**Politics**

**Obama will win the debt ceiling fight – strength and resolve are key to forcing the GOP to bend**

**POLITICO 10 – 1** – 13 [“Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3>]

President Barack Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a **display of resolve and strength** that could redefine his presidency. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no. For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk. “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” **by waiting them out**, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage **forces them to bend.** “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

**Plan kills Obama’s agenda**

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One of the mechanisms by which congressional opposition influences presidential cost-benefit calculations is by sending signals of American disunity to the target state. Measuring the effects of such congressional signals on the calculations of the target state is always difficult. In the case of Iraq it is exceedingly so, given the lack of data on the non-state insurgent actors who were the true “target” of the American occupation after the fall of the Hussein regime. Similarly, in the absence of archival documents, such as those from the Reagan Presidential Library presented in chapter 5, it is all but impossible to measure the effects of congressional signals on the administration’s perceptions of the military costs it would have to pay to achieve its objectives militarily.

By contrast. measuring the domestic political costs of congressional opposition, while still difficult, is at least a tractable endeavor. Chapter 2 posited two primary pathways through which congressional opposition could raise the political costs of staying the course militarily for the president. **First. high-profile congressional challenges** to a use of force can affect real or anticipated public opinion and bring popular pressures to bear on the president to change course. Second, congressional opposition to the president’s conduct of military affairs **can compel him to spend considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major items on his programmatic agenda**. On both of these dimensions, congressional opposition to the war in Iraq appears to have had the predicted effect.

**Losing military authority will embolden the GOP to fight on the debt ceiling**

**SEEKING ALPHA 9 – 10** – 13 [“Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight” <http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight>]

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of his primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability.

I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four.

While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling. Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be **emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues.** Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand-alone debt ceiling increase. However, the right wing of Boehner's caucus has been pushing for more, including another $1 trillion in spending cuts, defunding of Obamacare, and a one year delay of the individual mandate. Already, Conservative PACs have begun airing advertisements, urging a debt ceiling fight over Obamacare. **With the President rendered hapless** on Syria, **they will become even more vocal** about their hardline resolution, **setting us up for a showdown** that will rival 2011's debt ceiling fight.

I currently believe the two sides will pass a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open, and then the GOP will wage a massive fight over the debt ceiling. While Obama will be weakened, he will be unwilling to undermine his major achievement, his healthcare law. In all likelihood, both sides will dig in their respective trenches, unwilling to strike a deal, essentially in a game of chicken. If the House blocks Syrian action, it will take America as close to a default as it did in 2011. Based on the market action then, we can expect massive volatility in the final days of the showdown with the Dow falling 500 points in one session in 2011. As markets panicked over the potential for a U.S. default, we saw a massive risk-off trade, moving from equities into Treasuries. I think there is a significant chance we see something similar this late September into October. The Syrian vote has major implications on the power of Obama and the far-right when it comes to their willingness to fight over the debt ceiling. If the Syrian resolution fails, the debt ceiling fight will be even worse, which will send equities lower by upwards of 10%.

Investors must be prepared for this "black swan" event. Looking back to August 2011, stocks that performed the best were dividend paying, less-cyclical companies like Verizon (VZ), Wal-Mart (WMT), Coca-Cola (KO) and McDonald's (MCD) while high beta names like Netflix (NFLX) and Boeing (BA) were crushed. Investors also flocked into treasuries despite default risk while dumping lower quality bonds as spreads widened. The flight to safety helped treasuries despite U.S. government issues. I think we are likely to see a similar move this time. Assuming there is a Syrian "no" vote, I would begin to roll back my long exposure in the stock market and reallocate funds into treasuries as I believe yields could drop back towards 2.50%. Within the stock market, I think the less-cyclical names should outperform, making utilities and consumer staples more attractive. For more tactical traders, I would consider buying puts against the S&P 500 and look toward shorting higher-beta and defense stocks like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LMT). I also think lower quality bonds would suffer as spreads widen, making funds like JNK vulnerable. Conversely, gold (GLD) should benefit from the fear trade. I would also like to address the potential that Congress does not vote down the Syrian resolution. First, news has broken that Russia has proposed Syria turn over its chemical stockpile. If Syria were to agree (Syria said it was willing to consider), the U.S. would not have to strike, **canceling the congressional vote**. The proposal can be found here. I strongly believe this is a delaying tactic rather than a serious effort. In 2005, Libya began to turn over chemical weapons; it has yet to complete the hand-off. Removing and destroying chemical weapons is an exceptionally challenging and dangerous task that would take years, not weeks, making this deal seem unrealistic, especially because a cease-fire would be required around all chemical facilities. The idea that a cease-fire could be maintained for months, essentially allowing Assad to stay in office, is hard to take seriously. I believe this is a delaying tactic, and Congress will have to vote within the next two weeks. The final possibility is that Democrats back their President and barely ram the Syria resolution through. I think the extreme risk of a full-blown debt stand-off to dissipate. However, Boehner has promised a strong fight over the debt limit that the market has largely ignored. I do believe the fight would still be worse than the market anticipates but not outright disastrous. As such, I would not initiate short positions, but I would trim some longs and move into less cyclical stocks as the risk would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to some drama not no drama. Remember, **in politics everything is connected**. Syria is not a stand-alone issue. Its resolution will impact the power structure in Washington. A failed vote in Congress is likely to make the debt ceiling fight even worse, spooking markets, and threatening default on U.S. obligations unless another last minute deal can be struck.

**Destroys the global economy**

**DAVIDSON 9 – 15** – 13 co-founder and co-host of Planet Money, a co-production of the NYT and NPR [Adam Davidson, Our Debt to Society, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&>]

The Daily Treasury Statement, a public accounting of what the U.S. government spends and receives each day, shows how money really works in Washington. On Aug. 27, the government took in $29 million in repaid agricultural loans; $75 million in customs and duties; $38 million in the repayment of TARP loans; some $310 million in taxes; and so forth. That same day, the government also had bills to pay: $247 million in veterans-affairs programs; $2.5 billion to Medicare and Medicaid; $1.5 billion each to the departments of Education and Defense. By the close of that Tuesday, when all the spending and the taxing had been completed, the government paid out nearly $6 billion more than it took in.

This is the definition of a deficit, and it illustrates why the government needs to borrow money almost every day to pay its bills. Of course, all that daily borrowing adds up, and we are rapidly approaching what is called the X-Date — the day, somewhere in the next six weeks, when the government, by law, cannot borrow another penny. Congress has imposed a strict limit on how much debt the federal government can accumulate, but for nearly 90 years, it has raised the ceiling well before it was reached. But since a large number of Tea Party-aligned Republicans entered the House of Representatives, in 2011, raising that debt ceiling has become a matter of fierce debate. This summer, House Republicans have promised, in Speaker John Boehner’s words, “a whale of a fight” before they raise the debt ceiling — if they even raise it at all.

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, **the ultimate national financial disaster** achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest **self-imposed financial disaster** in history.

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. **economy would collapse** far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that **the collapse might be more insidious**. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes **within shouting distance of a default** (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), **the world’s investors** — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.

While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.

The U.S. benefits enormously **from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven**. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, **no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status**. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, **the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier**.

**Global nuke wars**

**Kemp 10**—Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Geoffrey Kemp, 2010, *The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East*, p. 233-4]

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

**Exec CP**

**The President of the United States should declare that the United States will not use nuclear weapons first.**

**Declaratory policy solves for a NFU**

**LAIRD 09** national security analyst in the Washington, D.C. area

 [Burgess Laird is a, 7/21, “A Guide to the Challenges Facing President Obama's Nuclear Abolition Agenda” Carnegie Council, http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles\_papers\_reports/0025.html]

Adopting a Policy of No First Use

There is another initiative that many experts advocate, but that the Obama Administration has not embraced. It is the option of adopting and announcing to the world what is known as a "no first use" declaratory policy (the United States has never had such a policy). Declaratory policy is critically important; it effects procurement decisions, the alert procedures of our nuclear forces, and even our operational plans themselves. Equally important, **it affects the analogous nuclear policies of other nations**.

The declaration of a no first use policy would notify the nations of the world that the United States would only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear weapon attack upon it. Currently, U.S. policy is much broader and deliberately ambiguous; under it the United States reserves a right to respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the United States, its people, its military forces, and U.S. friends and allies. The inclusion of chemical and biological weapons within the category of WMD means that the United States could use nuclear weapons to respond to a chemical or biological attack. Experts see a number of problems with such a policy, the foremost of which is that it seems to underscore the centrality of nuclear weapons in responding to attacks against which our advanced conventional capabilities would be more than sufficient for responding. In doing so, the United States sends a signal to other nations about what it believes to be legitimate potential uses of nuclear weapons. In short, many experts believe that current U.S. declaratory policy works at cross purposes with international anti-nuclear norms and non-proliferation efforts which are very much in the interests of the United States.

**Kritik**

**The aff focuses on the institutional solution to war powers ignoring the individual’s role – this re-entrenches gendered IR**

**Sylvester 12** (Christine Sylvester is Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut, USA and Professorial Affiliate of the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.) War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory

What if International Relations (IR) were to turn its usual view of war around and start not with states, fundamentalist organisations, strategies, conventional security issues and a weapons system, and not with the aim of establishing the causes of war, as has so often been the case? What if we think of war as experience, as something ordinary people observe and suffer physically and emotionally depending on their locations? To date, much of IR has been operating comfortably in a world of theoretical abstractions – states, systems, power, balances, stakeholders, decision-makers, peace, war – tacitly leaving people and war to journalists, novelists, memoirists, relief workers, anthropologists, women’s studies and social history to flesh out.1 **This means** that **IR is not addressing one of the key elements of war**: its actual mission of injuring human bodies and destroying normal patterns of social relations. Neglecting the human elements for strategic and interest politics renders the injurious nature of war a consequence rather than the actual focal point of war.2 **It** also **makes it more difficult to appreciate the decentralised aspects of** many contemporary **wars, which is to say the dispersal of authority to people who are** routinely **off IR’s grid** – like the Liberian peace women who forced Charles Taylor into peace talks and the kidnapped war women led by Black Diamond, who simultaneously gained notoriety as fierce combatants in the bush.3 As well, IR knows about the political economies and security mercenaries of war,4 but often finds the individuals who sustain and benefit from war less pertinent than the international web of interactions they create, **thus potentially missing links in chains that start and end with people**.

Much of IR actually seems unprepared for the presence, let alone the power, of ordinary people in international relations, whether those people walk through the Berlin Wall and help shift Cold War polarity, or toss out autocrats in the Arab Spring revolutions. Ordinary people are overwhelmingly absent in IR because they are not seen as key stakeholders in IR’s versions of international relations. My challenge to the field is to pay more attention to war as experience, on two grounds: **war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people** and not only studied down from places that sweep blood, tears and laughter away, or assign those things to some other field to look into; and **people demonstrate time and again that they too comprise international relations, especially the relations of war, and cannot therefore be ignored or relegated to a collateral status**. IR’s feminist wing of war studies, which is still taking shape, has implicitly made those kinds of propositions the touchstones of its war research. As well, scholars from a number of IR’s many camps work the boundaries of IR theories in ways that can reveal the people of war. Even IR traditions that make a point of operating above people (neorealism) can briefly mention people in war situations, albeit without elaborating their experiences or building them into IR theories.

**AND their representations create structural violence – that outweighs and turns the case – only evaluating IR can solve**

**Shepherd 09** [Laura J. Dept of Political Science and International Studies, U of Birmingham (UK), “Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies,” Political Studies Review, V7 I2, Apr]

