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**Immigration will pass – ignore random quotes from pissed off tea-partiers**

**BUCKHOUT 10 – 23 – 13 NDN Staff Blogger** [Emma Buckhout, Immigration Reform: Alive, Not Dead, in the House, <http://ndn.org/blog/2013/10/immigration-reform-alive-not-dead-house>]

A surprising number of recent media reports declare once again that immigration reform is dead- **surprising** because **numerous** House Republicans are **signaling the exact opposite**. It is true that responsibility for action lies with the House GOP after the Senate passed its bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform bill in June, House Democrats have introduced both CIR ASAP and H.R. 15 (now with 184 cosponsors), and President Obama has declared immigration reform a legislative priority. However, the House GOP passed five separate bills out of committee, and this week members have affirmed they are still working on more related to legalization of undocumented immigrants. As long as a contingent of the House majority is willing to keep moving on meaningful pieces of legislation, immigration reform is very much alive.

See these articles:

Speaker Hopeful of Immigration Reform This Year, Donna Cassata, Associated Press, October 23, 2013

“Reps. Mike Coffman, R-Colo., and David Valadao, R-Calif., joined immigrants brought illegally to the U.S. as children who want to join the military at a Capitol Hill news conference. Coffman and Valadao have been working with Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va., and Judiciary Committee Chairman Robert Goodlatte, R-Va., on legislation that would offer citizenship to the children.”

Boehner Says He Might Bring Up Immigration Reform This Year, David Lawder and Caren Bohan, Reuters, October 23, 2013

House Speaker Boehner: "I still think that immigration reform is an important subject that needs to be addressed and I am hopeful."

Immigration Reform: Still Not Quite Dead, Greg Sargent, Washington Post, October 22, 2013

Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R, Fla.) says he is working with a number of representatives to figure out: “what to do with the millions of undocumented who are here in a way that completely conforms with the rule of law.”

House Republicans Drafting Immigration Measures, Kristina Peterson, Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2013

“Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R., Fla.) and a small group of other lawmakers are working on one proposal that includes elements of –but is expected to diverge from– a bipartisan plan Mr. Diaz-Balart had worked on earlier this year.”

“Rep. Darrell Issa (R., Calif.) is also working on a proposal that would offer temporary legal status to qualifying illegal immigrants, his spokesman said Tuesday.”

Is Immigration Really Dead in the House?, Fawn Johnson, National Journal, October 22, 2013

“Powerful House Republicans like Boehner, Majority Leader Eric Cantor, and Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan all want to see something happen on immigration.”

An Immigration Challenge for Boehner, William Galston, Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2013

“…a majority of rank-and-file Republicans, backed by evangelical leaders and business, favor immigration reform….”

Did Shutdown “Poison the Well” for Immigration Reform?, Carrie Dann, NBC News, October 20, 2013

"Another proposal being worked on by Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va., and House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte, R-Va., would allow some children who were brought the United States illegally as children to obtain legal status.”

Written Off for Dead, Immigration Reform Could Still Live On, Byron York, Washington Examiner, October 17, 2013

"’There is still a window,’ says one House GOP aide involved in crafting a reform proposal. ‘The leadership has said keep working on it and see what you can do.’”

Time Running Out for Immigration Reform, Dan Nowicki, Arizona Republic, October 20, 2013

"’We're still committed to moving forward on step-by-step, common-sense reforms,’ Boehner spokesman Michael Steel told The Arizona Republic in an email. ‘The Judiciary Committee has already passed several bills that could see floor action.’"

**Obama’s top priority – his pressure is key**

**STOKOLS 10 – 17 – 13 Fox31 Denver Staff Writer** [Eli Stokols, ANALYSIS: Obama’s quick pivot to immigration reform, <http://kdvr.com/2013/10/17/analysis-obamas-quick-pivot-to-immigration-reform/>]

Just hours after signing the legislation ending the government shutdown and raising the debt ceiling, President Barack Obama told the country that “there are no winners” after the two-week stalemate that cost the country’s economy more than $20 billion.

But, in the political world, there is a clear winner — the president.

Republicans, by following a bone-headed strategy in pursuit of an unattainable goal, have put their own approval ratings in the toilet 13 months before the 2014 midterm election.

Further, they’ve put some wind back in the sails of an administration that had been rudderless and adrift almost from the start of the president’s second term.

On Thursday morning, Obama looked to press his advantage by urging Republicans in Congress to end the political brinksmanship and to start working together with Democrats on budget negotiations, immigration reform and the farm bill that has stalled in the House.

“To all my friends in Congress, understand that how business is done in this town has to change,” Obama said, implicitly chiding the Republicans who seemingly oppose his administration at every turn.

“You don’t like a particular policy, or a particular president, then argue for your position,” Mr. Obama said in the 15-minute statement. “Go out there and win an election. Push to change it. But don’t break it.”

While another stern lecture from the president isn’t likely to improve relations between the White House and Capitol Hill, **Obama does have a stronger hand** in the upcoming political fights; and **by pivoting quickly to immigration** reform, he’s taking advantage of a sudden window of opportunity.

During his remarks Thursday, Obama re-framed the debate over comprehensive immigration reform, reminding the country of the Senate proposal, passed with broad bipartisan support earlier this year, that’s lingering in the House.

“There’s already a broad coalition across America that’s behind this effort of comprehensive immigration reform — from business leaders to faith leaders to law enforcement,” the president said.

“In fact, the Senate has already passed a bill with strong bipartisan support that would make the biggest commitment to border security in our history; would modernize our legal immigration system; make sure everyone plays by the same rules, makes sure that folks who came here illegally have to pay a fine, pay back taxes, meet their responsibilities.”

The legislation, crafted by a bipartisan group of eight senators including Colorado Sen. Michael Bennet, a Democrat, would spend $46 billion to enhance security on the U.S. Mexico border and create a 13-year path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.

“It will establish a sensible and rational system for the future flow of immigrants to this country, put in place a process to reunite families and provide a path to citizenship for millions of people who came to this country for a better but are living in the shadows of our society,” Bennet said. “I suggest the House take a hard look at the Senate bill. **There is no reason we can’t work out a final bill to pass into law in the coming months**.”

Obama noted that the legislation is likely to grow the nation’s economy over the next several decades.

“Our economy would be 5 percent larger two decades from now,” the president said. “That’s $1.4 trillion in new economic growth.

“The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do. And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. This can and should get done by the end of this year.”

The president is speaking to a House GOP caucus that is fractured into factions, the body’s growing dysfunction writ large by the debacle of the last two weeks.

While many of the conservative hard-liners who aimed to dismantle Obamacare by shutting down the government **will never support** comprehensive immigration reform, more moderate Republicans — those concerned with the GOP’s ability to win national elections, not just their own grip on their safe, gerrymandered, primary-ripe seats — have likely been chastened by recent polls showing their approval ratings in the 20s.

**Plan kills Obama’s agenda**

**KRINER 10 Assistant professor of political science at Boston University** [Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, page 276-77]

One of the mechanisms by which congressional opposition influences presidential cost-benefit calculations is by sending signals of American disunity to the target state. Measuring the effects of such congressional signals on the calculations of the target state is always difficult. In the case of Iraq it is exceedingly so, given the lack of data on the non-state insurgent actors who were the true “target” of the American occupation after the fall of the Hussein regime. Similarly, in the absence of archival documents, such as those from the Reagan Presidential Library presented in chapter 5, it is all but impossible to measure the effects of congressional signals on the administration’s perceptions of the military costs it would have to pay to achieve its objectives militarily.

By contrast. measuring the domestic political costs of congressional opposition, while still difficult, is at least a tractable endeavor. Chapter 2 posited two primary pathways through which congressional opposition could raise the political costs of staying the course militarily for the president. **First. high-profile congressional challenges** to a use of force can affect real or anticipated public opinion and bring popular pressures to bear on the president to change course. Second, congressional opposition to the president’s conduct of military affairs **can compel him to spend considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major items on his programmatic agenda**. On both of these dimensions, congressional opposition to the war in Iraq appears to have had the predicted effect.

**Immigration reform expands skilled labor --- spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.**

**Los Angeles Times, 11/9/2012** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html>)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see **expansion of skilled labor visas**," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a **fivefold increase** in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a **significant shot in the arm for India and China**." There is **widespread consensus among economists and academics** that skilled migration **fosters new trade and business relationships** between countries and **enhances links to the global economy**, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

**US/India relations averts South Asian nuclear war.**

**Schaffer**, Spring **2002** (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can **benefit by closer cooperation**. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a **stronger position** from which to help **calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region**. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a **prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India**. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

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**The aff focuses on the institutional solution to war powers ignoring the individual’s role – this re-entrenches gendered IR**

**Sylvester 12** (Christine Sylvester is Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut, USA and Professorial Affiliate of the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.) War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory

What if International Relations (IR) were to turn its usual view of war around and start not with states, fundamentalist organisations, strategies, conventional security issues and a weapons system, and not with the aim of establishing the causes of war, as has so often been the case? What if we think of war as experience, as something ordinary people observe and suffer physically and emotionally depending on their locations? To date, much of IR has been operating comfortably in a world of theoretical abstractions – states, systems, power, balances, stakeholders, decision-makers, peace, war – tacitly leaving people and war to journalists, novelists, memoirists, relief workers, anthropologists, women’s studies and social history to flesh out.1 **This means** that **IR is not addressing one of the key elements of war**: its actual mission of injuring human bodies and destroying normal patterns of social relations. Neglecting the human elements for strategic and interest politics renders the injurious nature of war a consequence rather than the actual focal point of war.2 **It** also **makes it more difficult to appreciate the decentralised aspects of** many contemporary **wars, which is to say the dispersal of authority to people who are** routinely **off IR’s grid** – like the Liberian peace women who forced Charles Taylor into peace talks and the kidnapped war women led by Black Diamond, who simultaneously gained notoriety as fierce combatants in the bush.3 As well, IR knows about the political economies and security mercenaries of war,4 but often finds the individuals who sustain and benefit from war less pertinent than the international web of interactions they create, **thus potentially missing links in chains that start and end with people**.

Much of IR actually seems unprepared for the presence, let alone the power, of ordinary people in international relations, whether those people walk through the Berlin Wall and help shift Cold War polarity, or toss out autocrats in the Arab Spring revolutions. Ordinary people are overwhelmingly absent in IR because they are not seen as key stakeholders in IR’s versions of international relations. My challenge to the field is to pay more attention to war as experience, on two grounds: **war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people** and not only studied down from places that sweep blood, tears and laughter away, or assign those things to some other field to look into; and **people demonstrate time and again that they too comprise international relations, especially the relations of war, and cannot therefore be ignored or relegated to a collateral status**. IR’s feminist wing of war studies, which is still taking shape, has implicitly made those kinds of propositions the touchstones of its war research. As well, scholars from a number of IR’s many camps work the boundaries of IR theories in ways that can reveal the people of war. Even IR traditions that make a point of operating above people (neorealism) can briefly mention people in war situations, albeit without elaborating their experiences or building them into IR theories.

**AND their representations create structural violence – that outweighs and turns the case – only evaluating IR can solve**

**Shepherd 09** [Laura J. Dept of Political Science and International Studies, U of Birmingham (UK), “Gender, Violence and Global Politics: Contemporary Debates in Feminist Security Studies,” Political Studies Review, V7 I2, Apr]

