#### K Flow

#### Military goals—strucutured around a patriarchal idea of the role of the soldier and the military. Our introduction of women into combat solves. That’s Goodell

#### Myth of Masculinity—the introduction of women into combat collapses traditional ideas of strong male warriors, solves the reasons the military becomes militaristic. **Vojdoik**

#### Decision-making—increasing the role of women in the military reframes decision-making to less violent and masculinist frames, the plan changes our conception of national identity. **Statchowistch**

#### Military is a key zone to contest patriarchy—cultural structuring factor

#### Must risk some cooption to matter-- the alt either accomplishes nothing or is just as likely to be coopted as the aff

David **CAMPBELL**Human and Community Development @ UC Davis ‘**1** “Conviction seeking efficacy: Sustainable Agriculture and the politics of cooptation” *Agriculture and Human Values* 18 p.  360-362

**Conclusion**While co-optation cannot be avoided, it need not be framed as posing a stark choice between politically disengaged purity and politically engaged capitulation. As CAFF’s experience suggests, social and political movements retain a significant freedom to craft middle range strategies that adapt to political circumstances while retaining attachments to core values and constituencies. These strategies are by no means easy to conceive or execute, and pose tensions and tradeoffs for movement organizations. However, if framed as a built-in necessity of meeting movement goals given entrenched opposition, the strategies can be implemented in a spirit that sustains organizational vitality, and **broadens political and social impact**. They can also enlarge the democratic sensibilities of movement leaders, increasing their ability to listen, learn, and forge alliances based on shared goals. To be certain, the end results will owe much to the political power of opponents. Critique ofthese opponents, and the structural forces they represent, remains essential to movement organizing. But as CAFF organizers discovered, criticism gains its effective power when it is wedded to an ability to lead by example, and to offer **positive and realistic options**. In this process, tradeoffs cannot be avoided, but neither are they necessarily a zero-sum game in which participants always return to square one.

#### Their fear of cooption tanks alt solvency-- even if the aff is coopted, taking the risk can lead to real change

**Zizek 4**Slavoj, Senior Researcher, U of Ljubljana“Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj Zizek”; THE ELECTRONIC BOOK REVIEW; July 1, 2004; [www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?comman=view\_essay&essay\_id=rasmussen](http://www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?comman=view_essay&essay_id=rasmussen).

Zizek: I’m trying to avoid two extremes. One extreme is the traditional pseudo-radical position which says, “If you engage in politics - helping trade unions or combating sexual harassment, whatever - you’ve been co-opted and so on. Then you have the other extreme which says, “Ok, you have to do something.” I think both are wrong. **I hate** those**pseudo-radicals who dismiss every concrete action by saying that “This will all be co-opted.” Of course, everything can be co-opte**d [chuckles] **but this is just a nice excuse to do absolutely nothing**.**Of course, there is a danger**that - to use the old Maoist term, popular in European student movements thirty some years ago, “the long march through institutions” will last so long that you’ll end up part of the institution. **We need more than ever, a parallax view - a double perspective. You engage in acts, being aware of their limitations. This does not mean that you act with your fingers crossed. No,you fully engage, but with the awareness that - the ultimate wager** in the almost Pascalian sense -**is not simply that this act will succeed, but that the very failure of this act will trigger a much more radical process**

**We solve the root cause of American exceptionalism**

True ’5 – Lecturer in International Politics, University of Auckland, New Zealand (Jacqui, *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 221-222, http://gendocs.ru/docs/35/34939/conv\_1/file1.pdf)//SS