According to conventional accounts of international relations (IR), scholars focus on war (predominantly as a means to providing the sovereign state with security) and the existence of war's corollary is a foundational assumption that goes largely unquestioned. Peace must exist, for international relations are not characterised by perpetual conflict. However, peace is implicitly defined, in dichotomous terms, by the absence of violent conflict, as 'not-war'. Of more analytical interest is conflict, which is always a possibility and which, moreover, occurs between states. International relations as a discipline, narrowly conceived, is largely unconcerned with activities that occur within the state. Minimally, feminist and other critical approaches to IR seek to correct such disciplinary myopia. While classical realism theorises the political actor –Hans Morgenthau's 'political man' (1973, pp. 15–6) – in order to construct the state as actor, the now dominant neo-realism abstracts the human subject from its disciplinary musings, leading to the infamous 'black box' model of the state. Early feminist scholarship challenged this assumption as well, arguing that individuals, as human subjects in all their messy complexity, are an integral part of international relations (see Shepherd, 2007, pp. 240–1). Attention to the human subject in I/international R/relations – or, as Christine Sylvester phrases it, 'relations international', to emphasise the embedded nature of all kinds of relations in the international sphere, including power relations and gender relations (Sylvester, 1994, p. 6; see also Enloe, 1996) – allows critical scholars to look beyond the disciplinary obsession with war. Further, it allows us to investigate one of the simplest insights of feminist IR, which is also one of the most devastating: the war/peace dichotomy is gendered, misleading and potentially pathological. In this essay, I address each of these concerns in turn, developing a critique of the war/peace dichotomy that is foundational to conventional approaches to IR through a review of three recent publications in the field of feminist security studies. These texts are Cynthia Enloe's (2007) Globalization and Militarism, David Roberts' (2008) Human Insecurity, and Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics by Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2008). Drawing on the insights of these books, I ask first how violence is understood in global politics, with specific reference to the gendered disciplinary blindnesses that frequently characterise mainstream approaches. Second, I demonstrate how a focus on war and peace can neglect to take into account the politics of everyday violence: the violences of the in-between times that international politics recognises neither as 'war' nor 'peace' and the violences inherent to times of peace that are overlooked in the study of war. Finally, I argue that **feminist security studies offers an important corrective to the foundational assumptions of IR, which themselves can perpetuate the very instances of violence that they seek to redress**. If we accept the core insights of feminist security studies – the centrality of the human subject, the importance of particular configurations of masculinity and femininity, and the gendered conceptual framework that underpins the discipline of IR – we are encouraged to envisage a rather different politics of the global. From Boudica to Bhopal As Sjoberg and Gentry recount (2008, pp. 38–9), Boudica was an Iceni queen who led an uprising against the Roman forces occupying the British Isles circa 61 AD. Prior to launching the attack, Boudica's refusal to allow a Roman general to claim ownership of her land resulted in the rape of her two daughters as punishment. However, 'many inherited tales about Boudica do not emphasise her personal or political motivations, but the savage and unwomanly brutality of her actions' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 39). Almost two thousand years later and half a planet away, a toxic gas leak in 1984 at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India caused the immediate deaths of approximately 3,000 people and left tens of thousands suffering the after-effects for decades (Roberts, 2008, p. 10). At first reading, little links these two accounts of quite different forms of violence. The first is an instance of violent resistance against imperial oppression, and Boudica has been vilified, her efforts delegitimised, in much the same way as many actors in 'small wars' tend to be in global politics today (see Barkawi, 2004). The second is perhaps more usefully seen as the result of structural violence, following Johan Galtung's explanation of the same, as 'violence where there is no such actor' (cited in Roberts, 2008, p. 18). However, by asking questions about Boudica and Bhopal that are born of a 'feminist curiosity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 1, p. 11), these texts demonstrate connections beyond the simplistic equation that is applicable to both: actor/structure plus violence equals death. In Human Insecurity, Roberts poses the question, 'What is violence?' (2008, p. 17). This is a question rarely asked in international relations. Violence is war: large-scale, state-dominated, much studied, war. However, the three texts under review here all offer more nuanced theories of violence that focus analytical attention on complex constructions of agency (institutional and international), structure, and the global context that is product and productive of such violence. Through an intricate and beautifully accessible analysis of modernity –'that pot of gold at the end of the global rainbow' (Enloe, 2007, p. 64) – Enloe encourages her readers to seek the connections between globalisation and militarisation, arguing that at the heart of this nexus lie important questions about violence and security. Roberts notes a broad dissatisfaction with the concept of 'human security' (2008, pp. 14–7), offering instead his investigative lens of 'human insecurity', defined as 'avoidable civilian deaths, occurring globally, caused by social, political and economic institutions and structures, built and operated by humans and which could feasibly be changed' (p. 28). Placing the human at the centre of concerns about security immediately challenges a conventional state-based approach to security, as Enloe explains. In a convincing account of the hard-fought expansion of the concept of security, mapped on to strategic and organisational gains made by various feminist organisations, Enloe reminds us that **if we take seriously the lives of women – their understandings of security – as well as on-the-ground workings of masculinity and femininity, we will be able to produce more meaningful and more reliable analyses of 'security'– personal, national and global** (Enloe, 2007, p. 47). This latter quote typifies an approach for which Enloe has become somewhat famous. In the early 1980s, Enloe began asking the questions for which she is rightly acknowledged as a key figure in feminist security studies, including Does Khaki Become You? (Enloe, 1983) and 'where are the women?' (Enloe, 2000; see also Enloe, 2004). Inspired by her own curiosity about the roles played by women and the functions performed by gender in the militarisation of civilian life, Enloe has explored prostitution, marriage, welfare and war making with an eye to the representation (both political and symbolic) of women. In Globalization and Militarism she offers detailed vignettes that illuminate just how interwoven violence is with the quest for (various types of) security, and demands that nothing is left unquestioned in a critical analysis of these concepts. Even baby socks (embossed with tiny fighter planes, a gift to the parent of a small boy) have something to tell us about gender, militarism and the casual representations of violence and war that society accepts (Enloe, 2007, pp. 143–4). Following a similar logic, although he initially defines human insecurity as avoidable civilian deaths, Roberts focuses on 'preventable female deaths ... and avoidable deaths in children under five' (2008, p. 31). While this conflation of 'civilian' with 'women and children' is rather problematic (see Carpenter, 2006), in asking not only, where are the women? but also, why are they dying in such disproportionate numbers? Roberts enhances his critique of 'most security studies ... [that] largely [miss] the scale of avoidable human misery and avoidable human death' (2008, p. 4). As mentioned above, Roberts uses Galtung's concept of structural violence to draw attention to the manifest ways in which an increasingly interconnected global system relies on gender and violence (and gendered violence) for its perpetuation: 'The process of globalization, to which few are ideologically or otherwise opposed, is an essential conveyor and articulator of the masculinity that underpins andrarchy' (Roberts, 2008, p. 157). Whereas Enloe offers a persuasive and accessible account of patriarchy, a concept familiar to feminist and non-feminist scholars alike (Enloe, 2007, pp. 66–8), Roberts suggests 'andrarchy' as an alternative, which he defines as 'the gender-partisan ideological domination and rule structure that determines and sustains the general relative power of males over females globally' (Roberts, 2008, p. 140). However, it is difficult to see how this reformulation either differs substantively from patriarchy as an analytical tool or assists in the construction of an alternative theory of global violence that centralises the individual, and therefore takes gender seriously, in that it seems to essentialise violent actors (males) and violated victims (females). In contrast, Enloe's explanation of patriarchy challenges such essentialism as its first point of critical intervention. That is, the assumption of essential differences between men and women is part of patriarchal ideology, feeding into stereotypical notions of how such men and women should behave, which in turn constitute recognisable discourses of gender: sets of narratives about masculinity and femininity and how these are, in general, respectively privileged and marginalised. The most theoretically coherent account of gender and violence offered in these three texts comes from Sjoberg and Gentry and employs the notion of discourse to great effect. Whereas Roberts seeks to map out a consciously structural account of global violence, where the structure in question is a hybrid of andrarchy and a 'rapacious, increasingly competitive and hyper-masculine' neoliberalism (Roberts, 2008, p. 118), Sjoberg and Gentry offer a more sophisticated analysis of structure and agency in their 'relational autonomy framework' that accounts for both individual agency and structural constraint (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 189–98). When people perform acts of political violence, they argue, this is a conscious choice, but crucially individuals 'choose within a specified spectrum of socially acceptable choices' (p. 190). 'In its simplest form, relational autonomy is the recognition that freedom of action is defined and limited by social relationships' (p. 194) and this has profound implications for the study of violence in global politics. Sjoberg and Gentry use this insight to demonstrate that women's violence in global politics is rendered unintelligible, through narrative representations of the perpetrators as mothers, monsters or whores (in media discourse and academic discussion), rather than as autonomous agents. From the abuses of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, via the 'black widows' of Chechnya, to female perpetrators of genocidal violence in Rwanda, the authors show how representations of women's violence conform to and further confirm the stereotypes of violent women as either mothers (supporting or vengeful), monsters or sexually deviant whores (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 30–49). The very different theories of violence outlined in these three texts all contribute to the development of a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of violence in global politics. By insisting that international relations are also gender relations – by demanding that we recognise that states are an analytical abstraction and politics is practised or performed by gendered bodies – all of the authors put forward theories of violence that are corrective of gender blindness, in that the violences in question are simultaneously gendered and gendering (see Shepherd, 2008, pp. 49–54). They are gendered because they have different impacts on male and female bodies (Enloe, 2007, p. 13), both materially as people experience violence differently depending on their gender (and race, class, sexuality and so on) and also discursively, as what we expect of men and women in terms of their behaviours, violent and otherwise, is limited by the meaning(s) ascribed to male and female bodies by society. Regarding the former, Roberts proposes that we term the global victimisation of women 'structural femicide' (Roberts, 2008, p. 65), but does not sufficiently engage with the question of whether defining gendered violence as violence against women (and children) functions to constitute the subject of 'woman' as a perpetual victim, in need of protection and lacking in agency (Shepherd, 2008, p. 41). In contrast, Sjoberg and Gentry neatly articulate the interplay between material and discursive violence as they write a theory that accounts 'for people's impact on global politics and for the impact of narratives others construct for and about them' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 216, emphasis in original). Thus, violence is gendering as our understanding of politics is in part reproduced through violent actions. Through discursive violence against individuals – for example, representing Chechen women suicide terrorists as 'black widows', which demands that they are attributed the characteristics of the venomous and deadly black widow spider and, further, that their violence is grounded in familial loss, 'born directly of a desire for vengeance for the deaths of their husbands and sons' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 100) rather than as the result of a process of political decision making – our understanding of that individual and of the act of violence itself is produced. Similarly, through material acts of violence, discourses of gender are given physical form; the detainees at Abu Ghraib who were forced to simulate oral sex with each other were forced to do so in part because of crude cultural understandings of homosexuality as deviant and homosexuals as lesser men – that is, as women. To force a man to perform oral sex on another man is to undermine his masculinity and simultaneously to reinforce the gendered power relations that claim privilege for masculinity over femininity, heterosexuality over homosexuality – power relations that render such an act intelligible in the first instance. Such understandings of violence are beyond the remit of conventional state-based approaches to international relations. However, 'it is by tracking the gendered assumptions about how to wield feminization to humiliate male[s]' (Enloe, 2007, p. 115) and how to represent gendered individuals in such a way as to render some acts of violence intelligible as political and others as monstrous that we can begin to piece together a useful feminist account of global violence, which is a necessary component of understanding security. Everyday Violence and In-Between Days In addition to questioning what violence is, how it is represented and with what effects, feminist security studies scholarship also asks which violences are considered worthy of study and when these violences occur. Expanding the concept of violence that underpins feminist analysis, as outlined above, allows us to take seriously what Arthur Kleinman (2000) refers to as 'the violences of everyday life'. Beyond a narrow focus on war and state-based violence lies a plethora of everyday violences that feminist security studies seeks to address. In the field of security studies the broadening and deepening of the concept of security, such that it is no longer assumed to apply only to the sovereign state, has demonstrated the multiple insecurities experienced by individuals and social collectives (Booth, 2005, pp. 14–5). The development of the concept of 'human security' largely took place within the parameters of a wider disciplinary debate over the appropriate referent object for security studies (the individual, society, the state) and the types of threat to the referent object that would be recognised. In a move similar to Ken Booth's (1991) reformulation of security as emancipation, Roberts' quest for individual empowerment seeks to overcome the 'élite-legitimized disequilibrium' that results in the manifest insecurity of the majority of the world's population (Roberts, 2008, p. 185). As might be expected, the violences Roberts identifies are innumerable. In addition to the physical violences of 'infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate ("domestic", "honour" and "dowry") killings and lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five' (Roberts, 2008, p. 31), his analysis attacks the institutional structures of the dominant international financial institutions (pp. 117–35) and the andrarchal and neoliberal discourses that sustain them (pp. 136–58). In short, Roberts' answer to the question of which violences matter in global politics is quite simple: all of them. However, while studies of human security, he argues, seek to provide the human with security, his reformulated analytic takes as its starting point human insecurity; that is, he starts with the threat(s) to the sovereign subject rather than the subject's ontological condition. Roberts suggests that this circumvents the disciplinary definitional problem with human security – identified by Roland Paris (2001), Edward Newman (2001; 2004) and others – but I cannot see how this is the case, given that the answer to the question 'what is it that humans do to make the world a more dangerous and dysfunctional place?' (Roberts, 2008, p. 28) is also quite simple: we live in it. Thus Roberts' analytic seems to suffer the same lack of definitional clarity – and therefore policy relevance – that he ascribes to more conventional approaches; it is no easier to identify, quantify and ultimately reduce the threats experienced by coexisting human subjects than it is to provide those human subjects with security, if security can first be defined as freedom from fear or want. I do not espouse some construction of human nature (if such a thing were to exist) that assumes essential selfishness and a propensity for violence, nor do I assume that security is a zero-sum game, in that one person's security must always be at the expense of another's, but I recognise that even the most well-intentioned security policy can have unforeseen and sometimes disastrous effects. Sometimes, moreover, as Sjoberg and Gentry demonstrate, the decision to perform acts of political violence that are a source of insecurity for the intended victims can be understood if not condoned. Enloe's analytical remit is similarly wide-ranging to Roberts', in that she focuses on processes – globalisation and militarism – that are inherently violent. However, although Enloe also insists that all violences should count in the study of global politics, she grounds this claim in an analysis of specific sites of violence and demonstrates with startling clarity just how everyday items – for example, sneakers – are both globalised and militarised: Threaded through virtually every sneaker you own is some relationship to masculinized militaries. Locating factories in South Korea [in the 1960s and 1970s] was a good strategic decision in the eyes of those Oregon-headquartered male Nike executives because of the close alliance between male policymakers in Washington and Seoul. It was a relationship – unequal but intimate – based on their shared anticommunism, their shared commitment to waging the Cold War, and their shared participation in an ambitious international military alliance (Enloe, 2007, p. 28). By drawing her readers' attention to the ways in which discourses of gender (ideas about how 'proper' men and women should behave) function, Enloe reminds us that adhering to ideals of masculinity and femininity is both productive of violence and is a violence in itself, a violence against the empowered human subject. 'Ideas matter', she concludes, ideas about modernity, security, violence, threat, trust. 'Each of these ideas is fraught with blatant and subtle presumptions about masculinity and femininity. Ideas about both masculinity and femininity matter. This makes a feminist curiosity a necessity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 161). While conventional studies of IR and security may be willing to concede that ideas matter (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001), paying close attention to the work that gender does allows for a fuller understanding of why it is that particular violences fall outside the traditional parameters of study. As to the question of when violence is worthy of study, all three texts implicitly or explicitly draw on the popular feminist phrase: 'the personal is political'. This slogan neatly encapsulates the feminist critique of a supposed foundational divide between the private and the public realms of social life. In arguing that the personal is political, feminist theory refuses to accept that there are instances of human behaviour or situations in social life that can or should be bracketed from study. At its simplest, this critique led to the recognition of 'domestic violence' as a political, rather than a personal issue (see, for example Moore, 2003; Youngs, 2003), forming the foundation for critical studies of gendered violence in times of war and in times of peace that would otherwise have been ignored. Crucially, Enloe extended the boundaries of critique to include the international, imbuing the phrase with new analytical vitality when she suggested, first, that the phrase itself is palindromic (that is, that the political is also personal, inextricably intertwined with the everyday) and, second, that the personal is international just as the international is personal. 'The international is personal' implies that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. ... To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments' recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinised dignity and feminised sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood (Enloe, 2000, pp. 196–7). These ideas about dignity and sacrifice are not neatly contained within the temporal boundaries of any given war, nor are they incidental to the practice of warfare. Further, there is of course also the question of who gets to define or declare war, or peace. While some of the violent women whose actions are analysed by Sjoberg and Gentry perform their violences in wartime (for example, Lynndie England, who received the most attention from global media of the women involved in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib; see Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 67–70), others are fighting wars that are not sanctioned by the international community (such as the Chechen women [pp. 97–111] and female Palestinian suicide bombers [pp. 112–40]). As discussed above, ideas about masculinity and femininity, dignity and sacrifice may not only be violent in themselves, but are also the product/productive of physical violences. With this in mind, the feminist argument that 'peacetime' is analytically misleading is a valid one. Of interest are the 'in-between days' and the ways in which **labelling periods of war or peace as such can divert attention away from the myriad violences that inform and reinforce social behaviour**. [W]ar can surely never be said to start and end at a clearly defined moment. Rather, it seems part of a continuum of conflict, expressed now in armed force, now in economic sanctions or political pressure. A time of supposed peace may come later to be called 'the pre-war period'. During the fighting of a war, unseen by the foot soldiers under fire, peace processes are often already at work. A time of postwar reconstruction, later, may be re-designated as an inter bellum– a mere pause between wars (Cockburn and Zarkov, cited in El Jack, 2003, p. 9). Feminist security studies interrogates the pauses between wars, and the political processes – and practices of power – that demarcate times as such. In doing so, not only is the remit of recognisable violence (violence worthy of study) expanded, but so too are the parameters of what counts as IR. Everyday violences and acts of everyday resistance ('a fashion show, a tour, a small display of children's books' in Enloe, 2007, pp. 117–20) are the stuff of relations international and, thus, of a comprehensive understanding of security. In the following section I outline the ways in which taking these claims seriously allows us to engage critically with the representations of international relations that inform our research, with potentially profound implications. The Violent Reproduction of the International As well as conceiving of gender as a set of discourses, and violence as a means of reproducing and reinforcing the relevant discursive limits, **it is possible to see security as a set of discourses**, as I have argued more fully elsewhere (Shepherd, 2007; 2008; see also Shepherd and Weldes, 2007). Rather than pursuing the study of security as if it were something that can be achieved either in absolute, partial or relative terms, **engaging with security as discourse enables the analysis of how these discourses function to reproduce, through various strategies, the domain of the international with which IR is self-consciously concerned**. Just as violences that are gendering reproduce gendered subjects, on this view states, acting as authoritative entities, perform violences, but violences, in the name of security, also perform states. These processes occur simultaneously, and across the whole spectrum of social life: an instance of rape in war is at once gendering of the individuals involved and of the social collectivities – states, communities, regions – they feel they represent (see Bracewell, 2000); building a fence in the name of security that separates people from their land and extended families performs particular kinds of violence (at checkpoints, during patrols) and performs particular subject identities (of the state authority, of the individuals affected), all of which are gendered. All of the texts under discussion in this essay argue that it is imperative to explore and expose gendered power relations and, further, that doing so not only enables a rigorous critique of realism in IR but also reminds us as scholars of the need for such a critique. The critiques of IR offered by feminist scholars are grounded in a rejection of neo-realism/realism as a dominant intellectual framework for academics in the discipline and policy makers alike. As Enloe reminds us, 'the government-centred, militarized version of national security [derived from a realist framework] remains the dominant mode of policy thinking' (Enloe, 2007, p. 43). Situating gender as a central category of analysis encourages us to 'think outside the "state security box"' (p. 47) and to remember that 'the "individuals" of global politics do not work alone, live alone or politic alone – they do so in interdependent relationships with others' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 200) that are inherently gendered. One of the key analytical contributions of all three texts is the way in which they all challenge what it means to be 'doing' IR, by recognising various forms of violence, interrogating the public/private divide and demanding that attention is paid to the temporal and physical spaces in-between war and peace. Feminist security studies should not simply be seen as 'women doing security', or as 'adding women to IR/security studies', important as these contributions are. Through their theorising, the authors discussed here reconfigure what 'counts' as IR, challenging orthodox notions of who can 'do' IR and what 'doing' IR means. The practices of power needed to maintain dominant configurations of international relations are exposed, and critiquing the productive power of realism as a discourse is one way in which the authors do this. Sjoberg and Gentry pick up on a recent theoretical shift in Anglo-American IR, from system-level analysis to a recognition that individuals matter. However, as they rightly point out, the individuals who are seen to matter are not gendered relational beings, but rather reminiscent of Hobbes' construction of the autonomous rational actor. '[T]he narrowness of the group that [such an approach] includes limits its effectiveness as an interpretive framework and reproduces the gender, class and race biases in system-level international relationship scholarship' (Sjoberg and Gentry 2008, p. 200, emphasis added). Without paying adequate attention to the construction of individuals as gendered beings, or to the reproduction of widely held ideas about masculine and feminine behaviours, Sjoberg and Gentry remind us that we will ultimately fail 'to see and deconstruct the increasingly subtle, complex and disguised ways in which gender pervades international relations and global politics' (2008, p. 225). In a similar vein, Roberts notes that 'human security is marginalised or rejected as inauthentic [because] it is not a reflection of realism's (male) agendas and priorities' (2008, p. 169). The 'agendas and priorities' identified by Roberts and acknowledged by Sjoberg and Gentry as being productive of particular biases in scholarship are not simply 'academic' matters, in the pejorative sense of the term. As Roberts argues, 'Power relationships of inequality happen because they are built that way by human determinism of security and what is required to maintain security (p. 171). Realism, as academic discourse and as policy guideline, has material effects. Although his analysis employs an unconventional definition of the term 'social construction' (seemingly interchangeable with 'human agency') and rests on a novel interpretation of the three foundational assumptions of realism (Roberts, 2008, pp. 169–77), the central point that Roberts seeks to make in his conclusion is valid: 'it is a challenge to those who deny relationships between gender and security; between human agency (social construction) and lethal outcome' (p. 183). In sum, all three texts draw their readers to an inescapable, and – for the conventional study of IR – a devastating conclusion: the dominance of neo-realism/realism and the state-based study of security that derives from this is potentially pathological, in that it is in part productive of the violences it seeks to ameliorate. I suggest that critical engagement with orthodox IR theory is necessary for the intellectual growth of the discipline, and considerable insight can be gained by acknowledging the relevance of feminist understandings of gender, power and theory. The young woman buying a T-shirt from a multinational clothing corporation with her first pay cheque, the group of young men planning a stag weekend in Amsterdam, a group of students attending a demonstration against the bombing of Afghanistan – studying these significant actions currently falls outside the boundaries of doing security studies in mainstream IR and I believe these boundaries need contesting. As Marysia Zalewski argues: International politics is what we make it to be ... We need to rethink the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both that which we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world (Zalewski 1996, p. 352, emphasis in original). Conclusion: 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend' (Mao Tse-Tung) In this essay, I have used the analysis of three contemporary publications in the field of feminist security studies to demonstrate three significant sets of analytical contributions that such scholarship makes to the discipline of IR. Beyond the war/peace dichotomy that is frequently assumed to be definitive of the discipline, we find many and various forms of violence, occurring in and between temporally distinct periods of conflict, which are the product/productive of socially acceptable modes of gendered behaviour, ways of being in the world as a woman or man. I have also argued that critical engagement with conventional, state-based approaches to (national) security must persist as the academic discourses we write are complicit in the construction of the global as we understand it. Further, **'if all experience is gendered, analysis of gendered identities is an imperative starting point in the study of political identities and practice'** (Peterson, 1999, p. 37). To this end, I conclude by suggesting that we take seriously Enloe's final comment: 'Tracking militarization and fostering demilitarization will call for cooperative investigations, multiple skills and the appreciation of diverse perspectives' (2007, p. 164). While there has been intense intra-disciplinary debate within contemporary feminist security studies over the necessary 'feminist credentials' of some gendered analyses, it is important to recognise the continual renewal and analytical vigour brought to the field by such debates. Broadly speaking, there are two positions we might map. On the one side, there are those who refuse to reduce gender to a variable in their research, arguing that to do so limits the critical insight that can be gained from treating gender instead as a noun, a verb and a structural logic (see, for example, Sjoberg, 2006; Zalewski, 2007). On this view, 'gender', whether deployed as noun, verb or logic in a particular analysis, cannot be separated from the decades of feminist scholarship that worked to explore, expand on and elucidate what gender might mean. On the opposing side are scholars who, typically using phrases such as 'balanced consideration' (Jones, 1998, p. 303) and 'an inclusive perspective on gender and war' (Griffiths, 2003, pp. 327–8, emphasis in original), manipulate gender as a variable in their research to 'extend the scope of feminist IR scholarship' (Caprioli, 2004, p. 266) and to draw conclusions regarding sex-specific behaviours in conflict and post-conflict situations (see also Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Carpenter, 2006; Melander, 2005). Crucially, however, scholarship on both sides of this 'divide' coexists, and in doing so encourages 'the appreciation of diverse perspectives'. While bracketing feminist politics from the study of gender is an overtly political move, which can be presented as either strategic (Carpenter, 2006, pp. 6–10) or as common sense, in that it 'enhances [the] explanatory capabilities' of feminist security studies (Caprioli, 2004, p. 266), all interrogations of security that take gender seriously draw attention to the ways in which gender is at once personal, political and international. Although it might seem that conceiving of gender as a variable adheres both to a disciplinary narrative that rewards positivist and abstract theory (without messy reference to bodies) and to a neo-/anti-/post-feminist narrative that claims 'we' have solved the gender problem (see Zalewski, 2007, p. 303), at the very least such approaches give credence to the idea that gender matters in global politics. Mary Caprioli suggests that 'IR feminists shattered the publishing boundary for feminist IR scholarship, and tackled the difficult task of deconstructing IR theory' (2004, p. 257). I would caution that it is perhaps too soon to represent the shattering and tackling as a fait accompli, but with the vital interjections of texts such as those discussed here, security studies scholars may yet envisage a politics of violence and human subjectivity that transcends the arbitrary disciplinary boundaries which constrain rather than facilitate understanding.

