### FW

Our interpretation is that an affirmative should defend a topical action by the USfg as the endpoint of their advocacy. This does not mandate roleplaying, immediate fiat or any particular means of impact calculus.

“USFG should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

The Aff undermines the ability to have a limited and stable number of Affirmatives to prepare against. This is a reason to vote negative.

First is Decision-making

Increasing the abstraction of debates and undermining stasis hampers the decision-making benefits of debate

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decision-making is the most important facet of education we could take away from debate – key to success in any future role

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

Next is substantive side bias

Surely the Aff will say the Neg can still debate them on the substance of their advocacy but not defending the clear actor and mechanism of the resolutional produces a substantive side bias.

Affirmatives that don’t defend the resolution make deploying other strategies against them inordinately Aff tilted. They have the ability to radically recontextualize link arguments, empathize different proscriptive claims of the 1AC while using traditional competition standards like perms to make being impossible inordinately difficult.

And we have an external impact to this net benefit

Sufficient research-based preparation and debates focused on detailed points of disagreement are crucial to transforming political culture

Gutting (professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) 13

(Gary, Feb 19, A Great Debate, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/?emc=eta1)

This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But our political “debates” seldom deserve the name. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.”

Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”).

There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique.
Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.

Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — part of our political culture? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points?

A first condition is that the debates be **focused on specific points of major disagreement**. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake.

Another issue is the medium of the debate. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They should not, however, be merely extemporaneous events, where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner. We want **remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses**.

And effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving all existential problems

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

Third is Mechanism Education

The Aff’s failure to ID a clear mechanism of change has the most devastating effects on the quality of debates. It makes link comparisons vacuous and means that detailed and well prepared PICs about substance, everyone’s favorite and most education part of debate are all but impossible.

We do not need to win that the state is good, rather just that the value of the state is something that should be debated about. This creates another standard for reading the Aff’s evidence – it can’t just indicate that the state or the resolution is bad or ineffective but that they should not even be discussed. Any of the aff’s ev on this account is simply proof that it can be done on the neg – no unique educational benefit to doing it on the aff, only provides an unfair tactical advantage to their arguments.

And this turns the Aff – debates over mechanisms for change are crucial to the success of leftist politics

Schostak (Professor of Education at Manchester Metropolitan University) 11

(John, Wikileaks, Tahrir Square – their significance for re-thinking democracy, Manchester social movements conference, April, http://www.enquirylearning.net/ELU/politics/tahrirwikileaks.html)

In his study of the conditions of work imposed by neo-liberal practices in France, Christophe Dejours (1998) has argued that political strategies, particularly those on the left, have not employed appropriate strategies of analysis. Without a good analysis of contemporary circumstances, he argues, **political strategies aiming at social justice will be deficient or wrong**. And **a good analysis for the production of appropriate strategies can only be accomplished through a multiplicity of collective reflections, debates and decision making in public spaces for public action(s).** The protests that have spread since the food riots in Algeria on the 6th January, the revolution in Tunisia and then the revolution in Egypt and then riots spreading to Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Jordan and others have drawn lessons from each other providing experience for the development of local strategies. Any protest will give insights into the conditions underlying the protests and the community and state structures, discourses, practices, and processes that tacitly if not explicitly underlie the social, political and economic order at local, national, transnational and global levels. This is why, it seems to me, that critically exploring from an educational and research perspective what has happened in response to Wikileaks and has been happening in the Middle East is so important today.

This is particularly true for education on this topic

Public sphere debates over engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and equips us to oppose the dominance of oil, coal, and other elitist interests they criticize

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.

These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48

Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy.

Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.

III. Conclusion

The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.

One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.

Parliamentary Politics

In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program.

This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.

Technical Debate

In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators.

The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria.

Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.

In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56

In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

CAP K

Capitalism make real enjoyment impossible, you can have anything you want as long as you don’t have it to excess. Revolution requires the necessarily painful rejection of this form of enjoyment

**Zizek 5** (http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/endconstruction/desublimation Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj Zizek Eric Dean Rasmussen 07-26-2005)

**What interests me is the following paradox: of how, precisely in our liberal societies, where no one can even imagine a transcendental cause for which to die, we are allowed to adopt a hedonistic, utilitarian, or even more spiritually egotistical stance - like, the goal of my life is the realization of all my potential, fulfillment of my innermost desires, whatever you want. The result is not that you can do everything you want, but a paradoxical situation: so many prohibitions, regulations. You can enjoy your life, but in order to do it, no fat, no sexual harassment, no this, no that. Probably never in human history did we live in a society in which, at the microlevel of personal behavior, our lives were so strongly regulated. To this paradox, I like to link another, which interests me even more: how this applies at all levels, not only at the personal level. Namely, how false is the official position that we live in a permissive society of consumption where you just consume until you drop, and so on. No, I think that if there is something which is paradigmatic for today's society, it's phenomena like decaffeinated coffee. You can consume coffee, but it should be decaf. Have beer, but without alcohol. Have dessert, but without sugar. Get the thing deprived of its substance. And the way this interests me is not only at this personal level. What is safe sex, but another name for sex without?** It makes me almost sympathetic to that famous racist notion in Europe, where they ask an African guy, "With such a high rate of AIDS, why don't you use more condoms?" and he responds, "It's like taking a shower with a raincoat on." But I tend to agree with it [chuckling], I'm sorry. Even war follows this logic. **What's Colin Powell's doctrine if not war without war? War, but with no casualties on our side, of course.** And I could go on. The emblematic product of all these phenomena is a chocolate laxative, laxative in the form of chocolate. Chocolate is perceived, at least in the popular imagination, as the main cause of constipation. So, advertisers devised a wonderful publicity slogan: still constipated, no problem, have another portion of chocolate. No wonder, then, that there is such a movement for, among some so-called radicals, to liberate the consumption of marijuana. Marijuana is precisely kind of a decaf coffee - opium, without opium. You can have it, but not fully. **The paradox for me, in this sense, is that precisely by dedicating your life to a full assertion of life, life's pleasures, you pay a price.**  **Now I come to truly answering you. What if this sounds almost proto-fascist, a celebration of violence and such? I will give you a horrible answer. "Why not?" This line of questioning is the typical liberal trap.** In These Times - those crazy loonies, they are my friends, I like them, Leftists - published an essay of mine apropos Leni Riefenstahl in which I ferociously attack a typical liberal reaction against fascism. 5 You don't really have a theory of fascism. So you look a little bit into history, encounter something which superficially reminds you of fascism, and then you claim that it's proto-fascist already. Before making her famous Nazi movies, Riefenstahl did so-called bergfilms, "mountain movies," filled with this heroic, extreme danger, climbing mountains, passionate love stories up there. Everybody automatically assumes these films must already be proto-Nazi. Sorry, but the guy who co-wrote the scenario for her best known early film, Das Blaue Licht (The Blue Light), Béla Balézs was a Communist. [Chuckles]. Now, liberals have an answer to this one, which is [spoken in a half-whisper] "this only proves how the entire society was already penetrated by the spirit of Nazism." No, I violently disagree. Take the most popular example used again and again by Susan Sontag in her famous text on Leni Riefenstahl: mass public spectacles, crowds, gymnastics, thousands of bodies. I'm very sorry, but it's an historical fact that the Nazis took these forms from the Social Democrats. Originally, these forms were Leftist. The liberal point would be, "Oh, this only proves how totalitarianism was in the air." I am totally opposed to this line of argument. We should not oppose something just because it was appropriated by the wrong guys; rather, we should think about how to reappropriate it. And I think that the limit is here - I admit it here, we are in deep critical waters - very refined, between...engaging in redemptive violence and what is truly fascist, the fetishizing of violence for its own sake. **A kind of litmus test is - this always works on all my friends - "How do you stand toward Fight Club, the movie?" All the liberals claim, "Ah, it's proto-fascist, violent, blah, blah, blah." No, I am for it. I think the message of Fight Club is not so much liberating violence but that liberation hurts. What may falsely appear as my celebration of violence, I think, is a much more tragic awareness. If there is a great lesson of the 20th-century history, it's the lesson of psychoanalysis: The lesson of totalitarian subordination is not "renounce, suffer," but this subordination offers you a kind of perverted excess of enjoyment and pleasure. To get rid of that enjoyment is painful. Liberation hurts. In the first act of liberation, as I develop it already in The Fragile Absolute, where I provide lots of violent examples - from Keyser Soze in The Usual Suspects, who kills his family (which I'll admit, got me into lots of trouble) to a more correct example, Toni Morrison's Beloved.** But, of course, now, I'm not saying what Elizabeth Wright, who edited a reader about me, thought. I love her, an English old lady. I had tea with her once, and she said, "I liked your book, The Fragile Absolute, but something bothered me. Do I really have to kill my son to be ethical?" I love this total naïveté. Of course not! My point was to address the problem of totalitarian control. **The problem is: how does a totalitarian power keep you in check? Precisely by offering you some perverse enjoyment, and you have to renounce that, and it hurts. So, I don't mean physical violence, or a kind of fetishization of violence. I just mean simply that liberation hurts. What I don't buy from liberals is this idea of, as Robespierre would have put it, "revolution without revolution," the idea that somehow, everything will change, but nobody will be really hurt. No, sorry, it hurts.**