According to conventional accounts of international relations (IR), scholars focus on war (predominantly as a means to providing the sovereign state with security) and the existence of war's corollary is a foundational assumption that goes largely unquestioned. Peace must exist, for international relations are not characterised by perpetual conflict. However, peace is implicitly defined, in dichotomous terms, by the absence of violent conflict, as 'not-war'. Of more analytical interest is conflict, which is always a possibility and which, moreover, occurs between states. International relations as a discipline, narrowly conceived, is largely unconcerned with activities that occur within the state. Minimally, feminist and other critical approaches to IR seek to correct such disciplinary myopia. While classical realism theorises the political actor –Hans Morgenthau's 'political man' (1973, pp. 15–6) – in order to construct the state as actor, the now dominant neo-realism abstracts the human subject from its disciplinary musings, leading to the infamous 'black box' model of the state. Early feminist scholarship challenged this assumption as well, arguing that individuals, as human subjects in all their messy complexity, are an integral part of international relations (see Shepherd, 2007, pp. 240–1). Attention to the human subject in I/international R/relations – or, as Christine Sylvester phrases it, 'relations international', to emphasise the embedded nature of all kinds of relations in the international sphere, including power relations and gender relations (Sylvester, 1994, p. 6; see also Enloe, 1996) – allows critical scholars to look beyond the disciplinary obsession with war. Further, it allows us to investigate one of the simplest insights of feminist IR, which is also one of the most devastating: the war/peace dichotomy is gendered, misleading and potentially pathological. In this essay, I address each of these concerns in turn, developing a critique of the war/peace dichotomy that is foundational to conventional approaches to IR through a review of three recent publications in the field of feminist security studies. These texts are Cynthia Enloe's (2007) Globalization and Militarism, David Roberts' (2008) Human Insecurity, and Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics by Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2008). Drawing on the insights of these books, I ask first how violence is understood in global politics, with specific reference to the gendered disciplinary blindnesses that frequently characterise mainstream approaches. Second, I demonstrate how a focus on war and peace can neglect to take into account the politics of everyday violence: the violences of the in-between times that international politics recognises neither as 'war' nor 'peace' and the violences inherent to times of peace that are overlooked in the study of war. Finally, I argue that **feminist security studies offers an important corrective to the foundational assumptions of IR, which themselves can perpetuate the very instances of violence that they seek to redress**. If we accept the core insights of feminist security studies – the centrality of the human subject, the importance of particular configurations of masculinity and femininity, and the gendered conceptual framework that underpins the discipline of IR – we are encouraged to envisage a rather different politics of the global. From Boudica to Bhopal As Sjoberg and Gentry recount (2008, pp. 38–9), Boudica was an Iceni queen who led an uprising against the Roman forces occupying the British Isles circa 61 AD. Prior to launching the attack, Boudica's refusal to allow a Roman general to claim ownership of her land resulted in the rape of her two daughters as punishment. However, 'many inherited tales about Boudica do not emphasise her personal or political motivations, but the savage and unwomanly brutality of her actions' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 39). Almost two thousand years later and half a planet away, a toxic gas leak in 1984 at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India caused the immediate deaths of approximately 3,000 people and left tens of thousands suffering the after-effects for decades (Roberts, 2008, p. 10). At first reading, little links these two accounts of quite different forms of violence. The first is an instance of violent resistance against imperial oppression, and Boudica has been vilified, her efforts delegitimised, in much the same way as many actors in 'small wars' tend to be in global politics today (see Barkawi, 2004). The second is perhaps more usefully seen as the result of structural violence, following Johan Galtung's explanation of the same, as 'violence where there is no such actor' (cited in Roberts, 2008, p. 18). However, by asking questions about Boudica and Bhopal that are born of a 'feminist curiosity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 1, p. 11), these texts demonstrate connections beyond the simplistic equation that is applicable to both: actor/structure plus violence equals death. In Human Insecurity, Roberts poses the question, 'What is violence?' (2008, p. 17). This is a question rarely asked in international relations. Violence is war: large-scale, state-dominated, much studied, war. However, the three texts under review here all offer more nuanced theories of violence that focus analytical attention on complex constructions of agency (institutional and international), structure, and the global context that is product and productive of such violence. Through an intricate and beautifully accessible analysis of modernity –'that pot of gold at the end of the global rainbow' (Enloe, 2007, p. 64) – Enloe encourages her readers to seek the connections between globalisation and militarisation, arguing that at the heart of this nexus lie important questions about violence and security. Roberts notes a broad dissatisfaction with the concept of 'human security' (2008, pp. 14–7), offering instead his investigative lens of 'human insecurity', defined as 'avoidable civilian deaths, occurring globally, caused by social, political and economic institutions and structures, built and operated by humans and which could feasibly be changed' (p. 28). Placing the human at the centre of concerns about security immediately challenges a conventional state-based approach to security, as Enloe explains. In a convincing account of the hard-fought expansion of the concept of security, mapped on to strategic and organisational gains made by various feminist organisations, Enloe reminds us that **if we take seriously the lives of women – their understandings of security – as well as on-the-ground workings of masculinity and femininity, we will be able to produce more meaningful and more reliable analyses of 'security'– personal, national and global** (Enloe, 2007, p. 47). This latter quote typifies an approach for which Enloe has become somewhat famous. In the early 1980s, Enloe began asking the questions for which she is rightly acknowledged as a key figure in feminist security studies, including Does Khaki Become You? (Enloe, 1983) and 'where are the women?' (Enloe, 2000; see also Enloe, 2004). Inspired by her own curiosity about the roles played by women and the functions performed by gender in the militarisation of civilian life, Enloe has explored prostitution, marriage, welfare and war making with an eye to the representation (both political and symbolic) of women. In Globalization and Militarism she offers detailed vignettes that illuminate just how interwoven violence is with the quest for (various types of) security, and demands that nothing is left unquestioned in a critical analysis of these concepts. Even baby socks (embossed with tiny fighter planes, a gift to the parent of a small boy) have something to tell us about gender, militarism and the casual representations of violence and war that society accepts (Enloe, 2007, pp. 143–4). Following a similar logic, although he initially defines human insecurity as avoidable civilian deaths, Roberts focuses on 'preventable female deaths ... and avoidable deaths in children under five' (2008, p. 31). While this conflation of 'civilian' with 'women and children' is rather problematic (see Carpenter, 2006), in asking not only, where are the women? but also, why are they dying in such disproportionate numbers? Roberts enhances his critique of 'most security studies ... [that] largely [miss] the scale of avoidable human misery and avoidable human death' (2008, p. 4). As mentioned above, Roberts uses Galtung's concept of structural violence to draw attention to the manifest ways in which an increasingly interconnected global system relies on gender and violence (and gendered violence) for its perpetuation: 'The process of globalization, to which few are ideologically or otherwise opposed, is an essential conveyor and articulator of the masculinity that underpins andrarchy' (Roberts, 2008, p. 157). Whereas Enloe offers a persuasive and accessible account of patriarchy, a concept familiar to feminist and non-feminist scholars alike (Enloe, 2007, pp. 66–8), Roberts suggests 'andrarchy' as an alternative, which he defines as 'the gender-partisan ideological domination and rule structure that determines and sustains the general relative power of males over females globally' (Roberts, 2008, p. 140). However, it is difficult to see how this reformulation either differs substantively from patriarchy as an analytical tool or assists in the construction of an alternative theory of global violence that centralises the individual, and therefore takes gender seriously, in that it seems to essentialise violent actors (males) and violated victims (females). In contrast, Enloe's explanation of patriarchy challenges such essentialism as its first point of critical intervention. That is, the assumption of essential differences between men and women is part of patriarchal ideology, feeding into stereotypical notions of how such men and women should behave, which in turn constitute recognisable discourses of gender: sets of narratives about masculinity and femininity and how these are, in general, respectively privileged and marginalised. The most theoretically coherent account of gender and violence offered in these three texts comes from Sjoberg and Gentry and employs the notion of discourse to great effect. Whereas Roberts seeks to map out a consciously structural account of global violence, where the structure in question is a hybrid of andrarchy and a 'rapacious, increasingly competitive and hyper-masculine' neoliberalism (Roberts, 2008, p. 118), Sjoberg and Gentry offer a more sophisticated analysis of structure and agency in their 'relational autonomy framework' that accounts for both individual agency and structural constraint (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 189–98). When people perform acts of political violence, they argue, this is a conscious choice, but crucially individuals 'choose within a specified spectrum of socially acceptable choices' (p. 190). 'In its simplest form, relational autonomy is the recognition that freedom of action is defined and limited by social relationships' (p. 194) and this has profound implications for the study of violence in global politics. Sjoberg and Gentry use this insight to demonstrate that women's violence in global politics is rendered unintelligible, through narrative representations of the perpetrators as mothers, monsters or whores (in media discourse and academic discussion), rather than as autonomous agents. From the abuses of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, via the 'black widows' of Chechnya, to female perpetrators of genocidal violence in Rwanda, the authors show how representations of women's violence conform to and further confirm the stereotypes of violent women as either mothers (supporting or vengeful), monsters or sexually deviant whores (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 30–49). The very different theories of violence outlined in these three texts all contribute to the development of a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of violence in global politics. By insisting that international relations are also gender relations – by demanding that we recognise that states are an analytical abstraction and politics is practised or performed by gendered bodies – all of the authors put forward theories of violence that are corrective of gender blindness, in that the violences in question are simultaneously gendered and gendering (see Shepherd, 2008, pp. 49–54). They are gendered because they have different impacts on male and female bodies (Enloe, 2007, p. 13), both materially as people experience violence differently depending on their gender (and race, class, sexuality and so on) and also discursively, as what we expect of men and women in terms of their behaviours, violent and otherwise, is limited by the meaning(s) ascribed to male and female bodies by society. Regarding the former, Roberts proposes that we term the global victimisation of women 'structural femicide' (Roberts, 2008, p. 65), but does not sufficiently engage with the question of whether defining gendered violence as violence against women (and children) functions to constitute the subject of 'woman' as a perpetual victim, in need of protection and lacking in agency (Shepherd, 2008, p. 41). In contrast, Sjoberg and Gentry neatly articulate the interplay between material and discursive violence as they write a theory that accounts 'for people's impact on global politics and for the impact of narratives others construct for and about them' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 216, emphasis in original). Thus, violence is gendering as our understanding of politics is in part reproduced through violent actions. Through discursive violence against individuals – for example, representing Chechen women suicide terrorists as 'black widows', which demands that they are attributed the characteristics of the venomous and deadly black widow spider and, further, that their violence is grounded in familial loss, 'born directly of a desire for vengeance for the deaths of their husbands and sons' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 100) rather than as the result of a process of political decision making – our understanding of that individual and of the act of violence itself is produced. Similarly, through material acts of violence, discourses of gender are given physical form; the detainees at Abu Ghraib who were forced to simulate oral sex with each other were forced to do so in part because of crude cultural understandings of homosexuality as deviant and homosexuals as lesser men – that is, as women. To force a man to perform oral sex on another man is to undermine his masculinity and simultaneously to reinforce the gendered power relations that claim privilege for masculinity over femininity, heterosexuality over homosexuality – power relations that render such an act intelligible in the first instance. Such understandings of violence are beyond the remit of conventional state-based approaches to international relations. However, 'it is by tracking the gendered assumptions about how to wield feminization to humiliate male[s]' (Enloe, 2007, p. 115) and how to represent gendered individuals in such a way as to render some acts of violence intelligible as political and others as monstrous that we can begin to piece together a useful feminist account of global violence, which is a necessary component of understanding security. Everyday Violence and In-Between Days In addition to questioning what violence is, how it is represented and with what effects, feminist security studies scholarship also asks which violences are considered worthy of study and when these violences occur. Expanding the concept of violence that underpins feminist analysis, as outlined above, allows us to take seriously what Arthur Kleinman (2000) refers to as 'the violences of everyday life'. Beyond a narrow focus on war and state-based violence lies a plethora of everyday violences that feminist security studies seeks to address. In the field of security studies the broadening and deepening of the concept of security, such that it is no longer assumed to apply only to the sovereign state, has demonstrated the multiple insecurities experienced by individuals and social collectives (Booth, 2005, pp. 14–5). The development of the concept of 'human security' largely took place within the parameters of a wider disciplinary debate over the appropriate referent object for security studies (the individual, society, the state) and the types of threat to the referent object that would be recognised. In a move similar to Ken Booth's (1991) reformulation of security as emancipation, Roberts' quest for individual empowerment seeks to overcome the 'élite-legitimized disequilibrium' that results in the manifest insecurity of the majority of the world's population (Roberts, 2008, p. 185). As might be expected, the violences Roberts identifies are innumerable. In addition to the physical violences of 'infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate ("domestic", "honour" and "dowry") killings and lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five' (Roberts, 2008, p. 31), his analysis attacks the institutional structures of the dominant international financial institutions (pp. 117–35) and the andrarchal and neoliberal discourses that sustain them (pp. 136–58). In short, Roberts' answer to the question of which violences matter in global politics is quite simple: all of them. However, while studies of human security, he argues, seek to provide the human with security, his reformulated analytic takes as its starting point human insecurity; that is, he starts with the threat(s) to the sovereign subject rather than the subject's ontological condition. Roberts suggests that this circumvents the disciplinary definitional problem with human security – identified by Roland Paris (2001), Edward Newman (2001; 2004) and others – but I cannot see how this is the case, given that the answer to the question 'what is it that humans do to make the world a more dangerous and dysfunctional place?' (Roberts, 2008, p. 28) is also quite simple: we live in it. Thus Roberts' analytic seems to suffer the same lack of definitional clarity – and therefore policy relevance – that he ascribes to more conventional approaches; it is no easier to identify, quantify and ultimately reduce the threats experienced by coexisting human subjects than it is to provide those human subjects with security, if security can first be defined as freedom from fear or want. I do not espouse some construction of human nature (if such a thing were to exist) that assumes essential selfishness and a propensity for violence, nor do I assume that security is a zero-sum game, in that one person's security must always be at the expense of another's, but I recognise that even the most well-intentioned security policy can have unforeseen and sometimes disastrous effects. Sometimes, moreover, as Sjoberg and Gentry demonstrate, the decision to perform acts of political violence that are a source of insecurity for the intended victims can be understood if not condoned. Enloe's analytical remit is similarly wide-ranging to Roberts', in that she focuses on processes – globalisation and militarism – that are inherently violent. However, although Enloe also insists that all violences should count in the study of global politics, she grounds this claim in an analysis of specific sites of violence and demonstrates with startling clarity just how everyday items – for example, sneakers – are both globalised and militarised: Threaded through virtually every sneaker you own is some relationship to masculinized militaries. Locating factories in South Korea [in the 1960s and 1970s] was a good strategic decision in the eyes of those Oregon-headquartered male Nike executives because of the close alliance between male policymakers in Washington and Seoul. It was a relationship – unequal but intimate – based on their shared anticommunism, their shared commitment to waging the Cold War, and their shared participation in an ambitious international military alliance (Enloe, 2007, p. 28). By drawing her readers' attention to the ways in which discourses of gender (ideas about how 'proper' men and women should behave) function, Enloe reminds us that adhering to ideals of masculinity and femininity is both productive of violence and is a violence in itself, a violence against the empowered human subject. 'Ideas matter', she concludes, ideas about modernity, security, violence, threat, trust. 'Each of these ideas is fraught with blatant and subtle presumptions about masculinity and femininity. Ideas about both masculinity and femininity matter. This makes a feminist curiosity a necessity' (Enloe, 2007, p. 161). While conventional studies of IR and security may be willing to concede that ideas matter (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001), paying close attention to the work that gender does allows for a fuller understanding of why it is that particular violences fall outside the traditional parameters of study. As to the question of when violence is worthy of study, all three texts implicitly or explicitly draw on the popular feminist phrase: 'the personal is political'. This slogan neatly encapsulates the feminist critique of a supposed foundational divide between the private and the public realms of social life. In arguing that the personal is political, feminist theory refuses to accept that there are instances of human behaviour or situations in social life that can or should be bracketed from study. At its simplest, this critique led to the recognition of 'domestic violence' as a political, rather than a personal issue (see, for example Moore, 2003; Youngs, 2003), forming the foundation for critical studies of gendered violence in times of war and in times of peace that would otherwise have been ignored. Crucially, Enloe extended the boundaries of critique to include the international, imbuing the phrase with new analytical vitality when she suggested, first, that the phrase itself is palindromic (that is, that the political is also personal, inextricably intertwined with the everyday) and, second, that the personal is international just as the international is personal. 'The international is personal' implies that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. ... To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments' recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinised dignity and feminised sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood (Enloe, 2000, pp. 196–7). These ideas about dignity and sacrifice are not neatly contained within the temporal boundaries of any given war, nor are they incidental to the practice of warfare. Further, there is of course also the question of who gets to define or declare war, or peace. While some of the violent women whose actions are analysed by Sjoberg and Gentry perform their violences in wartime (for example, Lynndie England, who received the most attention from global media of the women involved in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib; see Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, pp. 67–70), others are fighting wars that are not sanctioned by the international community (such as the Chechen women [pp. 97–111] and female Palestinian suicide bombers [pp. 112–40]). As discussed above, ideas about masculinity and femininity, dignity and sacrifice may not only be violent in themselves, but are also the product/productive of physical violences. With this in mind, the feminist argument that 'peacetime' is analytically misleading is a valid one. Of interest are the 'in-between days' and the ways in which **labelling periods of war or peace as such can divert attention away from the myriad violences that inform and reinforce social behaviour**. [W]ar can surely never be said to start and end at a clearly defined moment. Rather, it seems part of a continuum of conflict, expressed now in armed force, now in economic sanctions or political pressure. A time of supposed peace may come later to be called 'the pre-war period'. During the fighting of a war, unseen by the foot soldiers under fire, peace processes are often already at work. A time of postwar reconstruction, later, may be re-designated as an inter bellum– a mere pause between wars (Cockburn and Zarkov, cited in El Jack, 2003, p. 9). Feminist security studies interrogates the pauses between wars, and the political processes – and practices of power – that demarcate times as such. In doing so, not only is the remit of recognisable violence (violence worthy of study) expanded, but so too are the parameters of what counts as IR. Everyday violences and acts of everyday resistance ('a fashion show, a tour, a small display of children's books' in Enloe, 2007, pp. 117–20) are the stuff of relations international and, thus, of a comprehensive understanding of security. In the following section I outline the ways in which taking these claims seriously allows us to engage critically with the representations of international relations that inform our research, with potentially profound implications. The Violent Reproduction of the International As well as conceiving of gender as a set of discourses, and violence as a means of reproducing and reinforcing the relevant discursive limits, **it is possible to see security as a set of discourses**, as I have argued more fully elsewhere (Shepherd, 2007; 2008; see also Shepherd and Weldes, 2007). Rather than pursuing the study of security as if it were something that can be achieved either in absolute, partial or relative terms, **engaging with security as discourse enables the analysis of how these discourses function to reproduce, through various strategies, the domain of the international with which IR is self-consciously concerned**. Just as violences that are gendering reproduce gendered subjects, on this view states, acting as authoritative entities, perform violences, but violences, in the name of security, also perform states. These processes occur simultaneously, and across the whole spectrum of social life: an instance of rape in war is at once gendering of the individuals involved and of the social collectivities – states, communities, regions – they feel they represent (see Bracewell, 2000); building a fence in the name of security that separates people from their land and extended families performs particular kinds of violence (at checkpoints, during patrols) and performs particular subject identities (of the state authority, of the individuals affected), all of which are gendered. All of the texts under discussion in this essay argue that it is imperative to explore and expose gendered power relations and, further, that doing so not only enables a rigorous critique of realism in IR but also reminds us as scholars of the need for such a critique. The critiques of IR offered by feminist scholars are grounded in a rejection of neo-realism/realism as a dominant intellectual framework for academics in the discipline and policy makers alike. As Enloe reminds us, 'the government-centred, militarized version of national security [derived from a realist framework] remains the dominant mode of policy thinking' (Enloe, 2007, p. 43). Situating gender as a central category of analysis encourages us to 'think outside the "state security box"' (p. 47) and to remember that 'the "individuals" of global politics do not work alone, live alone or politic alone – they do so in interdependent relationships with others' (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2008, p. 200) that are inherently gendered. One of the key analytical contributions of all three texts is the way in which they all challenge what it means to be 'doing' IR, by recognising various forms of violence, interrogating the public/private divide and demanding that attention is paid to the temporal and physical spaces in-between war and peace. Feminist security studies should not simply be seen as 'women doing security', or as 'adding women to IR/security studies', important as these contributions are. Through their theorising, the authors discussed here reconfigure what 'counts' as IR, challenging orthodox notions of who can 'do' IR and what 'doing' IR means. The practices of power needed to maintain dominant configurations of international relations are exposed, and critiquing the productive power of realism as a discourse is one way in which the authors do this. Sjoberg and Gentry pick up on a recent theoretical shift in Anglo-American IR, from system-level analysis to a recognition that individuals matter. However, as they rightly point out, the individuals who are seen to matter are not gendered relational beings, but rather reminiscent of Hobbes' construction of the autonomous rational actor. '[T]he narrowness of the group that [such an approach] includes limits its effectiveness as an interpretive framework and reproduces the gender, class and race biases in system-level international relationship scholarship' (Sjoberg and Gentry 2008, p. 200, emphasis added). Without paying adequate attention to the construction of individuals as gendered beings, or to the reproduction of widely held ideas about masculine and feminine behaviours, Sjoberg and Gentry remind us that we will ultimately fail 'to see and deconstruct the increasingly subtle, complex and disguised ways in which gender pervades international relations and global politics' (2008, p. 225). In a similar vein, Roberts notes that 'human security is marginalised or rejected as inauthentic [because] it is not a reflection of realism's (male) agendas and priorities' (2008, p. 169). The 'agendas and priorities' identified by Roberts and acknowledged by Sjoberg and Gentry as being productive of particular biases in scholarship are not simply 'academic' matters, in the pejorative sense of the term. As Roberts argues, 'Power relationships of inequality happen because they are built that way by human determinism of security and what is required to maintain security (p. 171). Realism, as academic discourse and as policy guideline, has material effects. Although his analysis employs an unconventional definition of the term 'social construction' (seemingly interchangeable with 'human agency') and rests on a novel interpretation of the three foundational assumptions of realism (Roberts, 2008, pp. 169–77), the central point that Roberts seeks to make in his conclusion is valid: 'it is a challenge to those who deny relationships between gender and security; between human agency (social construction) and lethal outcome' (p. 183). In sum, all three texts draw their readers to an inescapable, and – for the conventional study of IR – a devastating conclusion: the dominance of neo-realism/realism and the state-based study of security that derives from this is potentially pathological, in that it is in part productive of the violences it seeks to ameliorate. I suggest that critical engagement with orthodox IR theory is necessary for the intellectual growth of the discipline, and considerable insight can be gained by acknowledging the relevance of feminist understandings of gender, power and theory. The young woman buying a T-shirt from a multinational clothing corporation with her first pay cheque, the group of young men planning a stag weekend in Amsterdam, a group of students attending a demonstration against the bombing of Afghanistan – studying these significant actions currently falls outside the boundaries of doing security studies in mainstream IR and I believe these boundaries need contesting. As Marysia Zalewski argues: International politics is what we make it to be ... We need to rethink the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both that which we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world (Zalewski 1996, p. 352, emphasis in original). Conclusion: 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend' (Mao Tse-Tung) In this essay, I have used the analysis of three contemporary publications in the field of feminist security studies to demonstrate three significant sets of analytical contributions that such scholarship makes to the discipline of IR. Beyond the war/peace dichotomy that is frequently assumed to be definitive of the discipline, we find many and various forms of violence, occurring in and between temporally distinct periods of conflict, which are the product/productive of socially acceptable modes of gendered behaviour, ways of being in the world as a woman or man. I have also argued that critical engagement with conventional, state-based approaches to (national) security must persist as the academic discourses we write are complicit in the construction of the global as we understand it. Further, **'if all experience is gendered, analysis of gendered identities is an imperative starting point in the study of political identities and practice'** (Peterson, 1999, p. 37). To this end, I conclude by suggesting that we take seriously Enloe's final comment: 'Tracking militarization and fostering demilitarization will call for cooperative investigations, multiple skills and the appreciation of diverse perspectives' (2007, p. 164). While there has been intense intra-disciplinary debate within contemporary feminist security studies over the necessary 'feminist credentials' of some gendered analyses, it is important to recognise the continual renewal and analytical vigour brought to the field by such debates. Broadly speaking, there are two positions we might map. On the one side, there are those who refuse to reduce gender to a variable in their research, arguing that to do so limits the critical insight that can be gained from treating gender instead as a noun, a verb and a structural logic (see, for example, Sjoberg, 2006; Zalewski, 2007). On this view, 'gender', whether deployed as noun, verb or logic in a particular analysis, cannot be separated from the decades of feminist scholarship that worked to explore, expand on and elucidate what gender might mean. On the opposing side are scholars who, typically using phrases such as 'balanced consideration' (Jones, 1998, p. 303) and 'an inclusive perspective on gender and war' (Griffiths, 2003, pp. 327–8, emphasis in original), manipulate gender as a variable in their research to 'extend the scope of feminist IR scholarship' (Caprioli, 2004, p. 266) and to draw conclusions regarding sex-specific behaviours in conflict and post-conflict situations (see also Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Carpenter, 2006; Melander, 2005). Crucially, however, scholarship on both sides of this 'divide' coexists, and in doing so encourages 'the appreciation of diverse perspectives'. While bracketing feminist politics from the study of gender is an overtly political move, which can be presented as either strategic (Carpenter, 2006, pp. 6–10) or as common sense, in that it 'enhances [the] explanatory capabilities' of feminist security studies (Caprioli, 2004, p. 266), all interrogations of security that take gender seriously draw attention to the ways in which gender is at once personal, political and international. Although it might seem that conceiving of gender as a variable adheres both to a disciplinary narrative that rewards positivist and abstract theory (without messy reference to bodies) and to a neo-/anti-/post-feminist narrative that claims 'we' have solved the gender problem (see Zalewski, 2007, p. 303), at the very least such approaches give credence to the idea that gender matters in global politics. Mary Caprioli suggests that 'IR feminists shattered the publishing boundary for feminist IR scholarship, and tackled the difficult task of deconstructing IR theory' (2004, p. 257). I would caution that it is perhaps too soon to represent the shattering and tackling as a fait accompli, but with the vital interjections of texts such as those discussed here, security studies scholars may yet envisage a politics of violence and human subjectivity that transcends the arbitrary disciplinary boundaries which constrain rather than facilitate understanding.

**Our alternative is to interrogate reality – failure to do so makes their methodology suspect**

**Peterson and Runyan 99** [professor of political science at the University of Arizona and professor of women’s studies at Wright State University, 1999 (V. Spike and Anne, Global Gender Issues, 2nd edition, p. 1-3)]

Whenever we study a topic, we do so through a lens that necessarily focuses our attention in particular ways. By filtering or "ordering" what we look at, each lens enables us to see some things in greater detail or more accurately or in better relation to certain other things. But this is unavoidably at the expense of seeing other things that are rendered out of focus--filtered out--by each particular lens. According to Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, various theoretical perspectives, or "images," of international politics contain certain assumptions and lead us "to ask certain questions, seek certain types of answers, and use certain methodological tools."1 For example, different images act as lenses and shape our assumptions about who the significant actors are (individuals? states? multinational corporations?), what their attributes are (rationality? self-interest? power?), how social processes are categorized (politics? cooperation? dependence?), and what outcomes are desirable (peace? national security? global equity?). The images or lenses we use have important consequences because they structure what we look for and are able to "see." In Patrick Morgan's words, "Our conception of [IR acts as a] map for directing our attention and distributing our efforts, and using the wrong map can lead us into a swamp instead of taking us to higher ground."2 What we look for depends a great deal on how we make sense of, or "order," our experience. We learn our ordering systems in a variety of contexts. From infancy on, we are taught to make distinctions enabling us to perform appropriately within a particular culture. As college students, we are taught the distinctions appropriate to particular disciplines (psy- chology, anthropology, political science) and particular schools of thought within them (realism, behavioralism, liberalism, structuralism). No matter in which context we learned them, the categories and ordering frameworks shape the lenses through which we look at, think about, and make sense of the world around us. At the same time, the lenses we adopt shape our experience of the world itself because they shape what we do and how and why we do it. For example, a political science lens focuses our attention on particular categories and events (the meaning of power, democracy, or elections) in ways that variously influence our behavior (questioning authority, protesting abuse of power, or participating in elec- toral campaigns). By filtering our ways of thinking about and ordering experience, the categories and images we rely on shape how we behave and thus the world we live in: They have concrete consequences. We observe this readily in the case of self-fulfilling prophecies: If we expect hostility, our own behavior (acting superior, displaying power) may elicit responses (defensive posturing, aggression) that we then interpret as "confirming" our expectations. It is in this sense that we refer to lenses and "realities" as interactive, interdependent, or mutually constituted. Lenses shape who we are, what we think, and what actions we take, thus shaping the world we live in. At the same time, the world we live in ("reality") shapes which lenses are available to us, what we see through them, and the likelihood of our using them in particular contexts. In general, as long as our lenses and images seem to "work," we keep them and build on them. Lenses simplify our thinking. Like maps, they "frame" our choices and exploration, enabling us to take advantage of knowledge already gained and to move more effectively toward our objectives. The more useful they appear to be, the more we are inclined to take them for granted and to resist making major changes in them. We forget that our particular ordering or meaning system is a choice among many alternatives. Instead, we tend to believe we are seeing "reality" as it "is" rather than as our culture or discipline or image interprets or "maps" reality. It is difficult and sometimes uncomfortable to reflect critically on our assumptions, to question their accuracy or desirability, and to explore the implications of shifting our vantage point by adopting a different lens. Of course, the world we live in and therefore our experiences are constantly changing; we have to continuously modify our images, mental maps, and ordering systems as well. The required shift in lens may be minor: from liking one type of music to liking another, from being a high school student in a small town to being a college student in an urban en- vironment. Or the shift may be more pronounced: from casual dating to parenting, from the freedom of student lifestyles to the assumption of full-time job responsibilities, from Newtonian to quantum physics, from East-West rivalry to post-Cold War complexities. Societal shifts are dramatic, as we experience and respond to systemic transformations such as economic restructuring, environmental degradation, or the effects of war. To function effectively as students and scholars of world politics, we must modify our thinking in line with historical developments. That is, as "reality" changes, our ways of understanding or ordering need to change as well. This is especially the case to the extent that outdated worldviews or lenses place us in danger, distort our understanding, or lead us away from our objectives. Indeed, as both early explorers and urban drivers know, outdated maps are inadequate, and potentially disastrous, guides.

**1NC CP**

The CP is competitive and solves the case—OLC rulings do not actually remove authority but nevertheless hold binding precedential value on the executive.

Trevor W. **Morrison**, October **2010**. Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. “STARE DECISIS IN THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,” Columbia Law Review, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, Lexis.

On the other hand, an OLC that says "yes" too often is not in the client's long-run interest. n49 Virtually all of OLC's clients have their own legal staffs, including the White House Counsel's Office in the White House and the general counsel's offices in other departments and agencies. Those offices are capable of answering many of the day-to-day issues that arise in those components. They typically turn to OLC when the issue is sufficiently controversial or complex (especially on constitutional questions) that some external validation holds special value. n50 For example, when a department confronts a difficult or delicate constitutional question in the course of preparing to embark upon a new program or course of action that raises difficult or politically sensitive legal questions, it has an interest in being able to point to a credible source affirming the  [\*1462]  legality of its actions. n51 The in-house legal advice of the agency's general counsel is unlikely to carry the same weight. n52 Thus, even though those offices might possess the expertise necessary to answer at least many of the questions they currently send to OLC, in some contexts they will not take that course because a "yes" from the in-house legal staff is not as valuable as a "yes" from OLC. But that value depends on OLC maintaining its reputation for serious, evenhanded analysis, not mere advocacy. n53

The risk, however, is that OLC's clients will not internalize the long-run costs of taxing OLC's integrity. This is in part because the full measure of those costs will be spread across all of OLC's clients, not just the client agency now before it. The program whose legality the client wants OLC to review, in contrast, is likely to be something in which the client has an immediate and palpable stake. Moreover, the very fact that the agency has come to OLC for legal advice will often mean it thinks there is  [\*1463]  at least a plausible argument that the program is lawful. In that circumstance, the agency is unlikely to see any problem in a "yes" from OLC.

Still, it would be an overstatement to say that OLC risks losing its client base every time it contemplates saying "no." One reason is custom. In some areas, there is a longstanding tradition - rising to the level of an expectation - that certain executive actions or decisions will not be taken without seeking OLC's advice. One example is OLC's bill comment practice, in which it reviews legislation pending in Congress for potential constitutional concerns. If it finds any serious problems, it writes them up and forwards them to the Office of Management and Budget, which combines OLC's comments with other offices' policy reactions to the legislation and generates a coordinated administration position on the legislation. n54 That position is then typically communicated to Congress, either formally or informally. While no statute or regulation mandates OLC's part in this process, it is a deeply entrenched, broadly accepted practice. Thus, although some within the Executive Branch might find it frustrating when OLC raises constitutional concerns in bills the administration wants to support as a policy matter, and although the precise terms in which OLC's constitutional concerns are passed along to Congress are not entirely in OLC's control, there is no realistic prospect that OLC would ever be cut out of the bill comment process entirely. Entrenched practice, then, provides OLC with some measure of protection from the pressure to please its clients.

But there are limits to that protection. Most formal OLC opinions do not arise out of its bill comment practice, which means most are the product of a more truly voluntary choice by the client to seek OLC's advice. And as suggested above, although the Executive Branch at large has an interest in OLC's credibility and integrity, the preservation of those virtues generally falls to OLC itself. OLC's nonlitigating function makes this all the more true. Whereas, for example, the Solicitor General's aim of prevailing before the Supreme Court limits the extent to which she can profitably pursue an extreme agenda inconsistent with current doctrine, OLC faces no such immediate constraint. Whether OLC honors its oft-asserted commitment to legal advice based on its best view of the law depends largely on its own self-restraint.

2. Formal Requests, Binding Answers, and Lawful Alternatives. - Over time, OLC has developed practices and policies that help maintain its independence and credibility. First, before it provides a written opinion, n55 OLC typically requires that the request be in writing from the head or general counsel of the requesting agency, that the request be as specific and concrete as possible, and that the agency provide its own written  [\*1464]  views on the issue as part of its request. n56 These requirements help constrain the requesting agency. Asking a high-ranking member of the agency to commit the agency's views to writing, and to present legal arguments in favor of those views, makes it more difficult for the agency to press extreme positions.

Second, as noted in the Introduction, n57 OLC's legal advice is treated as binding within the Executive Branch until withdrawn or overruled. n58 As a formal matter, the bindingness of the Attorney General's (or, in the modern era, OLC's) legal advice has long been uncertain. n59 The issue has never required formal resolution, however, because by longstanding tradition the advice is treated as binding. n60 OLC protects that tradition today by generally refusing to provide advice if there is any doubt about whether the requesting entity will follow it. n61 This guards against "advice-shopping by entities willing to abide only by advice they like." n62 More broadly, it helps ensure that OLC's answers matter. An agency displeased with OLC's advice cannot simply ignore the advice. The agency might  [\*1465]  construe any ambiguity in OLC's advice to its liking, and in some cases might even ask OLC to reconsider its advice. n63 But the settled practice of treating OLC's advice as binding ensures it is not simply ignored.

