the Middle East . . . be changed? Is Iraq the place to start? Is military intervention the way to do it? . . .Had our debates not been framed by the laws of war, we might well have found other solutions, escaped the limited choices of UN sanctions, humanitarian aid, and war, thought outside the box. (p. 163) 6. CONCLUSIONS Those familiar with the author’s previous works93 will certainly have already identified the Derridean streak in Kennedy’s thought in the underlying claim that every discourse generates dark zones and silences or represses certain aspects, renders the formulation of certain questions impossible (a Foucauldian streak in the author could be suspected as well: every discourse—be it administrative, legal, medical, or psychiatric—implies simultaneously ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’; each discourse amounts somehow to a system of domination, insofar as it defines ‘conditions of admission’ into the realm of the legally valid, the ‘sane society’, etc.).94 In the picture resulting from the application of this analytical framework to the domain of the use of force, international lawyers and humanitarian professionals appear gagged, restricted by the language they try to utter effectively to themselves and others. As if the legal language had imposed on them its own logic, it now speaks through their voices and what is, evidently, once again, the Marxian-structuralist idea of cultural products gaining a life of their own and turning against their own creators. Kennedy, however, does not stop at noting that jurists have become ‘spoken’ by their language amidst a dramatically changing war scenario. More disquietingly, he stresses the evident corollary of the previous proposition: the evaporation of a sense of individual moral responsibility: [A]ll these formulations, encouraged by the language of law, displace human responsibility for the death and suffering of war onto others . . . . In all these ways, we step back from the terrible responsibility and freedom that comes with the discretion to kill. . . .Violence and injury have lost their author and their judge as soldiers, humanitarians, and statesmen [statespeople] have come to assess the legitimacy of violence in a common legal and bureaucratic vernacular. (pp. 168–9) While depersonalization and a lack of sense of personal responsibility are evidently also favoured by external structural factors, among which is the bureaucratic political complexity of modern states themselves (p. 17),96 Kennedy stresses that the language of international law would thus trivialize and conceal the gravity of decisions: In all these ways, we step back from the terrible responsibility and freedom that comes with the discretion to kill. . . . The problem is loss of the human experience of responsible freedom and free decision—of discretion to kill and let live. (p. 170)

### AT: Jackson

#### This argument takes out their claim that you should prioritize empirical knowledge—Jackson says neopositivism’s attempt to posit itself as an unshakable ground for knowledge is stupid. The aff’s attempt to find one generalizable model to explain IR, like hegemony solves war, ignores the complexity of specific empirical situations.

Jackson 10—Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC [“The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” p 41-2]

Ontological commitments, whether philosophical or scientific, logically precede substantive claims, and serve as the often-unacknowledged basis on which empirical claims are founded. In this sense, ontological commitments are “foundational”—not in the sense that they provide unshakable grounds that universally guarantee the validity of the claims that are founded on them, but “foundational” in the sense that they provide the conditions of intelligibility for those claims. In that way, ontological commitments are world-disclosing, since they make a particular kind of tangible world available to a researcher (Habermas 1990, 321). A claim such as “democratic states do not go to war with one another” implicitly makes a number of ontological presuppositions. The claim makes scientific-ontological presuppositions that a state’s “democracy-ness” is a conceptually separable attribute of that state and most likely also presupposes that a state’s standing as a democracy is something that is visible to external scholarly observers and specifiable in an abstract fashion.1 The claim also makes philosophical-ontological presuppositions, although these are somewhat further removed from the individual claim and pertain more to the overall intellectual context within which the claim make sense; hence one needs to know something about the broader body of scholarly literature within which a claim has standing in order to explicate the philosophical-ontological commitments that it tacitly presumes. The academic study of the democratic peace has been almost completely dominated by a *neopositivist* methodology. Neopositivism, although neutral with respect to the truth-value of specific empirical propositions, sets the contours of the research design within which claims about the democratic peace—and, quite frankly, claims about many of the other empirical phenomena regularly studied within academic IR—are evaluated. Before scholars can engage in debates about whether democratic peace is best measured and assessed as a dyadic of as a monadic phenomenon (for example, Rousseau et al. 1996), it is first necessary for those scholars to agree on some basic methodological principles, such as the notion that a causal connection shows itself in systematic cross-case correlations between specific factors (in this case, variable attributes such as “being a democracy” and “going to war with another democracy”), and the notion that knowledge is constructed through the successive proposing and testing of hypothetical guesses about the character of the world. The fact that these assumptions are so widely shared, both within the democratic peace research community and within the field of IR more generally, does not make them any less philosophical—or any less philosophically contentious. Hypothesis testing and covariation-causality2 are more or less direct consequences of the pair of philosophical-ontological commitments on which neopositivism stands: mind-world dualism and phenomenalism. Mind-world dualism enables hypothesis testing, inasmuch as testing a hypothetical guess to see whether it corresponds to the world makes little sense in the absence of a mind-independent world against which to test the hypothesis. Phenomenalism enables covariation-causality, since the limitation of knowledge to those aspects of the world that can be empirically grasped and directly experienced implies that the only confidence that observers can have about a causal relationship—which must be inferred rather than abduced or counterfactually ideal-typified—must be founded on its systematicity.3 In the absence of these philosophical-ontological commitments, testing hypotheses in order to arrive at reliable statements about robust correlations would make little sense, and if we were interested in knowing about how democracy was connected to questions of war and peace, we would have to engage in some other kinds of knowledge-production procedures.