Revolution is not a tea party—it requires violent struggle, our alternative is to embrance the violent exuberance of revolution, only repeating the Maoist-Leninist gesture of violently opposing capitalism makes new modes of social production possible

**Mao 27** (REPORT ON AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN HUNAN to CCP headquarters in Shanghai, Mao Zedong 1927)

**The main targets of attack by the peasants are the local tyrants, the evil gentry and the lawless landlords, but in passing they also hit out against patriarchal ideas and institutions, against the corrupt officials in the cities and against bad practices and customs in the rural areas. In force and momentum the attack is tempestuous; those who bow before it survive and those who resist perish.** As a result, the privileges which the feudal landlords enjoyed for thousands of years are being shattered to pieces. Every bit of the dignity and prestige built up by the landlords is being swept into the dust. With the collapse of the power of the landlords, the peasant associations have now become the sole organs of authority and the popular slogan "All power to the peasant associations" has become a reality. Even trifles such as a quarrel between husband and wife are brought to the peasant association. Nothing can be settled unless someone from the peasant association is present. The association actually dictates all rural affairs, and, quite literally, "whatever it says, goes". Those who are outside the associations can only speak well of them and cannot say anything against them. The local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords have been deprived of all right to speak, and none of them dares even mutter dissent**. In the face of the peasant associations' power and pressure, the top local tyrants and evil gentry have fled** to Shanghai, those of the second rank to Hankow, those of the third to Changsha and those of the fourth to the county towns, while the fifth rank **and the still lesser fry surrender to the peasant associations in the villages. "Here's ten yuan. Please let me join the peasant association," one of the smaller of the evil gentry will say.  "Ugh! Who wants your filthy money?" the peasants reply**. Many middle and small landlords and rich peasants and even some middle peasants, who were all formerly opposed to the peasant associations, are now vainly seeking admission. Visiting various places, I often came across such people who pleaded with me, "Mr. Committeeman from the provincial capital, please be my sponsor!" In the Ching Dynasty, the household census compiled by the local authorities consisted of a regular register and "the other" register, the former for honest people and the latter for burglars, bandits and similar undesirables. In some places the peasants now use this method to scare those who formerly opposed the associations. They say, "Put their names down in the other register!" Afraid of being entered in the other register, such people try various devices to gain admission into the peasant associations, on which their minds are so set that they do not feel safe until their names are entered. But more often than not they are turned down flat, and so they are always on tenterhooks; with the doors of the association barred to them, they are like tramps without a home or, in rural parlance, "mere trash". In short, what was looked down upon four months ago as a "gang of peasants" has now become a most honourable institution. Those who formerly prostrated themselves before the power of the gentry now bow before the power of the peasants. No matter what their identity, all admit that the world since last October is a different one. **The peasants' revolt disturbed the gentry's sweet dreams. When the news from the countryside reached the cities, it caused immediate uproar among the gentry.** Soon after my arrival in Changsha, I met all sorts of people and picked up a good deal of gossip. From the middle social strata upwards to the Kuomintang right-wingers, there was not a single person who did not sum up the whole business in the phrase, "It's terrible!" **Under the impact of the views of the "It's terrible!" school then flooding the city, even quite revolutionary minded**

**people became down-hearted as they pictured the events in the countryside in their mind's eye; and they were unable to deny the word "terrible". Even quite progressive people said, "Though terrible, it is inevitable in a revolution." In short, nobody could altogether deny the word "terrible".** But, as already mentioned, the fact is that the great peasant masses have risen to fulfil their historic mission and that the forces of rural democracy have risen to overthrow the forces of rural feudalism. **The patriarchal-feudal class of local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords has formed the basis of autocratic government for thousands of years and is the cornerstone of imperialism, warlordism and corrupt officialdom. To over-throw these feudal forces is the real objective of the national revolution.** In a few months the peasants have accomplished what Dr. Sun Yat-sen wanted, but failed, to accomplish in the forty years he devoted to the national revolution. This is a marvellous feat never before achieved, not just in forty, but in thousands of years. **It's fine. It is not "terrible" at all. It is anything but "terrible". "It's terrible!" is obviously a theory for combating the rise of the peasants in the interests of the landlords; it is obviously a theory of the landlord class for preserving the old order of feudalism and obstructing the establishment of the new order of democracy, it is obviously a counter-revolutionary theory. No revolutionary comrade should echo this nonsense. If your revolutionary viewpoint is firmly established** and if you have been to the villages and looked around, **you will undoubtedly feel thrilled as never before. Countless thousands of the enslaved -- the peasants -- are striking down the enemies who battened on their flesh. What the peasants are doing is absolutely right; what they are doing is fine!** "It's fine!" is the theory of the peasants and of all other revolutionaries. Every revolutionary comrade should know that the national revolution requires a great change in the countryside. The Revolution of 1911[3] did not bring about this change, hence its failure. **This change is now taking place, and it is an important factor for the completion of the revolution. Every revolutionary comrade must support it, or he will be taking the stand of counter-revolution. Then there is another section of people who say, "Yes, peasant associations are necessary, but they are going rather too far."** This is the opinion of the middle-of-the-roaders. But what is the actual situation? True, the peasants are in a sense "unruly" in the country-side. Supreme in authority, the peasant association **allows the landlord no say and sweeps away his prestige. This amounts to striking the landlord down to the dust and keeping him there. The peasants threaten, "We will put you in the other register!" They fine the local tyrants and evil gentry, they demand contributions from them, and they smash their sedan-chairs. People swarm into the houses of local tyrants and evil gentry who are against the peasant association, slaughter their pigs and consume their grain. They even loll for a minute or two on the ivory-inlaid beds belonging to the young ladies in the households of the local tyrants and evil gentry. At the slightest provocation they make arrests, crown the arrested with tall paper hats, and parade them through the villages, saying, "You dirty landlords, now you know who we are!" Doing whatever they like and turning everything upside down, they have created a kind of terror in the countryside. This is what some people call "going too far", or "exceeding the proper limits in righting a wrong", or "really too much"**. Such talk may seem plausible, but in fact it is wrong. **First, the local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords have themselves driven the peasants to this.** For ages they have used their power to tyrannize over the peasants and trample them underfoot; that is why the peasants have reacted so strongly. **The most violent revolts and the most serious disorders have invariably occurred in places where the local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords perpetrated the worst outrages. The peasants are clear-sighted. Who is bad and who is not, who is the worst and who is not quite so vicious, who deserves severe punishment and who deserves to be let off lightly -- the peasants keep clear accounts, and very seldom has the punishment exceeded the crime.** Secondly, **a revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous.**[4] **A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another. A rural revolution is a revolution by which the peasantry overthrows the power of the feudal landlord class. Without using the greatest force, the peasants cannot possibly overthrow the deep-rooted authority of the landlords** which has lasted for thousands of years. The rural areas need a mighty revolutionary upsurge, for it alone can rouse the people in their millions to become a powerful force. **All the actions mentioned here which have been labelled as "going too far" flow from the power of the peasants, which has been called forth by the mighty revolutionary upsurge in the countryside. It was highly necessary for such things to be done in the second period of the peasant movement, the period of revolutionary action. In this period it was necessary to establish the absolute authority of the peasants. It was necessary to forbid malicious criticism of the peasant associations. It was necessary to overthrow the whole authority of the gentry, to strike them to the ground and keep them there.** There is revolutionary significance in all the actions which were labelled as "going too far" in this period. To put it bluntly**, it is necessary to create terror for a while in every rural area, or otherwise it would be impossible to suppress the activities of the counter-revolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry.** Proper limits have to be exceeded in order to right a wrong, or else the wrong cannot be righted.[5] **Those who talk about the peasants "going too far" seem at first sight to be different from those who say "It's terrible!" as mentioned earlier, but in essence they proceed from the same standpoint and likewise voice a landlord theory that upholds the interests of the privileged classes. Since this theory impedes the rise of the peasant movement and so disrupts the revolution, we must firmly oppose it.**

