# **1NC**

### **1**

#### USCode defines as conflict in war

LII 13 Legal Information Institute 2013 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/948a

10 USC § 948a - Definitions

(9) Hostilities.— The term “hostilities” means any conflict subject to the laws of war.

#### They don’t meet—“into hostilities” means into war—the plan is a peacetime regulation

#### Their regulations are not limited to hostilities—

#### The affirmative interpretation is bad—

#### Limits—It permits all sorts of peacetime regulation of the military—everything about daily military life would be topical, anything including diets, routine, etc would be topical.

#### T is a voter because it’s necessary to debate.

T

### 2

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order substantially increasing environmental restrictions on the armed forces.

#### Net benefit is court stripping.

### 3

#### Plan pushes congress over the brink on court stripping.

Brandenburg 6 Bert Brandenburg and Amy Kay, Justice At Stake Campaign, March 13, 2006 Courting Danger How the War on Terror Has Sapped the Power of Our Courts to Protect Our Constitutional Liberties Second Edition http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/Jascourting2ndEd\_4C79637478CBA.pdf

The assault on our courts did not begin on September 12, 2001. For more than a decade, an increasingly aggressive band of lawmakers, pundits and special interest groups have been working to weaken the power of our courts and the legitimacy of our judges.

Congress periodically engages in waves of “court- stripping,” often to punish the courts for particular rulings on hot-button social issues. After the Supreme Court’s 954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that school segregation vio - lated the Constitution, furious lawmakers sought to exempt federal courts from ruling on public education laws. ¹⁶² During the 960s and 970s, issues like the draft, Miranda warnings, busing, school prayer and abortion sparked efforts to cut the courts’ power to hold laws up to the standards of our Constitution. ¹⁶³

The Big Bang for the latest round of assaults came in 996, a presidential election year that saw three major court-stripping laws and a politi - cal assault on a sitting judge. In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed an anti-terrorism bill that dramatically restricted federal judicial review for death row inmates and for many immigrants facing deportation.64 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act eliminated or severely restrict - ed the ability of immigrants to seek a federal court review as they seek asylum from persecution or fight deportation efforts. ¹⁶⁵ The Prison Litigation Reform Act drastically diminished the ability of prisoners to get a day in court to object to abusive prison conditions, and weakened the authority of federal judges to craft remedies when those condi - tions actually break the law. ¹⁶⁶

A new round of efforts began after the 2002 elections. The 2003 “Feeney Amendment”—protested strongly by Chief Justice William Rehnquist— sharply limited the ability of federal judges to issue sentences below federal guidelines in order to set punishments that fit the crime. ¹⁶⁷ In 2004, the House of Representatives passed a measure to strip federal court jurisdiction to rule on chal - lenges to the Pledge of Allegiance. ¹⁶⁸ The House also passed the “Marriage Protection Act”, which singles out one law (the Defense of Marriage Act) for special treatment, exempting it from any review by the federal courts. ¹⁶⁹

With the 109th Congress, 2005 and 2006 are ushering in yet more court-stripping measures. One measure passed in 2005 gives the Secretary of Homeland Security unilateral power to waive any law on the books that might interfere with the building of border fences—including civil- rights and minimum-wage protections, and even criminal laws. ¹⁷⁰ Government wrongdoing could only be redressed if it rose to the level of a Constitutional violation, and a contrary court decision could only be appealed to the Supreme Court, which hears far fewer appeals than tradi - tional appeals courts. ¹⁷¹ Of course, the effort to rig the Terri Schiavo case by sending it to federal court was so politically transparent that it gener - ated a national backlash. ¹⁷²

Congress is now considering a fresh round of court stripping efforts, many of which seem designed to energize activists who have been spoiling for a fight with the courts. Proposed marriage amendments to the Constitution seek to take powers from state judges to rule on family law issues they have handled for centuries. ¹⁷³ The “Constitution Restoration Act” would deny federal courts the power to hear any suit involving a governmental official’s “acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government.” ¹⁷⁴ (For good measure, any judge caught exceeding his or her jurisdiction could be impeached. ¹⁷⁵ ) A separate House measure would allow Congress to reverse any Supreme Court decision that struck down a law on constitutional grounds, lowering the curtain on two centuries of judicial review. ¹⁷⁶ Other pending legislation would encourage defendants to renege on promises they made in consent decrees—such as pledges to clean up pollution and dilapidated schools—by forcing judges to let certain defendants reopen the agreements every few years, or when a new governor or mayor is elected. ¹⁷⁷

#### Stripping would result in rollback.

Daniel O. Bernstine, J.D., L.L.M., Assoc. Prof. of Law, U. of Wisconsin Law School, Dec. 1982. [1982 Wis. L. Rev. 1157, p. BOOK REVIEW: HEARTS AND MINDS: THE ANATOMY OF RACISM FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN. By Harry S. Ashmore, p. ln]

One need not be a constitutional law scholar to realize that the laundry list of issues targeted by the jurisdiction-stripping legislation raises constitutional questions that federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have been actively addressing for many years. In essence, these legislative proposals are nothing more than attempts to eliminate federal court jurisdiction as a response to specific federal judicial decisions of which some members of Congress [\*1165] disapprove. In fact, these proposals are reminiscent of the attempt by southern members of Congress to overturn the Brown decision with the signing of the Southern Manifesto that Ashmore described. n37 It is also no coincidence that these proposals are consistent with the Reagan administration's policy of "New Federalism" as well as with the revival of the morality of conservatism that swept many members of Congress into office during the 1980 presidential election. This jurisdiction-stripping legislation is an obvious attempt to reverse much of the constitutional doctrine that has been enunciated by the federal courts to date. If the proposed legislation is adopted, the federal courts would no longer be able to shape and develop constitutional doctrine and the state courts would be free to reinterpret the Constitution without review by the Supreme Court.