International Relations’ key concepts are neither natural nor gender-neutral: they are derived from a social and political context where¶ masculine hegemony has been institutionalized. Feminist scholars argue¶ that notions of power, sovereignty, autonomy, anarchy, security and¶ the levels of analysis typology in International Relations are inseparable¶ from the gender division of public and private spheres institutionalized¶ within and across states. These concepts are identified specifically with¶ masculinity and men’s experiences and knowledge derived from an¶ exclusive, male-dominated public sphere. Theorizing, as Burchill and¶Linklater state in the Introduction to this volume, (Chapter 1) is ‘the¶ process by which we give meaning to an allegedly objectified world “out¶ there” ’ . A feminist analysis reveals International Relations’ conceptual¶ framework as but one, partial attempt to make sense of world politics.¶The discursive separation of domestic and international politics,¶ together with the neo-realist aversion to domestic explanations for interstate relations, obscures the prior gendered public–private division¶ within states and masculine aversion to the latter’s association with¶ emotion, subjectivity, reproduction, the body, femininity and women.¶ Both mainstream and critical theories of world politics overlook this¶ private sphere because it is submerged within domestic politics and state¶ forms (Walker 1992; Sylvester 1994a). The ontology of mainstream¶ International Relations theory conceives the private sphere like the international sphere as natural realms of disorder. The lower being, represented¶ by women, the body and the anarchical system, must be subordinated to¶ the higher being, represented by men, the rational mind and state¶ authority. Jean Elshtain (1992) insists that the realist narrative of¶ International Relations, in particular, pivots on this public–private¶ division and its essentialist construction of femininity and masculinity as¶ the respective cause of disorder and bringer of order.¶ For feminist analysts, the independence of domestic politics from¶ international politics and the separation of public from private spheres¶ cannot be the basis for a disciplinary boundary, since anarchy outside¶ typically supports gender hierarchy at home and vice versa. Throughout¶ modern history, for example, women have been told that they will¶ receive equality with men, after the war, after liberation, after the¶ national economy has been rebuilt and so on: but after all of these¶ ‘outside’ forces have been conquered, the commonplace demand is for¶ things to go back to normal, and women to a subordinate place. As¶ Cynthia Enloe (1989: 131) has observed ‘states depend upon particular¶ constructions of the domestic and private spheres in order to foster¶smooth[er] relationships at the public/international level’.

**Our analysis disrupts the war on terror**

Wilcox 03 [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”]

These statements give several clues as to the implications of ”barbaric‘ behavior. Terrorists are barbaric and uncivilized, and opposed to democracy. Those who commit evil acts commit attacks against civilization, therefore, being uncivilized is equivalent to being evil. Finally, terrorists fight without rules, they kill innocents and women, and they are cowards, therefore they are barbaric and uncivilized. Overall, the message is clearly that of a dichotomous world, in which there are only two choices; civilization or barbarism, us or them.

In order to understand the significance of the use of the discourse of civilization versus barbarism in the war on terror, a brief history of this discourse is helpful. Applying the label ”barbaric‘ to people from the Middle East, or any non-white peoples is hardly a new historical development. In his book Orientalism˙ Edward Said critiques the discipline of Oriental Studies in the European and American academies for reproducing stereotypes and using their privileged status to create knowledge about people in the Middle East that served to justify and increase their control and domination over these people. 63 Said describes the relationship between West and the Middle East, as seen from the West, —to be one between a strong and a weak partner,“ and adds that, —many terms were used to express the relations…The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ”different‘; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ”normal.‘ “64 This relationship is gendered in that ”Orientals‘ are assigned traits associated with femininity and inferiority. This dichotomous relationship is replicated in political discourses as well as in academic and literary circles.

The discourse of civilization/barbarism was used in order to justify colonialism of non-white peoples throughout the world, and has a long history in US foreign history. A people labeled ”uncivilized‘ is considered to be unable to rule themselves, and is need of guidance from more civilized people. The use of force against ”barbarians‘ is also justified.65 Furthermore, the rules of humane and civilized warfare do not apply to wars against ”barbaric‘ peoples. Against this background, the use of the discourse of barbarism can be seen as an attempt to foretell the coming war and to persuade people of the necessity of using force against al-Qaeda and their hosts in Afghanistan. The additional measures of control, surveillance, and detention of Middle Eastern and North African men in the process of securitizing immigration served to harass, demean and subordinate this ”inferior‘ masculinity, contributing to the constructing of the hegemonic masculinity of American men. The ”special‘ registration requirements for the National Security Entry-Exit System is evidence of the gendered inside/outside, us/them distinction in regards to national identity. This program, instituted as part of the securitization of immigration, serves to support the construction and maintenance of the current articulation of hegemonic masculinity, which differentiates American men as superior to men in the Middle East. The special registration requires that men and boys over the age of fifteen with non-immigrant visas from countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, countries with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Pakistan, and an outlier, North Korea, be interviewed and have their whereabouts tracked by the INS.66 These persons will be finger printed and photographed, with their fingerprints matched against fingerprints of known or suspected terrorists and used by law enforcement. They are also required to submit personal contact information, and are required to notify the Attorney General when the change addresses. These measures are in addition to the detention and questioning of thousands of men of Arab or Muslim background after the September 11 that tacks, some allegedly detained without access to attorneys or proper food.67 The INS has also recently changed its policy on asylum, as people seeking asylum from thirty-three countries, mostly in the Middle East, are now being detained pending the processing of their applications, where previously they have been released.68 By concentrating on men as the ”outsiders‘ Middle Eastern men specifically service not only as the ”other‘ that American identity is contrasted again, but a feminized ”other‘ that American masculinity is defined against.