In theory, the very bindingness of OLC's opinions creates a risk that agencies will avoid going to OLC in the first place, relying either on their general counsels or even other executive branch offices to the extent they are perceived as more likely to provide welcome answers. This is only a modest risk in practice, however. As noted above, legal advice obtained from an office other than OLC - especially an agency's own general counsel - is unlikely to command the same respect as OLC advice. n64 Indeed, because OLC is widely viewed as "the executive branch's chief legal advisor," n65 an agency's decision not to seek OLC's advice is likely to be viewed by outside observers with skepticism, especially if the in-house advice approves a program or initiative of doubtful legality.

OLC has also developed certain practices to soften the blow of legal advice not to a client's liking. Most significantly, after concluding that a client's proposed course of action is unlawful, OLC frequently works with the client to find a lawful way to pursue its desired ends. n66 As the OLC Guidelines put it, "when OLC concludes that an administration proposal is impermissible, it is appropriate for OLC to go on to suggest modifications that would cure the defect, and OLC should stand ready to work with the administration to craft lawful alternatives." n67 This is a critical component of OLC's work, and distinguishes it sharply from the courts. In addition to "providing a means by which the executive branch lawyer can contribute to the ability of the popularly-elected President and his administration to achieve important policy goals," n68 in more instrumental terms the practice can also reduce the risk of gaming by OLC's clients. And that, in turn, helps preserve the bindingness of OLC's opinions. n69

 [\*1466]  To be sure, OLC's opinions are treated as binding only to the extent they are not displaced by a higher authority. A subsequent judicial decision directly on point will generally be taken to supersede OLC's work, and always if it is from the Supreme Court. OLC's opinions are also subject to "reversal" by the President or the Attorney General. n70 Such reversals are rare, however. As a formal matter, Dawn Johnsen has argued that "the President or attorney general could lawfully override OLC only pursuant to a good faith determination that OLC erred in its legal analysis. The President would violate his constitutional obligation if he were to reject OLC's advice solely on policy grounds." n71 Solely is a key word here, especially for the President. Although his oath of office obliges him to uphold the Constitution, n72 it is not obvious he would violate that oath by pursuing policies that he thinks are plausibly constitutional even if he has not concluded they fit his best view of the law. It is not clear, in other words, that the President's oath commits him to seeking and adhering to a single best view of the law, as opposed to any reasonable or plausible view held in good faith. Yet even assuming the President has some space here, it is hard to see how his oath permits him to reject OLC's advice solely on policy grounds if he concludes that doing so is indefensible as a legal matter. n73 So the President needs at least a plausible legal basis for  [\*1467]  disagreeing with OLC's advice, which itself would likely require some other source of legal advice for him to rely upon.

The White House Counsel's Office might seem like an obvious candidate. But despite recent speculation that the size of that office during the Obama Administration might reflect an intention to use it in this fashion, n74 it continues to be virtually unheard of for the White House to reverse OLC's legal analysis. For one thing, even a deeply staffed White House Counsel's Office typically does not have the time to perform the kind of research and analysis necessary to produce a credible basis for reversing an OLC opinion. n75 For another, as with attempts to rely in the first place on in-house advice in lieu of OLC, any reversal of OLC by the White House Counsel is likely to be viewed with great skepticism by outside observers. If, for example, a congressional committee demands to know why the Executive Branch thinks a particular program is lawful, a response that relies on the conclusions of the White House Counsel is unlikely to suffice if the committee knows that OLC had earlier concluded otherwise. Rightly or wrongly, the White House Counsel's analysis is likely to be treated as an exercise of political will, not dispassionate legal analysis. Put another way, the same reasons that lead the White House to seek OLC's legal advice in the first place - its reputation for  [\*1468]  providing candid, independent legal advice based on its best view of the law - make an outright reversal highly unlikely. n76

Of course, the White House Counsel's Office may well be in frequent contact with OLC on an issue OLC has been asked to analyze, and in many cases is likely to make it abundantly clear what outcome the White House prefers. n77 But that is a matter of presenting arguments to OLC in support of a particular position, not discarding OLC's conclusion when it comes out the other way. n78The White House is not just any other client, and so the nature of - and risks posed by - communications between it and OLC on issues OLC is analyzing deserve special attention. I take that up in Part III. n79 My point at this stage is simply that the prospect of literal reversal by the White House is remote and does not meaningfully threaten the effective bindingness of OLC's decisions.

Abstention

**deference**

Judicial involvement in war power authority debates turns and escalates every impact

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Whatever the doctrinal formulation, the basic distinction between the two views is that our view counsels courts to provide high deference during emergencies, as courts have actually done, whereas the civil libertarian view does not. During normal times, the deferential view and the civil libertarian view permit the same kinds of executive action, and during war or other emergencies, the deferential view permits more kinds of executive action than the civil libertarian view does. We assume that courts have historically provided extra deference during an emergency or war because they believe that deference enables the government, especially the executive, to act quickly and decisively. Although deference also permits the government to violate rights, violations that are intolerable during normal times become tolerable when the stakes are higher. Civil libertarians, on the other hand, claim either that government action is likely to be worse during emergencies than during normal times, or at least that no extra deference should be afforded to government decisionmaking in times of emergency-and that therefore the deferential position that judges have historically taken in emergencies is a mistake.

The deferential view does not rest on a conceptual claim; it rests on a claim about relative institutional competence and about the comparative statics of governmental and judicial performance across emergencies and normal times. In emergencies, the ordinary life of the nation, and the bureaucratic and legal routines that have been developed in ordinary times, are disrupted. In the case of wars, including the "war on terror," the government and the public are not aware of a threat to national security at time 0. At time 1, an invasion or declaration of war by a foreign power reveals the existence of the threat and may at the same time cause substantial losses. At time 2, an emergency response is undertaken.

Several characteristics of the emergency are worthy of note. First, the threat reduces the social pie-both immediately, to the extent that it is manifested in an attack, and prospectively, to the extent that it reveals that the threatened nation will incur further damage unless it takes costly defensive measures. Second, the defensive measures can be more or less effective. Ideally, the government chooses the least costly means of defusing the threat; typically, this will be some combination of military engagement overseas, increased intelligence gathering, and enhanced policing at home. Third, the defensive measures must be taken quickly, and-because every national threat is unique, unlike ordinary crime-the defensive measures will be extremely hard to evaluate. There are standard ways of preventing and investigating street crime, spouse abuse, child pornography, and the like; and within a range, these ways are constant across jurisdictions and even nation-states. Thus, there is always a template that one can use to evaluate ordinary policing. By contrast, emergency threats vary in their type and magnitude and across jurisdictions, depending heavily on the geopolitical position of the state in question. **Thus, there is no general template that can be used for evaluating the government's response**.

In emergencies, then, judges are at sea, even more so than are executive officials. The novelty of the threats and of the necessary responses makes judicial routines and evolved legal rules seem inapposite, even **obstructive**. There is a premium on the executive's capacities for swift, vigorous, and secretive action. Of course, the judges know that executive action may rest on irrational assumptions, or bad motivations, or may otherwise be misguided. But this knowledge is largely useless to the judges, because they cannot sort good executive action from bad, and they know that **the delay** produced by judicial review **is costly in itself.** In emergencies, the judges have no sensible alternative but to defer heavily to executive action, and the judges know this.

Effective fast response and mission planning is key to deterring every conflict globally

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We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing.

Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, **the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place**, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. **Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions**—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

**Internal link**

**No uniqueness for precedent – their Garrett evidence says the Boumedine ruling created a precedent**

**Judicial foreign affairs rulings don’t create precedent**

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One of the most obvious and persistent problems in judicial interpretation of the constitutional foreign affairs powers concerns the role of definition. In other words, the Constitution is unambiguously silent as to the meaning of the relevant terms that define the scope of the foreign affairs powers, such as "war" or "treaties." Furthermore, the Supreme Court has yet to supply its own understanding of what these terms mean from a constitutional standpoint. n159 Understandably, without the benefit of any guidance as to the definition of these terms, lower courts have been reluctant to resolve controversies regarding the constitutional allocation of the foreign affairs powers. Perhaps this explains why, in refusing to hear such controversies, the courts often declare that the underlying issues involve the "lack of judicially manageable or discoverable standards." n160

In many respects, it is not difficult to understand why the courts have balked at imposing any substantive limitations on the scope of the foreign affairs powers. The political branches have a demonstrable institutional advantage over the courts in understanding the international political norms that inform the substantive meaning of the various terms underlying the [\*977] foreign affairs powers. The early constitutional history of the foreign affairs powers strongly suggests that the Framers understood the constitutional meaning of these terms would be consistent with that of early British constitutional practice and the prevailing international norms at the time. n161 In the international context, however, the meanings of these foreign affairs terms are dynamic and tend to evolve with changing conditions and the demands of the international environment. Since the political branches are better suited than the courts in tracking these norms, it makes sense that the courts would also defer to the political branches' understandings of the scope of the foreign affairs powers. More importantly, as a descriptive matter, many of the disputes that implicate foreign affairs involve considerations of "realpolitik" that are largely absent in domestic controversies. n162

No reverse causal internal link – their ev doesn’t say courts will reverse arms sales and the asia pivot. Scales says the cause is the military industrial complex which the plan obviously doesn’t affect.

**russia**

**No Russia impact – Klare says arms sales are a step to a cold war – not that it results in conflict.**

**The United States will never attack Russia**

**CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS 9-15-2004**

Ivanov's position would seem to be entirely rational and sound. First of all, it's hard to imagine that, over the next few years, the mood in Washington will swing toward launching a war against Russia. Or even to conceive of some sort of military provocations. Admittedly, we have not exactly become fast friends with Washington over the past decade, but neither do we regard each other as enemies. No US politicians in their right minds are currently thinking in terms of thermonuclear war -- their No. 1 enemy is terrorism. Moreover, what would war against Russia really mean for the Americans? Mass casualties, which would inevitably spell the end of many political careers. And enormous economic costs as well -- after all, the population of a country occupying one sixth of the planet's land mass would need to be fed and maintained somehow or other, and that kind of drain would overcome even the economy of the United States of America.

**Russia wouldn’t attack the US**

**Bush 8** **(Jason, staff,** **http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/europeinsight/archives/2008/08/the\_new\_cold\_war.html**, dw: 8-22-2008, da: 7-9-2011,)

**The biggest loser from a prolonged cool-off will be Russia though. One interesting angle of the Georgian crisis is the negative impact on the Russian economy**. In the days after the outbreak of war, **the stock market and even the rouble plunged, and Russian banks found it harder to get credit lines abroad**. This shows how far the new globalized Russia depends economically on the outside world. This economic dependence increases the West's options, but also means that the West doesn’t necessarily need to take strong-arm measures to restrain the Russians. The danger is that the West will now over-react, punishing Russia unnecessarily because of the overblown fears and simplistic analysis of the numerous Cold Warriors back home.

**No miscalculation – new consultation agreement**

**Ford 8.** [Chris, Senior Fellow & Director @ Center for Technology and Global Security @ Hudson Institute, “Dilemmas of Nuclear Force ‘De-Alerting’” Int’l Peace Institute Policy Forum -- October 7 -- www.hudson.org/files/documents/De-Alerting%20FINAL2%20(2).pdf]

The United States and Russia have also worked for years to improve communications, reduce misunderstandings, and develop ways to lessen the risk of inadvertent launch or other errors in their strategic relationship. Most readers will be familiar with the Direct Communications Link (the famous “hotline”) established in 1963.27 In 1971, however, Washington and Moscow also signed an agreement establishing basic procedures to increase mutual consultation and notification regarding relatively innocent but potentially alarming activities – thereby reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war.28 Since 1987, the two parties have also operated securely-linked 24-hour communications centers – the U.S. node of which is the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) operated by the State Department29 – which specialize in transmitting such things as the notifications required under arms control treaties. Pursuant to a 1988 memorandum, NRRC transmittals, which go directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense, include ballistic missile launch notifications. This link also proved useful to help prevent strategic tensions after the terrorist assault of September 11, 2001 – at which point U.S. officials used the NRRC to reassure their Russian counterparts that the sudden American security alert in the wake of the Manhattan and Pentagon attacks was not in any way an indication of impending U.S. belligerence vis-à-vis Russia.

**Asia**

**No risk of Asian war – stability now**

**Desker 8** 6/25, \*Barry Desker: dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU and writes for The Strait Times, “Why war is unlikely in Asia,” http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080625-72716.html, AJ

THE Asia-Pacific region is both a zone of relative insecurity as well as one of relative stability. On the one hand, it contains some of the world's most significant flashpoints: the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen glacier. Tensions between nations at these points could escalate into major wars. The region is also replete with border issues, acts of terrorism and overlapping maritime claims. It is a strategically significant area, sitting astride key sea lines of communication and important choke-points. Nevertheless, the region is more stable than one might believe. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is moving towards a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan seem unlikely to erupt into conflict, especially after the recent victories of the Kuomintang in Taiwan. The region also possesses significant multilateral structures such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the nascent Six-Party Talks forum and, in particular, Asean. But the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is likely. First, a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions. Second, when we examine the Chinese military buildup, we find that there may be less there than some might have us believe. The Chinese war machine is not quite as threatening - although still worrisome - as some fear. Instead of Washington's perspectives shaping Asia-Pacific affairs coercively, the rise of China is likely to see a new paradigm in international affairs. The nascent 'Beijing Consensus', for want of a better term, would consist of the following attributes: The leadership role of the authoritarian state, a technocratic approach to governance, an emphasis on social rights and obligations over individual rights, a reassertion of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, support for freer markets and stronger regional and international institutions. The argument that there is an emerging 'Beijing Consensus' is not premised on the rise of the 'East' and decline of the 'West', as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier 1990s 'Asian values' debate. But like the previous debate, this new debate will reflect alternative philosophical traditions. At issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This debate will highlight the values China and other states in the region share. By contrast, one conventional American view is that Sino-American competition will result in 'intense security competition with considerable potential for war' in which most of China's neighbours 'will join with the United States to contain China's power'. Asia's shared values are likely to reduce the risk of such conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation of and engagement with China, rather than a confrontation with it. In its interactions with the region, China itself is beginning to be interested in issues of proper governance, the development of domestic institutions and the strengthening of regional institutions. Nor is Chinese policy unchanging, even on the issue of sovereignty. For example, there has been an evolution in Chinese thinking on the question of freedom of passage through the straits of Malacca and Singapore. China supported the claims of the littoral states to sovereign control over the straits when the Law of the Sea Convention was concluded in 1982. But its increasing dependence on imported oil shipped through the straits has led to a shift in favour of burden-sharing, the recognition of the rights of user states and the need for cooperation between littoral states and user states. China has also revised its earlier advocacy of strict non-intervention and non-interference. Its support for global initiatives such as peacekeeping and nuclear non-proliferation - as well as its restrained use of its veto in the UN Security Council and its active role in the World Trade Organisation - indicates it is aware that responsible participation in global institutions can shape perceptions of a rising China. Beijing has also greatly lowered the tone and rhetoric of its strategic competition with the US. This is significant as most South-east Asian states prefer not to have to choose between the US and China, and have adopted 'hedging' strategies in their relationships with the two powers. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is certainly in the midst of the most ambitious upgrading of its combat capabilities since the early 1960s. Its current defence doctrine is centred on the ability to fight 'Limited Local Wars'. The emphasis is on pre-emption, surprise and shock value, given that the earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war. Thus the PLA has pursued the acquisition of weapons for asymmetric warfare. It mimics the US military in terms of the ambition and scope of its transformational efforts - and therefore challenges the US military at its own game. Nevertheless, China is still at least two decades behind the US in terms of its defence capabilities. It is certainly acquiring new and better equipment, but its current military buildup is indicative of an evolutionary, steady-state and sustaining - rather than disruptive or revolutionary - innovation and change. **War in the Asia-Pacific is unlikely**. But the emergence of East Asia, especially China, will require adjustments by the West, just as Asian societies had to adjust to Western norms and values during the American century.

**mideast**

**Empirics go neg – leaders default toward regime preservation**

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Underlying **this** anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iranas well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government**.** These warsthendestabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt.This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet**,** the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are **very unlikely to go to war** either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand **in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First,** Middle Eastern leaders, **like politicians everywhere,** are primarily interested in **one thing:** self-preservation.Committing forces **to Iraq** is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability**. Moreover,** most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troopsto Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally**,** there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight.Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq.The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. **But** given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also **developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.**

**No superpower draw-in.**

**Dyer, ‘2**

[Gwynne, Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London and former professor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Oxford University Queen’s Quarterly, “The coming war”, December, Questia]

All of this indicates an extremely dangerous situation, with many variables that are impossible to assess fully. But there is one comforting reality here: this will not become World War III. Not long ago, wars in the Middle East always went to the brink very quickly, with the Americans and Soviets deeply involved on opposite sides, bristling their nuclear weapons at one another. And for quite some time we lived on the brink of oblivion. But that is over. World War III has been cancelled, and I don't think we could pump it up again no matter how hard we tried. **The connections that once tied Middle Eastern confrontations to a global confrontation involving tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have all been undone.** The East-West Cold War is finished. The truly dangerous powers in the world today are the industrialized countries in general. We are the ones with the resources and the technology to churn out weapons of mass destruction like sausages. But the good news is: we are out of the business.

**Venezuela**

No spillover – their evidence says plan allows US to prezzure Venezuela on detention not economic policy

**No modeling**

**Law & Versteeg 12**—Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law @ Washington University & Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law @ University of Virginia [David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 87, 2012

The appeal of American constitutionalism as a model for other countries appears to be waning in more ways than one. Scholarly attention has thus far focused on global judicial practice: There is a growing sense, backed by more than purely anecdotal observation, that **foreign courts cite** the constitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court less frequently than before.267 But the behavior of those who draft and revise actual constitutions exhibits a similar pattern. Our **empirical analysis** shows that the content of the U.S. Constitution is¶ becoming increasingly atypical by global standards. Over the last three decades, other countries have become **less likely to model** the rights-related provisions of¶ their own constitutions upon those found in the Constitution. Meanwhile, global adoption of key structural features of the Constitution, such as federalism, presidentialism, and a decentralized model of judicial review, is at best stable and at worst declining. In sum, rather than leading the way for global¶ constitutionalism, the U.S. Constitution appears instead to be losing its appeal as¶ a model for constitutional drafters elsewhere. The idea of adopting a constitution may still trace its inspiration to the United States, but the manner in which constitutions are written increasingly does not.

If the U.S. Constitution is indeed losing popularity as a model for other countries, what—or who—is to blame? At this point, one can only speculate as to the actual causes of this decline, but four possible hypotheses suggest themselves: (1) the advent of a superior or more attractive competitor; (2) a general decline in American hegemony; (3) judicial parochialism; (4) constitutional obsolescence; and (5) a creed of American exceptionalism.

With respect to the first hypothesis, there is little indication that the U.S. Constitution has been displaced by any specific competitor. Instead, the notion that a particular constitution can serve as a dominant model for other countries may itself be obsolete. There is an increasingly clear and broad consensus on the types of rights that a constitution should include, to the point that one can articulate the content of a generic bill of rights with considerable precision.269 Yet it is difficult to pinpoint a specific constitution—or regional or international human rights instrument—that is clearly the driving force behind this emerging paradigm. We find only limited evidence that global constitutionalism is following the lead of either newer national constitutions that are often cited as influential, such as those of Canada and South Africa, or leading international and regional human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. Although Canada in particular does appear to exercise a quantifiable degree of constitutional influence or leadership, that influence is not uniform and global but more likely reflects the emergence and evolution of a shared practice of constitutionalism among common law countries.270 Our findings suggest instead that the development of global constitutionalism is a polycentric and multipolar¶ process that is not dominated by any particular country.271 The result might be likened to a global language of constitutional rights, but one that has been collectively forged rather than modeled upon a specific constitution.

Another possibility is that America’s capacity for constitutional leadership is at least partly a **function of American “soft power**” more generally.272 It is reasonable to suspect that the overall influence and appeal of the United States and its institutions have a powerful spillover effect into the constitutional arena. The popularity of American culture, the prestige of American universities, and the efficacy of American diplomacy can all be expected to affect the appeal of American constitutionalism, and vice versa. All are elements of an overall American brand, and the strength of that brand helps to determine the strength of each of its elements. Thus, any erosion of the American brand may also diminish the appeal of the Constitution for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the Constitution itself. Likewise, a decline in American constitutional influence of the type documented in this Article is potentially indicative of a broader decline in American soft power.

There are also factors specific to American constitutionalism that may be¶ reducing its appeal to foreign audiences. Critics suggest that the Supreme Court has **undermined the global appeal of its own jurisprudence by failing to acknowledge the relevant intellectual contributions of foreign courts** on questions of common concern,273 and by pursuing interpretive approaches that lack acceptance elsewhere.274 On this view, the Court may bear some responsibility for the declining influence of not only its own jurisprudence, but also the actual U.S. Constitution: one might argue that the Court’s approach to constitutional issues has undermined the appeal of American constitutionalism more generally, to the point that other countries have become unwilling to look either to American constitutional jurisprudence or to the U.S. Constitution itself for inspiration.275

It is equally plausible, however, that responsibility for the declining appeal of American constitutionalism lies with the idiosyncrasies of the Constitution itself rather than the proclivities of the Supreme Court. As the oldest formal constitution still in force, and one of the most rarely amended constitutions in the world,276 the U.S. Constitution contains relatively few of the rights that have become popular in recent decades,277 while some of the provisions that it does contain may appear increasingly problematic, unnecessary, or even undesirable with the benefit of two hundred years of hindsight.278 It should therefore come as little surprise if the U.S. Constitution¶ strikes those in other countries–or, indeed, members of the U.S. Supreme Court279–as **out of date and out of line with global practice**.280 Moreover, even if the Court were committed to interpreting the Constitution in tune with global fashion, it would still lack the power to update the actual text of the document.

Indeed, efforts by the Court to update the Constitution via interpretation may actually reduce the likelihood of formal amendment by rendering such amendment unnecessary as a practical matter.281 As a result, there is only so much that the U.S. Supreme Court can do to make the U.S. Constitution an¶ attractive formal template for other countries. The obsolescence of the Constitution, in turn, may undermine the appeal of American constitutional jurisprudence: foreign courts have **little reason to follow the Supreme Court**’s lead on constitutional issues if the Supreme Court is saddled with the interpretation of an unusual and obsolete constitution.282 No amount of ingenuity or solicitude for foreign law on the part of the Court can entirely divert attention from the fact that the Constitution itself is an increasingly atypical document.

