### T

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative’s advantages should stem from the implementation of a topical plan.

#### “USFG should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The Aff undermines the ability to have a limited and stable number of Affirmatives to prepare against. This is a reason to vote negative.

#### First is Decision-making

#### Increasing the abstraction of debates and undermining stasis hampers the decision-making benefits of debate

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decision-making is the most important facet of education we could take away from debate – key to success in any future role

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Next is substantive side bias

#### Surely the Aff will say the Neg can still debate them on the substance of their advocacy but not defending the clear actor and mechanism of the resolutional produces a substantive side bias.

#### Affirmatives that don’t defend the resolution make deploying other strategies against them inordinately Aff tilted. They have the ability to radically recontextualize link arguments, empathize different proscriptive claims of the 1AC while using traditional competition standards like perms to make being impossible inordinately difficult.

#### And we have an external impact to this net benefit

#### Sufficient research-based preparation and debates focused on detailed points of disagreement are crucial to transforming political culture

Gutting (professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) 13

(Gary, Feb 19, A Great Debate, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/?emc=eta1)

This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But our political “debates” seldom deserve the name. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.”

Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”).

There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique.  
Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.

Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — part of our political culture? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points?

A first condition is that the debates be focused on specific points of major disagreement. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake.

Another issue is the medium of the debate. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They should not, however, be merely extemporaneous events, where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner. We want remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses.

#### And effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving all existential problems

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### Cap

#### Their analysis of power collapses resistance to capitalism

Marsh 95

(James L., Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, Critique, Action, and Liberation p. 78-79 GAL)

Finally. Foucault's political rejection of truth does not square at all with his truth of politics. He criticizes various claims of truth because they express and contribute to strategies of power and control. On the other hand. Foucault does think that some political options are better, freer, "truer" than others. The disciplinary society is clearly not the ideal; a freer use of sexuality is clearly desirable; a more democratic, decentralized society is clearly preferable to the present regime in the West. Foucault's. as his activism in the 1960s and his work with prisoners indicates, is a leftist, postmodern politics. Yet this leftist politics seems not to have any greater legitimacy than rightist postmodern politics. Foucault gives us no reason, evidence, or argument for preferring the one to the other.

To his credit. Foucault is aware of these difficulties and tries to provide a way out by privileging the counterpower of marginalized or subjugated groups like prisoners, homosexuals, and African-Americans. Again, however, the question is. Why privilege this form of power over others? Why is such subjugation wrong? Why resist such subjugation? I agree with Foucault's preferences and sympathies here, but he gives us no adequate basis for distinguishing, as Marx, critical history, and liberation philosophy do or try to do. between illegitimate and legitimate power, domination or liberation, injustice or justice.

#### The unchecked spread of neoliberal capitalism necessitates extermination in the name of profit – ensures poverty and environmental and cultural destruction, culminating in eventual extinction.

Cole 11 [Dr. Mike Cole is Emeritus Research Professor in Education and Equality at Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln, Lincoln, UK. His most recent book is Racism and Education in the U.K. and the U.S.: towards a socialist alternative (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 RACISM AND EDUCATION IN THE U.K. AND THE U.S. Palgrave Macmillan (June 7, 2011), pgs. 180-182]

Neo-liberal capitalism, in being primarily about expanding opportunities for large multinational companies, has undermined the power of nation¬states and exacerbated the negative effects of globalization on such services as healthcare, education, water and transport (Martinez and Garcia, 2000). However, the current hegemonic role of business in schooling is para¬mount in convincing workers and future workers that socialism is off the agenda. Marxist educators and other Left radicals should expose this myth. Students have a right to discuss different economic and political systems such as twenty-first-century democratic socialism. This is particularly press¬ing given the current economic recession. It is easier in general for discussion in schools to embrace issues of gender, “race,” disability, sexual orientation, and social class when social class relates just to attainment than to address social class in the context of overthrowing capitalism, and replacing it with world democratic socialism, where participatory democracy is central. The latter may thus be seen as the last taboo, and, of course, understandably so. It is time to move forward and bring such discussions into schools, colleges, and universities, Marxist and other Left educators can make the case that such considerations are a perfectly reasonable democratic demand. Global capitalism is out of control, and **the very survival of our planet** is dependent on dialogical education that considers the socialist alternative, an alternative distanced from the distortions of Marx by Stalinism. No longer can socialism be divorced from environmental and ecologi¬cal issues. McLaren and Houston (2005, p, 167) have argued that “escalat¬ing environmental problems at all geographical scales from local to global have become a pressing reality that critical educators can no longer afford to ignore.” They go on to cite “the complicity between global profiteering, resource colonization, and the wholesale ecological devastation that has become a matter of everyday life for most species on the planet.” Following Kahn (2003), they state the need for “a critical dialogue between social and eco-justice” (McLaren and Houston 2005, p. 168). They call for a dialec¬tics of ecological and environmental justice to reveal the malign interaction between capitalism, imperialism, and ecology that has created widespread environmental degradation that has dramatically accelerated with the onset of neo-liberalism. World capitalism’s environmentally racist (Bullard et al., 2007) effects in both the “developing” and “developed” world should be discussed openly and freely in the educational institutions. As far as the “developing world” is concerned, there are, for example, such issues as the environmentally dev-astating method of extraction of natural resources utilized by multinational corporations in numerous “developing” countries that have devastated eco-systems and destroyed cultures and livelihoods (World Council of Churches, 1994, cited in Robinson, 2000), with toxic waste polluting groundwater, soil and the atmosphere (e.g., Robinson, 2000). In addition, there is trans¬boundary dumping of hazardous waste by developed countries to develop¬ing nations, usually in sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., Ibitayo et al., 2008; see also Blanco, 2010 on Latin America). As far as the “developed” world is concerned, in the U.S., for example, people of color are concentrated around hazardous waste facilities-more than half of the nine million people living within two miles of such facilities are minorities (Bullard et al., 2007). Finally, there is the ubiquitous issue of climate change, itself linked to the totally destructive impact of capitalism. Joel Kovel (2010) has described cli-mate change as “a menace without parallel in the whole history of humanity.” However, on a positive note, he argues that “[it]s spectacular and dramatic character can generate narratives capable of arousing general concern and thus provide a stimulus to build movements of resistance.” Climate change is linked to loss to the planet of living things—also a rallying point for young people. For Marxist educators, this provides a good inroad for linking envi¬ronment, global capitalism, and arguments for the socialist alternative. As Kovel (2010) puts it, only within the framework of a revolutionary ecoso- cialist society can we deal with the twinned crises of climate change and spe¬cies loss—and others as well—within a coherent program centered around the flourishing of life.” Capitalism and the destruction of the environment are **inextricably linked,** to the extent that it is becoming increasingly apparent that saving the environment is **dependent** on the destruction of capitalism. Debate should therefore include a consideration of the connections between global capital¬ism and environmental destruction, as well as a discussion of the socialist alternative. The need for environmental issues to be allied to socialism is paramount. As Nick Beams (2009) notes, all the “green” opponents of Marxism view “the overthrow of the capitalist system by means of the socialist revolution as the key to resolving the problems of global warming” as either “unrealis¬tic,” “not immediate enough,” or believe that socialism is hostile to nature. Beams (ibid.) argues that, in reality, “the system of market relations is based on the separation of the producers from the means of production, and it is this separation—-the metabolic rift between [human beings] and nature— that is the source of the crisis.” In other words, instead of the real producers of wealth (the working class) having control over what they produce and rationally assigning this to human need, goods are irrationally produced for profit. Beams (ibid.) quotes Marx (1894 [1966] p. 959) as follows: Freedom. ..can consist only in this, that socialised man, the associated pro¬ducers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature. As Beams (2009) concludes, “[f]ar from Marx being outdated, the world has, so to speak, caught up with Marx.”

#### Centering class in our analysis does not deny individuals’ experiences. Instead, beginning from the question of class as primary antagonism enables more effective struggles against race and other manifestations of oppression.