**Our alternative is to interrogate reality – failure to do so makes their methodology suspect**

**Peterson and Runyan 99** [professor of political science at the University of Arizona and professor of women’s studies at Wright State University, 1999 (V. Spike and Anne, Global Gender Issues, 2nd edition, p. 1-3)]

Whenever we study a topic, we do so through a lens that necessarily focuses our attention in particular ways. By filtering or "ordering" what we look at, each lens enables us to see some things in greater detail or more accurately or in better relation to certain other things. But this is unavoidably at the expense of seeing other things that are rendered out of focus--filtered out--by each particular lens. According to Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, various theoretical perspectives, or "images," of international politics contain certain assumptions and lead us "to ask certain questions, seek certain types of answers, and use certain methodological tools."1 For example, different images act as lenses and shape our assumptions about who the significant actors are (individuals? states? multinational corporations?), what their attributes are (rationality? self-interest? power?), how social processes are categorized (politics? cooperation? dependence?), and what outcomes are desirable (peace? national security? global equity?). The images or lenses we use have important consequences because they structure what we look for and are able to "see." In Patrick Morgan's words, "Our conception of [IR acts as a] map for directing our attention and distributing our efforts, and using the wrong map can lead us into a swamp instead of taking us to higher ground."2 What we look for depends a great deal on how we make sense of, or "order," our experience. We learn our ordering systems in a variety of contexts. From infancy on, we are taught to make distinctions enabling us to perform appropriately within a particular culture. As college students, we are taught the distinctions appropriate to particular disciplines (psy- chology, anthropology, political science) and particular schools of thought within them (realism, behavioralism, liberalism, structuralism). No matter in which context we learned them, the categories and ordering frameworks shape the lenses through which we look at, think about, and make sense of the world around us. At the same time, the lenses we adopt shape our experience of the world itself because they shape what we do and how and why we do it. For example, a political science lens focuses our attention on particular categories and events (the meaning of power, democracy, or elections) in ways that variously influence our behavior (questioning authority, protesting abuse of power, or participating in elec- toral campaigns). By filtering our ways of thinking about and ordering experience, the categories and images we rely on shape how we behave and thus the world we live in: They have concrete consequences. We observe this readily in the case of self-fulfilling prophecies: If we expect hostility, our own behavior (acting superior, displaying power) may elicit responses (defensive posturing, aggression) that we then interpret as "confirming" our expectations. It is in this sense that we refer to lenses and "realities" as interactive, interdependent, or mutually constituted. Lenses shape who we are, what we think, and what actions we take, thus shaping the world we live in. At the same time, the world we live in ("reality") shapes which lenses are available to us, what we see through them, and the likelihood of our using them in particular contexts. In general, as long as our lenses and images seem to "work," we keep them and build on them. Lenses simplify our thinking. Like maps, they "frame" our choices and exploration, enabling us to take advantage of knowledge already gained and to move more effectively toward our objectives. The more useful they appear to be, the more we are inclined to take them for granted and to resist making major changes in them. We forget that our particular ordering or meaning system is a choice among many alternatives. Instead, we tend to believe we are seeing "reality" as it "is" rather than as our culture or discipline or image interprets or "maps" reality. It is difficult and sometimes uncomfortable to reflect critically on our assumptions, to question their accuracy or desirability, and to explore the implications of shifting our vantage point by adopting a different lens. Of course, the world we live in and therefore our experiences are constantly changing; we have to continuously modify our images, mental maps, and ordering systems as well. The required shift in lens may be minor: from liking one type of music to liking another, from being a high school student in a small town to being a college student in an urban en- vironment. Or the shift may be more pronounced: from casual dating to parenting, from the freedom of student lifestyles to the assumption of full-time job responsibilities, from Newtonian to quantum physics, from East-West rivalry to post-Cold War complexities. Societal shifts are dramatic, as we experience and respond to systemic transformations such as economic restructuring, environmental degradation, or the effects of war. To function effectively as students and scholars of world politics, we must modify our thinking in line with historical developments. That is, as "reality" changes, our ways of understanding or ordering need to change as well. This is especially the case to the extent that outdated worldviews or lenses place us in danger, distort our understanding, or lead us away from our objectives. Indeed, as both early explorers and urban drivers know, outdated maps are inadequate, and potentially disastrous, guides.

**1NC T**

**The aff is not topical --- introducing armed forces only refers to human troops, not weapons systems.**

Eric **Lorber**, January **2013**. J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?" University of Pennsylvania Journal of Contsitutional Law, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, lexis nexis.

As is evident from a textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation**,** expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non-members constituting armed forces). n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.¶ The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.¶ This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

**Vote negative for limits --- nuclear weapons is a whole topic by itself --- requiring research into an entirely separate literature base overstretches negative research burdens.**

**Threats fail**

**There is no such thing as a single firebreak --- every country has their own threshold determined by their security concerns.**

Keith **Payne**, Summer **2005**. President of the National Institute for Public Policy, full professor and department head at the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, chairman of the Policy Panel of the US Strategic Command’s Senior Advisory Group and co-chair of the Nuclear Strategy Forum. “The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight,” Washington Quarterly 28.3, Ebsco.

**There is no such thing as a single, objective nuclear threshold to be lowered or raised mechanistically**. That notion, like others, is a construct of the Cold War's balance of terror. Today, the United States has multiple opponents with various perceptions of the U.S. nuclear threshold, and these perceptions may be far removed from actual presidential decisionmaking following a provocation. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for example, on the basis of expressed U.S. threats, Saddam Hussein was deterred by the belief that his use of chemical or biological weapons against coalition members would lead to a U.S. nuclear reply. Postwar memoirs and statements of the U.S. decisionmakers involved make abundantly clear, however, that the United States was not considering any use of a nuclear weapon at the time, even if Saddam had used WMD.37 The heart of the debate is not the Cold War adage that low-yield precision weapons are militarily more usable from the president's perspective and thus more likely to be used, but that opponents [End Page 144] may judge them to be more credible for deterrence when the stakes for the United States do not include survival. Low-yield precision weapons may help strengthen deterrence in this fashion.

**Firebreak impact is dumb because there is no “nuclear taboo.” Particular use or non-use is always a rational policy calculation.**

**Gehring ‘00** (Verna, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, "The Nuclear Taboo", http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/IPPP/Summer00/nuclear\_taboo.htm, Google Cache)

More than a half century has passed since the first and last use of nuclear weapons in warfare. Thomas C. Schelling suggests that over the years a convention has arisen, one which provides strong evidence that nuclear weapons are under a "curse." Schelling is hopeful that, because the nuclear arsenal is perceived as unique—in some way different from conventional weapons--a "nuclear taboo" has taken root over the decades and can remain secure. It is remarkable that nuclear weapons have not been used for so long. But is it true that there exists a taboo on their use? Taboos may be as old as humankind itself, but some taboos are less enduring than others. **It is not clear that avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons has risen to the level of a taboo or that refraining from nuclear warfare can withstand the challenges of the coming decades**. Local Taboos vs. Universal Taboos One reason to doubt the existence of a "nuclear taboo" is that it is unclear how strong the prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons actually is. Most taboos reflect local values and serve practical ends. Forbidden forms of dress or kinds of food, for example, tend to be specific to a particular place or culture. Often one can find sensible practical reasons for the prohibitions these taboos impose—to reduce the possibility of food poisoning, or to discriminate easily between sexes, for instance. Such local, culturally particular taboos also help identify and knit together the social fabric of a kin, clan, or country, distinguishing one group from all others and providing identity through exclusion. Local taboos tend to erode over time until they become quaint vestiges of a culture’s social history. The most striking example of the ephemeral nature of this sort of taboo comes from the case of Captain Cook, whose outrageous behavior occasioned importing the Polynesian word taboo (or, among variations, tapu) into the European languages. According to one account, while in Hawaii Cook and his men dismantled several rails of a temple to use as fuel. This so appalled their hosts that they pronounced Cook, his crew, and their actions "tapu." Although the actions of Cook and his men violated local custom, one could reasonably suppose that they were unaware that their behavior was disrespectful. Further, today we can only speculate about precisely what transgression Cook and his men were guilty of (although one could presume that the violation was the desecration of a holy place). Not all taboos are local, however. Some seem stronger, are applied more uniformly, and are less open to revision. While dress or dietary taboos may be local and mutable, other taboos--those against incest, public elimination of bodily waste, and disrespect or neglect of a human corpse, for example--seem more universal and less likely to be abandoned. As with culturally particular taboos, these more generally accepted taboos also tend to have a practical dimension. Prohibitions against incest, public elimination, and thoughtless treatment of corpses all contribute to the physical health of a community. But these more universally accepted taboos knit the fabric not just of a local community, of a kin or clan, but of humanity itself. Human beings are not to commit incest, relieve themselves indiscriminately in front of other people (as other animals do among themselves), or ignore or molest a human corpse. Culturally specific taboos contribute to the identity of an individual as a member of a group, but the generalized taboo unites the individual to the entire human family and helps define humanity. These more universally recognized taboos seem self-evident and depend for their authority on individuals not thinking in detail about them. We are discouraged from considering whether a particular taboo is sensible, or whether it is outmoded. We certainly are not to imagine whether the forbidden practice may be satisfying or pleasurable. People follow ordinary social proscriptions because they have thought about the inconvenient, embarrassing, or costly consequences of breaking them. But it would seem bizarre for someone to claim that he adheres to an incest taboo, for example, only after deep reflection on the consequences of its violation, or following thoughtful consideration of its gratifying aspects. The strength of taboos depends not on considered reflection, but on revulsion. Unlike weaker, local taboos, then, a universal taboo forbids the performance of a particular action and also restricts full consideration of the prohibition generally. If nuclear warfare is under a "curse," as Professor Schelling suggests, then one hopes the prohibition expresses a strong, more universally recognized taboo rather than the weak, local variety. The Nuclear Taboo and its Doubters The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represents the first and last uses of atomic weapons. Does this provide credible evidence of a prohibition that now rises to the level of a "nuclear taboo?" Obviously, this initial use did not violate any sort of longstanding taboo against atomic weapons and, consequently, one cannot find—nor would one expect to find at the time—widespread condemnation of President Truman or others responsible for those acts. Condemnation has arisen in subsequent decades. One might say that we have no satisfying answer to the speculation that the prohibition against nuclear warfare has risen to the level of a taboo. Certainly, conventional weapons have improved over this past half century and the means to victory via the disabling of the opposition are far more effective. Paul Nitze, for one, has argued that "smart" conventional weapons can now achieve many of the military purposes that only a nuclear warhead could have achieved twenty years ago. Further, advances in satellite surveillance technology has made fighting a nuclear war more difficult, since they lessen the element of surprise and the possibility of a timely return strike. Perhaps the increasing effectiveness of conventional weapons has allowed us to avoid the desperate consideration of nuclear use. **If attitudes are better measured by actions not words, then nuclear policy makers have accepted no taboo on nuclear warfare.** In toto, nuclear policies address the questions of deterrence, how it works and what makes it effective, and how to prepare for its failure. Since the 1950s, American strategists have worried not just about ensuring command and control of their nuclear arsenals, but about ensuring that the United States preserves its ability to retaliate after a nuclear attack. The resulting series of policies led President Eisenhower to lament, in his 1961 farewell address, that the United States had become a "military-industrial complex." The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD, which relied not just on restraint but also on perfect control of the nuclear arsenal by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) was developed in the 1960s, as was the first serious effort (undertaken by President Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara) to answer the question "How much is enough?" in building a nuclear arsenal. A decade later Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger explored the notion of "flexible" responses in nuclear warfare, and the administrations of Nixon, Reagan, and Carter developed "selected nuclear operations," which included the possibility of waging regional wars. Finally, policymakers also exploit the purposes the possession of nuclear arms can serve. For example, political science professor Peter Beckman and his colleagues argue that the possession of nuclear signals declares one’s status as a player on the world stage. Brandishing nuclear weapons also signals that one’s vital interests have been engaged, or that one is resolute and cannot be driven from one’s position. Finally, nuclear powers threaten use of their arsenal as bargaining chips and as a means to bolster alliances. As Professor Schelling points out, nuclear policies have been crafted from pragmatic considerations. Granted, ordinary citizens do treat nuclear weapons as taboo, which reflects their emotional revulsion at their indiscriminately destructive power. However, Cold War policy planners adopted the language that described nuclear weapons as "different"—separate from the "conventional" arsenal—but not because nuclear use was taboo, as the ordinary citizen might accept. Instead, policy makers recognized that, in the scenario they feared most--the crisis of a military confrontation pitting NATO allies against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact--crossing the threshold to employ nuclear weapons would secure NATO’s goals in war, but with catastrophic results. Since in this scenario even the "winner" loses, policy makers concluded that it was better not to step onto the "nuclear escalator" in the first place. Consequently, they rejected the option of first use. Ordinary citizens may well consider nuclear weapons taboo, their "no use" stance resulting from their emotional revulsion at the prospect of nuclear warfare. But policy makers do not operate on this emotional plane. **Mutual intimidation explains all the effects we now associate with those of a "nuclear taboo." The ban against nuclear warfare is based on a calculated reasoning of the costs and benefits of nuclear warfare, and at present this rational calculus has not tipped in favor of lifting the ban.**

**Accidental nuclear war is stupid-ass science fiction. Motives are for de-escalation not escalation.**

(FYI, referenced later on, are the beginning of the card if they ask about warrants.)