### AT: Deterrence Empirics

#### Deterrence theory creates spirals of distrust -- Most recent psychological and neuroscience research proves.

Neta CRAWFORD Poli Sci @ Boston University 11 [*Realism and World Politics* Ed. Ken Booth p. 173]

For example, research on fear suggests that long-held assumptions of deterrence theory are probably not simply wrong but dangerously so. Research in political psychology has shown that ‘deterrence is inadequate as an explanatory theory of international relations because the growing body of empirical evidence’ does not support the theory.69 Recent research on fear implies that the notion that deterrence threats can be manipulated with great confidence is folly. We cannot expect decision-makers to respond to threats by doing elaborate (or even boundedly rational) calculations of costs, risks and benefits, yet policy-makers are still counselled as if this were possible. This is not simply because signalling resolve is difficult. Fear, and also anger and perceived humiliation, affect the ways people reason and react to threats: fear is a powerful source and re-enforcer of both the cognitive and motivated biases that interfere with the communication and reception of deterrent threats. Fear can become institutionalized and self-reinforcing. To the extent that our theories, uninformed by research on fear, have guided decision-makers and shaped foreign policies by promoting the use of threats, they have made the world more dangerous rather than less. The path to decreased tension, conflict resolution, and improved security lies in re-examining the relationship between ‘human nature’, political practices and institutions and in devising policies that actually decrease fear and enhance trust.

#### Building empathy and trust helps overcome fear and security dilemma spirals—turns their group think arguments

Neta CRAWFORD Poli Sci @ Boston University 11 [*Realism and World Politics* Ed. Ken Booth p. 170-171]

At the level of foreign policy decision-making, fear may not only increase the tendency to misunderstand or dismiss the adversary’s point of view, but it may also cause decision-makers to ignore divergent interpretations or even stifle internal disagreement and dissent. Those who are afraid tend to look for more threats. The fearful tend to rally around the flag, and attempt to bolster their sense that they are right. Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenberg suggest that the fear of death can decrease tolerance for disconfirming information and views: ‘when thoughts of death are salient, people generally become less tolerant and more hostile toward those with diverging views. In dozens of experiments, mortality salience has been shown to lead to more negative evaluations of those with different political orientations and attitudes toward a diverse array of subjects.’52 ‘Groupthink’, a tendency to value consensus over critical thinking and an unquestioning adherence to the beliefs and decisions of the group—rises when actors are gripped by fear. When groupthink occurs, group members’ ‘striving for unanimity override[s] their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action’ and leads to a ‘deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment’.53 To the extent that groups are already ethnocentric, nationalist and militarist, fear will likely magnify the salience of those beliefs and their policy impact.54 Those who question the worldview dominant in strongly identified groups will be viewed negatively.55 Focusing on fear (and anger) may suggest why some regions seem to have long periods of war and crisis. Each crisis feeds the spiral of fear and distrust, and generations may grow up primed to fear their neighbours. Protracted, intergenerational conflicts are probably those where the baseline of underlying biology has shifted toward hyper-arousal among elite decision-makers on both sides, at the same time that fear becomes institutionalized in a positive feedback loop that is difficult to break or mitigate. Individual and group perceptions of repeated insults lead to anger which tends, like fear, to decrease the quality of information processing, while at the same time increasing group confidence and the willingness to take risks.56 As Booth and Wheeler argue, security dilemmas are both about interpreting the other’s motives, intentions and capabilities and about determining a response.57 Fear thus keeps active security dilemma action-reaction dynamics that produce a spiral of mutual hostility and escalation. How can foreign policy decision-makers ameliorate the deleterious effects of individual and institutionalized fear? At the organizational level, intelligence that disconfirms potentially threatening information that will induce fear should be forwarded alongside the threatening information. Decision-makers should be reminded not to discount the disconfirming evidence and organizations should be tasked with looking for non-threatening cues. Fear is obviously not the only important emotional relationship between groups or states. The degree of empathy and trust that groups feel toward one another may account for the quality of their relationship. Richard Rorty has argued that dehumanization accounts for ethnic cleansing, while increased sentimentality and empathy account for our willingness to intervene in such conflicts.58 Some historical cases suggest that the development of empathy over long periods of time can have important political consequences. For example, increased empathy accounts, in part, for the end of legalized slavery and formal colonialism.59 And Lynn Hunt argues that the development of human rights over the long term depends on the development of greater sympathy and empathy towards others, starting in the eighteenth century.60 Regions characterized by security communities or successful post-conflict peacebuilding, may have achieved their success by first ratcheting down the effects of fear and gradually increasing the effects of empathy and the capacity to trust. Indeed, the literature on fear and empathy I have reviewed suggests that confidence-building measures, such as data exchanges, cultural exchanges, exercises in conciliation, and the graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT), are extremely important if understudied by political science.61 Trust building and maintaining mechanisms must be institutionalized in routine practices and expectations to have their greatest effects.62

