## \*\*\* 1AC

### Contention one is *Victory*

#### The United States thinks quite highly of itself. We think we are a city on a hill, that we are invulnerable, that there’s no fight we can lose. The world is a lump of iron and we are a hammer. Justice, goodness, and freedom are not ideals, they are our *possessions*.

#### At least, that’s what we tell ourselves. In reality, this exceptional belief in our righteousness, omnipotence, and invulnerability is a psychological fiction, akin to an outfit we like to wear because it makes us feel like the most popular kid in school. We feel an obligation to eliminate anything that threatens this psychological fiction, lest our nightmares come true and we end up naked to the world.

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It is almost un-American to be vulnerable. As a people, we pride ourselves on being able to stand up to anything, solve all problems. We have long had a national self-image that involves an ability to call forth reservoirs or strength when we need it, and a sense of a protected existence peculiar to America in an otherwise precarious world. In recent times we managed, after all, to weather the most brutal century in human history relatively unscathed. THE BLESSED COUNTRY Our attitude stems partly from geography. We have always claimed a glorious aloneness thanks to what has been called the “Free security” of the two great oceans which separate us from dangerous upheavals in Europe and Asia. While George Washington was not the isolationist he is sometimes represented to be, he insisted on his celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, “’Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.” That image has been embraced, and often simplified or distorted, by politicians ever since. (He warned against permanent alliances, not alliances in general).

The idea of our separateness and safety from faraway conflicts has had importance from the time of the early settlers, many of whom left Europe to escape political religious, or legal threats or entanglements. Even if one came as an adventurer or an empire-builder, one was leaving a continent of complexity and conflict for a land whose remoteness could support new beginnings. Abraham Lincoln absolutized that remoteness and security from outside attack in order to stress that our only danger came from ourselves: “All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Buonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years.” However much the world has shrunk technologically in the last half century, and however far-ranging our own superpower forays, that sense of geographic invulnerability has never left us. We have seen ourselves as not only separate from but different from the rest of the world, a special nation among nations. That sense of American exceptionalism was intensely observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, the brilliant French politician and writer, in the early nineteenth century. In de Tocqueville’s view of America, “A course almost without limits, a field without horizon, is revealed: the human spirit rushes forward and traverses [it] in every direction.” American exceptionalism has always been, as the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out, “a double-edged sword.” In the psychological life of Americans it has been bound up with feelings of unique virtue, strength, and success. But this has sometimes led Americans to be “utopian moralists, who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.” That subjective exceptionalism has been vividly expressed in the historian Richard Hofstadter’s observation, “It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.” At the time of the Puritans, sentiments of exceptionalism were expressed in biblical terms: America was an “Arcadian image of the New World … an Eden from which the serpent and forbidden trees had been thoroughly excluded,” and “a new Promised Land and a New Jerusalem.” The language was that of a postapocalyptic utopia, and remnants of such sentiments persist whenever we speak of ourselves in more secular terms as the “new world.” Important to this feeling of exceptionalism has been a deep sense that America offered unparalleled access to regenerative power. As Richard Slotkin explains: “The first colonists saw in America an opportunity to regenerate [end page 127] their fortunes, their spirits, and the power of their church and nation,” though “the means to that regeneration ultimately became the means of violence.” Even when Americans played what has been called a “shell game of identity,” they could experience an unlimited capacity for renewal—endless new beginnings as individuals or as a nation. Slotkin speaks of a new relationship to authority in this new world. While “in Europe all men were under authority; in America all men dreamed they had the power to become authority.” These claims of new authority extended to the country as a whole, to America’s authority among nations—a claim to new national authority that was expanded over time thanks to America’s considerable achievements—economic, technological, scientific, and cultural. American exceptionalism has often had the overall psychological quality of a sense of ourselves as a blessed people, immune from the defeats and sufferings of others. But underneath that sense there had to be a potential chink in our psychological armor—which was a deep-seated if hidden sense of vulnerability. OMNIPOTENCE AND VULNERABILITY Ironically, superpower syndrome projects the problem of American vulnerability onto the world stage. A superpower is perceived as possessing more than natural power. [end page 128] (In this sense it comes closer to resembling the comic-strip hero Superman than the Nietzschean Superman.) For a nation, its leaders, or even its ordinary citizens to enter into the superpower syndrome is to lay claim to omnipotence, to power that is unlimited, which is ultimately power over death. At the heart of the superpower syndrome then is the need to eliminate a vulnerability that, as the antithesis of omnipotence, contains the basic contradiction of the syndrome. For vulnerability can never be eliminated, either by a nation or an individual. In seeking its elimination, the superpower finds itself on a psychological treadmill. The idea of vulnerability is intolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. One solution is to maintain an illusion of invulnerability. But the superpower then runs the danger of taking increasingly draconian actions to sustain that illusion. For to do otherwise would be to surrender the cherished status of superpower. Other nations have experiences in the world that render them and their citizens all too aware of the essential vulnerability of life on earth. They also may be influenced by religious and cultural traditions (far weaker in the United States) that emphasize vulnerability as an aspect of human mortality. No such reality can be accepted by those clinging to a sense of omnipotence. At issue is the experience of death anxiety, which is the strongest manifestation of vulnerability. Such a deep-seated [end page 129] sense of vulnerability can sometimes be acknowledged by the ordinary citizens of a superpower, or even at times by its leaders, who may admit, for instance, that there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. But those leaders nonetheless remain committed to eliminating precisely that vulnerability—committed, that is, to the illusory goal of invulnerability. When that goal is repeatedly undermined—whether by large-scale terrorist acts like 9/11, or as at present by militant resistance to American hegemony in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East—both the superpower and the world it acts upon may become dangerously destabilized.

#### Why do we hold such an egotistical self image? We, as citizens, have lost a war over our *consciences*.

#### The power of the presidency is a big part of the reason why. The presidency exists to seduce us into thoughtless compliance. I value security and freedom, so how can I possibly disagree with Bush? I hope for things, and there are things I want changed, so how could I possibly disagree with Obama? The president is like a fortune teller—it tells us vague platitudes we want to hear so we trust it absolutely. As a result, we close off our conscience and consent to an imperial “war on terror”

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From Bush to Obama, the war on terror is principally a war over conscience. The aim of the security regime is to justify itself not only through the ownership of bare life, but in laying claim to the life of conscience as well. Its purpose is to continue the century-old devolution to the messianic presidency through the permeation and colonization of conscience. Its agenda, on the strength of the values it presents as liberal and democratic, is to make conscience the ground of the presidency — to mollify, conscript, subdue and seduce the operation of conscience in sovereign power’s construction of democratic citizenship. The biopolitical project of the war on terror is to produce, and lay claim to, what Agamben calls “forms of life” of which there are two: politically qualified life, the life of the choice-making citizen, and bare life, the naked fact of our biological existence. I argue that the war on terror produces these forms of life through two integrated means. Vivification is the process of animating public deliberation or doing the work of conscience for us in an effigy of democratic communication. It provides a more satisfactory account of the subjective impact of sovereign power as violence than theories of total biopolitical oppression (e.g. Edkins and Pin-Fat) because it acknowledges, with Iris Marion Young, that this power elicits adoration and gratitude. (Young, 2003) Vivisection is the extraction of the truth that makes us secure through rendition, torture and structurally reinforced racism, from the matter of the human body reduced to bare life. The powers of vivification and vivisection mark the rise of the messianic presidency, its biopolitical function as the source of citizenship and arrogator of conscience. They allow a more precise definition of the violence of sovereign power that reduces all of us to homines sacri or bare life. At the same time, it is essential to recognize that these powers have a disparate impact on human personality, through the construction of a taxonomy of citizens and human existents according to their race, gender, religion and social condition. The violence of sovereign power is by no means equal. An ethic of democratic communication would speak to this contest over conscience, mapping it out as the terrain upon which the troubled story of citizenship unfolds and bare human life finds a new political voice.

Barak Obama’s presidency—like good philosophy—raises more questions than it settles about democratic political culture in pluralistic societies. The central problem liberal political philosophy attempts to decide is how to sustain a culture of democratic communication, allowing us equally to share in self-governance as citizens even as we bear disparate, fundamentally irreconcilable views about the big questions of human existence. Will Kymlicka summarizes this project as seeking “equality between groups, and freedom within groups”; the sequestering of deep personal beliefs is essential if we are to allow maximal equality and freedom. (Kymlicka, 2007: 255) The rise to power of this son of a Kenyan scholar, it would seem, affirms the wisdom of a polity designed to relegate existential questions, questions about the good, to the small circles of our private lives whilst structuring the democratic playing field to address the basic, non-metaphysical issue of fairness. More astonishing still, this drama played out against the war on terror’s 198 reassertion of race categories. (Ahmad, 2004) Standing in the light of Obama’s victory, it is tempting to see the theocratic ambition of the Bush White House—its retrograde imposition of faith based standards in domestic policy and on the global stage, branding the war on terror a crusade to rid the world of evil—as an anti-liberal atavism that died with a stake through its heart in the election of 2008. Obama’s triumph was the triumph of political liberalism and its project of creating a neutral framework of democratic communication, a public square emancipated from the stubborn intimacy of race, religion, gender and so on. Political liberalism allows anyone—any domestically born U.S. citizen—to be president. Obama won because he was constitutionally emancipated to fashion for himself answers to the big questions, while excelling in the political capacity to keep his metaphysics to himself and thus prove his worth for the leadership of the world’s leading pluralist democracy: the bi-racially telegenic, cool and neutral decider. The prize is a presidency the framers of the republic would not have recognized as republican—not simply in the scale of the nation’s martial, social and economic resources, but that the president should have these at what amounts to an imperial command.

My sense is that Obama’s success, like the core function of the presidency itself, has nothing to do with anything like a liberal restraint concerning the big questions of human existence but is, instead, a most illiberal and muscular intrusion into these matters. Instead of carving out a zone of exclusion for the private operation of conscience, the function of the presidency in contemporary U.S. political culture is to elicit the conformity of conscience with powerful, charismatic affirmations of the nature and purpose of human life. Clearly, the core of Obama’s ongoing resonance with voters and aliens alike—why we 199 want to adore him—has nothing to do with his bracketing out his beliefs about the big questions, the facts of his race and his religion, his worldview; he built political power in large measure through his acumen in actively presenting these features of his personality. Furthermore, these features were not parsed through the rarefied Cartesian space of a public square, they were embroiled in the maelstrom of detraction, calumny and desperate stargazing that is political discourse in the United States. Judging by his biography, the capacity to foreground his beliefs and make them publicly resonant is not something Obama purchased with his campaign contributions. It is a capacity that is integral to his political personality. None of this was novel or revolutionary in any way because U.S. electoral politics demands that candidates make bold claims about the big questions as defined in the political culture of the United States. Politics, in this sense, remains very much about the power to produce doctrine. The situation persists not as an aberration from the norms of political liberalism, but because of them.

#### The result of this consent to an imperial presidency is that we defer decisions about the life and death of whole populations to sovereign power—the doctrines the sovereign sells us are policed by imperial violence.

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Far from living in a post-metaphysical era, I believe Connolly is correct in his assertion that every “political interpretation projects presumptions about the primordial character of things”. (Connolly, 1993: 1) There is, therefore, a caesaropapist effect in the liberal narrative of public neutrality; it provides plausible cover for the construction of dominant, history-ending definitions about what it means to be human. Instead of building a political culture beyond metaphysics—the purely procedural and inclusive political culture, democratic in the equal freedoms it accords for our private fulfilment in seeking the good individually—this narrative allows sovereign power to enforce its edict about the nature and purpose of human life. The post-metaphysics feint allows a political culture to develop 200 and enforce the limits of the political community, setting the bounds between the citizen and the alien, and the community of life itself, setting the bounds between human and subhuman, the quick, the dead and the expendable. It is the means by which sovereign power bifurcates human existence, producing on the one hand politically qualified life—the citizen made in its own image—and, on the other, bare life, the human organism. Political liberalism’s restraint about the big questions, its concern to create maximal space for our individual, creative self-fashioning, is part of its edict about the “primordial character of things”. Instead of standing against republicanism, political liberalism works symbiotically with the republican project of defining the national character, the way of life, of a democratic people. Together they confer freedom and equality on the terms of sovereign power, not on the terms of conscience. They set the bounds of democratic communication, and remove from the function of citizenship public deliberation about existential questions. There is no return through political liberalism to classical politics, the sharing in self-governance of a democratic people through the scrupulous separation of public and private life, of political life and organic life. Instead, citizenship becomes the constructed acceptance of a synthetic freedom and equality, synthetic because freedom and equality under sovereign power are not the fruit of the operation of conscience; they are, instead, the doctrines of the state policed by violence. Citizenship becomes sovereign power’s imposition of a doctrinal closure on the debate about what it means to be human, because the definition of who is a citizen carries with it the power to define who is and who is not human. This places citizenship at odds against conscience and its principal function of continually discerning the meaning and purpose of human existence; sovereign power 201 might simulate conscience, but it cannot replace the restless human work in conscience of examination and deconstruction.

