# Politics

1NC Debt Ceiling DA

#### Obama’s pressuring the GOP by staying on the debt message – the GOP will blink.

Dovere 10/1 [Edward, Politico, “Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line”

http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3]

President Barack Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no. For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk. “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend. “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

#### Going off message undermines Obama’s constant pressure on the GOP.

Milbank 9/27 [Dana, Washington Post, “Obama should pivot to Dubya’s playbook” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-obama-should-try-pivoting-to-george-bushs-playbook/2013/09/27/c72469f0-278a-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9\_story.html]

If President Obama can stick to his guns, he will win his October standoff with Republicans. That’s an awfully big “if.” This president has been consistently inconsistent, predictably unpredictable and reliably erratic. Consider the events of Thursday morning: Obama gave a rousing speech in suburban Washington, in defense of Obamacare, on the eve of its implementation. “We’re now only five days away from finishing the job,” he told the crowd. But before he had even left the room, his administration let slip that it was delaying by a month the sign-up for the health-care exchanges for small businesses. It wasn’t a huge deal, but it was enough to trample on the message the president had just delivered. Throughout his presidency, Obama has had great difficulty delivering a consistent message. Supporters plead for him to take a position — any position — and stick with it. His shifting policy on confronting Syria was the most prominent of his vacillations, but his allies have seen a similar approach to the Guantanamo Bay prison, counterterrorism and climate change. Even on issues such as gun control and immigration where his views have been consistent, Obama has been inconsistent in promoting his message. Allies are reluctant to take risky stands, because they fear that Obama will change his mind and leave them standing alone. Now come the budget showdowns, which could define the rest of his presidency. Republican leaders are trying to shift the party’s emphasis from the fight over a government shutdown to the fight over the debt-limit increase, where they have more support. A new Bloomberg poll found that Americans, by a 2-to-1 margin, disagree with Obama’s view that Congress should raise the debt limit without any conditions. But Obama has a path to victory. That poll also found that Americans think lawmakers should stop trying to repeal Obamacare. And that was before House Republicans dramatically overplayed their hand by suggesting that they’ll allow the nation to default if Obama doesn’t agree to their laundry list of demands, including suspending Obamacare, repealing banking reforms, building a new oil pipeline, easing environmental regulations, limiting malpractice lawsuits and restricting access to Medicare. To beat the Republicans, Obama might follow the example of a Republican, George W. Bush. Whatever you think of what he did, he knew how to get it done: by simplifying his message and repeating it, ad nauseam, until he got the result he was after. Obama instead tends to give a speech and move along to the next topic. This is why he is forever making “pivots” back to the economy, or to health care. But the way to pressure Congress is to be President One Note. In the debt-limit fight, Obama already has his note: He will not negotiate over the full faith and credit of the United States. That’s as good a theme as any; it matters less what the message is than that he delivers it consistently. The idea, White House officials explained to me, is to avoid getting into a back-and-forth over taxes, spending and entitlement programs. “We’re right on the merits, but I don’t think we want to argue on the merits,” one said. “Our argument is not that our argument is better than theirs; it’s that theirs is stupid.” This is a clean message: Republicans are threatening to tank the economy — through a shutdown or, more likely, through a default on the debt — and Obama isn’t going to negotiate with these hostage-takers. Happily for Obama, Republicans are helping him to make the case by being publicly belligerent. After this week’s 21-hour speech on the Senate floor by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), the publicity-seeking Texan and Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) objected to a bipartisan request to move a vote from Friday to Thursday to give House Republicans more time to craft legislation avoiding a shutdown. On the Senate floor, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) accused them of objecting because they had sent out e-mails encouraging their supporters to tune in to the vote on Friday. The Post’s Ed O’Keefe caught Cruz “appearing to snicker” as his colleague spoke — more smug teenager than legislator. Even if his opponents are making things easier for him, Obama still needs to stick to his message. As in Syria, the president has drawn a “red line” by saying he won’t negotiate with those who would put the United States into default. If he retreats, he will embolden his opponents and demoralize his supporters.

#### Failure to lift the ceiling collapses the global economy.

Davidson 9/10 [Adam, co-founder of NPR’s "Planet Money," Our Debt to Society, New York Times, 9/10/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all]

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years. Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar. While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy. The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war.

Merlini, Senior Fellow – Brookings, 11

 [Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

#  T

#### T – not authority to introduce armed forces into hostilities

A. The plan is not topical for several reasons

1. The plan is not a restriction on introducing armed force --Armed forces applies only to troops, not weapons
Lorber 13 Eric Lorber, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law January, 2013 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961

COMMENT: Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?

**DEBATER NOTE: SHORT FORM OF THE CARD IS JUST THE BOXED**

 C. The War Powers Resolution as Applied to Offensive Cyber Operations

As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers Resolution - especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation - are the definitions of key terms, particularly "armed forces," as the relevant provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President "introduc[es armed forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent ... hostilities," n172 or if such forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces." n173 The requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed forces "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." n174 As is evident, the definition of "armed forces" is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over executive actions. The definition of "hostilities," which has garnered the majority of scholarly and political attention, n175 particularly in the recent Libyan conflict, n176 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only be-comes important if "armed forces" exist in the situation.

As is evident from a textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non-members constituting armed forces). n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.

An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.

The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examin-ing the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to South-east Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.

This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### 2. the weapons are not introduced into hostilities – space weapons are pre-positioned prior to hostilities

#### USCode defines hostilities as conflict in war

LII 13 Legal Information Institute 2013 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/948a

10 USC § 948a - Definitions

(9) Hostilities.— The term “hostilities” means any conflict subject to the laws of war.

#### 3. not restrict presidential authority – creating the military and deciding which weapons are available is Congressional authority. The president's authority to conduct war remains the same, just with different weapons

Yoo 02 GW Bush's Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, US Justice Department (John, Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism, Senate Judiciary Comm, April 17, 2002, S. HRG. 107–892

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg85888/pdf/CHRG-107shrg85888.pdf, p. 11)

Of course, as the President has the constitutional authority to engage U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities, Congress has a broad range of war powers as well. Congress has the power to tax and to spend. Congress has the power to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy. And Congress has the power to call forth the militia, and to make rules for the Government and regulation of the armed forces. In other words, although the President has the power of the sword, Congress has the power of the purse.

#### B. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate

**Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash. The affirmative makes the topic too big. If they can specify any of the different kinds of weapons systems, there are thousands of different weapons cases . We can't be expected to prepare for all the nuclear weapons cases, much less cases on landmines, bombers, jets, carriers, cruise missiles, etc. etc.**

#### C. T is a voter because it is necessary for there to be debates.

# CP

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order mandating the restriction of the war powers authority of the president to introduce space armed forces into hostilities.

#### IT Solves

**Pitts 11** (Pitts Report National International News, 5/9/11, “Sci/Tech/Psy: Obama Keeps Attacking the American Identity Through Executive Order” accessed 5/24/11 http://www.pittsreport.com/2011/05/scitechpsy-white-house-plans-to-sign-an-executive-order-compelling-us-military-and-space-industry-to-comply-with-european-union-code-of-conduct/)

White House Plans to Sign an Executive Order Compelling US military and Space Industry to Comply with European Union Code of Conduct In the name of better managing the celestial environment, the Obama administration seems to be on the verge of imposing new international constraints on the American space establishment, without consultation with the Senate. Sources in the arms-control community inform me that, as part of its National Security Space StrategyCode of Conduct” for space activities. The proposed code is partly a response to the Chinese test of an anti-satellite weapon in early 2007, which created a huge mess in low earth orbit. Such concern was further heightened by the accidental collision between an Iridium communications satellite and a derelict Russian satellite a little over two years ago. released a couple months ago, the White House plans to sign an executive order soon that will compel both the U.S. military and commercial space industry to comply with the European Union “

#### The net benefit is presidential resolve.

#### Executive self-restraint is key to preserve the ability to respond to crises.

Pildes 12 [Richard H., Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law and Co-Director, NYU Center on Law and Security. 2/27/12 BOOK REVIEWS LAW AND THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC. By Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2010. Pp. 249. $29.95. New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers]

First, they argue, a President unbound can produce better outcomes than a President bound to follow preexisting legislation: laws (constitutions and statutes) are always written in a specific context in the past, but technology, the economy, international dynamics, and other circumstances that characterize the modern age are exceptionally fluid and constantly shifting. Better to have presidents make their best judgment, all things considered, about the right action in the actual, immediate circumstances at hand than to have them be bound by laws that could not have contemplated these precise circumstances. Second, and central to Posner and Vermeule’s analysis, presidents do remain constrained — not by law, but by politics and the political judgment of others. As scholars since Richard Neustadt, if not earlier, have recognized, the actual, effective powers of a President (as opposed to the formal powers of the office) are directly rooted in, and limited by, his or her ongoing credibility.21 Presidents want the capacity to exercise their best judgment as contexts arise. But other actors in the system, including “the public,” will permit presidents to exercise more or less discretion depending on how credible those presidents are perceived to be (pp. 122–23). Credibility means generalized judgments about presidential performance, such as how well motivated the President is considered to be, how effective his or her actions are judged to be, and how wise or prudent his or her judgments are taken to be. “Credibility” in this context is analogous to what scholars of the Supreme Court have called long-term “diffuse support” for the Court; diffuse support means the willingness of the public to support the Court’s discretionary power, even when people might disagree with particular outcomes, because they generally believe the Court is exercising these powers in sound ways for good reasons.22 The more credible presidents make themselves, the more other actors will permit them to exercise broad discretion — including discretion to ignore or manipulate the law, which is the unique contribution of Posner and Vermeule’s view. Thus, argue Posner and Vermeule, presidents have strong incentives to adopt practices and take actions that establish and maintain their credibility (p. 133). These incentives will lead smart presidents to adopt various sorts of self-binding mechanisms that limit their discretion: commitments to transparency so others can monitor and oversee; or commitments to multilateral approaches in foreign policy so that presidents can act only with approval of other nations; or commitments to ceding some power to independent actors, such as special prosecutors or other institutions within the executive branch; or similar approaches through which presidents accept limits on their own power (pp. 113–53). By acting consistently with these self-adopted constraints, presidents build up their credibility by signaling that they are using their discretion in acceptable ways and should therefore continue to be granted that discretion — including discretion to avoid, circumvent, or ignore the law when, in the President’s best judgment, doing so will produce better outcomes.