#### The Ukraine judiciary, including its independence is based off the American court system. Ukraine adjusts its system each year to mirror that of the US

The Supreme Court of Ohio ‘8 (The Supreme court of Ohio and the Ohio judicial system Nov. 14, 2008 [www.sconet.state.oh.us/PIO/news/2008/ukraine\_111408.asp](http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/PIO/news/2008/ukraine_111408.asp))

The Supreme Court of Ohio will welcome six members of the Ukrainian judiciary on Monday as they begin a week-long visit to study the American judicial system. “The Supreme Court of Ohio, the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the Supreme Rada of Ukraine have been partners for 16 years to exchange ideas and further the ideals of democracy in both countries,” said Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer. “We are honored to host this Ukrainian delegation and again provide a forum on the rule of law and the democratic electoral processes.” Four Ukrainian judges, one court administrator and one facilitator are at the Court for a five-day visit with judges, attorneys, court personnel and university professors. Their visit is marked by several highlights, including discussions with Chief Justice Moyer and a visit to the Montgomery County Courthouse to observe court proceedings. Their visit will begin with the traditional Ukrainian welcoming Bread and Salt Ceremony at 8:30 a.m., Monday, Nov. 17, at the Ohio Judicial Center. The delegation also will participate in a panel discussion about the role of the courts in a maturing democracy at the John Glenn School of Public Affairs at The Ohio State University and numerous sessions focusing on trial procedures and court policies. During the Bread and Salt Ceremony, the visitors will be presented with bread, which represents hospitality, and salt, which symbolizes eternal friendship, in a custom dating to the Middle Ages. While in Dayton, the delegates will meet with Judge Michael T. Hall, Administrative Judge for the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and other judges. In addition to an overview of the Ohio judicial system by the Chief Justice, the group will learn about the differences and similarities between the United States and Ukraine systems of justice from Elena V. Helmer, a visiting assistant professor of law at the Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, who has taught in law schools in Russia, Kazakhstan and the United States. Another aspect of their learning will center on the Ohio judicial branch budgeting process. Leaders from all three branches of government will explain their roles in proposing, developing or considering the budget including Steven C. Hollon, Supreme Court administrative director; David Ellis, assistant director of the Ohio Office of Budget and Management; and State Rep. Scott Oelslager. Several other topics round out the delegation’s lesson plan including a comparison of administrative justice in the United States and the Ukraine, Ohio criminal justice, public accountability cases, dispute resolution assistance and overviews of Ohio’s Criminal Sentencing Commission and the Court’s Domestic Violence Program. The visit to the Supreme Court of Ohio is part of a 10-day visit to the United States organized through the congressionally sponsored Open World Program and the Russian American Rule of Law Consortium (RAROLC). Prior to their arrival in Columbus, the Ukrainian delegation is in Washington, D.C., for orientation meetings with federal officials. Ohio is represented at the Washington meetings by Licking County Common Pleas Court Judge Jon R. Spahr. Managed by the Open World Leadership Center, Open World is the only exchange program in the U.S. legislative branch. Participants get an inside look at the U.S. judicial system and develop ties with the U.S. judges who host them. They also gain insight into how the U.S. political system promotes and protects **judicial independence** and the rule of law. The Open World Program is a nonpartisan initiative of the U.S. Congress that builds mutual understanding between the emerging political and civic leaders of participating countries and their U.S. counterparts. The Open World Leadership Center has awarded a grant to the Russian American Rule of Law Consortium of Colchester, Vermont to administer this and similar exchanges in 2008. Chief Justice Moyer worked with judicial leaders of Ukraine to develop an independent judiciary after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Ohio Ukraine Rule of Law Project involved numerous exchange trips by Ohio judges and lawyers to introduce Ukraine to concepts related to the rule of law. The Chief Justice also has worked with the U.S. Department of State in conducting education programs for judges and lawyers in Argentina and Chile.

#### Ukrainian Judicial independence is key to political and economic stability

Ukrainian Rule of law project ‘9 (Ukrainian Rule of Law project in cooperation with the United States Agency for International development and the millennium challenge corporation “An expert conference ''Judicial Reform in Ukraine: Finding Solutions in Line with European Standards” March 23 March 2009 http://www.ukrainerol.org.ua/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=128&Itemid=1&lang=en )

The Council of Europe in the framework of the Joint Programme between the European Union and the Council of Europe Transparency and Efficiency of the Judicial System of Ukraine together with USAID Ukraine Rule of Law Project, in cooperation with the Council of Judges of Ukraine, the Supreme Court of Ukraine, and with participation of the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the National Commission on Strengthening Democracy and the Rule of Law supported the expert discussion on judicial reform in Ukraine in line with European and International standards. The objective of the conference was to open an expert dialogue and to start building a consensus among a variety of stakeholders on a number of issues related to the judicial reform in Ukraine. The issues of the structure of the court system, the functioning of judicial institutions, and judicial self-governance, as well as judicial selection, training and discipline of judges were discussed. Representatives of top judicial institutions, courts, judicial self-governmental bodies, Verkhovna Rada, national governmental officials, European and International experts, academicians, media, and the public exchanged views on the challenges faced by the Ukrainian judiciary today. The participants expressed different approaches to judicial reform in Ukraine. However, they all stressed on the importance of implementation of the Council of Europe standards in organisation of judiciary and principles of its functioning while conducting judicial reform. When becoming the Council of Europe member, Ukraine took obligation to ensure real independence of judiciary and judges. In the opinions of the participants the Constitution of Ukraine should be amended in several positions to ensure enforcement of and compatibility of the judicial system with European standards. Vasyl Onopenko, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, stated that there are several systemic issues in Ukrainian judiciary, including state authorities’ attitudes toward courts, judiciary not acting as one holistic system, absence of socially oriented laws. Chief Justice also referred to the need to rapidly elaborate a substantiated strategy for the wider reform of the legal system and professions including advanced institutional and procedural solutions. Speaking about the current issues in Ukrainian judicial system Mykola Onishchuk, the Minister of Justice mentioned that Ukraine has been successful in reforming its judicial system from the Soviet type system to the democratic one, based on European standards instance based judicial system. The Minister of Justice especially emphasized that all reforms of legal professions and legal system in general have to be well prepared and financed. He also mentioned that in some cases the changes to the Constitution are necessary to fulfill European standards. The Minister mentioned in his opening speech that following steps should be taken in order to improve judicial system in Ukraine: adoption of the institutional approach to the judiciary, specialization of courts, improvement of the system of selection and accountability of judges and judicial control over pre-trial investigation. **U.S. Ambassador William Taylor pointed out that a** fair, **independent**, transparent, and efficient **judicial system** **is the cornerstone of a democratic society that also promotes investment and economic growth**. It is therefore essential that the structure and organization of judicial institutions be clearly and carefully articulated in the law. Head of Operations Section of the European Commission Delegation to Ukraine, Mr. Schieder stressed that in all European countries the cooperation between different actors in solving issues related to the judiciary is highly appreciated. EU also provides help to a number of countries and helps to build up administrative and professional capacity of judiciary. He emphasized that in cooperation, the EC approach is moving from project based cooperation to the sector-wide approach and for successful cooperation the clear and consolidated vision of Ukrainian authorities and political actors must be elaborated. This vision should be based on common European values and respective standards. As it was stressed in the presentation of David Vaughn, Chief of Party of the Ukrainian Rule of Law Project “Public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of the utmost importance in a modern democratic society. That is why the UROL Project together with our partners contributes to a consensus on judicial reform in Ukraine”.Stephan Gass, Vice-President of the International Association of Judges, Judge of the Court of Appeal of Basel (Switzerland), emphasized that judicial independence is not the privilege but the tool for achieving and supporting the rule of law and democracy in the widest terms. He also underlined that the Venice Commission in his opinion noted too high complexity of judicial self-government system proposed in the draft laws and proposed to simplify it. Carsten Mahnke, team leader and resident expert of the Council of Europe and European Commission joint project in Moldova stressed that it is important that first the European standards are introduced into the legislation and then implemented in practice. In his summary report Daimar Liiv, resident expert of the Joint Programme between the European Union and the Council of Europe “Transparency and Efficiency of the Judicial System of Ukraine” expressed his satisfaction of high level of discussions. He underlined that clear opinion of experts-participants was formed that there is a real need for high level expert discussion over the next steps in the reform of judiciary and legal professions in Ukraine and that experts clearly supported the idea of introducing relevant European standards into laws. He also mentioned that the need for changes of the Constitution of Ukraine to achieve the reform ultimate goals - better judiciary **and higher level of protection of rights of Ukrainian people**, was expressed by the vast majority of the participants.