I will argue below that the persistence of this unexamined, dominant metaphysics allows the continuing ascendance of the security regime. Further, the political effect of this metaphysics is to consolidate power in the messianic presidency. A great deal of authoritative work has been done to map the contours of, and at times laud, the “imperial presidency”, with reference to the global reach of the executive branch in the United States. (Schlesinger, 1989) In the words of Michael Ignatieff, “Yet what word but ‘empire’ describes the awesome thing that America is becoming?” (Ignatieff, 2005) My concern is the biopolitical dimension this office now assumes; I believe the claim it makes to validate human life as such, to “touch the soul” of the citizen, to be the agent of a divine plan in the unfolding of human history suggest a presidency that is not simply imperial in its self-understanding but messianic. I will suggest that a biopolitical reading of the war on terror gains ground in deconstructing the covert ontology of what passes for democratic political culture, moving the analysis from ideology and discipline to the messianic powers of vivification and vivisection. Ostensible neutrality “about the primordial character of things” is the shell within which the messianic presidency quickens, rising to primacy over constitutional governance in the United States. The Obama White House does not represent a break with this phenomenon; it does not return the Office of the President to the proportions the framers of the republic entrenched constitutionally. Instead, through its reinvigorated prosecution of the war on terror, the Obama White House represents the next phase in the maturation of the messianic presidency.202

#### This leads to an apocalyptic violence, insistent on defending the nation at all costs—that makes annihilation possible

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The apocalyptic imagination has spawned a new kind of violence at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We can, in fact, speak of a worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal. In particular, we are experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off between Islamist\* forces, overtly visionary in their willingness to kill and die for their religion, and American forces claiming to be restrained and reasonable but no less visionary in their projection of a cleansing war-making and military power. Both sides are [end page 1] energized by versions of intense idealism; both see themselves as embarked on a mission of combating evil in order to redeem and renew the world; and both are ready to release untold levels of violence to achieve that purpose. The war on Iraq—a country with longstanding aspirations toward weapons of mass destruction but with no evident stockpiles of them and no apparent connection to the assaults of September 11—was a manifestation of that American visionary projection. The religious fanaticism of Osama bin Laden and other Islamist zealots has, by now, a certain familiarity to us as to others elsewhere, for their violent demands for spiritual purification are aimed as much at fellow Islamics as at American “infidels.” Their fierce attacks on the defilement that they believe they see everywhere in contemporary life resemble those of past movements and sects from all parts of the world; such sects, with end-of-the-world prophecies and devout violence in the service of bringing those prophecies about, flourished in Europe from the eleventh through the sixteenth century. Similar sects like the fanatical Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas into the Tokyo subways in 1995, have existed—even proliferated—in our own time. The American apocalyptic entity is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up with what I’ve come to think of [end page 2] as “superpower syndrome.” By that term I mean a national mindset—put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership group—that takes on a sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. More than merely dominate, the American superpower now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of entitlement, of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems partly from historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological power translated into military terms. That is, a superpower—the world’s only superpower—is entitled to dominate and control precisely because it is a superpower. The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, at the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpower’s victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore, or even [end page 3] extend, the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity. Throughout the decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both lived with a godlike nuclear capacity to obliterate the cosmos, along with a fear of being annihilated by the enemy power. Now America alone possesses that world-destroying capacity, and post-Soviet Russia no longer looms as a nuclear or superpower adversary. We have yet to grasp the full impact of this exclusive capacity to blow up anyone or everything, but its reverberations are never absent in any part of the world. The confrontation between Islamist and American versions of planetary excess has unfortunately tended to define a world in which the vast majority of people embrace neither. But apocalyptic excess needs no majority to dominate a landscape. All the more so when, in their mutual zealotry, Islamist and American leaders seem to act in concert. That is, each, in its excess, nurtures the apocalypticism of the other, resulting in a malignant synergy. \* In keeping with general usage, Islamist refers to groups that are essentially theocratic and fundamentalist, and at times apocalyptic. Islamic is a more general ethnic as well as religious term for Muslims. The terms can of course overlap, and “Islamic state” can mean one run on Islamist principles.

### Plan(s)

#### The United States Congress should surrender the global war on terror by restricting the President’s authority to introduce armed forces into hostilities.

### Contention two is *Surrender*

#### The act of surrendering is a radical one—it opens us to vulnerability, ambiguity, and acceptance of the world as it is. It gives up on the dream of invulnerability, and helps to shatter falsely held illusions about our place in the world.

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Stepping out of that syndrome would also include surrendering the claim of certainty, of ownership of truth and reality. That ownership gives rise to deadly righteousness, with a claim to illumination so absolute as to transcend ordinary restraints against mass violence. The healthier alternative is an acceptance of some measure of ambiguity, of inevitable elements of confusion and contradiction, [end page 196] whether in relation to large historical events or in matters of personal experience. This would include a more nuanced approach to Islam and Islamist thought and behavior that allows for the possibility of evolution and change. It is often claimed that no such acceptance of ambiguity is possible because superpowers, like nations, like people, are uncomfortable with it, that the tendency is always to seek clarity and something close to certainty. But this assumption may well underestimate our psychological capabilities. Ambiguity, in fact, is central to human function, recognized and provided for by cultural institutions and practices everywhere. American society in particular has cultivated the kinds of ambiguity that go with multiplicity and with shifting populations and frontiers. I have tried in my past work to formulate a version of the self as many-sided, flexible, and capable of change and transformation. This protean self (named after Proteus, the Greek sea god who was capable of taking on many shapes) stands in direct contrast to the fundamentalist or apocalyptic self. Indeed, the closed fundamentalist self and its apocalyptic impulses can be understood as a reaction to protean tendencies, which are widely abroad in our world as a response to the complexities of recent history. Any contemporary claim to absolute certainty, then, is compensatory, an artificial plunge into totalism that seeks an escape from the ambiguity that so pervades our historical legacy. American society is more volatile on these matters than [end page 197] many suspect. Over the previous century and at the beginning of a new one, we have been undergoing waves of contending forms of populism—pendulum swings between totalistic impulses and more open, if less clearly formulated, protean principles. How this psychohistorical struggle will develop we have no way of knowing, but we need hardly give up on ambiguity, or on our capacity to combine it with strongly held ethical principles. There is a real sense in which elements of ambiguity are necessary to our well-being. They certainly are necessary to the well-being of our nation, and of the world. To live with ambiguity is to accept vulnerability. American aspirations toward superpower invulnerability have troubling parallels in Islamist visions of godly power. Surrendering the dream of invulnerability, more enlightened American leaders could begin to come to terms with the idea that there will always be some danger in our world, that reasonable and measured steps can be taken to limit that danger and combat threats of violence, but that invulnerability is itself a perilous illusion. To cast off that illusion would mean removing the psychological pressure of sustaining a falsified vision of the world, as opposed to taking a genuine place in the real one. Much of this has to do with accepting the fact that we die, a fact not altered by either superpower militarism or religious fanaticism. A great part of apocalyptic violence is in the service of a vast claim of immortality, a claim that [end page 198] can, in the end, often be sustained only by victimizing large numbers of people. Zealots come to depend upon their mystical, spiritual, or military vision to protect themselves from death, and to provide immortality through killing.

#### And, Surrender leads to an embrace of change and a willingness to think differently. It changes our psyche. The psychic wound and shock people will feel is an opportunity for growth. A voluntary act of authentic surrender is key.

Moze, Ph.D in Personal Development, 7—Mary Beth, Ph.D. in Personal Development and Transformation [“Surrender: An Alchemical Act in Personal Transformation,” *Journal of Conscious Evolution*, http://www.cejournal.org/GRD/Surrender.pdf]

Surrender and the Ego

Surrender provides a willing path toward greater understandings. Surrender allows for flexibility and movement in relation to a polarized Other and is a voluntary choice to not resist. Such a choice is as much a part of ego development as choosing to resist (LaMothe, 2005). The wise use of our will can get us to the edge of the Ego and beyond; we can will ourselves into the act of surrender that carries us into the flow of possibilities and growth (Hart, 2000).

We think we live by virtues and influences that we can control, but we are governed by more than ourselves (Hawkins, 2002). World religion s teach that the Ego interferes with detection of truth and cannot engage the bigger, systemic view of things (Leary, 2004) central to personal development is the management of the Ego and surrendering to a more universal identity (Hidas, 1981). In lieu of more culturally sanctioned spiritual practices in the West, our need for universal identity and spiritual sustenanc e comes by way of therapy (Some’, 1999), but Western therapy focuses heavily on ego strengthenin g and can inadvertently build up the Ego’s narcissistic muscles.

Recovery from any dysfunction as well as growth fr om places of normality is dependent on the willingness to explore new ways of looking a t things: to endure inner fears when belief systems are shaken (Hawkins, 2002). By quieting the Ego, we can soften its rigid influence and help to strengthen the health of the ego and assist the act of surrender (Hidas, 1981; Leary, 2004). It is an act of ego strength void of Ego fix ation (Hart, 2000). Surrender is the exercise of moral muscles. In surrender, the Ego may feel like it is dying, but the ego is sustained. In the initial efforts to exercise moral muscles, the Ego will feel torn, but it is through that wound – a sacred wound - that new ways of understanding arrive (Branscomb, 1991).

We are complex systems. Systems are made up of systems and exist within ever larger systems within which paradox is characteristic and can be understood (Laszlo, 1996; Morin, 1999; Rowland, 1999). As long as the Ego functions with its narrow view, the paradox of human behavior can not be sufficiently contextualized and it causes frustration. Curiously enough, motives to embrace change arise when the mind is challenged and puzzles are perceived (Baumeister & Vohs, 2002; Hawkins, 2002), and paradoxes are puzzles. The very fears and obstacles that we perceive and resist ironically point us in the very direction of our own growth and serve as portals for surrender (Hart, 2000). Each surrender exposes us to a part of the larger systems within which we function. Through surrender , the Ego can grasp paradox and greater truths.

It is beneath the fears of the narrow Egoic system where one finds the curiosity and courage that is willing to risk and accept what unfolds, driven by a desire to connect (Grant, 1996). Surrender releases the perceived control to which the Ego clings and simultaneously releases of the burden of being in control (Branscomb, 1991). Surrender eases the burden and grip of Egoic boundary control, relaxing narcissistic muscles in order to also flex and build the unintentionally neglected moral muscles.

#### And, Surrender is different than submission, compliance, or resignation. Surrender yields unconditionally, unworried about preferences or expectations. Only this authentic letting go is an act that create immediate, authentic, and lasting personal change.

Moze 7—Mary Beth, Ph.D. in Personal Development and Transformation [“Surrender: An Alchemical Act in Personal Transformation,” *Journal of Conscious Evolution*, http://www.cejournal.org/GRD/Surrender.pdf]

Before pursuing a definition of what surrender is, it is helpful to benchmark what it is not. Some terms are used synonymously with surrender but have subtle shifts in meaning that differ significantly from the healthy version of surrender that grounds this article. Those terms include submission, resignation, and compliance.

Submission entails a role of domination by one over another and is a perversion of surrender (LaMothe, 2005). It is an individual’s conscious acceptance of reality but tainted with an unconscious unacceptance that harbors the desire for eventual revenge (Tiebout, 1949). Submission sustains the tension between self and Other and houses distrust and a sense of betrayal (LaMothe, 2005; Tiebout, 1949). It is ofte n a defense against hopelessness and the fear  of the annihilation of one’s sense of identity (LaM othe, 2005). It resembles surrender in its longing to know and be known, but cheats the process by sustaining a role of bondage and a sense of futility (Ghent, 1990).

Resignation holds an element of judgment (Tolle, 1 999) which is contrary to the unconditional nature of healthy surrender. Resignation moves one into accordance with another, but not based on shared beliefs nor trust and often as a result of exhausted failed efforts to negotiate a mutually satisfying interpersonal relat ionship. It often accompanies the role of submission (Ghent, 1990). Both submission and resignation have a resistant quality about them which maintains an Egoic position, not a state of surrender. To a certain degree, there is a sense of longevity to the roles of submission and resigna tion.

In comparison, compliance has a temporariness abou t it. Like resignation, it entails a going along with attitude while not necessarily approving of that t o which one resigns. However, compliance is more about saying yes in the moment more for the sake of convenience than for the sake of acceptance. Compliance contributes to a sense of guilt, inferiority, and shame for not standing up for oneself and it also deceives all of those involved with the circumstance (Tiebout, 1953).

The more inviting definition of surrender appeals to its resilient nature, not its resistant nature. Resistance operates against growth or chang e and seeks to maintain the familiar, while surrender and resilience operate toward growth (Ghe nt, 1990). Rather than an Egotistical defeat, healthy surrender is a compassionate giving over that rests on trust (LaMothe, 2005). Such surrender involves commitment, openness, soulful mo tivation, and vibrancy.