# Resolve DA

#### Congressional restrictions cause adversaries to doubt the resolve of U.S. deterrence – causes crisis escalation.

Waxman 8/25 [Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law – Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy – CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN]

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it **establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority** to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that **any serious restrictions** on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off **explosive confrontations.”**178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation **which might escalate.**179

#### Credible conventional deterrence checks nuclear aggression

Gerson 09

MICHAEL S. GERSON, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, Policy Fellow with the ONE Campaign, a visiting fellow with the Center for Public Justice, and a former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,“Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age”, Strategic Studies Institute, Autumn 2009 //jchen

Although implicit or explicit nuclear threats may lack credibili- ty against non-WMD regimes, many potential adversaries believe that the United States will use conventional firepower, especially because America has conventional superiority and a demonstrated willingness to use it. Consequently, when dealing with non-WMD-related threats, conventional deterrence will be the most likely mechanism for deterring hostile actions.

According to Admiral Michael Mullen, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “A big part of credibility, of course, lies in our convention- al capability. The capability to project power globally and conduct effective theater-level operations . . . remains essential to deterrence effectiveness.”14

Conventional deterrence also plays an important role in preventing nonnuclear aggression by nuclear-armed regimes. Regional nuclear pro- liferation may not only increase the chances for the use of nuclear weap- ons, but, equally important, the possibility of conventional aggression. The potential for conventional conflict under the shadow of mutual nucle- ar deterrence was a perennial concern throughout the Cold War, and that scenario is still relevant. A nuclear-armed adversary may be emboldened to use conventional force against US friends and allies, or to sponsor ter- rorism, in the belief that its nuclear capabilities give it an effective deter- rent against US retaliation or intervention.15 For example, a regime might calculate that it could undertake conventional aggression against a neigh- bor and, after achieving a relatively quick victory, issue implicit or explicit nuclear threats in the expectation that the United States (and perhaps coali- tion partners) would choose not to get involved.

In this context, conventional deterrence can be an important mech- anism to limit options for regional aggression below the nuclear threshold. By deploying robust conventional forces in and around the theater of potential conflict, the United States can credibly signal that it can respond to conventional aggression at the outset, and therefore the opponent can- not hope to simultaneously achieve a quick conventional victory and use nuclear threats to deter US involvement. Moreover, if the United States can convince an opponent that US forces will be engaged at the beginning of hostilities—and will therefore incur the human and financial costs of war from the start—it can help persuade opponents that the United States would be highly resolved to fight even in the face of nuclear threats be- cause American blood and treasure would have already been expended.16 Similar to the Cold War, the deployment of conventional power in the re- gion, combined with significant nuclear capabilities and escalation dom- inance, can help prevent regimes from believing that nuclear possession provides opportunities for conventional aggression and coercion.

#### Foreign policy resolve’s key to prevent a host of impacts---now’s key

Chapin and Hanson 9 – Bernard Chapin- interviewer, and Victor Davis Hanson, the Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 7, 2009, “Change, weakness, disaster,” online: http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

# K

Their attempt to order the world through multilateralism ignores the inherently chaotic nature of politics – destroys all that makes life valuable and makes the aff fail

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, On Security, CIAO)

The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear.

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37

The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols :

The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38

A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39

The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41

Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors:

The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. 42

Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for

The ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god . 43

As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling

One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the ~~man~~ outside , the "~~man~~ without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts. 44

The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago.

This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security:

- My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession. 45

The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." 46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of ~~man~~, the apathy of the last ~~man~~ which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions:

Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness , not also diminished? 47

It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last ~~man~~, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security." 48

It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

Apocalyptic representations of climate change are an ineffective rhetorical strategy that produces a self-fulfilling prophecy

Hulme (Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, and Director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research) 6

(Mike, Chaotic world of climate truth, 4 November, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6115644.stm)

The language of catastrophe is not the language of science. It will not be visible in next year's global assessment from the world authority of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). To state that climate change will be "catastrophic" hides a cascade of value-laden assumptions which do not emerge from empirical or theoretical science. Is any amount of climate change catastrophic? Catastrophic for whom, for where, and by when? What index is being used to measure the catastrophe? The language of fear and terror operates as an ever-weakening vehicle for effective communication or inducement for behavioural change. This has been seen in other areas of public health risk. Empirical work in relation to climate change communication and public perception shows that it operates here too. Framing climate change as an issue which evokes fear and personal stress **becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy**. By "sexing it up" we exacerbate, through psychological amplifiers, the very risks we are trying to ward off. The careless (or conspiratorial?) translation of concern about Saddam Hussein's putative military threat into the case for WMD has had major geopolitical repercussions. We need to make sure the agents and agencies in our society which would seek to amplify climate change risks do not lead us down a similar counter-productive pathway. The IPCC scenarios of future climate change - warming somewhere between 1.4 and 5.8 Celsius by 2100 - are significant enough without invoking catastrophe and chaos as unguided weapons with which forlornly to threaten society into behavioural change. I believe climate change is real, must be faced and action taken. But **the discourse of catastrophe is in danger of tipping society onto a negative, depressive and reactionary trajectory.**

Security logic has become a system of future predicting and pre-programing of response priori to a authentic engagement. The orientation precludes a ethical engagement with others and makes it impossible to have a objective perspective. Do nothing is a policy of resistance that changes the very concept of policy making.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One might think that Derrida's invocation of International Law in his later writings would represent an example of a concrete relation between his writing and something that could take the manner of a policy formulation. In fact, while Derrida speaks eloquently of the need for International Law and demonstrates its philosophical genealogy, he actually does very little by way of elaborating what such a law might look like. Once again we return to the insurmountable difficulty of deconstruction's refusal to programme or pre-empt the arrival of an unknowable future. In fact, looked at in these terms, policy-making would seem to have a distinct relation to fortune telling, divination and other such modes of predicting the future. Future-ologists are of course a specialist sub-branch of policy-makers. In the context of university administration, I have never written a 'forward-looking strategic plan' that did not have to be rewritten six months later due to unforeseen circumstances. Derrida's discussion of International Law in the early 1990s was certainly prescient, given the way in which International Law has moved from the margins of legal specialism to become the locus of global politics through the development of the International Criminal Court, the test cases of 'universal jurisdiction', the demands of globalisation and the obfuscations of the war on terror. However, the question of International Law in Derrida remains to be determined according to a double braid of reading: firstly, the deconstruction of the inherited western model of law and ethics which prevails in the discourse on the international, humanitarian and cosmopolitical; secondly, a responsible philosophical response to singular events as they arrive in the present calling for an exercise of public, critical reason. In other words, the deconstruction of International Law will proceed on a provisional and strategic basis. International Law is, of course, only an example for Derrida of a wider mutation in the conditions of sovereignty in the world today. This account of sovereignty is in turn part of a more general undoing of the logocentric schema, in Derrida, which points out that sovereignty as such is always already decentred by its inability to master the unconditionality of the other which it seeks to suppress, thus rendering the sovereign no longer sovereign. For example, the unconditionality of literature makes it both powerless in the sovereign public realm of techno-media-politics and simultaneously the one thing that this sovereignty cannot master, thus demonstrating the impotence of sovereignty and the all-powerful powerlessness of unconditionality. This is a scenario that can be moved around the tropes of the Derridean corpus in so far as it describes the familiar strategies of and resistances to phallogocentrism in a more general sense. Policy without conditions or a policy of unconditionality would seem to be no policy at all, or at least nothing policy-makers would recognise as policy in its proper sense. After all a policy without limits or purpose would be policy without utility and would be of no use to anyone, except as a policy of resistance.

Here is the rub, the moment that one begins to attempt a thought experiment of this kind one runs into immediate and insurmountable difficulties, not because deconstruction has nothing to say to politics or that deconstruction is a weak ontology, parasitical on the strong discourse of political culture but because if one were to take seriously (if not literally) what Derrida has to say about the disarticulation of the inherited metaphysical models of the political, it quickly becomes apparent that a new politics does not require that 'deconstruction' (if such a thing exists) be translated into a number of thematic policy choices but that the entire political model which rests upon policy as an enactable idea be subject to complete and irreversible displacement. Policy-making as it stands is untenable from a deconstructive point of view because political culture as such is untenable. The unconditionality and infinite responsibility of deconstruction, does not mean simply that we should make better policy (or that we should make better policy, simply) but that in doing so the entire apparatus of western political culture be removed and rethought in an unpredictable and emerging future. The frustration that many feel with deconstruction's reading of the political lies in this refusal to provide 'concrete policies'. However, it is this refusal to decide on the undecideable in advance which is the whole point of deconstruction. It is the promise of deconstruction. This is not the same thing as opposition politicians saying they could not say what their expenditure plans would be until they were in government and saw the state of the accounts (that is just a lie for political expediency and such people always have well developed plans for what they would do). The promise of deconstruction would be that in encountering the other, justice ought to be done, even if the progressive structure of the promise relied on the necessary, in principle, ability for promises to be broken or to fail. The politics of deconstruction can then only ever follow the dual strategy we saw above: the critical reading of the western inheritance and the disarticulation of the event as it arrives in the present. In this sense, deconstruction cannot be a political science because it has no means of securing the predictive force necessary to a science. Rather, deconstruction is that which puts all and every such prediction in doubt. As Bismarck remarked, politics is not a science it is an art. Elsewhere, he is said to have noted that it was the art of the possible. As Derek Attridge has put it, for Derrida, it is the art of the impossible (Attridge 2007). It is, nevertheless, an art and as such is on the side of the unconditional rather than the sovereign.