### ALT—Anti-Subordination Framing

#### We should frame the question of executive power in terms of racialized harm and otherization. Refusing accommodation with values of the security state is a *precondition* for preventing racialized hierarchy.

Gil GOTT Int’l Studies @ DePaul 5 “The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law” Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4, p. 1075-1076

Anti-subordinationist principles require taking more complete account of how enemy groups are racialized, and how they come to be constructed as outsiders and the kinds of harms that may befall them as such. Group-based status harms include those that have been inscribed in law and effectuated through state action, and those that arise within civil society, through social structures, institutions, culture and habitus. Familiarity with the processes of racialization is a necessary precondition for appreciating and remedying such injuries. Applying anti-subordinationist thinking to national security law and policy does not require arguing that only race-based effects matter, but does require affording significant analytical and normative weight to the problems of such status harms. Racial injuries require racial remedies. Foregrounding anti-subordinationist principles in national security law and policy analysis departs significantly from traditional approaches in the field. Nonetheless, arguments based in history, political theory and pragmatism suggest that such a fundamental departure is warranted. Historically, emergency-induced "states of exception" 6 that have suspended legal protections against governmental abuses have tended to be identitybased in conception and implementation. 7 Viewed from the perspective of critical political theory, the constellation of current "security threats" rests on the epochal co-production of identity-based and market-driven global political antagonisms, referred to somewhat obliquely as civilization clashes or perhaps more forthrightly as American imperialism. Pragmatically, it makes no sense to fight terrorism by alienating millions of Muslim, Arab and South Asian residents in the United States and hundreds of millions more abroad through abusive treatment and double standards operative in identity-based repression at home and in selective, preemptive U.S. militarism abroad. Such double standards undermine the democratic legitimacy of the United States both in its internal affairs and in its assertions of global leadership. Indeed, there seems to be no shortage of perspectives from which liberal legal institutions would be enjoined from embracing a philosophy of political decisionism precisely at the interface of law and security, an anomic frontier along which are likely to arise identity-based regimes of exception and evolving race-based forms of subordination. Part I analyzes accommodationist approaches that variously incorporate security-inflected logic in truncating the regulative role law plays in national security contexts. I will seek to understand the accommodationist thrust of these interventions in light of the authors' operative assumptions regarding the proper array of interests and exigencies to be balanced. I will argue that the interests of demonized "enemy groups" facing racebased status harm-Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United States-are ineffectively engaged through accommodationist frameworks. The decisionist impulse of these analyses, that is, the tendency to acquiesce in the outcomes of non-substantively constrained statist and/or majoritarian political process, results from an incomplete grasp of the racialization processes. In short, more race consciousness is needed in national security law and policy in order to cement substantive commitments and procedural safeguards against historical and ongoing racebased subordination through the racialization of "security threats."

### Jones

#### Spillover from criticism is empirically proven. The role of the judge should be an intellectual whose goal is to destabilize the security regimes through critical interrogation of the status quo.