One way to put a more positive spin upon the U.S. Constitution’s status as a global outlier is to emphasize its role in articulating and defining what is unique about American national identity. Many scholars have opined that formal constitutions serve an expressive function as statements of national identity.283 This view finds little support in our own empirical findings, which suggest instead that constitutions tend to contain relatively standardized packages of rights.284 Nevertheless, to the extent that constitutions do serve such a function, the distinctiveness of the U.S. Constitution may simply reflect the uniqueness of America’s national identity. In this vein, various scholars have argued that the U.S. Constitution lies at the very heart of an “American creed of exceptionalism,” which combines a belief that the United States occupies a unique position in the world with a commitment to the qualities that set the United States apart from other countries.285 From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to make use of foreign and international law in constitutional cases amounts not to parochialism, but rather to respect for the exceptional character of the nation and its constitution.286

Unfortunately, it is clear that the reasons for the declining influence of American constitutionalism cannot be reduced to anything as simple or attractive as a longstanding American creed of exceptionalism. Historically, American exceptionalism has not prevented other countries from following the example set by American constitutionalism. The global turn away from the American model is a relatively recent development that postdates the Cold War. If the U.S. Constitution does in fact capture something profoundly unique about the United States, it has surely been doing so for longer than the last thirty years. A complete explanation of the declining influence of American constitutionalism in other countries must instead be sought in more recent history, such as the wave of constitution-making that followed the end of the Cold War.287 During this period, America’s newfound position as lone superpower might have been expected to create opportunities for the spread of American constitutionalism. But this did not come to pass.

Once global constitutionalism is understood as the product of a polycentric evolutionary process, it is not difficult to see why the U.S. Constitution is playing an **increasingly peripheral** role in that process. No evolutionary process favors a specimen that is frozen in time. At least some of the responsibility for the declining global appeal of American constitutionalism lies not with the Supreme Court, or with a broader penchant for exceptionalism, but rather with the static character of the Constitution itself. If the United States were to revise the Bill of Rights today—with the benefit of over two centuries of experience, and in a manner that addresses contemporary challenges while remaining faithful to the nation’s best traditions—there is no guarantee that other countries would follow its lead. But the world would surely pay close attention. Pg. 78-83

**A2 oil prices**

**A2 arctic war**

**No arctic war – it's overblown – regulations, territorial jurisdiction, business incentives – assumes resources and cites experts**

**Mahony 3/19** **(Honor, editor of the EUobserver in Brussels, “Fears of Arctic conflict are 'overblown',” March 19, 2013,** [**http://euobserver.com/foreign/119479**](http://euobserver.com/foreign/119479)**)**

BRUSSELS - The Arctic has become a new frontier in international relations, but fear of potential conflict in the resource-rich region is overblown, say experts.¶ For long a mystery because of its general impenetrability, melting ice caps are revealing more and more of the Arctic region to scientists, researchers and industry.¶ Climate change experts can take a more precise look at a what global warming is doing to the planet, shipping trade routes once considered unthinkable are now possible, and governments and businesses are in thrall to the potential exploitation of coal, iron, rare earths and oil.¶ The interest is reflected in the growing list of those wanting to have a foot in the Arctic council, a forum of eight countries with territory in the polar region.¶ While the US, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Canada form the council, the EU commission, China, India, South Korea and Japan have all expressed an interest in having a permanent observer status.¶ "The Arctic has become a new meeting place for America, Europe and the Asia Pacific," says Damien Degeorges, founder of the Arctic Policy and Economic Forum.¶ During a recent conference on Arctic shipping routes in the European Parliament, Degeorges noted that "China has been the most active by far in the last years."¶ He points to its red-carpet treatment of politicians from Greenland, a territory that recently got full control over its wealth of natural resources. Bejing also cosied up to Iceland after the island's financial meltdown. The two undertook a joint expedition to the North Pole and the Chinese have the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik.¶ Meanwhile, South Korea's president visited Greenland last year and shipping hubs like Singapore are holding Arctic conferences.¶ The interest is being spurred by melting icebergs.¶ Last year saw a record low of multi-year ice - permanent ice - in the polar sea. This means greater shipping and mineral exploitation potential. There were 37 transits of the North East Passage (NEP), running from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the top of Russia, in 2011. This rose to 47 in 2012.¶ For a ship travelling from the Netherlands to China, the route around 40 percent shorter than using the traditional Suez Canal. A huge saving for China, where 50 percent of its GDP is connected to shipping. Russia is also keen to exploit the route as the rise in temperatures is melting the permafrost in its northern territory, playing havoc with its roads and railways.¶ According to Jan Fritz Hansen, deputy director of the Danish shipowners’ association, the real breakthrough will come when there is a cross polar route. At the moment there are are two options - the North East Passge for which Russia asks high fees for transiting ships - or the much-less developed North West Passage along Canada.¶ His chief concern is that "trade up there is free. We don't want protectionism. Everyone should be allowed to compete up there."¶ And he believes the biggest story of the Arctic is not how it is traversed but what will be taken out of it. According to the US Geological Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas supplies.¶ Greenland is already at the centre of political tussle between the EU and China over future exploitation of its rare earths - used in a range of technologies such as hybrid cars or smart phones.¶ "The biggest adventure will be the Arctic destination. There is a lot of valuable goods that should be taken out of nature up there," he said.¶ This resource potential - although tempered by the fact that much of it is not economically viable to exploit - has led to fears that the Arctic region is ripe for conflict.¶ But **this is nonsense**, says Nil Wang, a former Danish admiral and Arctic expert.¶ Most resources have an owner¶ "There is a general public perception that the Arctic region holds great potential for conflict because it is an ungoverned region where all these resources are waiting to be picked up by the one who gets there first. **That is completely false**," he said.¶ He notes that it is an "extremely well-regulated region," with international rules saying that coastal states have territorial jurisdiction up to 12 nautical miles off their coast.¶ On top of that is a further 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone "where you own every value in the water and under the seabed."¶ "Up to 97 percent of energy resources is actually belonging to someone already," says Wang.¶ He suggest the actors in the region all want to create a business environment, which requires stable politics and security.¶ But he concedes there are "risk factors." These include "ambiguous communication" (so that there is an impression of a security conflict), and possible fishing wars as fish stocks move further north because of rising temperatures into areas with no fishing rules.¶ A fall-out in relations between the China and the US could also impact the Arctic region but **the "Arctic itself will not create conflict**."¶ As for the EU, it has been seeking to gain a foothold in the region. It spends millions of euros each year on research, environmental and social programmes in the Arctic area.¶ A European Commission strategy paper last year noted that giving the commission permanent observer status - it applied in 2008 - in the Arctic Council would allow the EU "to gain detailed understanding of the concerns of Arctic partners."¶ But Wang reckons it has little chance for now.¶ "Russia is the biggest boy in the school yard. And in this case you don't normally invite anyone from a neighbouring school yard that is bigger than you. And Canada is more or less of the same opinion," he noted.

**No arctic activity – assumes melting ice**

**Rogers 1/11** Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a nonpartisan national security and defense policy think tank in Washington, D.C. U.S. Must Keep Planning Realistic for Arctic 'Opening' By Will Rogers, on 11 Jan 2013, Briefing

The Arctic is melting faster than anyone predicted. The World Meteorological Organization announced that ice melt in the Arctic reached a new record in 2012 when an area of ice larger than the continental United States vanished between the months of March and September. The seasonal thaw contributed to a new record in regional shipping as well, with more vessels than ever hauling cargo between Europe and Asia across the top of the world. And international energy companies spent record time searching for oil and gas beneath the frigid waters. But **in spite of these trends, the Arctic probably won’t become a bustling hub of commercial activity anytime soon**. Setting realistic expectations for the region will pay dividends to U.S. policymakers charged with figuring out how to protect America’s Arctic interests. Conventional wisdom suggests that the commercial shipping industry is poised to be the biggest Arctic winner. Like the man-made Suez and Panama Canals, which transformed world trade in the late-19th and early 20th centuries, a thawing Arctic promises a natural shortcut for ships that would cut the cost and time required to ply the world’s oceans. Arctic passage would cut transit time between Rotterdam and Shanghai by more than 20 percent, allowing shippers to save on bunker fuel costs and avoid transit routes riddled with piracy that have raised insurance premiums and the total cost of doing business. With more than 90 percent of global trade still carried by ship, the follow-on savings would be significant. But the Arctic Age may turn out to be a frozen fantasy. While a record number of ships transited the Arctic in 2012 -- 46 vessels compared to 34 in 2011 -- regional shipping is dwarfed by that in other parts of the world: Nearly 15,000 ships passed through the Panama Canal in 2011; another 18,000 ships crossed the Suez Canal the same year. Meanwhile, most of the ships passing through the Arctic in recent years are designed with hardened hulls and navigation equipment proven capable of surviving the region’s harsh environment. **Most of the world’s shipping fleet, however, remains untested for such sea routes.** The number of commercial ships transiting the Arctic will continue to rise, but not to levels seen elsewhere. Despite the potential gains for the commercial shipping industry, **many in the business say the Arctic is not in the cards. The risks of operating there outweigh the benefits**, according to some executives. After all, shippers rely on predictable timetables and routes, and the Arctic is anything but predictable. Massive and moving sheets of sea ice impede access to waterways, and unpredictable thawing as well as limited windows of opportunity for transit, usually confined to the summer months, make planning reliable schedules a daunting task. Others are looking at the Arctic’s energy wealth with great hope. The region is estimated to hold 25 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas. Of this, the U.S. Geological Survey projects that U.S. companies could recover roughly 90 billion barrels of oil, enough to satisfy almost 15 years of U.S. oil demand and help move America along in its quest for energy self-sufficiency. But Shell’s recent experiences have called into question these dreams of Arctic drilling. On New Year’s Eve, the company’s 266-foot drilling vessel the Kulluk ran aground off the Alaskan coast when it broke free from its towing ropes after being thrashed about by a winter storm. The Coast Guard sent crews to fly over the vessel to see if any of its 140,000 gallons of diesel fuel or 12,000 gallons of maintenance fluids had breached the ice-hardened hull. While there are no signs of a leakage or structural damage, crews struggled for nearly a week to retrieve and secure the rig because of hazardous weather conditions.

**No arctic war – profit motive, high costs, Law of the Sea**

**Economist 12 (“Too much to fight over,” June 16, 2012, The Economist,** [**http://www.economist.com/node/21556797**](http://www.economist.com/node/21556797)**)**

Yet the risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated. Most of the Arctic is clearly assigned to individual countries. According to a Danish estimate, 95% of Arctic mineral resources are within agreed national boundaries. The biggest of the half-dozen remaining territorial disputes is between the United States and Canada, over whether the north-west passage is in international or Canadian waters, hardly a casus belli.¶ The risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated. Far from violent, the development of the Arctic is likely to be uncommonly harmonious¶ Far from violent, the development of the Arctic is likely to be uncommonly harmonious, for three related reasons. One is the profit motive. The five Arctic littoral countries, Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, would sooner develop the resources they have than argue over those they do not have. A sign of this was an agreement between Russia and Norway last year to fix their maritime border in the Barents Sea, ending a decades-long dispute. The border area is probably rich in oil; both countries are now racing to get exploration started.¶ Another spur to Arctic co-operation is the high cost of operating in the region. This is behind the Arctic Council's first binding agreement, signed last year, to co-ordinate search-and-rescue efforts. Rival oil companies are also working together, on scientific research and mapping as well as on formal joint ventures.¶ The third reason for peace is equally important: a strong reluctance among Arctic countries to give outsiders any excuse to intervene in the region's affairs. An illustration is the stated willingness of all concerned to settle their biggest potential dispute, over their maritime frontiers, according to the international Law of the Sea (LOS). Even the United States accepts this, despite its dislike for treaties—though it has still not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an anomaly many of its leaders are keen to end.¶ The LOS entitles countries to an area of seabed beyond the usual 200 nautical miles, with certain provisos, if it can be shown to be an extension of their continental shelf. Whichever of Russia, Canada and Denmark can prove that the Lomonosov ridge is an extension of its continental shelf will therefore have it. It will be up to the countries themselves to decide this: the UN does not rule on disputed territories. The losers will not do too badly, though: given the Arctic's wide continental shelves, the LOS guarantees each a vast amount of resource-rich seabed.¶ The 2007 furore over the Russian flag led to an important statement of Arctic solidarity, the Ilulissat Declaration, issued by the foreign ministers of the five countries adjoining the Arctic Ocean (to the chagrin of the Arctic Council's other members, Sweden, Iceland and Finland). This expressed their commitment to developing the Arctic peacefully and without outside interference. Possible defence co-operation between Arctic countries points in the same direction. Their defence chiefs met for the first time in Canada in April in what is to become an annual event.

**Oil**

**Oil dependence key to middle east engagement and Saudi relations**

**Gonzalez 12** Angel Gonzalez is Houston Bureau Chief for Dow Jones Newswires, "Expanded Oil Drilling Helps U.S.Wean Itself From Mideast" June 27, 2012 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304441404577480952719124264.html

Still, growing domestic energy production could allow the U.S. to **lessen its focus** on the unpredictable region over time. Dependence on Middle East oil has **shaped American foreign, national-security and defense policies** for most of the last half century. It helped **drive the U.S. into active participation in the search for Arab-Israeli peace**; drove Washington into **close alignments with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf states**; compelled it to side with Iraq during its war with Iran; prompted it to then turn against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait, bringing about the first Persian Gulf war; and prompted Washington to then build up and sustain its **military presence in the region**.

**That accesses all impacts---terrorism, econ, iran, middle eastern war**

**Cordesman 11** (Anthony Cordesman - Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, national security analyst for ABC News, served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense, "Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability – Cordesman" Saudi-US Relations Information Service, March 1, 2011www.susris.com/2011/03/01/understanding-saudi-stability-and-instability-cordesman/)

History scarcely means we can take Saudi stability for granted. Saudi Arabia is simply too critical to US strategic interests and the world. Saudi petroleum exports play a **critical role** **in the stability and growth of a steadily more global economy,** and the latest projections by the Department of Energy do not project any major reductions in the direct level of US dependence on oil imports through 2025.

**Saudi Arabia is as important to the region’s security and stability as it is to the world’s economy.** It is the key to the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council to **create local defenses**,and for **US strategic cooperation** with the Southern Gulf states. **It plays a critical role as a counterbalance to a radical and more aggressive Iran, it is the source of the Arab League plan for a peace with Israel, and it has become a key partner in the war on terrorism. The US strategic posture in the Middle East depends on Saudi Arabia having a friendly and moderate regime.**

**Iranian aggression goes nuclear**

**Chossudovsky, 10** - Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Michael, August 13, 2010, “Towards a World War III Scenario? The Role of Israel in Triggering an Attack on Iran” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.phpcontext=va&aid=20584)

For several years now Iran has been conducting its own war drills and exercises. While its Air force has weaknesses, its intermediate and long-range missiles are fully operational. Iran's military is in a state of readiness. Iranian troop concentrations are currently within a few kilometers of the Iraqi and Afghan borders, and within proximity of Kuwait. The Iranian Navy is deployed in the Persian Gulf within proximity of US and allied military facilities in the United Arab Emirates. It is worth noting that in response to Iran's military build-up, the US has been transferring large amounts of weapons to its non-NATO allies in the Persian Gulf including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. While Iran's advanced weapons do not measure up to those of the US and NATO, Iranian forces would be in a position to inflict substantial losses to coalition forces in a conventional war theater, on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan. Iranian ground troops and tanks in December 2009 crossed the border into Iraq without being confronted or challenged by allied forces and occupied a disputed territory in the East Maysan oil field. Even in the event of an effective Blitzkrieg, which targets Iran's military facilities, its communications systems, etc. through massive aerial bombing, using cruise missiles, conventional bunker buster bombs and tactical nuclear weapons, a war with Iran, once initiated, could eventually lead into a ground war. This is something which US military planners have no doubt contemplated in their simulated war scenarios. An operation of this nature would result in significant military and civilian casualties, particularly if nuclear weapons are used. The expanded budget for the war in Afghanistan currently debated in the US Congress is also intended to be used in the eventuality of an attack on Iran. Within a scenario of escalation, Iranian troops could cross the border into Iraq and Afghanistan. In turn, military escalation using nuclear weapons could lead us into a World War III scenario, extending beyond the Middle East Central Asian region. In a very real sense, this military project, which has been on the Pentagon's drawing board for more than five years, threatens the future of humanity. Our focus in this essay has been on war preparations. The fact that war preparations are in an advanced state of readiness does not imply that these war plans will be carried out. The US-NATO-Israel alliance realizes that the enemy has significant capabilities to respond and retaliate. This factor in itself has been crucial over the last five years in the decision by the US and its allies to postpone an attack on Iran.

**Libya**

**High oil prices are key to Libyan stability**

**ACHY ‘12** - a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. He is an economist with expertise in development and institutional economics, as well as trade and labor, with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa (Achy, Lahcen. “Libya’s Economy: On Path to Recovery but Facing Hard Challenges”. May 1, 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/01/libya-s-economy-on-path-to-recovery-but-facing-hard-challenges/apm9)

The Libyan oil minister recently announced that oil production is approaching pre-war levels. The oil sector is the backbone of the Libyan economy, so such a statement is of high importance. It accounts for 70 percent of GDP, over 95 percent of exports**,** and 90 percent of government revenue. With the current level of oil production and high prices on international markets, the Libyan economy is expected to recover this year. Yet, to ensure long-term stability, Libya must move away from its dependence on oil toward a diversified economy led by a competitive private sector. The Libyan economy paid a heavy price to topple the regime of Muammar Qaddafi, a toll that far exceeds the losses incurred by both Tunisia and Egypt. Indeed, the year 2011 brought a 60 percent contraction in Libya’s GDP, following months of almost total interruption of oil production and exports. Government revenue fell, while the budget deficit reached a record 40 percent of GDP and a supply shortage led to an inflation rate of nearly 20 percent. The UN Security Council resolution to freeze the Libyan central bank’s assets and the growing amount of bad debt in the country has resulted in a severe lack of liquidity. Libya’s neighborhood has also felt the effects of the armed conflict to overthrow Qaddafi. Many Tunisians and Egyptians that had worked in Libya returned home, thus depriving their families of remittances and swelling the ranks of the unemployed in their home countries. A 70 percent increase in GDP and a current account surplus of 11 percent of GDP are expected in 2012. Prices are projected to go down by 10 percent after the resumption of imports and market supply to normal level. Still, the budget deficit is expected to represent 7 percent of GDP due to a generous increase in civil servants’ wages in March of last year—an attempt by the Qaddafi regime to end popular discontent. The amount budgeted for wages now represents 20 percent of GDP, which is double the level in 2010. Egypt and Tunisia are in need of external funding, which may eventually lead them to accept costly or conditional loans; Libya with foreign reserve assets amounting to $174 billion and almost no foreign debt to repay can set its priorities and design its policies without any external pressure. But Libya’s strengths, along with burgeoning oil revenue, may become weaknesses if the government fails to restore security and stability throughout the country. This is why Libya’s current government must manage the transition to democracy according to a set timetable and build strong, efficient, and yet accountable institutions that will allow Libya to meet the major challenges its economy is facing

**Libyan war sparks World War III**

**Lendman**, 7-6-**11**

[Stephen, Libya - Flashpoint for World Conflict, http://www.rense.com/general94/libya.htm]

  On July 3, Peter Dale Scott told Progressive Radio News Hour listeners what he fears most. He repeated it in a July 4 email, citing a Paul Joseph Watson Infowars.com article, accessed through the following link:

http://www.infowars.com/report-ground-invasion-of-libya-within-two-weeks

Using information from DEBKAfile, a Jerusalem-based intelligence site with close Mossad ties (providing commentary and analysis on regional terrorism, intelligence, security, military and political affairs), he discussed a frightening prospect. More on it below. Founded in June 2000, DEBKA calls itself independent, "pioneer(ing) intensive news coverage and analysis of global (Islamic, not Israeli, US, or other Western) terror before it hits" front pages. Calling its reports "not infallible," Scott said its information deserves attention because some past predictions proved true. Specifically, he cited their June 25, 2003 story that "The Americans are secretly building two giant intelligence facilities in Iraq at a cost of some half a billion dollars." Doing so and more makes it "seem that America is now indeed acting as recklessly and idiotically as Britain and France did in the (1956) Suez crisis...." On air and in his email, Scott wondered whether "Washington failed to take into account the reaction of Russia and China (the way Britain in 1956 insanely" didn't bank on America's response at the time). "Or is (America) counting on its (nuclear superiority) to deal with any problems in that area." Disturbingly, top US officials include extremists who think brute force solutions work best, even high risk ones like nuclear war or simultaneously waging too many conventional ones. Scott told Progressive Radio News Hour listeners that he's warned for months about Libya being a flashpoint for escalated general war, similar to how WW I began. Global Research founder/editor Michel Chossudovsky has similar concerns, including in his new E-book titled, "Towards a World War III Scenario," calling today's world "at a critical crossroads." Citing two major incidents, Japan's Fukushima disaster and imperial war on Libya, he called "(t)hese two seemingly unrelated events....of crucial importance in understanding both the nuclear issue as well as the ongoing US-NATO sponsored war." Fukushima's implications and fallout go largely unexplained. In fact, except for occasional misreporting, America's media now entirely ignore them, including warnings from Helen Caldicott and others that every commercial reactor is a ticking time bomb "atomic bomb factory." Moreover, Chossudovsky said "(n)uclear energy is not a civilian economic activity. It is an appendage of the nuclear weapons industry which is controlled by the so-called defense contractors." In fact, secret "atomic-bomb research facilities (are) hidden inside Japan's civilian nuclear power plants," and perhaps also in America's. It may not have been coincidence that Libya's war was launched within days of Fukushima's disaster. It's now dramatically escalated as part of America's broader Middle East/North Africa/Central Asia conflict, encroaching recklessly close to China and Russia's borders. Their concerns, in fact, may trigger counter-responses that could dangerously spin things out of control. In fact, the war Obama won't call war potentially could trigger a "World War III scenario." It worries Chossudovsky, Scott and others enough to highlight it on air and in print. It's repeated in this article, citing another recent one discussing Barbara Tuchman's 1962 book, "The Guns of August," on how WW I began and its early weeks. Once started, it escalated out of control disastrously, involving dozens of countries directly and indirectly. Moreover, before it ended, over 20 million died, at least that many more were wounded, and a generation of young men were erased before nuclear and today's other mass destruction weapons and technologies existed. Over a half century ago, it worried Einstein enough to say: "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones" if civilizations survive to do it. Given the possibility of Libya triggering escalated general or global war, that scenario today is real, especially in light of a "1996 plan to bomb Libya using tacticalnuclear weapons." It was shelved at that time, but never eliminated as a possibility against any nation. In fact, the Bush administration claimed the preemptive right to use nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear states, based on alleged national security concerns.Obama recklessly maintains the same policy even though America hasn't had an enemy since Japan surrendered in August 1945. Nonetheless, the prospect of escalating war with nuclear or other mass destruction weapons suggests frightening possibilities, including a potential WW III scenario. It's no less implausible now than WW I seemed in early 1914. Worry most perhaps about what's least expected, especially to refocus angry millions (suffering from global economic crisis misery) on something greater. It's worked many times before, notably post-9/11, escalating one war into multiple ones and counting. Given America's out-of-control belligerence, perhaps ad infinitum wars will proliferate until America destroys planet earth to liberate it in a mushroom-shaped cloud. It's possible given alarming reports like Watson's July 4 Infowars one linked above.

Solv

Wartime means Obama will ignore the decision.