Smith 6 [Sharon Smith is also the author of Women and Socialism: Essays on Women’s Liberation (Haymarket Books, 2005). Her writings appear regularly in Socialist Worker newspaper and the ISR. Race, class, and "whiteness theory" ISR Issue 46, March–April 2006 http://isreview.org/issues/46/whiteness.shtml]

Meyerson counters this set of assumptions, proposing that Marx’s emphasis on the centrality of class relations brings oppression to the forefront, as a precondition for working-class unity: Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One, of course, is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent—a primacy which does not, as often thought, render women and people of color “secondary.” Such an equation of white male and working class, as well as a corresponding division between a “white” male working class identity and all the others, whose identity is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid, is a view this essay contests all along the way. The primacy of class means that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement: the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender and class oppression. Oppression is multiple and intersecting **but its causes are not.**18 Designating class as the primary antagonism in capitalist society bears no inference on the “importance” of racism, as Roediger claims. Marxism merely assumes a causal relationship—that white supremacy as a system was instituted by capital, to the detriment of labor as a whole. Marxist theory rests on the assumption that white workers do not benefit from a system of white supremacy. Indeed, Marx argued of slavery, the most oppressive of all systems of exploitation, “In the United States of America, every independent workers’ movement was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured part of the republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.”19 Marx was not alone in assuming that racism, by dividing the working class along ideological lines, harmed the class interests of both white and Black workers. Abolitionist Frederick Douglass stated unambiguously of slaveholders, “They divided both to conquer each.”20 Douglass elaborated, “Both are plundered and by the same plunderers. The slave is robbed by his master, of all his earnings above what is required for his physical necessities; and the white man is robbed by the slave system, because he is flung into competition with a class of laborers who work without wages.”21 Capitalism forces workers to compete with each other. The unremitting pressure from a layer of workers—be they low-wage or unemployed—is a constant reminder that workers compete for limited jobs that afford a decent standard of living. The working class has no interest in maintaining a system that thrives upon inequality and oppression. Indeed, all empirical evidence shows quite the opposite. When the racist poll tax was passed in the South, imposing property and other requirements designed to shut out Black voters, many poor whites also lost the right to vote. After Mississippi passed its poll tax law, the number of qualified white voters fell from 130,000 to 68,000.22 The effects of segregation extended well beyond the electoral arena. Jim Crow segregation empowered only the rule of capital. Whenever employers have been able to use racism to divide Black from white workers, preventing unionization, both Black and white workers earn lower wages. This is just as true in recent decades as it was 100 years ago. Indeed, as Shawki points out of the 1970s, “In a study of major metropolitan areas Michael Reich found a correlation between the degree of income inequality between whites and Blacks and the degree of income inequality between whites.”23 The study concluded: But what is most dramatic—in each of these blue-collar groups, the Southern white workers earned less than Northern Black workers. Despite the continued gross discrimination against Black skilled craftsmen in the North, the “privileged” Southern whites earned 4 percent less than they did. Southern male white operatives averaged…18 percent less than Northern Black male operatives. And Southern white service workers earned…14 percent less than Northern Black male service workers.”24 Racism against Blacks and other racially oppressed groups serves both to lower the living standards of the entire working class and to weaken workers’ ability to fight back. Whenever capitalists can threaten to replace one group of workers with another—poorly paid—group of workers, neither group benefits. Thus, the historically nonunion South has not only depressed the wages of Black workers, but also lowered the wages of Southern white workers overall—and prevented the labor movement from achieving victory at important junctures. So even in the short term the working class as a whole has nothing to gain from oppression.

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the best political strategy for addressing all manifestations of exploitation and oppression. Debates about transforming society must center on the question of what constitutes the most appropriate political avenue and method for addressing the multiplicity of ongoing struggles happening not only around us, but also those which are rendered imperceptible by the violence of neoliberalism.

McGregor 13 [Sheila McGregor Marxism and women’s oppression today International Socialism Issue: 138 Posted: 10 April 13 http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=885&issue=138]

Revolutionary socialists take part in **all struggles** against exploitation and oppression, whether they are against austerity measures, sexual violence, the impact of war, police racism or the growth of fascist organisations, attempting to unite the maximum number of forces in any given struggle. At the same time, revolutionary socialists are concerned not only with combatting the particular effects of exploitation and oppression, but also with taking the struggle forward so as to break the very chains of exploitation, which give rise to all forms of oppression. Thus involvement in struggle is both a practical question of how best to build a protest or strike and an ideological question of how to win those you are struggling alongside to an understanding that it is not enough to win over the particular struggle, but that **what is required** is a revolutionary transformation of society. When people embark on a struggle over an issue, they usually come with a mixture of ideas about the society they live in, what they are fighting for and how best to achieve their goal. **Inherent in any struggle is a debate about how to take it forward.** Struggles against sexism are no exception to this.

### Case

#### Hacktivism gets misattributed – collapses norms

Citro, Martin, and Straf 9 Constance Citro, Margaret Martin, and Miron Straf, Editors; Computer Science and Telecommunications Board); Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences (DEPS); National Research Council, “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities,” http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record\_id=12651&page=200

The discussion above should not be construed as advocating a change from today’s legal regime that strongly discourages active threat neutralization by private sector entities. Indeed, allowing self-help actions for private parties also has a variety of broader and negative ramifications for the nation’s interests writ large. For example, active threat neutralization conducted by the private sector may have negative implications for the conduct of international relations. A private party in the United States conducting an action that harms computers in Zendia is likely to be attributed to the U.S. government even if there is no such linkage, and Zendia may well seek to hold the United States government responsible. A denial by the U.S. government may even be seen as evidence of government complicity in a plausibly deniable attack. And if Zendia believes that the U.S. government is responsible for an attack on it, it—or computer-savvy citizens of Zendia—may well see fit to attack the United States directly or its interests (e.g., private sector companies). (Such complex escalation scenarios do not generally characterize the typical self-defense or defense-of-property scenarios of a company defending its building or a homeowner defending her home.)¶ In addition, active threat neutralization conducted by the private sector may also interfere with cyberattacks launched by the U.S. government. For example, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which major U.S. corporations come under cyberattack from a foreign power and the U.S. government chooses to respond in kind. Cyberattacks launched by these corporations at the same time might well interfere with the conduct of the U.S. cyberattack, might work at cross-purposes with it, and would almost certainly be indistinguishable from cyberattack actions taken by the U.S. government.¶ These issues are further complicated if the U.S. government establishes standards, mandates licensing, or otherwise provides advice that could support actions taken in defense of property (e.g., that describe what conditions must be established for when such behavior should be considered a reasonable option, or what the limits on such actions should be).¶ In the absence of mandatory standards for taking such action, actions by private parties would be governed by the party’s own view of its self-interest, and in particular would be unlikely to take into account other broader societal or national needs.20 Thus, active threat neutralization may run a higher risk of having effects that work against those broader needs or objectives. A private party’s threshold for action may also be lower (for example, it may be less tolerant of corporate espionage) than public policy might dictate. On the other hand, the explicit establishment of stated policy that allowed private parties to act in defense of property to a cyberattack could well be taken as government endorsement of such actions, even if such policy did not require them to do so. Standards established ostensibly to regulate such behavior and prevent these actions from being taken arbitrarily or solely at the discretion of the victimized party could thus have a perversely negative effect on how the U.S. government is perceived.¶ Self-help actions of multinational corporations have implications with respect to both international law and the domestic laws of all the nations in which the corporations have a physical presence (where, for example, personnel and assets may be placed at risk by actions taken elsewhere by the corporation). Although such actions have not yet produced a visible reaction from other nations (perhaps because the scale of the problems involved has not reached the necessary level), how nations and the international community will react in the future remains to be seen.