Other Flows

#### Agamben’s account of barelife is wrong

Robert Eaglestone, Prof. of Comparative Literature And Thought @ Univ. of London, ‘4 [*The Holocaust and the Postmodern*, p. 322-3]

Thirdly, and importantly from a Levinasian perspective, Agamben's bare **life is too** bare, too much like Heidegger's abstract Dasein. For Levinas, the 'bare fact of life is never bare'.16 'Bare life' is **intentional, not simply 'there', even in the case of the Muselmann**. We do not have 'bare life' and then eat or warm ourselves. Eating and warming are what life consists of. 'Bare life' is not hungry or cold: cold and hunger are what makes up 'bare life'. And in the eight testimonies cited in Agamben's Remnants of Auschwitz there are suggestions the **Muselmann maintained an interest** in food, warmth, and survival (T used to . . . look for skins in the trash' (RA 166); 'I kept myself warm when the Germans weren't watching' (RA 166); 'I just wanted to survive another day' (RA 167); 'They spoke only about their memories and food' (RA 168). This is significant because it is precisely on the content of 'bare life' and experience that crucial arguments, discussed below**, about the nature of the human turn**. For Levinas, the ethical signifies 'within experience' (TI 23). That is, he argues that ethics—the relation with the other—is grounds of the possibility of experiencing the world in the first place. Levinas, in this respect, is a good phenomenologist, and seeks to make his case by recourse to reflection on experience alone. Beyond or behind all philosophical, political, or theological language, for Levinas, the act of facing is the source of ethics. This arises not from doctrines of humanism or from education, but from the experience of the other. Ethics relies not on human life but what is between human lives. This **ethics is not one of reassurance, it** does **not mobilize a morality but a responsibility.**

#### reject their standing reserve impact—thinking mass death in terms of being and the equation of agriculture with the holocaust elevates the perpetrators form of being—makes us thoughtless in terms of actually understanding specific impacts/atrocities.

Todd PRESNER Comp Lit and Jewish Studies @ UCLA ‘6 “Heidegger, Arendt, and the Modernity of Mass Death” Telos Vol. 135 Summer p. 102-105

To understand this strange phrase, we need to look back to Heidegger's second Bremen lecture, "The En-framing" ["Das Ge-Stell"], where he clarifies the concept of Bestandstucke. In this lecture, he is concerned with how technology reduces the essence of being by turning it into something available, able to be used, stored, manipulated, and distributed at will. Technology-such as tractors, power plants, motorized vehicles, and, we might add, gas chambers-"en-frames" being by transforming it into an object to be tapped and, as necessary, kept in reserve or stock, as a Bes- tand. He explains:

What the machine brings out piece for piece, it puts in the reserve of that which can be ordered. That which is brought out is a piece of stock [Bestand-Stack] The pieces of stock are the same piece for piece. Their piecemeal character demands this uniformity. As the same thing, the pieces are cut off from one another in the most extreme sense; in this way, they solidify and secure precisely their piecemeal character . ... A piece of stock is replaceable by another . ... Ordinarily, we imagine something lifeless when we think of the word "piece," although one can speak of a piece of cattle. The piece of stock is, however, bound to an order from which it is placed. Man also belongs, certainly in this regard, to this framing, be it that he works on a machine, be it that he constructed and built the machine within the order of the machinery .... Man is in this way a piece of stock [Bestand-Stack], in the strong sense of the words stock and piece. (BV 36-37)

In other words, technology has a leveling effect, producing over and over again objects that are, in their essential qualities, the same. These objects- as replaceable, uniform pieces-can be called up, used, and consumed.