**Pushaw 4**—Professor of law @ Pepperdine University [Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., “Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells,” Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, 2004]

Civil libertarians have urged the Court to exercise the same sort of **judicial review over war powers** as it does in purely domestic cases—i.e., independently interpreting and applying the law of the Constitution, despite the contrary view of the political branches and regardless of the political repercussions.54 This proposed solution ignores the institutional differences, embedded in the Constitution, that have always led federal judges to review warmaking under special standards. Most obviously, the President can act with a speed, decisiveness, and access to information (often highly confidential) that cannot be matched by Congress, which must garner a majority of hundreds of legislators representing multiple interests.55 Moreover, the judiciary by design acts far more slowly than either political branch. A court must wait for parties to initiate a suit, oversee the litigation process, and render a deliberative judgment that applies the law to the pertinent facts.56 Hence, by the time federal judges (particularly those on the Supreme Court) decide a case, the action taken by the executive is several years old. Sometimes, this delay is long enough that the crisis has passed and the Court’s detached perspective has been restored.57 At other times, however, the **war rages, the President’s action is set in stone, and he will ignore any judicial orders** that he conform his conduct to constitutional norms.58 In such critical situations, issuing a judgment simply **weakens the Court** as an institution, as Chief Justice Taney learned the hard way.59

Professor Wells understands the foregoing institutional differences and thus does not naively demand that the Court exercise regular judicial review to safeguard individual constitutional rights, come hell or high water. Nonetheless, she remains troubled by cases in which the Court’s examination of executive action is so cursory as to amount to an abdication of its responsibilities—and a stamp of constitutional approval for the President’s actions.60 Therefore, she proposes a compromise: requiring the President to establish a reasonable basis for the measures he has taken in response to a genuine risk to national security.61 In this way, federal judges would ensure accountability not by substituting their judgments for those of executive officials (as hap-pens with normal judicial review), but rather by forcing them to adequately justify their decisions.62

This proposal intelligently blends a concern for individual rights with pragmatism. Civil libertarians often overlook the basic point that constitutional rights are **not absolute**, but rather may be infringed if the government has a compelling reason for doing so and employs the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.63 Obviously, national security is a **compelling governmental interest**.64 Professor Wells’s crucial insight is that courts should not allow the President simply to assert that “national security” necessitated his actions; rather, he must concretely demonstrate that his policies were a reasonable and narrowly tailored response to a particular risk that had been assessed accurately.65

Although this approach is plausible in theory, I am not sure it would work well in practice. Presumably, the President almost **always will be able to set forth plausible justifications for his actions**, often based on a wide array of factors—including highly sensitive intelligence that he does not wish to dis-close.66 Moreover, if the President’s response seems unduly harsh, he will likely cite the wisdom of erring on the side of caution. If the Court disagrees, it will have to find that those proffered reasons are pretextual and that the President overreacted emotionally instead of rationally evaluating and responding to the true risks involved. But are judges competent to make such determinations? And even if they are, would they be willing to impugn the President’s integrity and judgment? If so, what effect might such a judicial decision have on America’s foreign relations? These questions are worth pondering before concluding that “hard look” review would be an improvement over the Court’s established approach.

Moreover, such searching scrutiny will be **useless in situations where the President has made a wartime decision** that he will not change, even if judicially ordered to do so. For instance, assume that the Court in Korematsu had applied “hard look” review and found that President Roosevelt had wildly exaggerated the sabotage and espionage risks posed by Japanese-Americans and had imprisoned them based on unfounded fears and prejudice (as appears to have been the case). If the Court accordingly had struck down FDR’s order to relocate them, he would likely have **disobeyed it.**

Professor Wells could reply that this result would have been better than what happened, which was that the Court engaged in “pretend” review and stained its reputation by upholding the constitutionality of the President’s odious and unwarranted racial discrimination. I would agree. But I submit that the solution in such unique situations (i.e., where a politically strong President has made a final decision and will defy any contrary court judgment) is **not judicial review in any form**—ordinary, deferential, or hard look. Rather, the Court should simply declare the matter to be a political question and dismiss the case. Although such Bickelian manipulation of the political question doctrine might be legally unprincipled and morally craven, 67 at least it would avoid giving the President political cover by blessing his unconstitutional conduct and instead would force him to shoulder full responsibility. Pg. 968-970

**Obama will rely on immigration authority**

**Hernandez 11** (Ernesto A. Hernandez, Chapman University School of Law Professor of Law, “Kiyemba, Guantanamo, and Immigration Law: An Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World”, Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/ernesto_hernandez/17>)

Immigration law doctrine **provides a fallback** in the form of an established set of legal tools to exclude foreign nationals, even after the Supreme Court found that significant constitutional and extraterritorial checks apply to these Guantánamo detentions.13 **This fallback quality of immigration law now stands out**, after three Supreme Court cases since 2004 have checked the Guantánamo detention program14 **and detainees have won a majority of petitions for habeas release since Boumediene**.15 The Kiyemba detainees,16 Yusef Abbas, Hajiakbar Abdulghupur, Saidullah Khalik, Ahmed Mohamed, and Abdul Razak,17 share similar identities with Chae Chan Ping,18 Ignatz Mezei,19 and Kestutis Zadvydas,20 the aliens in leading immigration cases. The detention or exclusion of these noncitizens is primarily justified by the plenary powers doctrine, while constitutional arguments in favor of release has proven ineffective. **The plenary powers doctrine has kept the Uighurs detained for nine years.** By framing legal issues, **immigration law precludes habeas relief.** The Uighurs’ detention is illegal, but release is not required by law, even after nine years and habeas approval.21

# --Russia

**2NC AT: War**

**No war – assumes relations collapse**

**Aron 6 (Leon,06**,resident scholar and the director of Russian Studies at AEI,http://www.aei.org/outlook/24606,”The United States and Russia”,6/29/6.

Yet the probability of a frontal confrontation and a new Cold War remains very remote for at least three reasons. First, despite the erosion, the countries’ geopolitical assets are still very weighty, as the bedrock issues of anti-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and energy will continue to force them to seek common ground and at least limited partnership.[17] Second, the “restorationist” foreign policy notwithstanding, the three basic elements of the 1992-1993 national consensus on the foreign policy and defense doctrine remain largely the same. Russia is to stay a nuclear superpower and the regional superpower, but it seems to have settled for the role of one of the world’s great states, rather than a global superpower engaged in a worldwide competition with the United States. While these desiderata will continue to cause occasional sparring with the United States, they are no longer dedicated to the attainment of goals inimical to the vital interests of the United States and are not likely to ignite a relentless antagonistic struggle to the bitter end. Lastly, despite the muscular rhetoric emanating of late from the Kremlin, unlike the Soviet Union twenty years ago and China today, Russia is not a “revisionist” power. It does not seek radically to reshape the geopolitical “balance of forces” in its favor. Moscow may rail at the score, but it is unlikely to endeavor to change the rules of the game. For that, one needs a different ideology and, as a result, a different set of priorities. Yet even in today’s Russia flush with petrodollars, the share of GDP devoted to defense (around 3 percent) is not only at least ten times smaller than in the Soviet Union, but also below the 1992-1997 average in a Russia that inherited an empty treasury from the Soviet Union and that was, like every revolutionary government, unable to collect taxes. Calculated in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defense expenditures in 2005 ($47.77 billion) were less than one-eleventh of what the U.S. spent ($522 billion).[18]

# --China

# 2NC No Asian War

**No escalation – US won’t be drawn in**

**Record 1 –** Jeffrey, professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, senior research fellow at the Center for Int’l Strategy, Technology, and Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology, PhD from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Int’l Studies, Winter 2001, Aerospace Power Journal, v15 i4, “Thinking about China and War,” p. InfoTrac OneFile

Chinese military action against Asian mainland states not allied with the United States probably would not occasion a direct, armed US response. Sino-Russian, -Indian, and -Vietnamese war scenarios of the kind that transpired in 1962, 1969, and 1979, respectively, would not directly engage the vital interests of the United States--unless they spilled over into attacks on US forces and allies. Why would the United States intervene in such conflicts? To be sure, it has a general interest in peace and stability on the Asian mainland and a specific interest in deterring nuclear war between other states. But would it go to war to prevent a nuclear exchange between, say, Russia and China? It was certainly not prepared to do so to deter an Indo-Pakistani exchange during the South Asian nuclear-war scare of 1999.

**No Asian War**

Richard A. **Bitzinger**, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, **2009**. Survival vol. 50 no. 6, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” p. Proquest

Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

**U.S. involvement checks escalation.**

**Ottens 10** [Nick, Atlantic Sentinel, Tension? What Tension?,, 1/18/2010, http://atlanticsentinel.com/2010/01/tension-what-tension/]

The United States is bound by law to arm Taiwan however and a recent sale of missiles met with strong Chinese disapproval. Sino-American relations are still shaky but as Clinton said last Tuesday, “America’s future is linked to the future of this region, and the future of this region depends on America.” Obama was even happy to call himself a “Pacific President” and for gaood reasons: East Asia is fast becoming the new core of the world economy while politically, its integration can be fragile at times. US involvement is able spark discontent but it also helps smooth over differences by providing greater power leadership to those nations fearing Chinese domination. The political discord should not be exaggerated. Today’s tension springs from relatively minor disagreements and will, in the end, be resolved.

**ASEAN solves stability.**

**Noi 07** – (Goh Sui Noi, @ Straits Times, 8-23-07 [Asean 'holds key to building stable East Asian region'; S'pore official says grouping plays vital role by providing neutral platform, lexis]

GOVERNMENTS in the East Asian region have realised that it is in their nations' interests to build a community to preserve stability for growth, a senior Singapore official has said. And building such a community depends on Asean's ability to integrate deeper and faster, said Mr Bilahari Kausikan, Second Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In addition, a grouping of the region's think-tanks, which held a conference in Singapore, yesterday called for greater cultural exchanges to promote community-building. 'An East Asian community will...depend on Asean's ability to integrate deeper and faster and create a community of its own,' Mr Kausikan said on Tuesday. He explained that the complexity and sensitivity of relationships among major powers meant that Asean played an essential role in providing a relatively neutral platform for an East Asian architecture. 'This is the real meaning of the oft-repeated refrain 'Asean in the driver's seat',' he said. He added that this was the broader significance of the Asean Charter, which will be discussed at the next summit of the 10-nation grouping to be held in Singapore in November. The charter, which will give a legal basis to the grouping, is expected to deepen integration within Asean.

**1NC China Relations**

**Relations high now- cooperation on all major issues**

**Kissinger, 12** (Henry A. hair of Kissinger Associates and a former U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity.” March/April *Foreign Affiairs*)

On January 19, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement at the end of Hu's visit to Washington. It proclaimed their shared commitment to a "positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship." Each party reassured the other regarding his principal concern, announcing, "The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region." Since then, the two governments have set about implementing the stated objectives. Top American and Chinese officials have exchanged visits and institutionalized their exchanges on major strategic and economic issues. Military-to-military contacts have been restarted, opening an important channel of communication. And at the uno/cial level, so-called track-two groups have explored possible evolutions of the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

**Relations inevitable – previous downturns haven’t collapse relations, no reason why the SQ uniquely triggers a collapse**

**Relations can’t solve – no common interests**

**Feigenbaum, 11** (Evan- writer for Council on foreign relations. “Does US-China strategic cooperation have to be so hard?” 11/5. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/05/does-us-china-strategic-cooperation-have-to-be-so-hard/>)

For their part, Chinese officials often view US policies in these countries as naïve at best, destabilising at worst. Many in Beijing hold the view that US and South Korean ‘failures’ have cornered North Korea and thus urge deepened policies of engagement. In Central Asia, meanwhile, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the region in 2006 and 2007, I heard Chinese officials argue ad infinitum that US actions to promote political reform could, ultimately, destabilise these countries. What’s going on? Does cooperation really have to be so hard? For that matter, is coordination so hard because the US and China lack common interests? I think not. In fact, asserting so is a too-easy cop out because, in most cases, it would be awfully hard to demonstrate empirically that China actually ‘wants’ an unstable Pakistan or would just ‘love’ a North Korea with nuclear weapons. In the countries at the heart of this CFR study, why wouldn’t China share America’s interest in stability, security, development and prosperity? No, I suspect the problem usually isn’t a lack of common interests. It’s that shared interests are very general in nature. Turning (abstract) common interests into (concrete) complementary policies requires that Beijing and Washington overcome two very high hurdles: First, Beijing almost never seems to share American threat assessments anymore. Countries like Iran and North Korea don’t threaten China directly, so Beijing can probably afford to be more relaxed and many Chinese analysts argue that Washington overstates the scope and urgency of such threats. Second, even when Beijing shares America’s sense of threat, countervailing interests still obstruct cooperation. In Afghanistan, for example, China certainly shares America’s core interest: a stable Afghan state that does not harbour, nurture or export terrorism. But Chinese decision-makers have become uncomfortable when told that the path to victory may require a long-term NATO presence on China’s western border, US bases and access agreements in Central Asia, and enhanced US and NATO strategic coordination with neighbours that have had difficult relations with China.

**New geopolitical competition makes relations unsustainable**

**Xuetong and Haixia 4-6**-12 [Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University. Qi Haixia is Lecturer at Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” online]

1. As the comprehensive power of China and the United States continues towards parity, the character of Sino–US relations as that of superficial friendship determines that conflicts of interests between the two states will continue to be intensified, and that there will be an increasing trend wherein the two compete more than they cooperate. Obama's strategy of pivoting towards the Asia Pacific Region is a product of relative decline in US power and of the increased pace of China's rise. It is only natural for structural conflict between China and the United States to deepen as the relative gap in their national power narrows. As conflicts of interests between the two states grow at a rate faster than that of shared interests, regardless of the outcome of the US Presidency elections in 2012—that is of whether Obama continues to be President or if a Republican enters office—hedge will by necessity be the cornerstone of the US policy toward China. As such, the superficial friendship between the United States and China will continue to tilt towards competition outweighing cooperation, or the development of an adversarial relationship that exceeds one of friendship. Furthermore, as its comprehensive national power decreases, United States will as a matter of necessity narrow its strategy, and apply its strategic resources to the globe's most vital strategic areas. China's rise has gradually made the Asia Pacific the center of the world, and by narrowing the scope of its strategy, United States can enhance its domination in the Western Pacific. In 2011, when announcing the US naval strategy for the next 10–15 years, US Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert stated that in the future the United States would place more than one-third of its warships in the Western Pacific.54 Such a deployment will undoubtedly increase strategic conflict between the United States and China.

#

# --Arctic

# 2NC No War

**No arctic war – that’s Kraska 11 – Law of the Sea Treaty promotes multilateral cooperation, other measures check against aggressive and expansionist behavior, even Putin is abiding by a spirit of cooperation**

**Specifically in the context of an Arctic oil rush, Arctic nations will cooperate.**

**DoD 11** – US Department of Defense (“Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage” May 2011; < http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab\_A\_Arctic\_Report\_Public.pdf>)//AB

The extent, impact, and rate of climate change in the Arctic are uncertain, and may not unfold in a linear fashion. This will make it challenging to plan for possible future conditions in the region and to mobilize public or political support for investments in U.S. Arctic capabilities or infrastructure absent a clear and immediate need for them. The general assumption that climate change will occur gradually, allowing plenty of time to adapt, may be overturned by periods of rapid change punctuated by episodes of climatic stability, or by unexpectedly severe impacts from the change. Part of the challenge will be the variable pace of climate change: several relatively ice-free summers may be followed by a number of unusually cold years during which the sea ice remains throughout the year. Relationships among the Arctic nations will remain generally stable and cooperative. All five littoral nations (United States, Russian Federation, Canada, Norway, and Denmark on behalf of Greenland) have already established the groundwork of common approaches to managing the region within the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Arctic Council, and other international forums. All of the Arctic states (the five littoral nations plus Iceland, Sweden, and Finland) have shown through their participation in the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the IMO, and other international organizations a willingness and ability to manage and resolve disputes through established international diplomatic mechanisms. **This provides a sound basis to anticipate that the security environment in the Arctic will be defined by cooperation rather than conflict in the future**. Should military security issues arise, they will be addressed with the appropriate stakeholders through the network of relevant bilateral and multilateral relationships.

**All Arctic states want cooperation – no arms race.**

**Holtsmark, 09 –** is the Deputy Director at the Norwegian Institute for Defense studies. (Sven G., “Towards cooperation or confrontation: Security in the High North,” Research Paper, Research Division – NATO Defense College, Rome – No. 45, February 2009 // JH)

The discussion above of military aspects of High North security should not distract from the overall message of this paper: there is no ongoing "race" for High North resources, nor is there a visible threat of a "grab" for still undivided Arctic Ocean areas. Until now, the Arctic Ocean has been an area of stability, characterized by a web of bilateral and multilateral regimes. There are many good reasons to believe that this benign state of affairs can be maintained. Most importantly, Russia shares the West's fundamental interest in maintaining the High North as an area characterized by international cooperation and the absence of military confrontation. Like all the other Arctic littoral states, Russia also considers that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, UNCLOS, provides the overall legal framework for the Arctic Ocean region. It can be taken for granted that Russia would like the High North to remain the country's most stable and conflict-free border region. Managing relations with Russia will be both the key to - and the measure of - success or failure in securing continued prosperity and stability in the High North. Full use should be made of hard-won lessons from the era of strategic confrontation during the cold wait and from the ups and downs of managing relations with Russia since the 1990s." This will require the skillful calibration of political and military means to reach a defined set of fundamental aims. Western policy makers must demonstrate the ability and will to take Russian foreign and security interests into account as the Russians themselves perceive them, without necessarily accepting them at face value." The West and NATO should be unanimous in their resolve to engage Russia in constructive cooperation over the broadest spectrum of security-related issues. The NATO Russia Council may be one important arena for constructive High North dialogue. But there is still the residual risk that conflicts of interests may develop into armed confrontation, through escalation or otherwise. However unlikely, it cannot be excluded that a major conflict elsewhere may spill over into armed aggression in the High North. Thus, the High North is one of several areas where NATO needs to examine how the Alliance's core function - the idea of collective defense presented by the Washington Treaty's Article 5 - ought to be interpreted and implemented in the post cold-war setting. Surveillance and intelligence and deterrence including contingency planning must remain core elements of the Western Alliance's military posture in the High North. The difficult task will be to find ways to back up declarations of intent through necessary adjustments to current policies without jeopardizing the ultimate goal of preventing the use of armed force in the High North. All decisions must be guided by a firm intent to avoid a return to the chess-board reasoning of the cold war, which presupposed that only one winner would be left on the field. This will involve multiple balancing acts between demonstrations of Allied solidarity and preparedness and the danger that they may provoke destabilizing Russian countermeasures. The approach should be analytical rather than emotional. All steps should be calculated in terms of their long-term effect on High North security and stability, and they should be predictable and legitimate in terms of the Western countries' declared policy aims. Military measures have the negative aim of avoiding the worst. Positive ambitions can only be achieved through dialogue, cooperation and compromise solutions to matters under dispute.

**Arctic conflicts will remain purely diplomatic.**

**Byron, 12 --** a John Gardner Fellow at the U.S. Department of State in the Office of Global Change working on adaptation measures to climate change. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa in May 2011 with a B.A. in Political Science, a B.S. in Society & Environment. In addition to receiving Highest Honors in political science for his honors thesis, Byron was awarded Highest Distinction in General Scholarship for both of his degrees. (Ruby, “Conflict or Cooperation? Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change,” Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, Office of Undergraduate Research, UC Berkeley, Peer Reviewed, 2012, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6z7864c7> // JH)

Within the existing literature on Arctic geopolitics and climate change, few authors explicitly define what they mean by "conflict." In fact, the term is often thrown around loosely, sometimes referring to a state of armed warfare or at other times to conflict of the political or diplomatic kind. While these uses are certainly legitimate and within the established meaning of the word, it makes for fuzzy boundaries and ambiguous projections: the chance or likelihood of future diplomatic "conflict," whatever that is intended to mean, most certainly differs—and probably differs starkly—from the chances of total war between two Arctic nations. Thus, for the purposes of this research, unless otherwise specified, conflict is defined as a militarized confrontation between at least two countries. No shots need be fired, nor do casualties need to be suffered. A formal declaration of war would also be too high of a standard for "conflict," as that would exclude such prominent wars like those in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf on the basis of what has become in many respects a dispensable procedural formality. Rather, the mere formal invocation of some form of coercive force is sufficient to qualify an event as a form of conflict (e.g. ordering a ship to fire across the bow of another ship belonging to another nation). A baseline example of what would constitute a conflict, then, is the Turbot War of 1995 between Canada and Spain, where the Canadian Navy boarded a Spanish fishing vessel and arrested its crew for fishing in Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone off the coast of Newfoundland (Nordås & Gleditsch 2007, 631). In this respect, this definition of conflict differs slightly from the typical notion of "war," which tends to connote much greater military mobilization and the number of causalities being greater than zero (Bremer 1992, 310). The logic for narrowing the scope of conflict in this respect is twofold. First, while there has certainly been a history of diplomatic dispute in the Arctic, there has yet to be any form of armed brinksmanship or militarized conflict to date—at least not since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This leaves such future-facing projections on armed conflict—such as this research— still a relevant exercise. Second, it creates a clear distinction between what does constitute "conflict" and what does not. Definitions of conflict seeking to make qualitative judgments on the degree, size, or escalation of conflict inevitably invite criticism in terms of the arbitrariness of the line that renders some conflicts authentic and others as something else altogether.

# --Saudi DA

**Loss of US relations increases Saudi relations with China**

**Luft 06** (Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) a Washington based think tank focused on energy security, specializes in strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, Middle East and energy security. “Fueling the dragon: China's race into the oil market”, http://www.iags.org/china.htm)

A key component of China's strategy to guarantee access to Persian Gulf oil is the special relations it has cultivated with Saudi Arabia. The ties with Riyadh go back to the mid-1980s when China sold Saudi Arabia intermediate range ballistic missiles. Since then, the relations have grown closer. High-level visits of Chinese leaders to Saudi Arabia culminated in 1999 with President Jiang Zemin's state visit in which he pronounced a "strategic oil partnership" between the two countries. China has offered to sell the Saudis intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Saudis have so far preferred to turn down many of the proposals and limit their procurement from China in order **to maintain their special relations with the U.S.** But **continuous deterioration in Saudi-American relations** or, in the longer run, a regime change in the oil kingdom, **could drive the Saudis to end** their **reliance on the U.S. as the sole guarantor of** their regime's **security and offer China an expanded role.**

**War between the US and China**

**Luft 04** (Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) a Washington based think tank focused on energy security, specializes in strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, Middle East and energy security, Los Angeles Times, “US, China Are on Collision Course Over Oil,” 2004. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2004/0202collision.htm)

Optimists claim that the world oil market will be able to accommodate China and that, instead of conflict, China's thirst could create mutual desire for stability in the Middle East and thus actually bring Beijing closer to the U.S. History shows the opposite: Superpowers find it difficult to coexist while competing over scarce resources. **The main bone of contention probably will revolve around China's relations with Saudi Arabia**, home to a quarter of the world's oil. The Chinese have already supplied the Saudis with intermediate range ballistic missiles, and they played a major role 20 years ago in a Saudi financed Pakistani nuclear effort that may one day leave a nuclear weapon in the hands of a Taliban-type regime in Riyadh or Islamabad. Since 9/11, a **deep tension in U.S.-Saudi relations has provided the Chinese with an opportunity** to win the heart of the House of Saud. The Saudis hear the voices in the U.S. denouncing Saudi Arabia as a "kernel of evil" and proposing that the U.S. seize and occupy the kingdom's oil fields. The Saudis especially fear that if their citizens again perpetrate a terror attack in the U.S., there would be no alternative for the U.S. but to terminate its long-standing commitment to the monarchy - and perhaps even use military force against it. The Saudis realize that to forestall such a scenario they can no longer rely solely on the U.S. to defend the regime and must diversify their security portfolio. In their search for a new patron, they might find China the most fitting and willing candidate. The risk of Beijing's emerging as a competitor for influence in the Middle East and a Saudi shift of allegiance are things Washington should consider as it defines its objectives and priorities in the 21st century. Without a comprehensive strategy designed to prevent China from becoming an oil consumer on a par with the U.S., **a superpower collision is in the cards.** The good news is that we are still in a position to halt China's slide into total dependency.