-Empirically disproven in 65 years, and non-war accidents should have triggered sensors if their argument was true

-Neither side wants it---Rationality overcomes escalation

**Quinlan ‘9** (Michael, Former Permanent Under-Sec. State – UK Ministry of Defense, “Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects”, p. 63-69)

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. **It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be**. **Neither side could want escalation**. Both would be appalled at what was going on. **Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt**. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modem delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclearweapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And **none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality**. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's , survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating theznemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postlated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defined in a way that is dear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably .so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is `If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which 1 a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it, to a tolerable outcome--the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger, and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor volib wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, Dr the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme **it is absurd to claim,** as has been heard from distinguished figures, **that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years**). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. **There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents** involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements----it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. **A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low**. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by, indicators mistaken or misconstrued. **In none of these instances**, it is accepted, **did matters get at all near to nuclear launch**--extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. **But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote**. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. **To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets**. Hi

story anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way **belongs to science fiction**.

**Prolif**

**1NC Prolif Advantage**

**The NPT doesn’t prevent proliferation and their impacts are exaggerated --- regime survival incentives and integration into the global economy provide a better explanation for prolif decisions.**

Etel **Solingen**, **2007**. Professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, Introduction, <http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8554.html>.

Nuclear choices have wide-ranging implications for international security. The potential proliferation of nuclear weapons served as partial justification for the 2003 war in Iraq and continues to rank high in the foreign policy agenda of major powers and international institutions. The United States, the European Union, Japan, the G-8, and former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan have defined the problem as the preeminent threat to international security, with attending consequences for budgetary allocations and the need for collective action.10 Although Iran and North Korea are now focal cases, many regard this as a much broader problem, regardless of political persuasions. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved the minute hand of its “Doomsday Clock” from seven to five minutes, warning that “we stand at the brink of a second nuclear age.” President George W. Bush has repeatedly asserted that more nations have nuclear weapons, and still more have nuclear aspirations.11 Campbell et al. (2004) suggested that we may be approaching a “tipping point” that will unleash a proliferation epidemic, and that we now stand on the verge of a new nuclear age with potentially more nuclear-weapons-states (NWS) and a much greater chance that these weapons will be used. Others regard the nonproliferation regime (NPR) as poised for collapse and fear that the “domino theory” of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear.12 Former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix declared that “certainly if Iran were to develop further in the wrong direction, there is a risk for other countries considering going for nuclear weapons. And if the North Koreans move on, well the risks are very, very great. If the North Koreans were to test a weapon, yes, it would be very, very serious” (ASAW). IAEA director general Mohammed El-Baradei declared that “we are reaching a point today where I think Kennedy’s prediction is very much alive. Either we are going to...move to nuclear disarmament or we are going to have 20 or 30 countries with nuclear weapons, and if we do have that, to me, this is the beginning of the end of our civilization” (CNSW). In 2006 these concerns appeared even more real as North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and fear of a defiant Iran arguably led to declarations by six Middle East countries that they would pursue nuclear energy programs.13 Not all agree with this vision, and assessments of past progression vary with different benchmarks. President Kennedy’s 1963 prediction of fifteen to twenty-five NWS by 1973 did not come about.14 The past three decades reflected declining nuclear aspirations even by technically capable states. As Rosecrance (1964:300) correctly predicted, nuclear weapons did not spread “as ineluctably as the instruments of modern industrialism.” Most states (189) joined the NPT, the most widely subscribed international treaty in existence, including some that had rejected it for decades, as did Argentina and Brazil. Some gave up nuclear weapons, including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and South Africa. Libya surrendered its program to U.S. and IAEA scrutiny in 2003. More states abandoned than acquired nuclear weapons programs during the past fifteen years (Roberts 1995; Wolfsthal 2005). Yet the number of NWS increased. India and Pakistan conducted tests in 1998 and, like Israel, remained outside the NPT. Israel’s capabilities have been widely asserted although its formal policy of “not being the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region” remains in place.15 North Korea proclaimed possession of nuclear weapons in 2003 and tested one in 2006; Iran’s record in acquiring weapons-suitable technologies has not been matched by dutiful reporting to the IAEA. Both North Korea and Iran are deemed to have breached their NPT commitments. The tally of NWS has thus risen from the five recognized by the NPT in 1968 (the United States, Britain, Russia, China, and France) to nine states in 2006. What explains this variability in behavior, with some states renouncing nuclear weapons altogether, others reversing previous efforts in that direction, and yet others developing them in violation of international commitments? Three decades ago Economics Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling (1976:80) advised that “the emphasis has to shift from physical denial and technology secrecy to the things that determine incentives and expectations.” Nearly three decades later Hans Blix recognized that the task of uncovering the sources of incentives for proliferation still constitutes a fundamental problem (CEW). As Brad Glosserman (2004) puts it, a key obstacle to efforts to counter nuclear proliferation is that “**we still don’t know why governments proliferate** nuclear weapons. Several explanations have been offered ...but no single explanation convinces. Until we know why governments acquire nuclear weapons, it will be difficult to stop them from doing so.” The theoretical literature in international relations on this issue is much less copious than the studies on nuclear deterrence, tends to advance mono-causal explanations (a single factor explains it all), and frequently involves case studies by country experts.16 This book’s objective is to advance our understanding of nuclear behavior and revisit the way we study it. A controlled comparison between East Asia and the Middle East offers several advantages for achieving those objectives. The Research Design There are at least nine reasons why a focused comparison (George and McKeown 1985) between the two regions that is sensitive to methodological issues in comparative analysis, case selection, and research design, offers important benefits for improving our understanding of denuclearization:17 First, the two regions are at the forefront of policy debates as potential nuclear dominoes. The North Korean and Iranian crises will continue to shape—and perhaps shake—the foundations of regional and international security. Both the Middle East and East Asia find themselves in the midst of a historical period with potentially profound transformational effects, providing a unique vantage point from which to evaluate the past and explore the future of nuclear proliferation. Second, the NPT’s inception was a watershed that affected the balance of incentives and constraints regarding nuclear weapons, offering analysts the opportunity to gauge variability in outcomes against a common international institutional order represented by the NPR. Since 1968 about fourteen industrializing countries have been suspected of exploring or considering nuclear weapons, taking concrete steps in that direction, or outright producing them.18 Nearly two-thirds of the cases were in the Middle East (five) and East Asia (four).19 The concentration on East Asia and the Middle East therefore (a) helps understand nuclear decisions while holding an important causal variable—international regime—constant;20 and (b) enables a focused comparison of the two main regional concentrations of nuclear aspirants since 1968. Third, four decades ago these two regions experienced authoritarian rule, limited economic interdependence, regional security dilemmas, and state-building challenges. The contrasting subsequent evolution of their respective political-economy models offers an opportunity to examine background conditions leading to distinct nuclear policies. This evolution entailed wide variance in another causal variable (integration in the global economy), potentially explaining divergent nuclear policies.21 This variance provides excellent conditions for a natural experiment: the two regions differed both on the causal and the dependent variable—nuclear outcomes (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; George and McKeown 1985). Both regions are also subject to ongoing pressures that may alter those outcomes in the future, offering propitious conditions for assessing competing perspectives on the dynamics of proliferation. Hence, comparative process-tracing of nuclear behavior in the two regions generates additional methodological advantages:22 (a) the presence of similar initial background conditions across regions (approximating a “most similar case” design);23 (b) subsequent wide variation in a specific causal variable of interest (particularly across regions but also within them); and (c) wide variation in the dependent variable. Fourth, both regions had hierarchic and multipolar power distributions, helping to control for a presumed prime causal variable. According to neorealist canons, comparable power distributions should lead to similar outcomes and clearly cannot account for differential outcomes (George and Bennett 2005:156). Furthermore, multipolarity itself has been hypothesized to enhance the likelihood of nuclearization (Mearsheimer 1990). Hence, not only should we have observed similar outcomes in both regions but also nuclearization in both cases. This has not happened yet and, as discussed in chapter 2, neorealist explanations habitually invoke auxiliary theories that are often rooted in domestic politics (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Nonetheless, comparing these two regions offers an opportunity to examine the effects of balance-of-power theories on different states, across regions as well as within them. Fifth, an early theory advanced that high preexisting industrial and technological infrastructures were a prerequisite for acquiring nuclear weapons (Meyer 1984). The post-1968 trajectories of these two regions, however, arguably call into question these expectations. East Asia developed dynamic industrial and technological infrastructures but refrained from applying them to nuclear weapons’ development. The least industrially dynamic—North Korea—was the exception and was driven by political will rather than technological thrust. In the Middle East, Israel might suggest a better fit with technological determinism, but in the 1970s, states with much weaker industrial infrastructures (Libya, Iraq, and Iran) embarked on nuclear weapons programs, sometimes circumventing low indigenous capabilities by purchasing critical technologies “off the shelf ” from the A. Q. Khan network. With perhaps better technical chances than these three, Egypt discontinued its quest for nuclear weapons. These comparisons between and within the two regions help dismiss technological determinism by pointing to “most likely cases” in East Asia that abstained from acquiring nuclear weapons and “least likely cases” in the Middle East (from the standpoint of this argument) that sought them. Sixth, the two regions differed on the relationship between natural energy resources and nuclear technological capabilities, civilian and military. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were highly dependent on foreign natural resources and developed robust and sophisticated nuclear industries without converting them into weapons. The region’s anomaly, North Korea, was also energy-poor but lagged in civilian nuclear energy while seeking nuclear weapons. Oil-rich Middle East powers such as Iraq, Libya, and Iran had dramatically lower incentives to develop nuclear industries at the outset, yet they allocated gargantuan resources to nuclear programs that had weapons applications, without ever achieving viable nuclear industries after decades of investment. Egypt had moderate oil endowments and a faltering nuclear industry, and it discontinued its nuclear weapons program. Israel lacked energy resources altogether and its non-NPT status burdened its ability to develop a nuclear industry but not a weapons program. These observations point to additional analytical benefits from comparing two regions that best exemplify special forms of capital accumulation related to natural endowments—Middle East rentier states versus East Asian developmental states: (a) in the post-1968 era, oil wealth may be more of an enabling antecedent (Van Evera 1997)—albeit not a necessary condition—for nuclear weapons than wealth amassed from industrialization; and (b) an inverse relationship may be hypothesized between robust civilian nuclear industries and the pursuit of nuclear weapons.24 Seventh, the scholarly literature on both regions tends to stress unique features, particularly evident in cultural understandings of each one. “Contextualized comparisons” of cases within each region enable tests of distinctive regional properties. At the same time, the inclusion of cases from both regions precludes excessive concentration on specificity that sometimes obscures useful cross-regional comparisons. A focused comparison between the two regions advances the broader comparative politics agenda while circumventing fallacies of regional “exceptionalism.” Eighth, most of the cases under study provide, in and of themselves, important tests of alternative theories. From one neorealist standpoint, Japan and Egypt are arguably “most likely” cases for acquiring nuclear weapons as major regional powers facing nuclear-armed neighbors, and Libya a “least likely” case. Yet the former two renounced nuclear weapons and the latter pursued them. Different identity-based arguments place different cases on the “most likely” and “least likely” lists for nuclearization. Hypotheses linking relative closure to the global economy to nuclearization place North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran in the “most likely” category and Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in the “least likely.” Both identity and political-economy arguments sometimes compete with alternative explanations. The two regions thus provide useful cases that enable “crucial” or tough tests for corroborating or rejecting different theories.25 Finally, despite these analytical and methodological advantages and policy relevance there has been no systematic effort to explain divergent nuclear behavior in the two regions. Where does one start? Conceptual Perspectives In an early study of nuclear proliferation, Rosecrance (1964:299) argued that although predictions regarding prospective nuclear aspirants are chimerical, “there are some guideposts on this otherwise perilous route.” This book extracts potential guideposts from various schools of thought that might shed light on the complex phenomenon of denuclearization. No major school provides a satisfactory response to these differential paths. Nor have they ever been applied to controlled, systematic comparisons between our two regions of interest. This section introduces their essential premises and applicability to these cases leaving for chapter 2 a more thorough discussion of theoretical issues and specific applications to the Middle East and East Asia. Structural Power (Neorealism) An established school of thought in international relations advances that state insecurity drives the search for nuclear weapons. In its structural form, commonly referred to as neorealism, this view traces nuclear decisions to the balance of power and security dilemmas (Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1990).26 The nuclearization (or potential nuclearization) of a state is thus expected to induce similar responses by its neighbors. In this view, the domestic nature of states, regimes, groups, or individuals is irrelevant to nuclear decisions and outcomes. Uniquely concerned with national security, neorealism has been granted pride of place in explaining nuclear behavior. As argued, were alternative theories to be found equally (or more) persuasive on nuclear issues, neorealism would be questioned in its home court, where it enjoys highest advantage for substantiating its tenets. The empirical studies indeed suggest that neorealism—although useful in some general sense—fails to explain some of the cases examined, is incomplete in explaining others, competes with alternative explanations in what should be its best arena of argumentation, suffers from underdetermination (leads to multiple possible outcomes), and may be unfalsifiable given that so many options can be made to fit vague notions of security maximization a posteriori. Beyond these generic deficiencies, discussed in chapter 2, neorealism suffers from several shortcomings in explaining nuclear trajectories in our two regions. First, both regions had hierarchic and multipolar power distributions. Multipolarity should have encouraged nuclearization in both cases but led instead to nuclearization in much of the Middle East but not East Asia since 1964. Second, both regions lacked robust and symmetric distributions of nuclear capabilities, yet they led to different outcomes. Third, states presumably afflicted with intense security dilemmas abstained from acquiring nuclear weapons (Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) whereas states with much lower existential threats (Libya, Iraq in the early 1970s) did not. U.S. commitments to East Asian allies were extremely important in addressing those dilemmas, but these were not absolute, inclusive, unlimited, or unconditional commitments that put security dilemmas entirely to rest under the anarchical conditions stipulated by neorealism. Fourth, U.S. commitments in the Middle East (or South Asia)—to Iran’s shah, for instance (or Pakistan)—have mysteriously not had the same effect. Nor have Chinese and Soviet commitments to North Korea led to its denuclearization. As Waltz (2003:38) has persuasively argued, “in the past half-century, no country has been able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they were determined to do so.” Fifth, Egypt abandoned nuclear weapons designs in 1971 without the backing of an effective U.S. alliance even as its main adversary (Israel) was presumed to have them. Unsurprisingly, given all these anomalies, Levite (2002/03:83) finds that “there is no evidence to suggest ...that the U.S. influence has ever been a sufficient factor for inducing reversal.” Indeed, U.S. security guarantees do not account for most cases of nuclear reversal. Sixth, whereas changes in structural power would have predicted changes in nuclear policies, the rise of China, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relative decline of Japan, and enhanced competition between China and the United States have not altered East Asia’s nuclear trajectory thus far. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea remained non-nuclear weapons states while North Korea continued on its nuclearizing path. Finally, is East Asia traversing a bipolar, hegemonic, or multipolar transition at the dawn of the twenty-first century?27 Disagreements within neorealism over the actual nature and specific effects of power distribution on nuclear incentives provide uncertain grounds for explaining past, let alone predicting future, trajectories. That security predicaments are important sources of nuclear behavior bears repetition. At the same time, reducing nuclear tendencies to this rubric, as is often done, leads to analytic overestimations of state security as the exclusive source of nuclearization. As Betts (2000) argues, insecurity is not a sufficient condition for acquiring nuclear weapons; many insecure states have not, from Vietnam to Singapore, Jordan, and many others. The earlier dominance of neorealism on this issue stemmed partially from inherent problems of epistemology and evidence collection, afflicting nonproliferation studies perhaps most severely.28 Leaders and state officials have incentives to justify nuclear decisions in terms of “reasons of state,” which both domestic and international audiences consider more legitimate than parochial internal reasons. Analysts thus find more “evidence” for the role of security concerns in leaders’ statements and justifications along those lines, and the secondary literature reinforces that focus.29 In-depth analyses of North Korea, Iraq, Libya, and arguably Iran after 1991 including those in this book clearly suggest that nuclear weapons programs were driven more by regime than by state insecurity. Yet the latter, not the former, is the staple of neorealist accounts of nuclearization. The analytic and policy implications of this distinction are only beginning to permeate academic and policy-oriented thinking on nuclear proliferation.30 The most important frontier for understanding nuclear choices and outcomes is the relationship between regime and state, or internal and external political survival. As will be clear throughout the chapters that follow, this book does not assert that U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea and commitments to Taiwan are irrelevant. Indeed, such commitments provide an important explanatory layer for these countries’ nuclear abstention. Yet understanding their relative receptivity to persuasive and coercive aspects of the U.S. alliance requires us to delve into their domestic politics. Nuclear weapons would have seriously undermined favored strategies of economic growth and regional and global access. The choice for alliance itself was the product of domestic models that favored it over other options, trumping internal demands for nuclear weapons and generating receptivity to hegemonic inducements. This argument thus qualifies the tendency to focus exclusively on alliances in three ways. First, the domestic argument provides a deeper understanding of nuclear preferences insofar as it can also explain why alliance was chosen to begin with. Second, alliances provide a more robust explanation if one can show that the net outcome of domestic political debates were forceful demands for nuclear weapons that were trounced by the United States. There is little evidence of such forceful demands, particularly in Japan but perhaps even in South Korea and Taiwan, despite some domestic proponents of nuclear weapons in all three countries. The net outcome of the domestic debate was in line with East Asia’s favored domestic model of political survival, which nuclearization would have derailed. Third, other hegemonic defense pacts involving the United States and the Soviet Union did not induce abstention from nuclear weapons in too many other cases (Iran’s shah, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iraq among others). Indeed, if alliances told the tale, Britain (and arguably France) should never have gone nuclear. The role of alliances in the second nuclear age is mediated by the relative receptivity of domestic models to alliance and denuclearization. Absent such receptivity, alliances have played far less determining roles; in its presence, alliances have provided stronger incentives to abstain from nuclear weapons. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Neoliberalism) Neoliberal perspectives focus on the role of international institutions in mitigating security dilemmas by enhancing information about others’ intentions and capabilities, and by monitoring and enforcing compliance (Keohane 1984; Gourevitch 1999; Kahler 2000; Inoguchi 1997). The emphasis is on states’ rational incentives to choose particular institutional arrangements that leave all states better off (Pareto optimal). Some consider the network of institutions known as the NPR, including regional NWFZs, as serving that purpose. Accordingly, the NPT established a two-tier system: a small tier of five nuclear-weapons-states (NWS) and a large tier of states that renounced nuclear weapons in exchange for civilian nuclear technology. Although **there has been no systematic collection of evidence corroborating that the NPT** indeed **accounts for nuclear choices** made since 1968, this perspective has widespread appeal and strong intuitive plausibility. However, as Betts (2000:69) argued, “If the NPT or CTBT [Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty] themselves prevented proliferation, one should be able to name at least one specific country that would have sought nuclear weapons or tested them, but refrained from doing so, or was stopped, because of either treaty. None comes to mind.” Another prominent expert on the NPT, Egypt’s ambassador to the United States, Nabil Fahmy, expressed that “in the spirit of candid and clear-sighted analysis, one must be obliged to acknowledge that very few non-nuclear weapons states—parties—actually joined the treaty because it responded to their immediate security concerns. Most of the parties that joined NPT did so for political or economic reasons or circumstances, or because they had no reason to pursue nuclear weapons or nuclear programs from the beginning” (CEW). How does a neoliberal perspective fare in explaining differential trajectories in our two regions? First, state-centric rational-institutionalist perspectives prove compatible with a few cases but inadequate, incomplete, or unnecessary for explaining nuclear choices and outcomes in several others. Persuasive institutionalist accounts would have had to establish that—had the NPT not existed at the time—alternative decisions to develop nuclear weapons in Japan or South Korea would have obtained (Taiwan ceased to be an NPT party due to China’s opposition). The historical record does not provide strong evidence for such a counterfactual. Second, the NPT clearly did not prevent Middle East nuclearization, as several parties defected from their commitments. East Asia exhibited far higher levels of compliance with the NPR (except North Korea) than the Middle East, which begs the question of what explains this disparate compliance. Third, East Asia lacked a regionally based nuclear regime that could account for its denuclearizing trajectory (Southeast Asia’s NWFZ is rather recent, hence clearly not the cause of denuclearization in that region). Fourth, although the Middle East was home to the oldest regional institution, the Arab League played no effective role in nuclear policies. Israel and Iran provided convenient justification for the League’s inaction on nuclear weapons programs in Iraq or Libya, but inter-Arab rivalries were no less crucial in paralyzing the League as an effective regional institution. Notwithstanding these points, the empirical chapters suggest that the NPR can be credited with some success in raising the costs of acquiring sensitive technologies and equipment, tightening inspection regimes in post-1991 Iraq, changing the context against which states formulated decisions regarding nuclear weapons, and offering new focal points such as the Additional Protocol. These achievements must be assessed against the fact that the NPR operated in the most thorny domain of national security, where the emergence and functioning of international institutions are most difficult. From this standpoint, rational institutionalist perspectives face vast disadvantages relative to neorealism as a theory that explains nuclear choices and outcomes. Norms and Constructivism The constructivist approach draws attention to how international norms emerge and converge around institutions, emphasizing socialization and normative pressure (Checkel 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Johnston 2001). The NPR can be traced to antinuclear norms that developed after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite the presumed rise of non-nuclear use norms (Schelling 1976; Tannenwald 2005), insufficient systematic evidence is available to ascertain whether a strong norm against nuclear acquisition developed as well. Furthermore, in the framework of deterrence theory, acquisition circumvents use and can conform to a “conditional morality” (Nye 1988). How can norms-based arguments be applied to explain differences in nuclear trajectories between the two regions? First, only East Asia since the 1970s may imply the possible operation of anti-acquisition norms, given nuclear restraint (except for North Korea). There is only limited evidence, however, for the impact of such norms even there, suggesting that they may have provided neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for denuclearization. Rational disincentives (including external coercion, alliances, or domestic politics) could have led to compliance with the NPT. Japan’s unique experience makes it a “most likely case” to support normative accounts of non-acquisition, but its “nuclear embeddedness” under the U.S. umbrella and other considerations reveal a possible overstatement of the nuclear allergy. There is no evidence of norms-based constraints for Taiwan or South Korea (or for other cases of denuclearization including South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, among others). Second, the Middle East’s poor record of NPT-compliance (and actual use of chemical weapons) questions the possibility that such norms developed deep roots in this region. Indeed, alternative norms stemming from nationalist, religious, and other identities invested nuclear weapons with redemptive value as tools of modernization and defiance of the international order. Constructivist accounts would be particularly valuable if they could isolate the effects of socialization from those of hegemonic coercion or rational nuclear learning. They could explore clustered behavior toward or away from nuclearization in different regions and why such differences obtain under the shadow of a presumably shared anti-nuclear-weaponsacquisition norm. A systematic application of norms-based approaches to explain these two regions must be complemented with a theory of domestic politics capable of explaining whose meanings are relevant to leaders’ decisions to pursue or eschew nuclear weapons, who are the norm entrepreneurs promoting one set of values or the other and why, and, most importantly, what explains the relative receptivity to each path in different regions. As with security-related “reasons of state,” leaders are arguably more likely to explain nuclear decisions by appealing to norms than by wielding parochial political considerations. In that sense, norms-based considerations should surface more easily in the effort to reconstruct such decisions. Democracy and Nuclear Weapons The perspective that democracies and non-democracies differ in their international behavior has blossomed in the study of international relations. The democratic peace hypothesis, for instance, seeks to explain why democracies do not wage wars against each other (Elman 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001; Lipson 2003) but has not been applied systematically to explain regional nuclear trajectories. Some may argue that since 1968, democracies have not acquired nuclear weapons as a means to cope with conflict with other democracies except for India. The non-democratic nature of states, however, cannot explain differences between East Asia and the Middle East. First, Taiwan, South Korea, and several Southeast Asian states were not democratic when they renounced nuclear weapons; most were dictatorships. Second, most autocracies in both regions did not embark on nuclear weapons programs. Third, while most nuclearizing states in the Middle East have been autocracies (Iraq, Libya, Iran, and Egypt under Nasser), some autocracies also reversed course and abandoned nuclear weapons programs (Egypt first, and most recently Libya) and others never pursued it (Jordan). Autocracies thus did not exhibit uniform nuclear behavior in the Middle East. Fourth, the only sustained democracy—Israel within 1967 borders—is attributed with robust nuclear capabilities. Regime-type theories might be extended to suggest that isolated democracies surrounded by adversarial autocracies have greater incentives to acquire nuclear weapons than democracies surrounded by democratic neighbors. This remains an untested theory that may be arguably supported by the Indian case but not by Japan (or South Korea and Taiwan since they became democracies). In sum, given the historically mixed nature of regimes in both regions, the democratic peace would not be expected to apply to either case. Furthermore, the tendency between interactive democracies to dampen conflict may not necessarily be equivalent to the tendency to denuclearize, as France and Britain suggest (Lipson 2003). Domestic Models: Orientations to the Global Economy and Nuclear Behavior Domestic models of political survival and their orientations to the global political-economy have implications for nuclear trajectories. Leaders or ruling coalitions advocating economic growth through integration in the global economy have incentives to avoid the costs of nuclearization, which impair domestic reforms favoring internationalization. By contrast, nuclearization implies fewer costs for inward-looking leaders and for constituencies less dependent on international markets, investment, technology, and institutions, who can rely on nuclear weapons programs to reinforce nationalist platforms of political survival. Hence, nuclearization has been much less attractive and far more costly for most East Asian leaders for domestic, regional, and international reasons, which will be detailed further in the next chapter. Furthermore, the heavy regional concentration of internationalizing strategies in East Asia reinforced each state’s incentives to avoid nuclearization. Conversely, Middle East leaders faced lower domestic barriers to, and responded to stronger domestic incentives for, nuclearization than East Asian ones. In addition, the heavy regional concentration of inward-looking strategies throughout the Middle East exacerbated mutual incentives to develop nuclear weapons. Despite preliminary support for systematic differences in nuclear behavior traceable to domestic political survival, this hypothesis remains an understudied source of nuclear behavior.31 This omission has important implications. A “missing” or “omitted” variable may lead to an overestimation of other causal variables, **granting them too large an effect on the outcome while rendering at least some of their effects spurious** (Brady and Collier 2004). Without taking into account domestic political survival models, one may not properly understand nuclear behavior or estimate the actual effects of balance of power, international norms and institutions, or democracy. Introducing a previously omitted variable does not imply that other variables are rendered irrelevant, but rather that we are better able to understand their relative impact on nuclear choices. Domestic political arguments help explain why security dilemmas are sometimes seen as more (or less) intractable, why some states rank alliance higher than self-reliance but not others, why nuclear weapons programs surfaced where there was little need for them, and why such programs were obviated where one might have expected them. Balance of power as well as norms and institutions may be more relevant than political survival in some cases and not others, but, in the aggregate, complete explanations of nuclear behavior must include all relevant variables for particular cases, a consideration that guides the empirical chapters in this book. Political survival models provide valuable insights on the evolution of nuclear trajectories in East Asia and the Middle East. First, only staunch opponents of internationalization pursued nuclear weapons in East Asia: China (1950s–1960s) and North Korea. Second, all nuclear programs in the Middle East were launched by leaders steering import-substitution and relatively closed political economies (Iran, Iraq, Egypt until 1971, Israel, and Libya). Third, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, although afflicted with intense security dilemmas, support the hypothesis that internationalizing models create propitious conditions for denuclearization as do some Southeast Asian cases, notably Singapore (never considered a nuclear aspirant).

**The NPT is useless at preventing proliferation**

**De Bruin 2008** [Danielle, Research Assistant at the Henry Jackson Society (cross-partisan, British-based think-tan), “A New Approach for dealing with nuclear weapons” 7/21/2008 http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=736]

CHANGING NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE The world now has almost twice the number of nuclear states than it did in 1968, when the NPT was signed by 62 countries around the world. At that time, the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France, and China were the only nuclear powers, and one of the main aims of the treaty was to ensure that this remained the case. However over the years we have seen more and more countries seeking nuclear capabilities in order to compete with those who pose threats to them, due to the unfortunate nature of any arms race. A state will automatically seek such arms if an enemy develops them, in order to balance that threat and ensure its own security. With the bi-polar nature of the Cold War at an end, and the state of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) between the United States and Russia a distant memory, today’s world no longer fits into a black and white distinction creating a plethora of consequences. THE APPEAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS In the last forty years, there has been an increase in contained regional arms races, with India and Pakistan being prime examples. India tested a ‘peaceful nuclear device’ in 1974, nicknamed the Smiling Buddha. Pakistan, not wishing to be left at the mercy of its long time arch-rival, swiftly drew up plans to join the nuclear club as quickly as possible, eventually testing a weapon of their own in 1998. This has developed into a dangerous status, with both sides provoking the other by testing weapons near their mutual border. The situation escalated in the 1990s to the point where many Indian politicians were publicly threatening war, demonstrating the volatility of the situation and the danger of an already heated confrontation being exacerbated by nuclear weapons. Both India and Pakistan have refused to sign the NPT, highlighting the treaty’s inability to force compliance from non-signatories. Iran, a highly isolated country which feels that it has few friends and many enemies, aspires to build a nuclear arsenal in order to achieve regional dominance and security. Tehran’s claim that itis enriching uranium for a peaceful energy programme is a cover-up that few believe. The regime proved last week that it has ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons that are likely to be developed within the next five years, and much sooner by some estimates. The situation with North Korea is quite different, because the regime’s nuclear ambitions are fuelled by the desire to use their possession as a bargaining tool with China and the West. Their recent dismantling of a nuclear cooling tower in exchange for a relaxation of international sanctions demonstrated this point. The regime is playing a highly dangerous game with the international community that could have dire consequences. The second major change to the composition, or at least the potential composition of the nuclear landscape, has been the desire of non-state actors and ‘rouge states’ to gain access to nuclear weapons. Intelligence reports suggest that a number of terrorist groups are actively seeking the ability to acquire nuclear weapons and carry out attacks using them. With more and more ‘rogue states’ in possession of nuclear weapons, the chances of these falling into the wrong hands is ever increasing. This has already become a reality with the case of A. Q. Khan, the scientist at the heart of Pakist - iran’s nuclear programme, who was accused of passing on classified nuclear technology and parts to a number of countries and organizations including Iran, Libya, North Korea and the Taliban. This is a threat that was virtually non-existent forty years ago, and is reflected by the fact that the NPT focuses entirely on state actors who have signed up to the treaty, whilst giving no attention to non-state actors. **Its inability to deal with threats from non signatories and non state actors has proven detrimental to its future existence**. What these very different cases prove is that the **nuclear landscape is changing in a drastic way**, with a shift away from the limitation of weapons to the five ‘safe powers’ who clearly understood the implications of their use and towards a plethora of state and non-state actors who want weapons for very different reasons. **The NPT has been unable to prevent this, and is unlikely to be able to** do so **in the future**. How do we deal with this much changed scenario?