Total surrender unconditionally yields to what is (Tolle, 1999) rather than to what one prefers or expects. It is a wholehearted acceptance of one’s perception of reality and unreservedly yields to more than the Ego (Cohen, 20 04; Jones, 1994; Tiebout, 1953). Judgments are suspended. One is involved in a code of integrity and unity with Other, and admits to not knowing the full meaning of an encounter, especially in the moment it occurs (Parlee, 1993; Wolff, 1974). This allows for openness of experience and fully embraces the unknown (May, 2004).

Surrender is liberation, expansion of self, and the letting down of defensive barriers (Ghent, 1990). It is something that takes place within one’s self and contingent only upon one’s willingness to let down the barriers that one alone puts up: to give up resistances, defenses, and self-preconceptions in service of healing, acceptance, and seeking to know Other (Branscomb, 1993; Jones, 1994; Tiebout, 1949). Surrender is an existential reality that does not objectify self or Other and rather identifies with limitlessness ( May, 1982). Surrender need not be permanent; it can be a temporary relinquishment of control and suspension of beliefs (Hart, 2000). It leaves intellectual knowledge in tact while releasing one to inquire further about truths (Rutledge, 2004) without an agenda for expected outcomes (Wolff, 197 4). It involves curiosity that is attracted to meaning, not oddity.

Surrender is a particular way of functioning, motivated by the longing for growth and connectedness (Ghent, 1990). It is soulful. Such willingness rests on and is motivated by trust, faith, hope, and heart based desires for meaning; it appeals to that which dignifies and ennobles (Hawkins, 2002). Surrender is an act of faith and a statement of hope based on trust (Hart, 2000). Surrender of this nature reacquaints us with our humanness and innocence, not our individuality, and enables us to see the good in Other and in the world (Branscomb, 1993; Wolff, 1974). It nourishes the needs of the soul and gently releases the wants of the Ego (Zukav, 1990).

An act of surrender is inevitably followed by a state of surrender (Tiebout, 1949), free of time and space (Hart, 2000). Surprisingly, surrender is vibrant, not passive. It is an intimate state of involvement (May, 1982) in which one actively constructs an experience while choosing to give in – to lean in toward – another (LaMothe, 200 5). There is a dynamic flow of emergence and waning that actualizes the potential for enhanc ed meaning and communion with Other (LaMothe, 2005). One does not passively tolerate a situation nor cease personal action; instead, there is an awareness and reciprocity of responsive ness that is improvisational and uncontrolling (Rutledge, 2004; Tolle, 1999). To improvise is to be intuitively creative; it is a universal capacity!

I do not posit a linear relationship between trust, commitment, openness, soulful motivation, and vibrancy. The literature does not suggest anything in this regard. What is noteworthy is the simultaneous simplicity and compl exity of a resilient act of surrender. It is alchemical. It is not an act that simply initiates a natural progression of potential change; it is an innately complex function that transmutes one way of being into another.

I hesitate to offer a definition of surrender, fea ring that it will be concretized. Surrender has a wholesomeness that is elusive and not easily definable. For the sake of grounding the remaining contents of this article, I offer the following definition as support, not absolute. Surrender is a trusting act to which one fully commits and lets go of absolute perceived control and personal defenses in order to step into a limitless unknown and actively engage Other, allowing for the potential discovery of greater truths while being unattached to any expected outcomes. Even more simply stated, surrender is a faithful gesture toward knowing Other and being known.

#### And, by promoting this sort of reflection and thought through the act of surrender, we solve a shift in citizen opinions on the war on terror—the aff is the sort of painful self-examination that creates change

Grieder, bestselling author, 4 [William Greider, a prominent political journalist and author, has been a reporter for more than 35 years for newspapers, magazines and television.. He is the author of the national bestsellers One World, Ready or Not, Secrets of the Temple and Who Will Tell The People. In the award-winning Secrets of the Temple, he offered a critique of the Federal Reserve system. Greider has also served as a correspondent for six Frontline documentaries on PBS, including "Return to Beirut," which won an Emmy in 1985. “Under the Banner of the ‘War’ on Terror” http://samizdat.cc/shelf/documents/2004/06.07-greider/greider.pdf]

An important question remains for Americans to ponder: Why have most people submitted so willingly to a new political order organized around fear? Other nations have confronted terrorism of a more sustained nature without coming thoroughly un- hinged. I remember living in London briefly in the 1970s s, when IRA bombings were a frequent occurrence. Daily life continued with stiff -upper-lip reserve (police searched ladies’ handbags at restaurants, but did not pat down the gentlemen). We can only spec- ulate on answers. Was it the uniquely horrific quality of the 9/11 attacks? Or the fact that, unlike Europe, the continental United States has never been bombed? For mod- ern Americans, war’s destruction is a foreign experience, though the United States has participated in many conflicts on foreign soil. Despite the patriotic breast-beating, are we closet wimps? America’s exaggerated expressions of fear may look to others like a surprising revelation of weakness.

My own suspicion is that many Americans have enjoyed Bush’s “terror war” more than they wish to admit. Feeling scared can be oddly pleasurable, like participating in a real-life action thriller, when one is allied in imagined combat with a united country of brave patriots. The plot line is simple—good guys against satanic forces—and pushes aside doubts and ambiguities, like why exactly these people are out to get us. Does our own behavior in the world have anything to do with it? No, they resent us because we are so virtuous—kind, free, wealthy, democratic. The contest, as framed by Bush, invites Americans to indulge in a luxurious sense of self-pity—poor, powerful America, so innocent and yet so misunderstood. America’s exaggerated fear of unknown “others” is perhaps an unconscious inversion of its exaggerated claims of power.

The only way out of this fog of pretension is painful self-examination by Americans— cutting our fears down to more plausible terms and facing the complicated realities of our role in the world. The spirited opposition that arose to Bush’s war in Iraq is a good starting place, because citizens raised real questions that were brushed aside. I don’t think most Americans are interested in imperial rule, but they were grossly misled by patriotic rhetoric. Now is the time for sober, serious teach-ins that lay out the real history of power in the world, and that also explain the positive and progressive future that is possible. Once citizens have constructed a clear-eyed, dissenting version of our situation, perhaps politicians can also be liberated from exaggerated fear. The self-imposed destruction that has flowed from Bush’s logic cannot be stopped until a new cast of leaders steps forward to guide the country. This transformation begins by changing Presidents.

#### And, the affirmative represents a psychological shift—yes, we think congress should actually surrender the war on terror, but, more importantly, it’s a useful thought experiment for any American.

#### What does it mean that we were wrong about fighting terrorists? What does it mean that we couldn’t win? This change on the psychological and personal level allows us to reclaim our moral compass, resist the fantasy of total control, and change the way future and current leaders deal with feelings of vulnerability

Lifton 3 [Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003 (Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunder’s Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 188-192)]

We can do better. America is capable of wiser, more measured approaches, more humane applications of our considerable power and influence in the world. These may not be as far away as they now seem, and can be made closer by bringing our imaginations to bear on them. Change must be political, of course, but certain psychological contours seem necessary to it. As a start, we do not have to collude in partitioning the world into two contending apocalyptic forces. We are capable instead of reclaiming our moral compass, of finding further balance in our national behavior. So intensely have we embraced superpower syndrome that emerging from it is not an easy task. Yet in doing so we would relieve ourselves of a burden of our own creation—the psychic burden of insistent illusion. For there is no [end page 189] greater weight than that one takes on when pursuing total power. We need to draw a new and different lesson from Lord Acton's nineteenth-century assertion: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Acton was not quite right. The corruption begins not with the acquisition of power but with the quest for and claim to absolute power. Ever susceptible to the seductive promise that twenty-first-century technology can achieve world control, the superpower can best resist that temptation by recognizing the corruption connected with that illusion. STEPPING OFF THE TREADMILL To renounce the claim to total power would bring relief not only to everyone else, but, soon enough, to citizens of the superpower itself. For to live out superpower syndrome is to place oneself on a treadmill that eventually has to break down. In its efforts to rule the world and to determine history, the United States is, in actuality, working against itself, subjecting itself to constant failure. It becomes a Sisyphus with bombs, able to set off explosions but unable to cope with its own burden, unable to roll its heavy stone to the top of the hill in Hades. Perhaps the crucial step in ridding ourselves of superpower syndrome is recognizing that history cannot be controlled, fluidly or otherwise. Stepping off the superpower treadmill would also enable us to cease being a nation ruled by fear. [end page 190] Renouncing omnipotence might make our leaders—or at least future leaders—themselves less fearful of weakness, and diminish their inclination to instill fear in their people as a means of enlisting them for military efforts at illusory world hegemony. Without the need for invulnerability, everyone would have much less to be afraid of. What we call the historical process is largely unpredictable, never completely manageable. All the more so at a time of radical questioning of the phenomenon of nationalism and its nineteenth- and twentieth-century excesses. In addition, there has been a general decline in confidence in the nation state, and in its ability to protect its people from larger world problems such as global warming or weapons of mass destruction. The quick but dangerous substitute is the superpower, which seeks to fill the void with a globalized, militarized extension of American nationalism. The traditional nation state, whatever its shortcomings, could at least claim to be grounded in a specific geographic area and a particular people or combination of peoples. The superpower claims to "represent" everyone on earth, but it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of those it seeks to dominate, while its leaders must struggle to mask or suppress their own doubts about any such legitimacy. The American superpower is an artificial construct, widely perceived as illegitimate, whatever the acquiescence it coerces in others. Its reign is therefore inherently unstable. Indeed, its reach for full-scale world domination [end page 191] marks the beginning of its decline. A large task for the world, and for Americans in particular, is the early recognition and humane management of that decline.

#### Rather than singlehanded solving everything in one shot, surrender sets off an avalanche of conversation and questioning that activates our conscience. Only this process can engage both formal legal discourse and social movements—conscience is the one kernel of humanity that exists in every context, it is the lynchpin of solvency

Markwick 10—Michael Markwick, Lecturer at Simon Fraser University, Ph.D candidate in philosophy at Simon Fraser University [Spring 2010, “Terror and Democratic Communication,” Ph.D Dissertation, http://summit.sfu.ca/item/9989]

At the same time, the messianic presidency as sovereign power is the product of continual negotiation, and its powers of vivification and vivisection do not—indeed cannot— extirpate the operation of conscience. Against the facts of the war on terror, I argue for the role of conscience in democratic communication, across the full range of cultural expression, from formal political and jurisprudential discourse to movements of social change and popular culture. Democratic communication persists even in the midst of bare life as the site of the public operation of conscience, of knowing together. It is the assertion of conscience against sovereign power, not through grand narratives or defiant, beautiful acts of hopelessness but through our agonistic and reflexive encounters in a plurality of worldviews. The point, therefore, of Kymlicka’s “equality between groups, and freedom within groups” is not to isolate conscience as an insular entity, but rather to allow us to meet each other and contend with each other over the big questions about human existence, to get to the truth and to order our affairs to suit our best understanding about these questions. The project of democratic communication is not to create zones of exclusion for our creative self-fashioning, it is to allow us to take seriously the content of each other’s lives, to discern therein insights into the way we understand ourselves as human persons. In this sense, democratic communication necessarily involves the ongoing articulation and deconstruction of ontological claims, not to rid us of metaphysics but instead—agonistically, empathetically—to find our own voice in it.