**Impact**

**Saudis are contemplating switch to the euro – strong relations preserve US petrodollar**

**Shipley 7** (Tyler, Ph.D. candidate in the Dept. of Political Science at York University. “Currency Wars: Oil, Iraq, and the Future of US Hegemony.” Studies in Political Economy: 79, 2007. http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/view/5194.)

 If that were not enough, a major event in 2006 was set to complicate matters even further. An important aspect of the structural apparatus that facilitates the oil-dollar nexus is the fact that there are only two significant trading bourses for oil in the world. The NYMEX in New York and the IPE in London are where the world goes to buy oil, and both are American owned and operated. They are also, notably, denominated in US dollars, facilitating the conventional use of dollars in oil transactions. But Iran was scheduled to open its own bourse in the spring of 2006, with the Iranian Oil Bourse (IOB) to be denominated in euros.69 Much of Iran’s trade in oil is with Europe and is already denominated in euros, but the opening of the IOB would undoubtedly make it much easier for OPEC countries to reject the US dollar if they so choose. There are still many political pressures that would inhibit oil producers from undermining US hegemony, but **there is no reason to assume that consent for American dominance will persist indefinitely.** The cost of keeping the Unites States in command is increasing, especially given the incredible amount of money borrowed to finance the occupation of Iraq, and the presence of the IOB would make the potential shift easier. The euro switch is getting due consideration everywhere that oil is produced. Despite being the United States strongest Arab ally in the Middle East and having an estimated $7 trillion in petrodollar investments on Wall Street,70 even **Saudi Arabia**, the worlds largest oil exporter, **seems to have considered the euro switch**. If true, this is a remarkable development; **no one oil-exporting state would have as profound an effect on the US dollar** if it switched its holdings and sales to euros **as Saudi Arabia**, and few members of OPEC would have as great an effect on the rest of the oil cartel. The United States recognizes Saudi Arabias importance in this regard, as demonstrated in this paper and by recent remarks by the US ambassador to the Kingdom, who told a US congressional committee that one of the major things the Saudis have historically done is to insist that oil continues to be priced in dollars. Therefore, **the US** treasury **can print money and buy oil**, which is **an advantage that no other country has.**71 It seems that US officials are not as ignorant of the currency issue as Ari Fleischer would have us believe. Keeping in mind this frank admission of US reliance on Saudi Arabia to denominate sales in dollars and pressure the rest of OPEC to do the same, one can only imagine the deep concerns US officials must have felt when, between April and June 2003, the Saudis began amassing an estimated 30 billion euros in foreign reserves.72 The cold sweat probably subsided in a sigh of relief a year later when the Saudis officially abandoned these movements towards the euro, stating that the euro has not yet gained a competitive status against the dollar as a major reserve currency.73 It is worth noting the use of yet in the Saudi statement: is the door still open for a switch in the future?

**Petro Dollar key to Heg**

**Looney 04** (Robert E, professor of National Security Affairs, and Associate Chairman of Instruction, Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End?” Middle East Policy No. 1 Vol. 11, p. 26 http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp

Political power and prestige. The benefits of "power and prestige" are nebulous. Nevertheless, the loss of key currency status and the loss of international creditor status have sometimes been associated, along with such non-economic factors as the loss of colonies and military power, in discussions of the historical decline of great powers. **Causality may well flow from key currency status to power and prestige** and in the opposite direction as well.[8] On a broader scale, Niall Ferguson[9] notes that one pillar of American dominance can be found in the way successive U.S. government sought to take advantage of the dollar's role as a key currency. Quoting several noted authorities, he notes that [the role of the dollar] enabled the United States to be "far less restrained…than all other states by normal fiscal and foreign exchange constraints when it came to funding whatever foreign or strategic policies it decided to implement." As Robert Gilpin notes, quoting Charles de Gaulle, such policies led to a **'hegemony of the dollar" that gave the U.S. "extravagant privileges**." In David Calleo's words, the U.S. government had access to a "gold mine of paper" and could therefore collect a subsidy form foreigners in the form of seignorage (the profits that flow to those who mint or print a depreciating currency). The web contains many more radical interactions of the dollar's role. Usually something along the following lines: World trade is now a game in which the U.S. produces dollars and the rest of the world produces things that dollars can buy. The world's interlinked economies no longer trade to capture a comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars to service dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to sustain the exchange value of their domestic currencies…. This phenomenon is known as dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopolitically constructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars. Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil. The recycling of petro-dollars is the price the U.S. has extracted from oil-producing countries for U.S. tolerance of the oil-exporting cartel since 1973.[10] America's coercive power in the world is based as much on the dollar's status as the global reserve currency as on U.S. military muscle. Everyone needs oil, and to pay for it, they must have dollars. To secure dollars, they must sell their goods to the U.S., under terms acceptable to the people who rule America. The dollar is way overpriced, but it's the only world currency. Under the current dollars-only arrangement, U.S. money is in effect backed by the oil reserves of every other nation.[11] While it is tempting to dismiss passages of this sort as uninformed rants, they do contain some elements of truth. There are tangible benefits that accrue to the country whose currency is a reserve currency. The real question is: if this situation is so intolerable and unfair, why hasn't the world ganged up on the United States and changed the system? Why haven't countries like Libya and Iran required something like euros or gold dinars in payment for oil? After all, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 the International Monitary Fund's Standard Drawing Rights (unit of account) was certainly an available alternative to the dollar.[12]

**Good**

**Barnett 11**- chief analyst at Wikistrat, former visiting scholar at the University of Tennessee’s Howard Baker Center for Public Policy and a visiting strategist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies (Thomas, World Politics Review, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” 3/7, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job.  It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II.  Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation.  But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.

**GCC petrodollar recycling is key to finance US debt, keep interest rates low, and promote consumption – that’s key to growth**

**Momani 8** (Bessma, Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance and Innovation, University of Waterloo. “Gulf Cooperation Council Oil Exporters and the Future of the Dollar.” *New Political Economy*, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 2008. DOI: 10.1080/13563460802302594.)

 Recycling petrodollars in US securities and investments Since oil is priced in dollars and GCC oil exporting companies are primarily state-owned, the Gulf states have a signiﬁcant amount of petrodollars to invest and recycle. Since the 1970s, Gulf states have recycled their petrodollars in dollar-based assets and securities, particularly in US Treasury Bills, which has invariably supported the dollar. In light of recent congressional and public anxieties over Gulf investment in the United States, this section examines the question whether the Gulf will continue to invest their petrodollars in US securities and investments. Under the rubric of the US– Saudi forum of the 1970s, US Treasury Secretary William Simon made a secret agreement where the Saudis could buy US Treasury bills not yet publicly auctioned to help ﬁnance the growing US debt. 49 A dominant view of petrodollar recycling describes the 1970s as a period when OPEC ﬁnancial wealth was deposited into commercial banks and then, in turn, lent or recycled to developing oil-consuming countries. Instead, David Spiro demonstrates how the United States and the Saudis negotiated the recycling of Saudi oil dollars into the US bond market. Spiro argues that the United States had believed that the inter-bank market was failing and there was little faith in the international capital markets’ ability to recycle OPEC oil wealth efﬁciently. The US government decided to unilaterally guide this recycling by selling US government debt to the Saudis. 50 The Saudis agreed to conditionally purchase US securities as long as the amount purchased was kept conﬁdential. 51 **The petrodollar inﬂux into US government bonds had kept interest rates low and promoted American consumption**, thereby **keeping Americans content and stimulating non-inﬂationary growth.** Moreover, despite the high number of dollars in circulation outside of the United States, international faith in the US dollar had remained high. Subsequently, the United States has been effectively printing money to ﬁnance its deﬁcit, and arguably its military ventures, with little international recourse on the value of the dollar. 52 For the Saudis, petrodollars reinvested into US government bonds allowed them to avoid currency risks of conversion and gave them access to secure investment in the United States. The same economic beneﬁts were to be realised by other Arab states in the Gulf as well, as they also invested heavily into the United States.

**US economic collapse will destroy the global economy**

**Mead 04** – Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations

[Walter Russell, “America's STICKY Power,” Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr, Proquest]

Similarly, in the last 60 years, as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States-government and private bonds, direct and portfolio private investments-more and more of them have acquired an interest in maintaining the strength of the U.S.-led system. A collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the prosperity of the United States. Without their best customer, countries including China and Japan would fall into ***depressions. The financial strength of every country would be severely shaken should the U***nited States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt becomes a strength, not a weakness, and other countries fear to break with the United States because they need its market and own its securities. Of course, pressed too far, a large national debt can turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by maintaining its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the Philistines, a collapsing U.S. economy would inflict ***enormous, unacceptable damage*** on the rest of the world. That is sticky power with a vengeance.

**Extinction**

**Bearden 2000** (Lt. Col Thomas E. Bearden, PhD, MS, BSCo-inventor - the 2002 Motionless Electromagnetic Generator - a replicated overunity EM generator Listed in Marquis' Who'sWho in America, 2004)

Just **prior to the** terrible **collapse of the World economy**, with the crumbling well underway and rising, **it is inevitable that** some of the **weapons of mass destruction will be used** by one or more nations **on others**. An interesting result then—as all the old strategic studies used to show—is that **everyone will fire everything as fast as possible against their perceived enemies**. The reason is simple: When the mass destruction weapons are unleashed at all, **the only chance a nation has to survive is to** desperately try to **destroy its perceived enemies** before they destroy it. So **there will erupt a spasmodic unleashing of the long range missiles, nuclear arsenals, and biological warfare arsenals of the nations as they feel the economic collapse**, poverty, death, misery, etc. a bit earlier. **The ensuing holocaust is certain to immediately draw in the major nations also,** and literally a **hell on earth will result**. In short, **we will get the great Armageddon** we have been fearing since the advent of the nuclear genie. Right now, my personal estimate is that **we have** about **a 99% chance of that scenario** or some modified version of it, **resulting**.

**2NC Libya Impact**

**And escalation’s guaranteed – it’s a geopolitical hub**

Arun **Sahgal &**, former Army officer who created the Office of Net Assessment in the Indian Joint Staff, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses and ‘Distinguished Fellow’ School of Geo-Politics at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Vinod **Anand 10**, postgraduate in defence and strategic studies and is an alumnus of Defence Services Staff College and College of Defence Management, “Strategic Environment in Central Asia and India”, <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/1004Joshi-V-Strategic.pdf>

The geo-strategic salience of Central Asia today has been underscored by two main factors. First, **Central Asia has become important because of the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves and** second, it **has become a major transportation hub for gas and oil pipelines and multi-modal communication corridors connecting China, Russia, Europe, the Caucasus region, the Trans-Caspian region and the Indian Ocean**. Furthermore, whether it was Czarist Russia or the Soviet Union or even the present Central Asian regimes, there has always been a strategic ambition in the north to seek access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Thus Afghanistan, which links Central Asia and South Asia, is a strategic bridge of great geopolitical significance. Central Asia and South Asia are intimately connected not only geographically but also strategically. The Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have borders with Afghanistan, Iran lies to its west and Pakistan to the east and south. Therefore, the geostrategic significance of Afghanistan is enhanced even though it may not be an oil- or gas-rich country. With the control of Afghanistan comes the control of the land routes between the Indian subcontinent and resource-rich Central Asia, as well as of a potential corridor to Iran and the Middle East. Thus, stability and peace in Afghanistan, and for that matter Pakistan, are a geostrategic imperative. **Central Asia** has never been a monolithic area and **is undergoing a turbulent transitional process with a diverse range of ethnicities and fragmented societies throughout the region**. **These societal divisions and lack of political maturity compound the social, economic and political challenges**. Security and economic issues are the two most important components of the Central Asian states’ engagement with outside powers. **Among the states** themselves **there are elements of both cooperation and competition**. Historical legacies, their geo-strategic locations, and above all their perceived national interests profoundly influence the political choices of Central Asian nations. **The weaknesses of the new nations in Central Asia pave the way for outside powers to interfere in their internal affairs**.

**Stability – Dirty Bombs**

**Libyan dispersal risks yellowcake dirty bombs**

Terror Trends bulletin 9/10/11

<http://terrortrendsbulletin.wordpress.com/2011/09/10/more-worries-about-libyas-new-regime-and-weapons-on-the-loose/>

 Terror Trends Bulletin is edited by Christopher Holton, Vice President with the Center for Security Policy in Washington DC. I am the Director of the Center’s Divest Terror Initiative, a project to empower American investors to cut off financial support for terrorist sponsoring nations. I am also active in the Center’s Shariah Risk Due Diligence Project, an initiative to investigate and scrutinize Shariah-Compliant Finance in the West to expose ties to Islamist extremism.

 Finally, none of this addresses the even more worrisome issue of stocks of radiological material and chemical agents in Libya. There are thought to be Libyan stocks of material suitable for making “dirty” bombs, something that has been a nightmare scenario on the minds of Western security organizations for years. These stocks include uranium yellowcake.

**Extinction**

Lewis 9/29/11

<http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/09/is_qadaffis_yellowcake_going_to_adolf.html>

 scientist, writer and policy consultant

 Like Aladdin's Genie, Moammar Gaddafi has disappeared in a puff of smoke back in Libya, but he left a piece of yellowcake behind for the rest of us. No, not fattening cheesecake. Bigger than that. It's in the great Libyan desert, where there are warehouses full of leaking barrels of uranium ore, stuff you can make bombs from. The U.K. Telegraph speculates that this unguarded stockpile is being smuggled barrel by barrel to Ahmadinejad in Iran -- a man I will simply call "Adolf" to make it hard even for liberals to get it wrong. Oh, yes, and Gaddafi left behind an estimated 20,000 portable anti-aircraft missiles. Don't take your next Mediterranean cruise too soon. If you believe the New York Times, you think that yellowcake is not a Weapon of Mass Destruction. But **if some of those AK-47-toting "liberators" in Libya load up a plane with those leaking barrels, fly it over Manhattan, and aim it down over Times Square, they will set off World War III.** Even the Times will finally deign to take notice. That's close enough to WMDs for me. Sure, a plane full of yellowcake makes a dirty bomb, a low-tech radiation bomb, not the big nuclear chain-reaction kind. But the 9/11 killers were not choosy. Think what bin Laden could have done with that warehouse in Libya.

# DISAD

#### DA outweighs the case ---

#### It’s the most likely scenario for nuclear war and causes nuclear winter

**Robock & Toon 10** - Professor of climatology at Rutgers University & Chair of atmospheric and oceanic scienc­es @ University of Colorado-Boulder [Allan Robock (Director of Rutger’s Center for Environmental Prediction) & Owen Brian Toon (Fellow of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics University of Colorado-Boulder, “Local Nuclear War,” Scientific American, January 2010 ] language modified

Why discuss this topic now that the cold war has ended? Because as other nations continue to acquire nuclear weapons, smaller, regional nu­clear wars could create a similar global catastro­phe. New analyses reveal that a conflict be­tween India and Pakistan, for example, in which 100 nuclear bombs were dropped on cities and industrial areas—only 0.4 percent of the world’s more than 25,000 warheads—would produce enough smoke to ~~cripple~~ destroy global agriculture. A regional war could cause widespread loss of life even in countries far away from the conflict.

Regional War Threatens the World

By deploying modern computers and modern cli­mate models, the two of us and our colleagues have shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects would last for at least 10 years, much longer than previously thought. And by doing calculations that assess decades of time, only now possible with fast, current computers, and by including in our cal­culations the oceans and the entire atmosphere— also only now possible—we have found that the smoke from even a regional war would be heat­ed and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, continuing to block sunlight and to cool the earth.

India and Pakistan, which together have more than 100 nuclear weapons, may be the most worrisome adversaries capable of a regional nu­clear conflict today. But other countries besides the U.S. and Russia (which have thousands) are well endowed: China, France and the U.K. have [has] hundreds of nuclear warheads; Israel has more than 80, North Korea has about 10 and Iran may well be trying to make its own. In 2004 this situation prompted one of us (Toon) and later Rich Turco of the University of California, Los Angeles, both veterans of the 1980s investiga­tions, to begin evaluating what the global envi­ronmental effects of a regional nuclear war would be and to take as our test case an engage­ment between India and Pakistan.

The latest estimates by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security and by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resourc­es Defense Council are that India has 50 to 60 assembled weapons (with enough plutonium for 100) and that Pakistan has 60 weapons. Both countries continue to increase their arsenals. In­dian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests indi­cate that the yield of the warheads would be sim­ilar to the 15-kiloton explosive yield (equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT) of the bomb the U.S. used on Hiroshima.

Toon and Turco, along with Charles Bardeen, now at the National Center for Atmospheric Re­search, modeled what would happen if 50 Hiro­shima-size bombs were dropped across the high­est population-density targets in Pakistan and if 50 similar bombs were also dropped across In­dia. Some people maintain that nuclear weapons would be used in only a measured way. But in the wake of chaos, fear and broken communications that would occur once a nuclear war began, we doubt leaders would limit attacks in any rational manner. This likelihood is particularly true for Pakistan, which is small and could be quickly overrun in a conventional conflict. Peter R. La­voy of the Naval Postgraduate School, for exam­ple, has analyzed the ways in which a conflict be­tween India and Pakistan might occur and ar­gues that Pakistan could face a decision to use all its nuclear arsenal quickly before India swamps its military bases with traditional forces. Pg. 74-75

#### Solves china relations by solidifying trade ties – our 1NC ev on case says that structurally preserves stability

#### Immigration reform generates an effective base of IT experts - solves cyberterror

\*top 20 firms conclude H1-B visa requestors are oversees – increasing IT experts, the majority of which are overseas, cannot come to the US, talented students that have tremendous ability to develop tech and scientific advances don’t have the ability to come to the US – collapses response mechanisms

**McLarty 09 –** (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States. We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to **generate a more effective group of IT experts** here in the **U**nited **S**tates, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward. MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a **tremendous ability to develop** these kind of **tech**nology **and scientific advances**, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to **strengthen**, I think, our system, **our security needs**.

#### Uniquely turns Russia miscalc

**Fritz 09 –** (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)

The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause **incorrect information** to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively **easy** using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may **provide an entry point**, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process**,** and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a **nuclear war.** “ “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

# relatiosn u

#### Visa policy is dragging down US-India relations now – only CIR can reaffirm our alliance with India

Zee News 12 [“Krishna, Hillary to discuss visa fee hike in NY”, October 1st, 2012, <http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/krishna-hillary-to-discuss-visa-fee-hike-in-ny_802978.html>, Chetan]

New York: The issue of US visa fee hike, which has hurt several Indian IT firms, is expected to come up for discussion when External Affairs Minister SM Krishna meets US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton here on Monday on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. India has "consistently" taken up the issue of the visa fee hike with the US and the issue will figure in talks between Krishna and Clinton, official sources said. The US had raised visa fee in 2010 to fund its enhanced costs on securing border with Mexico under the Border Security Act. Some of the top Indian companies TCS, Infosys, Wipro and Mahindra Satyam were affected by the US action and India is expected to soon seek consultations with the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the issue. The sources said that young Indian professionals working in the US have been the "cornerstone" of India-US relations and are a pillar in the improved bilateral relations that has brought the two countries closer. Hiking visa fees or limiting the number of work visas available to Indian companies is tantamount to "undermining that pillar and growth in India-US relations," they added. "Raising visa fees and putting other barriers is not in consonance with the forward thinking of growing bilateral ties," the sources said. This will be the third bilateral meeting between Krishna and Clinton this year. They had previously met in India in April and again in June in Washington. The sources said that the two countries have a fairly elaborate agenda and the visa issue is one of the issues in a broader relationship. Krishna will also address the 67th session of the UN General Assembly today.

#### And – it’s key to science cooperation

**Kumar 10** [Arun, Daily Times of India, 6-24, “US visas pose ‘appallingly pervasive problem’ (<http://www.dailytimesindia.com/2010/06/134540.htm>)

Washington, June 25 (IANS) A day after India raised the issue of visas for Indian professionals and skilled workers, a senior US official acknowledged that visas posed an “appallingly pervasive problem” in science and technology cooperation. “Visas have been an appallingly pervasive problem in science and technology cooperation,” said Dr John P Holdren, advisor to the US president on science and technology, Thursday. “We need to streamline visa procedures and we have made considerable achievements already in the Obama administration,” Holdren said at the inauguration of first US-India Joint Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation. Indian Minister of State for Science and Technology Prithviraj Chavan, who is leading the Indian team, said the coming together of the US and India, one a very large economy and the other poised to become one, would have great bearing on the future. “The commitment of our two leaders in building knowledge society, without a doubt, is at a level never seen before,” he said. “For the relationship to be meaningful, it has to be a mutually beneficial arrangement, with a win win situation.” The present day challenges of water, food security, food, climate change or threat to national security can only be addressed through science and technology and through cooperation between willing partners, Chavan said. Science and technology plays a key role in addressing the challenges being faced by both India and the US, Holdren said noting the two countries have already accomplished a lot through their cooperation in the field of science and technology. Holdren’s acknowledgement of the problems with the US visa regime came a day after Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Anand Sharma raised the issue in a meeting with the US Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke.

#### Immigration reform is key to food security

Fitz 12 (Marshall Fitz is the Director of Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress, Time to Legalize Our 11 Million Undocumented Immigrants, November 14th, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2012/11/14/44885/time-to-legalize-our-11-million-undocumented-immigrants/)

Nowhere is the tension between immigrant labor and the economy more obvious than in agriculture. By most estimates, undocumented immigrants make up more than half of the workers in the agriculture industry. Likewise the U.S. Department of Agriculture has estimated that each farm job creates three “upstream” jobs in professions such as packaging, transporting, and selling the produce, meaning that what happens in the agricultural sector affects the economy as a whole.¶ Agriculture is particularly susceptible to the whims of the labor market, since crops become ripe at a fixed time and must be picked quickly before they rot. Migrant laborers often travel a set route, following the growing season as it begins in places such as Florida and works its way north. Disrupting this flow of pickers can be devastating to local economies and the nation’s food security.¶ After the passage of Georgia’s anti-immigrant law, H.B. 87, for example, the Georgia Agribusiness Council estimated that the state could lose up to $1 billion in produce from a lack of immigrant labor. A survey of farmers conducted by the Georgia Department of Agriculture found 56 percent of those surveyed were experiencing difficulty finding workers—a devastating blow to the state. Even a program by Gov. Nathan Deal (D-GA) to use prison parolees to fill the worker shortage quickly fell apart, with most walking off the job after just a few hours.¶ Creating a process for legalizing these undocumented workers would help stabilize the agricultural workforce and enhance our nation’s food security. It would also diminish the incentive of states to go down the economically self-destructive path that Georgia, Alabama, Arizona, and others have pursued.