# Weaponization

#### Weaponization inevitable globally

Bridge 12-10 – Robert Bridge, writer for RT, December 10th, 2012, "Space militarization: Coming to a galaxy near you" rt.com/politics/space-militarization-us-russia-699/print/

The United States is moving toward the militarization of space and this will change the face of war in the near future, an academician with the Russian Academy of Engineering Sciences has warned.¶ Judging by recent developments, **the idea of** formidable space weapons **prowling the last frontier is no longer limited to the realm of science fiction**.¶ The US has published tactical guidelines over the past three years on the use of force in outer space, while systems that may be used as orbiting weapons are undergoing rigorous test flights, said Yuri Zaitsev, Academic Advisor with the Russian Academy of Engineering Sciences.¶ In a security document released in October, the US Department of Defense (DoD) said that its space-related activities are designed to “maintain and enhance the national security advantages afforded by the use of outer space.”¶ Among its numerous stated objectives, the DoD report said it is US policy to “proactively seek opportunities to cooperate with allies and selected international partners in developing space architectures and in **designing, acquiring, and** operat**ing military space systems**.”¶ Zaitsev said that America’s push to militarize space may include the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, which could have dangerous and dramatic implications for future warfare.¶ "**The** U**nited** S**tates, as well as some other leading powers, is attempting to gain supremacy** in [space],” Zaitsev explained. “This will enable their aerospace operations at the very beginning of a war to initiate strikes on strategic facilities throughout the [targeted] country.”¶ **During this year’s UN General Assembly, the US conspicuously refused to support a resolution to halt the militarization of space.**¶ In a vote on a resolution titled ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,’ 169 member-states, including the Russian Federation, voted in favor of the draft resolution stating, “[The] exploration and use of space…shall be for peaceful purposes…carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.”¶ Only **the United States and Israel abstained from voting on the document**, rendering it effectively toothless.¶ Washington’s refusal to cede control of space likely stems from its increasing reliance on space-based systems: An estimated 90 percent of the US Military reportedly uses or depends on space-based systems.¶ The Russian academic referred the shock over China’s successful targeted destruction of an old orbiting weather satellite in 2007.¶ "The Americans were frightened by the Chinese tests of anti-satellite weapons,” Zaitsev said. “It is quite possible that the US may soon initiate negotiations on anti-satellite systems."¶ Zaitsev also said that the United States and its allies may attempt to regulate space activity to its advantage.¶ "The United States and the European Union are working out a draft code of conduct in outer space," he said. "This document may regulate space activity in the interests of the United States and its allies and may discriminate [against] other states, including Russia.”¶ “**Russia and China are unlikely to sign this document, which means** military confrontation in outer space will intensify**,”** Zaitsev warned.

#### No arms race

Lopez 12 – Laura Delgado Lopez, expert at the Institute for Global Environmental Studies, Arlington, Virginia, master's degree in international science and technology from George Washington University, 2009 Truman Scholar and a Northrop Grumman Fellow at GWU's Space Policy Institute, bachelor's in political science, March 6th, 2012, "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control" [www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391)

**Referring to the history of the nuclear arms race, as space doves often do, is misleading**. The Soviet Union and the United States did race to build up their nuclear arsenals, but that was because they could, both technologically and economically. Interestingly, while both lawful 43 and potentially illegal transfers of nuclear technology have taken place, the list of countries with known or suspected nuclear technology is still relatively small. 44 Moreover, it would be open to debate whether those countries that possess the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons are currently immersed in a race to build up their arsenals in response to that of other countries. It is probable that limited proliferation may be a sign of the success of an efficient arms control regime, but it is nevertheless evident that adequate resources are a necessary prerequisite for an arms race**.**¶ **In the case of** space weapons**, the** conditions are even harsher**.** The incredible cost not only to develop and launch these systems, but to maintain them has been a major impediment to their development. Brilliant Pebbles, arguably the most cost-effective U.S. space-based missile defense program, which would also amount to an ASAT weapon, still amounted to a price tag of between $11 and $16 billion, expended over a 20-year period. 45 Would a country such as Pakistan, which ranks twenty-eighth in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook Gross Domestic Product comparison, be able to raise the kind of resources necessary for racing other countries in space? It is more probable that countries such as China and Russia would be able to compete if they so chose, 46 but **the idea of a worldwide space arms race can still not be sustained**. And therein lies the biggest issue that space doves fail to address in their arguments about an inevitable space race: resources. The perception of a threat and the political will to meet it are not enough to warrant the kind of worldwide conditions they are so quick to describe.¶ When space doves bring up the question of resources, they point to ‘‘asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants in the race itself.’’ 47 This situation might encourage, for instance, nuclear proliferation or the build-up of chemical or biological weapons. In fact, Nancy Gallagher argues that the United States rightly denies the existence of an arms race in space ‘‘only in the narrow sense that there is not, and probably will not be, a Cold War style ‘space arms race,’ i.e., an action-reaction dynamic between peer competitors,’’ but that doing so ignores the danger of ‘‘asymmetric reactions.’’ 48¶ Space doves thus seem to acknowledge that measures to regain or sustain stability in the international system do not always manifest themselves in the same way because power can take many forms. In proposing his concept of ‘‘soft power’’ as a legitimate tool for the United States to exert international influence, Joseph Nye explained that in a world of increased political complexity, the traditional ways to employ force are too costly, and thus ‘‘other instruments such as communications. . . and manipulation of interdependence have become more important.’’ 49¶ But this contention clearly **invalidates the inevitability of an arms race in space**. If countries do not respond in kind, then there is no race to speak of, and the inevitability argument breaks down. Gallagher’s statement thus seems contradictory: if a space race is not an ‘‘action-reaction dynamic between peer-competitors,’’ then what do space doves mean with an arms race? Why must it be avoided?¶ **This issue also raises a more** important problem: causality. **Unless other countries explicitly state that their asymmetric build-up is a direct response to U.S. deployment of space weapons, then** this link cannot be established**.** Even considering the timing sequence of deployment and the projected build-up—which would be difficult considering it takes years to develop, launch, and deploy space systems—**it would be simplistic to assume that other motivators for international behavior are not at work.**

#### No space war – deterrence checks

Klein 12 – CDR John J. Klein, USN (BS, Georgia Institute of Technology; MS, Naval Postgraduate School; MA, Naval War College), is assistant air officer (“miniboss”) aboard the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). He has served as maintenance officer, Sea Control Squadron 24 (VS‑24); test and evaluation project officer, Naval Force Aircraft Test Squadron (VX-20); naval flight officer under instruction, US Naval Test Pilot School; tactical development and evaluation officer (VS-24); and maintenance branch officer, Sea Control Squadron 28 (VS‑28). Commander Klein is the author of several journal articles and the book Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy (London: Routledge, 2006). March 6th, 2012, Astropolitics: The International Journal of Space Politics & Policy, "The Influence of Technology on Space Strategy," [www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2012.651700](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2012.651700)

Fourth, advanced space-based technology and weapons systems can have a stabilizing effect on the international community. As was the case with nuclear weapons during the Cold War, if a weapons system poses a large enough threat to two or more adversaries, its potential use can cause state leaders to avoid direct confrontation. This is not to suggest that future space-based weapons will eliminate tensions among competing states, nations, or groups, but **weapons can provide a stabilizing influence at times.**

#### Arms control fails—verifiability, dual purpose, and latency

**O’Hanlon 11** (Michael, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, Looks like Evan McCarty, “Chapter 21: Balancing U.S. Security Interests in Space,” Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf>, EMM)

One type of arms control accord on activities in space would be quite comprehensive, calling for no testing, production, or deployment of ASATs of any kind, based in space or on the ground, at any time; no Earth-attack weapons stationed in space, ever; and formal, permanent treaties codifying these prohibitions. These provisions are in line with those in proposals made by the Chinese and Russian delegations to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. They also are supported by some traditional arms control proponents who argue that space should be a sanctuary from weaponization and that the Outer Space Treaty already strongly suggests as much.14

These provisions suffer from three main flaws. To begin, it is difficult to be sure that other countries' satellite payloads are not ASATs. This is especially true in regard to microsatellites, which are hard to track. Some have proposed inspections of all payloads going into orbit, but this would not prevent a "breakout," in which a country on the verge of war would simply refuse to continue to abide by the provisions. Since microsats can be tested for maneuverability without making them look like ASATs and are being so tested, it will be difficult to preclude this scenario. A similar problem arises with the idea of banning specific types of experimentation, such as outdoor experiments or flight testing.15 A laser can be tested for beam strength and pointing accuracy as a ballistic missile defense device without being identified as an ASAT. A microsat can be tested for maneuverability as a scientific probe, even if its real purpose is different, since maneuvering microsats capable of colliding with other satellites may have no visible features clearly revealing their intended purpose. Bans on outdoor testing of declared ASAT devices would do little to impede their development.

Second, more broadly, it is not possible to prevent certain types of weapons designed for ballistic missile defense from being used as ASATs. This is in essence a problem of verification. However, the issue is less of verification per se than of knowing the intent of the country building a given system—and ensuring that its intent never changes. The latter goals are unrealistic. Some systems designed for missile defense have inherent ASAT capabilities and will retain them, due to the laws of physics, regardless of what arms control prohibitions are developed, and countries possessing these systems will recognize their latent capabilities.16 For example, the American midcourse missile defense system and the airborne laser would both have inherent capabilities against low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, if given good information on a satellite's location—easy to obtain—and perhaps some software modifications. The United States could declare for the time being that it will not link these missile defense systems to satellite networks or give them the necessary communications and software capabilities to accept such data. But such restraints, while currently worthwhile as informal, nonbinding measures, are difficult to verify and easy to reverse. Thus, no robust, long-term formal treaty regime should be based on them. Indeed, the problem goes beyond missile defense systems. Even the space shuttle, with its ability to maneuver and approach satellites in low Earth orbit, has inherent ASAT potential. So do any country's nuclear weapons deployed atop ballistic missiles. Explicit testing in ASAT modes can be prohibited, but any prohibition could have limited meaning.