### K

**To call for a ballot is to breathe life into the system, a system content on devouring and consuming all beings and potentialities for the sake of dead labor which is turned on its head for more and more production - resistance is a sight for power to exert itself. To vote aff is to vote for production, prefer exhaustion.**

**Bifo 11** – Whit Whitmore’s pen name

(Franco “Bifo” Berardi, *After the Future* pg 106-108 (of my copy), dml)

Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

Trying to create change is bad—traps us within capitalist systems and is depression

Genosko and thoburn 11—philosophers

(Gary and Nick, After the Future pg 6-7, dml)

Activism, Bifo argues, is the narcissistic response of the subject to the infinite and invasive power of capital, a response that can only leave the activist frustrated, humiliated, and depressed. Bifo here locates this modern political configuration with Lenin, and makes a most heretical statement: “I am convinced that the 20th century would have been a better century had Lenin not existed”. He diagnoses this condition in these pages through a reading of Lenin’s bouts of depression, but we would highlight that elsewhere Bifo also identifies the problem in Félix Guattari, a most surprising move, given the sophistication of Guattari’s schizoanalytic critique of authoritarian political subjectivation. Bifo developed his friendship with Guattari while in exile from Italy in the 1980s, a period that Guattari characterized as his “winter years”, the coincidence of personal depression and neoliberal reaction. Under these conditions, a certain political activism appeared central to Guattari, but not so to Bifo: “I remember that in the 1980s Félix often scolded me because I was no longer involved in some kind of political militancy. … For me, militant will and ideological action had become impotent” (Berardi 2008: 13). For Bifo, at times of reaction, of the evacuation of political creativity from the social field, activism becomes a desperate attempt to ward off depression. But it is doomed to fail, and, worse, to convert political innovation and sociality into its opposite, to “replace desire with duty”: Félix knew this, I am sure, but he never said this much, not even to himself, and this is why he went to all these meetings with people who didn’t appeal to him, talking about things that distracted him… And here again is the root of depression, in this impotence of political will that we haven’t had the courage to admit. (Berardi 2008: 13) One can discern two aspects to Bifo’s analysis of depression. It is a product of the “panic” induced by the sensory overload of digital capitalism, a condition of withdrawal, a disinvestment of energy from the competitive and narcissistic structures of the enterprise. And it is also a result of the loss of political composition and antagonism: “depression is born out of the dispersion of the community’s immediacy. Autonomous and desiring politics was a proliferating community. When the proliferating power is lost, the social becomes the place of depression” (Berardi 2008: 13). In both manifestations, depression is a real historical experience, something that must be actively faced and engaged with – we cannot merely ward it off with appeals to militant voluntarism. We need to assess its contours, conditions, products, to find an analytics of depression, and an adequate politics. And that is the goal of this book, a first step toward a politics after the future, and after the redundant subjective forms of which it was made.

Vote negative on presumption - the poem has already been introduced into the word. The artist has no tie to the poem.

Bryant 12 - Professor of Philosophy at Collin College (Levi R., Author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, and political theory, July 22nd, 2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/22/machinic-art-the-matter-of-contradiction/)

An artist friend of mine asked me what I’ll be discussing at The Matter of Contradiction conference in Limosine, so I thought it might be nice to post a few words here on where I’m going. I’m a bit terrified by this talk as I’m not an artist and I believe that philosophers should recognize the situated knowledge and practices of other fields rather than presuming to legislate over them. Following Badiou, I believe that philosophers should not so much seek to legislate or dictate to other practices, as hear their Truths. My talk will be focused on three interrelated points. First, I’m interested in emphasizing the materiality or real autonomy of art, or that it is not simply about something, but is something. For me, works of art are objects or machines in their own right, that circulate throughout the world independent of their makers. A work of art is no less a thing or machine than a person, rock, or tardigrade. They take on a life of their own and have their own singular powers and properties. In my view, there’s a tendency to ignore the powers of art per se, to always reterritorialize it on artists intentions and audience receptions, rather than exploring the being of the work of art as a real entity in the world as such. While I agree with everything you say about the production of the work of art– that the production of art involves an immersion of the artist in the medium with which he works such that both artist and medium become something different in the activity of production and such that there isn’t a pre-existent model of the work of art in the artist’s mind that’s then simply placed in material embodiment –I want to argue that art works enjoy a sort of autonomy from both their makers and audiences. We know little about the author of the Epic of Gilgamesh or the creators of the French cave paintings, yet these things are still nonetheless able to resonate and act in the world. There’s thus a way in which, I think, works of art are in excess of all contexts (author’s intention, historical setting, audience reception, etc); and it is because they are in excess of context that they are able to endure throughout the ages. Works of art are perpetually escaping all historical and hermeneutic horizons, all regimes of attraction, and falling into new regimes of attraction modifying them in all sorts of ways. They are examples of the Lucretian clinamen or swerve and are inexhaustible in their ability to produce swerves. This is what the historicists and hermeneuticians miss in their approach to art: the excess of art over any and all historical context or horizon, the constitutive being of art as clinamen. This excess over every horizon is possible because art is a material being. To my knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari do the best job of emphasizing the being of art as object or machine. In chapter 7 of What is Philosophy?, they claim that art preserves and is the only thing that preserves. Paraphrasing them, they point out that Mona Lisa’s smile is preserved in oil for all eternity, or at least until the paint and canvas decay. While I don’t share the view that art is the only thing that preserves, their point is nonetheless well taken. They begin from the observation that art is a material being, an object, not a meaning. In this vein they speak of art works creating blocks of affect and sensation. Reference to “blocks” should be taken literally. The art work does not represent a percept, affect, or sensation, it creates a percept, affect, or sensation that has now become an autonomous material being in its own right, liberated from dependence on the sense organs. These blocks of affect are literally things out there in the world, not just experiences in the sense organs of a person. read on! Second, I want to argue that works of art are machinic rather than hermeneutic. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari say that the unconscious is a factory, not a theater. By this they mean that the unconscious does not represent or mean, but that it produces. I want to say that works of arts are factories or machines, not theaters. They don’t have meanings, but are powers of producing differences in the world. They are real actors. They do not represent, even in the tradition of realism, but make. I read Proust, for example, and his exquisite discussion of various emotional states has the power to actually create new forms of affect in me that I never before had. I begin to love as Proust’s characters do. The work of art is thus a factory that both transforms the artist that creates it (artists tell me that they become something else as a result of their work) and that transforms the audiences that encounter the work. Works of art are difference engines that circulate throughout the world and that transform the people and things that encounter them. Picasso’s Guernica does not represent the bombing of Guernica, but both transforms the event of that bombing, giving it a new sense, and creates an affect for the slaughter of the innocents everywhere.