#### Terrorism is politically motivated—only our radical action of stepping back and taking blame can address the real grievences

Blum 4—William Blum is an author, historian, and renowned critic of U.S. foreign policy. He is the author of *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II* and *Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower*. In early 2006, Blum briefly became the subject of widespread media attention when Osama bin Laden issued a public statement in which he quoted Blum and recommended that all Americans read *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower*. As a result of the mention sales of his book greatly increased. "I was quite surprised and even shocked and amused when I found out what he'd said," Blum said. "I was glad. I knew it would help the book's sales and I was not bothered by who it was coming from. If he shares with me a deep dislike for certain aspects of US foreign policy, then I'm not going to spurn any endorsement of the book by him. I think it's good that he shares those views and I'm not turned off by that."[4] On the Bin Laden endorsement Blum stated "This is almost as good as being an Oprah book." [http://williamblum.org/chapters/freeing-the-world-to-death/myth-and-denial-in-the-war-against-terrorism]

It dies hard. It dies very hard. The notion that terrorist acts against the United States can be explained by envy and irrational hatred, and not by what the United States does to the world – i.e., US foreign policy – is alive and well. The fires were still burning intensely at Ground Zero when Colin Powell declared: “Once again, we see terrorism, we see terrorists, people who don’t believe in democracy …” 1 George W. picked up on that theme and ran with it. He’s been its leading proponent ever since September 11 with his repeated insistence, in one wording or another, that terrorists are people who hate America and all that it stands for, its democracy, its freedom, its wealth, its secular government.” (Ironically, the president and Attorney General John Ashcroft probably hate our secular government as much as anyone.) Here he is more than a year after September 11: “The threats we face are global terrorist attacks. That’s the threat. And the more you love freedom, the more likely it is you’ll be attacked.” 2 The American Council of Trustees and Alumni, a conservative watchdog group founded by Lynne Cheney, wife of the vice-president, announced in November 2001 the formation of the Defense of Civilization Fund, declaring that “It was not only America that was attacked on September 11, but civilization. We were attacked not for our vices, but for our virtues.” 3 In September 2002, the White House released the “National Security Strategy”, purported to be chiefly the handiwork of Condoleezza Rice, which speaks of the “rogue states” which “sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” In July of the following year, we could hear the spokesman for Homeland Security, Brian Roehrkasse, declare: “Terrorists hate our freedoms. They want to change our ways.” 4 Thomas Friedman the renowned foreign policy analyst of the New York Times would say amen. Terrorists, he wrote in 1998 after two US embassies in Africa had been attacked, “have no specific ideological program or demands. Rather, they are driven by a generalized hatred of the US, Israel and other supposed enemies of Islam.” 5 This idée fixe – that the rise of anti-American terrorism owes nothing to American policies – in effect postulates an America that is always the aggrieved innocent in a treacherous world, a benign United States government peacefully going about its business but being “provoked” into taking extreme measures to defend its people, its freedom and its democracy. There consequently is no good reason to modify US foreign policy, and many people who might otherwise know better are scared into supporting the empire’s wars out of the belief that there’s no choice but to crush without mercy – or even without evidence – this irrational international force out there that hates the United States with an abiding passion. Thus it was that Afghanistan and Iraq were bombed and invaded with seemingly little concern in Washington that this could well create many new anti-American terrorists. And indeed, since the first strike on Afghanistan in October 2001 there have been literally scores of terrorist attacks against American institutions in the Middle East, South Asia and the Pacific, more than a dozen in Pakistan alone: military, civilian, Christian, and other targets associated with the United States, including the October 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which destroyed two nightclubs and killed more than 200 people, almost all of them Americans and their Australian and British allies. The following year brought the heavy bombing of the US-managed Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, the site of diplomatic receptions and 4th of July celebrations held by the American Embassy. Even when a terrorist attack is not aimed directly at Americans, the reason the target has been chosen can be because the country it takes place in has been cooperating with the United States in its so-called “War on Terrorism”. Witness the horrendous attacks of recent years in Madrid, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. A US State Department report on worldwide terrorist attacks showed that the year 2003 had more “significant terrorist incidents” than at any time since the department began issuing statistics in 1982; the 2003 figures do not include attacks on US troops by insurgents in Iraq. 6 Terrorists in their own words The word “terrorism” has been so overused in recent years that it’s now commonly used simply to stigmatize any individual or group one doesn’t like, for almost any kind of behavior involving force. But the word’s raison d’être has traditionally been to convey a political meaning, something along the lines of: the deliberate use of violence against civilians and property to intimidate or coerce a government or the population in furtherance of a political objective. Terrorism is fundamentally propaganda, a very bloody form of propaganda. It follows that if the perpetrators of a terrorist act declare what their objective was, their statement should carry credibility, no matter what one thinks of the objective or the method used to achieve it. Let us look at some of their actual declarations. The terrorists responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 sent a letter to the New York Times which stated, in part: “We declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the American political, economical, and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in the region.” 7 Richard Reid, who tried to ignite a bomb in his shoe while aboard an American Airline flight to Miami in December 2001, told police that his planned suicide attack was an attempt to strike a blow against the US campaign in Afghanistan and the Western economy. In an e-mail sent to his mother, which he intended her to read after his death, Reid wrote that it was his duty “to help remove the oppressive American forces from the Muslims land.” 8 After the bombings in Bali, one of the leading suspects – later convicted – told police that the bombings were “revenge” for “what Americans have done to Muslims.” He said that he wanted to “kill as many Americans as possible” because “America oppresses the Muslims”. 9 In November 2002, a taped message from Osama bin Laden began: “The road to safety begins by ending the aggression. Reciprocal treatment is part of justice. The [terrorist] incidents that have taken place … are only reactions and reciprocal actions.” 10 That same month, when Mir Aimal Kasi, who killed several people outside of CIA headquarters in 1993, was on death row, he declared: “What I did was a retaliation against the US government” for American policy in the Middle East and its support of Israel. 11 It should be noted that the State Department warned at the time that the execution of Kasi could result in attacks against Americans around the world. 12 It did not warn that the attacks would result from foreigners hating or envying American democracy, freedom, wealth, or secular government. Similarly, in the days following the start of US bombing of Afghanistan there were numerous warnings from US government officials about being prepared for retaliatory acts, and during the war in Iraq, the State Department announced: “Tensions remaining from the recent events in Iraq may increase the potential threat to US citizens and interests abroad, including by terrorist groups.” 13 Another example of the difficulty the Bush administration has in consistently maintaining its simplistic idée fixe: In June 2002, after a car bomb exploded outside the US Consulate in Karachi, killing or injuring more than 60 people, the Washington Post reported that “US officials said the attack was likely the work of extremists angry at both the United States and Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for siding with the United States after September 11 and abandoning support for Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban.” 14 George W. and others of his administration may or may not believe what they tell the world about the motivations behind anti-American terrorism, but, as in the examples just given, some officials have questioned the party line for years. A Department of Defense study in 1997 concluded: “Historical data show a strong correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.” 15 Former US president Jimmy Carter told the New York Times in a 1989 interview: We sent Marines into Lebanon and you only have to go to Lebanon, to Syria or to Jordan to witness first-hand the intense hatred among many people for the United States because we bombed and shelled and unmercifully killed totally innocent villagers – women and children and farmers and housewives – in those villages around Beirut. … As a result of that … we became kind of a Satan in the minds of those who are deeply resentful. That is what precipitated the taking of our hostages and that is what has precipitated some of the terrorist attacks. 16 Colin Powell has also revealed that he knows better. Writing of this same 1983 Lebanon debacle in his memoir, he forgoes clichŽs about terrorists hating democracy: “The U.S.S. New Jersey started hurling 16-inch shells into the mountains above Beirut, in World War II style, as if we were softening up the beaches on some Pacific atoll prior to an invasion. What we tend to overlook in such situations is that other people will react much as we would.” 17 The ensuing retaliatory attack against US Marine barracks in Lebanon took the lives of 241 American military personnel. The bombardment of Beirut in 1983 and 1984 is but one of many examples of American violence against the Middle East and/or Muslims since the 1980s. The record includes: the shooting down of two Libyan planes in 1981 the bombing of Libya in 1986 the bombing and sinking of an Iranian ship in 1987 the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in 1988 the shooting down of two more Libyan planes in 1989 the massive bombing of the Iraqi people in 1991 the continuing bombings and sanctions against Iraq for the next 12 years the bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 the habitual support of Israel despite the routine devastation and torture it inflicts upon the Palestinian people the habitual condemnation of Palestinian resistance to this the abduction of “suspected terrorists” from Muslim countries, such as Malaysia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Albania, who are then taken to places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where they are tortured the large military and hi-tech presence in Islam’s holiest land, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region the support of undemocratic, authoritarian Middle East governments from the Shah of Iran to the Saudis. “How do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for America?” asked George W. “I’ll tell you how I respond: I’m amazed. I’m amazed that there’s such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I am – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it because I know how good we are.” 18 It’s not just people in the Middle East who have good reason for hating what the US government does. The United States has created huge numbers of potential terrorists all over Latin America during a half century of American actions far worse than what it’s done in the Middle East. If Latin Americans shared the belief of radical Muslims that they will go directly to paradise for martyring themselves in the act of killing the great Satan enemy, by now we might have had decades of repeated terrorist horror coming from south of the border. As it is, there have been many non-suicidal terrorist attacks against Americans and their buildings in Latin America over the years. To what extent do Americans really believe the official disconnect between what the US does in the world and anti-American terrorism? One indication that the public is somewhat skeptical came in the days immediately following the commencement of the bombing of Iraq on March 20 of this year. The airlines later announced that there had been a sharp increase in cancellations of flights and a sharp decrease in future flight reservations in those few days. 19 In June, the Pew Research Center released the results of polling in 20 Muslim countries and the Palestinian territories that brought into question another official thesis, that support for anti-American terrorism goes hand in hand with hatred of American society. The polling revealed that people interviewed had much more “confidence” in Osama bin Laden than in George W. Bush. However, “the survey suggested little correlation between support for bin Laden and hostility to American ideas and cultural products. People who expressed a favorable opinion of bin Laden were just as likely to appreciate American technology and cultural products as people opposed to bin Laden. Pro- and anti-bin Laden respondents also differed little in their views on the workability of Western-style democracy in the Arab world.” 20 The Iraqi resistance The official Washington mentality about the motivations of individuals they call terrorists is also manifested in current US occupation policy in Iraq. Secretary of War Donald Rumsfeld has declared that there are five groups opposing US forces – looters, criminals, remnants of Saddam Hussein’s government, foreign terrorists and those influenced by Iran. 21 An American official in Iraq maintains that many of the people shooting at US troops are “poor young Iraqis” who have been paid between $20 and $100 to stage hit-and-run attacks on US soldiers. “They’re not dedicated fighters,” he said. “They’re people who wanted to take a few potshots.” 22 With such language do American officials avoid dealing with the idea that any part of the resistance is composed of Iraqi citizens who are simply demonstrating their resentment about being bombed, invaded, occupied, and subjected to daily humiliations. Some officials convinced themselves that it was largely the most loyal followers of Saddam Hussein and his two sons who were behind the daily attacks on Americans, and that with the capture or killing of the evil family, resistance would die out; tens of millions of dollars were offered as reward for information leading to this joyful prospect. Thus it was that the killing of the sons elated military personnel. US Army trucks with loudspeakers drove through small towns and villages to broadcast a message about the death of Hussein’s sons. “Coalition forces have won a great victory over the Baath Party and the Saddam Hussein regime by killing Uday and Qusay Hussein in Mosul,” said the message broadcast in Arabic. “The Baath Party has no power in Iraq. Renounce the Baath Party or you are in great danger.” It called on all officials of Hussein’s government to turn themselves in. 23 What followed was several days of some of the deadliest attacks against American personnel since the guerrilla war began. Unfazed, American officials in Washington and Iraq continue to suggest that the elimination of Saddam will write finis to anti-American actions. Another way in which the political origins of terrorism are obscured is by the common practice of blaming poverty or repression by Middle Eastern governments (as opposed to US support for such governments) for the creation of terrorists. Defenders of US foreign policy cite this also as a way of showing how enlightened they are. Here’s Condoleezza Rice: [The Middle East] is a region where hopelessness provides a fertile ground for ideologies that convince promising youths to aspire not to a university education, a career or family, but to blowing themselves up, taking as many innocent lives with them as possible. We need to address the source of the problem. 24 Many on the left speak in a similar fashion, apparently unconscious of what they’re obfuscating. This analysis confuses terrorism with revolution. In light of the several instances mentioned above, among others which could be cited, of US officials giving the game away, in effect admitting that terrorists and guerrillas may be, or in fact are, reacting to actual hurts and injustices, it may be that George W. is the only true believer among them, if in fact he is one. The thought may visit leaders of the American Empire, at least occasionally, that all their expressed justifications for invading Iraq and Afghanistan and for their “War on Terrorism” are no more than fairy tales for young children and grown-up innocents. But officialdom doesn’t make statements to represent reality. It constructs stories to legitimize the pursuit of interests. And the interests here are irresistibly compelling: creating the most powerful empire in all history, enriching their class comrades, remaking the world in their own ideological image. Being the target of terrorism is just one of the prices you pay for such prizes, and terrorist attacks provide a great excuse for the next intervention, the next expansion of the empire, the next expansion of the military budget. A while ago, I heard a union person on the radio proposing what he called “a radical solution to poverty – pay people enough to live on.” Well, I’d like to propose a radical solution to anti-American terrorism – stop giving terrorists the motivation to attack America. As long as the imperial mafia insist that anti-American terrorists have no good or rational reason for retaliation against the United States for anything the US has ever done to their countries, as long as US foreign policy continues with its bloody and oppressive interventions, the “War on Terrorism” is as doomed to failure as the war on drugs has been. If I were the president, I could stop terrorist attacks against the United States in a few days. Permanently. I would first apologize – very publicly and very sincerely – to all the widows and orphans, the impoverished and the tortured, and all the many millions of other victims of American imperialism. Then I would announce to every corner of the world that America’s global military interventions have come to an end. I would then inform Israel that it is no longer the 51st state of the union but -ññ oddly enough -ññ a foreign country. Then I would reduce the military budget by at least 90% and use the savings to pay reparations to the victims and repair the damage from the many American bombings, invasions and sanctions. There would be more than enough money. One year’s military budget in the United States is equal to more than $20,000 per hour for every hour since Jesus Christ was born. That’s one year. That’s what I’d do on my first three days in the White House. On the fourth day, I’d be assassinated.