In the concentration camps and gas chambers, according to Heidegger, technology was used to turn human beings into "pieces of stock in a reserve of the fabrication of corpses." Their bodies became "uniform" pieces, "cut off" from and "replaceable" by one another; the corpses in the death camps are "the same piece for piece." Human beings have been reduced, in Arendt's horribly accurate phrase, to "superfluous human material," which is, in its corporeal form, all the same (OT 443). It is in this regard that Heidegger can argue that "agriculture is now a motorized food-industry, in essence the same thing as the fabrication of corpses in the gas chambers and death camps" (BV 27). Reserves of food, like reserves of corpses, are produced over and over again, in the same fashion, in the same units or pieces, with the same kind of machinery. In every case-whether the motorized food industry, the production of corpses in the gas chambers, or the starvation of millions in China-individuality is replaced by the mechanized, mass production of the same.

We can now understand what Heidegger means when he maintains that the victims of the concentration camps and gas chambers did not die, that "everywhere there is massive misery of countless, atrocious deaths that have not died." The victims may not be alive anymore, but they did not die either; instead, they were turned into pieces of corpses, reserves of human material. To become a "piece of stock in the reserve of the fabrica- tion of corpses" is radically incommensurate with Heidegger's conception of death as "the shelter of the truth of being." Although the inmates in the concentration camps existed every second of every day toward death as a permanent possibility, their death does not count as authentic because it conferred no individuality. Dying is a permanent potentiality for being, my ownmost, insuperable possibility, which individualizes the conduct of my life. In the final analysis, the victims of the Nazi death camps did not die, and, hence, they have no "truth of being." Heidegger will not even name the victims as Jews because masses of corpses who did not die have no individual or group identities.

Unlike Arendt, Heidegger never attempted to understand the specific- ity or genealogy of the concentration camps. He refused to name, let alone describe, the victims and perpetrators or even speak about their actions in anything but the passive tense. And, at the same time, he never gave up the existential conception of authentic death, despite the fact that the distinction between inauthentic "fleeing" from death and authentic "being- towards-death" no longer made sense in a sociality designed exclusively for anonymous mass death. The very distinction between inauthenticity and authenticity is only tenable in a life-world where the possibility exists either to evade death by covering up the fact that it could come at any moment, or to live in such a way that death is always considered my own- most possibility, which no one can take away from me. In the death-world, one could neither flee in the face of death, nor could one become individualized by being-towards-death. The possibility of conceiving death authentically and inauthentically is foreclosed because the nature and presuppositions of death itself have changed. Mass death does not indi- vidualize but anonymize; death is no longer a possibility and individual potentiality for being but an absolute actuality, taken away from me and enforced by oblivion.

Nevertheless, perhaps it is tempting to be somewhat more charitable to Heidegger by recognizing how his remarks on the death camps betray a certain insight into the Nazi debasement of death and dying, even if he never mentioned the Holocaust or the victims by name. As Agamben wrote in his analysis of Heidegger: "[C]uriously enough, for Heidegger the 'fabrication of corpses' implied, just as it did for Levi, that it is not possible to speak of death in the case of extermination victims, that they did not truly die, but were rather only pieces produced in a process of an assembly line production."" After all, it was Primo Levi who suggested, with reference to the anonymous masses of Muselmänner tottering on the edge of living and dying, "One hesitates to call their death death."" it would seem that both Heidegger and Levi recognized the way in which the sociality of the death-world and the phenomenon of mass death not only produced masses of "walking corpses" but also degraded dying itself. As Agamben writes, "it is no longer possible truly to speak of death, that what took place in the camps was not death, but rather something infinitely worse, more appalling. In Auschwitz, people did not die; rather, corpses were produced. Corpses without death, non-humans whose decease is debased into a matter of serial production. 04

However, I think Heidegger is ultimately saying something else. Although his recognition of the debasement of death may have accorded with Arendt and Levi's trajectory of thought, Heidegger is also making a distinction between those who are capable of dying in its **essence** and **those who are not**. This is a distinction made from a life-world in which deportations, arbitrary imprisonment, starvation, terror, gassing, and mass death are not the structuring features of being in the world. According to Heidegger, those who were killed en masse did not die because dying is reserved for those who are capable of conducting their lives in such a way that they can still bear death in its essence. This distinction, it seems to me, has the effect of tacitly **elevating the perpetrators' mode of being** in the world precisely because they can bear death in its essence. Even as a mass murderer, the Nazi officer could still "authentically" be towards his own, individualized death. This fundamental structuring **distinction** between **authentic** and **inauthentic** dying becomes absurd, if not thought- less, in a sociality where anonymous mass death is its defining and ultimate purpose.