Jones 99 [Richard Wyn Jones, Professor International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 1999, p. 155-163]

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer place///

. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures—can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

### Nixon

#### Slow violence outweighs. We should privilege displaced structural violence over their immediate scenarios which are just media sensations

Nixon 11—Rob Nixon, English @ Wisconsin [*Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor* p. 1-4]

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of Sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational viSibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

Politically and emotionally, different kinds of disaster possess unequal heft. Falling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis have a visceral, eye-catching and page-turning power that tales of slow violence, unfolding over years, decades, even centuries, cannot match. Stories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats are all cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations. In an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need, a central question is strategic and representational: how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and that star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image-world? How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time? This book's second, related focus concerns the environmentalism of the poor, for it is those people lacking resources who are the principal casualties of slow violence. Their unseen poverty is compounded by the invisibility of the slow violence that permeates so many of their lives. Our media bias toward spectacular violence exacerbates the vulnerability of ecosystems treated as disposable by turbo-capitalism while simultaneously exacerbating the vulnerability of those whom Kevin Bale, in another context, has called" disposable people."z It is against such conjoined ecological and human disposability that we have witnessed a resurgent environmentalism of the poor, particularly (though not exclusively) across the so-called global South. So a central issue that emerges is strategic: if the neoliberal era has intensified assaults on resources, it has also intensified resistance, whether through isolated site-specific struggles or through activism that has reached across national boundaries in an effort to build translocal alliances. "The poor" is a compendious category subject to almost infinite local variation as well as to fracture along fault lines of ethnicity, gender, race, class, region, religion, and generation. Confronted with the militarization of both commerce and development, impoverished communities are often assailed by coercion and bribery that test their cohesive resilience. How much control will, say, a poor hardwood forest community have over the mix of subsistence and market strategies it deploys in attempts at adaptive survival? How will that community negotiate competing definitions of its own poverty and long-term wealth when the guns, the bulldozers, and the moneymen arrive? Such communities typically have to patch together threadbare improvised alliances against vastly superior military, corporate, and media forces. As such, impoverished resource rebels can seldom afford to be single-issue activists: their green commitments are seamed through with other economic and cultural causes as they experience environmental threat not as a planetary abstraction but as a set of inhabited risks, some imminent, others obscurely long term.

### AT: Perm

#### The focus on transparency and accountability is a ruse that obscures broader militarism and legitimates the institutional defense of drones