#### Ukrainian economic collapse draws in Russia and the west leading to a nuclear world war three

Kingston, Loveridge, Steritt ‘9

(Brian Kingston, Peter Loveridge, Joe Sterritt masters paper @ The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs – CIFP “UKRAINE: A RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT February 2009 www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1214.pdf)

Worst Case Scenario: WWIII Economics: Ukraine suffers catastrophic economic collapse during the global recession; Ukrainians are plunged into deep economic hardship and revolt against the government. Domestic Politics: The 2010 Presidential elections worsen domestic political stability (i.e. the President and PM can still not work together); economic collapse fractures the domestic political situation; the threat of internal violence increases. Russia: Russia seeks to influence the weakened Ukraine, inflaming ethnic-Russian separatism; Crimea declares independence; Ukraine resists, perhaps seeing an external war as a distraction from internal strife; Russia comes to the aid of Crimea/ethnic-Russians resulting in open warfare between Russia and Ukraine. The West: **The West** also suffers from the global recession, but (perhaps following a period of inward looking protectionism) realizes **that it cannot allow Russian success** in Ukraine; open **hostilities** **erupt** **between** **Russian** **and** **NATO** forces **triggering** **World** **War** **III** **and the strong possibility of** **nuclear** **war**, or at least the drawing in of many other countries.

### Environmental Destruction

#### Multipolarity’s inevitable – economic realities make hegemony unsustainable.

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]

The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a **serious fiscal crisis** **by the end of this decade.** As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The **best indicators** of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be **replaced by a multipolar** international **system.** The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.

#### Heg doesn’t solve conflict.

Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US **hegemony is not the** primary **cause of** the current era of s**tability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2\* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has **already rid itself of crime.** Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection** between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict **declined** while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T 15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—**nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms** necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co\*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-\*7 exis\*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.

#### Retrenchment solves war.

MacDonald and Parent 11 [Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for opti- mism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift bur- dens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in **fewer militarized disputes** than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credi- bility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a **greater geopolitical gamble** than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conºict prone than other moments of acute relative de- cline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons **still have formidable capabil- ity**, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe **the empirical record supports these conclusions.** In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo- American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been inºuenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impend- ing Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or en- gage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incen- tives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the im- portance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy com- mitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expan- sionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential beneªts. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an im- provement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conºict.98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to en- hance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent re- gional order.99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. In- deed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional ter- ritory.100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can **strengthen the credibility of its core commit- ments** while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the beneªts of retrenchment is that it helps **alleviate an unsustainable finan- cial position**. Immense forward deployments will only **exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.**101

#### Hegemony spurs proliferation.

Monteiro 12 [Nuno P., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. , International Security Volume 36, Number 3, Winter 2011/12]

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120 At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system. Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By [End Page 39] putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. **Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid** being involved in **wars.** If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, **including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same.**122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater influence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint. [End Page 40]

#### Prolif means small conflicts go nuclear.

Sokolski 9, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, (Henry, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd, Policy Review June & July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)

At a minimum, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), “non-nato allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

#### First, China’s rise isn’t a threat to U.S. interests.

Allin and Jones 6/22 [Dana H., Editor of Survival and Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs at The International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Erik, Professor and Director of European Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS Director, Bologna Institute for Policy Research Head of Europe, Oxford Analytica Adelphi Series Conclusion: Realist Dilemmas Version of record first published: 22 Jun 2012 Adelphi Series, 52:430-431, 183-198]

Getting the balance right is obviously an overriding demand on US strategy and diplomacy. Along with the danger of provoking Beijing with a posture that might appear aggressive, the obverse risk is that the spectre of American disarray and decline could embolden nationalists in a still-growing China to demand more aggressive and assertive policies. In theory, such assertiveness would be enabled by the possibility that China’s GDP and military spending could exceed America’s by the middle of the century. Yet, we should not let hypothetical future dangers scare us out of recognising some **stabilising realities** of the present. ‘China’, Dobbins observes, ‘is seeking neither territorial aggrandise-ment nor ideological sway over its neighbours. It shows **no interest** in matching US military expenditures, achieving comparable global reach, or assuming defence commit-ments beyond its immediate periphery’.8 Indeed, insofar as Beijing is not eager to be a supplier of global public goods, its grand strategy at least implicitly confers upon the United States a continued leadership role. All of this might change, of course, but the United States would have ample time to observe these changes and adjust its own strategic planning and posture.

#### But pursuing primacy ensures escalating rivalry.

White 12 [Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, America’s choices about China August 5th, 2012 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/05/america-s-choices-about-china/]

Washington’s message to Beijing is that everything will be fine, as long as China agrees to do things America’s way. If not, America will use ‘every element of America’s power’ to pull it into line. Don’t believe me? Go back and read President Obama’s big speech in Canberra last November, and ask yourself how it sounds to Chinese ears — which are the ones that really matter. The problem is that China will not accept America’s pre-conditions for a good relationship, and the more its wealth and power grows relative to America’s, the more willing Beijing will be to make that plain. The rest of us might regret that, but we can hardly be surprised by it, and we cannot wish it away. If America insists on maintaining the status quo of US primacy as China’s power and ambitions grow, **escalating strategic rivalry with China is** close to **a certainty.**

No biodiversity collapse.