Their agency claims are politically disabling

Bernauer, 1990

(James, Professor of Philosophy @ Boston College, *Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought*, Humanities Press International, Pg. 147-151)

More than a few might be troubled by Foucault’s likening of our political condition to that of the early Christian era. For a long time the failure of the Second Coming to occur as anticipated bore major responsibility for a withdrawal from political concern and for a passivity in the face of history. How could it have been otherwise, if the focus of the age emphasized the awaiting of an event over which man himself had no control? Foucault’s comparison might be appropriate in a way that he himself had no intended. The same questions might be put to him as were posed after the appearance of *LMC*. Have these studies conspired with his earlier work to undermine the possibility of human action changing the reality it finds? Whereas his notion of epistemic systems had once prompted doubts about the political efficacy of his thought, it was now his perspective on power and its functioning that generated suspicion. Just as archeological thinking was divested of the target that the history of ideas had provided, so political movements were deprived of that clear opponent against which they struggled. Those movements that defined themselves in terms of the struggle against the power of the state or against the powers of a specific class seems to be antiquated. In the modern period, there is no king, no center of power to function as a magnet for revolt, only a vast network of diverse elements that have various natures and functions at different levels. While the notion of a transgression against a prohibitive power may be attractive and galvanizing—as it had been for Foucault in the past—the present deployment of power does not permit a conception of its overthrow as obeying a law of all or nothing. There is “no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary.” Against whom, or against which constitution, does one revolt when the complex system of power-knowledge within which we exist has neither a great man nor any particular group of individuals that is consciously responsible for putting the system into operation and for maintaining its functioning? Foucault does not evade the *possible* implications of the type of society that his analysis shows modernity to have fabricated. Bio-power may well maintain its hegemony, and the questions of common concern that emerge within its system may simply involve its smoother functioning. Such questions will be responded to not by political debate but by the increasing intervention of experts for whom general political discussion on such issues has become anachronistic. In the light of our contemporary deployment of power, Foucault did not avoid considering whether politics itself is threatened with extinction, that we are “perhaps experiencing the end of politics.” And yet Foucault’s imagining of this very real possibility is but a dimension of a critical hope. When he was censured in the past for having locked men into discourses and rules over which they had no control, Foucault argued that, far from wanting to make a prisoner of human being, his aim was to comprehend what needed to be changed and how such transformations could be enacted. Which it is true that he deprived the “sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right” to effect such transformation—which is only an obvious acknowledgement of the situation—the point of his studies was to master the rules in regard to which human creativity could operate. He had wanted to demonstrate how fragile an epoch’s order of things actually is so as to “show up, transform and reverse the systems which quietly order us about.” Foucault’s analysis of power led to a similar form of response. One always exists within a specific deployment of power, and to nurture a wish to be outside of power is merely to cultivate a private fantasy. At the same time, this is not to say that one is trapped by the specific distribution of power in which one finds oneself. In fact, Foucault felt that his analysis if power had given hope regarding resistance to it. The other side of power’s pervasiveness is precisely the omnipresence of the resistance it discovers. No ruse of reason can guarantee ultimate triumph to the system of power that is at work, and its adversaries are as scattered, as multiple, and as heterogeneous as power itself. The opposition to power is the twin of its birth, an opposition that is constituted, with different intensities at various times, of “mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages on a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds.” Power cannot be considered a massive, irresistible force, since so many within a specific society, so much within a particular individual, have to cooperate for it to function and its objectives to be realized. As “soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance. We can never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy.” The political function of the intellectual is tied to this task of modification.

Without the state authority warlords will take control -- they use violence, exploit the people, and replicate the worst aspects of the state structure

Jackson 3 Paul Jackson, International Development Department of the University of Birmingham, UK (2003):

Warlords as alternative forms of Governance, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 14:2, 131-150 Tandfonline

Use of Violence to Reassert Local Power

With the complete breakdown of moral authority and the law, let alone any means of enforcement, the only recourse is to establish rule through force.

The violence associated with warlords is the most publicised aspect of their activity, and its seeming randomness is undoubtedly one of the most horrific characteristics of warlords. The casual nature of violence within areas held by warlords is symptomatic of the gang culture outlined by Lary in China, but equally resonant of earlier cultures of violence.