**Iran highlights the fundamental weakness of the NPT in enforcement and reaction to violations --- if people want to cheat, they’ll just do it.**

**Choe 2006** [Julia, Associate Editor, Harvard International Review, “Problems of enforcement: Iran, North Korea, and the NPT.” Harvard International Review, Summer 2006, http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/149520994\_2.html]

Broad Acceptance, Good Intentions Since its creation in 1970, the NPT has been accepted by 187 states. Only India, Pakistan, and Israel have failed to sign, and North Korea has withdrawn. Under the NPT, the five declared nuclear weapons states--the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China--agree to not assist other states in acquiring nuclear weapons. They also consent to reduce and eventually eliminate their own nuclear arsenals. Non-weapons states are obligated not to pursue nuclear weapons and can individually allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect their nuclear facilities. All states are forbidden to supply certain nuclear-related weapons or materials to others unless they are under safeguards. Only peaceful nuclear technology such as energy technology is allowed under the NPT. To induce states to abide by its terms, the NPT relies on nuclear safeguards--agreements that allow the IAEA to make routine inspections. Though the IAEA has no third-party enforcement power, its inspectors can report NPT violations to the United Nations, which can then enact sanctions and other measures. At the May 1995 NPT Extension Conference, parties adopted the Strengthened Safeguards System, which gave inspectors more power, including complete access to nuclear records and environmental sampling. **The NPT's principal shortcoming is its reliance on immediate referrals of treaty violations to the UN Security Council and on effective action within the United Nations--conditions that are rarely achievable.** The Fundamental Flaw Despite the consensus embodied in the NPT that states should pursue non-proliferation, its provisions have not been enforced in a reliable manner. The NPT contains no procedures for the Security Council's management of non-compliance. After referring a country to the Security Council, the IAEA has no control over subsequent developments. In addition, the Security Council has no obligation to act in a specific way; it could ignore the situation or take military action. It is also difficult to define compliance within Article IV of the NPT, which establishes the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Because compliance is a nebulous issue, inconsistencies that might merit the label of non-compliance can go undetected. In recent years Iran's actions in this gray area have highlighted the treaty's weaknesses. Though Iran is a member of the NPT and has allowed the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities, its actions in recent years have breached NPT terms. Iran's nuclear program started in 1959 with a research reactor purchased from the United States. In December 2002, satellite photographs provided evidence of nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak intended for uranium enrichment and heavy-water production, respectively. Since then, IAEA inspections have revealed undeclared efforts toward uranium enrichment, separation of plutonium, as well as the presence of undeclared imported material. In February 2003, then Iranian President Mohammed Khatami stated that Iran planned to mine its own uranium and reprocess spent fuel from the reactor, contrary to previous understandings that the uranium would be returned to Russia. In a report issued in late November 2003, IAEA Director Mohomad ElBaradei stated that Iran had admitted to developing a uranium centrifuge enrichment program, adding that Iran had "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement." Current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserted in September 2005 that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is "prohibited" under Iran's religious principles and has consistently denied that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. The international community, however, remains skeptical. Despite clear violations of the NPT, the IAEA mandated only that Iran suspend uranium enrichment and allow stricter inspections. Since then, Iran has failed to make significant moves toward compliance. An IAEA report in June 2004 condemned Iran's lack of complete cooperation after Iran admitted that it had understated the amount of plutonium it had enriched. Even so, the IAEA took no steps to divert Iran away from its path. The IAEA's statements, while well-intentioned, were issued in a way that did not lead to immediate action--a precedent that may have inadvertently lowered the IAEA's credibility. Negotiations throughout this time (beginning in 1993) had been ongoing with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the EU-3. In 2005 a delayed negotiation proposal prompted Iran to resume uranium conversion, as verified by the IAEA in November of that year. By September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors voted on a resolution that declared Iran's non-compliance. However, the resolution was not passed with full consensus, and it was not until February 4, 2006, that Iran was finally referred to the UN Security Council. The problem is that action may still be unlikely; Russia and China, both holding Security Council vetoes, abstained at the September 2005 IAEA Board vote, which was aimed at declaring Iran's non-compliance. The events of the past three years in Iran demonstrate the difficulty of implementing the NPT's doctrines and reflect the sluggish and inadequate pace of treaty enforcement in a system reliant on states' self-initiative. They have also shown that there is no consensus on what NPT doctrine should be, leading to divisions that a nation like Iran can exploit. Under the NPT there is no concrete, automatic response to a state's nuclear pursuits, and enforcement is hindered by unrelated political events. As a result of the NPT's lack of action, Iran has been able to disregard calls for a reduction of its nuclear program for several months, as it continues with its nuclear program. **These** actions **underscore the weakness of the NPT in defining and handling non-compliance** before a nation begins to make nuclear arms.

**China**

**China will not risk war—economics and diplomacy**

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Little noticed, however, has been China's recent adoption of a new -- and much more moderate -- approach. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to restore China's tarnished image in East Asia and to reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role there.

Beijing is also **unlikely** to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States.

The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the countries' various maritime disputes. The visit paved the way for an agreement in July 2011 between China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to finally implement a declaration of a code of conduct they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes."

Since the summer, senior Chinese officials, especially top political leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have repeatedly reaffirmed the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's maritime conflicts to focus on **economic cooperation** while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas."

Authoritative Chinese-language media, too, has begun to underscore the importance of cooperation. Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies.

In terms of actually setting aside disputes, China has made progress. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands.

China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness. Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is probably more than just a mere stalling tactic.

Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also halted many of the more assertive behaviors that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor.

The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had **overreached**. Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region.

So far, Beijing's new approach seems to be working, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

Even if it is smooth sailing now, there could be choppy waters ahead. Months of poor weather have held back fishermen and oil companies throughout the South China Sea. But when fishing and hydrocarbon exploration activities resume in the spring, incidents could increase. In addition, China's new approach has raised expectations that it must now meet -- for example, by negotiating a binding code of conduct to replace the 2002 declaration and continuing to refrain from unilateral actions.

Nevertheless, because the new approach reflects a strategic logic, it might endure, signaling a more significant Chinese foreign policy shift. As the 18th Party Congress draws near, Chinese leaders want a stable external environment, lest an international crisis upset the arrangements for this year's leadership turnover. And even after new party heads are selected, they will likely try to avoid international crises while consolidating their power and focusing on China's domestic challenges.

China's more moderate approach in the South China Sea provides further evidence that China will seek to **avoid** the type of **confrontational policies** that it had adopted toward the United States in 2010. When coupled with Xi's visit to Washington last month, it also suggests that the United States need not fear Beijing's reaction to its strategic pivot to Asia, which entails enhancing U.S. security relationships throughout the region. Instead, China is more likely to rely on conventional diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft than attempt a direct military response. Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States. Whether the new approach sticks in the long run, it at least demonstrates that China, when it wants to, can recalibrate its foreign policy. **That is good news for stability in the region**.

**No military aggression**

**Goldstein 11**—Professor and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute @ US Naval War College [Dr. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” Survival | vol. 53 no. 2 | April–May 2011 | pp. 89–116]

Weighed in the aggregate, China’s rise remains a peaceful process, and the record to date should engender **significant confidence**. Beijing has not resorted to a significant use of force against another state in more than **three decades**. Its deployments of troops as UN peacekeepers to hot spots such as Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have played a helpful role, as have the counter-piracy operations of its fleet in the Gulf of Aden. When dealing with weak and occasionally unstable states on its borders, such as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, Beijing has **not resorted to military intervention**, nor even flexed its military muscles to gain advantage. Chinese maritime claims, whether in the South or the East China seas, are generally being enforced by **unarmed patrol cutters**, a clear signal that Beijing does not seek escalation to a major crisis on these matters. Contrary to the perception that China’s senior military officers are all irreconcilable hawks, one influential People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral recently said in an interview, with reference to lessons learned from recent border negotiations on China’s periphery: ‘If there are never any concessions or compromises, there is simply no possibility of reaching a breakthrough in border negotiations.’2 pg. 90

**Trade solves**

**Lieberthal, ‘7**

[Kenneth, Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Political Science and William Davidson Professor of Business Administration at the University of Michigan, “China’s March on the 21st Century,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/chinas-march-21st-century]

Second, the current U.S.-China relationship is not fragile. Indeed, it has become extraordinarily wide ranging, complex, and deeply embedded in the political and economic systems of both societies. Structurally, the financial, economic, and trade relationship is the most well-developed leg of our current bilateral engagement. It has produced a situation of such deep interdependence that only a very traumatic crisis could significantly change this in the short run. However, such disruption would palpably affect the standards of living in both countries. Despite well-known frictions, therefore, neither side is prepared to damage itself by taking steps to fundamentally disentangle this economic interdependence. China has shown, moreover, that economic cooperation with the United States is sufficiently important to warrant serious concessions when necessary to keep this part of our relationship in reasonably good working order. The existing U.S.-China engagement extends far beyond classic foreign policy and economic spheres. Indeed, almost every major agency in the U.S. government has serious programs and fre-quent contacts with its Chinese counterpart. This includes such bodies as the Department of Education, Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Energy, the Center for Disease Control, the Environmental Protection Agency, and so forth. In short, the overall U.S.-China relationship is mature: **even very significant problems in any one issue area will not disrupt the entire relationship**, and a very solid base already exists for future cooperative efforts. Considerable interests in each country have gelled around the specific forms of engagement that the two countries have developed.

**Strategic reassurance fails – China will pocket the concession.**

**Parameswaran, 09** (Prashanth, research fellow for Asia Chronicle, a daily online journal, and blogs about international affairs at GlobalEye. “Obama's China Policy: Neither Strategic Nor Reassuring” 11-25-09. Obama's China Policy: Neither Strategic Nor Reassuring)

President Barack Obama failed to wring any concessions from China in his maiden voyage to Beijing last week. But the disappointing visit is only a symptom of the Obama administration's dysfunctional and poorly conceived China policy, which, though well-intentioned, threatens to undermine U.S. objectives and wreck its global image. Dubbed "strategic reassurance," the policy envisions a tacit bargain whereby the United States mollifies Chinese fears of containment, while Beijing assuages U.S. concerns about its global intentions and shoulders more international responsibilities. But so far, the policy has confounded more than clarified. Some China watchers wonder where Obama will strike the balance between soothing Chinese-defined headaches, like arms sales to Taiwan, and addressing American concerns, such as China's lack of transparency about its blistering military modernization and global ambitions. Indeed, administration officials themselves seem divided as to where the focus lies. But more troubling is the very concept of "strategic reassurance" itself. At first glance, it appears quite innocuous, even pragmatic. It makes sense to encourage a rising China to be a status quo -- rather than a revisionist -- power, and Washington needs Beijing's help to tackle a host of big-ticket issues, from curbing greenhouse gas emissions to checking North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions. But in bending over backwards to reassure China, the Obama administration risks undermining America's own objectives, losing leverage with Beijing, and eroding its standing in the world. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton belittled the importance of U.S. pressure on China over human rights earlier this year, she displayed a profound disregard for the power of rhetoric in reinforcing America's principled support for those fighting for freedom in China and beyond. Similarly, Obama's snubbing of the Dalai Lama during his trip to Washington last month was widely perceived as a bow to Chinese pressure. This disturbing pattern of acquiescence continued during Obama's China visit. His polite murmurs on universal rights were drowned out by encomiums about the glory of Chinese civilization, euphemisms regarding "differences" on human rights, and excuses about displaying "respect for different cultures." Kelley Currie, former special assistant to the under secretary for democracy and global affairs, says this conciliatory tone was unfortunate in light of Beijing's assaults on human rights in the days before Mr. Obama's visit, which included the detention of prominent activists. To some observers, the Taiwan portion of the U.S.-China joint statement also seemed to concede too much to Beijing by suggesting that "respect for . . . sovereignty and territorial integrity" represents the "core" of the various documents leading to Sino-American rapprochement. In fact, Washington has always sought to balance its recognition that Taiwan is part of China with guaranteeing Taiwanese security under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Such concessions by Washington will only reduce U.S. leverage, while simultaneously feeding Beijing's sense of its growing power and decreasing its incentive to reform. Furthermore, no amount of reassurance will profoundly change China's core national interests or quell its reluctance to be a "responsible stakeholder" on the world stage. According to Brad Glosserman, director of Pacific Forum CSIS, because China tends to attribute problems like North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan-Pakistan to these countries' desire to reshape their bilateral relationships with the United States, it feels that Washington should bear the burden of resolving them. Glosserman also cites a CSIS survey of Chinese elites that revealed that few felt any sense of global responsibility for China, with a whopping 90 percent rejecting an international leadership role. Recent Chinese conduct confirms this. Beijing has been unwilling to compromise on the renminbi, to utter the word "sanctions" in relation to Iran, to unveil hard targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions, or to fully implement a United Nations Security Council resolution on North Korea. Instead, it has chosen to vastly increase trade with Iran, while also signing a fresh economic package with Pyongyang. And even where its interests do align with the United States, such as stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region or the need for clean energy technologies, Beijing is loath to invest the necessary capital in pursuit of these public goods, preferring that Washington and other developed nations pick up the tab. Nor is Beijing's current behavior or future intentions in any way "reassuring" to Washington or its neighbors. In addition to producing a wide range of missiles, radars, sensors, and torpedoes, Beijing is also moving ahead with a ballistic missile that could deter U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups critical to the defense of Taiwan and the security of Washington's friends. U.S. allies are already sounding alarm bells and counseling a more robust American regional presence. This year's Australian defense white paper paints a grim picture of China contesting American primacy in Asia, while Singapore's patriarch Lee Kuan Yew privately chided Washington for "giving China a free run in Asia" during a recent trip. Finally, given the differences between Washington and Beijing's political systems, Obama's suggestion that Beijing and Washington "together can help to create international norms" is as naïve as it is alarming. Does the United States really want to craft global rules with a country that coddles dictators from Pyongyang to Harare, and tramples on freedom of expression and minority rights domestically? One would hope not. White House spokesman Robert Gibbs argued that the administration had not expected that "the waters would part and everything would change over the course of two and a half days in China." But a flawed strategy will disappoint, no matter how much time is devoted to it. Rhetoric and concessions will never change the fact that Beijing is a rising power bent on pursuing its own interests, and averse to assuming global responsibilities that might impede its ambitions. Instead of "strategic reassurance," Washington should aim for a realistic China policy, working with Beijing where it can, pressuring Beijing when it should, and balancing China's influence where it must. The sooner the Obama administration grasps this, the better, for its current approach is neither strategic, nor reassuring.