If they win some model of subjectivity in relation to the artistic piece is good, it would be better to vote negative anyway. Make the aff a suicide bomber.

Fernando 10 (Jeremy Fernando, The Suicide Bomber and her gift of death, 2010, pg 213 - \_\_\_, DA: 1/24/12)

The poet, irremediably split between exaltation and vulgarity, between the autonomy that produces the concept within intuition and the foolish earthly being, functions as a contaminant for philosophy – a being who since Plato, has been trying to read and master an eviction notice served by philosophy. The poet as genius continues to threaten and fascinate, menacing the philosopher with the beyond of knowledge. Philosophy cringes. If we recall the words of Paul Cenan, the words that we turned to earlier, that of “poetry does not impose itself, it exposes itself,” one’s instinctive reaction – the thought that comes to mind without thinking, without knowing – is the question ‘expose itself to what?’ Whilst it is easy, too easy, to dismiss a naïve question like that, it would be to our detriment if we choose not to attend it, not to attend a possibility that sometimes lies in the simplest of questions, the silly questions, as it were. After all, if one exposes oneself, it can only be so if there was something, or someone to expose oneself to. There has to be a witness to the exposure, otherwise there would not be one at all. Hence, exposure is always a state of establishing a relationality with another. It is not a relationality that seeks to impose a particular, single, meaning, reading upon another. And this is why poetry continues to menace the philosopher with the beyond of knowledge; without an imposition, the borders are not drawn, the limits are not set. And whilst not forgetting the registers that Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida opened earlier – yes there are only always rules to seeing, and we are always already in grammar, always bounded by grammar – the lack of a boundary also always opens more possibilities than we can account for. One may not even be overstating if one claims that at this point, all accounting systems which are set up to predict, to control, via graphs, curves, probabilities – fail. Whilst exposing itself, and hence, opening itself to response, any response, poetry “always risks what it cannot avoid appealing to in reply, namely, recompense and retribution. It risks the exchange that it might expect but is at the same time unable to count on. Once the poem is sent off, set off, one can only hope for a response. In fact, one always gets a response; even a non-response, a complete ignoring of the poem, is a form of response. It is just that one can never know what kind of response one is going to get. Once the poem is set of, the poet remains completely blind to its effects. Once the bomb is set off, the suicide bomber s completely blind to its effects. It is probably of no coincidence that the suicide bomber is usually constituted as one who is completely irrational, cast as a complete idiot; the most common question heard whenever there is an instance of a suicide bombing is ‘why would one give up her life when she has so much to live for? All attempts to provide an answer to the question are banal, as the very person that the answer attempt to address is dead; hence all answers are unverifiable. One has no choice but to admit that all reason eludes, escapes, is beyond one, is beyond the limits of one’s cognition, is at the beyond of knowledge. Perhaps the only thing we can say is that she gives up her life in spite of the fact that she has so much to live for; after all, it is she who chooses to do so. Whilst this does not provide any answer to the question, provide any comfort that we finally understand her, this is all we can say. Perhaps it is the fact that she remains an enigma that is her gift to us. It is the refusal to be understood, to be subsumed under any existing conception, to be flattened, exchanged, reproduced, that is her gift. And in that same spirit, it is not a gift that can be understood – this is not a gift that one can bring to the return-counter at the shop, to be exchanged for something else, something more palatable, something easier, something more comfortable, more comforting. This is a gift that is unknowable, in full potential, always possible; perhaps always a gift that is to come. What continues to trouble us is that this gift – as with all gifts – comes with an obligation to reciprocate, an obligation to respond. So even though this is an objectless gift – and to compound it a gift that we might not even begin to comprehend, or even know is present – we are always already within the realm of reciprocation. This is the point where the eternal question of the serpent, that of what did she mean’, returns to haunt us, along with the other question of responding, and attempting an appropriate response at that; the question of Lenin, that of “what is to be done?” If we attempt the question of Lenin, that of “what is to be done?” If we attempt to answer the question, to provide a prescription, then we are back to the situation of effacement. Perhaps then the task that we are faced with is that of reconstituting Lenin in and within a situation. If the question of ‘what is to be done’ is a situational question, there can be no answer outside of the situation – at the point of uttering both the question and the answer, we are always immanent to the story, in the making, even when we are the ones telling the story to the other – and more than that, each answer is at best a provisional answer. However, the fact that one can even attempt an answer suggests that at least momentarily, one must be able to “step back” as it were, be exterior to the question, to situation. Hence, each answer, each definition to the question can only be accomplished as a more or less provisory, more or less violent arresting of a dynamic that is interminable, but never simply interminable or infinite. For a dynamic such as this can only be conceived as a series of highly conflictual determinations, as a movement of ambivalence, in which the other is always being seized as a function of the same, all the while eluding this capture. The other becomes the intimate condition of the possibility of the game, remaining all the while out of bounds. It is the ambivalence that is the key in this provisionary relationship between the question and the situation; a relationship between the question and the situation; a relationality that Sam Weber points out is constantly unsure of itself, as we can never be in a position that is totally ‘immanent’ to the stories we tell because – here as elsewhere – the stories are not immanent to themselves. This is why we cannot be entirely in a game or story, any more than we can be squarely outside the stories we tell. But if in dreams, as in popular narratives, “there is no place one can go to photograph the whole scene,” it is not because, as we read in Just Games, “there is no exteriority,” but because in a certain sense, there is only that; as soon as the unconscious is in play, we are dealing with an exteriority that tries to exclude itself, in other words to internalize, incorporate, appropriate itself, without managing to do it. But if we can never succeed in this impossible effort, neither can we renounce it, and it is precisely this double impossibility that makes the game of unconscious both imprecise (because it is never completely determinable) and ambivalent (because it is always in the process of arresting itself, of revolting around a “fixation”). In all of this, there is always already an echo of the strange pairing of despair and hope in the Beckettian formulation of not being able to go on, but yet having to at the same time. We also hear this strange paradox resound in Wolfgang Schirmacher’s wonderful response to aporia, one that he formulates in his deceptively simple maxim of “Just Living”. This is not a over-arching philosophy to life – one that frames, guides, or attempts to be a framework – but the exact opposite; it is a response to life itself. All you can ever do is choose, respond, life – live your life; live your life; life as a concept, life in general, will take care of itself. In other words, in order to live life, you have to actually distance yourself, at least momentarily, from life as an idea, and actually be ambivalent to life. When one is asked how to life, the only answer – which is at best a provisional response – you just do. And perhaps it is this ambivalence towards the answer – of having to come up with a provisional answer whilst knowing that it is only provisional at the same time – that allows one to maintain a proper distance as it were, towards the answer, towards a final solution. This proper distance is also the space of irony, where one recognizes the multitude of possibilities that rest within every singularity, where each possibility – or meaning – is but one of the multiplicities, where every interpretation like narration, is not simply external… it is also an active participant (while still distorting it). Hence, the story, the tale, is inseparable from a process of interpretation that in turn implies a play (and a relation) of force. In maintaining this proper distance, there is also the maintaining of a certain tension between unity and disunity – that characterizes all games as such. And it is this tension that maintains the space between, the site of negociation, and the continual negotiation; this tension is precisely the tension of relationality itself. When poetry “exposes itself” it is exposing itself to this very tension, to the possibility of relationality, all the while maintaining this ambivalence, and ambiguity, as to the exact nature of that relationality. The significance of this exposure, this ambiguity, comes to light if we recall Jean Baudrillard and his lamentation that ‘the possibility of metaphor is disappearing in every sphere’. This disappearance as he posits, is due to the “viral loss of determinancy” that of transparency, of utter and absolute exchandability; in other words, when everything is like everything lose and one can no longer distinguish between objects any longer. It is this lack of distance between objects that results in them disappearing into each other, into meaninglessness. For, the very name for this ambivalence, this proper distance itself, is metaphor. It is metaphor that allows us to name, to call, and to witness. And it is also metaphor that doesn’t allow the names to sink into one another, doesn’t allow names to equate with each other, prevents them from disappearing into utter nothingness. Perhaps it might be momentarily disturbing to consider the suicide bomber in this lift, as the one that remains to remind us of the impossibility of determining, the impossibility of knowing who or even what (s)he is. But in the spirit of thinking, recalling the bravery needed to think that Georges Bataille invokes, one must be willing to consider this possibility, whilst never resting in any surety, or finality, that this is a solution of any sort. In this sense, all one can do at this point is post the possibility that the suicide bomber is our remainder in these times of instant answers, a reminder of the impossibility of answering. After all, one must never forget that we can only named as such after her death. Hence, she is always already named in absence, named in the absence of all referentiality, where all possibility of legitimizing the name which requires the knowledge of her subjective will – is lost; (s)he is named as a suicide bomber even though there is nothing we can say of her except the fact that she is dead.