## \*\*\* 2AC

### 2AC—AT: Gender/Lesbian Separatism

#### The plan is key—the security regime we challenge is the archtypical exercise of masculine power

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This construction of the safe citizen is, in Iris Marion Young’s reading, something of an archetypal exercise of masculinist power, the drive to protect us from bad men. What she finds striking is that we do not simply submit to the erosion of privacy and the curtailment of freedoms, be they incidental or fundamental, in the security regime; we in fact embrace these measures. The security regime claims not only our obedience, but our loyalty and, to use Young’s word, adoration.

The state pledges to protect us, but tells us that we should submit to its rule and decisions without deliberation, publicity, criticism or dissent. (Young, 2003: 227) The deep personal reach of the security regime, its pledge of protection, is evident in President Bush’s declaration of the war on terror. This is not, as mentioned above, a war on terrorism as such. In his address to a Joint Session of Congress nine days after the attacks of 9/11, Bush affirmed “Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done. […] Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” (Bush, 2001a: Added emphasis.)

This war on terror is, therefore, global in scope but with no concrete geopolitical foe: it is a war of deliverance from a subjective state, from the condition of being in terror. It is therapeutic war. In the security regime, the aim of masculinist power is to protect us physically, but also our sense of well being; it imposes a beneficence that reaches into our souls. Young sees in this the infantilization of the citizen, one that we embrace, from a participant in self-governance to the cosseted dependent of the executive branch.

#### Their insistence on negativity and a particular starting point is problematic—only our inclusive approach can create movements and tangible change

Brand-Jacobsen, 2005[Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen is founder and Director of the Peace Action, Training and Research Institute of Romania (PATRIR) and Co-Director of TRANSCEND, and is on the Executive Board of the TRANSCEND Peace University (TPU) where he is Course Director for the courses Peacebuilding and Empowerment and War to Peace Transitions. He has worked in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Russia, South Eastern Europe, North America, Colombia, Somalia, Cambodia, Aceh-Indonesia and the Middle East at the invitation of governments, inter-governmental organisations, UN agencies, and local organisations and communities. He has written and published widely, and is author of The Struggle Continues: The Political Economy of Globalisation and People's Struggles for Peace (Pluto, forthcoming), co-author, together with Johan Galtung and Carl Jacobsen, of Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND (Pluto, 2000 & 2002) and Editor of the TRANSCEND book series published together with Pluto Press, Constructive Peace Studies: Peace by Peaceful Means. He is a member of the Executive Board of the Journal of Peace and Development and the Executive Board of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution. In 1999 he was founder and Director of the Coalition for Global Solidarity and Social Development, and in 2000, together with Johan Galtung, he was founder of the Nordic Institute for Peace Research (NIFF). Since 1996 he has provided more than 250 training programmes in peacebuilding, development, and constructive conflict transformation to more than 4000 participants in 30 countries. <http://www.globalsolidarity.org/articles/peace_means_kai.html>]

Peace by Peaceful Means

Dear Friends, The discussions which have taken place over e-mail over the past few days have been extremely interesting. I have just returned from Oslo where the 100th anniversary of the Nobel Peace Prize was being celebrated. The obvious contrast between the rather elite 'suit' dominated celebrations in Oslo and the realities of what is occurring in the world today was stark. Questions of strategy, tactics and visions for how we work to bring about change, to transform all forms of violent conflict -- direct, structural, and cultural -- and to empower, mobilise, and involve people in a mass, broad-based movement for peace and to build the alternatives we are looking for, are **vital**. In Norway alone, to take one example, perhaps 80% of people think what is happening now in and over Afghanistan is wrong, either completely or at least in part, and yet all they hear from the media, academics and politicians is constant support and acclaim for the 'justness' of this war (or indeed, any war in which it is 'we' against 'them'). Small groups of people and 'NGOs', in Norway as in every single country, are trying to bring forward alternatives, to raise their voices, and to protest/oppose what they think is wrong. While these organisations are in every case much smaller than our governments and militaries going to war, they often represent the social majority. A major challenge they face, however, is how to reach out to people, how to involve people, and how to develop alternatives which make sense to people tired of war and violence (whether of the kind we are seeing in Afghanistan, or of a global economic system killing 100,000 a day). **Negative** **slogans** and **opposition** to what is wrong **is** **not** **enough** however. It is not enough, but it is necessary. 'Basta!', 'Enough!' was perhaps the most 'revolutionary' cry of the last decade, and still is in many parts of the world. The simple, courageous act, of standing up when we see that something is wrong, and stating that it is wrong, not cooperating with it, can be a powerful and evocative symbol. When we are having our conferences, discussions and meetings in whichever city, town or village of the world we may be found, we should always remember that the vast majority of people in our own city, town or village, as well as the entire rest of the world, have no idea that we are there, meeting. The vision, hope and ideas which bring people to these conferences are, in the vast majority of cases, kept marginalised, on the periphery. Yet that is also part of our own responsibility, technique and methods. Basta! became a cry to inspire millions, because those who said it lived it, refusing to cooperate any longer with what they know to be wrong. While Basta! may be the most revolutionary cry or word today, transforming all forms of direct, structural, and cultural violence is the greatest challenge. The two are **inclusive** and **complementary**, not exclusive. We need to state clearly our opposition to violence, war, injustice and exploitation (the 'peace movement' has often been willing to do the first two, not always as willing on the last two), and we need also to build a constructive, positive programme. It is not only a question of what we are against, but what we are for. When we criticize what we think is wrong, people will also want to know what we think could be done instead. In these cases, our **answers** **must** **seem** **real** and **viable** to people. The 'anti-globalisation' movement is therefore also a social justice movement; 'non-governmental organisations' should also be people's organisations or people's movements; and one of our challenges today will be to build upon the growing 'anti-war' movement, transforming it also into a peace movement. A step further, as many social and peace activists have recognised, will be to link the peace and social justice movements. Slogans and messages are important, as are practice and vision. It will not be possible today to unite broad numbers of people around issues which they feel are too abstract and divorced from them. The 'abolish the debt' campaign/movement was successful because people were able to see the clear linkages between debt and the effective colonisation and enslavement of countries and people across the south, as well as the incredible suffering and destruction it brought. The Jubilee 2000 'campaign' however, unlike the Jubilee South movement which continues today, did not reach its objective of having the debt cancelled. Instead, while many people around the world believe the problem has been solved, the debt-system and the burden it places upon countries has become even more extreme. Going from 'campaigns' to movements will also be important, though even here it is not a question of 'either/or' but 'both/and' with individual campaigns extremely useful and effective at times for involving people, raising awareness and mobilising around specific issues, strengthening further the broader movements of which they may be a part. Today, a movement for demos kratos is necessary, and vital for any movement or work towards peace. To speak about the United States or any government in the world today as a 'democracy' is a ridiculous farce. They are highly elite dominated systems built upon massive structures and cultures of violence, and willing to use overwhelming (Powel Doctrine) violence when necessary to enforce their needs and/or interests. At best they may be demagogia's, where elites maintain power by promising the people what they will do for them (we call this 'elections'), but they are not system's or societies built upon people's power, demos kratos. Decisions to go to war are made by tiny numbers of people. Our economic and political policies are constructed for us, often to the detriment of the social majorities who are told to 'leave well enough alone' and trust in the experts. This is sometimes as true of politicians as it is of non-governmental organisations who themselves frequently prefer the conference halls and well-funded projects to actually working democratically with people as part of the people themselves. An alternative today, what Johan Galtung has called for, with 10,000 dialogues, meetings, discussions at every level, focussing not only on what is wrong, but also on what we want therapy, ideas, alternatives. In one form or another many of these dialogues are taking place. In a way they are therapy for the massive amounts of violence we are all being exposed to today, in our cultures, in our world, on our television sets or in the speeches of our 'democratically elected' rulers (the question, for those who do not support their policies, should not be 'who put them in power' -- though this is also important -- but why haven't we removed them from power yet\_). They are also empowering, if we take the step beyond saying what is wrong to what could be done\_, what should be done\_, and then go further to discussing what I/we can do about it. Mobilising people for peace today is not simply about a slogan (though coming up with clearly expressed messages in a few words will of course help us to link people together and raise awareness). What is necessary, beyond any single issue or top-level strategy for how to change the world, is the process. The way is the goal. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the social justice/anti-globalisation movement is that it has mobilised, involved, and empowered millions of people around the world in discussing, thinking about, and acting upon the realities around them. On the streets of Seattle, Praha, Okinawa, Melbourne, Gotheburg, Washington, Quebec, Genoa, Ottawa, people, many of whom refuse to vote, have been discussing foreign policy, domestic politics, people to people movements, and all the issues which politicians and well-established NGOs are not able and often not willing to discuss with people. We have our 'manifestos', our policies and plans which we wish to put forward in the name of people, often addressing them to 'politicians' and 'elites' believing, in a fundamentally undemocratic way, that they will be the ones to bring about and implement change for us. This is not to say that that is not an important level which we also need to work at. The broader vision here is both/and, not either or, in terms of strategy as well often of vision. We also need, however, to be willing to take part in the much slower, more timely, and more empowering process, of tens of thousands of dialogues together with people, communities, and organisations at every level. Solidarity today is being built upon and carried further into alliances not just supporting people in their struggles for social justice, peace and freedom, but carrying forward those struggles ourselves in our own communities, our own towns, cities and villages. If we wish to change the injustices taking place in the world today we must of course work on a global level, but we must also work, just as importantly, within our communities. Again, both/and rather than either or. We should also be wary when we say 'we must begin here', or 'this must be done first!', even when the message is very positive and constructive. 'We must begin with the individual!'. 'We must begin by changing society!'. 'We must begin with a culture of peace!'. 'We must begin by ending the debt!'. All of these, and the many others put forward, are extremely important issues. They are also all linked together. Again, both/and. Exclusive and elitist visions will only serve to further fragment our efforts, creating division and separation where what is needed is dialogue, solidarity, cooperation and alliances between movements/organisations which often take diverse strategies and approaches to addressing deeply interlinking injustices and structures and cultures of violence. Conscientisation (raising awareness, often political awareness -- but also social, cultural, economic), organisation (we can do more together than we can apart, and it is necessary to organise -- though in many different ways -- to be able to bring about changes, both against what we think is wrong and for what we think is right), mobilisation (bringing in more and more people, involving people in dialogues, discussion, action, and work for change/transformation), and empowerment (I/we can, rather than 'I/we can't'; also important recognising the power we have to bring about change, rather than simply accepting existing, often extremely violent, power structures and believing that change can/should/must be implemented by those 'in power', whether slave owners, men, politicians, or fuhrers) are all necessary.

#### The plan is a prerequisite to the K – must evaluate states of exception in order to understand gender theory. Anything else allows for military intervention in the name of gender equality – Afghanistan proves

**Blake 09** Sarah Blake, Journal of International Women's Studies Volume 11 Issue 3 Winning and Short-listed Entries from the 2007 Feminist and Women’s Studies Association Annual Student Essay Competition Article 5 Sep-2009 The War on Terrorism as State of Exception: A Challenge for Transnational Gender Theory http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1192&context=jiws&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D10%26q%3D%2522gender%2522%2B%2522indefinite%2Bdetention%2522%26hl%3Den%26as\_sdt%3D0%2C11#search=%22gender%20indefinite%20detention%22

Theoretical engagements of ‘States of exception’ and ‘bare life’ are, as a rule, critiques of power. Like gender theory, this realm of critical engagement focuses on the consequences of politics and state power on the body.1 Where gender theory has long prioritized the body and the experience of power as a basis for its critiques,2 theories of bare life and the state of exception address violence perpetrated on the body in the exercise of extra-legal power.3 Most significantly, the connections between, and potential contributions of one to the other, revolve around questions of what is at stake in analyzing a particular experience of power in a particular way. **The focused, ethical urgency of theoretical engagements of states of exception has much to offer gender theory**. Put simply, **it illuminates the stakes of issues that are** already **under consideration by gender scholars**. The struggle over representations of the ‘Muslim Woman’ in American popular discourse in the early 2000’s is instructive. In this essay, I will discuss how specific works in both theoretical traditions deconstruct the idea that the United States’ response to the terrorist attacks on September 11 was natural, inevitable and justified. The ‘war on terrorism,’ was justified by the claim of an intractable, culturally inscribed opposition of cultures. The challenges to this claim that I will explore here carry ethical questions for academics, and raise new possibilities for critiques of state power and violence.