**US norms against preemptive cyberattacks reverses cyber weapons prolif**

**Goldsmith 10**

Jack Goldsmith, teaches at Harvard Law School and is on the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law. He was a member of a 2009 National Academies committee, “Can we stop the cyber arms race?” February 01, 2010, <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks>, KB)

In a speech this month on "Internet freedom," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton decried the cyberattacks that threaten U.S. economic and national security interests. "Countries or individuals that engage in cyber attacks should face consequences and international condemnation," she warned, alluding to the China-Google kerfuffle. **We should "create norms of behavior among states and encourage respect for the global networked commons."**¶ Perhaps so. But **the problem** with Clinton's call for accountability and norms on the global network -- a call frequently heard in policy discussions about cybersecurity -- **is the** enormous **array of cyberattacks originating from the United States. Until we** acknowledge these attacks and signal how we might **control them, we cannot make progress on preventing cyberattacks emanating from other countries.**¶ An important weapon in the cyberattack arsenal is a botnet, a cluster of thousands and sometimes millions of compromised computers under the ultimate remote control of a "master." Botnets were behind last summer's attack on South Korean and American government Web sites, as well as prominent attacks a few years ago on Estonian and Georgian sites. They are also engines of spam that can deliver destructive malware that enables economic espionage or theft.¶ The United States has the most, or nearly the most, infected botnet computers and is thus the country from which a good chunk of botnet attacks stem. The government could crack down on botnets, but doing so would raise the cost of software or Internet access and would be controversial. So it has not acted, and the number of dangerous botnet attacks from America grows.¶ The United States is also a leading source of "hacktivists" who use digital tools to fight oppressive regimes. Scores of individuals and groups in the United States design or employ computer payloads to attack government Web sites, computer systems and censoring tools in Iran and China. These efforts are often supported by U.S. foundations and universities, and by the federal government. Clinton boasted about this support seven paragraphs after complaining about cyberattacks.¶ Finally, the U.S. government has perhaps the world's most powerful and sophisticated offensive cyberattack capability. This capability remains highly classified. But the New York Times has reported that the Bush administration used cyberattacks on insurgent cellphones and computers in Iraq, and that it approved a plan for attacks on computers related to Iran's nuclear weapons program. And the government is surely doing much more. "We have U.S. warriors in cyberspace that are deployed overseas" and "live in adversary networks," says Bob Gourley, the former chief technology officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency.¶ These warriors are now under the command of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency. The NSA, the world's most powerful signals intelligence organization, is also in the business of breaking into and extracting data from offshore enemy computer systems and of engaging in computer attacks that, in the NSA's words, "disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy the information" found in these systems. When the Obama administration created "cyber command" last year to coordinate U.S. offensive cyber capabilities, it nominated Alexander to be in charge.¶ Simply put, the United States is in a big way doing the very things that Clinton criticized. We are not, like the Chinese, stealing intellectual property from U.S. firms or breaking into the accounts of democracy advocates. But we are aggressively using the same or similar computer techniques for ends we deem worthy.¶ Our potent offensive cyber operations matter for reasons beyond the hypocrisy inherent in undifferentiated condemnation of cyberattacks. Even if we could stop all cyberattacks from our soil, we wouldn't want to. On the private side, hacktivism can be a tool of liberation. On the public side, the best defense of critical computer systems is sometimes a good offense. "My own view is that the only way to counteract both criminal and espionage activity online is to be proactive," Alexander said last year, adding that if the Chinese were inside critical U.S. computer systems, he would "want to go and take down the source of those attacks."¶ **Our adversaries are aware of our** prodigious and **growing offensive cyber capacities and exploits.** In a survey published Thursday by the security firm McAfee, **more information technology experts from critical infrastructure firms around the world expressed concern about the United States as a source of computer network attacks than about any other country. This awareness, along with our vulnerability to cyberattacks, fuels a dangerous** public and private **cyber arms race** in an arena **where the offense already has a natural advantage.**¶ Everyone agrees on the need to curb this race by creating proper norms of network behavior. But like Clinton, U.S. cybersecurity policymakers are in the habit of thinking too much about those who attack us and too little about our attacks on others. Creating norms to curb cyberattacks is difficult enough because the attackers' identities are hard to ascertain. But **a**nother large **hurdle is the federal government's refusal to acknowledge more fully its many offensive cyber activities**, or to propose which such activities it might clamp down on in exchange for reciprocal concessions by our adversaries.

#### Norms elicit positive responses from non-state actors- allows 3rd parties to increase influence through compliance

Thomas ‘2

[Daniel C. Thomas, University of Illinois at Chicago. “Boomerangs and Superpowers: International Norms, Transnational Networks and US Foreign Policy.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 15, Number 1, 2002. ETB]

This evolution in international relations theory includes growing recognition that the **creation of** formal international **norms by state actors facilitates** (often inadvertently) **the political mobilisation of non-state actor**s.5 **By** **identifying with the** purposes of an international **norm**, **non-state actors legitimate their demands, gain access to state decision makers, and thus gain greater influence over state policy**. In some cases, **they may publicise a state’s non-compliance with its obligations under the norm in question**. In other cases, **they may pressure a state that is already in compliance to exert its in􏰝uence on non-compliant states**. **The ‘boomerang effect’ refers to situations where non-state actors apply this strategy transnationally in order to circumvent blocked domestic opportunities for pro- test**.6 International norms thus help non-state actors to create transnational networks capable of reshaping the conceptions of self-interest driving state behaviour.

#### Miscalc escalates to shooting wars

**Clarke 2009**

(Richard Clarke, special adviser to the president for cybersecurity in the George W. Bush administration and chairman of Good Harbor Consulting, November/December 2009, “War from Cyberspace,” The National Interest, <http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/Clarkecyber.pdf>)

As in the 1960s, **the speed of war is rapidly accelerating.** Then, long-range ¶ ¶ missiles could launch from the prairie of ¶ ¶ Wyoming and hit Moscow in only thirtyfive minutes. Strikes in cyber war move at ¶ ¶ a rate approaching the speed of light. And ¶ ¶ **this speed favors a strategy of preemption, which means the chances that people can become trigger-happy are high.** **This**, in ¶ ¶ turn, **makes cyber war all the more likely.** ¶ ¶ If a cyber-war commander does not attack quickly, his network may be destroyed first. **If a commander does not preempt an enemy, he may find that the target nation has suddenly raised new defenses or even disconnected from the worldwide Internet.** ¶ ¶ There seems to be a premium in cyber war ¶ ¶ to making the first move.¶ ¶ And much as in the nuclear era, **there is a real risk of escalation with cyber war.** ¶ ¶ Nuclear war was generally believed to be ¶ ¶ something that might quickly grow out of ¶ ¶ conventional combat, perhaps initiated with ¶ ¶ tanks firing at each other in a divided Berlin. The speed of new technologies created ¶ ¶ enormous risks for crisis instability and miscalculation. Today, **the risks of miscalculation are even higher, enhancing the chances that what begins as a battle of computer programs ends in a shooting war.** Cyber ¶ ¶ war, with its low risks to the cyber warriors, ¶ ¶ may be seen by a decision maker as a way ¶ ¶ of sending a signal, making a point without ¶ ¶ actually shooting. An attacker would likely ¶ ¶ think of a cyber offensive that knocked out ¶ ¶ an electric-power grid and even destroyed ¶ ¶ some of the grid’s key components (keeping ¶ ¶ the system down for weeks), as a somewhat ¶ ¶ antiseptic move; a way to keep tensions ¶ ¶ as low as possible. But **for the millions of people thrown into the dark** and perhaps ¶ ¶ the cold, unable to get food, without access ¶ ¶ to cash and dealing with social disorder, ¶ ¶ **it would be in many ways the same as if bombs had been dropped on their cities. Thus, the nation attacked might well respond with “kinetic activity.”**

#### No threat construction

Dunlap 13 Retired Deputy Judge Advocate General for the US Air Force, Executive Director, Center on Law, ¶ Ethics, and National Security, Duke University School of Law, 6/29/13, “The Intersection of Law and Ethics in Cyberwar,” http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5357&context=faculty\_scholarship