Gregory 2014, Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver

Derek, “Drone geographies,” Radical Philosophy 183, Jan/Feb

My view is both narrow and wide. It is narrow because I discuss only the use of Predators and Reapers by the US Air Force in Afghanistan and Iraq, sometimes as part of Joint Special Operations Command, and their involvement in CIA-directed targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Other advanced militaries also operate drones, some of them armed and some for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as part of networked military violence, but it is even more difficult to detail their operations. The US Army and Marine Corps use drones too, but most of these are much smaller and limited to providing ISR for close combat and ground attack. Within these limits, my view is also wide, however, because I want to disclose the matrix of military violence that these remote platforms help to activate. Much of the critical response to drones is unduly preoccupied with the technical (or techno-cultural) object – the drone – and virtually ignores these wider dispositions and propensities. This is, I will argue, both an analytical and a political mistake.¶ Homeland insecurities¶ Fig. 1¶ Fig. 1¶ The first set of geographies is located within the United States, where the US Air Force describes its remote operations as ‘projecting power without vulnerability’. Its Predators and Reapers are based in or close to the conflict zone, where Launch and Recovery crews are stationed to handle take-off and landing via a C-band line-of-sight data link; given the technical problems that dog what Jordan Crandall calls ‘the wayward drone’, there are also large maintenance crews in-theatre to service the aircraft.3 Once airborne, however, control is usually handed to flight crews stationed in the continental United States via a Ku-band satellite link to a ground station at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and a fibre-optic cable across the Atlantic. The network also includes senior officers and military lawyers who monitor operations from US Central Command’s Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and specialized image analysts in the United States who scrutinize the full-motion video feeds from the aircraft and are linked in via the Air Force’s Distributed Common Ground System. Taken together, the suite of four aircraft that constitutes a Combat Air Patrol capable of providing coverage twenty-four hours a day seven days a week involves 192 personnel, and most of them (133) are located outside the combat zone and beyond immediate danger (Figure 1). This is risk-transfer war with a vengeance, where virtually all the risks are transferred to populations overseas.4 Those who live in the attack zones often criticize drone strikes as cowardly, but the fact that most of those flying these online missions do not put their own lives on the line has also sparked a series of domestic debates about military ethics and codes of honour. These have traditionally invoked a reciprocity of risk that gave war what Clausewitz saw as its moral force: to kill with honour, the soldier must be prepared to die. Now the remote warrior remains the vector of violence but is no longer its potential victim.5¶ Indeed, some critics have ridiculed the drone crews as ‘cubicle warriors’ who merely ‘commute’ to war.6 The remotely piloted aircraft can remain in the air for at least 18 hours – some have recorded flights of more than 40 hours – and this requires crews to work in shifts of 10–12 hours and to alternate between home and work. Many of them report considerable difficulty in this interdigitation. As in previous wars, crews of conventional aircraft are forward deployed at varying distances from the conflict, and when they return to their bases at the end of a mission they remain within a military space that enables them to maintain focus and ‘psychic integrity’. The same is true for the Launch and Recovery crews, but it is much harder for crews of Predators and Reapers in the United States, who, as one of them put it, ‘commute to work in rush-hour traffic, slip into a seat in front of a bank of computers, fly a warplane to shoot missiles at an enemy thousands of miles away, and then pick up the kids from school or a gallon of milk at the grocery store on [their] way home for dinner’. He described it as living ‘a schizophrenic existence between two worlds’; the sign at the entrance to Creech Air Force Base announced ‘You are now entering CENTCOM AOR [Area of Operations]’, but ‘it could just as easily have read “You are now entering C.S. Lewis’s Narnia” for all that my two worlds intersected.’7 ‘The weirdest thing for me’, one pilot admitted, is ‘getting up in the morning, driving my kids to school and killing people’.8 Another confirms ‘the peculiar new disconnect of fighting a telewar’ from ‘a padded seat in American suburbia’ and commuting home ‘always alone with what he has done’.9¶ Remote crews are perhaps most vulnerable to this form of post-traumatic stress disorder – a product not so much of what they have seen as what they have done, though the two are of course connected – and it must be aggravated by the constant switching between worlds. In George Brant’s play Grounded a pilot describes the difficulty of maintaining the separation necessary for her to decompress, and gradually and ever more insistently one space keeps superimposing itself over the other; the fixed, precise sensor of the Gorgon Stare yields to a blurred vision in which she finds it virtually impossible to know where (or who) she is. The two worlds begin to become one: the desert on the night drive home from Creech starts to look like the greyed-out desert landscape in Afghanistan, and the face of a little girl on the screen, the daughter of a High Value Target, turns into the face of her own child.10 Brant’s play is all the more powerful because public attention has been artfully orchestrated so that it does not make that connection: it too is insulated by a ‘remote split’. When critics of CIA-directed drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere demand to know about their legal basis and the rules and procedures that are followed, they divert the public gaze from Waziristan to Washington. Madiha Tahir has noted how what she calls the Obama administration’s ‘theatrical performance of faux secrecy’ over its drone war in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – a teasing dance in which the veil of official secrecy is deliberately let slip once, twice, three times – functions to draw its audience’s eye towards the American body politic and away from the Pakistani bodies on the ground. It has been a hideously effective sideshow, in which Obama and an army of barkers and hucksters – unnamed spokesmen ‘speaking on condition of anonymity’ because they are ‘not authorized to speak on the record’, and front-of-house spielers like Harold Koh and John Brennan11 – induce not only a faux secrecy but its obverse, a faux intimacy in which public debate is focused on transparency and accountability as the only ‘games’ worth playing. Yet when you ask people who live under the drones what they want, Tahir continues,¶ They do not say ‘transparency and accountability’. They say they want the killing to stop. They want to stop dying. They want to stop going to funerals – and being bombed even as they mourn. Transparency and accountability, for them, are abstract problems that have little to do with the concrete fact of regular, systematic death.12

### Impact Calculus

#### From our privileged position all genuine change is presumed dangerous and undesirable. Your decision should be willing to risk the possibility of danger to redress colonial exploitation.

Saunders 5 [Rebecca Comparative Lit @ Illinois St., “Risky Business: Edward Said as Literary Critic” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle Eas p. 529-532]