# 2NC Gender K

**AND – it turns the case –**

**Grim predictions and scenario planning are hyped up by defense analysts to justify a constant military modification – internal link turns the aff**

**Carr 10** [Matt, Writer and Journalist “Slouching towards dystopia: the new military futurism” Institute of Race Relations, http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/3/13]

The military has also shown a keen interest in the study of the ‘possible future’ in the early twenty-first century, particularly in the United States. In 1997, the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) published Global Trends 2010, the first of three reports in its ambitious 2020 Project that aims to predict the ‘forces that will shape our world’ over a two-decade period. In 2001, the prestigious US Air Force thinktank, the RAND Corporation, established the Frederick S. Pardee Center for Longer Range Global Policy and the Future Human Condition. Since 2000, the US Joint Forces Command has published two studies of the international military and security environment over the next two decades and its implications for the military. Military and national security research institutions such as the US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) regularly stage conferences and symposia on ‘Long Range Planning and Forecasting’, ‘Scenario Planning’ and ‘Projecting Future Battlespaces and Scenarios’. These studies are not limited to purely military concerns. Military futurists also devote considerable attention to more mainstream futurological subjects, such as social and economic transformation, demographics, urbanism, cultural trends and climate change. What explains the military’s interest in the future and what does this fascination tell us about the present? Military futurism is not a historical novelty in itself. Armies have routinely engaged in contingency planning ever since the German armed forces pioneered ‘long range planning’ in the late nineteenth century. Military futurism really came into its own during the cold war, when the RAND Corporation began conducting regular war games and simulations to predict the likely outcomes of nuclear and conventional military confrontations with the Soviet Union. In the 1950s and 1960s, RAND luminaries such as Herman Kahn, Leo Roster and Albert Wohlstetter built illustrious careers around ‘scenario planning’ and ‘systems thinking’, which attempted to provide US policymakers with the conceptual tools to anticipate ‘alternate’ or ‘surprising’ military futures by ‘thinking the unthinkable’. By the 1980s, forecasting, war-gaming and scenario planning had become routinely integrated into US military practice. While studies such as Innovation Task Force 2025 (1988) and AirLand Battle 2000 (1982) considered the transformation of the armed forces or rehearsed NATO war plans against the Warsaw Pact, others continued to explore the outer limits of the unthinkable future. One report published by the Department of Defense in the early years of the Reagan presidency imagined a nuclear war in which the White House, the Pentagon and much of civilisation were destroyed, but computers continued in the aftermath ‘to run a war no human mind can control’, directing space satellites, nuclear weapons and armies of robots ‘that can gallop like horses and walk like men, carrying out computerised orders as they roam the radioactive battlefield’.2 Cold war military futurism also spilled over into the private sector. In 1961, Herman Kahn founded the Hudson Institute, a conservative thinktank and research centre which aspires to provide ‘global leaders in government and business’ with the tools to ‘manage strategic transitions to the future’.3 In the 1970s, Royal Dutch Shell pioneered the corporate use of scenario planning in the oil industry in response to what was perceived as a new climate of uncertainty and unpredictability following the OPEC oil embargo. This overlapping nexus between the military and corporate futurism has continued ever since. Not only do the US military and the private sector share the same concern with geopolitical and international developments pertaining to US national security and the future of the capitalist world economy, but private companies and institutions specialising in scenario planning and risk management also work closely with the military in developing futuristic analyses. The Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis produces regular studies for the military on the ‘critical variables’ and ‘nonlinear forces’ affecting international politics.4 Both the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security have also commissioned futuristic studies from scenario planning specialists such as the Global Business Network (GBN) and the giant management consultancy firm Booz Allen Hamilton. In 2006, Booz Allen won a $32 million contract to provide the Pentagon’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with war-gaming materials and simulations, whose aim, according to the company spokesman, was to ‘write the history of the future’ and provide the Pentagon with a ‘picture of the world between 2001 and 2025’.5 All this is in keeping with the tradition developed by Kahn and his RAND colleagues but the new military futurism is also strikingly different from its predecessors. Where the cold war futurists were primarily concerned with the Soviet Union and scenario planning for nuclear war, twenty-first century futurists are concerned with very different ‘threats’ and ‘challenges’. One of the most prolific producers of futurological studies is the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA), an obscure but influential thinktank run by the veteran RAND intellectual and military futurist Andrew Marshall. Each year, the ONA commissions dozens of studies from academics and thinktanks like the Hudson Institute and private consulting companies. Most of these reports are classified but the talkingpointsmemo.com website recently used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain an index of ONA publications. These include titles such as Pandora’s Boxes: the mind of jihad (June 2007), Why they Won’t Know What Hit Them: are Arabs thinking about the consequences of another 9/11 (July 2006), Europe 2025: mounting security challenges amidst declining competitiveness (September 2008), Role of High Power Microwave Weapons in Future Intercontinental War (July 2007) and even German Liberals and the Integration of Muslim Minorities in Germany (December 2006).6 These titles are an indication of the new concerns of contemporary military futurism. The new military futurists also differ from their predecessors in their generally grim perspective on the future. In Rethinking the Unthinkable (1963), Herman Kahn attempted to demonstrate that a nuclear war might not be survivable and therefore ‘thinkable’. This scenario was intended to be positive – albeit from a hawkish foreign policy perspective – but contemporary military futurism is often extremely pessimistic in its depictions of the twenty-first century ‘security environment’. Such pessimism is partly a reflection of the prevailing mood in the US national security establishment. Ever since the end of the cold war, US security analysts have argued that the US was vulnerable to attack by elusive and unpredictable enemies that were potentially more dangerous than the former Soviet Union. Such predictions appeared to be confirmed by the catastrophic events of September 11. On the one hand, the 9/11 attacks were ‘predictable’, in the sense that an attack of some kind had been expected. At the same time, the attacks constituted what futurologists call ‘wild cards’, ‘discontinuities’ or ‘surprising events with huge consequences’, which force a new set of expectations about what the future might contain. Some US security analysts have since added the Iraq insurgency to the category of ‘strategic shocks’ and attributed the failure to predict it to the same ‘failure of imagination’ that helped make the 9/11 attacks possible. The result is a new willingness amongst the US national security establishment to consider further ‘strategic shocks’ by ‘imagining the unimaginable’ – a tendency which has generated imaginative scenarios that sometimes owe more to apocalyptic Hollywood movies, manga comics and science fiction than they do to sober analysis. Faced with a future that seems fraught with unpleasant surprises, the Pentagon has embarked on some outlandish and even bizarre attempts to try to reduce the element of uncertainty and unpredictability. One ongoing project aims to recruit social scientists to compile a computerised database of cultural, religious and political beliefs in every country in the world that will supposedly enable the military to predict which countries are most likely to succumb to unrest, insurgency or terrorism. In 2002, the Pentagon’s cutting edge Defense and Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) came close to introducing a ‘terrorism futures market’ based on the financial futures market, which invited bets on when and where terrorist events were likely to occur in order to predict them beforehand. This scheme was abandoned when it was pointed out that some organisations might deliberately carry out attacks in order to profit from them. In 2007, DARPA awarded Lockheed Martin a contract to develop an ‘Integrated Crises Early Warning System’ (ICEWS) that its designers claimed will ‘anticipate and respond to worldwide political crises and predict events of interest and stability of countries of interest with greater than 80 percent accuracy’ in the same way that meteorologists predict the weather.7 These initiatives cannot be attributed simply to an overzealous desire to protect the US ‘homeland’ from ‘another 9/11’. The broad scope of contemporary military futurism is partly a consequence of changing concepts of warfare in the early twenty-first century, with its new emphasis on ‘asymmetric’ warfare, terrorism and insurgency across the global ‘battlespace’ rather than conventional wars between states. The commitment to ‘fourth generation warfare’ is fuelled by a new sense of the fragility and instability of the international state system, coupled with the belief that the nation-state in the early twenty-first century is increasingly vulnerable to global economic turbulence, civil and ethnic conflict and the violent activities of ‘non-state actors’ – all of which are perceived to pose threats to global security and even the future of globalisation itself. The ‘uncertainty’, instability and risk that military futurists project onto the future not only emanates from nuclear-armed ‘rogue states’ or ‘non-state actors’, however. A recurring theme in military futurist scenarios concerns the possibility that the emergence of China, India and Brazil as major economic powers may be accompanied by a decline in US – and western – global hegemony and that the ‘unipolar world’ of the post-cold war era may be drawing to an end. With the demise of the Soviet Union, US military thinking has been dominated by the concept of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) – a term used to describe periods of history in which one particular military power or group of powers outstrips all potential rivals. The display of US technological firepower in the first Gulf War convinced many military planners that this position is now occupied by the US. But this belief is often accompanied by a realisation of the limitations of US military power and anxiety that the RMA may not be permanent. The notion of the US RMA is often attributed to the Pentagon’s ‘futurist-in-chief’ Andrew Marshall at the ONA. Celebrated as a visionary genius by his admirers and denounced as a paranoiac by his enemies, Marshall is a long-time associate of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, and was given a major role by Rumsfeld in the preparation of the 2002 Quadrennial Defense Review, which the US Armed Forces use as a medium-range planning guide to justify its budget requests to Congress. That same year, Marshall commissioned an 85-page monograph for the ONA from Booz Allen Hamilton entitled Military Advantage in History, which studied some of the most successful military conquerors of the past for lessons on how the United States ‘should think about maintaining military advantage in the twenty-first century’.8 Though the study identified the United States as the ‘dominant military power in the world’, it nevertheless warned that such dominance might not be permanent and that ‘barring a more innovative approach the process leading to its substantial erosion has already been set in motion’. To contribute to this process of innovation, the report sought inspiration from imperial conquerors such as Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and particularly from Rome, whose 600-year dominance, the authors argued, ‘suggests that it is possible for the United States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable of transforming its forces before an opponent can develop counter-capabilities’.9 Stripped of its anachronistic application of contemporary military jargon, its shallow scholarship and its unproblematic comparisons between the United States and previous empires, this document was essentially a variant on ONA futuristic studies such as Preserving American Primacy (January 2006) and Preserving US Military Supremacy (August 2001). The same objectives are shared by the neoconservative thinktank Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in its 2000 call for US military transformation, Rebuilding America’s Defenses. The PNAC couples a boyish fascination with sci-fi weaponry with a strident insistence on the need to preserve US ‘primacy’, ‘geo-political pre-eminence’, ‘dominance’ and a ‘global security order that is uniquely friendly to American principles and prosperity’.10 This determination to shape, control and ‘dominate’ the turbulent and conflict-prone twenty-first century in the foreseeable (and unforeseeable) future is a key component of the new military futurism. On the one hand, military futurism is a by-product of the megalomaniac military doctrine of ‘full spectrum dominance’. At the same time, its predictions about the future express very real fears amongst the US ruling elite that the United States is inextricably connected to a world that may be slipping out of its control. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the new military futurists are often considerably more pessimistic than their predecessors and tend to paint a very bleak future of an unsafe and unstable world that **demands a constant military presence to hold it together**. From Yevgeny Zemyatin’s We to Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, twentieth-century writers have used dystopian visions of the future as a warning or as a satirical commentary on the often lethal consequences of twentieth-century utopianism. The dystopias of the new military futurists have a very different purpose. The US military often tends to perceive itself as the last bastion of civilisation against encroaching chaos and disorder. The worse the future is perceived to be, the more these dark visions of chaos and disorder serve **to justify limitless military ‘interventions’, techno-warfare, techno-surveillance and weapons procurement programmes, and the predictions of the military futurists are often very grim indeed.**

**AND it proves their methodology is flawed – favoring solutions to law ignore the broader political environment which creates the issue**

**Rana 11** Aziz RANA Law @ Cornell ’11 “Who Decides on Security?” Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers. Paper 87. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops\_papers/87 p. 45-51

If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars – emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness – is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants – danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently – it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

**1AC masculinity has been constructed – simply adding the k is insufficient**

**Peterson 05** [V Spike, Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson; “How (The Meaning of) Gender Matters in Political Economy,” New Political Economy 10.4 Dec]

Making women empirically visible is thus an indispensable project. It inserts actual (embodied) women in our picture of economic reality, exposes how women and men are differently engaged with and affected by political economy, and reveals women as agents and activists, as well as victims of violence and the poorest of the poor. But adding women to existing paradigms also raises deeper questions by exposing how the conceptual structures themselves presuppose masculine experience and perspective. For example, women/femininity cannot simply be ‘added’ to constructions that are constituted as masculine: reason, economic man, breadwinner, the public sphere. Either women as feminine cannot be added (that is, women must become like men) or the constructions themselves are transformed (namely, adding women as feminine alters their masculine premise and changes their meaning). In this sense, the exclusions are not accidental or coincidental but required for the analytical consistency of reigning paradigms.10

**IR sexualizes nuclear weapons making an arms race inevitable**

**Duncanson & Eschle 2008** [University of Edinburgh and University of Strathclyde (Claire and Catherin. Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident', New Political Science, 30:4, 545 -563.]

We begin by looking at the way the White Paper talks about nuclear weapons technology. There are three strands to the feminist critique of the way in which states in general talk about nuclear weapons technology: **first, the deployment of sexualised, phallic imagery; second, a tendency to abstraction; and, third, a reliance on gendered axioms**. On the first point, feminists have long highlighted that the political and military power associated with nuclear weapons is linked metaphorically with sexual potency and masculinity. This linkage is neither arbitrary nor trivial: sexual metaphors are a way of mobilising gendered associations in order to create excitement about, support for and identification with both the weapons and the political regime possessing them.15 Thus feminist histories of the development of the nuclear arms race in the decades after World War Two demonstrate the extent to which it was a race to prove masculine prowess, fuelled by “missile” envy,16 with the nuclear weapons of the Cold War superpowers “wheeled out like monumental phalluses” on parade.17 Such imagery has proved seductive to many governments across time and space**.** Thus when India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist leader Balashaheb Thakeray argued that “[w]e have to prove that we are not eunuchs” and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was portrayed in a newspaper cartoon as propping up his coalition with a nuclear bomb, captioned “Made with Viagra.”18 Indeed, as Indian novelist Arundhati Roy has commented: Reading the papers, it was often hard to tell when people were referring to Viagra (which was competing for second place on the front pages) and when they were talking about the bomb—“We have superior strength and potency.”19

**Constructing China as a threat creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, arms race, and increases the risks of escalation and warfare**

**Pan 4** (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” June/July 2004, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 305-331, JSTOR)//PC

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in main- stream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a posi- tivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted coun- try but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of con- tainment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93 For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile- defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting com- ment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist, on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in gen- eral represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemol- ogy, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

**Proliferation imagery is saturated with racism-this worldview promotes “war of civilizations” solutions**

**Batur 07** [Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, “The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7]

At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “ . . .we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006). Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

**We access education better – methodology shapes policy evaluation**

**Bartlett 90** [professor of law at Duke University, 1990 (Katharine, 103 Harvard Law Review 829, February, lexis)]

Feminists have developed extensive critiques of law n2 and proposals for legal reform. n3 Feminists have had much less to say, however, about what the "doing" of law should entail and what truth status to give to the legal claims that follow. These methodological issues matter because methods shape one's view of the possibilities for legal practice and reform. Method "organizes the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification." n4 Feminists cannot ignore method, because if they seek to challenge existing structures of power with the same methods that [\*831] have defined what counts within those structures, they may instead "recreate the illegitimate power structures [that they are] trying to identify and undermine." n5

**The affirmative cedes the political – using the political to end the war on terrorism allows the left wing to think all threats are over and forces the right wing to take over**

**Margulies and Metcalf 11** [\*Joseph Margulies is a Clinical Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. He was counsel of record for the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush and Munaf v. Geren. He now is counsel of record for Abu Zubaydah, for whose torture (termed harsh interrogation by some) Bush Administration officials John Yoo and Jay Bybee wrote authorizing legal opinions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at workshops at the American Bar Foundation and the 2010 Law and Society Association Conference in Chicago. Margulies expresses his thanks in particular to Sid Tarrow, Aziz Huq, Baher Azmy, Hadi Nicholas Deeb, Beth Mertz, Bonnie Honig, and Vicki Jackson. \*\*Hope Metcalf is a Lecturer, Yale Law School. Metcalf is co-counsel for the plaintiffs/petitioners in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, Padilla v. Yoo, Jeppesen v. Mohammed, and Maqaleh v. Obama. She has written numerous amicus briefs in support of petitioners in suits against the government arising out of counterterrorism policies, including in Munaf v. Geren and Boumediene v. Bush. Metcalf expresses her thanks to Muneer Ahmad, Stella Burch Elias, Margot Mendelson, Jean Koh Peters, and Judith Resnik for their feedback, as well as to co-teachers Jonathan Freiman, Ramzi Kassem, Harold Hongju Koh and Michael Wishnie, whose dedication to clients, students and justice continues to inspire.] “Terrorizing Academia” http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/jle/jle603jmarguilies.pdf

President Obama’s speech on national security May 21, 2009 at the National Archives is a case study in symbolic reassurance. As a number of observers have noted, despite Obama’s campaign promises, his post-9/11 counter-terror policies are most striking for their similarity to Bush’s, rather than their differences, which are mostly modest and incremental.130 Yet in his only major speech on national security, Obama—invoking the mythical power of the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights— said the Bush Administration “went off course” when it made a series of “hasty decisions” that “established an ad hoc legal approach for fighting terrorism… that failed to rely on our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a compass.” To correct these mistakes, Obama said he had made “dramatic changes” that represented “a new direction from the last eight years,” and that his approach to terrorism, unlike that of his predecessor, was faithful to “our most fundamental values…[to] liberty and justice in this country, and a light that shines for all who seek freedom, fairness, equality, and dignity around the world.” These changes, he vowed, would allow us to resume our timeless “American journey…toward a more perfect union.”131