The rule mentions candor. Again, this not something simply for attorneys, but¶ is a fundamental ethical virtue for all defense professionals.50 Among other ¶ things, it is an important trait to keep in mind when assessing the potential ¶ threat that cyber represents. Misstating or, worse, deliberately ¶ misrepresenting the threat, can lead to poor allocations of resources and other ¶ errors in judgment. Opinions about the scope and nature of the threat differ ¶ widely; in a PBS Newshour interview in the spring of 2012 Terry Benzel of the 11¶ Information Research Institute insists that “all of us in [the cyber] community, ¶ we talk about cyber-Pearl Harbor. And it's not if. It's when.”51 Likewise, a ¶ “leading European cybersecurity expert says international action is needed to ¶ prevent a catastrophic cyberwar and cyberterrorism.”52¶ Not all agree, however. In April of 2012 Rear Admiral Samuel Cox, director of ¶ intelligence at the U.S. Cyber Command, was reported as having “played down ¶ the prospect that an enemy of the U.S. could disable the nation's electric power ¶ grid or shut down the Internet, saying those systems are designed to withstand ¶ severe cyberattacks.”53 More stinging is a February 2012 Wired, article in ¶ which researchers Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins debunk much of the histrionic ¶ talk about the threat of cyberwar.54 According to Brito and Watkins, “evidence ¶ to sustain such dire warnings [about cyberwar] is conspicuously absent.”55¶ Consistent with Brito and Watkins’ conclusions is a 2011 report by the ¶ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.56 While asserting ¶ that governments “need to make detailed preparations to withstand and ¶ recover from a wide range of unwanted cyber events, both accidental and ¶ deliberate,”57 the authors of that study nevertheless conclude “that very few ¶ single cyber-related events have the capacity to cause a global shock.”58¶ Writing in Foreign Policy analyst Thomas Rid contends that cyberwar is “still ¶ more hype than hazard.”59¶ All of this raises concerns because Brito and Watkins say that “[i]n many ¶ respects, rhetoric about cyber catastrophe resemble the threat inflation we saw ¶ in the run-up to the Iraq War.”60 They also point out that “[c]ybersecurity is a ¶ big and booming industry” and that “Washington teems with people who have a ¶ vested interest in conflating and inflating threats to our digital security.”61¶ Although they stop short of actually accusing anyone of pushing cyberwar fears ¶ for personal gain, they do call for a “stop” in the “apocalyptic rhetoric” and ¶ insist that “alarmist scenarios dominating policy discourse may be good for the ¶ cybersecurity-industrial complex, but they aren’t doing real security any ¶ favors.”62¶ The scope and immediacy of the threat is rightly debated, yet all might agree ¶ that, in any case, deliberately overstating (or understating) the threat, even for ¶ the well-intentioned reasons of advocacy, can raise questions of ethics and ¶ professionalism. As Brito and Watkins suggest, in considering the run-up to ¶ the war with Iraq in 2003 it is clear what can happen when a threat is ¶ misconstrued, which may be why they entitle their polemic “Cyberwar Is the ¶ New Yellowcake.” In short, candor – and tempered rhetoric if appropriate – are ¶ critical qualities for cyberwarriors. President Obama’s measured language ¶ which urges people to take the cyber threat “seriously” and to make planning ¶ for it a “priority,” represents a responsible approach that highlights the dangers ¶ without falling victim to counterproductive and misleading hyping.63

#### Hacktivists can’t get in – intrusions detected and flexible systems

Hundman 8 [Eric, Center for Defense Information Science Fellow, “Information Warfare: Relevance to Nuclear Weapons Security,” http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/InformationWarfare.pdf]

But while the economic costs of cyber-attacks are clear – on the order of $15 billion worth in 2001 28 – the danger to the actual integrity of critical infrastructure and particularly of military networks is far more uncertain. Even if hackers were able to gain control of a particular system, critical infrastructure systems often require specialized knowledge to operate; attackers will rarely have such knowledge. And even if attackers are able to gain insider help, power plants or the like are rarely left unsupervised and the intrusion would likely be detected. Essentially, even if it is possible to break in to a system, a hacker won’t necessarily know what he is seeing. Some analysts also argue that the threat is overblown because critical infrastructure systems, at least in large industrialized countries, are “more flexible and responsive in restoring service than early analysts realized.”29 According to CRS, “simulated cyber-attacks, conducted by the U.S. Naval War College in 2002, indicated that attempts to cripple the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure would be unsuccessful because system redundancy would prevent damage from becoming too widespread;” additionally, “many U.S. counterterrorism experts feel that far-reaching effects from a cyber-attack are highly unlikely.”30

#### Dual systems and consultation mean hacktivists fail

Fritz 9 [Jason, BS (St. Cloud), MIR (Bond), Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 7/7/2009, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.pdf]

In terms of detecting and analysing a potential attack, that is, distinguishing a missile attack from the launch of a satellite or a computer glitch, the US employs dual phenomenology. This means two different systems must be used to confirm an attack, such as radar and satellite. Terrorists trying to engage a launch by falsifying this data would need to determine which two systems were being used in coordination at the target location and spoof both systems. Attempting to falsify commands from the President would also be difficult. Even if the chain of command is identified, there are multiple checks and balances. For example, doctrine recommends that the President confer with senior commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the primary military advisor to the President. However, the President may choose to consult other advisors as well. Trying to identify who would be consulted in this system is difficult, and falsification may be exposed at any number of steps. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes that new systems of command and control must be survivable in the event of cyber warfare attacks. On the one hand, this shows that the US is aware of the potential danger posed by computer network operations and are taking action to prevent it. On the other hand, this shows that they themselves see computer network operations as a weakness in their system. And the US continues to research new ways to integrate computer systems into their nuclear command and control, such as IP-based communications, which they admit, “has not yet been proven to provide the high degree of assurance of rapid message transmission needed for nuclear command and control” (Critchlow 2006).

#### Equipment and expertise check.

Hundman 8 [Eric, Center for Defense Information Science Fellow, “Information Warfare: Relevance to Nuclear Weapons Security,” http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/InformationWarfare.pdf]

However, all such attacks would require specialized equipment and expertise; they would probably also require some degree of insider knowledge to be successful. VLF communications with submarines, for example, require extremely long antennas (~2.5 miles) in order to broadcast effectively. Traditionally this has been done using large land installations or trailing wires from airplanes. An attacker would need to procure such equipment in addition to securing the relevant encryption, timing, and location data for intercepts and faked signals. So far, many Pentagon networks have also probably been protected to some degree by the nature of defense procurement. The NCC system and the early warning computer systems were almost certainly developed as proprietary systems; very few people will have expertise in their specific protocols. They will therefore be very difficult to manipulate electronically without insider knowledge. Just as with CNO hacks, even if attackers were to use EW means to get inside a system, they wouldn’t necessarily be able to interpret the data they would receive, much less manipulate it.38

#### 4. No takeover – anti-tampering devices.

Slocombe 9 [The Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, Caplin & Drysdale Attorneys; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, De-Alerting: Diagnoses, Prescriptions, and Side-Effects Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context” in Yverdon, Switzerland, 21-23 June 2009, http://www.ewi.info/system/files/Slocombe.pdf]

Turning next to Custody Failure – the same requirements for external orders and information that protect against pure accidents will also provide protection against a take-over of the weapons, whether by their own crews or some outside elements. Here again, however, there is likely to be room for improvement. The early PALs systems were intended primarily to prevent a usurpation of authority by the operators. The relatively simple arrangements for blocking arming signals could, with expertise, time, and undisturbed access, be by-passed. As concern with theft by outsiders grew relative to concern at unauthorized or mistaken action by the military crews in immediate possession of the weapons, the US has developed new generation anti-tampering control devices that are designed not simply to block immediate fuzing but to render the weapon ineffective if someone without proper authority attempts to bypass the “safety.” These anti-tamper measures should be pressed forward because, in addition to dealing with accidents or misinformation, they address theft and diversion which, under current conditions are almost certainly more serious problems.

### 2NC

#### Draws in other actors and encourages Chinese/Russian hacking

The Economist 13, 8/10/13, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21583268-letting-companies-strike-back-computer-hackers-bad-idea-byte-byte

The discussion has been sparked by the rise of a new generation of hacker, either working for criminal groups or with close links to the state in places such as China. Advocates of hacking back argue that the usual digital defences are no match for these attackers. Instead, firms need to go on the offensive, using everything from spyware that monitors suspected hackers’ activities to software that retrieves or deletes pilfered property (see article). If an aerospace firm spots the blueprints for its next plane flying off its database and into the computers of a foreign rival, it should be able to give chase.¶ The concept of hacking back has some prominent supporters, notably in America. In May a private commission on intellectual-property theft, whose members include Jon Huntsman, a former ambassador to China, and Dennis Blair, a former director of national intelligence, gave its support to technology that helps firms track stolen files and then reclaim them or prevent their use without damaging other networks. Another idea, floated more recently, is for governments to license private firms to hunt down and deal with hackers on businesses’ behalf. But encouraging digital vigilantes will only make the mayhem worse.¶ Hackers like to cover their tracks by routing attacks through other people’s computers, without the owners’ knowledge. That raises the alarming prospect of collateral damage to an innocent bystander’s systems: imagine the possible consequences if the unwitting host of a battle between hackers and counter-hackers were a hospital’s computer.¶ Endorsing the idea of hacking back would also undermine current diplomatic efforts to get China and Russia to rein in their hordes of unofficial hackers. America has been a cheerleader for an international convention on cyber-crime that prohibits private actors from striking out online. Letting American companies, or their hired guns, retaliate against hackers would undermine that effort.