### K

They deify sacrifice. Valorization of the act makes sacrifice ITSELF the one thing that stands beyond critique.

The endless reintroduction of meaning through the affirmation of sacrifice as an act of defiance is itself the essence of the modern world.

Our alternative is to sacrifice the sacrifice, to demonstrate the impossibility of sacrifice

Elisabeth Arnould, lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, “The Impossible Sacrifice of Poetry: Bataille and the Nancian Critique of Sacrifice,” Diacritics 26.2, 1996

Sacrifice is unquestionably the most prominent model in Bataille's thinking of finitude. But it is also, if one accepts Nancy's allegations, the most problematic. While hoping to find in the exemplarity of sacrifice a new paradigm for the thinking of finitude, Nancy explains in "The Unsacrificeable," Bataille does nothing but resubmit this finitude to the most traditional determinations of ontotheology. Sacrifice remains, in Bataille's thought, a deficient model for finitude insofar as it continues to be conceptually dependent on traditional philosophical and Christian interpretations of sacrifice. Thus, Nancy asserts that the characteristic valorization Bataille grants to the finite and cruel moment of immolation in his rethinking of sacrifice does nothing but repeat, by simply inverting its valence, the classical interpretation of an occidental sacrifice that conceives itself as the ideal sublation of this same moment. The philosophical and Christian version of sacrifice is understood as the spiritual transformation of a sacrificial moment the finite nature of which it denounces even as it appropriates its power. The Bataillian version, on the contrary, insists upon this finite moment in order to escape the dialectical comedy that transforms sacrifice into an ideal process. Performed in the name of spiritual rebirth, the sacrifices of Plato and Christ, for instance, reappropriate death by transfiguring it as resurrection. Grotesque and replete with horrors, death in Bataille appears alone on a stage whose cruelty is neither explained nor redeemed through transfiguration. Thus, Bataille withholds nothing from the scene of sacrifice but lets it emerge in the fullness of its amorphous violence. He valorizes its sanguinary horror in order to denounce the dialectic idealization of a death nothing should domesticate. He exhibits it "as it is": opaque, silent, and without meaning. According to Nancy, however, the valorization itself remains caught in the sacrificial logic of the idealist tradition. For, he argues, only in light of its ontotheological conceptualization can sacrifice become at once the infinite process of dialectical sublation and the blood-spattered moment this process both negates and sublates, simultaneously [End Page 87] avers and contests. The Bataillian thesis, granting efficacy and truth (reality) to sacrificial cruelty, is irremediably linked to the processes of dialecticization and spiritualization through which the philosophical and Christian West appropriates the power of sacrifice. It is the cruel counterpart of its idealization. And if this conception gives to sacrificial death an importance proportionally opposite to that which it receives from the Christian and philosophical transfiguration--since the finite truth of death plays at present the role of the infinite truth of resurrection--it still does nothing but repeat its ontotheological scheme. For it also pretends to find, on the cruel stage of sacrifice, a singular and more "real" truth of death. The stage of the torment is, for Bataille, that place where death appears with the full strength of a nonmeaning that can be exposed only through the immolation of the sacrificial victim. If this is so, then should we not suppose that this immolation pretending to give us the "inappropriable" truth of death's rapture appropriates in its turn the excess of the "excessive" meaning of this rapture? Does it not transform its excess into an "excessive truth," to be sure a negative one, though no less absolute than the philosophical and spiritual truths to which it opposes itself? At the heart of modern theories of sacrifice is thus, as Nancy puts it, a "transappropriation of sacrifice" by itself, even when, as is the case for Bataille, this theory tries to overcome sacrifice's spiritual operation through an excessive and volatile negativity. As soon as sacrifice thinks itself as revelation, be it that of a spiritual beyond or its negative counterpart, it remains a sacrifice in the name of its own transcendence, a loophole to a finitude powerless to think itself in terms other than those of a revelation: the revelation of a clear or obscure god, symbol of resurrection or of death's blind horror. If one wants to think finitude according to a model different from that of its sacrificial appropriation, one should think "apart from" sacrifice. If finitude is, as Bataille has himself wanted to think, an "access without access to a moment of disappropriation," then we must also call it "unsacrificeable" [Nancy 30].

2NC

And, don’t misunderstand us, it is *the revolution itself* that creates value to life, not any sort of utopian society

**Zizek 2** (A Plea for Leninist Intolerance Author(s): Slavoj Zizek Reviewed work(s): Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 2002), pp. 542-566 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344281)

The Leninist Utopia Which, then, is the criterion of the political act? Success as such clearly doesn't count, even if we define it in the dialectical way of Merleau-Ponty, as the wager that future will retroactively redeem our present horrible acts (this is how, in his Humanism and Terror, Merleau-Ponty

provided one of the more intelligent justifications of the Stalinist terror: retroactively, it will become justified if its final outcome will be true freedom)53; neither does the reference to some abstract-universal ethical norms. The only criteria is the absolutely INHERENT one: that of the ENACTED UTOPIA. In a proper revolutionary breakthrough, the utopian future is neither simply fully realized, present, nor simply evoked as a distant promise which justified present violence - it is rather as if, in a unique suspension of temporality, in the short-circuit between the present and the future, we are - as if by Grace - for a brief time allowed to act AS IF the utopian future is (not yet fully here, but) already at hand, just there to be grabbed. Revolution is not experienced as a present hardship we have to endure for the happiness and freedom of the future generations, but as the present hardship over which this future happiness and freedom already cast their shadow - in it, we ALREADY ARE FREE WHILE FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM, we ALREADY ARE HAPPY WHILE FIGHTING FOR HAPPINESS, no matter how difficult the circumstances. Revolution is not a Merlo-Pontyan wager, an act suspended in the futur anterieur, to be legitimized or delegitimized by the long term outcome of the present acts; it is as it were ITS OWN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF, an immediate index of its own truth. Let us recall the staged performance of "Storming the Winter Palace" in Petrograd, on the third anniversary of the October Revolution, on 7 November 1920. Tens of thousands of workers, soldiers, students and artists worked round the clock, living on kasha (the tasteless wheat porridge), tea and frozen apples, and preparing the performance at the very place where the event "really took place" three years earlier; their work was coordinated by the Army officers, as well as by the avant-garde artists, musicians and directors, from Malevich to Meyerhold. Although this was acting and not "reality," the soldiers and sailors were playing themselves - many of them not only actually participated in the event of 1917, but were also simultaneously involved in the real battles of the Civil War that were raging in the near vicinity of Petrograd, a city under siege and suffering from severe shortages of food. A contemporary commented on the performance: "The future historian will record how, throughout one of the bloodiest and most brutal revolutions, all of Russia was acting"54; and the formalist theoretician Viktor Shklovski noted that "some kind of elemental process is taking place where the living fabric of life is being transformed into the theatrical."55 We all remember the infamous self-celebratory First of May parades that were one of the supreme signs of recognition of the Stalinist regimes - if one needs a proof of how Leninism functioned in an entirely different way, are such performances not the supreme proof that the October Revolution was definitely NOT a simple coup d'etat by the small group of Bolsheviks, but an event which unleashed a tremendous emancipatory potential? The archetypal Eisensteinian cinematic scene rendering the exuberant orgy of revolutionary destructive violence (what Eisenstein himself called "a veritable bacchanalia of destruction") belongs to the same series: when, in October, the victorious revolutionaries penetrate the wine cellars of the Winter Palace, they indulge there in the ecstatic orgy of smashing thousands of the expensive wine bottles; in Behzin Meadow, after the village Pioneers discovers the body of the young Pavlik, brutally murdered by his own father, they force their way into the local church and desecrate it, robbing it of its relics, squabbling over an icon, sacrilegiously trying on vestments, heretically laughing at the statuary... In this suspension of the goal-oriented instrumental activity, we effectively get a kind of Bataillean "unrestrained expenditure" - the pious desire to deprive the revolution of this excess is simply the desire to have a revolution without revolution. It is against this background that one should approach the delicate issue of revolutionary violence which is an authentic act of liberation, not just a blind passage a l'acte.56 And did we not get exactly the same scene in the Great Cultural Revolution in China, with the thousands of Red Guardists ecstatically destroying old historical monuments, smashing old vases, desecrating old paintings, chirping off old walls?57 In spite of (or, rather, because of) all its horrors, the Great Cultural Revolution undoubtedly did contain elements of such an enacted utopia. At its very end, before the agitation was blocked by Mao himself (since he already achieved his goal of reestablishing his full power and getting rid of the top nomenklatura competition), there was the "Shanghai Commune": one million workers who simply took the official slogans seriously, demanding the abolition of the State and even the Party itself, and the direct communal organization of society. It is significant that it was at this very point that Mao ordered the restoration of order.