This rhetoric built on both the anti-Bush narrative of indifference to the rule of law and Obama’s campaign promise of change. The speech left a powerful impression that the Obama Administration had reclaimed America’s moral standing, ending the abuses of a shameful past, and returning to our foundational principles. At least for those who are inclined to look to Obama as a trusted voice, his speech provided all the reassurance they could possibly want that change had finally come, and that the democratic process worked. Obama had reaffirmed their vision of American identity as a law-abiding and honorable nation, committed to a set of ideals that had been cast aside in the madness after 9/11. Lost in the comforting rhetoric, however, were the policy details, which included—for the first time in U.S. history—support for a preventive detention regime, something even the Bush Administration had not proposed.132

Among opponents to Bush-era policies, **Obama’s remarks produced quiescence and calm, a sense that the nation had finally “recovered” and that attention could safely be devoted to more pressing matters like the economy. But immediately after Obama’s speech, the cameras shifted to former Vice President Cheney, who offered a vigorous defense of Bush-era counter-terror policies, including in particular Guantánamo and the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques**.” Relying on his position as an insider with presumed access to secrets unknown to most Americans, Cheney hinted darkly of the dangers that would befall Americans now that President Obama was carving holes in the security net carefully woven by the Bush Administration.133 Republicans have hammered on this theme throughout Obama’s Administration (just as, it must be acknowledged, Democrats hammered on the theme of lawlessness and incompetence throughout the Bush Administration).134

Both speeches presented powerful narratives that appealed to particular audiences. But where Obama’s speech produced quiescence, Cheney’s produced the far more potent sense of threat. Once again, the nation was dangerously at risk and no more pressing matter faced the country than to thwart Obama’s recklessness.135 In reflecting on the relative impact of these two speeches, it is worth recalling the nature of counter-terror policy in the American imagination. It exists only as a collection of evocative images and ideas—black sites, torture, Guantánamo, terrorists—all of which are entwined with the most powerful political symbols in American life: race, national security, and the most elusive of all, “American values.” This intimate connection not only to our perceived safety but to our most potent national symbols means that Americans can be roused to attach inordinate significance to the debates, creating the appearance of a cultural consensus. But at the same time, their attachments will be superficial and easily changed, perhaps with bewildering rapidity.136

For the moment, it seems that the success of Obama’s narrative produced quiescence on the Left and alarm on the Right. **Conservatives were invigorated and mobilized just as the Left was abandoning the public square**. The result has been a counter-mobilization against Obama and his national security policies that was much more vitriolic and effective than anything during the campaign.137

**Ignore relations WITHIN the state – their reliance on restrictions miss the fact that we must question the structures and NOT the law**

**Margulies and Metcalf 11** [\*Joseph Margulies is a Clinical Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. He was counsel of record for the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush and Munaf v. Geren. He now is counsel of record for Abu Zubaydah, for whose torture (termed harsh interrogation by some) Bush Administration officials John Yoo and Jay Bybee wrote authorizing legal opinions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at workshops at the American Bar Foundation and the 2010 Law and Society Association Conference in Chicago. Margulies expresses his thanks in particular to Sid Tarrow, Aziz Huq, Baher Azmy, Hadi Nicholas Deeb, Beth Mertz, Bonnie Honig, and Vicki Jackson. \*\*Hope Metcalf is a Lecturer, Yale Law School. Metcalf is co-counsel for the plaintiffs/petitioners in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, Padilla v. Yoo, Jeppesen v. Mohammed, and Maqaleh v. Obama. She has written numerous amicus briefs in support of petitioners in suits against the government arising out of counterterrorism policies, including in Munaf v. Geren and Boumediene v. Bush. Metcalf expresses her thanks to Muneer Ahmad, Stella Burch Elias, Margot Mendelson, Jean Koh Peters, and Judith Resnik for their feedback, as well as to co-teachers Jonathan Freiman, Ramzi Kassem, Harold Hongju Koh and Michael Wishnie, whose dedication to clients, students and justice continues to inspire.] “Terrorizing Academia” http://www.swlaw.edu/pdfs/jle/jle603jmarguilies.pdf

But by framing the Bush Administration’s response as the latest in a series of regrettable but temporary deviations from a hypothesized liberal norm, the legal academy ignored the more persistent, and decidedly illiberal, authoritarian tendency in American thought to demonize communal “others” during moments of perceived threat. Viewed in this light, what the dominant narrative identified as a brief departure caused by a military crisis is more accurately seen as part of a recurring process of intense stigmatization tied to periods of social upheaval, of which war and its accompanying repressions are simply representative (and particularly acute) illustrations. It is worth recalling, for instance, that the heyday of the Ku Klux Klan in this country, when the organization could claim upwards of 3 million members, was the early-1920s, and that the period of greatest Klan expansion began in the summer of 1920, almost immediately after the nation had “recovered” from the Red Scare of 1919–20.7 Klan activity during this period, unlike its earlier and later iterations, focused mainly on the scourge of the immigrant Jew and Catholic, and flowed effortlessly from the anti-alien, anti-radical hysteria of the Red Scare. Yet **this period is almost entirely unaccounted for in the dominant post-9/11 narrative of deviation and redemption**, which in most versions glides seamlessly from the madness of the Red Scare to the internment of the Japanese during World War II.8

**And because we were studying the elephant with the wrong end of the telescope, we came to a flawed understanding of the beast**. In Part IV, we argue that the interventionists and unilateralists came to an incomplete understanding by focusing almost exclusively on what Stuart Scheingold called “the myth of rights”—the belief that if we can identify, elaborate, and secure judicial recognition of the legal “right,” political structures and policies will adapt their behavior to the requirements of the law and change will follow more or less automatically.9 Scholars struggled to define the relationship between law and security primarily through exploration of structural10 and procedural questions, and, to a lesser extent, to substantive rights. And they examined the almost limitless number of subsidiary questions clustered within these issues. Questions about the right to habeas review, for instance, generated a great deal of scholarship about the handful of World War II-era cases that the Bush Administration relied upon, including most prominently Johnson v. Eisentrager and Ex Parte Quirin. 11

Regardless of political viewpoint, a common notion among most unilateralist and interventionist scholars was that when law legitimized or delegitimized a particular policy, this would have a direct and observable effect on actual behavior. The premise of this scholarship, in other words, was that policies “struck down” by the courts, or credibly condemned as lawless by the academy, would inevitably be changed—and that this should be the focus of reform efforts. Even when disagreement existed about the substance of rights or even which branch should decide their parameters, **it reflected shared acceptance of the primacy of law**, often **to the exclusion of underlying social or political dynamics**. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for instance, may have thought, unlike the great majority of their colleagues, that the torture memo was “standard fare.”12 But their position nonetheless accepted the notion that if the prisoners had a legal right to be treated otherwise, then the torture memo authorized illegal behavior and must be given no effect.13

**Recent developments, however, cast doubt on two grounding ideas** of interventionist and unilateralist scholarship—viz., that post-9/11 policies were best explained as responses to a national crisis (and therefore limited in time and scope), and that the problem was essentially legal (and therefore responsive to condemnation by the judiciary and legal academy). **One might have** reasonably **predicted that in the wake of a string of Supreme Court decisions limiting executive power**, apparently widespread and bipartisan support for the closure of Guantánamo during the 2008 presidential campaign, and the election of President Barack Obama, which itself heralded a series of executive orders that attempted to dismantle many Bush-era policies, **the nation would be “returning” to a period of respect for individual rights and the rule of law. Yet the period following Obama’s election has been marked by an increasingly retributive and venomous narrative surrounding Islam and national security**. Precisely **when the dominant narrative would have predicted change and redemption, we have seen retreat and retrenchment**.

This conundrum is not adequately addressed by dominant strands of post-9/11 legal scholarship. In retrospect, **it is surprising that much post-9/11 scholarship appears to have set aside critical lessons from previous decades as to the relationship among law, society and politics**.14 Many scholars have long argued in other contexts that rights—or at least the experience of rights—are subject to political and social constraints, particularly for groups subject to historic marginalization. Rather than self-executing, rights are better viewed as contingent political resources, capable of mobilizing public sentiment and generating social expectations.15

**From that view, a victory in Rasul or Boumediene no more guaranteed that prisoners at Guantánamo would enjoy the right to habeas corpus than a victory in Brown v. Board**16 **guaranteed that** schools in **the South would be desegregated**.17 Rasul and Boumediene, therefore, should be seen as part (and probably only a small part) of a varied and complex collection of events, including the fiasco in Iraq, the scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison, and the use of warrantless wiretaps, as well as seemingly unrelated episodes like the official response to Hurricane Katrina. These and other events during the Bush years merged to give rise to a powerful social narrative critiquing an administration committed to lawlessness, content with incompetence, and engaged in behavior that was contrary to perceived “American values.”18 Yet the very success of this narrative, culminating in the election of Barack Obama in 2008, produced quiescence on the Left, even as it stimulated massive opposition on the Right. The result has been the emergence of a counter-narrative about national security that has produced a vigorous social backlash such that most of the Bush-era policies will continue largely unchanged, at least for the foreseeable

future.19

Just as we see a widening gap between judicial recognition of rights in the abstract and the observation of those rights as a matter of fact, there appears to be an emerging dominance of proceduralist approaches, which take as a given that rights dissolve under political pressure, and, thus, are best protected by basic procedural measures. But that stance falls short in its seeming readiness to trade away rights in the face of political tension. **First**, it accepts the tropes du jour surrounding radical Islam—namely, that it is a unique, and uniquely apocalyptic, threat to U.S. security. In this, proceduralists do not pay adequate heed to the lessons of American history and sociology. And **second**, it endorses too easily the idea that procedural and structural protections will protect against substantive injustice in the face of popular and/or political demands for an outcome-determinative system that cannot tolerate acquittals. Procedures only provide protection, however, if there is sufficient political support for the underlying right. Since the premise of the proceduralist scholarship is that such support does not exist, it is folly to expect the political branches to create meaningful and robust protections. **In short, a witch hunt does not become less a mockery of justice when the accused is given the right to confront witnesses. And a separate system (especially when designed for demonized “others,” such as Muslims) cannot, by definition, be equal.**

# 1NR T

#### They don’t meet – capitalized “United States Armed forces” means all branches

DOD 13 Department of Defense Unclassified Dictionary – contained in Joint Publication and amended on July 16, 2013 <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/u/7829.html>

United States Armed Forces

(DOD) Used to denote collectively the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. See also Armed Forces of the United States.

Source: JP 1

#### WAR POWER Authority refers to the power to wage a war and defend the nation

BALLENTINE’S 10 [BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, lexis]

TERM: war power.

TEXT: 1. The power of the government of the United States to wage war to the point of success, that is the overcoming of the enemy.

 2. The national defense is an absolute necessity of our existence. The people of the United States have prepared themselves for such a situation by confiding to Congress the power to declare war and to support and maintain armies for the national defense. This is necessarily a master power, to be exercised without the hampering interference of anyone. The call of men to the colors is within, and necessarily within, the exercise of this power. To whom the call goes out, and who is to make an answering response are matters germane to, and indeed necessarily involved in, the exercise of the war-making power. Questions which necessarily arise, or may be expected to arise, must be determined in some way and by some tribunal. The warmaking power may therefore provide the required system and constitute the needed tribunals.

#### Our evidence is in the context of explicit congressionally authorized war powers – that’s more predictable on the topic than the twilight zone

Bradley and Goldsmith, 2005 (Curtis and Jack, professor of law at the University of Virginia and professor of law at Harvard, 118 Harvard Law Review 2047, May, lexis)

Second, under Justice Jackson's widely accepted categorization of presidential power, n5 "the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation" attach "when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress." n6 This  [\*2051]  proposition applies fully to presidential acts in wartime that are authorized by Congress. n7 By contrast, presidential wartime acts not authorized by Congress lack the same presumption of validity, and the Supreme Court has invalidated a number of these acts precisely because they lacked congressional authorization. n8 The constitutional importance of congressional approval is one reason why so many commentators call for increased congressional involvement in filling in the legal details of the war on terrorism. Before assessing what additional actions Congress should take, however, it is important to assess what Congress has already done. Third, basic principles of constitutional avoidance counsel in favor of focusing on congressional authorization when considering war powers issues. n9 While the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief is enormously important, determining the scope of that authority beyond what Congress has authorized implicates some of the most difficult, unresolved, and contested issues in constitutional law. n10 Courts have been understandably reluctant to address the scope of that constitutional authority, especially during wartime, when the consequences of a constitutional error are potentially enormous. n11 Instead,  [\*2052]  courts have attempted, whenever possible, to decide difficult questions of wartime authority on the basis of what Congress has in fact authorized. n12 This strategy makes particular sense with respect to the novel issues posed by the war on terrorism.

#### AND they un-limit the topic

BARRON\* & LEDERMAN\*\* 08 \*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. \*\* Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. [David J. Barron\* & Martin S. Lederman\*\*, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB - FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, January, 2008, Havard Law Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689]

5. Further Assertions of the Preclusive Commander in Chief Power. - In light of the Bush Administration's theory of preclusive Commander in Chief authority, and its consistent invocation of that argument across so many distinct areas, there are probably other examples as well. Because any further OLC documents containing arguments in support of such statutory noncompliance are not public, we do not know the extent of the phenomenon. On dozens of occasions, however, the President has invoked his power as Commander in Chief in issuing signing statements objecting to statutory enactments, suggesting that he will not fully comply with such laws in some circumstances, in particular when they cut too close to his chosen means of conducting a military campaign. n66 Moreover, the President, as we have noted, has invoked a Commander in Chief objection in vetoing a bill purporting to regulate the use of troops in Iraq. n67 The Administration has further indicated that any statutory restrictions Congress might approve on the use of force against Iran would be unconstitutional. n68 These recent assertions give practical effect to the expansive and uncompromising constitutional theory of preclusive executive war powers first enunciated in the OLC memorandum drafted two weeks after the attacks of September 11. n69

#### President has NO authority to initiate a conflict – regardless – Constitution is clear

BYRD 98 US Senator from West Virginia. JD American University [Robert C. Byrd, REMARKS BY U.S. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD THE CONSTITUTION IN PERIL, West Virgina Law Review, Winter, 1998, 101 W. Va. L. Rev. 385]

The constitutional framework arranged by the Framers speaks with crystal clarity regarding the war powers. The authority to initiate war rests solely with Congress, except for one narrow area--the inherent defensive authority to repel sudden attacks on our country, which is granted to the Commander in Chief. Let us listen for a moment to the words of President Abraham Lincoln in a letter to William H. Herndon on the subject of the exercise of the unfettered use of the war power by a President:

allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose --and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, after you have given him so much as you propose. If, today, he should choose to say he thinks it necessary to invade Canada, to prevent the British from invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, 'I see no probability of the British invading us' but he will say to you 'be silent; I see it, if you don't. . . .'

Well, obviously, Lincoln had it absolutely right with regard to the constitutional wisdom of the Framers. And the legislative histories of both the U.N. Participation Act and the NATO Treaty firmly establish that the President has no type of unilateral war power authority granted to him by virtue of our country's participation in these two international organizations. It is entirely preposterous to claim that an international treaty, which must be consented to by the United States Senate, somehow strips the Senate and the House of their constitutional mandate to declare war! Oh, and by the way, calling a conflict a "police action" does not give the President magical authority to use military force without the authorization of Congress, any more than calling a dog a cat suddenly empowers a dog to climb trees.

#### Those authorities are BEYOND the scope of congress to regulate

BARRON & LEDERMAN 8—\*David J. Barron, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School AND \*\*Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center [THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB—FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, January, 2008, Havard Law Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689]

n6. Following Justice Jackson's lead, in these Articles we will often refer to indefeasible Article II prerogatives as "preclusive" powers of the Commander in Chief—preclusive because they would supersede any effort by Congress to use its own constitutional authorities to enact statutes that would limit the discretion the President would otherwise be constitutionally entitled to exercise. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system."). We choose that adjective advisedly, for we certainly share Justice Jackson's view that the "loose and irresponsible" use of adjectives in these discussions more often obscures than illuminates. See id. at 646-47.