### Impact – Cyberwar

Vatis 12 Michael, served as the founding director of the National Infrastructure Protection Center at the FBI, the government’s first organization dedicated to detecting and investigating cyberattacks. He also served as Associate Deputy Attorney General in the Department of Justice and Special Counsel at the Department of Defense, and was the first Director of the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth and the founding Chairman of the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P). Michael was a law clerk to Thurgood Marshall on the US Supreme Court and Ruth Bader Ginsburg when she was a judge on the DC Circuit. At Steptoe, Michael provides counsel on privacy, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, intelligence, and e-commerce issues, 6/22, http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/06/22/taking-the-offense-to-defend-networks-another-perspective/

It’s not just that innocent bystanders get hurt. There are serious national security implications, too. Say, for example, an American company is losing terabytes of highly valuable technical data to a hacker that is exfiltrating the data remotely. The company traces the source back to a research institute in China. It’s pretty confident it has the goods on ‘em. So it launches a counter-attack on the bad guys. Well, it turns out that research institute is a wing of the People’s Liberation Army. And when the PLA traces the attack to the United States, all it can see is that the attack is coming from the US. What would the PLA do then? At the very least, you have a serious international incident. At worst, you could have the start of a tit-for-tat campaign of cyberattacks that could escalate into an actual cyberwar. And if that’s not bad enough, suppose that Chinese research institute actually had nothing to do with the attacks on the American company. Instead, it was the \_\_\_\_\_\_ [take your pick: Russians, Iranians, Syrians…..]. Now you’ve really got a problem.

**That causes nuclear miscalc due to hair-trigger response**

**Clark and Andreasen 13**

(Richard A. Clarke, the chairman of Good Harbor Security Risk Management, was special adviser to the president for cybersecurity in the George W. Bush administration. Steve Andreasen, a consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, was the National Security Council’s staff director for defense policy and arms control from 1993 to 2001, “Cyberwar’s threat does not justify a new policy of nuclear deterrence” June 14, 2013, <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-14/opinions/39977598_1_nuclear-weapons-cyber-attack-cyberattacks>, KB)

President Obama is expected to unveil a new nuclear policy initiative this week in Berlin. Whether he can make good on his first-term commitments to end outdated Cold War nuclear policies may depend on a firm presidential directive to the Pentagon rejecting any new missions for nuclear weapons — in particular, their use in response to cyberattacks.¶ The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board concluded this year that **China and Russia could develop capabilities to launch an “existential cyber attack” against the United States** — that is, **an attack causing sufficient damage that our government would lose control of the country.** “**While the manifestation of a nuclear and cyber attack are** very **different**,” the board concluded, “in the end, **the existential impact to the United States is the same.”**¶ Because it will be impossible to fully defend our systems against existential cyberthreats, the board argued, the United States must be prepared to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter cyberattacks. In other words: I’ll see your cyberwar and raise you a nuclear response.¶ Some would argue that Obama made clear in his 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviewthat the United States has adopted the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attacks the “sole purpose” of our nuclear weapons. Well, the board effectively reviewed the fine print and concluded that the Nuclear Posture Review was “essentially silent” on the relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons and cyberthreats, so connecting the two “is not precluded in the stated policy.”¶ As the board noted, cyberattacks can occur very quickly and without warning, requiring rapid decision-making by those responsible for protecting our country. **Integrating the nuclear threat into the equation means making clear to any potential adversary that the United States is prepared to use nuc**lear weapon**s very early in response to a major cyberattack — and is maintaining nuclear forces on “prompt launch” status to do so.**¶ **Russia and China would** certainly take note — and presumably **follow suit**. Moreover, **if the United States, Russia and China adopted policies threatening an early nuclear response to cyber­attacks, more countries would surely take the same approach.**¶ It’s hard to see how this cyber-nuclear action-reaction dynamic would improve U.S. or global security. It’s more likely to lead to a new focus by Pentagon planners on generating an expanding list of cyber-related targets and the operational deployment of nuclear forces to strike those targets in minutes.¶ Against that backdrop, maintaining momentum toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’ national security strategy (and that of other nations) — a general policy course pursued by the past five presidents — would become far more difficult. **Further reductions in nuclear forces and changes in “hair-trigger” postures, designed to lessen the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch, would** also probably **stall**.¶ Fortunately, Obama has both the authority and the opportunity to make clear that he meant what he said when he laid out his nuclear policy in Prague in 2009. For decades, presidential decision directives have made clear the purpose of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and provided broad guidance for military planners who prepare the operations and targeting plans for our nuclear forces. An update to existing presidential guidance is one of the homework items tasked by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.¶ Cyberthreats are very real, and **there is** much we ne**ed to do to defend our military and critical civilian infrastructure against** what former defense secretary Leon E. Panetta referred to as **a “cyber Pearl Harbor”** — including enhancing the ability to take action, when directed by the president, against those who would attack us. We also need more diplomacy such as that practiced by Obama with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, at their recent summit. Multinational cooperation centers could ultimately lead to shared approaches to cybersecurity, including agreements related to limiting cyberwar.

#### Escalation is rapid and global

VOA News ‘12

<http://blogs.voanews.com/digital-frontiers/2012/03/20/the-coming-cyberwar-with-iran/> ETB

That said, the battles might actually begin small. Think online skirmishes between angry bands of nationalist hackers, busting into systems and defacing websites, but doing no serious long-term damage. Or perhaps, says Matthew Aid, should Israel decide to strike Iranian targets, it might begin with online operations to knock out crucial defense systems, “…like the artillery barrage before the cavalry goes up the hill.” That, cautions professor Sean Lawson, would probably elicit a response from Iran, and soon after from allies like Hezbollah, Syria and possibly even North Korea. And if that were to happen, hacker havens like Russia, China and those in Europe and North America might soon join the fray. One genuine danger of cyberwar, says Lawson, is how quickly it could spread around the globe.

Social movements revolving around specific local sites within the structure of capital, like race, gender or sexuality only attempt to create more space *within* capitalism—they signal abandonment of the totalizing goal of transforming capitalism.

Young 2006 (Robert, Red Critique, Winter/Spring, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>)

Gilroy endorses the new social movements precisely because "the new movements are not primarily oriented towards instrumental objectives, such as the conquest of political power or state apparatuses" (226). Instead, the new social movements desire autonomy within the existing system (226) and therefore foreground the "sphere of autonomous self-realization" (233). In other words, they do not want to change an exploitative system, they merely want a little more (discursive) freedom within it, and this (reformist) project signals agency for Gilroy. For Gilroy, the new social movements represent agency, and in this regard, they replace the proletariat—the historic vehicle for social transformation—but their agency, to repeat, is directed toward reforming specific local sites, such as race or gender, within the existing system. In short, they have abandoned the goal of transforming existing capitalism—a totalizing system which connects seemingly disparate elements of the social through the logic of exploitation—for a new goal: creating more humane spaces for new movements within capitalism.

So, then, what is so new in the new social movements? It is certainly very "old" in the way it rehabilitates liberal notions of the autonomous subject. Its newness is a sign of the contemporary crisis-ridden conjuncture in capitalist social relations. This crisis of capital and the ensuing rupture in its ideological narrative provides the historical condition for articulating resistance along the axes of race, class, gender, ecology, etc. Even though resistance may take place in very specific domains, such as race, gender, ecological, or sexuality, among others, this does not mean that the crisis is local. It simply indexes how capitalist exploitation brings every social sphere under its totalizing logic. However, rather then point up the systematicity of the crisis, the theorists of the new social movements turn to the local, as if it is unrelated to questions of globality.

With Gilroy and the new social movements, we are returned, once again, to the local and the experiential sets the limits of understanding. Gilroy asserts that people "unable to control the social relations in which they find themselves…have shrunk the world to the size of their communities and begun to act politically on that basis" (245). If this is true, then Gilroy, at the level of theory, mirrors this as he "shrinks" his theory to the dictates of crude empiricism. Rather than opening the possibility of collective control over social relations, which points in an emancipatory direction, Gilroy brackets the question of "social relation" and consequently, he limits politics to the cultural (re)negotiations of identity.