#### We’re winning now—the aff wrecks deterrence

**Kitfield 10**-Senior Correspondent @ The National Journal, writer for Air Force Magazine, B.A. Journalism, University of Georgia, distinguished writer on defense, national security, and foreign policy, author of two books on national security, [James, Air Force Magazine, “Crowded Congested Space” August 2010, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810space.aspx>]

In the “commons” above Earth, US military forces must deal with junk and potential predators. Last year, an Iridium communications satellite unexpectedly went dead. US military space analysts soon discovered it had smashed into a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite, a collision that destroyed both spacecraft and created a large and dangerous debris field in space. That incident followed another worrisome event. In January 2007, China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile against one of its own defunct satellites. That attack, a direct hit, created 150,000 pieces of space clutter—not all of it even visible to US space operators. Both events reveal that the global commons of space—which the United States has long dominated and has increasingly used as leverage to achieve a decisive military edge—is increasingly crowded and contested. There have been years of warnings that US space dominance is in peril. It is now safe to assume that, in a future war, the military will not have unhindered access to the space-based capabilities that create numerous US combat advantages. Potential adversaries aren’t just aware of how heavily the US relies on space. They already have the means to compete and to challenge US operations there. Today, many commanders view space dominance as vital to warfare in the Information Age. "Certainly in the air world, in the ISR [intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance] world, and most especially in the space world, [there is] competition out there, [and the] competition is getting better," said Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, commander of 14th Air Force at Vandenberg AFB, Calif. "Multiple nation-states now have space launch capability, have ISR capability, [and] have intelligence capability from space, so we’ve got to continue to raise our game to make sure we are still the best." As a recent report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) noted, it is increasingly clear that a military able to effectively use space has tremendous advantages through rapid globe-spanning communications, broad and sophisticated surveillance and intelligence-gathering capability, and accurate force positioning, operations timing, and precision targeting abilities. "Put in military terms, the space commons offers distinct and significant advantages in command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR), maneuverability, and firepower," noted report author Eric Sterner. "As the United States has been the world’s leading innovator in the use of space for military purposes, this development is largely a story of American innovation." Given the game-changing advantages that the United States reaps from its dominance of space, it was inevitable that other countries would also seek to exploit space for their own uses, both military and commercial. Today, nine countries, plus the European Space Agency member states, have the ability to independently place satellites into orbit, and virtually any country or nonstate actor can access satellite technology by buying time on commercial satellites. As the US military’s dependence on space systems has grown exponentially in recent years, however, so has a growing sense of unease among military commanders concerned about the vulnerability of those assets. In 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization released a report that predicted that future warfare in space was a "virtual certainty," and it proposed that the United States [should] begin to develop the means both to deter and defend against attacks on its space assets, and to mount offensive operations to deny the use of space to potential adversaries. To do otherwise, the commission warned, would invite a "space Pearl Harbor." US officials confirmed in 2006 that China had successfully "painted" a US satellite with a laser. China’s January 2007 test of the direct-ascent, anti-satellite SC-19 missile greatly heightened those concerns. And a recent Pentagon report on China’s military modernization revealed that China is developing other anti-satellite systems, to include ground-based lasers designed to blind sensitive satellite optics. China is also reportedly developing microsatellites crafted to act as "space mines," which could loiter in space until given the signal to destroy other satellites. At present, US officials say they are uncertain whether China has already launched such "parasite" satellites. "In today’s world, ... there are a lot of folks launching a lot of satellites, some of them very small," and we have a lot of work to do in terms of knowing "what their mission is, ... what the intent of the owner is," and whether they represent a threat, said James. That really gets into the intelligence world more than the tracking world, but, "frankly, we have a long way to go" in achieving that space situational awareness. According to the CNAS report, China has identified American dependence on space as an asymmetric vulnerability to exploit. "China is developing robust capabilities to operate in space and deny its adversaries the use of space during a time of crisis or conflict," the report concluded.

#### Turns case—creates entry barriers to weaponizing

Dolman 10 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, “The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment,” September, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=1532576, EMM)

This is the context in which the world now exists. The relatively stable global hegemony of US dominance since 1945, punctuated by limited wars and shifting balances of opposition, has relied on technology-dominant global power projection. Today, that technology is wholly integrated and inextricable from space support, and no state relies more on space power for its economic and security well-being than the US. Any effort to deny space capabilities would be a direct challenge to its hegemonic power, and the United States must confront the usurper or abdicate its leadership position. To be sure, China’s increasing space emphasis and its cultural antipathy to military transparency suggests that a serious attempt at seizing control of space is in the works. A lingering fear is the sudden introduction of an unknown capability (call it Technology X) that would allow a hostile state to place multiple weapons into orbit quickly and cheaply. The advantages gained from controlling the high ground of space would accrue to it as surely as to any other state, and the concomitant loss of military power from the denial of space to America’s already-dependent military forces could cause the immediate demise of the extant international system. The longer the United States dithers on its military responsibilities, the more likely a potential opponent could seize low-earth orbit before America is able to respond. And in such circumstances, the US certainly would respond. Conversely, if America were to weaponize space, it is not at all sure that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. The entry cost to provide the necessary infrastructure is still too high—hundreds of billions of dollars, at minimum. The years of investment needed to achieve a comparable counter-force capability—essentially from scratch—would provide more than ample time for the United States to entrench itself in space and readily counter preliminary efforts to displace it. The tremendous effort in time and resources would be worse than wasted. Most states, if not all, would opt not to counter US deployments directly. They might oppose American interests with asymmetric balancing, depending on how aggressively it uses its new power, but the likelihood of a hemorrhaging arms race in space should the United States deploy weapons first—at least for the next few years—is remote. This reasoning does not dispute the fact that US deployment of weapons in outer space would represent the addition of a potent new military capacity, one that would assist in extending the current period of American hegemony well into the future. Clearly this would be intimidating, and America must expect severe condemnation and increased competition in peripheral areas. But such an outcome is less threatening than another, particularly non-liberal authoritarian state doing so, as the necessity of a response in kind is compelling. Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the majority of states seem to regard it as at least tolerable. A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working toward its demise. As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. Mirror-imaging does not apply here. An attempt by China to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order. Such an action would challenge the status quo, rather than seek to perpetuate it. This would be disconcerting to nations that accept, no matter how grudgingly, the current international order—including the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within it—and intolerable to the United States. As leader of the current system, the United States could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside and accept a diminished world status. Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States is dominant in space infrastructure, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. The enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space and to readily engage and destroy terrestrial anti-satellite capacity would make the possibility of large-scale space war or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote.

#### Multilat fails—global governance

Langenhove, 11 – Luk Van, Director of the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Institute of the United Nations University (“Multilateralism 2.0: The transformation of international relations,” UN University, 5/31/11, http://unu.edu/publications/articles/multilateralism-2-0-the-transformation-of-international-relations.html)Red

Two major developments are currently transforming the multilateral system. The first is the trend towards multi-polarity as expressed by the rising number of states that act as key players. There have been times when only a few or even one player dominated the geopolitical game. But today it seems that several states are becoming dominant players as global or regional actors. The (voting) behavior of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the UN and their presence in the G20 illustrates this trend. The second development, meanwhile, is that new types of actors are changing the nature of the playing multilateral field. Regions with statehood properties are increasingly present in the area of international relations. Since 1974, the European Union (EU) for instance has been an observer in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). But on 3 May 2011, UNGA upgraded the EU’s status by giving it speaking rights. And that same resolution opens the door for other regional organizations to request the same speaking rights. Undoubtedly, this is what is what will happen in the near future. But as stated by some UN members in discussions on this resolution, this could unbalance the ‘one state, one vote’ rule within the UN. On the other hand, this opening towards regional organizations brings with it new opportunities. Together these two developments illustrate that multilateralism is no longer only a play between states: various regions as well as other actors are present and are profoundly changing the multilateral game. But thinking about multilateralism is still very much based upon the centrality of states: they are regarded as the constitutive elements of the multilateral system and it is their interrelations that determine the form and content of multilateralism. This implies that international politics is regarded as a closed system in at least two ways: firstly, it spans the whole world; and, secondly, there are huge barriers to enter the system. Many authors have pointed to all kinds of dys-functions such as the complexity of the UN system with its decentralized and overlapping array of councils and agencies, or to the divides between developed and developing countries. The emergence of truly global problems such as climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and many others have indeed led to an increasing paradox of governance. As Thakur and Van Langenhove put it in Global Governance (2006, 12:3) “[t]he policy authority for tackling global problems still belong to the states, while the sources of the problems and potential solutions are situated at transnational, regional or global level”. As such the building blocks of multilateralism, the states, seem to be less and less capable of dealing with the challenges of globalization. But because the multilateral world order is so dependent on the input of states, multilateralism itself is not functioning well. From an open to a closed system One way to capture the above-mentioned developments is to use the metaphor of ‘multilateralism 2.0’ in order to stress how the playing field and the players in multilateralism are changing. The essence of the Web 2.0 metaphor is that it stresses the emergence of network thinking and practices in international relations, as well as the transformation of multilateralism from a closed to an open system. In multilateralism 1.0 the principle actors in the inter-state space of international relations are states. National governments are the ‘star players’. Intergovernmental organizations are only dependent agents whose degrees of freedom only go as far as the states allow them to go. The primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of international relations. In contrast, in multilateralism 2.0, there are players other than sovereign states that play a role and some of these players challenge the notion of sovereignty. Regions are one such type of actor. Conceived by states, other players can have statehood properties and as such aim to be actors in the multilateral system. Regional organizations especially are willing and able to play such a role. But sub-national regions as well increasingly have multilateral ambitions as demonstrated by their efforts towards para-diplomacy. As a result ‘international relations’ is becoming much more than just inter-state relations. Regions are claiming their place as well. This has major consequences for how international relations develop and become institutionalized, as well as for how international relations ought to be studied. What was once an exclusive playing ground for states has now become a space that states have to share with others. It is a fascinating phenomenon: both supra- and sub-national governance entities are largely built by states and can therefore be regarded as ‘dependent agencies’ of those states. However, once created, these entities start to have a life of their own and are not always totally controllable by their founding fathers. These new sub- and supra-entities are knocking on the door of the multilateral system because the have a tendency to behave ‘as if’ they were states. This actorness gives them, at least in principle, the possibility to position themselves against other actors, including their founding fathers! All of this has weakened the Westphalian relation between state and sovereignty. ‘One state, one vote’ Organizing multilateralism in a state-centric would only be possible if all states are treated as equal. This means that irrespective of the differences in territorial size, population size, military power or economic strength, all states have the same legal personality. Or in other words, the Westphalian principle of sovereign equality means working with the principle of ‘one state, one vote’, although it is universally acknowledged that this principle does not correspond to the reality. In multilateralism 2.0 this could be balanced through a more flexible system that compares actors in terms of certain dimensions (such as economic power) regardless of the type of actors they are. In other words, one can for instance compare big states with regions or small states with sub-national regions. This allows not only a more flexible form of multilateralism. It could perhaps also lead to a more just system with a more equal balance of power and representation. Within the present multilateral system, the UN occupies a major position. But, in order to adapt to the emerging ‘mode 2.0’ of multilateralism, it needs to open up to regions. This is a problem, as the UN is a global organization with sovereign states as members. Indeed, the way the UN is organized, only sovereign states, the star players, can be full members (see Article four of the UN Charter). Even though the EU was granted speaking rights, it was not granted voting rights. Chapter VIII of the Charter also mentions the possibility of cooperation with regional organizations and right from its conception there have been attempts to go beyond a state-centric approach. However, for many years now, the UN has struggled with the question of what place supra-national regional organizations should and could take in achieving UN goals. On one end of the spectrum is the position that regionalism blocks the necessary global and universal approach needed to solve the problems of today. At the other end there is the position that regionalism can serve the overall goals of the UN. Obviously, the question is not only a philosophical one. Rather, it is also about power of institutions. Are regional organizations weakening the UN or can they be considered as allies of the UN in dealing with supra-national problems? Further recognition required The key issue in relation to any institutional reform aimed at reinforcing multilateralism is how to create a balance of power among UN members and a balance of responsibilities and representation for the people of our planet. Such a complex set of balances cannot be found if reform propositions continue to be based upon states as the sole building blocks of multilateralism. A radical rethinking is needed, which recognizes that, next to states, world regions based upon integration processes between states have to play a role in establishing an effective multilateralism. Today’s reality is that, next to states, world regions are becoming increasingly important tools of global governance. There needs to be, however, a lot of creative and innovative thinking based upon careful analysis of the regional dimensions of ongoing conflicts and of existing cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. The upgrading of the EU’s status in the UN is an important step forward. But it is not enough. Other regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN or the League of Arab States should follow. And next to speaking rights, collaboration between the UN and regional organizations needs to be further developed. This is the only way to increase regional ownership of what the UN and its Security Council decide. As a matter of fact, this recently happened with the UNSC resolution 1973 regarding Libya: explicit reference is made to the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Moreover, the League of Arab States’ members are requested to act in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in implementing the resolution. Reviving Chapter VIII seems to be a promising way to combine global concerns with local (regional) legitimacy and capacity to act. The challenge is that in line with the complexity of the emerging new world order, any proposal to rethink multilateralism in such a way that it incorporates regionalism needs to be flexible. A simplistic system of regional representations that replace the national representations will not work. And not only the UN, but also the regional organizations themselves need to adjust to the reality of multilateralism 2.0. In this respect it remains to be seen to what extent the EU Member States will allow the EU to speak with one vision. And above all, in order to become politically feasible, the idea of a multi-regional world order needs to be supported and promoted by civil society. As long as this is not the case, old habits and organizational structures will not change, and the world will not become a more secure place to live in.