Doremus, Berkeley Law, 2K [Holly, Law Professor – Cal Berkeley, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, L/N]

Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. **Nor is human extinction probable any time soon.** Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 [\*47] One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by **multiple species.** This **functional redundancy** means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse. n217

Bio-d collapse inevitable

Pynn 7 [Larry, staff writer at The Vancouver Sun, “Global warming not biggest threat: expert,” The Vancouver Sun, http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=6e2988da-31ab-4697-810d-7a008306d571&p=1]

"We all worry about climate change, as we should, but it doesn't mean we shouldn't worry about protecting habitat," says James Grant, a biology professor at Concordia University in Montreal and co-author of a new report on threats to endangered species in Canada. "The really immediate causes right now for many species are things like farming, urbanization and habitat loss caused by the direct things we do." Research by Grant and his pupils shows the **biggest threat** is habitat loss at 84 per cent, overexploitation 32 per cent, native species interactions 31 per cent, natural causes 27 per cent, pollution 26 per cent, and introduced species 22 per cent. On average, species are threatened by at least two of the six categories. Human activities representing the biggest source of habitat loss and pollution are not industrial resource extraction, but agriculture at 46 per cent and urbanization at 44 per cent. "Farming is huge," Grant said in an interview. "The Prairies are one of the most affected habitats in the world. We've turned them into wheat fields." The southern Okanagan-Similkameen is another example, home to about one-third of species at risk in B.C. as well as a thriving agricultural industry, including vineyards, and increased urban development.

#### Iran containment backfiresand is unsustainable

 Wehrey 9 Frederic Wehrey et al RAND , 2009 Dangerous but not omnipotent : exploring the reach and limitations

of Iranian power in the Middle East <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG781.pdf>

Although an inclusive multilateral security structure in the Persian Gulf region would take time to build, it would contribute more to regional stability over the long run than would continuing to rely solely on competitive, balance-of-power strategies designed to isolate Iran. Such narrow strategies are more likely to encourage, even reify, Iranian hegemonic aspirations than remove them. Furthermore, a U.S.-led “containment” of Iran is also unlikely to be sustainable among Persian Gulf states that desire to maintain cordial relations with Iran, if not active political and economic engagement.

#### Iran Containment empirically fails and can’t solve proxy wars

Bromund 11 Ted R. Bromund, Ph.D.,Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. February 14, 2011 Backgrounder No. 2517 Containing a Nuclear Iran: Difficult, Costly, and Dangerous http://thf\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2517.pdf

The 1991 Gulf War, which reversed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the U.N. sanctions imposed after the regime violated the cease-fire greatly weakened Iraq, Iran’s strongest Arab neighbor. The Clinton Administration adopted its dual containment strategy to contain and deter both Iran and Iraq. However, both regimes actively resisted containment and continued to support terrorist attacks against various neighbors and the United States. In June 1996, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards supported a terrorist bombing by the Saudi branch of Hezbollah that killed 19 American servicemen stationed in Saudi Arabia. The massive truck bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran targeted U.S. military personnel that were enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq.3 By launching the attack, Tehran drove up the costs to the U.S. of the dual containment policy and the costs to the Saudi government of cooperating with Washington in containing Iran.

In addition to supporting terrorist attacks against Americans in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, Iran has ordered its proxies to attack U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, Iran is pursuing a strategy similar to its strategy in Lebanon by working to radicalize, arm, train, and direct Iraqi Shiite militias and using them to attack U.S. troops and undermine the Iraqi government.4

The manifest failure of U.S. efforts to contain Iranian influence and deter attacks on Americans in the past 30 years should raise alarms about the much greater difficulty inherent in containing and deterring Tehran after it acquires nuclear weapons. To argue the merits of containment now that Iran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons is to argue for a policy that has been tried for decades— a policy that is now close to an enormous defeat because of the progress of Iran’s nuclear program.

### Citizen Suits

#### 1. Inevitable –

#### A. Deforestation.

Nordhaus 8 [Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, Co-Founders – Break Through Institute, Break Through, p. 64]

None of this is to deny the ecological reality. The burning of forests, the loss of their role as net absorbers and storage banks of carbon, and the reality of global warming make the increasingly rapid destruction of the Amazon even more alarming than it was back in the mid-1980s, when the Amazon first became appreciated for its biodiversity. **Even if we reduced greenhouse gases by 70 percent worldwide overnight**, the continued destruction of the Amazon would **still leave the global climate system in jeopardy.**

#### B. Ag.

Mead 11 [January 30, 2011 Mad Meat Making Scientist Proves Climate Doomsayers Wrong Walter Russell Mead Via Meadia http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/01/30/mad-meat-making-scientist-proves-climate-doomsayers-wrong/]

According to a United Nations report (which must as we all know be completely and unquestionably true when referring to matters of climate science having nothing to do with glacier melt), “**Cattle-rearing generates more global warming greenhouse gases**, as measured in CO2 equivalent, **than transportation.”** Ronald Reagan was widely and no doubt justly mocked for saying that trees cause more pollution than cars do; had he said cows instead of trees he could have appealed to the UN for support. In any case, the report (from the Food and Agricultural Organization) goes on: When emissions from land use and land use change are included, the livestock sector accounts for 9 per cent of CO2 deriving from human-related activities, but produces a much larger share of even more harmful greenhouse gases. It generates 65 per cent of human-related nitrous oxide, which has 296 times the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of CO2. Most of this comes from manure. And it accounts for respectively 37 per cent of all human-induced methane (23 times as warming as CO2), which is largely produced by the digestive system of ruminants, and 64 per cent of ammonia, which contributes significantly to acid rain. With increased prosperity, people are consuming more meat and dairy products every year, the report notes. Global meat production is projected to more than double from 229 million tonnes in 1999/2001 to 465 million tonnes in 2050, while milk output is set to climb from 580 to 1043 million tonnes.