**univ**

**Zizek 8** (Tolerance as an Ideological Category, Slavoj Zizek summer 08 in Critical Inquiry)

In the same way, the French royalists were victims of the cunning of reason, blind to the universal (capitalist-republican) interest served by the pursuit of their particular royalist goals. They were like Hegel’s valet de chambre who doesn’t see the universal dimension, so there are no heroes for him. More generally, an individual capitalist thinks he is active for his own profit, ignoring how he is serving the expanded reproduction of universal capital. It is not only that every universality is haunted by a particular content that taints it; it is that every particular position is haunted by its implicit universality, which undermines it. **Capitalism is not just universal in-itself, it is universal for-itself, as the tremendous actual corrosive power that undermines all particular lifeworlds, cultures, traditions, cutting across them, catching them in its vortex. It is meaningless to ask the question, Is this universality true or a mask of particular interests? This universality is directly actual as universality, as a negative force mediating and destroying all particular content.** In this precise sense, Brown’s ironic rejection of liberalism’s claim of *kulturlos* universality misses the (Marxist) point. Capitalism (whose ideology liberalism is) effectively is universal, no longer rooted in a particular culture or world. This is why, as I have written, Badiou recently claimed that our time is devoid of world: **the universality of capitalism resides in the fact that capitalism is not a name for a *civilization,* for a specific cultural-symbolic world, but the name for a truly neutral economico-symbolic machine which operates with Asian values as well as with others, so that Europe’s worldwide triumph is its defeat, self-obliteration. The critics of ‘Eurocentrism’ who endeavor to unearth the secret European bias of capitalism fall short here: the problem with capitalism is not its secret Eurocentric bias, but the fact that it *really is universal,* a neutral matrix of social relations**.10 A possible argument against capitalist universality is that, within each civilization, the same capitalist mechanisms are symbolized, integrated into the concrete social whole, in a different way (they certainly affect a Protestant society differently than a Muslim one). So **while capitalism certainly is composed of a set of transcultural features, it nonetheless functions within each society as a particular subsystem integrated each time into a specific, overdetermined articulation, that is, into the texture of socialsymbolic relations. It is like the use of the same words by different social groups; although we all talk about *computers* or *virtual reality,* the scope of meaning of these terms is not the same in a San Francisco hacker community and in a small working-class town in economic depression. Precisely for this reason, the capitalist matrix of social relations is real; it is that which, in all possible symbolic universes, functions in the same transsymbolic way. Even if it doesn’t mean the same thing to individuals in different communities, even if it doesn’t inscribe itself into the totality of their lifeworlds in the same way, it generates the same formal set of social relations, pursuing its circular movement of self-reproduction. In the U.S. or in China, in Peru or in Saudi Arabia, the same profit-oriented matrix is at work. The same logic holds for the emancipatory struggle. The particular culture that tries desperately to defend its identity has to repress the universal dimension active at its very heart, that is, the gap between the particular (its identity) and the universal, which destabilizes it from within. This is why the “leave us our culture” argument fails. Within every particular culture, individuals do suffer, women do protest when forced to undergo clitoridectomy, and these protests against the parochial constraints of one’s culture are formulated from the standpoint of universality. Actual universality is not the deep feeling that, above all differences, different civilizations share the same basic values; actual universality appears (actualizes itself) as the experience of negativity, of the inadequacy-to-itself of a particular identity. The formula of revolutionary solidarity is not *let us tolerate our differences,* it is not a pact of civilizations, but a pact of struggles that cut across civilizations, a pact between what, in each civilization, undermines its identity from within, fights against its oppressive kernel. What unites us is the same struggle.** A better formula would thus be**: in spite of our differences, we can identify the basic antagonism of the antagonistic struggle in which we are both caught; so let us share our intolerance and join forces in the same struggle. In other words, in the emancipatory struggle, it is not the cultures in their identity that join hands; it is the repressed, the exploited and suffering, the parts of no-part of every culture that come together in a shared struggle.** Such universality remains concrete in the precise sense that, once formulated, its persistence is not guaranteed; every historical epoch has to find its own specific way to accomplish the breakthrough to universality (and there are epochs that fail in this endeavor and remain blind to the universal dimension of a work in question, just as most of both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were blind to Shakespeare). **This universality, which emerges out of a violent breakthrough, is not the awareness of the universal as the neutral frame that unites us all (“in spite of our differences, we are basically all human”); it is the universality that becomes for-itself in the violent experience of the subject who becomes aware that he is not fully himself (he does not coincide with his particular form of existence), that he is marked by a profound split. Universality becomes for-itself in the particular element that is thwarted in its endeavor to reach its identity.**

**Micropower and the reduction of all politics to discursive interprellation prevents any radical formulations of resistance**