Risk-free ethics, like all protection from risk, are a class privilege. As Deborah Lupton puts it, “The disadvantaged have fewer opportunities to avoid risks because of their lack of resources compared with the advantaged”; “people’s social location and their access to material resources are integral to the ways in which they conceptualize and deal with risk.”22 Or, as Ulrich Beck argues, “Poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, wealth (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk.”23 Thus when we endorse a risk-free ethics, we should bear in mind that members of social groups with less to lose and more to gain are more likely to engage in risky behaviors than are members of more secure and privileged social groups. Moreover, as Mary Douglas has argued at length, risk is a forensic resource and, much like the “danger” she elaborated in her early work, functions as a means of social control. “Anthropologists would generally agree,” she writes, “that dangers to the body, dangers to children, dangers to nature are available as so many weapons to use in the struggle for ideological domination.”24 These weapons are sharpened, she argues, by Western societies’ association of risk assessment with scientific neutrality. Along similar lines, Nick Fox contends that “risk analysis is a deeply political activity. The identification of hazards (and the consequent definition of what is a risk) can easily lead to “the valorization of certain kinds of living over others.”25 The identification of “risk groups” deemed to be threatening to the social order—the unemployed, criminal, insane, poor, foreign—are a common technology for establishing boundaries between self and other, the normal and the pathological, that is, for securing that “formidable battery of distinctions” Said analyzes between “ours and theirs, proper and improper,” higher and lower, colonial and native, Western and Eastern.26 In a fascinating article on debates over native title in Australia, Eva Mackey demonstrates both the way in which political actors deploy a rhetoric of risk, danger, and threat and the uses of risk management to imperial hegemony. Not only have newspaper headlines “presented native title as an issue that has brought the nation to the brink of a dangerous abyss, to the point of destruction,” but the Howard government “constructs native title as a danger and risk to the ‘national interest,’ particularly a risk to competitiveness, opportunities, and progress. The entire anti-native title lobby have all stated . . . that the uncertainty over native title is dangerous for investment and economic competitiveness.”27 As Mackey points out, these notions of danger imply “a normative, non-endangered state,” and it is through ideas of the normal and deviant that institutional power is maintained.28 A related argument articulated by governmentality theorists is that modern societies normalize risk avoidance and pathologize risk taking, represent the former as rational and mature, the latter as irrational and childish— oppositions that, again, are familiar to any student of colonial discourse.29 These oppositions are buttressed by an elaborate apparatus of expert knowledge produced by disciplines such as engineering, statistics, actuarialism, psychology, epidemiology, and economics, which attempt to regulate risk through calculations of probability and which view the social body as “requiring intervention, management and protection so as to maximize wealth, welfare and productivity.”30 Knowledge produced about probability is then deployed as counsel to individuals about how to conduct their lives. As Lupton contends: “In late modern societies, not to engage in risk avoiding behavior is considered ‘a failure of the self to take care of itself—a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of skillfulness’ (Greco 1993). Risk-avoiding behavior, therefore, becomes viewed as a moral enterprise relating to issues of self-control, self-knowledge and self-improvement.”31 This is a characteristic of neoliberal societies that Pat O’Malley, Franc¸ois Ewald, and others refer to as the “new prudentialism.”32 To recognize that risk is a form of social control, and that risk taking is more necessary to certain classes than to others, is also to recognize that risk is not an objective entity or preexisting fact but is produced by specific cultural, political, and institutional contexts, as well as through competing knowledges. “To call something a risk,” argues Douglas, “is to recognize its importance to our subjectivity and wellbeing.” 33 Anthony Giddens, similarly, contends that “there is no risk which can be described without reference to a value.”34 In a frequently cited passage, Ewald writes, “Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event.”35 Indeed, this is precisely the unconscious of risk-management technologies, which assume both that risks are preexistent in nature and that individuals comport themselves in strict accordance with a “hedonic calculus.” 5 3 1 Also embedded within this insurantial unconscious is the fact that, as Fox puts it, “The welladvertised risk will turn out to be connected with legitimating moral principles.”36 If postcolonial studies, as I am arguing, should more rigorously interrogate risk-avoidance strategies (including those that repress or discipline the foreignness in language) on their political, class, and ideological investments, it should also recognize the degree to which risk management (no doubt among modernity’s most wildly optimistic formulations) indulges in a fantasy of mastery over uncertainty. In risk-management discourses, risk has taken on the technical meaning of a known or knowable probability estimate, contrasted with uncertainty, which designates conditions where probabilities are inestimable or unknown. This transformation of the unknown into a numerical figure, a quantification of nonknowledge that takes itself for knowledge, attempts to master whatever might be undesirable in the unknown (i.e., the future) by indemnifying it in advance—and thereby advertising its own failure. I believe it could be demonstrated, moreover, were we to trace the genealogy of this fantasy, that it coincides at crucial moments with the history of colonization. The notion of risk, first used in relation to maritime adventures, arises contemporaneously with modern imperialism, to describe the hazards of leaving home. With industrial modernity, and particularly the rise of the science of statistics in the nineteenth century, it took on themien of instrumental reason and the domination of nature, nuances that bear an unmistakable resemblance to the logics of concurrent colonial enterprises.37 This fantasy of mastery is also a suppression of possibility; in most instances, risk avoidance is an (implicit or explicit) maintenance of dominant values. Risk taking, by contrast, is the condition of possibility of possibility— that is, of change. It is perhaps no surprise that one’s political position is the strongest predictor of his/her attitude toward risk. Risk, as we have seen, is regularly formulated as that which threatens the dominant order (conceived on the level of a society, a colonial regime, or a global economic order). That threat, of course, is the “danger” of transformation, of reorganized social and ideological hierarchies, redistributed economic and cultural capital, renovated geopolitical relations—in short, precisely the kinds of transformation called for by much of postcolonial studies. Risk, including the risk of errors in meaning, may be necessary to any social change, that is, to engaging in the kind of oppositional criticism Said advocates: “Criticism must think of itself,” he writes, “as constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse.”38 The necessity of risk to change (and the craven conformism of risk avoidance) is a principle Friedrich Nietzsche elaborates in Beyond Good and Evil, where, critiquing the “timidity of morality,” he calls for a new species of philosophers, willing to risk untruth, uncertainty, even ignorance, thinkers willing to inhabit “the dangerous maybe.”39 Nietzsche was also prescient in recognizing that “howmuch or how little is dangerous to the community . . . now constitutes the moral perspective; here, too, fear is again themother ofmorals.”40 More recently, philosophers such as Derrida and John D. Caputo (explicitly taking up Nietzsche’s vocation) have argued that change, indeed social responsibility itself, inevitably demands a wager on uncertain possibilities (or, in Derridean terms, the “aporia”). “Let us not be blind,” writes Derrida, “to the aporia that all change must endure. It is the aporia of the perhaps, its historical and political aporia. Without the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible, without the radical abeyance and suspense marking a perhaps, there would never be either event or decision. . . . no decision (ethical, juridical, political) is possible without interrupting determination by engaging oneself in the perhaps.”41 On similar grounds, Caputo argues for “the suspension of the fine name of ethics in the name of obligation” and contends that “to speak of being against ethics and deconstructing ethics is to own up to the lack of safety by which judging is everywhere beset. . . . to admit that ‘obligation’ is not safe, that ethics cannot make it safe, that it is not nearly as safe as ethics would have us believe.”42