#### Worst climate impacts take decades to arrive and don’t assume adaptation

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from numerous warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human- induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a, 2007c; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007a), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007a), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007a), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007a), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20 and 30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007a). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets, causing severe sea-level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta and others 2009). Proponents argue that there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well-being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic conse- quences. The science and economics of climate change are quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two, accord- ing to Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume that there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold, and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long-range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

#### No warming---temperatures are trending down and negative feedbacks solve any impact

Fritz Vahrenholt 12, Honorary Professor of chemistry at the University of Hamburg, former Umweltsenator in the German Ministry for Environment, Scientific Reviewer for the 2010 IPCC, February 8, 2012, interviewed by Welt Online, a German newspaper, online: http://thegwpf.org/international-news/4932-the-cold-sun-why-the-climate-catastrophe-wont-happen.html

Welt Online: Will it become even colder soon?

Vahrenholt: First of all, the small solar cycles - the Gleissberg and the Suess cycles - are in a downturn phase. Secondly, the decadal oscillations will be in their negative phase for the next 30 years. And thirdly, we have one of the weakest solar cycles in 80 years. It could be that the next solar cycle will be even weaker.

All this led us to the the conclusion that we are facing a so-called Dalton Minimum, a cool period, as it was the case from 1790 to 1830. Warming of the climate, which is caused undoubtedly by CO2 and other greenhouse gases, will be offset by other natural effects to a considerable extent in coming years and decades. The bottom line is that we will only have global warming of only one degree by 2100 - provided that the cycles will continue to behave the way they did for the past 7,000 years.

Welt Online: But climate scientists warn that the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has reached such a level that the natural regulatory processes, of which you speak, may not even work anymore. If that is true, we would have a problem, not?

Vahrenholt: The sun cannot be influenced by the CO2 in the atmosphere, neither can the stratosphere. The increase in carbon dioxide from 0.028 percent to 0.038 percent in the atmosphere is nothing earth shattering, after all. Most people do not know that CO2 is only considered so significant because its climate impact is amplified by water vapor. When the temperatures rise due to CO2, so the argument goes, then the concentration of water vapor in the atmosphere also increses. This additional greenhouse gas contributes much more to the greenhouse effect than CO2.

But fortunately, there are feedbacks that are acting in a correcting way. More water vapor means more clouds. And clouds shield the radiation from the sun. I believe that Mother Nature is a fairly stable system, otherwise we would have turned into a hot, waterless planet like Venus a long time ago in our long geological history.

#### Technological adaptation is coming now and solves

Moore ’08 Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Stanford, (Thomas Gale 7/9/12 “Global warming; the good, the bad and the ugly and the efficient” EMBO reports http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3317379/?tool=pmcentrez)KG

Even if the pessimists are correct and future climate change reduces food production, wicked storms lash much of the planet, summers are plagued by terrible heat waves, and floods and droughts inundate large areas of the world and reduce the availability of clean water, human beings will be better able to handle such terrible conditions than they are now because technology will advance and people will become richer over the next century. Evidence of an increasing rate of technological advancement comes from patents; the number of patents issued for inventions has continued to rise at an increasing rate since 1790 ([Fig 2](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3317379/figure/f2/)). Although patented inventions are only a crude measure of technological growth, they do indicate that technology will continue to change the world in which we live. Consider the world 200 years ago when the fastest means of communication was by horseback, or just 100 years ago when telephones were only slowly spreading and radio, much less TV or the internet, were almost undreamed of. Thus progress will allow our descendants to deal with almost any difficulties that climate change brings.

#### They are hype

Lieberman, 2/19/10 (Ben, Specialist in Energy and Env. Issues and Senior Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, “Hype of Global Warming Far Scarier Than Science Shows”, 2010, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/02/19/hype-of-global-warming-far-scarier-than-science-shows/)

Q: As the controversy swirling around the IPCC deepens at the same time some are questioning the significance of global warming now that large portions of the U.S. are buried under record-breaking snow, what kind of information do policymakers need to make decisions about climate change? Any risks of global warming need to be weighed against the risks of global warming policies. Policymakers must have accurate information on both sides of the equation in order to avoid measures that do more harm than good. Most of the recent proposals — the Senate’s Boxer-Kerry cap-and-trade bill, a new UN treaty, EPA’s regulatory scheme — fail to accurately weigh the risks because they are based on the false premise that climate change is a dire threat. Simply put, global warming is not a crisis and should not be addressed as one. The recent wave of climate science scandals — climategate, glaciergate, hurricanegate, amazongate, others — have exposed a number of efforts initially crafted to hype the issue into something far scarier than the underlying science actually shows. Climategate — the release of internal emails from scientists with key roles in the UN’s 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report — largely centered around the strained attempt to portray temperatures in recent decades as unprecedented throughout recorded history. The researchers had to go to extreme lengths to create this impression — grafting one data set onto another to manufacture the desired “hockey stick” effect, using computer programs that add warming to the underlying temperature data and then destroying that data before others could see it — which speaks volumes about the weakness of their case. To his credit, Phil Jones, the head of the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit who had to step down pending the climategate investigation, recently conceded that temperatures have been statistically flat since 1995 and that the Medieval Warm Period may have been as warm as modern times. Slowly but surely, the hype and false certainty is being replaced by a more accurate picture of what the science really tells us about the earth’s temperature history. Similarly, most of the IPCC Report’s apocalyptic claims about the consequences of global warming – that Himalayan glaciers would completely melt by 2035, that damage from hurricanes and other extreme weather events has increased, that African agricultural production is poised to plummet, and that the Amazon rainforest is under grave threat – have been shown to be far-fetched speculation devoid of scientific support. Yvo de Boer, the UN’s top climate official, has just announced his resignation, in part due to the fact that so much so much alarmist junk made its way into the IPCC Report. There is a reason proponents of costly measures to address global warming have so exaggerated the risks – they essentially had to for there to be any chance the public would accept the high price tag for action to ratchet down carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions. Once the gloom and doom is replaced by a more accurate assessment of the risk, such measures as the Senate’s Boxer-Kerry bill, a new UN treaty, or EPA regulations look like an especially bad deal.

Single issues not key not key to soft power

Gray, International Politics at Reading, 11 [COLIN S. GRAY is Professor of International Poli- tics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and at Hudson Institute (Croton-on-Hudson, NY) before founding the Na- tional Institute for Public Policy, a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington, DC, area. Dr. Gray served for 5 years in the Reagan administration on the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms SSI Monograph HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Colin S. Gray April 2011]

The error lies in the search for, and inevitable finding of, “golden keys” and “silver bullets” to resolve current versions of **en- during problems.** Soft-power salesmen have a potent product-mix to sell, but they fail to appreciate the real- ity that **American soft power is a product essentially unalterable over a short span of years.** As a country with a cultural or civilizational brand that is unique and mainly rooted in deep historical, geographical, and ideational roots, America is not at liberty to emu- late a major car manufacturer and advertise an exten- sive and varied model range of persuasive soft-power profiles. Of course, some elements of soft power can be emphasized purposefully in tailored word and deed. However, foreign perceptions of the United States are no more developed from a blank page than the American past can be retooled and fine-tuned for contemporary advantage. Frustrating though it may be, a country cannot easily escape legacies from its past.