Questions regarding the historical and discursive constructions of what constitutes natural or inevitable power dynamics, the role of the academic in the world and the interpretation of personal experience of political institutions are priorities for theorists working in both fields of bare life and gender theory. Beginning from these shared questions, **it becomes evident that theories of the state of exception and gender theory have much to offer each other. A conversation between them can illuminate historical, social, cultural and legal contexts for particular, pressing ethical demands.**

The focus of recent theoretical engagements on the ways that states of exception are constructed and preserved resonates with gender theory’s ongoing struggle with political and social exercise of power internationally. With the centrality of the image of the ‘Muslim Woman’ in arguments for the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and in the years since, **gender theorists**, including Lila Abu-Lughod and Judith Butler, **have - explicitly or implicitly - engaged with the multiple ways that states of exception are constructed and justified**. From the lead-up to the invasion of Afghanistan through the spectacle of the abuses at Abu Ghraib and continuing today, as a new administration struggles with the “war on terrorism ,” (in both discourse and policy), the multiple ‘fronts’ in what has become an increasingly nebulous, global conflict, have been understood in gendered, sexualized terms. Giorgio Agamben contends, “the essential task of a theory of the state of exception is not simply to clarify whether it has juridical nature or not, but to define the meaning, place, and modes of its relation to the law.” 4 He finds the state of exception pervading institutions beyond new detention centers or legal procedures. Here, **the investment that many feminist scholars share in discourse and representation – in politics, media, and academia can find an ally in engagements of the state of exception.**

The dominant discourse used by the United States’ government under the Bush administration treated the ‘war’ as exceptional at every level: a new kind of war, with a global reach and exceptional urgency, requiring exceptional exercises of power, and the suspension of normal legal processes. When it comes to concrete interactions, both the United States government and the detainees are treated as exceptional, involving neither a normal armed conflict or criminal endeavor, but a grand struggle between good and evil. This exception, in the form of claims that normal law does not apply, is a subject that demands investigation both in relation explicit theoretical engagements of bare life and the state of exception and in relation to gender theory, as it was established in explicitly gendered terms.

**To discuss the gender dimensions of the ‘war on terrorism,’ and the institutions it has established, it is important to first discuss what constitutes a state of exception in any context**. Giorgio Agamben provides a definition: “The state of exception is not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept.”5 He further asserts: “In any case, to understand the problem of the state of exception, one must first correctly determine its localization (or illocalization) . . . the conflict over the state of exception presents itself essentially as a dispute over its proper locus.”6 The primary institution of the state of exception is ‘the camp,’ which is located in a ‘juridico-political structure.’7 The state of exception in this conflict is located in the physical institutions of military prisons outside of normal U.S. territory, and the broader context of public culture, and political discourse. .. It is in the focus on this structure, and, particularly, the political elements, that **this resonates with the strand of gender theory dedicated to interrogating the justification for construction of oppressive biopolitics///**

,8 **particularly in transnational exercises of power**.

To heed Christine Sylvester’s call to “follow bare life politics into its hideouts, and into our texts and toolboxes as well, searching with undeflecting and nuancing eyes”9 demands applying a gendered lens to the context that has allowed for the production of a state of exception. **Sylvester points to a particular responsibility** in her call **to search out the ‘bare life politics’ that may be hiding out in gender theory**. This requires locating the dynamics that, extending beyond government offices, allow states of exception to take hold in societies where sovereign power is normally assumed to be constrained by the law requires more than a dispassionate examination from without.10 Sylvester echoes a call that resonates with those of postcolonial feminist theorists like Gayatri Spivak and Chandra Mohanty, who contend that feminist academics have no choice but to examine their own position, and the consequences of their own attempts at representing themselves and others.11 To take the history of epistemic violence seriously means to pay attention to “remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other,”12 and to expose such projects wherever they arise.

**While searching out** the hideouts of **bare life politics**, however, **it is** also **important to map the state of exception**’s most obvious supporting elements. Here, this involves theoretical engagements that maps the more overt arguments supporting a state of exception in U.S. military prisons and the conduct of the ‘war on terrorism’ in general. For this, I will turn to the discussion of terrorism and security that Judith Butler discussed in Precarious Life, published in 2004. In Butler’s assessment, the United States responded to the unprecedented experience of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 with “heightened nationalist discourse, extended surveillance mechanisms, suspended constitutional rights, and developed forms of explicit and implicit censorship.13” Butler argues against any claim that these developments were natural or inevitable. She focuses on an effort that extends beyond the ‘military order’ allowing for ‘indefinite detention’ and trial by non-juridical ‘military commissions’ that Agamben cites as the genesis of a persistent state of exception14. Butler, too, understands the consequences of this suspension of normal law, and focuses her analysis on the elements that contributed to its appearance as utterly necessary, if not natural.

By highlighting the silencing of serious explorations of why the attacks occurred within the United States, followed by a starkly differing treatment of American lives and Afghan ones lost in the wake of the United States’ military response, Butler illuminates a broader ‘state of exception’ permeating American public life in the early 2000’s. Butler asserts this issue of grievability as fundamental to the state of exception: “the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human.”15 Here, the exception is located in literal space at Guantanamo Bay, where “the dehumanization effected by ‘indefinite detention’ makes use of an ethnic frame for conceiving who will be human, and who will not.”16 Observing the fallout, both in the erasure of combat-related deaths and the treatment of ‘detainees,’17 Butler touches on an underlying contemporary political current and a crucial link to historical exercises of domination linked to the history of conquest and colonization. She points out that “the dehumanization that Orientalism already performs is heightened to an extreme, so that the uniqueness and exceptionalism of this kind of war makes it exempt from the presumptions and protections of universality and civilization.”18 Butler both demands attention to historical context and highlights a historical context which, ironically, involves a long history of claims to ‘unique,’ unprecedented need to suspend normal law based on a suspension of the recognition of the ‘Other’s’ common humanity.

The paradox of the exception claimed here sits with the fact that **the United States claimed that part of its mission was in defending the rights of women, which it inevitably couched in universalizing, civilizational terms.** This particular paradox lends itself to a dimension of what a state of exception requires, “this space devoid of law seems, for some reason, to be so essential to the juridical order that **it must seek in every way to assure itself a relation with it,”**19 **including this international juridical order of gender equality**. In her 2002 essay, ‘Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?’ Lila AbuLughod addresses the deployment of images of women in the discursive war effort. She focuses on the ethical questions raised by the “’war on terrorism,’ a war which justifies itself by purporting to liberate, or save, Afghan women.”20 The questions she poses and discomfort she expresses occupy the point where gender theory’s position in relation to the state of exception is most relevant. That is, the point where a gendered discourse is used to justify the construction of a state of exception. Abu-Lughod’s concerns are hardly new, even if the events inspiring them are. Indeed, Gayatri Spivak highlighted the same issue when she declared, many years earlier (and referring to earlier events), “what interests me is that the protection of women (today the ‘Third World Woman’) becomes a signifier for the establishment of a good society which must, at some inaugurative moments, transgress mere legality, or equity of legal policy.”21 **That is, where women’s status in one society is treated as evidence of that society’s backwardness, and justification for any intervention on the part of a self-professed guardian of gender equality becomes an urgent case of “white men saving brown women from brown men**.”22 Like Butler, Abu-Lughod’s ethical queries carry an awareness of historical context, and, particularly, the cultural and social dimensions of the justifications for establishing exceptional legal – or extralegal – procedures and physical spaces.

Abu-Lughod’s discomfort with the public discourse on gender and, crucially, ‘culture,’ raises important questions for both academics and activists, which lend urgency and specificity to questions that have concerned Spivak and other gender theorists for decades. Considering the degree to which gender theorists have, as a community, struggled to deal with ‘culture,’ her criticism of the popular discourse around the invasion of Afghanistan retains a particular salience:

**The question is why knowing about the ‘culture’ of the region, and particularly its religious beliefs and treatment of women, was more urgent than exploring the history of the development of repressive regimes in the region and the U.S.’s role in this history. Such cultural framing**, it seemed to me, **prevented the serious exploration of the roots and nature of human suffering in this part of the world**. Instead of political and historical explanations, experts were being asked to give religio-cultural ones. **Instead of questions that might lead to the exploration of global interconnections, we were offered ones that work to artificially divide the world into separate spheres—recreating an imaginative geography of West versus East, us versus Muslims, cultures in which First Ladies give speeches versus others where women shuffle around silently in burqas.** 23

The ‘imaginary geography’ that Abu-Lughod describes here is familiar to gender theorists working on transnational issues, which relate to how power is justified and exercised through actual and imagined space. Achille Mbembe further explores the circular logic of imaginary and physical geography that traps individual bodies in its exception in his discussion of the circumstances of colonial occupation. Mbembe asserts:

Colonial occupation itself was a matter of seizing, delimiting and asserting control over a physical geographical area—of writing on the grounds a new set of social and spatial relations. The writing of new spatial relations (territorialization) was, ultimately, tantamount of the production of boundaries and hierarchies; zones and enclaves . . . and, finally, the manufacturing of a large reservoir of cultural imaginaries.24

Abu-Lughod maps the imaginary geography deployed in discourses about Afghan women in a way that reveals their historical precedence in the uses of ‘colonial feminism,’25 by the English and French in the Middle East in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The contrast that she highlights between that administration’s use of images of women’s rights in the territories it sought to dominate and the low status it granted to women at home26 points to a precedent for challenging the American government’s moral authority in this case. This rings particularly true in hindsight, and knowledge of the United States military’s abuses at Abu Ghraib, which Judith Butler called “the actions of a misogynist institution against a population in which women are cast in roles bound by codes of honor and shame, and so not ‘equal’ in the way that women ostensibly are in the West.”27

Abu-Lughod’s final criticism already touches on some of the instrumentalization already at work in 2002:

Even RAWA, the now celebrated Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, which was so instrumental in bringing to U.S. women’s attention to the excesses of the Taliban, has opposed the U.S. bombing from the beginning. . . They consistently remind audiences to take a close look at the ways policies are being organized around oil interests, the arms industry, and the international drug trade. They are not obsessed with the veil, even though they are the most radical feminists working for a secular democratic Afghanistan.28

This creates a sense that, from the beginning, the gender justice argument was almost entirely a symbolic one. This divergence in stated priorities – between the oppressed, yet activist RAWA, and the liberating government, raises questions about the degree to which Muslim–particularly Afghan—women were and are seen as muted subalterns. Indeed, their subaltern status is assured by the fact that even when they actively campaigning for their own political priorities, their alleged liberators continue to speak for them. Indeed, the treatment of RAWA provides an illustration of Spivak’s argument that subalterneity, rather than defined as mere disenfranchisement or disadvantage, but a reduction to an identity defined only as difference. 29 To return to a crucial element of Agamben’s idea of what structures states of exception:

…in the modern era, misery and exclusion are not only economic or social concepts, but eminently political categories. . . In this sense, our age is nothing but the implacable and methodical attempt to overcome the division dividing the people, to eliminate, radically the people that is excluded.30

It is possible, then, to read the instrumentalization of particular Afghan women’s advocacy as a consequence of the American public’s desire to accept any intervention that would eliminate this marked difference. This complicates the discussion of the a politics that encourage the use of the ‘liberation of Afghan women’ to justify violence that inevitably leads to the suffering of many such Afghan women. If symbolic deployments of women’s images is shorthand for the existence of the ‘people’ that suffers and that must be eliminated through ‘development’ in some cases, and overt violence in others, then investigating the discursive construction of certain categories of women becomes an even more urgent task.

If Muslim women and their clothing will always be trotted out to illustrate the utter incommensurability of the East and West, the other strain of Abu-Lughod’s essay, which calls on academics and feminists engaged in critiquing the purportedly natural institutional power around gender to look more closely at their own positions. . Christine Sylvester echoes Abu Lughod’s concerns where she calls for academics and development workers to “look at ourselves looking at and aiding others” 31 in light of the ways in which, as institutions, international development organizations and, more importantly, the Academy, are treated as separate from the political conditions that reinforce naturalseeming divisions and structures of domination. Indeed, this is a particularly important point of cohesion for theorists working on understanding states of exception and feminist academics, driven by arguments following Mohanty’s:

**Western feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of situating itself and examining its role in such a global economic and political framework. To do any less would be to ignore the complex interconnections between First and Third World economies and the profound effect of this on the lives of women in all countries**32

Abu-Lughod’s reminder that “We do not stand outside the world, looking out over this sea of poor benighted people, living under the shadow—or veil—of oppressive cultures; we are part of that world. Islamic movements themselves have arisen in a world shaped by the intense engagements of Western powers in Middle Eastern lives”33 challenges the constructed division of (Middle) East and West that claims to necessitate an exceptional response. The challenge that Abu-Lughod poses for her audience, and particularly the part of her audience that also uses gender lens as both political and academic tool echoes both Sylvester34 and Spivak, who declares: “The subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with ‘woman’ as a pious item. Representation has not withered away. The female intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish.”35 **Gender theory to join postcolonial studies and development studies must,** then, **involve a degree of self-critique and take responsibility to “address more of the troubling biopolitics of our time.”**36

Butler’s recent work on sexual politics provides a vivid illustration of the use of academic work to inform the construction of state of exception. Butler argues that ‘Bad anthropology’ in the form of a book titled The Arab Mind was used in making up procedures meant to intimidate, humiliate and control detainees:. “Since of course there is no ‘Arab mind,’ and it is not possible to attribute the same fears and anxieties across the Arab world to its geographical complexity and its cosmopolitan formulation, the text constructed an object that it could manipulate.”37 In addition to highlighting the ethical responsibilities of the academic, Butler extends the critiques of the state of exception, to reveal its reliance on an idea of a specific, simplistic form of cultural difference reinforced by an academic text.