## \*\*\* 1NR

### CMR Advantage

#### No impact to heg

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

### Blowback Advantage

#### Terror threat has markedly declined—most recent study proves

**Bergen 12/3**/13 - CNN's national security analyst [Peter Bergen, “Hyping the terror threat?,” CNN, updated 2:16 PM EST, Tue December 3, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/03/opinion/bergen-u-s-terror-risk/]

Both Feinstein and Rogers are able public servants who, as the heads of the two U.S. intelligence oversight committees, are paid to worry about the collective safety of Americans, and they are two of the most prominent defenders of the NSA's controversial surveillance programs, which they defend as necessary for American security.

But is there any real reason to think that Americans are no safer than was the case a couple of years back? Not according to a study by the New America Foundation of every militant indicted in the United States who is affiliated with al Qaeda or with a like-minded group or is motivated by al Qaeda's ideology.

In fact, the total number of such indicted extremists has declined substantially from 33 in 2010 to nine in 2013. And the number of individuals indicted for plotting attacks within the United States, as opposed to being indicted for traveling to join a terrorist group overseas or for sending money to a foreign terrorist group, also declined from 12 in 2011 to only three in 2013.

Of course, a declining number of indictments doesn't mean that the militant threat has disappeared. One of the militants indicted in 2013 was Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is one of the brothers alleged to be responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings in April. But a sharply declining number of indictments does suggest that fewer and fewer militants are targeting the United States.

Recent attack plots in the United States also do not show signs of direction from foreign terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, but instead are conducted by individuals who are influenced by the ideology of violent jihad, usually because of what they read or watch on the Internet.

None of the 21 homegrown extremists known to have been involved in plots against the United States between 2011 and 2013 received training abroad from a terrorist organization -- the kind of training that can turn an angry, young man into a deadly, well-trained, angry, young man.

Of these extremists, only Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the alleged Boston bombers, is known to have had any contact with militants overseas, but it is unclear to what extent, if any, these contacts played in the Boston Marathon bombings.

In short, the data on al-Qaeda-linked or -influenced militants indicted in the United States suggests that the threat of terrorism has actually markedly declined over the past couple of years.