Haters inevitable.

Heilbrunn 11 [Jacob, senior editor at the National Interest, Why America is Hated | June 16, 2011 http://nationalinterest.org/blog/jacob-heilbrunn/why-america-hated-5480]

America is hated abroad. Today's International Herald Tribune features a long article on Pakistan that provides a reminder of why it is hated. Gen. Kayani has apparently been touring military installations in the wake of the humiliating snatch of Osama bin-Laden. "We can't" was his response when queried about why Pakistan should trust America. Pakistan is not alone. The perception abroad that America is a willful superpower bent on imposing its will is not confined to Pakistan. In Germany, America continues to be viewed as the most dangerous power in the world. Now the Czechs are saying no to basing an early warning system against ballistic missiles in Prague. Geoffrey Wheatcroft cogently asks why we should even continue to have NATO exist. Why indeed? Western Europe is unable, or unwilling, to field significant military forces. It is also not clear who the enemy might be. Iran? The mullahs have no real beef with Europe. They want to engage in economic trade with it. If the United States could afford to pay for all of its commitments, including the defense of western Europe, that would be fine. But it can't. So NATO will continue to stumble along. America will continue to reel from the weight of its defense outlays. And it will continue to be abused by so-called allies such as Pakistan, which resents its dependence on Uncle Sam. Gratitude is rarely a category in international politics. But Americans would do well to recognize why such resentment exists. It may not be because we try to do too little, but too much.

Alt causes to climate leadership –

--lack of public statements/taking a stand

--backlash from environmental community

--alt energy policy

--EPA regulations (climate fights with Republicans, private sector disobedience)

--legislative empirics (didn’t do last year’s gw bill, screwed up cap and trade)

--personal problems – can’t even put panels on his house

Politico, ’11– respected news source [Politico Pro, 6/22/2011, “Gore voices left's climate grumbling,” <http://www.seattlepi.com/national/politico/article/Gore-voices-left-s-climate-grumbling-1435262.php#ixzz1bTu1Nm6a>, DS]

Al Gore has gone public with his complaints about President Barack Obama's environmental record and leadership on climate change - legitimizing a groundswell of grumbling from the left and throwing open the door for more of the same. Gore has had his own issues of late, including his separation from his wife, Tipper, but he remains something of a patron saint among environmentalists. And his open attack on Obama from the man who was once the next president of the United States makes it safe for others to follow. It's bad news for the White House - especially coming on the heels of a new poll showing that only 30 percent of Americans say they definitely plan to vote for Obama in 2012. "President Obama has never presented to the American people the magnitude of the climate crisis," the former vice president wrote in a 7,000-word essay for Rolling Stone. "He has simply not made the case for action. He has not defended the science against the ongoing, withering and dishonest attacks. Nor has he provided a presidential venue for the scientific community - including our own National Academy - to bring the reality of the science before the public." For Obama to win a second term, he knows he'll need to generate more enthusiasm among a Democratic base that largely sat on the sidelines and watched the Republican wave in the 2010 midterms. But the mood on Obama's left isn't good. Liberals booed White House Communications Director Dan Pfeiffer last Friday over his response to a gay marriage question during the Netroots Nation conference in Minneapolis. And agitation appears to be growing among some top brass in the environmental community, too, over what many see as an unnecessary capitulation to Republicans and industry. "Unfortunately, President Obama's instinct seems to be to avoid tough battles, relying on the argument that even as his record falls short, his administration is better on conservation than the previous one and better than any likely to succeed him should his reelection effort fall short," Defenders of Wildlife President Rodger Schlickeisen wrote in a long blog post Tuesday. Betsy Taylor, a philanthropic adviser to several climate donors and foundations, said Obama has disappointed greens by sending them mixed messages. Obama did call for a clean energy standard during the State of the Union in January that promoted wind, solar and geothermal power. But he also would allow coal and nuclear power into the mix. In the same speech, Obama called for long-standing oil industry tax breaks to be slashed but his Interior Department later gave drillers permits to begin exploring again in the Gulf of Mexico. "His defining characteristic, at least his initial one, was this sense that this man knows what matters and he has a strong moral fiber," said Taylor, a co-founder and board president of the environmental group 1Sky. "When you see him swinging in the wind, it's just deeply disappointing. We know he has a capacity to lead in a historic way. Instead, we see moments of this brilliance and then you can literally see him back-peddling after the oil companies visit, or the donors, or his inside staff." White House officials did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the Gore article. But Obama and his aides have tried to make it clear they're doing what they can to tackle the climate issue. "We've had some setbacks, and some things haven't happened as fast as people wanted them to happen," Obama said during a New York fundraiser this spring. "I know. I know the conversations you guys have. Oh, you didn't get the public option - and, gosh, I wish that energy bill had passed. I understand the frustrations. I feel them too." Greens have been tormented with Obama's handling of climate change regulations via the EPA. The issue has yet to play itself out completely, with House Republicans itching to revoke the EPA's authority through legislation and greens demanding repeated White House veto threats. Power plants will be regulated for greenhouse gases under new EPA rules due in May 2012. And fuel economy limits are coming later this fall, with environmentalists pushing for standards as high as 62 miles per gallon. But a resurgent Detroit and foreign automakers are pushing back against the most aggressive numbers. "There's no question that there's a lot of frustration with the lack of progress on climate policy to date," said Dan Lashof, director of the Natural Resources Defense Council's climate center. "We're going to be looking very carefully at what happens over the next few months on the rules within EPA's authority to decide." Schlickeisen, who is set to retire later this year, questioned Obama's dedication to the EPA given that the president did not follow through last year on global warming legislation and did not pushing harder for oil drilling safety laws in the wake of the BP oil spill. "Given its weak performance to date, it is reasonable to wonder just how firmly the White House will continue to stand by Lisa Jackson, EPA's strong administrator, and fight future efforts to limit EPA's authority," he wrote. Even the administration's failure to meet a self-imposed end-of-spring deadline to put solar panels on the White House roof has drawn catcalls from the left. "This was a no-brainer," 350.org founder and solar roof campaigner Bill McKibben said Monday. "Republicans couldn't filibuster it, the oil companies weren't fighting it, and it still didn't get done when they said it would. "Barack Obama told his supporters after the election that he needed constant pressure - from now on we'll do our best to provide it, and on issues even more significant than this," McKibben added. In his Rolling Stone article, Gore credited Obama for making historic investments in clean energy technology as part of the stimulus package. But he also said the president "did nothing to defend it when Congress decimated its funding." Gore also faulted Obama on cap-and-trade legislation. While the president deserved kudos for helping the House in 2009 to pass a bill, he left the issue to wither in the Senate while alienating his allies by making "concessions to oil and coal companies without asking for anything in return." The former vice president's criticism also reached into energy policy. "He has also called for a massive expansion of oil drilling in the United States, apparently in an effort to defuse criticism from those who argue speciously that 'drill, baby, drill' is the answer to our growing dependence on foreign oil," Gore wrote. Many environmentalists are struggling to come to grips with exactly how hard it is to swing at an Obama White House already at war with a Republican Party full of new tea party conservatives who question any linkage between humans and global warming. "There are more than a few on the left who see themselves as members of the president's extended team," said Frank O'Donnell, president of Clean Air Watch. "There are many others, including me, who are less angry than very disappointed in the president's rather conventional timidity." O'Donnell added that Obama's leading critic may not be the best person to make the case for stronger White House action. "Gore has exactly the right message, but he is a flawed messenger given he ducked the climate issue when he ran for president in 2000," he said. In his article, Gore also challenged the media to do a better job picking up on the link between extreme weather and climate change. He also acknowledged how tough it is for the president to navigate the issue with an already full plate. "Assuming that the Republicans come to their senses and avoid nominating a clown, his reelection is likely to involve a hard-fought battle with high stakes for the country," he wrote. "All of his supporters understand that it would be self-defeating to weaken Obama and heighten the risk of another step backward. Even writing an article like this one carries risks; opponents of the president will excerpt the criticism and strip it of context. "But in this case," Gore added, "the president has reality on his side."