**Feldner and Vighi 7** ( *Zizek, Beyond Foucault* Fabio Vighi & Heiko Feldner 2007 Probably qualled?)

Let us now move on to Zizek’s criticism of the second standard approach to ideology within contemporary critical theory, i.e. discourse analysis. With Zizek’s understanding of discourse analysis the Habermasian ‘Enlightenment critique of ideology’ is turned on its head, as the focus shifts on the invasive presence of discourse: instead of ideology falsifying reality for the sake of pathological interests (power strategies), **we start from the assumption that there is no way to access and conceptualise reality which is not already stained by discourse. The term ideology thus becomes redundant, Zizek argues, for what counts in critical analysis is that every ideological stance we assume is always-already parasitised by an intricate network of discursive devices whose function is to structure our point of view in advance, silently bestowing an appearance of necessity upon it. As with traditional ideology critique,** Zizek duly acknowledges the diagnostic value of discourse analysis with its emphasis on how every ideological position emerges as the result of a complex interaction of discursive procedures. Ernesto Laclau, one of Zizek’s regular interlocutors, is a perfect case in point here, since his claim that the veil of ideology conceals a relentless fight for hegemonic space, which articulates itself through a series of discursive appropriations, represents perhaps the most intriguing application of ideology–*critical* discourse analysis today**. Zizek’s main concern with discourse, however, relates to the classic Foucauldian notion that the discursive battle for hegemonic space functions as a somewhat spontaneous event, that is to say, as an occurrence which is disengaged from the top-downward logic of ideological pressure: as Foucault himself repeatedly claimed, power operates first and foremost at the level of micro-power**, i.e. through a plurality of discursive mechanisms that constitute themselves from below. **Zizek is far from convinced by what he calls Foucault’s ‘suspect rhetoric of complexity’, to the extent that he eventually discards it as ‘a clear case of patching up, since one can never arrive at Power this way – the abyss that separates micro-procedures from the spectre of Power remains unbridgeable’** (Zizek, 1994b, 13). **Along with its dubious emphasis on the political significance of micro-procedures, Foucauldian discourse analysis, according to Zizek, is most importantly liable for doing away with any conceptualisation of radical externality**, as we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4. **In discourse analysis one always starts from the presupposition that it is impossible ‘to draw a clear line of demarcation between ideology and actual reality’, which in turn prompts the conclusion that ‘the only non-ideological position is to renounce the very notion of extra-ideological reality and accept that all we are dealing with are symbolic fictions, the plurality of discursive universes, never “reality”’. In Zizek’s view, this boils down to nothing but a ‘*slick “postmodern” solution*’ (Zizek, 1994b, 17), a stratagem which, in fact, ends up favouring the proliferation of ideology**. Thus, key to his critique is the question of externality: while the traditional positing of a conceptually viable space outside ideology is delusive, **the negation of externality *tout court* is also defective, for it thwarts the articulation of radical political projects. Moving beyond traditional critical theory (where ideology deforms ‘true’ reality) and discourse analysis (where ideology is turned into an all-encompassing discursive practice), Zizek identifies a third model, whereby a place outside ideology is possible, but ‘*it cannot be occupied by any positively determined reality*’ (Zizek, 1994b, 17). What is situated beyond the ideological can never be retrieved as a rational paradigm, *and for this very reason (because it relates to a non-discursive core) it is ideology at its purest*.** Again, we ought to insist on a fundamental point here, which we shall develop in full in the following chapters. The excess of ideology is not conceived by Zizek as a meta-narrative, or a transepochal unchangeable feature (as many of his detractors, amongst which for example Judith Butler, often complain). Rather, **what he emphasises against traditional historicism is that all historical/societal concretions are answers to the same formal deadlock or impossibility, which however manifests itself through different contents, thus requiring different strategic interventions. If every society is sustained by a secret reference to some excessive element, this element is historically determined and necessarily mobilises radically heteronomous logics.** As previously anticipated, **Zizek often describes the Althusserian logic of ideological interpellation via a reference to the superego and its covert injunction to enjoy, insofar as the superego’s policing role hinges on its shadowy double, a surplus of secret, disavowed or illicit enjoyment. Every prohibition, in other words, is sustained by a secret investment in *jouissance*. This stance proves vitally significant for a drastic reconfiguration of the political scope of subjectivity, for it generates the argument that the subject’s full ideological potential is paradoxically realised in *jouissance*, in a senseless and unconditional injunction to enjoy. Consequently, since ideological interpellation ‘is operative only in so far as it is not openly admitted’ (Zizek, 2000a, 266), the best way to undermine its grip would be to assume its repressed libidinal core: if ideology functions ‘by proxy’, i.e. through its excessive and disavowed kernel, the subject’s only chance to challenge the ubiquitous grip of ideology is via identification with this explosive kernel. This consideration brings us directly to the crucial notion of ‘the act’** and, with it, to a reflection on the question of agency; both these questions shall be developed fully in Part II.

1. **Their willingness to act within the political horizons of capitalism, to not question the role of democracy and create *new* forms of political engagement Anything**

 **Zizek 1** (Repeating Lenin http://www.lacan.com/replenin.htm)

Here, **Lenin's stance against economism as well as against pure politics is crucial today, apropos of the split attitude towards economy in (what remains of) the radical circles: on the one hand, the above-mentioned pure "politicians" who abandon economy as the site of struggle and intervention; on the other hand, the economists, fascinated by the functioning of today's global economy, who preclude any possibility of a political intervention proper. Today, more than ever, we should here return to Lenin: yes, economy is the key domain, the battle will be decided there, one has to break the spell of the global capitalism - BUT the intervention should be properly POLITICAL, not economic. The battle to be fought is thus a twofold one: first, yes, anticapitalism. However, anticapitalism without problematizing the capitalism's POLITICAL form (liberal parliamentary democracy) is not sufficient, no matter how "radical" it is.** Perhaps **THE lure today is the belief that one can undermine capitalism without effectively problematizing the liberal-democratic legacy which - as some Leftists claim - although engendered by capitalism, acquired autonomy and can serve to criticize capitalism. This lure is strictly correlative to its apparent opposite, to the pseudo-Deleuzian love-hate fascinating/fascinated poetic depiction of Capital as a rhizomatic monstre/vampire which deterritorializes and swallows all, indomitable, dynamic, ever raising from the dead, each crisis making it stronger, Dionysos-Phoenix reborn... It is in this poetic (anti)capitalist reference to Marx that Marx is really dead: appropriated when deprived of his political sting.**

The 1AC is an object that speaks for ITSELF - voting for the affirmative is NOT voting for the 1ac, vote negative on presumption.

Bryant 12 - Professor of Philosophy at Collin College (Levi R., Author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, and political theory, July 24th, 2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/24/radical-ethnography-or-situated-knowledge-a-response-to-a-friend/)

Your tone here sounds a bit irritated. I hope I didn’t provoke that as it wasn’t my intention. I don’t think I understood your point, but genuinely disagree with you. While I readily acknowledge that the cave painters were the cause of the paintings, I strongly disagree that the painters are a part of the being of the painting. Just as ones parents are the cause of one’s being while nonetheless the child is an autonomous being, the painting is an autonomous beings that have its own power that exceed any particular cultural or historical context. I don’t disagree that the question of what the paintings were for the cave painters is an interesting and important one, but in raising that question we’ve entered into a new machinic relation and are no longer talking about the paintings for themselves as autonomous entities that circulate throughout the world beyond their origins. What they were for a particular group is an important issue. My only point is that no work can ever be reduced– nor any entity, for that matter –can be reduced to what it is for another entity.

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#### **They are ontologically backward. Their desire to dissolve the self is grounded in a fundamental fear of non-being. Every piece of the 1ac makes this clear in its attempt to run from meaning, to run from the pain of selfhood. Say fuck it and make your meaning anyway. At best, even if they choose to dissolve themselves, there is no reason they should force that onto you.**

Stevenson No Date Herb, some guy writing about Tillich; “The Courage To Be” *Natural Passages; http://www.natural-passages.com/articles/courage-to-be.htm*

To take a stand, alone, is to acknowledge that, in terms of existence, each of us are totally alone. This aloneness is a place where our capacity to search for meaning in life, to search for one’s true purpose, and to struggle with the anxiety of one’s existence can evolve.3 In Rank’s terms, this is the life instinct to seek individuation, competency, and independence. An aberrant life instinct would be the life fear of having not developed sufficient internal authority to pursue individuation and instead become frozen in the desperation and fear of abandonment, separation, loneliness, and alienation.¶ Tillich notes that "courage is the self-affirmation of being in spite of the fact of nonbeing. It is the act of the individual self affirming itself either as part of an embracing whole or in its individual selfhood by taking the anxiety of nonbeing upon oneself. Courage always includes a risk, it is always threatened by the sense of nonbeing, whether the risk of losing oneself and becoming a thing within the whole of things or of losing one's world in an empty self-relatedness. Courage needs the power of being, a power transcending the nonbeing which is experienced in the anxiety of fate and death, which is present in the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness, which is effective in the anxiety of guilt and condemnation. The courage which takes this threefold anxiety into itself must be rooted in a power of being that is greater than the power of oneself and the power of one's world. Neither self-affirmation as a part nor self-affirmation as oneself is beyond the manifold threat of nonbeing." (Tillich, p. 155)