Replacement of Formal Structures with Gang Mentality

The collapse of formal structures and norms, including formal military structures, lead warlords to develop their own internal structures. In particular, the replacement of hierarchical structures with gang cultures, with the warlord and close associates at the core of the gang. This gang culture manifests itself in particular ways, not least of which is the fact that gangs act as a spur to further violence by subgroups. In other words, the replacement of formal structures by ad hoc, primitive and personalised control leads to a behavioural logic based on the licensing of gratuitous violence.

The gang culture has a further element of interest: the development of subgroups. These subgroups may be smaller gangs, or alternatively part of the larger group aiming to progress up the pecking order. One of the features of all periods of warlord rule has been the behaviour of smaller groups of armed men on the periphery of the gang, which adds a further element of randomness into the violence. We will return to this below.

Lack of state authority means endless war among factions

Woodward 99 Dr. Susan L. Woodward, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, served as Head, Analysis and Assessment Unit, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, UNPROFOR, in 1994, and was associate professor of political science at Yale University prior to joining Brookings Naval War College Review, 00281484, Spring 99, Vol. 52, Issue 2 “Failed states” Academic Search Premier

The loss of a state's monopoly on authority to legislate, tax, enforce, and restrict the right to bear arms creates a situation of relative balance in resources, especially arms, and in access to finances for war. Examples are regional control over trade routes and customs posts, as can be seen in Bosnia, and over mineral resources, as in Angola today. (The Angolan case shows that where there are such resources, lucrative financial offers are likely to appear from international businesses who have no scruples about dealing with warlords and who do not condition their payments on certain behavior and reforms, as do the United States and international organizations.) Contrary to the stabilizing effects of balance-of-power interstate relations, the most likely result of this anarchic balance of resources (particularly military ones) domestically is unending war of attrition.[ [7](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=13&sid=54f20012-08e1-4c38-892a-3ce935be2595%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#bib7)] The equilibrium result--a negative equilibrium, in economists' terms--is "stable anarchy," in which "all resources would be spent in fighting rather than production." There may be temporary cessations of fighting, but only as battlefield stalemates; internal actors cannot on their own end the fight.

This relative balance also creates layer upon layer of security dilemmas. A spiraling dynamic of mutual fear continues to feed such wars once they begin.[ [8](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=13&sid=54f20012-08e1-4c38-892a-3ce935be2595%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#bib8)] To understand the disintegration of Yugoslavia or the Bosnian war, for example, one must recognize that once the federal state lost its authority, each group pressed for its own national fights and claimed to be at risk of exploitation and even extirpation by other groups in the same dissolving state; it became critical that each group was a numerical minority and perceived itself as acting only in defensive ways. Interventions that attempt to remain impartial, delivering food and shelter to all civilians but not intervening politically to stop the spiraling dynamic, thus are likely to perpetuate these perceptions and the stalemate; those that do intervene politically, taking one side but not going to war in support of that side (and thereby resolving the battlefield situation) also perpetuate the conflict, by demonstrating to the other sides that they are indeed endangered and that they cannot safely disarm, psychologically or physically.

(OPTIONAL – COULD SAVE FOR EXTENSION)

Ethnic cleansing occurs in the absence of state authority

Duffield 98 Mark Duffield School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Spring 1998 Post‐modern conflict: Warlords,

post‐adjustment states and private protection, Civil Wars, 1:1, 65-102 tandfonline

While the Balkan war may have coined the term ethnic cleansing, it is clear that the process of social inclusion and exclusion involved has a much wider application. It is typical of the reworking of political authority in a period of declining nation-state competence and globalisation. It is these processes and not the alleged reappearance of age-old and suppressed ethnic hatreds (Kaplan, 1994; Kennedy, 1993), which are important. Africa and the European East provide many examples. Regarding the latter, the effects of the demise of central authority have been greatest where pre-existing federal systems collapsed as republics declared their autonomy. That is, in Yugoslavia and parts of the Soviet Union. While less violent, similar processes have been taking place in other areas including Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Refusal to engage state politics bad

Boggs 2k (CAROL BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1)

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.