#### Laundry lists are dumb, if they read impact cards, we’ll read answers in the block, maybe even impact turns

No nuclear terror.

Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]

Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be **vanishingly small.”** The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has **only a minuscule chance** of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, **it** probably **won’t bother.**

Prefer conventional weapons.

Craig 11 [Campbell, professor of international relations at the University of Southampton Special Issue: Bringing Critical Realism and Historical Materialism into Critical Terrorism Studies Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda Critical Studies on Terrorism Volume 4, Issue 1, 2011, April, pages 115-124]

Let us address each of his claims, in reverse order. Mueller suggests that the risk of an act of major nuclear terrorism is **exceptionally small**, along the lines of an asteroid hitting the earth. Drawing upon his powerful book against terrorism alarmism, Overblown (2006), he shows that serious anti-Western terrorist groups are today **widely scattered and disorganized** – precisely the wrong kind of arrangement for the sustained and centralized project of building an atomic bomb. Looking for immediate results, terrorist groups are likely to go with what works today, rather than committing to a long-term and likely futile project. He points out, as have other authors, that so-called ‘rogue’ nations, even if they obtain a bomb, are never going to hand it over to terrorists: to do so would utterly negate everything they had worked so hard for. A nation such as Iran that somehow decided to give its bomb to al-Qaeda (leaving aide their completely different objectives) would not only be handing over a weapon that it had spent years and billions to build, and giving up the prestige and deterrence the bomb supposedly confers, it would also be putting itself at acute risk of being on the receiving end of a retaliatory strike once the terrorists did their work. By what rationale would any leader make such a move? The potential costs would be astronomical, the benefits non-existent.

# 2NC

### 2NC Sustainable

#### Hegemony is unsustainable –

#### 1. Fiscal crisis – debt, inflation, and loss of reserve currency will force retrenchment by the end of the decade. That’s Layne.

#### And primacy makes economic collapse inevitable – fuels bubbles.

Calleo 10 [David P., Dean Acheson Professor and Director of the European Studies Department at the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies ( SAIS), American Decline Revisited, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 4 August 2010 , pages 215 - 227]

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems **poison the currency**, an old pathology that **firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline.** It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this **excess of volatile money** that arguably **fuels the world's great recurring bubbles**. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) **sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings** and **dry up credit** for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a **threat to the world economy** in general.

#### 2. Multipolar transition – Layne says risings powers like China wield increasing clout and demand their place at the table. Great powers will convert resources into military assets if they feel threatened by the U.S. – stops American power projection its tracks.

#### Aff evidence doesn’t assume feedback loops.

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His current book project, to be published by Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The Global Power Shift from West to East From the MAY-JUNE 2012 issue Share on email Share on twitter Share on facebook Share on digg | More Sharing ServicesMore Christopher Layne | April 25, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-global-power-shift-west-east-6796?page=show]

Since the Cold War’s end, America’s military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country’s ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a **feedback loop** will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America’s fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus—not to mention the role of guarding the world’s sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists—a strategically overextended United States **inevitably will need to retrench.** Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished.

#### 3. Prefer neg ev – cites a consensus of economic forecasters and compares the most important indicators. Unipolar theorists rely on static measures and fail to grasp the velocity of China’s rise.

#### Evaluate their offense within the lens of sustainability – collapse is inevitable which means it’s only a question of peaceful retrenchment now or miscalculating later in an attempt to prolong primacy.

#### If we win collapse is inevitable, vote neg on the risk that sustaining heg in the short-term causes backlash and war.

Layne 7 [Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute,"The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate]

The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. 131 Thus, to reduce others' concerns about its power, the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well **hasten its end** by **stimulating more intensive efforts to balance** against the United States, thus causing the United States to become **imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power.** Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

#### Retrenchment now is key to maintain any future influence.

Maher 11 [Richard, IR at Brown, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis Volume 55, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 53–68]

It still remains inevitable that America's outsized role in world politics will decline in the years and decades ahead. Rather than seeking to desperately prolong this position at undue expense, which would serve **only** to **hasten** **America's decline and weaken its long-term position**, the United States should start thinking now about how it will exercise its power and influence once its preeminent position is over. The United States is still in a position to shape this new world order, by **defining the rules, institutions, and patterns of legitimacy** that will prevail in this new era of global politics. Periods of change in the global distribution of power are often chaotic, unstable, and violent. The United States will be responsible for maintaining some kind of global equilibrium so the end of one era of world politics and the emergence of a new, different era avoids the overt power competition and instability of previous transitions. While the United States will face more constraints and pushback from the rest of the world, it may actually be able to **preserve and in some cases even expand its influence** in this new era.