**Micropower and the reduction of all politics to discursive interprellation prevents any radical formulations of resistance**

**Feldner and Vighi 7** ( *Zizek, Beyond Foucault* Fabio Vighi & Heiko Feldner 2007 Probably qualled?)

Let us now move on to Zizek’s criticism of the second standard approach to ideology within contemporary critical theory, i.e. discourse analysis. With Zizek’s understanding of discourse analysis the Habermasian ‘Enlightenment critique of ideology’ is turned on its head, as the focus shifts on the invasive presence of discourse: instead of ideology falsifying reality for the sake of pathological interests (power strategies), **we start from the assumption that there is no way to access and conceptualise reality which is not already stained by discourse. The term ideology thus becomes redundant, Zizek argues, for what counts in critical analysis is that every ideological stance we assume is always-already parasitised by an intricate network of discursive devices whose function is to structure our point of view in advance, silently bestowing an appearance of necessity upon it. As with traditional ideology critique,** Zizek duly acknowledges the diagnostic value of discourse analysis with its emphasis on how every ideological position emerges as the result of a complex interaction of discursive procedures. Ernesto Laclau, one of Zizek’s regular interlocutors, is a perfect case in point here, since his claim that the veil of ideology conceals a relentless fight for hegemonic space, which articulates itself through a series of discursive appropriations, represents perhaps the most intriguing application of ideology–*critical* discourse analysis today**. Zizek’s main concern with discourse, however, relates to the classic Foucauldian notion that the discursive battle for hegemonic space functions as a somewhat spontaneous event, that is to say, as an occurrence which is disengaged from the top-downward logic of ideological pressure: as Foucault himself repeatedly claimed, power operates first and foremost at the level of micro-power**, i.e. through a plurality of discursive mechanisms that constitute themselves from below. **Zizek is far from convinced by what he calls Foucault’s ‘suspect rhetoric of complexity’, to the extent that he eventually discards it as ‘a clear case of patching up, since one can never arrive at Power this way – the abyss that separates micro-procedures from the spectre of Power remains unbridgeable’** (Zizek, 1994b, 13). **Along with its dubious emphasis on the political significance of micro-procedures, Foucauldian discourse analysis, according to Zizek, is most importantly liable for doing away with any conceptualisation of radical externality**, as we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4. **In discourse analysis one always starts from the presupposition that it is impossible ‘to draw a clear line of demarcation between ideology and actual reality’, which in turn prompts the conclusion that ‘the only non-ideological position is to renounce the very notion of extra-ideological reality and accept that all we are dealing with are symbolic fictions, the plurality of discursive universes, never “reality”’. In Zizek’s view, this boils down to nothing but a ‘*slick “postmodern” solution*’ (Zizek, 1994b, 17), a stratagem which, in fact, ends up favouring the proliferation of ideology**. Thus, key to his critique is the question of externality: while the traditional positing of a conceptually viable space outside ideology is delusive, **the negation of externality *tout court* is also defective, for it thwarts the articulation of radical political projects. Moving beyond traditional critical theory (where ideology deforms ‘true’ reality) and discourse analysis (where ideology is turned into an all-encompassing discursive practice), Zizek identifies a third model, whereby a place outside ideology is possible, but ‘*it cannot be occupied by any positively determined reality*’ (Zizek, 1994b, 17). What is situated beyond the ideological can never be retrieved as a rational paradigm, *and for this very reason (because it relates to a non-discursive core) it is ideology at its purest*.** Again, we ought to insist on a fundamental point here, which we shall develop in full in the following chapters. The excess of ideology is not conceived by Zizek as a meta-narrative, or a transepochal unchangeable feature (as many of his detractors, amongst which for example Judith Butler, often complain). Rather, **what he emphasises against traditional historicism is that all historical/societal concretions are answers to the same formal deadlock or impossibility, which however manifests itself through different contents, thus requiring different strategic interventions. If every society is sustained by a secret reference to some excessive element, this element is historically determined and necessarily mobilises radically heteronomous logics.** As previously anticipated, **Zizek often describes the Althusserian logic of ideological interpellation via a reference to the superego and its covert injunction to enjoy, insofar as the superego’s policing role hinges on its shadowy double, a surplus of secret, disavowed or illicit enjoyment. Every prohibition, in other words, is sustained by a secret investment in *jouissance*. This stance proves vitally significant for a drastic reconfiguration of the political scope of subjectivity, for it generates the argument that the subject’s full ideological potential is paradoxically realised in *jouissance*, in a senseless and unconditional injunction to enjoy. Consequently, since ideological interpellation ‘is operative only in so far as it is not openly admitted’ (Zizek, 2000a, 266), the best way to undermine its grip would be to assume its repressed libidinal core: if ideology functions ‘by proxy’, i.e. through its excessive and disavowed kernel, the subject’s only chance to challenge the ubiquitous grip of ideology is via identification with this explosive kernel. This consideration brings us directly to the crucial notion of ‘the act’** and, with it, to a reflection on the question of agency; both these questions shall be developed fully in Part II.

Regardless of alternative solvency, you have an ethical obligation to attempt to transcend capitalism-- utopian thinking is key to the value of life

Marsh 95

(James L., Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, Critique, Action, and Liberation p. 331-336 GAL)

However, such a conception of reason is highly questionable. Reason, as I have argued elsewhere and in this book, is dialectical and phenomenological. uniting within itself fact and possibility', "is" and "ought." subject and object. Reason is constitutive, not simply acquisitive or instrumental, and as such constitutes goals and values and reflectively chooses itself as an end in itself in a community' of ends. Reason is relational, communal, processive. on the move from lower viewpoints to higher viewpoints and in this sense related creatively to a world developing through a process of emergent probability According to the conception of reason, one attempting to fix human possibility' by saying "this far and no further" is inhibiting human development and is profoundly irrational. -

Moreover, through a dialectical phenomenological critique made earlier in this book we have discovered late capitalism and state socialism to be profoundly irrational systemically and morally. They are irrational systemically insofar as both systems are susceptible to various kinds of crises, economic, rational, legitimating, or motivational, and both systems systematically repress democratic participation. Both systems exercise a domination, economic or political, that inhibits the free, rational unfolding of human potentiality' in all of its fullness. In both systems is a tendency to ignore or repress the subjectivity of human beings and turn them into objects; in both systems is domination of nature and a resulting ecology problem. In such a context, it would be profoundly irrational not to try to think of alternatives to the status quo. In the face of systemic domination, fidelity' to the life of reason calls on reason to become revolutionary in its approach to the world. A merely bourgeois or Stalinist rationality' is an incomplete, truncated rationality'.-

Moreover, if our model of a dynamic, processive. developing world system on the move is correct, then such qualitative shifts from one epoch to another should have occurred in the past. One can imagine the Novaks or Kissingers or Friedmans of this world arguing in past centuries that political monarchy is the best human beings can do or that racism is inevitable or that a feudal relationship of lord to serf is the ultimate and best fate of human beings. Yet history has moved on. and there is no reason to think that such movement has stopped with capitalism or state socialism. The irrational, oppressive character of these structures indicates that we should move on; the processive character of human beings in the world indicates that we can move on. Recent events in eastern Europe only confirm such a judgment.

Positivism and scientism in our context, then, simply become ideologies confining the human mind and imagination to certain historical forms that happen to favor certain dominating classes or bureaucratic elites. Scientism and positivism are not simply crude intellectual errors, although they are certainly that, but are economic and political expressions of domination. Capitalism and state socialism, we might say. are lived, practical positivism and scientism that express, reinforce, and legitimate domination. Because they present themselves as the only forms of reason, men and women are tempted and invited to abandon their own reflection and choosing and hand their economic, political, and social lives over to some expert or group of experts. Because science and technology are not only dominant productive forces but also ideologies, they suppress symbolic interaction in favor of purposive-rational action, constitutive reason in favor of instrumental reason, participation in favor of domination.2

The basic question concerning the possibility of socialism, then, is the rationality of Utopian thinking. If scientism and positivism or some of their offshoots such as the postmodern pragmatism of Rorty exhaust the definition of reason, then Utopian thinking is irrational and the human mind must confine itself to the straight jacket of empirical fact. If. on the other hand, my dialectical phenomenological definition of reason is correct, then the thinking of Utopia is not only legitimate but necessary. Reflection and <CONTINUED>

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freedom and praxis are *essentially* Utopian in their full, unfolding life. Denial of Utopia mutilates freedom and reason.-

We can appreciate this point more deeply by focusing phenomenologically on my experience of myself as an incarnate subject in the world. First of all. questioning is essential to the life of reason, and any questioning points beyond the data to a future answer arrived at in a future insight and judgment. A scientist hit on the head by an apple asks questions that point toward a future answer. Any question negates the given set of facts and anticipates a new future.