#### Pandemics unlikely and no extinction

Ridley **12** [8/17, Matt Ridley, columnist for The Wall Street Journal and author of The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves, “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times,” http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff\_apocalypsenot/all/]

#### The emergence of AIDS led to a theory that other viruses would spring from tropical rain forests to wreak revenge on humankind for its ecological sins. That, at least, was the implication of Laurie Garrett’s 1994 book, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. The most prominent candidate was Ebola, the hemorrhagic fever that starred in Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone, published the same year. Writer Stephen King called the book “one of the most horrifying things I’ve ever read.” Right on cue, Ebola appeared again in the Congo in 1995, but it soon disappeared. Far from being a harbinger, HIV was the **only new tropical virus to go pandemic in 50 years**.¶ In the 1980s British cattle began dying from mad cow disease, caused by an infectious agent in feed that was derived from the remains of other cows. When people, too, began to catch this disease, predictions of the scale of the epidemic quickly turned terrifying: Up to 136,000 would die, according to one study. A pathologist warned that the British “have to prepare for perhaps thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, of cases of vCJD [new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human manifestation of mad cow] coming down the line.” Yet the total number of deaths so far in the UK has been 176, with just five occurring in 2011 and none so far in 2012.¶ In 2003 it was SARS, a virus from civet cats, that ineffectively but inconveniently led to quarantines in Beijing and Toronto amid predictions of global Armageddon. SARS subsided within a year, after killing just 774 people. In 2005 it was bird flu, described at the time by a United Nations official as being “like a combination of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than it’s running at the moment.” The World Health Organization’s official forecast was 2 million to 7.4 million dead. In fact, by late 2007, when the disease petered out, the death toll was roughly 200. In 2009 it was Mexican swine flu. WHO director general Margaret Chan said: “It really is all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic.” The outbreak proved to be a normal flu episode.¶ The truth is, **a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more**. Mass migration to cities means the opportunity for viruses to jump from wildlife to the human species has not risen and has possibly even declined, despite media hype to the contrary. Water- and insect-borne infections—generally the most lethal—are declining as living standards slowly improve. It’s true that casual-contact infections such as colds are thriving—but only by being

#### Multiple alt causes

**Grant, 12** – Charles, director of the Center for European Reform (“Multilateralism à la Carte,” NYT, 4/16/12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/opinion/multilateralism-a-la-carte.html?\_r=0)**Red**

Many problems cannot be solved without international cooperation, yet “multilateralism” — the system of international institutions and rules intended to promote the common good — **appears to be weakening.** The G-20 has become a talk shop; the Doha round of trade liberalization is moribund; the U.N. climate change talks have achieved very little. We seem to be moving toward a world of balance-of-power politics, competing alliances and unilateral actions. One reason for these trends is that Europe, always the biggest supporter of international institutions, is economically, diplomatically and militarily weak; another is that the United States has over the past 20 years become relatively weaker and more prone to unilateralism. A third reason is that the emerging and re-emerging powers — Russia and China in particular — tend to be cynical about international institutions: They see them as Western creations that promote Western interests, though they use them when it suits their purposes. Both implacably opposed to American hegemony, Russia and China are willing to deploy their vetoes on the Security Council to **thwart U.S. objectives.** Their strong attachment to state sovereignty makes them allergic to humanitarian intervention, as they made clear when vetoing Security Council resolutions that would have criticized the Syrian regime for killing protesters. Russia and China both think that power matters more than rules in international relations. They like “concert diplomacy” — informal gatherings that give great powers status, such as the six-party talks dealing with both the Iranian and North Korean nuclear problems. They are more wary of rules-based institutions, which may allow small countries to block the wishes of big ones. But the two countries do not always think alike on global governance. Russia takes security institutions and proliferation regimes seriously. Unlike China, it has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and joined both the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Proliferation Security Initiative (a club that tries to stop illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction). China has never signed any arms control treaty that limits conventional or nuclear weapons. China is also slacker than Russia at enforcing proliferation regimes: Its companies sell dual-use equipment to Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, as well as nuclear reactors to Pakistan. But the picture is very different on economic governance. Here, Russia has been slow to sign up to rules: It is now joining the World Trade Organization after 18 years of negotiations. It stands on the sidelines of U.N. climate change talks despite being the world’s fourth-biggest emitter of carbon. It is passive in forums on financial regulation. China, by contrast, is actively engaged in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It accepts rulings against it by W.T.O. dispute-settlement panels. And though China has been reluctant to accept binding limits on carbon emissions, its views are evolving: Last December, in Durban, it agreed that by 2020 there should be a carbon emissions regime “with legal force.” Economics and history explain these differences. As the world’s biggest exporter of manufactured goods, China needs global rules on trade. Knowing that its renminbi will eventually become a world currency, China takes a keen interest in international financial rules. Russia exports mainly oil and gas, for which there is no global regime. In the field of security, China is a rising power, increasingly confident of its newfound strength, so it is unwilling to be shackled by international rules on armaments. Russia, though in some respects a declining power, retains a huge nuclear arsenal. It sees arms control treaties as a means of protecting its status. In the long term, will Russia and China do more to strengthen or to undermine the multilateral system? That will depend, in part, on how successfully the two countries rebalance their economies. Russia must build up manufacturing and service industries, depend less on oil and gas exports, and create a business environment that encourages foreign investment. China needs to boost consumption and curb investment. It should create a credit system that benefits individuals, small enterprises and the private sector, rather than just state-owned enterprises. Powerful vested interests in both oppose reform: in Russia, some of the leadership clans and natural resource companies; in China, some sections of the Communist Party and the state-owned enterprises. Rebalancing would curb the power and incomes of elites in both countries. If the rulers in Moscow and Beijing succeed in transforming their economies, laying the basis for sustained growth, they will become more confident in engaging with international institutions and other powers. But if these countries fail to make a smooth adjustment and suffer from slower growth and the consequent social unrest, their regimes will be prone to insecurity, nationalist sentiment and paranoia toward the West. **Global governance would certainly suffer.** So Russia’s and China’s attempts to reform matter hugely for the international system.

#### Too late to solve warming

Dye, 10/26/12 (Lee, “It May Be Too Late to Stop Global Warming,” ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/late-stop-global-warming/story?id=17557814#.UI4EpcU8CSo)Red