Where Feinstein and Rogers were on much firmer ground in their interview with Crowley was when they pointed to the resurgence of a number of al Qaeda groups in the Middle East.

Al Qaeda's affiliates in Syria control much of the north of the country and are the most effective forces fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

In neighboring Iraq, al Qaeda has enjoyed a renaissance of late, which partly accounts for the fact that the violence in Iraq today is as bad as it was in 2008.

The Syrian war is certainly a magnet for militants from across the Muslim world, including hundreds from Europe, and European governments are rightly concerned that returning veterans of the Syrian conflict could foment terrorism in Europe.

But, at least for the moment, these al Qaeda groups in Syria and Iraq are completely focused on overthrowing the Assad regime or attacking what they regard as the Shia-dominated government of Iraq. And, at least so far, these groups have shown no ability to attack in Europe, let alone in the United States.

#### Pakistani nukes are safe. They are conscious of the security threat and take appropriate safeguards.

**Siddiqi, 2010** (Shahid R., Axis of Logic Columnist, former Paki Air Force and former Bureau Chief – Pakistan & Gulf Economist, “Critical Analysis Are Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear Assets Threatened by Terrorists?” 2-22, http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article\_58619.shtml)

"This is all overblown rhetoric. Even if the country's leadership were to be incapacitated, Pakistan's protections are so strong that the arsenal could never slip from the hands of the country's National Command Authority”, General Kidwai told David Sangers of New York Times. Pakistan has successfully put its strategic weapons program under formalized institutional control and oversight. National Command Authority effectively controls, manages and monitors strategic organizations, prevents tangible and intangible transfers or leakage of sensitive technologies and material - measures in line with IAEA safeguards. An over 8000-men strong Security Division secures nuclear assets and materials and guards against malevolent activities. Supported by the strategic forces, it is fully capable of ensuring nuclear security of components even in transit. Prevention of theft of nuclear assets or fissile material Like other nuclear states, Pakistan also faces the security challenge of preventing Non-State Actors and terror groups from gaining access to nuclear assets. Its preventive measures are no less effective than those of others. Commenting on security of nuclear weapons, Congressional Research Service Report (RL-31589) on Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan; observes, “Fissile material components (pits) are thought to be kept separately from the rest of the warhead. Such a physical separation helps deter unauthorized use and complicates theft”. Pakistan is believed to have incorporated certain technical safety features into the weapon design which coupled with de-mated status of the weapons, wherein the warhead and the fissile core are stored in separate locations, discourages and denies seizure or theft of an intact nuclear device, guards against accidental or unauthorized launch and prevents diversion of fissile material in the form of weapon components. Pakistan’s nuclear controls also include the functional equivalent to the two-man rule and Permissive Action Links (PALs) that most nuclear states rely on to protect against loss of control, inadvertent weapons use, accidents, and other mishaps. Pakistan’s nuclear material or radioactive sources have remained safe from theft or pilferage nor has there been any attempt by terrorist elements to gain access to weapons or materials. Lamenting the Western attitude Peter Lavoy (National Intelligence for Analysis) states, “Since the 1998 tests, various pronouncements, publications in the Western press, and events in the region have eroded the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control, overshadowing the efforts that have been made since 1999 to harness a coherent command system to ensure management of its nuclear capabilities….” Guarav Kampani of Center for Nonproliferation Studies says, “Despite such speculative scenario building among policy and security analysts, there is little public evidence to suggest that the safety or the security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations or its nuclear command and control mechanism was ever in jeopardy from internal political instability or Islamists or terrorists forces inside Pakistan or nearby in Afghanistan, either during the American ‘War against Terrorism‘ in Afghanistan or during the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military standoff. In their analysis of threats from Islamic fundamentalism, Scott Parrish and William C. Potter of the WMD Commission opined, “……. while many states may view Islamic fundamentalism as a significant threat, there appears to be much less agreement on the nature of that threat and its relationship to nuclear terrorism or proliferation”.

#### Empirics prove no war.

Miller 1—Morris Miller is an adjunct economics professor at the University of Ottawa [Jan.-Mar, 2001, “Poverty: A Cause of War?” *Peace Magazine*, http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v17n1p08.htm]

Economic Crises?

Some scholars have argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as an economic crisis. However, a study by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik shows that this hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin American and Asia since World War II, they concluded that much of the conventional thinking about the political impact of economic crisis is wrong:

"The severity of economic crisis—as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth—bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... or (in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."