Next, on the level of insight and conceptualization we arrive at a universal that is not exhausted by any particular manifestation or instance. "Triangle" is not exhausted by this particular triangular thing, "justice" by this particular example of justice, "beauty" by this particular painting. Moreover, no particular, sensible incarnation matches the perfection of the ideal. These instances of "triangle." "justice." "beauty." respectively, are not perfect; they have cracks, blemishes, and impurities.-

Further. on a reflective, ethical level I constitute through reflection and choice myself as an end in a community of ends. This ethical norm has the same inexhaustibility and perfection as any universal, but in addition is the ethical obligation to realize the ideal. If. therefore. I am essentially and eidetically an experiencing, understanding, judging, and choosing subject and the current social situation is irrational and unjust in not respecting that reality. I have three choices. I can capitulate to the situation and in so doing reduce or renounce my humanity', or I can live a double life in thinking Utopian thoughts and pursuing a nonutopian life, or I can pursue the Utopia of a full economic, social, and political democracy that is worthy of such a rational, free subject and incarnates in its institutions full respect for such a subject. Only the last option is fully consistent with the life of incarnate reason and freedom.

Finally, we may affirm a threefold exteriority' to the irrational, exploitative capitalist system: exteriority' as past, present, and future. Exteriority' as past is the laborer initially confronting capital as deprived of means of production, land, and means of consumption; as present exteriority' is labor confronting capital as nothing, poor, more and more deprived of skill, surplus value, and even of employment; and as future exteriority is the Utopia of liberation that is suggested by. demanded by. and called for by the alienated present. Such Utopia as norm and goal calls into question our alienated bourgeois present.

"Exteriority" or "the other" in this book has at least five moments or stages of articulation: as phenomenologically described, as ethically evaluated, as hermeneutically interpreted, as critically judged, and as anticipated in an Utopian manner. Our affirmation of "utopia" as essential and implied by "rationality" in the full sense just completes and fills out our affirmation of exteriority as linked to rationality. A rationality and freedom and ethics and hermeneutics and critique and praxis not open to exteriority' are incomplete, truncated, mutilated. Exteriority' is the positive ground enabling us to go fully beyond a merely negative dialectic. -

We affirm, then, the ethical necessity' of pursuing ethical community' and democratic socialism as the rational embodiment of that vision. Here it is important to be clear about the difference between acquisitive, empirical reason and constitutive, ethical reason. Ethical community' as utopia is not primarily something I stand back and predict objectively and scientifically; it is something to which I commit myself ethically and politically.

An example from the sphere of personal morality' should make the difference clear. When a friend relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed, it may seem unlikely, given this particular person's past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over our capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is *correct,* we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations. I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but I remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death.

Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community. If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality'. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty' years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinions of experts, have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War. for example, millions of people in the United States taking to the streets in protest proved the "best and the brightest" in the White House. Pentagon, and State Department wrong. The "best and the brightest" according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist.12<CONTINUED>

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To think in a Utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their own proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental. Indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial. What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet's "To be or not to be" speech? What does an empirical study of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx's Capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso's Guernica ?

To the extent, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason but the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factual, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality' most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it. mirroring it. and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted, topsy-turvy world, fidelity' to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality' is profoundly irrational.

A rationality; however, that confines itself to understanding the facts and accepting the facts as normal cannot pierce the veil. Indeed, piercing the veil becomes irrational according to such a definition of reason. Because such a positivistic definition of reason excludes ahead of time any critical reflection on the overall social context as possibly irrational, such a definition is ideological. legitimating and preserving a repressive status quo whose interest lies in not having the veil pierced.

Holloway 5 (John, teacher at the Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences at the [Autonomous University of Puebla](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_University_of_Puebla), “Can we change the world without taking power?” Znet, August 16, <http://www.zcommunications.org/can-we-change-the-world-without-taking-power-by-john-holloway> Accessed 7/13/11)

I don’t know the answer. Perhaps we can change the world without taking power. Perhaps we cannot. The starting point—for all of us, I think—is uncertainty, not knowing, a common search for a way forward. Because it becomes more and more clear that capitalism is a catastrophe for humanity. A radical change in the organisation of society, that is, revolution, is more urgent than ever. And this revolution can only be world revolution if it is to be effective.

But it is unlikely that world revolution can be achieved in one single blow. This means that the only way in which we can conceive of revolution is as interstitial revolution, as a revolution that takes place in the interstices of capitalism, a revolution that occupies spaces in the world while capitalism still exists. The question is how we conceive of these interstices, whether we think of them as states or in other ways.

In thinking about this, we have to start from where we are, from the many rebellions and insubordinations that have brought us to Porto Alegre. The world is full of such rebellions, of people saying NO to capitalism: NO, we shall not live our lives according to the dictates of capitalism, we shall do what we consider necessary or desirable and not what capital tells us to do. Sometimes we just see capitalism as an all-encompassing system of domination and forget that such rebellions exist everywhere. At times they are so small that even those involved do not perceive them as refusals, but often they are collective projects searching for an alternative way forward and sometimes they are as big as the Lacandon Jungle or the Argentinazo of three years ago or the revolt in Bolivia just over a year ago. All of these insubordinations are characterised by a drive towards self-determination, an impulse that says, ‘No, you will not tell us what to do, we shall decide for ourselves what we must do.’

These refusals can be seen as fissures, as cracks in the system of capitalist domination. Capitalism is not (in the first place) an economic system, but a system of command. Capitalists, through money, command us, telling us what to do. To refuse to obey is to break the command of capital. The question for us, then, is how do we multiply and expand these refusals, these cracks in the texture of domination?

There are two ways of thinking about this.

The first says that these movements, these many insubordinations, lack maturity and effectiveness unless they are focused, unless they are channelled towards a goal. For them to be effective, they must be channelled towards the conquest of state power—either through elections or through the overthrowing of the existing state and the establishment of a new, revolutionary state. The organisational form for channelling all these insubordinations towards that aim is the party.

The question of taking state power is not so much a question of future intentions as of present organisation. How should we organise ourselves in the present? Should we join a party, an organisational form that focuses our discontent on the winning of state power? Or should we organise in some other way?

The second way of thinking about the expansion and multiplication of insubordinations is to say, ‘No, they fshould not be all harnessed together in the form of a party, they should flourish freely, go whatever way the struggle takes them.’ This does not mean that there should be no coordination, but it should be a much looser coordination. Above all, the principal point of reference is not the state but the society that we want to create.

The principal argument against the first conception is that it leads us in the wrong direction. The state is not a thing, it is not a neutral object: it is a form of social relations, a form of organisation, a way of doing things which has been developed over several centuries for the purpose of maintaining or developing the rule of capital. If we focus our struggles on the state, or if we take the state as our principal point of reference, we have to understand that the state pulls us in a certain direction. Above all, it seeks to impose upon us a separation of our struggles from society, to convert our struggle into a struggle on behalf of, in the name of. It separates leaders from the<CONTINUED>

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masses, the representatives from the represented; it draws us into a different way of talking, a different way of thinking. It pulls us into a process of reconciliation with reality, and that reality is the reality of capitalism, a form of social organisation that is based on exploitation and injustice, on killing and destruction. It also draws us into a spatial definition of how we do things, a spatial definition which makes a clear distinction between the state’s territory and the world outside, and a clear distinction between citizens and foreigners. It draws us into a spatial definition of struggle that has no hope of matching the global movement of capital.