Their kritik creates a false dichotomy between total rejection and oppression—their “all or nothing” alternative dooms coalitions and closes off space for political activism

Krishna ’93 [Sankaran, Dept. of Polit. Sci., Alternatives, 1993]

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic”, essential unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear oppression, the Nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s, that according to him, was operating along obsolete lines emphasizing “facts” and “realities” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4)Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms.This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality.

 Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freedom movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics

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I shall return to that capacity for heeding normative claims momentarily. But first we need to ponder the puzzle as to why Agamben of all thinkers, who has been so resolute in framing the problem of the metaphysical construction of the politics of modernity on the basis of the separation between zoe and bios, should, finally, ignore the claim of zoe? For lack of space, I shall have to be brutally brief. Throughout I have presented the suffering of the Muselmann as the moment of dismemberment which is the potentiality of all membered, living beings. But **this is not how Agamben considers the issue**. For Agamben, finally, it is not dismemberment that is at issue, although he routinely writes as if this were indeed what he was depicting, but a desubjectification that is a consequence of or consubstantial with the loss of language: ‘It is necessary that this senseless sound [that the Muselmann in his dying makes] be, in turn, the voice of something or someone that, for entirely other reasons, can not bear witness. It is thus necessary that the impossibility of bearing witness, the “lacuna” that constitutes human language, collapses, giving way to a different impossibility of bearing witness – that which does not have language’.39 So rather than saying that the good life depends upon its excluded other, the sweetness of life (with its infinite potential for suffering, for becoming bare life), Agamben says the issue is the subject’s ability to have or not have language: ‘The subject is thus the possibility that language does not exist, does not take place – or, better, that it takes place only through its possibility of not being there, its contingency’.40 It is surely right to say that the extremity of human suffering involves a systematic undoing of a subject’s linguistically realized intentional relation to the world; our own experiences of extreme pain could have informed us of as much. And thus it must be equally right to say that, even as speaking animals, we belong to a world whose emphatic presence would vitiate our relation to it. From this, it equally follows that the biopolitical world of the camps operates through the disarticulation of subjectification (our speaking being) from desubjectification (the contingency of life). But **none of this** directly or **meaningfully seems to** be an **ethical response** to the fate of the Muselmann. At most, it is an **aestheticization of his fate for the** **sake of a metaphysics of language** (‘the taking place of a language as the event of a subjectivity’).41 And while that metaphysics of language may or may not be more ethically capacious than the enlightened rationality it means to displace, nothing in Remnants speaks to what that metaphysics concretely requires. Like Nachtwey, what Agamben wants, apparently, is **the absoluteness of witnessin**g: ‘In the Muselmann, the impossibility of bearing witness is no longer a mere privation. Instead, it has become real; it exists as such. If the survivor bears witness not to the gas chambers or to Auschwitz but to the Muselmann, if he speaks only on the basis of the impossibility of speaking, then his testimony cannot be denied. Auschwitz – that to which it is not possible to bear witness – is absolutely and irrefutably proven’.42 Not the chambers or Auschwitz, not a place or set of practices, not the apotheosis of a complex historical trajectory, **just the result of it all**. With this we can hear the shutter of Agamben’s **philosophic camera** snap open and closed.

Alt fails – general rejection of metaphysics ignores important context

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There are further problems with the narrative built into The End of Education. Humanism is always and everywhere, for Spanos, panoptic, repressive, characterized by "the metaphysics of the centered circle," which is repeatedly attacked by reference to the same overcited passage from Derrida's "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences"--not coincidentally one of the places where Derrida allows himself to make large claims unqualified by their derivation from reading a particular text. In order to make this assertion, Spanos must show that all apparent difference is in fact contained by the same old metaphysical discourse. Thus, within the space of four pages, in the context of making absolute claims about Western education (or thought, or theory), Spanos uses the following constructions: "whatever its historically specific permutations," "despite the historically specific permutations," "Apparent historical dissimilarities," "Despite the historically specific ruptures." (12-15) Western thought, he repeats, has "always reaffirmed a nostalgic and recuperative circuitous educational journey back to the origin" (15). This over-insistence suggests to me that Spanos is a poor reader of Derrida, for he is not attentive to difference at particular moments or within particular texts. He seems to believe that one can leap bodily out of the metaphysical tradition simply by compiling enough citations from Heidegger, whereas his rather anticlimactic final chapter shows, as Derrida recognizes more explicitly, that one cannot escape logocentrism simply by wishing to.