#### Food shortages lead to extinction.

Brown, founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute, ‘9

[Lester, “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May]

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis. For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

# healthcare

### A2 Thumpers

#### Immigration is the focus – House GOP wants it to be

McERLAIN 10 – 19 – 13 Crossmap Staff Writer [Michelle McErlain, Immigration Reform News: Obama Stressed to Fix the Broken Immigration System in US as 1 of the Top 3 Issues, http://crossmap.christianpost.com/news/immigration-reform-news-obama-stressed-to-fix-the-broken-immigration-system-in-us-as-1-of-the-top-3-issues-5832]

The speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) and House Republicans stressed 5 reasons why immigration should be the next Congressional agenda. One of the reasons is that immigration reform is an opportunity to change the country's political landscape by changing the racial proportions, according to the research done by David F. Damore, Ph. D on Latino decisions.

Furthermore, the Republicans believe that immigration reform will help to grow the economy, reduce the deficit and benefit job creation, Social Security and Medicare.

#### Obama all in on immigration

MARTOSKO 10 – 17 – 13 US Political Editor for the Daily Mail [David Martosko, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2464112/Immigration-battle-threatens-dwarf-debt-limit-fight-Republicans-fear-power-17-MILLION-newly-legalized-loyal-Democrats.html>]

Republicans' new worst fear isn't defaulting on America's debts. If an immigration policy favored by the White House and Senate Democrats should become law, 17.3 million newly legalized immigrant voters would emerge by 2036, eager to reward the party that gave them a path to citizenship.

The White House has shifted gears and put its policy team in immigration overdrive, zooming past the debt crisis that threatened to sink the republic and on to the task of normalizing the estimated 11 million U.S. residents who have no legal basis for being there.

The Democrat-dominated U.S. Senate passed a bill in June that would provide a citizenship path for those who have been in the U.S. since the end of 2011. But as with the early days of the debt crisis and the partial government shutdown, Republican leaders in the House of Representatives aren't eager to consider it.

The White House has avoided saying that it take advantage of a weak House and spend its political capital to push an immigration policy, but Republicans have reason to suspect the other shoe is about to drop.

The Center for Immigration Studies, a Washington, D.C. think-tank, projects that the Senate bill, S.744, would add 17.3 million new legal, voting-age U.S. residents to 14.9 million whom analysts already expect to appear without the proposed law.

'To place these figures in perspective,' writes Steven Camarota, the group's director of research, 'the last four presidential elections were decided by 4.5 million votes on average.'

Converting illegal immigrants into citizens has long been a Democratic Party brass ring. And not only, as President Barack Obama told business leaders on Sept. 18, because 'we know ... that that can add potentially a trillion dollars to our economy, and that we will continue to attract the best and brightest talent around the world.'

Hispanics are the biggest ethnic group involved in U.S. immigration. In the 2012 elections, 77 per cent of those who voted supported Democratic candidates for Congress, according to the polling group Latino Decisions. Seventy-five per cent voted for Obama.

Among Hispanic voters who weren't born in the U.S., Democratic congressional candidates picked up 81 per cent of the vote. Obama rated 80 per cent.

In fact, Republicans' share of Hispanic votes in presidential elections peaked in 2004, at 43 per cent before tumbling in the next two elections.

And the Pew Research Center has consistently found that large majorities Hispanic voters favor policies that produce governments with bigger footprints and more social programs.

'There are things that we know will help strengthen our economy that we could get done before this year is out,' the president said Wednesday night as focus on the debt-limit fix bill moved from the Senate to the House.

'A law to fix our broken immigration system' was first on his wish-list.

#### Healthcare didn’t drain all of Obama’s pc – Obama has capital

ALLARD & WEN 10 – 19 – 13 Sydney Morning Herald [Tom Allard, Philip Wen, The buck stopped, almost, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/the-buck-stopped-almost-20131018-2vs9l.html>]

The Republican retreat this week in Congress has been widely viewed in the US as a scarifying defeat.

The narrative that the party and its Tea Party wing held the nation - and the world - hostage in a mad attempt to cruel Obama's health- care reforms has resonated.

Polling is dreadful for the Republicans and there are upcoming mid-term congressional elections.

It would suggest Obama has some political capital to play with.

#### Got capital – will spend on budget, farm, and immigration

REUTERS 10 – 18 – 13 Obama says Americans 'completely fed up' with Washington, <http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/obama-says-americans-completely-fed-up-washington-5652654?ref=rss>

President Barack Obama has scolded congressional Republicans, hours after a fiscal crisis was narrowly averted and called on his opponents to help repair the economic damage caused by a 16-day US government shutdown and a close brush with a debt default.

Obama stressed that he is willing to work with lawmakers wherever they can agree, but the tone he struck amounted to a rebuke of Republicans, whom Americans largely blame for pushing the United States to the brink of an economic calamity.

"The American people are completely fed up with Washington," said Obama in a White House speech attended by many of the aides who worked day and night through the various stages of the latest fiscal stalemate.

Hours after he signed into law a bill hastily cobbled together to end the crisis, Obama said events over the past two weeks had inflicted "completely unnecessary" damage on the US economy.

An increase in borrowing costs caused by the near-debt default was harmful and consumers cut back on spending with hundreds of thousands of government workers suddenly idled, he said.

"There was no economic rationale for all of this," he said.

Though bruised by the battle, Obama emerged as the clear winner. He immediately sought to use the political capital gained to advance a domestic policy agenda centered around a fresh round of budget talks and an effort to win approval of two stalled items, immigration reform and a farm bill.

## NCLB

This evis about reid not Obama – also doesn’t say it would be a major controversy that could disrupt imm

Doesn’t answer our loses lose link – not necessarily a controversy argument – perception of Obama’s power

# detention dbate ienv

Their ev is about the NDAA from a MONTH ago -- it’s irrelevant to current immigration debtes

2. IT’s not a restriction on obama’s authority

# courts shield

# link

#### challenges to the war power Authority of the executive hurt the president’s success on other unrelated agenda items. The card is explicit – that’s Kriner.

#### Administration has stalled on all detention decisions – its hoarding capital for other issues.

ACKERMAN 10 Political blogger, Chief Writer for Attackerman [Apoplexy, Abdication, And An Indefinite Detention Without Trial For Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, By: Spencer Ackerman Saturday November 13, 2010 12:52 pm, http://attackerman.firedoglake.com/2010/11/13/apoplexy-abdication-and-an-indefinite-detention-without-trial-for-khalid-shaikh-mohammed/]

So can the Obama administration manage to reach a decision more craven than this one? According to the Washington Post, the months-long internal administration deadlock over trying Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and the other 9/11 co-conspirators has resulted in a decision: apoplexy. No trying them in federal courts in New York; no trying them at Guantanamo Bay in a military commission. Just… nothing.

The Post story is something of a mixture between reporting a decision and inviting administration officials to opine on the predicament they’re in. There’s basically a no-decision here: administration officials feel buffeted between conservative opposition to a civilian trial and liberal opposition to military commissions. Aww, poor them! So the alternative choice is to stall, despite last year’s rhetoric about “bring[ing] to justice those individuals who have conspired to attack our nation and our interests abroad,” meaning that “a trial is unlikely to happen before the next presidential election and, even then, would require a different political environment.”

And that’s the maddening thing. The Obama team talks about a “different political environment” as if it has nothing to do with creating one. Attorney General Holder talks about federal courts’ capability for handling terrorism trials — you see dangerous secrets leaking out of the Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani trial? Or al-Qaeda storming Manhattan, Cobra-style, to free their comrade? — and then undercuts his own arguments with a defense of military commissions and indefinite detention without trial. And that’s all the opponents of a federal trial — the good-faith opponents, like Lindsey Graham — need to contend that any other venue for trying or not-trying KSM is preferable. Graham may not have compelling arguments for his military-commissions and indefinite-detention advocacy. But politically, he’s got devastating ones — If KSM doesn’t qualify for a military commission, who does? – brought to him by the Obama administration.

“We have said he should be brought to justice, and brought to justice swiftly,” one of the senior officials said. “The problem is these legacy cases have been very heavily bogged down in very strong feelings and very heavy politics, and therefore it has become very difficult to work this through to a successful conclusion.”

Well, then make a case, and make it consistently. Build support and maintain it. Be willing to stake political capital on it. Or concede that you never meant what you said about justice. What will the Justice Department say when Graham reintroduces his indefinite-detention statute in the next Congress?

#### Obama’s appointments give him a judicial legacy

Reuters 8/5/10 ("Senate approves Obama nominee Kagan to top court," <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:8oM3T-dMCDYJ:www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6744YW20100805+obama+kagan+supreme+court+2+appointees&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>)

(Reuters) - President Barack Obama's nomination of Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court won Senate approval on Thursday, **his second appointment to the court that decides abortion, death penalty and other contentious cases.** The Democratic-led Senate voted largely along party lines, 63-37, to confirm the former Harvard Law School dean as the fourth female justice in U.S. history and the 112th high court member. Kagan was Obama's solicitor general, arguing government cases before the Supreme Court, when he named her in May as his choice to replace the retiring liberal Justice John Paul Stevens. The 50-year-old Kagan, who will be the third woman on the current court, is not expected to change the ideological balance of power on the closely divided panel, which for years has been dominated by a 5-4 conservative majority. All Democratic senators but one voted for her, two independent senators voted for her and five Republicans voted for her. All other Republican senators opposed her nomination. OBAMA'S JUDICIAL LEGACY Kagan becomes Obama's second lifetime appointee on the nine-member Supreme Court, a**llowing him to reshape the court and leave a judicial legacy** that could last long after he leaves office. U.S. appeals court Judge Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed last year by a 68-31 vote as the first Hispanic Supreme Court justice. The two appointments underscore an effort by Obama to move the court to the left after Republican President George W. Bush nominated a pair of conservative judges to the bench.

#### Draws in congress

CANON & JOHNSON 99 Professors of political science – UK & Texas A&M [Bradley Canon & Charles Johnson, Judicial policies: implementation and impact]

More than any other public agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for public reaction to judicial policies. As a political body, Congress cannot ignore any sizeable or prominent group of constituents. Some groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision or doctrine, and they are unhappy with some judicial decision or doctrine, and they make their dissatisfaction known to members of Congress. If the pressure is great enough and is not counterbalanced by pressure from groups that support the judicial policy, Congress will, if feasible take action. At the very least, numerous members of Congress will score political points by showing righteous indignation on behalf of the disaffected groups. Clashes between Congress and the courts are virtually as old as the two branches. Marbury v. Madison (1803) was a political finesse of a hostile Congress by the Supreme Court Constitutional crises have been provoked by such decisions in the 1930s. Strained relationships just short of crises have developed from numerous other decisions. Of course, not all differences between the courts and Congress are emotionally charged. Many of the differences arise over mundane issues such as pension or admiralty law. Either way, almost every year Congress reacts to judicial decisions.

#### Supreme Court rulings get blamed on Obama

Harrison 5—Professor of Law—University of Miami, FL [Lindsay, “Does the Court Act as "Political Cover" for the Other Branches?,” http://legaldebate.blogspot.com/]

While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is seen today as a politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be blamed on and/or credited to the President and Congress. The Court can still get away with a lot more than the elected branches since people don't understand the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless, it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public.

# june

### AT: Not announced Yet

#### Immediate decisions are possible, even if they’re the exception—and speeding up the decision uniquely draws the Court into political battles

**Herz, 02**—professor of law at Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University (Michael, 35 Akron L. Rev. 185, “THE SUPREME COURT IN REAL TIME: HASTE, WASTE, AND BUSH V. GORE,” lexis)

Exactly that sort of advantage is usually enjoyed by the Supreme Court. In Bush v. Gore, unfortunately, the Court put itself in the role of the television reporters who were fumbling in the dark rather than those who could read first and report later, in the clear light of day. The Court attempted the judicial equivalent of instantaneousness, operating in real time. The fiasco that resulted will not cause the Court irreparable harm (to use language with which the nation became familiar over that weekend), but it is a reminder of the importance of the Court keeping some distance from the disputes it decides. In particular, the episode highlights the increased risks of both actual and perceived politicization when the Court is in the middle of the fray, participating in an event in the present rather than evaluating it after the fact.[\*187]

II
The conventional wisdom is that distance enhances the Court's decisionmaking. Many factors ensure a separation between a particular controversy and its participants, on the one hand, and the Court, on the other. The Justices' political insulation (life tenure, salary protections, no need to please a boss or an electorate), their lack of a personal stake in the controversy, and training and a turn of mind that, generally and relatively speaking, incline toward considerations of law and principle rather than politics and expediency are all part of the picture. No less important, however, is the time lag between a particular event or legislative or judicial decision and the Court's subsequent review of it. n5

Normally, a Supreme Court case involves events that occurred years ago, and legal issues that have percolated through the lower courts. Bush v. Gore was just the opposite--a mad dash. Although preceded and surrounded by other lawsuits, n6 the specific case that became Bush v. Gore began on November 27, 2000, after the Florida Secretary of State certified George Bush as the winner of that state's electoral votes. This was an election contest action brought by Vice President Gore against Governor Bush and others under Florida Statutes' 102.168 seeking the inclusion of certain Gore votes and a recount in specified counties. Following a two-day trial, on December 4, 2000, the trial court entered judgment for the defendants. n7 The next day, the Florida Supreme Court  [\*188]  agreed to hear a direct appeal; briefs were due by noon December 6; oral argument was set for the morning of December 7. The court decided the case the next day, December 8, reversing in part and affirming in part. n8 Critically, it ordered a statewide manual recount, under the supervision of a state circuit court judge, pursuant to which observers would seek to determine the "intent of the voter" in all cases where machine-counting had not indicated any vote for President.

That day, President Bush sought a stay of the state Supreme Court's ruling from the United States Supreme Court. The lawyers argued that the recounts mandated by the state supreme court would run past the December 12 "deadline," were inconsistent with the state election statutes, and were arbitrary and standardless. Accordingly, they violated (1) the federal statutory provision governing congressional counting of electoral votes, n9 (2) the constitutional allocation of authority to the state legislature to determine the manner in which the state selects its electors, n10 and (3) the equal protection and due process clauses. n11 The Court granted the stay the next day, Saturday, December 9, and, treating the petition for a stay as a petition for certiorari, granted certiorari as well. n12 Briefs were due by 4:00 p.m. on December 10, and oral argument set for 10:00 a.m. Monday, December 11. n13 The Court handed down its decision at a little before 10:00 p.m. the following evening. n14

Only four similar instances come to mind in which the modern Court considered cases involving matters of great national importance on a highly expedited schedule. The steel seizure case, n15 the Nixon tapes case, n16 the Iranian assets case, n17 and the Pentagon Papers case n18 were all  [\*189]  litigated in a matter of weeks or months and produced almost instant opinions from the Supreme Court (19, 16, 8, and 4 days after oral argument, respectively). But these are rarities. And even by these standards Bush v. Gore set new records for speed--for the overall litigation, for the briefing schedule, and for the period within which the Court reached its decision.

The speed of Bush v. Gore is less striking when compared to the standards of an earlier time. The Supreme Court once decided cases much more quickly than is the current norm. During the period from 1815 to 1835, for example, the Court decided 66 constitutional cases with full opinion; 17 of those opinions were handed down within five days of the argument, including several of the Court's most significant rulings. n19 "By contemporary standards, the Marshall Court was breathtakingly swift to render decisions." n20 By the following century, the pace had slowed. Robert Post has calculated that during the 1912-1920 Terms the Court averaged 63.7 days from the argument of a case to the announcement of a full opinion. n21 In contrast, during the 1993-1998 Terms the Court took an average of 91.1 days after argument to hand down its decision. n22

Even by Marshall Court standards, however, Bush v. Gore was something astonishing. Compare, for example, McCulloch v. Maryland. n23 Oral argument in McCulloch ended on March 3, 1819; Marshall handed down his opinion for the Court a mere three days later, on March 6. The turnaround time was so quick, and the opinion so lengthy and complex, that some have speculated that Marshall had written it before the argument. Such was the supposition of Albert Beveridge, who deemed it "not unlikely" and "reasonably probable" that Marshall worked out the framework, if not the actual text, well in advance. n24 Speedy though this is, the scenario is still quite different  [\*190]  from Bush v. Gore. The fact that Marshall took three days rather than a day and a half is the least of it. More important, McCulloch was decided after nine days of oral argument, n25 it concerned a completely familiar legal issue that had been argued by leading figures for decades n26 and whose resolution was not seriously in doubt, n27 and the decision was unanimous. n28 Most important, the only rush in McCulloch was between argument and opinion; the overall litigation had proceeded at a quick but not at all extraordinary pace. n29

The risks of the mad dash are several, and all were painfully on display in Bush v. Gore. First, rather than giving their considered judgment, the Justices were shooting from the hip on extremely difficult legal issues. They were completely without time for reflection, study, or debate, all the things one wants when faced with a difficult problem. In addition, the Court was without the usual assistance from the parties or  [\*191]  other judges. The parties themselves had had very little time to develop, refine, and brief the issues. The equal protection issue, on which the case turned, had received no consideration from any other court or individual judge before it was laid before the Supreme Court. n30 As the Court in other circumstances has emphasized, it benefits from the "percolation" of legal issues in the lower courts before it decides them. n31 Thus, many basic structures designed to give the Court the best chance of getting it right were absent.

The point is not just that slow work is sure work, though that is part of it. n32 The point is also that when the Court's consideration is so rapid the chances increase that the decision will rest on purely political considerations. Deciding a case based on one's initial, impressionistic reaction; being all too aware of how different outcomes will affect a current emergency; not having the chance to let the problem sit and then come back to it--all these make it more likely that one's decision will reflect intuition, prejudice, and preference. Now, judicial decisionmaking always reflects intuition, prejudice, and preference;  [\*192]  nonetheless, it can do so in varying degrees, and those tendencies are often mitigated simply by giving a problem some time.

This risk is particularly acute when the case involves unfamiliar legal issues. Bush v. Gore was not one more search and seizure case, or one more free speech case, arising in an area with which the Justices are familiar and already have a doctrinal framework and a jurisprudential worldview within which to fit the specific dispute. Compare, for example, McCulloch, which involved an utterly familiar and longstanding constitutional question. n33 A more contemporary example is United States v. Eichman, n34 in which the Court struck down the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989, n35 handing down its decision a mere 27 days after argument, on direct appeal from the District Court, after expedited briefing and a special late-Term oral argument, all under pressure of a statute requiring expedited review. n36 From the date the Court took the case to the date it decided it was only 73 days. n37 While still a far cry from Bush v. Gore, that was pretty fast. But the case itself was largely a  [\*193]  reprise of the previous Term's decision in Texas v. Johnson, n38 to which the Flag Protection Act was a response. The Justices were on well-trod turf, having only to consider whether the slight differences between the federal law and the state law they had just struck down in Johnson justified a different result. The specific problem and the overall setting were familiar. In utter contrast, Bush v. Gore presented novel issues. It is no slight to the Justices' erudition to suggest that none was familiar with the intricacies of the Electoral College provisions in Title 3 of the U.S. Code or with the Florida contest and protest statutes.

Finally, by rushing into the maelstrom rather than reviewing it in the calm light of day, the Court did much to further the perception that it had become a purely political actor. The decision has been overwhelmingly attacked as partisan. n39 This reaction stems primarily from the 5-4 conservative/liberal split, combined with an apparent abandonment by all nine Justices of their usual positions on "neutral principles" such as federalism, respect for state courts, and narrow or broad readings of constitutional rights. The validity of the ubiquitous political-operatives-in-robes attack is beyond the scope of this essay. My narrower point is that the extraordinary speed with which the Court acted significantly added to the overwhelming impression of the Court as a partisan institution. At a minimum, it eliminated an important barrier to hyper-legal-realist cynicism; it may have contributed to that  [\*194]  cynicism. If the Court accelerates its ordinary processes in order to solve a political crisis, it will inescapably be perceived as deciding on political grounds, for that is how political problems are decided. Not only was the Court in Bush v. Gore ruling on a political battle, it had become a participant in that battle. The usual insulation and distance had evaporated.

#### --it’s reciprocal—they use FIAT to gain strategic advantages of using ABNORMAL means now—there’s no test case, there’s no lower court deliberation, and the Court has already chosen its docket for the current term. They should be held accountable to the strategic disadvantages from fiatting an abnormal process as well

#### --its their CHOICE to use the Court—they could avoid all of these arguments by not specifying an agent or choosing a different branch. They chose the Court because they wanted to hurt our disads—they can’t hide from the disadvantages of judicial process

####  --err negative—the inclusion of a Court agent more than doubles our research burdens, we have to research an entirely separate body of literature, counterplans and disad links

#### Bush v. Gore released its opinion a day and half after it was decided

**Herz, 02**—professor of law at Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University (Michael, 35 Akron L. Rev. 185, “THE SUPREME COURT IN REAL TIME: HASTE, WASTE, AND BUSH V. GORE,” lexis)

All of which is not to say that we should be wholly sanguine about Bush v. Gore. For one thing, to say these four cases were not embarrassments is a pretty low standard. And dodging bullets does not mean that the bullets are not dangerous. More important, there are real differences between these prior cases and Bush v. Gore. Bush v. Gore was the fastest of all; to release full opinions a day-and-a-half after argument and a week after the lower court decision beats all records. Moreover, the lower court litigation had been significantly more extensive in each of the earlier cases. n56 As a result, there was a more  [\*199]  developed record, the attorneys had had more time to think through the issues; the Justices had the benefit of more considered judicial views. Furthermore, in the earlier cases the Court at least knew what the case was about when it agreed to hear it. Here, the Court (and the lawyers) initially thought that Bush v. Gore was, in essence, a statutory case about the meaning of the Florida election laws and the fairness of the state Supreme Court's interpretation thereof, and about 3 U.S.C. 5. Indeed, the Court denied cert on the equal protection and due process questions in Bush I. Only at the very last minute did it discover that this was an equal protection case after all.

# U

### 1nr U Wall

#### We’ll control uniqueness – Immigration will pass in the status quo – Buckhout card is on fire – indicts numerous media reports that have declared CIR dead – says they are faulty overly optimistic conservative rags that should be ignored.

#### AND – prefer the link – Obama’s pressure is putting wind to the efforts – putting pressure that matters means moderate Republicans think they need to get on board too – that’s STOKOLS.

#### AND – here’s more – the VOTES are there if Obama can keep the pressure on.

NY DAILY NEWS 10 – 20 – 13 It's time to press House Republicans to bring immigration reform to a vote, <http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/time-press-gop-immigration-reform-article-1.1490008>

It is now or never for immigration reform.

Yes, I know, we have heard that one before, but when last Tuesday President Obama promised he would push for an immigration reform vote in the House “the day after” Congress reached an agreement to reopen the government and raise the debt ceiling, he breathed new life into the trite phrase.

“Once that’s done, you know, the day after — I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama told a Los Angeles affiliate of the Spanish-language TV network Univision.

“And if I have to join with other advocates and continue to speak out on that, and keep pushing, I’m going to do so because I think it’s really important for the country. And now is the time to do it.”