Here's a dark secret about the earth's changing climate that many scientists believe, but few seem eager to discuss: It's too late to stop global warming. Greenhouse gasses pumped into the planet's atmosphere will continue to grow even if the industrialized nations cut their emissions down to the bone. Furthermore, the severe measures that would have to be taken to make those reductions stand about the same chance as that proverbial snowball in hell. Two scientists who believe we are on the wrong track argue in the current issue of the journal Nature Climate Change that global warming is inevitable and it's time to switch our focus from trying to stop it to figuring out how we are going to deal with its consequences. "At present, governments' attempts to limit greenhouse-gas emissions through carbon cap-and-trade schemes and to promote renewable and sustainable energy sources are probably too late to arrest the inevitable trend of global warming," Jasper Knight of Wits University in Johannesburg, South Africa, and Stephan Harrison of the University of Exeter in England argue in their study. Those efforts, they continue, "have little relationship to the real world." What is clear, they contend, is a profound lack of understanding about how we are going to deal with the loss of huge land areas, including some entire island nations, and massive migrations as humans flee areas no longer suitable for sustaining life, the inundation of coastal properties around the world, and so on ... and on ... and on. That doesn't mean nations should stop trying to reduce their carbon emissions, because any reduction could lessen the consequences. But the cold fact is no matter what Europe and the United States and other "developed" nations do, it's not going to curb global climate change, according to one scientist who was once highly skeptical of the entire issue of global warming. "Call me a converted skeptic," physicist Richard A. Muller says in an op-ed piece published in the New York Times last July. Muller's latest book, "Energy for Future Presidents," attempts to poke holes in nearly everything we've been told about energy and climate change, except the fact that "humans are almost entirely the cause" of global warming. Those of us who live in the "developed" world initiated it. Those who live in the "developing" world will sustain it as they strive for a standard of living equal to ours. "As far as global warming is concerned, the developed world is becoming irrelevant," Muller insists in his book. We could set an example by curbing our emissions, and thus claim in the future that "it wasn't our fault," but about the only thing that could stop it would be a complete economic collapse in China and the rest of the world's developing countries. As they race forward, their industrial growth -- and their greenhouse gas emissions -- will outpace any efforts by the West to reduce their carbon footprints, Muller contends. "China has been installing a new gigawatt of coal power each week," he says in his Times piece, and each plant pumps an additional ton of gases into the atmosphere "every second." "By the time you read this, China's yearly greenhouse gas emissions will be double those of the United States, perhaps higher," he contends. And that's not likely to change. "China is fighting poverty, malnutrition, hunger, poor health, inadequate education and limited opportunity. If you were the president of China, would you endanger progress to avoid a few degrees of temperature change?" he asks. Muller suggests a better course for the West to take than condemning China for trying to be like the rest of us. Instead, we should encourage China to switch from coal to natural gas for its power plants, which would cut those emissions in half. "Coal," he writes, "is the filthiest fuel we have." Meanwhile, the West waits for a silver bullet, possibly a geo-engineering solution that would make global warming go away by reflecting sunlight back into space, or fertilizing the oceans so they could absorb more carbon dioxide, or something we haven't even heard about. Don't expect it anytime soon. It would take a bold, and perhaps foolish, nation to take over the complex systems that control the planet's weather patterns. That's sort of what we did beginning with the Industrial Revolution. Now we have to live with it. So maybe Knight and Harrison are right. It's time to pay more attention to how we are going to handle changes to our planet that seem inevitable. We can fight global warming and try to mitigate the consequences, but it isn't going to go away.

#### No extinction

**NIPCC 11**. Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC. 8 March 2011. http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

In a paper published in *Systematics and Biodiversity*, Willis *et al*. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas *et al*., 2004; Solomon *et al*., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford *et al*., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

#### Adaptation solves, warming is inevitable

**Thomas, 1/3/12** – Martyn, Vice-President (External Affairs) at Royal Academy of Engineering (“Environmental crisis demands big thinking,” The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/jan/03/environmental-crisis-demands-big-thinking)**Red**

Much of the CO² that will affect the climate this century **is already in the atmosphere.** Global warming will lead to further warming, through several mechanisms including the greater absorption of sunlight that you mention and the release of trapped methane and CO². Any attempt to stop the process would have to involve international agreement and action on an unprecedented scale because, even if Britain were able to stop producing CO² completely, the impact on the climate would be small. The actions necessary to halt or restrict climate change are politically impossible to deliver: massive investments in nuclear power worldwide, dramatic constraints on travel and other activities that burn fossil fuels, and much more. This could not be implemented even in Britain, let alone internationally. The debate about further runways in the south-east of England illustrates just how far British politicians are from understanding the global warming crisis. The speculative geoengineering "solutions" that have been proposed would be a high risk gamble with the planet and unlikely to succeed. We need instead to **accept that increased global warming is inevitable and plan on that basis.** Rather than policies reminiscent of King Canute, we need a mature recognition that sea levels will rise and that large parts of the world will become uninhabitable. When the worst happens, it will become clear that we should have acted now (or sooner) to build large-scale defences and to relocate vulnerable cities and communities to higher ground. If we started seriously planning to relocate London to somewhere safe, it would demonstrate a realistic understanding of the situation that would make it far easier to lead opinion nationally and internationally. Before long, talk of better insulation, electric vehicles, new runways and wind power will be seen for the minor considerations that they largely are. The solutions need to match the scale of the crisis you have rightly identified.

# Balancing

#### No counterbalancing – the US provides too many public goods

**Brooks and Wohlforth, 11 –** both professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen G Brooks & William C Wohlforth (2011): Assessing the balance, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:2, 201-219

The world is dearly a different place for the United States due to the permissive systemic environment. And the flip side of the lack of tight systemic constraints on the United States is their presence for other powers. The system constrains other powers from counter-balancing and contending for global leadership, for example, as most major powers have done in the past and at least two-Russia and China-would likely do now if the international system's structure did not render it prohibitively costly. And that is not the only constraint that affects others. Because most other powers lack the material capacity to help redefine rules and provide public goods, international rules and norms constrain them far more than Washington. Moreover, the global economy constrains smaller powers far more than the United States. While other powers are constrained by America's outsized role in the global economy from using economic statecraft (for example, sanctions) against the United States, Washington uses them with impunity against others (albeit not always effectively).

# 2NC

**Their interpretation links to all their offense Cap K and Econ DA proves
Counter interpretation – we get 2 conditional advocacies
That’s good
1.) Innovation –the alternative is teams only run what they are good at, and don’t try new arguments, leads to stale education and dogmatism**

**.2.) Neg Flex –key to check 2ac addons and  2ar persuasion outweighs time benefits of the block. transportation topic is skewed toward the aff.**

**3.) Breadth – Depth is impossible – teams would just read more shitty answers and hope we drop them, only a chance we force critical thinking. Breadth of information allows for multiple access points to education, forces research**

**4) Turns 2ac strategy – force them to read their best offense like turns and addons-Multiple Perms are worse they tempt aff condtionality and skew us worse, voter.
-Time skew inev – some teams are faster than others, we can run an infinite number of SPEC arguments.
-Aff didn’t specify their agent – kills agent cps and all implementation based education, voter for fairness education.
-No Strat Skew – 2ac always has a strategic option - stop crying, 1ar must articulate specific inround abuse
-Theory is a reason to reject the argument not the team (reasonability)
A2: Dispo
Dispo is condo – good teams can kick out of anything.
a.)    Kills Neg Flex – forces 2nr choice, kills strategic thinking
b.)    Dogmatism – forces us to defend racism
c.)     Exhausts education – leads to the worst debates, over-researches a topic.**

Resent

Extinction !

Conc. Epistemology indict – we seek friends/like-minded – t/o coop

**Baudrillard, 94** (Jean, *The Illusion of the End*, p. 71)

Artificial catastrophes, like the beneficial aspects of civilization, **progress much more quickly than natural ones**. The underdeveloped are still at the primary stage of the natural, unforeseeable catastrophe. We are already at the second stage, that of the manufactured catastrophe - imminent and foreseeable - and we shall soon be at that of the pre-programmed catastrophe, the catastrophe of the third kind, deliberate and experimental. And, paradoxically, it is our pursuit of the means for averting natural catastrophe - the unpredictable form of destiny - which will take us there. Because it is unable to escape it, humanity will pretend to be the author of its destiny. Because it cannot accept being confronted with an end which is uncertain or governed by fate, it will prefer to stage its own death as a species.

Lal, 2007

(Prerna P., Master of Arts in International Relations @ San Francisco State University, Senior Graduate Thesis, *Critical Security Studies*, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf)

Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how **national security is an antonym for human security**. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why **the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.”** Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how **the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare.** The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that **“economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security.** The question that arises next is how to **put** critical **theory into practice** and deconstruct the national security state. **Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth.** In other words, **there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist** Foucaultian **analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse.** The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, **we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality.** Thus, **citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security**. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of **a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.”** This **calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The U**nited **S**tates **has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War**, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, **grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations.** As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, **“it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually.** In the past two years, **India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future** that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. **While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations.** Therefore, **our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.** Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth (2005, 181) defines human emancipation as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.” For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with **questioning and changing structures** and institutions **that oppress us** and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. **Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin** for Booth (2005, 191), **as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept**. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal **that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come.** Therefore, **human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.**

#### Global solutions to climate change lock in structural inequalities that prevent action

Kythreotis (Global Change Institute and School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Management, University of Queensland) 11

(Andrew Paul, Progress in global climate change politics? Reasserting national state territoriality in a 'post-political' world, Prog Hum Geogr, 7 December 2011)

This is because a (global) politics of climate change is secondary to the economics of climate change (Newell and Paterson, 2010). In territor- ial terms, this is highlighted, inter alia, through the way in which capital is perpetually fixed, reconfigured and reproduced across space and territory as it seeks new accumulation strategies (Harvey, 1982). The fixing stage of capitalism leaves crystallized sociopolitical differences and inequities behind (overtly expressed through adversarial and antagonistic territorial politics), which materialize at subnational scales (Brenner, 1998; Lefebvre, 1978) through the level of experience (Taylor, 1982). This has vast implications for the way climate change is spatially governed because such processes are collectively approached, formed and enacted within spaces based upon rational liberal democracy, (re)producing geometries of power (Massey, 1993), and hindering the types of social capacity building that can engender change on a global scale. Climate change may be a global problem, but the political solution may not actually reside solely at this scale.

1. And, if successful, apocalyptic representations of climate change lead to great power war – regional interventions and arms races

Brzoska (Inst. for Peace Research and Security Policy @ Hamburg) 8

(Micahel, “The Securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security” ISA Convention Paper)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive, the financial means compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2°C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment,1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources.