There is one key concept in the history of the state-centred left, and that concept is betrayal. Time and time again the leaders have betrayed the movement, and not necessarily because they are bad people, but just because the state as a form of organisation separates the leaders from the movement and draws them into a process of reconciliation with capital. Betrayal is already given in the state as an organisational form.

Can we resist this? Yes, of course we can, and it is something that happens all the time. We can refuse to let the state identify leaders or permanent representatives of the movement, we can refuse to let delegates negotiate in secret with the representatives of the state. But this means understanding that our forms of organisation are very different from those of the state, that there is no symmetry between them. The state is an organisation on behalf of, what we want is the organisation of self-determination, a form of organisation that allows us to articulate what we want, what we decide, what we consider necessary or desirable. What we want, in other words, is a form of organisation that does not have the state as its principal point of reference.

The argument against taking the state as the principal point of reference is clear, but what of the other concept? The state-oriented argument can be seen as a pivoted conception of the development of struggle. Struggle is conceived as having a central pivot, the taking of state power. First we concentrate all our efforts on winning the state, we organise for that, then, once we have achieved that, we can think of other forms of organisation, we can think of revolutionising society. First we move in one direction, in order to be able to move in another: the problem is that the dynamic acquired during the first phase is difficult or impossible to dismantle in the second phase.

The other concept focuses directly on the sort of society we want to create, without passing through the state. There is no pivot: organisation is directly prefigurative, directly linked to the social relations we want to create. Where the first concept sees the radical transformation of society as taking place after the seizure of power, the second insists that it must begin now. Revolution not when the time is right but revolution here and now.

1. Gibson-Graham’s discursive focus is epistemologically flawed and dooms their movement to failure

Poitevin 1 (Rene, sociology@NYU, Socialist Reivew, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3952/is_200101/ai_n8932891/?tag=mantle_skin;content>, accessed: 30 June 2011, JT)

A third feature of J.K. Gibson-Graham's work, in particular, and of the whole radical democracy tradition, in general, is its post-structuralist extremism.26 For postmodern Marxists it is not enough to point out that, as both Foucault and Habermas argue, we inhabit an intellectual regime characterized by a paradigm shift from the "philosophy of consciousness" to the "philosophy of language."27 Nor is it good enough for postmodern/post-Marxists to recognize the pitfalls embedded in Hegelian epistemology and argue instead, as Spivak does, for strategic-- uses-of-essentialism as a corrective to the excesses of teleological thinking and fixed notions of class.28 No way. As far as postmodern Marxism is concerned, the only way to compensate for constructions of capitalism that are too totalizing is through the unconditional surrender of the Marxist project. As J.K. Gibson-Graham themselves make clear, "to even conceive of 'capitalism' as 'capitalisms' is still taking 'capitalism' for granted."29 And to try to redistribute the heavy theoretical and political burden placed upon the proletariat by reconfiguring political agency through "race-class-gender," as opposed to just class, is still a futile endeavor: essentialism is still essentialism whether one essentializes around one or three categories. This strand of post-structuralism, one that once again, can be directly traced back to Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,30 is predicated on the faulty epistemological premise that what really matters is "discourse." As Laclau and Mouffe clarify, "our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and nondiscursive practices. It offirms that every object is constituted as an object of discourse."31 The problem with this approach is that once we enter this world of epistemological foundationalism predicated on the claim that there is "nothing but discourse," we enter a world of relativism in which all we can do is "create discursive fixings," as J.K. Gibson-Graham themselves prescribe, that will guarantee that "any particular analysis will never find the ultimate cause of events."32 It is this ideological postmodern insistence on reducing all of social reality to discourse that ultimately overloads its theoretical apparatus and causes it to buckle beneath them. The Amherst School's "provisional ontology" is incapable of escaping the performative trap of trying to get rid of essentialism by essentializing all of reality as "discursive." The postmodern Marxist approach to ontology boils down to substituting in political practice every occurrence of "continuity" with "discontinuity" as a way to get rid of essentialism and macro-narratives. Even Foucault, the great master of discontinuity, distances himself from such mirror-reversal solutions when theorizing the limits of discourse and accounting for the "divergence, the distances, the oppositions, the differences" that constitute the episteme of a period.33

### 2NC A2: State Evil

#### When you read their ev, raise it to the threshold of whether its SO BAD it cannot be debated about, whether it’s a priori evil. If their cards don’t make that claim then it’s a reason why we should still have discussion.

#### The consequences of corporate exploitation or state implications on natives proves that debating about the state in relation to natives is good. We don’t have to win that the state is good, we just have to win whether debating ABOUT that sort of thing is good.

#### Bullard ev indicates government policies can be good – they need to be engaged at SOME POINT in the political process in order to actually effect change

#### The plan devolves into dogmatism which turns the case – need to defend bad things sometimes

Doyle 11

(Mike, In Defense of Neoliberalism, Ideas and Reflections by the MPhil Development Studies Students

http://cambridgedevelopmentstudies.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/in-defense-of-neoliberalism-part-i/)

We have all spent the past sixth months learning about how bad neo-liberalism is. Unfortunately, we have heard comparatively little from the other side. If neo-liberalism is to stand trial, it deserves a good defense as well as a good prosecution. This is why I have attempted to issue a defense of neoliberalism. What you are about to read are not necessarily my views. However, I think it is important to describe the thinking of the neoliberalism since we have, in my opinion, received very little of it in our course. Before I begin however, I want to state a few reasons why reading an article like this is important even if you have already made up your mind on this issue. Perhaps neoliberalism’s greatest failing is that it has developed an ossifying ideology that no longer heeds the advice of people outside its political and academic circle. This has stifled critical debate and broad based thinking causing neoliberals and their institutions to fall into groupthink. Unfortunately, I believe our course, with **its lack neoliberal counter criticisms**, is falling into the same trap. I fundamentally believe that very smart people can make themselves very stupid by failing to consider views outside their already established ideology. Regrettably, this happens far too often because ideologies are very tempting to adopt. It is very uncomfortable to honestly assess contrary views and come to the conclusion that what you thought you knew was wrong. Moreover, becoming part of a political or intellectual “team” is very reassuring. It isn’t often recognized that learning and scholarship are social activities, but they very much are. It feels good to associate with people, publications, and organizations that think as you do. It is equally difficult to reject these associations when you change your views. Just as leaving your job, your hometown, or a club comes with social costs, so can changing your ideological beliefs. While you won’t be cast into the streets by your free-market friends because you became a socialist, the social bonds that used to connect you to your old buddies can become frayed. Another reason why adopting an ideology proves tempting is because it makes thinking much easier. Without such intellectual rubrics, it becomes much harder to take a stance on an issue or formulate propositions. Without an ideology, we find ourselves in a nebulous space always questioning facts and suppositions and unable to come to any clear conclusions. The constant feeling of “I don’t know” plagues us. To be sure, this is not a bad place to be, intellectually speaking, but it certainly isn’t comfortable. It feels much better when we “know” the right answer and are able to ascertain the “true” facts. This is probably why so many smart people have caved in to ideologies over the years even though ideology has long been known to stifle thinking and lead to poor decision-making. This is also the reason why you should endeavor to consider the other side’s view, irritating as it may be.

### 1NR

Resolved is legislative

AOS 4, Army Officer School, 5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### Violation – the word “we” in the advocacy statement means the affirmative team is the actor

American Heritage Dictionary 2k, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/we

we (w)¶ pron.¶ 1. Used by the speaker or writer to indicate the speaker or writer along with another or others as the subject: We made it to the lecture hall on time. We are planning a trip to Arizona this winter.

#### Limits are key to their movement – we can’t know the rightness or wrongness of their idea unless we have access to literature on both sides. This undermines support for their advocacy

Underwood, Prof of Communication Studies, 2k1(Psychology of Communication,

http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/cshtml/psy/hovland3.html)

Whether or not you should include arguments for and against your case depends very much on your audience.If you know that they already agree with you, a one-sided argument is quite acceptable. If they areopposed to your point of view, then a one-sided message will actually be less effective, being dismissed as biased. Even if your audience don't know much about the subject, but do know that there are counterarguments (even if they don't know what they are) will lead them to reject your views as biased.Hovland'sinvestigations into mass propaganda used to change soldiers' attitudes also suggests that the intelligence of thereceivers is an important factor, a two-sided argument tending to be more persuasive with the more intelligent audience.