In considering the ways in which American politics have taken an exceptional form in the last few years, it is striking to read, repeatedly, the overt demands for a new configuration of politics from theorists discussing states of exception. **While Agamben’s theory of the state of exception is neither a perfect description of the world, nor a solution to all of the difficulties within gender theory**, or in the relationships gender theory has with other critical fields, **it provides useful dimensions for exploring gender-based inquiries into exercises of power within and beyond the law.**

In their discussions of different elements of the discourse and conduct of the ‘war on terrorism,’ Judith Butler and Lila Abu-Lughod have highlighted many of the historical precedents and contextual influences for this particular conflict and the institutions it depends on to continue. Their arguments underscore the responsibility gender theorists hold for engaging with the distribution of power that allows this to persist. This responsibility extends begins with the task of investigating and, where appropriate, challenging claims that women can be liberated by a foreign government’s invasion of their country.

Whether the conduct of this conflict consists a point at which a truly new politics, heeding Agamben’s claim that “**only a politics that will have learned to take the fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West into account will be able to stop this oscillation and to put an end to the civil war that divides the people and the cities of the earth**,” 38 or Butler’s lamentation of the lost opportunity to introduce a nonviolent ethics American politics based in the awareness of its own vulnerability39 remains to be seen. However, **the possibility that theorizations of states of exception offers to disciplines that already function as critiques of biopower is one of altering, or expanding the basis for critique**. Perhaps, through the reflection of engagements of states of exception and gender it will be possible to follow Butler’s argument “only . . . a critique of state violence” will allow for “finding and acknowledging the already existing alliances and sites of contact . . . in order to consider systematically how coercion seeks to divide us and to keep attention deflected from the critique of violence itself,”40 and, from there, **to approach politics, representation, and the exercise of power in new ways.**

#### The first link is essentialism--—not only does this fail to take lesbians into account, it ignores women who have restructured their relations with men. They claim actively excludes some women.

Cain, 1994 [Patricia, Professor of Law, University of Iowa. ”LESBIAN PERSPECTIVE, LESBIAN EXPERIENCE, AND THE¶ RISK OF ESSENTIALISM” 2 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 43]

I have a different response to theorists who claim that sexual exploitation¶ or domination by men is the core experience which forges a¶ united category purported to be "woman." While many women do experience¶ some form of sexual exploitation or domination, we experience¶ these events as objects or victims. Some women internalize these¶ experiences and develop an identity (or perhaps, more accurately, a¶ nonidentity) as victim. 72 But, some women resist and claim their own¶ agency. Lesbians in particular remove themselves from spheres of¶ sexual domination by removing themselves from intimate sexual association¶ with men.73 So do nonlesbian women who elect to remain¶ single and celibate. And I believe there are some nonlesbian women partnered with men who have (re)structured their intimate relationships¶ to reduce, or in rare cases remove, male sexual domination. That¶ does not mean that any of us escape the threat or reality of rape or that¶ we escape experiences of sexual harassment. But, we do escape the¶ constant pressuring from a male partner to engage in sexual activity¶ when we do not want to, the maneuvering towards sexual activity on a¶ first date, and the compliments about our bodies by men who speak as¶ though they have the right to judge our attractiveness. Thus, although¶ there is widely-shared experience, as women, of sexual domination,¶ and although that experience may affect our concept of self, many females¶ do not embrace the experience as central to our identity as individuals¶ or as women. To claim that this experience is core to identity¶ as a "woman" is to exclude some women. 74

#### The second link is age--age allows older women to express non-traditional gender norms and roles—their analysis ignores this. Their binary thinking loses it’s organizing power during old age—ignoring this is both ageist and reproduces inequalities.

Silver, 2003 [Catherine, Brooklyn College and The Graduate Center, Gendered identities in old age: Toward (de)gendering? Journal of Aging Studies¶ 17 (2003) 379–397]

Today, older women have more choices, greater aspirations, and can more freely express¶ nontraditional gender and sexual orientations.¶ 17¶ The leveling of power differential between¶ older men and women and the weakening of traditional gender expectations in everyday life¶ induce the emergence of new psychological states, namely, tendencies toward the integration¶ of feminine and masculine characteristics¶ (Baltes & Smith, 1999; Jung, 1933)¶ .¶ Gutmann¶ (1987)¶ pointed to the socioevolutionary tendency of gender reversal in old age. Some¶ researchers make a case for helping the integration of feminine and masculine features in old¶ age¶ (LaBouvie-Vief, 1994)¶ ; still others argue that the personality structure of older persons¶ becomes more androgynous¶ (Erikson et al., 1986, p. 214; Huyck, 1999)¶ . Androgyny as a¶ psychological state that combines aspects of femininity and masculinity affects social and¶ health outcomes, with ‘‘femininity’’ playing an increasingly important role for both males and¶ females. There is a positive relationship between androgyny and qualitative well being¶ (Ruffing-Rahal, Barin, & Combs, 1998)¶ , as well as between androgyny and productivity¶ among scientists¶ (Rossi, 1985a,b)¶ . A tendency toward androgyny was shown to be especially significant in widowhood¶ (O’Bryant, 1994)¶ . These psychological processes and subjective¶ states can be experienced as arenas for creativity, and forms of liberation from the restrictive¶ definitions of womanhood and femininity (Pearsall, 1977,¶ Myerhoff, 1978¶ ).

Feminists who advocate a (de)gendering process stress the need to deconstruct modes of¶ binary thinking and their expression in institutional settings and ideologies that reproduce¶ inequalities. The question remains: How do individuals change modes of thinking about¶ gender in social settings that are built on binary conceptions? The analysis of the third and¶ fourth ages is provocative because it provides an arena to explore what happens to the self¶ when binary thinking and gender categorization lose their organizing power. Research¶ findings point to the greater gender flexibility and changeability of the self. The lifting of¶ normative expectations, rolessness¶ (Erikson et al., 1986)¶ , role reversal¶ (Gutmann, 1987)¶ , and¶ biopsychological changes¶ (Rossi, 1985a,b)¶ create a paradoxical situation that presents older¶ individuals with greater economic dependence and at the same time greater normative¶ freedom from institutional frames¶ (Bauman & May, 2001)¶ . Feminist theorists have argued for¶ the need to create gender equality and diminish gender differences. However, despite¶ socioeconomic changes and women’s achievements in the labor force over the last decades,¶ the social order is still constructed and reproduced around gender differences defined as¶ ‘‘natural.’’ Postmodern feminist theorists have challenged the binary construction of a¶ gendered self and have stressed the need for analyzing and understanding multiplicities¶ and intersectionality of features of the self. However, their theoretical construct has yet to¶ include an epistemology of age.

#### The third link is bisexual invisibility—women who still or also enjoy sex with men cannot express themselves or their experiences—they would be rejected by the aff—this causes bisexual people to internalize the same sort of repressive structure they criticize

Hartman, 2006 [Julie E. Hartman, PHD gender and sociology, (2006) Another Kind of ¶ “¶ Chilly Climate¶ ”¶ , Journal¶ of Bisexuality, 5:4, 61-76]

The “Chilly Climate” of Discrimination from the LBGT Community¶ One reason the climate is chilly is because bisexuals have trouble “fitting¶ in” with both the larger LBGT community and more specifically the lesbian¶ community. Tensions between bisexual women and lesbians will be discussed¶ later in this paper, but first I shall focus on the ways bisexual women experi¶ -¶ ence not fitting in within the broader LBGT community.¶ Over the course of the past few decades many groups within the LBGT¶ community have changed their names to include the words bisexual and¶ transgender. One might think that with the inclusion of bisexuals in most¶ group names, bi-identified people would feel that the LBGT community was¶ their own, yet that is not how the women I spoke with felt. The problem seems¶ no longer to be overt (most groups do not actively discriminate against bisex¶ -¶ ual people) but rather in hidden ways that make for a “chilly climate” for bi¶ -¶ sexuals. One of the women I spoke with compared the situation of¶ discrimination against bisexuals within the LBGT community to the way race¶ is in America. As Emily, a 20-year-old student, explained to me:

I definitely think it’s [discrimination] still there.¶ ...I¶ think that the hardest part is that it’s covert. It’s like how racism is now. I mean, Black peo¶ -¶ ple may have equal rights but it’s still there. You can’t put your finger on¶ what it is, but it’s there. I¶ ...it¶ feels like¶ ...it’s¶ little things in a conversa¶ -¶ tion, like if you talk about the guy you’re dating you get . . . like people¶ invalidate that¶ . . . and people seem to act like maybe it’s just a phase.¶ You develop this strong sisterhood and so when somebody breaks away¶ from that and starts dating men it seems to put the rift back between you.¶ Like they’re this and you’re not anymore.

One form this discrimination takes is through the invisibility/ignorance of¶ bisexuality. While participants in this project expressed a variety of issues and¶ ideas in our discussions, one issue that every participant spoke of was the in¶ -¶ visibility of bisexuality. Even the bisexual women I spoke with who have¶ found a place for themselves within this community expressed the difficulty¶ they have had fitting in. While the LBGT community has been supportive of¶ their “gay side” the other side of their identity has been neglected. As Angela,¶ a 19-year-old bisexual woman explained to me about her experience with¶ wearing “pride” symbols:

I’ve also had people tell me I shouldn’t wear pride bracelets or stickers¶ because I’m bi, not gay. And I know straight people who have rainbow¶ stuff, why aren’t you yelling at them? And they’re like, well, they’re al-¶ lies. And I’m like, I’m an ally and a member of the community. And they¶ don’t get that.¶ Throughout the interview Angela described the pressure she felt not to talk¶ about her heterosexual relationships within the LBGT community. Yet she at¶ -¶ tributes this pressure to her own thinking, as she explains in the following ex¶ -¶ cerpt from her interview.

I can’t talk about my heterosexual relationships when I can talk about¶ my homosexual relationships. Which is purely me and my own feelings.¶ It’s nothing they’ve done to make me feel that way, it’s just my own like,¶ oh my god are they gonna be OK with this. When I first came here I did¶ -¶ n’t know how open they really are. And they are supportive here. I think¶ bisexual and transgender gets left out a lot in a lot of the literature and¶ stuff though, because it’s usually just gay and straight. And people don’t¶ really understand. It’s like, you’re straight, you like the opposite sex,¶ fine. You’re gay, you like the same sex, fine. But wait, you like both¶ sexes? Why? How?

This exemplifies an issue often explored in feminist consciousness-raising,¶ the connection of personal troubles with the larger community. Almost every¶ one interviewed had a story about feeling uncomfortable, yet most people¶ thought this was something that only happened to him or her. Angela cites the¶ lack of bisexual and transgender issues in the LBGT literature, but doesn’t¶ necessarily connect this to her own feelings of being uncomfortable discuss¶ -¶ ing her heterosexual relationships. The result is that women feel a self-imposed pressure to hide their “heterosexual side.

#### Permutation- embrace the position of the bisexual—as opposed to their totalizing binary politics, we should refuse both heterosexuality AND homosexuality as two sides of the same coin. This provides individual agency while also supplying a challenge to patriarchy—it’s the only solution to provide agency

Hartman, 2006 [Julie E. Hartman, PHD gender and sociology, (2006) Another Kind of ¶ “¶ Chilly Climate¶ ”¶ , Journal¶ of Bisexuality, 5:4, 61-76]

In addition to queer theory, post-structuralists have also looked at the socio¶ -¶ logical aspects of sexuality. Namaste (1994) stresses the importance of bridging the gap between queer theory and sociology to study sexuality. Here¶ Namaste draws on the work of Foucault and Derrida to examine the ways in¶ which homosexuality and heterosexuality depend upon one another for their¶ very definition. In a binary system there is no “center” without the “margin”¶ (and there is nothing “in between”) and there is no “other” unless you have¶ something for comparison. Namaste argues that when one attempts to define¶ his or her sexuality outside this binary norm, one must conform to it in order¶ for others to understand this “new” position and respond appropriately.¶ Namaste, like many other authors, only briefly touches on the issue of bisexu¶ -¶ ality and the impact it has on the heterosexual/homosexual dualism. The au¶ -¶ thor asks, “Is the category ‘homosexual’ the only one available to resist¶ heterosexual hegemony? Where do bisexuals and transgenders fit into these¶ debates?” (p. 228). Namaste suggests that those who refuse both options may¶ be the most effective site of resistance. While it is often difficult to survive in a¶ binary system when one refuses to choose, there is agency in not forcing¶ oneself into a category.