US militarism will destroys the biosphere even if every other issue were solved

 Kim Scipes, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Purdue University North Central in Westville, Indiana, 2009, http://countercurrents.org/scipes291209.htm

As a US military veteran—USMC, 1969-73, who turned around while on active duty—I have been incredibly frustrated at the impotence of the anti-war movement in the United States to stop the wars in particularly Iraq, Afghanistan and, increasingly, Pakistan. I am, obviously, not alone. Many other people—veterans, as well as many more civilians—also share this frustration. Barry Sanders’ new book, The Green Zone, takes a different angle than any I’ve seen before, and I believe it’s an approach I believe we all need to consider: Sanders focuses on the environmental costs of militarism, particularly those from the US military. Sanders recognizes the incredible threat by greenhouse gases to the worlds’ peoples well-being and, in fact, to our very survival. [Percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 280 parts per million (ppm) before the industrial revolution started in 1750 to where the latest readings are 392 ppm—should it reach 450, the accompanying temperature rise would lead to uncontrollable melting of the tundra across Russia and Canada, and the release of untold amounts of methane: methane has 20 times greater impact on the atmosphere than carbon dioxide. James Hansen of NASA believes we must go below 350 ppm to prevent serious environmental damage worldwide—KS.] Sanders also knows the environment is not just threatened by greenhouse gasses, but recognizes pollution of the water, air and soil as joining with greenhouse gases to imperil us all. Yet he makes an incredibly important point, trying to put things into perspective and to focus our attention: “… here’s the awful truth: even if every person, every automobile, and every factory suddenly emitted zero emissions, the Earth would still be headed head first and at full speed toward total disaster for one major reason. The [US] military—that voracious vampire—produces enough greenhouse gases, by itself, to place the entire globe, with all its inhabitants large and small, in the most immanent danger of extinction” (p, 22). To put it plain language, that social institution that is said to protect Americans is, in fact, hastening our very extermination along with all the other people of the planet. Sanders addresses the military’s affects on the environment in many ways. He starts off with trying to figure out how much (fossil) fuel the military uses, with their resulting greenhouse emissions there from. Despite diligent efforts, he cannot find out specific numbers, so he is forced to estimate. After carefully working through different categories, he comes to what he calls a conservative estimate of 1 million barrels of oil a day, which translates to almost 20 million gallons each and every day! He puts this number into international perspective: “If that indeed turns out to be the case, the United States military would then rank in fuel consumption with countries like Iran, Indonesia and Spain. It is truly an astonishing accomplishment, especially when one considers … that the military has only about 1.5 million troops on active duty, and Iran has a population of 66 million, Indonesia a whopping 235 million” (54) The cost, incidentally, is also quite high. He quotes a US Army General as estimating that the cost of this fuel averages $300 a gallon! (55) Yet, how does this contribute to global warming? He reports that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that “each gallon of gasoline produces 19.4 pounds of CO 2” (carbon dioxide). If his estimate of 1 million barrels of oil a day is correct, he writes, “then the combined armed forces sends into the atmosphere about 400 million pounds of greenhouse gases a day, or 200,000 tons. That totals 146 billion pounds a year—or 73 million tons of carbon a year” (67-68). And that’s just regarding fuel use. Sanders further discusses the military’s impact on the environment. He talks about the impact of exploding bombs, cluster bombs, napalm, cannon rounds, depleted uranium, etc. He points out that the US military estimates they need about 1.5 billion rounds for their M-16 rifles a year. He talks about the impact of US military bases around the world, including in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. To me, the most sickening chapter was the one on depleted uranium or DU. He explains, “Depleted uranium is essentially U-238, the isotope after the fissionable isotope, U-235, has been extracted from uranium ore.” DU has a half-life of 4.7 billion years. He continues: “… a good deal of the country of Iraq, both its deserts and cities, hums with radioactivity. For since 1991, the US has been manufacturing ‘just about all [of its] bullets, tank shells, missiles, dumb bombs, smart bombs, and 500- and 2000-pound bombs, and everything else engineered to help our side in the war of Us against Them, [with] depleted uranium in it. Lots of depleted uranium. A single cruise missile, which weighs 3,000 pounds, carries within its casing 800 pounds of depleted uranium.’ Recall that the Air Force dropped 800 of these bombs in just the first two days of the war. The math: 800 bombs multiplied by 800 pounds of depleted uranium equal 640,000 pounds, or 320 tons of radioactive waste dumped on that country in just the first two days of devastation” (83). The impact is devastating. When DU hits something, it ignites, reaching temperatures between 3,000-5,000 degrees Celsius (5,432-9,032 degrees F). It goes through metal like a hot knife through butter, making it a superb military weapon. But is also releases radiation upon impact, poisoning all around it. Its tiny particles can be inhaled—people don’t have to touch irradiated materials. Thus, Iraqis are being poisoned by simply breathing the air! And, once inhaled, DU hardens, turning into insoluble pellets than cannot be excreted. DU poisoning is a literal death sentence. It not only kills, however, but it can damage human DNA—it’s the gift that keeps on giving, to generations and generations. Yet, radiation is an equal opportunity destroyer: it also poisons those in occupying armies. Evidence from the Gulf War I (“Desert Storm”) shows the impact on American troops. Sanders quotes Arthur Bernklau, who has extensively studied the problem: “Of the 580,400 soldiers who served in Gulf War I, 11,000 are now dead. By the year 2000, there were 325,000 on permanent medical disability. More than a decade later, more than half (56 percent) who served in Gulf War I have permanent medical problems.” Bernklau then points out that the disability rate for soldiers in Vietnam was 10 percent (87). Yet the impact is not just on Iraqis, or the soldiers who fought there. Sanders points out that, according to the London Sunday Times, radiation sensors in Britain reported a four-fold increase in airborne uranium just a few days after George W. Bush launched the March 19, 2003 attack on Iraq. That sounds bad enough, that the uranium can travel the approximately 2500 miles from Baghdad to London. But what Sanders does not note is that global weather does not travel east to west: it travels west to east. In other words, this uranium had to cross North America to get from Iraq to Britain! There is much more detailed information included in this small, highly accessible book. AK Press deserves our respect and support for publishing such a worthy volume: and this is one we each should purchase and urge others to do so as well. The biggest strength of this book is Sanders’ clarity: this man is, if you will permit, “on target.” He sees the problem being not just the illegal and immoral wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. He sees the US military as being an essential part of the US Empire, along with the major multinational corporations. He sees the military as an institution as a threat to global environmental survival. He recognizes that politicians won’t address the problem; they are too incorporated in the US Empire. It says it is up to us, individually and collectively, in the US (primarily) and together with people around the world. Basically, his argument is this: the US military can continue to launch wars and continue killing people (including Americans) around the world, or we can end war, and devote resources to the well-being of people in this country and others around the world. The choice is our’s. But we also need to realize that if we let the US military continue on its path of continual war with its on-going quest for global domination, it will destroy all the humans, animals and vegetation on the planet. Your move, good people.

#### The medicalization of political discourses directly underwrites a reproduction of security discourse to eliminate the diseases and the filthy

**Campbell, 2008**

(David, Prof. of International Politics @ the University of Newcastle, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Revised Edition, University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 0-8166-3144-1, Pg. 81-82)

However one might begin to fathom the many issues located within those challenges, our current situation leaves us with one certainty: because we cannot escape the logic of differentiation, **we are often tempted by the logic of defilement. To say as much is not to argue that we are imprisoned within a particular and permanent system of representations.** To be sure, **danger is often represented as disease, dirt, or pollution.** As one medical text argues: "Disease is shock and danger for existence."32 Or as Karl Jaspers maintains: "Disease is a general concept of non-value which includes all possible negative values."33 But **such concerns have less to do with the intrinsic qualities of those conditions than the modernist requirements of order and stability: "Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative moment, but a positive effort to organize the environment."**34 One might suggest that **it is the extent to which we want to organize the environment—the extent to which we want to purify our domain— that determines how likely it is that we represent danger in terms of dirt or disease. Tightly defined order and strictly enforced stability, undergirded by notions of purity, are not a priori conditions of existence; some order and some stability might be required for existence as we know it** (i.e., in some form of extensive political community), **but it is the degree of tightness, the measure of strictness, and the extent of the desire for purity that constitute danger as dirt or disease.** But **the temptation of the logic of defilement as a means of orienting ourselves to danger has more often than not been overpowering, largely because it is founded on a particular conceptualization of "the body";** in its use since at least the eighteenth century, this conceptualization demands purity as a condition of health and thus makes the temptation to defilement a "natural" characteristic. **This has endowed us with a mode of representation in which health and cleanliness serve the logic of stability, and disorder is rendered as disease and dirt.** In the eighteenth century, when state forms were becoming the most prevalent articulations of extensive political community, these modes of representation began to take a new turn that intensified the capacity of representations of disease to act as discourses of danger to the social.

In France, a number of notions that would be fundamental to the medicalization of society materialized around the time of the Revolution. Including the myth of a clergy-like national medical profession and the supposition that pacific republics would be totally free of disease, these notions altered the conception of medicine and changed the functioning of the body politic metaphor. In this context, Foucault argues, **medicine shifted from simply being an ensemble of practices for curing ills to a concern with the knowledge of the healthy, nonsick, and model man.**35 In association with a more widespread intellectual shift from juridical discourses that promulgated natural rules to a concern with codes of normalization, **this development meant that medicine reoriented its principal focus from that which was healthy to that which was normal. In this context, "when one spoke of the life of groups and societies, of the life of the race, or even of the 'psychological life/ one did not think first of the internal structure of the organized being, but of the medical bipolarity of the normal and thepathological."**36 **This development did not mean that representations of danger ceased to function in terms of disease, dirt, or some other form of defilement. Rather, it meant that just as "the body" functioned as a trope for the social, "disease" now functioned as a trope for the pathological in opposition to the normal.**

While the bipolarity of normal/pathological appears to derive its authority as a regulative ideal for society from its medical origins, this fact should not obscure the contested and problematic nature of such an understanding within the practice of medicine. Although the common effect of this bipolarity is to assume that "normal" refers to natural or desired health marked by the complete absence of disease, there have been many debates within medicine concerning the extent to which disease itself is something of a biological norm.37 That is, few if any people are marked by the complete absence of ailments or physical problems, and most surveys show that large numbers of people who live in a perfectly happy and satisfactory way possess physiological characteristics that depart markedly from statistical averages and would be a source of ill health to some.38 As a result, a medical conclusion would be that "if the normal does not have the rigidity of a fact of collective constraint but rather the flexibility of a norm which is transformed in its relations to individual conditions, it is clear that the boundary between the normal and the pathological becomes imprecise."39 Most important, **the variability inherent in physiological norms, and their subsequent lack of universality, means that the imputation of a clear distinction between health and disease—which is the regulative desire of the bipolarity of normal/pathological in the political realm—is an understanding effected by a social and cultural logic. It is not something mandated by medical knowledge.** In consequence, proclaims Canguilhem: "Pathological constants have a repulsive and strictly conservative value."40

Chinese threat mentality is racist and causes serial policy failure and war

Wei (Master’s at Dartmouth College) 12

(Li Juan, THE AMERICAN CHINA THREAT MENTALITY, Master’s Thesis in Liberal Studies, March 2012, pg. 77-79)

The American China threat mentality has become an effective tool that perpetuates American exceptionalist practice in respect to U.S. relations with China and their dichotomous view of the world. It also helps shape the future trajectory of China‑U.S. relations.