The agreement to reopen the government and raise the debt ceiling, as we all are well aware of, finally happened on Wednesday after 16 irresponsible, wasted days of political brinkmanship ended in humiliation for the Republican Party and its radical Tea Party faction.

Obama told Univision that the votes are there to pass the Senate’s immigration reform bill, and that the only thing that’s blocking its passage is “Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.”

There could be an opening to pass immigration reform in the House: Taking action now could enable the GOP to regain some respect.

“This is the time to find out if Boehner learned anything from their defeat,” said Javier Valdés, co-executive director of Make the Road New York, a grassroots organization with offices in Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island. “Hopefully, Republicans understand now they cannot let themselves be dominated by the Tea Party.”

Make the Road will travel to Washington this Wednesday, to remind a group of Republican House members of their promise to vote for reform. On Friday, the group will hold a vigil in front of the Varick Street immigration detention center in Manhattan, to demand the end of deportations.

“We are going to keep escalating our actions until we get results,” Valdés said. “This is a rare opportunity, and we cannot waste it.”

The President’s efforts are important enough to bring a touch of hope to the proponents of reform. But House Republicans are a crazily unpredictable bunch, so no one can really say if Boehner will finally allow a vote or if anything will be approved, even if he does .

“It is hard to be optimistic about the prospects for anything happening in a bipartisan manner on Capitol Hill these days, but the President and I agree that immigration reform is very likely to be taken up before the end of the year,” said Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-Ill.), a national leader for the cause . “When we emerge from this crazy partisan eruption from the Republicans, there will be a huge incentive for sensible Republicans who want to repair some of the damage they have done to themselves.”

#### Capital means it’ll pass

LATINOS POST 10 – 18 – 13 [Immigration Reform 2013 News: Obama Uses Political Showdown in Congress to Push for Immigration Reform, <http://www.latinospost.com/articles/30029/20131018/immigration-reform-2013-news-obama-uses-political-showdown-congress-push-immigration-reform.htm>]

The last few weeks of partisan politics and the 16-day government shutdown may surprisingly give leeway for immigration reform to reemerge as an issue in the national discourse.

The political showdown in Washington ended Wednesday when the House GOP conceded to reopening the government and passing a last-minute bill that narrowly avoided a national default. Now President Obama is using the political capitol he gained during the standoff to call on Congress to revisit the country's broken immigration system and pass comprehensive legislation by the end of the year.

In a speech on Thursday, Obama called for a renewed, bipartisan effort to pass immigration reform.

"This can and should get done by the end of this year," he said at the White House, reports NPR.

He continued stating, "There's already a broad coalition across America that's behind this effort of comprehensive immigration reform--from business leaders to faith leaders to law enforcement," he said. In fact, he added, the Senate has already passed a bill, and "economists estimate that if that bill becomes law, our economy would be 5 percent larger two decades from now. That's $1.4 trillion in new economic growth."

#### Obama has to keep the pressure on

THE HILL 10 – 18 – 13 Obama’s hollow debt victory, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/329219-obamas-hollow-debt-victory>

Another former White House official saw things differently and argued Obama now has a real shot at securing a victory on the immigration bill.

“The trick here is to capitalize on the moment without spiking the football,” the former official said. “On immigration, if he could tailor what he’s doing as part of functionality and not as politics, that would be key."

Cal Jillson, a professor of political science at Southern Methodist University said Obama could capitalize on the victory simply by seizing on a Republican Party “in disarray.”

#### AND – here’s the only conclusive cards -

#### Has the votes

NBC LATINO 10 – 17 – 13 Immigration reform No. 2 on Obama’s to do list for Congress, <http://nbclatino.com/2013/10/17/immigration-reform-no-2-on-obamas-to-do-list-for-congress/>

Boehner has previously expressed interest in tackling immigration reform, mindful of the growing Latino vote and the party’s poor showing in 2012 with Latino voters.

“The speaker remains committed to a common sense, step-by-step approach that ensures we get immigration reform done right. That’s why the committees of the House continue to work on this important issue,” said Brendan Buck, a Boehner spokesman.

Izzy Santa, spokeswoman for Republican National Committee, said there’s still time to develop a solution to fix the immigration system “and stays true to conservative principles.”

In a conference call Thursday on immigration and the Latino vote, Ben Monterroso, national political director for Mi Familia Vota, a social justice group, said the House has the votes to pass immigration reform legislation. Republicans should “show the way if they truly want to embrace the Latino community,” Monterroso said.

#### Boehner thinks it’ll pass with enough GOP support

AP 10 – 23 – 13 [DONNA CASSATA, Associated Press, Speaker hopeful of immigration action this year, <http://www.sfgate.com/news/politics/article/Speaker-hopeful-of-immigration-action-this-year-4919946.php>]

Speaker John Boehner expressed optimism on Wednesday about House action by year's end on stalled efforts to overhaul immigration as Republicans discussed possible limited steps to deal with the contentious issue.

Boehner publicly and privately raised the possibility of a House vote although he faces strong opposition from tea partyers even more resistant to giving President Barack Obama a domestic achievement after the recent rancorous fight over the partial government shutdown.

"I still think immigration reform is an important subject that needs to be addressed. And I'm hopeful," Boehner told reporters at a Capitol Hill news conference when asked if the House can act in the remaining weeks.

The House has just five legislative weeks left though lawmakers indicated that could change.

Business groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, labor unions and religious organizations including U.S. Catholic bishops and evangelicals are pressing for immigration legislation. Many of their members plan a concerted lobbying effort on Capitol Hill next week.

Democrats, meanwhile, maintained their pressure on the House GOP, demanding a vote on comprehensive legislation similar to the Senate-passed bill that that would provide a path to citizenship for the 11 million immigrants living here illegally and tighten border security.

"Speaker Boehner, what are you waiting for?" asked Rep. Linda Sanchez, D-Calif., at a separate news conference of senior House Democrats.

The Senate passed its bill in June with bipartisan support but the measure has languished in the House.

Most House Republicans reject a comprehensive approach and many question offering citizenship to people who broke U.S. immigration laws to be in this country. The House Judiciary Committee has moved forward with individual, single-issue immigration bills.

Although House Republican leaders say they want to solve the issue, which has become a political drag for the GOP, many rank-and-file House Republicans have shown little inclination to deal with it.

There are notable exceptions. Reps. Mike Coffman, R-Colo., and David Valadao, R-Calif., joined immigrants brought illegally to the U.S. as children who want to join the military at a Capitol Hill news conference.

### A2 GOP will refuse to negotiate

#### SOME will – others are just angry butt-heads

WP 10 – 22 – 13 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/22/immigration-reform-still-not-quite-dead/>

The terrible political damage Republicans sustained in the government shutdown fight is apparently making some House Republicans even less willing to pass immigration reform, because mistrust of Obama is running higher than usual. To me, that’s a bit like saying: We just shot ourselves in the foot, so let’s get back at the president by shooting ourselves in the other foot. But for some Republicans, this is where we’re headed.

However, immigration reform still isn’t quite dead yet.

In an interview, GOP Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart of Florida told me that a “number” of House Republicans are in negotiations to develop a piecemeal solution to the problem of the 11 million undocumented immigrants – with the goal of commanding a majority of Republicans. This is good to hear. It means not all Republicans are using the shutdown loss as a way to bail on immigration reform.

“There are a number of us who are working on a proposal to deal with the folks who are here in a way that allows those who have not committed crimes to get right with the law,” Diaz-Balart says, adding that the goal is to figure out “what to do with the millions of undocumented who are here in a way that completely conforms with the rule of law.”

Diaz-Balart declined to specify who these Republicans were or what policy fixes are being discussed. But he provided a clue to the thinking. Republicans insist they can’t support anything that doesn’t secure the border before permitting legalization, and will only accept a piecemeal approach.

So one model for a proposal to deal with the 11 million in a piecemeal way could be an idea drawn from the now-defunct House “gang of seven” talks. House Republicans could pass border security measures, and then pass a measure that puts the 11 million on probation — status they would lose if E-Verify is not operational after five years. Legalization can only proceed after it is operational.

“It is a non-negotiable objective to make sure we have border and interior security as part of anything we do,” Diaz-Balart said. “It has to be enforceable. That aspect that was agreed to [by the gang of seven] is an example of something that’s workable.”

“We have to get the majority of Republicans in support, but on something this difficult and controversial, we’re going to need Democratic votes as well,” he continued. That’s a key point, because it suggests those in these talks recognize that, because the far right will not support anything, the solution must be crafted to be acceptable to Dems, too.

#### They’ll negotiate

WASHINGTON EXAMINER 10 – 24 – 13 <http://washingtonexaminer.com/written-off-for-dead-immigration-reform-could-still-live-on/article/2537386>

There's no doubt the president wants an immigration deal; he's talked about it for years, and now can't put it off until another term. But could the Republican-controlled House of Representatives -- exhausted, dazed, and confused after the self-inflicted battering of the last few weeks -- actually get itself together to pass a reform bill to go along with the Gang of Eight bill the Senate already passed?

The prospect alone makes some observers laugh. "People talking about immigration being next: have you been watching the House?" tweeted National Review's Jonathan Strong during the worst of the shutdown battle, adding the hashtag "#craziness." In this (entirely reasonable) view, there's no way the fractured GOP could ever unite to pass such a far-reaching piece of legislation.

But that doesn't keep immigration reformers from trying, and hoping. "There is still a window," says one House GOP aide involved in crafting a reform proposal. "The leadership has said keep working on it and see what you can do."

Republican immigration proponents have been quietly talking to GOP members throughout even the craziest days of the shutdown and default fights. They report some progress. Yes, the most conservative House Republicans are mostly against them. But those with a libertarian bent are more open to the cause. The aide says reformers have had good meetings "with a few of those guys who were with Ted Cruz at Tortilla Coast," referring to the House conservatives who held out longest against a deal to end the shutdown.

# a2 backfire

#### Obama’s capital & involvement are key to winning over GOP votes

DAILY CALLER 10 – 21 – 13 US Chamber of Commerce pleads for Obama’s help to pass immigration boost, <http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/21/u-s-chamber-of-commerce-pleads-for-obamas-help-to-pass-immigration-boost/>

The president needs to get personally involved in the high-stakes immigration battle to overcome growing GOP distrust, Tom Donohue, head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said Monday.

“I have serious concerns about trust all around in town right now, which suggests the way to get out is leadership,” Donohue told reporters at a breakfast meeting hosted by the Christian Science Monitor.

“We need leadership in the business community, we need leadership in the House, we need leadership in the Senate, and we need leadership in the White House,” he said.

However, he indirectly acknowledged the difficulty of getting the unpopular bill through Congress this year, amid bitter partisan fights over higher-priority budgets bills.

“We’ve got a whole year plus [left to go] of this Congress,” he said.

The backers of the immigration bill had initially hoped to get it done by August 2013.

Donohue’s call for Obama to get more involved comes as more GOP legislators say the immigration deal should be sidelined because Obama can’t be trusted to negotiate in good faith, or even to implement provisions that he doesn’t like.

In a television appearance Sunday, Sen. Marco Rubio acknowledged that criticisms of the immigration rewrite were valid. “Quite frankly, it’s difficult to find a good answer to that… they make a very legitimate point,” said the Florida Republican, a key member of the “Gang of Eight” senators who drafted the bill that passed the Senate in June. (Related: Rubio: Obama undermines immigration reform push with selective enforcement of the law)

“Absolutely — the president has undermined these efforts” to pass a bill, Rubio told “Fox News Sunday.”

At the breakfast meeting Monday, Donohue called for “leadership” in the House, but the GOP’s top leadership is still debating the risks and benefits of the Senate bill, which would triple immigration over the next 10 years.

The bill is backed by business, partly because it would boost immigration up to 33 million new customers and legal workers over the next 10 years and bring in millions of short-term guest-workers.

Major portions of the immigration bill are very unpopular among voters, and especially unpopular among the GOP’s base.

If the leadership pushes a bill through Congress, there’s a risk that the base won’t turn out in November 2014, handing Democrats control of the House.

Democratic control of the White House, Senate and House “would be a long two years” for the business community, Donohue told the reporters.

Obama could build trust “by getting involved and helping us come to a satisfactory and progressive — meaning moving forward — set of solutions on tax and spending, and on entitlements,” Donohue said.

“He will not get there if he doesn’t do what he says he’ll do — get involved and negotiate,” Donohue said.

However, White House press secretary jay Carney strongly hinted last week that the president would not play a leadership role in the budget talks. (Related: Obama WALKS AWAY from new budget talks, setting stage for next shutdown showdown)

“The president will be as involved as he and members of the Congress believe to be useful,” he said.

“Our view is that [in 2013] the House passed a budget, the Senate passed a budget; that’s how the process is supposed to work,” Carney said. “The president has already demonstrated a level of seriousness through the budget he put forward.”

“Flacks do [say] that, don’t they?” Donohue responded when The Daily Caller cited Carney’s comments.

“History is very clear, the most successful administrations… are those that get intimately involved in leading and working with the other leaders in town,” he said.

### PC key to immigration

**PC assembles a centrist coalition**

**Nicholas, 10/17/13** (Peter, Wall Street Journal, “Obama's Agenda Faces Rocky Road” <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303680404579141472200495820>)

Some Democrats, meanwhile, believe Mr. Obama must be a more active player in looming fights. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D., Calif.) said in an interview Mr. Obama "stepped back" in part because he felt "burned" by the grinding budget fights that have played out over the past three years.

"I hope that changes, because you do need presidential leadership on these" issues, she said. In "three or four months, we could be back in the same place, and we can't let ourselves be back in the same place," she said.

Mr. Obama suggested Thursday he was willing to negotiate on a range of issues, consistent with his message during the budget fight that he was prepared to bargain with lawmakers once the government was reopened and the debt ceiling raised.

Mr. Obama may find some consolation in the House vote Wednesday. In the end, 87 House Republicans voted the president's way on the debt bill. More than 17% of them hailed from districts Mr. Obama carried in 2012, suggesting a potential way forward for a president eager to **assemble a centrist coalition**.

### A2 Obama Backfires

#### People who thought Obama should previously have backed off have changed their tune – HE SHOULD DO MORE OF WHAT HE IS DOING NOW

LA TIMES 10 – 24 – 13 Obama softens tone on immigration reform [http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-obama-20131025,0,6755968.story#axzz2iqIj5Usd](http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-obama-20131025%2C0%2C6755968.story#axzz2iqIj5Usd)

Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez (D-Ill.), who asked the president in a meeting at the White House earlier this year to step back from negotiations in Congress for fear his involvement would spook Republicans, thought Obama struck the right tone Thursday.

"He didn't say, 'It's my way or the highway,'" said Gutierrez, who is involved in discussions with House Republicans on immigration proposals. Gutierrez wants Obama to step up his involvement in crafting a deal, including bringing together both sides for a face-to-face meeting.

**-2NR Cards**

**Brzezinski 12**

**US primacy solves war—multiple specific existential conflict scenarios**

**Brzezinski 12** [Zbignbiew Brzezinski, *national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter,* January/February 2012, “8 Geopolitically Endangered Species”, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8_geopolitically_endangered_species?page=full>, DMintz]

With the decline of America's global preeminence, weaker countries will be more susceptible to the assertive influence of major regional powers. India and China are rising, Russia is increasingly imperially minded, and the Middle East is growing ever more unstable. The potential for regional conflict in the absenceof an internationally active America is real. Get ready for a global reality characterized by the survival of the strongest. 1. GEORGIA American decline would leave this tiny Caucasian state vulnerable to Russian political intimidation and military aggression. The United States has provided Georgia with $3 billion in aid since 1991 -- $1 billion of that since its 2008 war with Russia. America's decline would put new limitations on U.S. capabilities, and could by itselfstir Russian desires to reclaim its old sphere of influence. What's more, once-and-future Russian President VladimirPutin harbors an intense personal hatred toward Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. At stake: Russian domination of the southern energy corridor to Europe, possibly leading to more pressure on Europe to accommodate Moscow's political agenda; a domino effect on Azerbaijan.  2. TAIWAN Since 1972, the United States has formally accepted the mainland's "one China" formula while maintaining that neither side shall alter the status quo by force. Beijing,however, reserves the right to use force, which allows Washington to justify its continued arms sales to Taiwan. In recent years, Taiwan and China have been improving their relationship. America's decline, however, would increase Taiwan's vulnerability, leaving decision-makers in Taipei more susceptible to direct Chinese pressure and the sheer attraction of an economically successful China. That, at the least, could speed upthe timetable for cross-strait reunification, but on unequal terms favoring the mainland. At stake: Risk of a serious collision with China.  3. SOUTH KOREA The United States has been the guarantor of South Korea's security since it was attacked in 1950 by North Korea, with Soviet and Chinese collusion. Seoul's remarkable economic takeoff and democratic political system testify to the success of U.S. engagement. Over the years, however, North Korea has staged a number ofprovocations against South Korea, ranging from assassinations of its cabinet members to the 2010 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan. So America's decline would confront South Korea with painful choices: either acceptChinese regional dominance and further reliance on China to rein in the nuclear-armed North, or seek a much stronger, though historically unpopular, relationship with Japan out of shared democratic values and fear of aggression from Pyongyang and Beijing. At stake: Military and economic security on the Korean Peninsula; a general crisis of confidence in Japan and South Korea regarding the reliability of existing American commitments.  4. BELARUS Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Europe's last dictatorship remains politically and economically dependent on Russia. One-third of its exports go to Russia, on which it is almost entirely reliant for its energy needs. At the same time, President Aleksandr Lukashenko's 17-year dictatorship has stood in the way of any meaningful relations with the West. Consequently, a marked American decline would give Russia a virtually risk-free opportunity to reabsorb Belarus. At stake: The security of neighboring Baltic states, especially Latvia.  5. UKRAINE Kiev's relationship with Moscow has been as prone to tension as its relationship with the West has been prone to indecision. In 2005, 2007, and 2009, Russia either threatened to or did stop oil and natural gas from flowing to Ukraine. More recently, President Viktor Yanukovych was pressured to extend Russia's lease of a naval base at the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Sevastopol for another 25 years in exchange for preferential pricing of Russian energy deliveries to Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to press Ukraine to join a "common economic space" with Russia, while gradually stripping Ukraine of direct control over its major industrial assets through mergers and takeovers by Russian firms. With America in decline, Europe would be less willing and able to reach out and incorporate Ukraine into an expanding Western community,leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to Russian designs. At stake: The renewal of Russian imperial ambitions.  6. AFGHANISTAN Devastated by nine years of brutal warfare waged by the Soviet Union, ignored by the West for a decade after the Soviet withdrawal, mismanaged by the medieval Taliban, and let down by 10 years of halfhearted U.S. military operations and sporadic economic assistance, Afghanistan is in shambles. With 40 percent unemployment and ranking 215th globally in per capita GDP, it has little economic output beyond its illegal narcotics trade. A rapid U.S. troopdisengagement brought on by war fatigue or the early effects of American decline would most likely result in internal disintegration and an external power play among nearby states for influence in Afghanistan. In the absence of an effective, stable government in Kabul, the country would be dominated by rival warlords. Pakistan and India wouldmore assertively compete for influence in Afghanistan -- with Iran also probably involved. At stake: The re-emergence of the Taliban; a proxy war between India and Pakistan; a haven for international terrorism. 7. PAKISTAN  Although Islamabad is armed with 21st-century nuclear weapons and held together by a professional late 20th-century army, the majority of Pakistan is still pre-modern, rural, and largely defined by regional and tribal identities. Conflict with India defines Pakistan's sense of national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir sustains a shared and profound antipathy.Pakistan's political instability is its greatest vulnerability, and a decline in U.S. power would reduce America's ability to aid Pakistan's consolidation and development. Pakistan could then transform into a state run by the military, a radical Islamic state, a state that combined both military and Islamic rule, or a "state" with no centralized government at all. At stake: Nuclear warlordism; a militant Islamic, anti-Western, nuclear-armed government similar to Iran's; regional instability in Central Asia, with violence potentially spreading to China, India, and Russia. 8. ISRAEL and the GREATER MIDDLE EAST America's decline would set in motion tectonic shifts undermining the political stability of the entire Middle East. All states in the region remain vulnerable to varying degrees ofinternal populist pressures, social unrest, and religious fundamentalism, as seen by the events of early 2011. If America's decline were to occur with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still unresolved, the failure to implement a mutually acceptable two-state solution would further inflame the region's political atmosphere. Regional hostility to Israel wouldthen intensify. Perceived American weakness would at some point tempt the more powerful states in the region, notablyIran or Israel, to preempt anticipated dangers. And jockeying for tactical advantage could precipitate eruptions by Hamas or Hezbollah, which could then escalate into wider and bloodier military encounters. Weak entities such as Lebanon and Palestine would pay an especially high price in civilian deaths. Even worse, such conflicts could rise to truly horrific levels through strikes and counterstrikes between Iran and Israel. At stake: Direct Israeli or U.S. confrontation with Iran; a rising tide of Islamic radicalism and extremism; a worldwide energy crisis; vulnerability of America's Persian Gulf allies.

**Zhang and Shi 11**

**Hegemony is key to prevent great power war**

**Zhang\* and Shi\*\* 11** (Both MA candidates at Columbia University. \*Yuhan, researcher @ Carnegie Endowment for international peace and \*\*Lin, consultant for the World Bank. “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry.” January 22nd, 2011) http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/

Paul Kennedy was probably right: the US will go the way of all great powers — down. The individual dramas of the past decade — the September 2001 terrorist attacks, prolonged wars in the Middle East and the financial crisis — have delivered the world a message: US primacy is in decline. This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

**Heg Good - Interventionism**

**More power means we don’t need to intervene**

**Hurrell 06**  Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford (Andrew, Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers? (p 1-19), International Affairs, Jan 24 2006)

The contrast with the United States is instructive. Much is made of the unique position of the United States and the degree to which, unlike all other modern great powers, it faced no geopolitical challenge from within its region and was able to prevent, or more accurately contain, the influence of extraregional powers. This is certainly true (even if the rise of the US to regional hegemony is often dated too  early and its extent exaggerated). But the other important regional aspect of US power is the ability to avoid excessively deep entanglement or involvement and, for the most part, to escape from ensnaring and diverting lower-level conflicts within its ‘backyard’. It has been able to take the region for granted and, for long periods, to avoid having a regional policy at all (as has arguably been the case since 2001). It is this fact that, perhaps counterintuitively, provides Brazil with some capacity to develop a relatively autonomous regional role. Second, attempts to develop a global role can easily stir the animosity, or at least raise the concerns, of regional neighbours. This has been particularly evident in the reactions of regional second-tier states to the attempt by India and Brazil to obtain permanent seats on the UN Security Council, and to Brazil’s more assertive regional policy within South America more generally, especially on the part of Argentina. Third, the dominant power in the system may take the opportunity to exploit regional conflicts to its own advantage and to engage in offshore balancing in precisely the way in which neo-realist theory would predict. A similar, but less often noted, logic applies to regional arrangements: the United States maximizes its power by promoting forms of regionalism so loosely institutionalized that they do not tie down or constrain the US but, at the same time, work to undercut or forestall the emergence of other, smaller regional groupings that could emerge as effective challengers to the US. This pattern has been visible in the cases of both the Asia-Pacific region and the Americas.

**Heg Good – Terrorism**

**Heg prevents terrorism**

**Kagan 11** (Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, January 24, “The Price of Power,” http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3) TJ

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it.