#### Appeals for institutional restrain are a crucial supplement to political resistance to executive power.

David **COLE** Law @ Georgetown **’12** “The Politics of the Rule of Law: The Role of Civil Society in the Surprising Resilience of Human Rights in the Decade after 9/11” http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Cole%201.12.12.pdf p. 51-53

As I have shown above, while political forces played a significant role in checking President Bush, what was significant was the particular substantive content of that politics; it was not just any political pressure, but pressure to maintain fidelity to the rule of law. Politics standing alone is as likely to fuel as to deter executive abuse; consider the lynch mob, the Nazi Party in Germany, or xenophobia more generally. What we need if we are to check abuses of executive power is a politics that champions the rule of law. Unlike the politics Posner and Vermeule imagine, this type of politics cannot be segregated neatly from the law. On the contrary, it will often coalesce around a distinctly legal challenge, objecting to departures from distinctly legal norms, heard in a court case, as we saw with Guantanamo. Congress’s actions make clear that had Guantanamo been left to the political process, there would have been few if any advances. The litigation generated and concentrated political pressure on claims for a restoration of the values of legality, and, as discussed above, that pressure then played a critical role in the litigation’s outcome, which in turn affected the political pressure for reform. There is, to be sure, something paradoxical about this assessment. The rule of law, the separation of powers, and human rights are designed to discipline and constrain politics, out of a concern that pure majoritarian politics, focused on the short term, is likely to discount the long-term values of these principles. Yet without a critical mass of political support for these legal principles, they are unlikely to be effective checks on abuse, for many of the reasons Posner andVermeule identify. The answer, however, is not to abandon the rule of law for politics, but to develop and nurture a political culture that values the rule of law itself. Civil society organizations devoted to such values, such as Human Rights Watch, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the American Civil Liberties Union, play a central role in facilitating, informing, and generating that politics. Indeed, they have no alternative. Unlike governmental institutions, civil society groups have no formal authority to impose the limits of law themselves. Their recourse to the law’s limits is necessarily indirect: they can file lawsuits seeking judicial enforcement, lobby Congress for statutory reform or other legislative responses, or seek to influence the executive branch. But they necessarily and simultaneously pursue these goals through political avenues – by appealing to the public for support, educating the public, exposing abuses, and engaging in public advocacy around rule-of-law values. Unlike ordinary politics, which tends to focus on the preferences of the moment, the politics of the rule of law is committed to a set of long-term principles. Civil society organizations are uniquely situated to bring these long-term interests to bear on the public debate. Much like a constitution itself, civil society groups are institutionally designed to emphasize and reinforce our long-term interests. When the ordinary political process is consumed by the heat of a crisis, organizations like the ACLU, Human Rights First, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, designed to protect the rule of law, are therefore especially important. While Congress and the courts were at best compromised and at worst complicit in the abuses of the post-9/11 period, civil society performed admirably. The Center for Constitutional Rights brought the first lawsuit seeking habeas review at Guantanamo, and went on to coordinate a nationwide network of volunteer attorneys who represented Guantanamo habeas petitioners. The ACLU filed important lawsuits challenging secrecy and government excesses, and succeeded in disclosing many details about the government’s illegal interrogation program. Both the ACLU and CCR filed lawsuits and engaged in public advocacy on behalf of torture and rendition victims, and challenging warrantless wiretapping. Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First wrote important reports on detention, torture, and Guantanamo, and Human Rights First organized former military generals and admirals to speak out in defense of humanitarian law and human rights. These efforts are but a small subset of the broader activities of civil society, at home and abroad, that helped to bring to public attention the Bush administration’s most questionable initiatives, and to portray the initiatives as contrary to the rule of law. At their best, civil society organizations help forge a politics of the rule of law, in which there is a symbiotic relationship between politics and law: the appeal to law informs a particular politics, and that politics reinforces the law’s appeal, in a mutually reinforcing relation. Posner and Vermeule understand the importance of politics as a checking force in the modern world, but fail to see the critical qualification that the politics must be organized around a commitment to fundamental principles of liberty, equality, due process, and the separation of powers – in short, the rule of law. Margulies and Metcalf recognize that politics as much as law determines the reality of rights protections, but fail to identify the unique role that civil society organizations play in that process. It is not that the “rule of politics” has replaced the “rule of law,” but that, properly understood, a politics of law is a critical supplement to the rule of law. We cannot survive as a constitutional democracy true to our principles without both. And our survival turns, not only on a vibrant constitution, but on a vibrant civil society dedicated to reinforcing and defending constitutional values.

#### No root cause of war so changing existing norms alone fails– counter-cultural pressures require political agency that respects the power of dominant systems.

Jack **SNYDER** IR @ Columbia **’12** in *Power and Progress* p. 88-92

The end of the Cold War has given rise to hopes among many international relations scholars and public activists that a dramatic transformation in world politics is now unfolding. They contend that changes in norms, ideas, and culture have the power to tame the historically war-prone nature of international anarchy. ' This analysis and the prescriptions that follow from it exaggerate the autonomy of ideas and culture in shaping behavior in anarchy. A rich body of research on war by anthropologists suggests that ideas and culture are best understood not as autonomous but as embedded in complex social systems shaped by the interaction of material circumstances, institutional arrangements, and strategic choices, as well as by ideas and culture. Cultural prescriptions that ignore these multifaceted interactions will provide a poor road map to guide strategies of global change. Those who foresee substantial opportunities to transform the war-prone international system into a realm governed by benign norms contend that "anarchy is what states make of it."2 In their view, culture, defined as shared knowledge or symbols that create meaning within a social group, determines whether behavior in the absence of a common governing authority is bloody or benign. If more benign ideas and identities are effectively spread across the globe through cultural change and normative persuasion, then "ought" can be transformed into "is". Support for warlike dictators can be undermined, perpetrators of war crimes and atrocities can be held accountable, benign multicultural identities can be fostered, and international and civil wars w ill wane3 These academic concepts have a potent counterpart in the international human rights approach of activist organizations 4 In contrast, skeptics about such transformations argue that anarchy, whether among states coexisting in a self- help system or among contending groups inside collapsed states , gives rise to an inescapable logic of insecurity and competition that culture cannot trump5 These skeptics fear that a transformative attempt to supersede self-help behavior amounts to reckless overreaching that will create backlashes and quagmires. Ironically, in this view, the idealist vanguard of the new world order will need to rely increasingly on old-fashioned military and economic coercion in a futile effort to change world culture for the better.6 This is a debate of compelling intellectual and practical import. It lays bare the most fundamental assumptions about the nature of world politics that underpin real policy choices about the deployment of the vast military, economic, and moral resources of the United States and other wealthy democraci es. However, some of the leading voices in this debate, both in academic and broader public settings, overlook the decisive interplay between situational constraints and the creation of culture. Prophets of transformation sometimes assert that politics in anarchy and society is driven by " ideas almost all the way down." They dismiss as negligible what Alexander Wendt ca lls "rump" material constraints rooted in biology, the physical environment, or other circumstances unalterable through changes in symbolism.7 For them, "agency" by political actors committed to social change consists primarily in working to alter prevailing principled ideas, such as promoting the norm of universal jurisdiction in the case of crimes against humanity. In contrast, working for improved outcomes within existing constraints of material power, for example, by bargaining with still powerful human rights abusers, does not count for them as true "agency"; rather it is mere myopic "problem solving" within constraints8 Conversely, when prophets of continuity discuss culture at all, they treat it as a largely unchangeable force that may have some effect in constituting the units competing for security but that has at most a secondary effect on strategic interactions between those units, which are driven mainly by the logic of the anarchical situation9 This is an unnecessarily truncated menu of possibilities for imagining the relationship between anarchy and culture. Ironically, in light of the ambitiously activist agenda of the proponents of cultural approaches to international relations, their one-dimensional approach limits agents to a peculiarly circumscribed set of tools for promoting political change. A more promising approach would integrate the material, institutional, and cultural aspects of social change, drawing on the insights of theories of complex systems. Robert Jervis reminds us that the elements of complex systems, such as international anarchy, are highly interconnected and consequently the behavior of the system as a whole cannot be understood just by examining its separate parts.10 In a tightly coupled system, a change in one of its aspects, such as norms or ideas, is unlikely to have simple, linear effects . T he consequences of any change can be predicted only by considering its interaction with other attributes of the system. For example, whether the spread of the concept of national self-determination promotes peace or war may depend on the material and institutional setting in which it occurs. Negative feedback may cancel out a change that is at odds with the self-correcting logic of the system as a whole. Conversely, in unstable systems, positive feedback may amplify the effects of small changes. More complicated feedback effects may also be possible, depending on the nature of the system. Actions in a system may have different consequences when carried out in different sequences. In social systems, outcomes of an actor's plans depend on strategic interactions with the choices of other independent decision nl.akers. For example, projects for cultural change are likely to provoke cultural counterprojects from those threatened by them. Even in "games against nature," changes in behavior may transform the material setting in ways that foil actors' expectation s. For all these reasons, system effects are likely to skew or derail transformative efforts that focus narrowly on changing a single aspect of social life, such as norms and ideas. All of these system effects are relevant to understanding the effect of culture on conflict in anarchy. As I describe later, anthropological research on war shows that ideas, norms, and culture are typically interconnected with the material and institutional elements of anarchical social systems in ways that produce the full panoply of Jervis's system effects. In such systems, efforts to promote cultural transformation need to take into account the material and situational preconditions that sustain these developments; otherwise they are likely to produce unintended consequences. Underestimating situational constraints is just as dangerous and unwarranted as reifying them. Testing the effects of culture: insights from the anthropology of war Current debates about anarchy and culture have been carried out largely at the level of abstract philosophy and visceral morality. Ultimately, however, the impact of culture on war in anarchy is an empirical question. What evidence should be examined? To assess the claim that behavior in an anarchical system is what the units and their culture make of it, the obvious methodological move is to vary the culture of the units or of the system as a whole and then assess the effect on behavior. Reasonably enough, some scholars who see anarchical behavior as culturally constructed examine contemporary changes, such as the peaceful end of the Cold War, the emergence of the democratic peace, and the purported current strengthening of human rights norms. 11 In assessing such developments , it is difficult to distinguish the hopes of transitional moments from enduring trends . These kinds of tests, while not irrelevant , are not well designed to disentangle the effects of autonomous changes in ideas and culture from the effects of selfjustifying US hegemonic power, an ideological pattern that was quite familiar in the old world order. Other scholars try to show that the progenitor of the contemporary international system-the historical European balance-of-power system among sovereign states-was itself a by-product of ideas, such as the Protestant Reformation or analogies between sovereignty and individual property rights.12 The implication is that whatever has been established by ideas can also be dismantled by ideas. However, it is not a simple task to disentangle the effects of war, state formation, and ideological change on the emergence of the competitive states system. 13 Arguably, a comparison of the European system with behavior in other anarchical state systems offers a methodologically cleaner way to vary culture and assess its effects. However, when cultural constructivists do look at behavior in anarchies in cultural settings radically different from our own, they sometimes fail to exploit obvious opportunities for focused comparison. For example, Ian Johnston's prominent book Cultural Realism shows how the strategic wisdoms of the anarchical ancient Chinese Warring States system were passed down to future generations to constitute a warlike strategic "culture." His adherence to a cultural account of Chinese strategic practices remains untroubled by the fact that these ideas and practices are similar to those of the anarchic European balance- ofpower system, the ancient Greek city-states, and the ancient Indian states system described by Kautilya, a set of cultures diverse in almost every way except their strategic behavior. 14 At a first approximation, it would seem from this evidence that state behavior in anarchy is not fundamentally altered by variations in culture. This is not to deny that cultural differences may have influenced the meaning the actors imputed to their military behavior, some of the goals for which they fought, and some political features of these anarchical systems. Nonetheless, the evidence from historical state systems strongly suggests that the situational incentives of anarchy have significantly shaped strategic behavior in ways that transcend culture. Constructivists have paid less attention to another body of evidence ideally suited to assessing the effects of variations in culture on behavior in anarchy. For decades, anthropologists have been amassing a theoretically rich, empirically substantial, and methodologically self-aware body of statistical and case- study research on the relationship between war and culture in stateless societies and preindustrial anarchic systems. 15 Many of the causal factors and processes they examine will seem strikingly familiar to students of modern international relations-for example, security fears, economic rivalry between groups, economic interdependence, the institutionalization of cooperative ties across political units, the popular accountability of decision makers, and the nature of identities and cultural symbolism of the political units and of the anarchic system as a whole. Notwithstanding the familiarity of these categories, the kinds of societies anthropologists of war study differ vastly from contemporary, industrialized, bureaucratized societies, and thus research findings on the anthropological history of war can not simply be read off and applied to debates about the construction of culture in today's "new world order." Indeed, a central part of the constructivist claim is that the spread of a new democratic culture may be on the verge of making obsolete all those old cultural patterns, whether those of the Cold War, the ancient Chinese Warring States, or warring villages in the Venezuelan jungle. 16 Moreover, evidence based on technologically primitive societies, some of which lack the minimal economic resources needed for assured survival, may load the dice in favor of explanations based on material pressures. However, following the arguments ofDurkheim or Weber, one could also argue that this type of evidence is biased in favor of cultural explanations on the grounds that social solidarity in such societies is achieved more through cultural rituals than through differentiated, rational- legal institutions