The American China threat mentality basically evolved from three major trends including racial nativism in the late nineteen century, McCarthyist extremism in the Cold War and the new American exceptionalism in the post‑Cold‑War era. This evolution started in the late nineteenth century when racial nativism was in full swing, cultivating the fear of the Chinese immigrants. The climax of this nativist movement was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. This fear and exclusion of the Chinese immediately morphed into the fear of Communism during the Cold War. McCarthyism definitely culminated in this paranoia of Communism or Chinese communism in particular. This extremist mindset and practice continued after the Cold War and was further reflected in the new American exceptionalism which supplied the American China threat mentality with the friend‑or‑foe binary opposition and the exceptionalist norm that promoted the American political model and legitimized its transgressions of and exemptions from the rule of law. Moreover, as suggested by Galtung's oscillation model, Americans' misunderstanding of the stark realities of Chinese politics and economy from 1949 to 1958 also enhanced Americans' misperceptions of China and further contributed to this China threat mentality.

Grounded on the friend‑or‑foe rationale and exceptionalist norm, the American China threat mentality not only was reflected in American public opinion of China as well as U.S.‑China policy, but also found its way into the discourse of American mainstream media and scholarly works. The scrutiny of the media discourse and scholarly publications concerning the four pivotal incidents in the history of China‑U.S. relations reveals that mass media reified the American China threat mentality by virtue of using those events as a way to revive Americans' Cold War memory, criticize the Chinese government and therefore accentuate the enemy image of the Chinese government and communism.

In a bigger picture, the American China threat mentality followed a zigzag pattern similar to Galtung's oscillation model. This pattern featured alternating periods of the waxing and waning of the China threat mentality, corresponding to the fluctuation of American public opinion on China. To be specific, the waxing of this China threat mentality was parallel to the 9‑year distribution period and the waning to the 9‑year growth period.

In a similar fashion, China‑U.S. relations showed a curvy pattern as well. From the confrontation and containment in the 1950s to the moderate improvements in the bilateral ties between the two in the 1960s, China‑U.S. relations fluctuated widely. From the nascent opening contacts and rapprochement in 1970s to the increasing military and economic cooperation in the 1980s, the fluctuation of China‑U.S. relations continued. From the strategic engagement in the 1990s to the widespread concerns over China's future economic trajectory and military prowess in the 2000s, China‑U.S. relations oscillated in the same manner. With a clear sight on the similar zigzag patterns of the American China threat mentality and China‑U.S. relations, one can predict that China‑U.S. relations will continue to fluctuate the conceivable future.

With growing interdependence and interweaving economies, America can no longer operate its relations with China by virtue of the American China threat mentality and the dichotomous view of the world. It will be in the interest of our nations to seek common ground while reserving our differences. Moreover, lack of historical perspective and a completely shallow understanding of the roots of Chinese culture in Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism will only misguide America and create more problems than solve.

Additionally, the misperception of Americans in viewing all Communism as the same lacks the understanding that post‑Cultural Revolution communism in China was a system that while flawed in some ways, worked for the Chinese people. Americans did not dare to admit that the communism at that time in China was actually saving a country of over 500 million people'97 from foreign oppression, domestic tyranny, constant warfare and starvation. It was Americans' imperative in post World War II to contain all of communism in the world which led to American policy seeking to ring China with a circle of strategic holdings. Another reason for America perceiving communism in the world and Chinese communism in particular as a threat was that communism was frequently linked to notables such as Stalin, and this threat of communism was a self‑created and self‑fulfilling fallacy predicated on the paranoiac aspect of American politics, which will only perpetuate actual conflicts or even wars.

#### The aff’’s binary between the US and Russia leads to endless war

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The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post- Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in-security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense. In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjects as "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. Everyone is expected to defend everything with **every possible means**. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows. In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity – already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence – unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.

**Heg spurs war with Russia and China – extinction.**

**Roberts 10** [Paul Craig Roberts, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy and associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. He was columnist for Business Week, Scripps Howard News Service, and Creators Syndicate. He has had many university appointments. The Road to Armageddon, Foreign Policy Journal, February 26, 2010 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/02/26/the-road-to-armageddon]

The U.S. has already encircled Iran with military bases. The U.S. government intends to neutralize China by seizing control over the Middle East and cutting China off from oil. This plan assumes that Russia and China, nuclear armed states, will be intimidated by U.S. anti-missile defenses and acquiesce to U.S. hegemony and that China will lack oil for its industries and military. The U.S. government is delusional. Russian military and political leaders have responded to the obvious threat by declaring NATO a direct threat to the security of Russia and by announcing a change in Russian war doctrine to the pre-emptive launch of nuclear weapons. The Chinese are too confident to be bullied by a washed-up American “superpower.” The morons in Washington are pushing the envelope of nuclear war. The insane drive for American hegemony threatens life on earth. The American people, by accepting the lies and deceptions of “their” government, are facilitating this outcome.

Space cooperation inevitable – debris.

Moltz 11 [James Clay, Associate Professor and Academic Associate for Security Studies – National Security Affairs faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, 'China, the United States, and Prospects for Asian Space Cooperation', Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 20, Issue 68 January 2011 20:68, 69 – 87]

But the increasing crowding of space itself, the need for improved control over debris, and expanded efforts to avoid collisions are providing top-down pressures on all countries—regardless of region—to cooperate more closely in 'managing' space. While relatively autonomous policies were possible in the early decades of space activity, recent events (such as the 2007 Chinese ASAT test and the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision) and the resultant increase in orbital debris have forced countries and their militaries to begin thinking more collectively about space. The recent willingness of the US Air Force to expand its international data sharing on conjunction analysis regarding space debris and satellite collisions marks a significant evolution in American thinking. China's restraint from conducting additional kinetic ASAT tests since 2007 may be part of the same learning curve. These factors suggest that increasing cooperation and transparency may yet emerge in the coming years, since states recognize that the alternative is the possible loss of safe access to low-Earth orbital space.

Human diversity, medicine and evolutionary limits check.

Gladwell 95 [Malcolm, New York bureau chief of The Washington Post, New Republic, July 17]

This is what is wrong with the Andromeda Strain argument. Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost, and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is almost invariably lethal because its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms. If there are any conclusions to be drawn about disease, they are actually the opposite of what is imagined in books such as The Hot Zone and The Coming Plague. It is true that the effect of the dramatic demographic and social changes in the world over the past few decades is to create new opportunities for disease. But they are likely to create not homogeneous patterns of disease, as humans experienced in the past, so much as heterogeneous patterns of disease. People are traveling more and living in different combinations. Gene pools that were once distinct are mixing through intermarriage. Adults who once would have died in middle age are now living into their 80s. Children with particular genetic configurations who once died at birth or in infancy are now living longer lives. If you talk to demographers, they will tell you that what they anticipate is increasing clusters of new and odd diseases moving into these new genetic and demographic niches. Rare diseases will be showing up in greater numbers. Entirely unknown diseases will emerge for the first time. But the same diversity that created them within those population subgroups will keep them there. Laurie Garrett's book is mistitled. We are not facing "the coming plague." We are facing "the coming outbreaks."

2. Self-interest means no extinction.

MacPhee and Marx 98 [Ross, American Museum of Natural History and Preston, Aaron, Diamond AIDS Research Facility, http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit1.html]

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

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#### Restrictions on war powers could include restrictions on any weapons system – nuclear weapons, land mine bans, cluster bombs, chemical weapons – it’s why we need a ‘human’ limit

**Lobel, 8** - Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School (Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War” 392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391, <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf>)

The third theory—based on the distinction between general rules and specific tactics—also has surface appeal, but is unworkable when applied to specific issues because the line between policy and tactic is too amorphous and hazy to be useful in real world situations. For example, how does one decide whether the use of waterboarding as a technique of interrogation is a policy or specific tactic? Even if it is arguably a specific tactic, Congress could certainly prohibit that tactic as antithetical to a policy prohibiting cruel and inhumane treatment. So too, President Bush’s surge strategy in Iraq could be viewed as a tactic to promote a more stable Iraq, or as a general policy which Congress should be able to limit through use of its funding power. Congress can limit tactical decisions to use particular weapons such as chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, or cluster bombs by forbidding the production or use of such weapons, or simply refusing to fund them.42 Congress could also, however, enact more limited and specific restrictions to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons or land mines in a particular conflict or even a particular theater of war. Indeed, most specific tactics could be permitted or prohibited by a rule. In short, the distinctions between strategies and tactics, rules and detailed instructions, or policies and tactics are simply labels which are virtually indistinguishable. Labeling an activity with one of these terms is largely a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, these labels are not helpful to the real problem of determining the respective powers of Congress and the President.43

#### Links to our limits offense – their evidence concedes that the plan is “other forces” not, forces and that it includes stuff like satellites – creates a whole new topic

**US Defense Report 3**

(RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO MISSION AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES, http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/us-defense-report/2003/14\_Appendix\_Resources\_Allocated.pdf)

Section 113(l) of Title 10, United States Code, requires the Department of Defense¶ (DoD) to identify resources allocated to mission and support activities in each of the five¶ preceding fiscal years. In response to that requirement, Appendix C provides year-byyear comparisons of: ¶ • DoD funding (in constant dollars) allocated to forces and infrastructure (Table ¶ C-1).1¶

\*\*\*footnote inserted\*\*\*

FORCE CATEGORIES¶ • Expeditionary Forces. Operating forces designed primarily for nonnuclear ¶ operations outside the United States. Includes combat units (and their organic¶ support) such as divisions, tactical aircraft squadrons, and aircraft carriers. ¶ • Deterrence and Protection Forces. Operating forces designed primarily to deter ¶ or defeat direct attacks on the United States and its territories. Also includes¶ those agencies engaged in U.S. international policy activities under the direct ¶ supervision of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ¶ • Other Forces. Includes most intelligence, space, and combat-related command, ¶ control, and communications programs, such as cryptologic activities, satellite ¶ communications, and airborne command posts.

#### Also includes cyberspace which proves a topic coherence da if their interpretation is correct, then including ‘offensive cyber operations’ in the topic would be redundant and unnecessary, since cyber command falls under the uniformed services – this means their interpretation isn’t predictable

**USSTRATCOM, 13** (“U.S. Cyber Command” current as of August, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber\_Command/)

USCYBERCOM is a sub-unified command subordinate to U. S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Service elements include: Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER); Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER); Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM); and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER). The Command is also standing up dedicated Cyber Mission Teams to accomplish the three elements of our mission.