#### Their focus on the sacred and ateleological expenditure results in fascism

Bell, M.A. Thesis in the Theory, Culture and Politics Program at Trent University, 2008 [Jeremy, “Bataille, the Economic, and the Sacred: Working through the accursed share,” January, proquest, 91-96]

At the same time however, we need not apologize for the irrefutable problems with Bataille's vision, problems better recognized by those sympathetic to this vision than by its overt detractors. For although Sartre's critique of Bataille as a "nouveau mystique" or Breton's critique that "Bataille professes to wish only to consider in the world that which is vilest, most discouraging, and most corrupted"24 are not without their grain of truth, it is Caillois, Kojêve, and Walter Benjamin that properly identify the most problematic points of Bataille's vision. Caillois' criticism is the most obvious, the least surprising: simply put, Bataille's preoccupation with "mysticism, tragedy, madness, and death" borders on a pathological obsession that compromises the establishment of "a moral community... as accessible as the community of established science".25 Kojêve's criticism is subtler, but equally valid: in wanting to revitalize the sacred within contemporary existence the College generally but Bataille particularly were "wanting to play at being sorcerer's apprentices... [and that] a miracleworker, for his part, could no more be carried away by a sacred knowingly activated by himself, than could a conjuror be persuaded of the existence of magic while marveling at his own sleight of hand".26 Even if one does recognize a value in the sacred, in this time of its fragmentation, its internalization, how possibly could one knowingly revitalize it? Although Kojêve's critique may, ultimately, be wrong, the puzzles set forth within it move it toward Benjamin's criticism, by far the most grave and persistently pertinent. "According to Klossowski," Michel Surya writes, "recent German exiles (Walter Benjamin first and foremost, but also Hans Meyer...) grew worried that the College was toying with explosive ideas without realistically weighing up the consequences."27 These explosive ideas, as we know, concerned fascism. For although, as Michel Surya's biography of Bataille conveys in the most unequivocal terms, in the most immediate sense Bataille was passionately opposed to fascism, which is illustrated, for example, in "Nietzsche and the Fascists", his single- handed effort to rescue and differentiate Nietzsche's philosophy from its cooptation by the fascists, as well as the journal of Acephale generally, one of the central purposes of which was the refutation of fascist ideology, one cannot help but feel that, nonetheless, there is an unsettling truth to Benjamin's worries. Was it not fascism, more than any other ideology within the last century, which toyed with idea of the sacred, while at the same time expressing an uprootedness no longer binding it to explicit religious formations? Bataille was well aware of this, as he expresses in no uncertain terms in "The Psychological Structure of Fascism". Not only this, but even if Acephale was oriented around a headlessness antithetical to the "head" of a fascist state, is there not, nonetheless, an insidious character to the secret society which evokes for us the most disturbing occult configurations of the Nazis? Although, on the one hand, it is wrong and false to accuse Bataille of being a fascist, are we really surprised that he has elicited this criticism, continually, from his detractors? One way in which we can acknowledge these dangers while nonetheless retaining Bataille's essential lessons without exhaustively rehashing Bataille's biography is by returning to our earlier observations regarding negative entropy, and how this is counterbalanced by an interest in "remaining a child" in the face of "mere survival", particularly as these terms are configured in "The Survivor", Lyotard's essay on Hannah Arendt and the dangers of totalitarianism. For as Lyotard explains it here, echoing Bataille's observations in "The Psychological Structure of Fascism", the shortcoming of Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism rests in her failure to recognize the proper "origins of totalitarianism" in our relation to the heterogeneous, repressed, or sacred. Although her analysis elegantly illustrates the particular historical conditions responsible for its development, it fails to observe the manner in which totalitarian ideology makes use of the forces of attraction and repulsion by simultaneously drawing from the anxiety brought about by our relation to these forces and by presenting it as a tremendously threatening force disseminated across the political sphere It is for this reason that we cannot view the defeat of particular regimes as properly sufficient in exhausting the presence of these dangers within contemporary political structures or forms. What totalitarianism earlier accomplished through extermination camps and military ventures he argues, now occurs through what Lyotard describes as the administration of daily life, and — more generally — the processes of negative entropy wherein the human is no more meaningful than any other term within the system, the dangerous culmination of the concept of utility. For as Lyotard writes, Crude propaganda is discreet in democratic forms: it gives way to the inoffensive rhetoric of the media. And worldwide expansion occurs not through war, but through technological, scientific, and economic competition. The historical names for this Mr. Nice Guy totalitarianism are no longer Stalingrad or Normandy (much less Auschwitz), but Wall Street's Dow Jones Average and the Tokyo's Nikkei Index.28 Where efficiency and productivity are granted primacy, and the human is no more important than any other term within the system, what we have called the heterogeneous, the sacred, and the repressed, which Lyotard describes as our enigmatic relation to birth and death, is threatened with the possibility of permanent and absolute foreclosure, which he calls "mere survival" in a manner similar to his scenario regarding the death of the sun and our exit from planet earth. For Lyotard, our recognition of this danger, the dangers present within both totalitarianism and contemporary capitalism, of foreclosing our relation to the heterogeneous and the sacred while simultaneously disseminating it across the political sphere, can occur in "neither a remission nor a challenge" — both of which fall within the parallel systems of totalitarianism and capitalism — but rather, can only occur in "the scruple of an as if," which is what he calls childhood.29 Childhood, what Bataille might call sovereignty, I would like to argue, is our mode of relation to and recognition of what I have described as the epistemological or psychological dimension of the accursed share. For as Lyotard writes, The effect is childhood that knows all about as 0; all about the pain of impotence and the complaint of being too small, of being there late (compared to others) and (as to its strength) of having arrived early, prematurely—childhood that knows all about broken promises, bitter disappointments, failings, and abandonment, but which also knows all about dreaming, memory, question, invention, obstinacy, listening to the heart, love, and real openness to stories. Childhood is a state of the soul inhabited by something to which no answer is ever given. It is led in its undertakings by an arrogant loyalty to this unknown guest to which it feels itself a hostage. Antigone's childhood. I understand childhood here as obedience to a debt (which we call a debt of life, of time, of event; a debt of being there in spite of everything), a debt for which only the persistent feeling of respect can save the adult from bein no more than a survivor, a creature living on reprieve from annihilation. 0 Of course, our obedience to this debt, our arrogant loyalty to this unknown guest, our accursed share, is not simply accomplished and completed, but rather perpetually worked through in our effort — which we should not hesitate to call painful — to bear witness to that inaccessible point, wholly heterogeneous, where, in intimate immanence, a sacred animality is — momentarily — attained. Only by transgressing the boundaries and limits of negative entropy, the systematic peak of utility and use- value, can we overcome the horrible burden of time and rejoin in that sacred totality, where — acephalic — we can attain that "sovereign self-consciousness that, precisely, no longer turns away from itself."31 What I mean to suggest by this is that, in a certain sense, Bataille's thought does in fact hold a dangerous proximity to fascism, a danger moreover that is only heightened in our failure to recognize this proximity. This is not to say that his thought is fascist. Nonetheless, it is extremely important that we recognize how Bataille's fascination with mysticism, tragedy, madness, and death does, like the sorcerer's apprentice, enter into a dangerous game, a game that for this reason is to be played neither as a remission nor a challenge to the accursed share, this unknown guest to which the soul feels itself a hostage, but only with the scruple of an as if, a game that is only to be played with humility. For if we acknowledge, for example, that the human sacrifices offered by the Aztecs to satiate the thirst of the sun does approach a general economy founded upon consumption and expenditure, **it is not difficult to see how,** similarly**, concentration camps could also facilitate an economy of expenditure and consumption where nothing is left in reserve**. However, it is difficult to see how an economy of listening to the heart, love, and real openness to stories, as well as abandonment and dispossession, ultimately a childish economy of play, could lapse into the bloodshed of primitive war.