### 2NC Prolif

#### Primacy ensures continued proliferation – countries go after nukes to try and deter U.S. interventions, especially in a post-Libya environment. That’s Monteiro.

Specifically, Iran

Heinonen and Henderson, 13 (Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Rouhani and Iran's Nuclear Progress. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rouhani-and-irans-nuclear-progress)

Uranium enrichment. Iran continues to enrich uranium and increase the number of centrifuges installed, including around 18,000 of the IR-1 type centrifuge and 1,000 of the more efficient IR-2m type. Yet it will not need more than a small fraction of the enriched uranium it has already produced in the foreseeable future, let alone new uranium. Its sole nuclear power reactor uses low-enriched fuel supplied by Russia. Tehran persists in claiming that it needs some of the new enriched uranium it is producing to fuel a research reactor in the capital, despite refusing a past international offer to supply such fuel. Worryingly, this research reactor requires 19.75 percent enriched uranium; Iran is currently producing 20 percent enriched fuel for it. In 20 percent fuel, the ratio of ordinary uranium-238 to its fissile isotope uranium-235 has already been processed from the 993:7 figure seen in natural uranium to 28:7, just short of the 1:7 needed for weapons-grade uranium. Iran continues to convert some of its 20 percent uranium into an oxide form, but most of this oxide (apart from a small amount that has been further processed into fuel plates) should be considered part of the enriched stockpile because it is comparatively easy to reconvert into centrifuge feedstock. The increase in Iran's centrifuges and enriched uranium stockpile has opened the door for multiple breakout scenarios at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants, especially if there are other undeclared plants available. For the past three years, discussions of Iran's breakout potential centered on its steadily growing stockpile of 20 percent uranium, but the number of centrifuges is now so great that the arithmetic has changed: the government's huge stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium is now a crucial part of the calculation. As a result, a previous diplomatic proposal -- asking Iran to cap enrichment at 20 percent and ship most of that material abroad -- is now much less relevant in terms of curbing the risk of breakout. The Arak heavy-water reactor. This research reactor will use natural-uranium (i.e., non-enriched) fuel rods, and it will be "moderated" using heavy water. Yet such reactors also produce plutonium, which could serve as an alternative nuclear explosive if separated from the spent fuel. Although Iranian officials told the IAEA that construction delays had pushed the reactor's start-up date to after the "first quarter of 2014," they subsequently indicated that "start-up" means "commissioning using nuclear material," according to a footnote in the latest report. This ambiguous phrasing could complicate any attempt to take military action against the facility if it became necessary, though another footnote indicates that Iranian officials told the IAEA three days before the report was published that they would give the agency notice "at least six months prior to the first introduction of nuclear material into the facility." As soon as nuclear fuel is brought to a reactor site, the whole facility becomes politically "unbombable" because of IAEA resolutions regarding attacks on safeguarded nuclear plants. And once the fuel is inserted and the reactor has gone critical, any military strikes could cause huge radiation emissions. (Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor and its reported 2007 raid on Syria's reactor both took place before nuclear material was inserted.) Possible military dimensions. The IAEA remains frustrated at Iran's lack of cooperation regarding "undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." Tehran has dismissed these concerns, which focus on the Parchin facility on the outskirts of the capital. Unidentified "member states" have told the agency that Iran conducted "hydrodynamic experiments" at Parchin, an indication that it may be trying to perfect the type of implosion device needed to make an atomic bomb using highly enriched uranium or plutonium. The government continues to block IAEA requests to visit the site and has bulldozed and asphalted the areas of concern, preventing the agency from taking potentially revealing samples even if it were allowed there. IMPACT OF SYRIA DEBATE Since the IAEA released its Iran report, Washington and other capitals have been absorbed in the debate over allegations that Syrian used chemical weapons on its own people. President Obama decided to delay a U.S. response until Congress has had time to debate the evidence; intentionally or not, this approach may well affect the Iranian nuclear issue. Washington's current policy toward Iran is based on the belief that U.S. intelligence will provide timely warning if Tehran decides to make a nuclear bomb. The assumption is that Iran cannot break out and produce sufficient nuclear explosive for a weapon without the international community having time to spot what is going on, debate it, and counter it. Yet President Obama's delay on Syria creates doubt that he would behave in a sufficiently timely fashion to counter Iran. Meanwhile, Israel has long indicated that it will make its own assessment of Iran's nuclear progress. Last September, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu presented his redline during a speech before the UN General Assembly: namely, Israel did not want Iran to acquire enough 20 percent enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb if the material was further processed. Yet when one factors in gaseous centrifuge feedstock and oxide that could be reconverted to feedstock, Iran is now past this line. ROUHANI'S POSITION Despite being inaugurated only weeks ago, President Rouhani should hit the ground running on the nuclear issue. He served as Iran's top nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005 and was also involved in crafting nuclear policies as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 1989 to 2005. His election was widely attributed to his campaign promises of bringing relief from international nuclear sanctions. Since winning office, Rouhani has been assessing his strengths within Iran's power structure, which is dominated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He has also been crafting a new nuclear negotiating team. Although he has already publicly indicated that suspending the nuclear program is not an option, his administration's actual negotiating strategy has not yet crystallized. This strategy will be at least partly shaped by Tehran's assessment of President Obama's determination to act in Syria, a close ally of Iran. In other words, events in Damascus could be an important indicator of the direction and progress of nuclear negotiations with Iran.

#### **Mid east proliferation causes nuclear war.**

Heisbourg ’12, [Francois Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, prof at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, July 2012, “How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?”, <http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/file/oving%20Beyond%20Pretense%20web%20version.pdf#page=182>]

Human societies tend to **lack the imagination to think through**, and to act upon, what have become known as “**black swan” events** 26 : **That which has never occurred** (or which has happened very rarely and in a wholly different context) **is deemed not to be in the field of reality,** and to which must be added eventualities that are denied because their consequences are too awful to contemplate. The extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11) bear testimony to this hardwired trait of our species. This would not normally warrant mention as a factor of growing salience if not for the recession into time of the original and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945. Nonuse of nuclear weapons may soon be taken for granted rather than being an absolute taboo. Recent writing on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs 27 may contribute to such a trend, in the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent, and often compelling, historical accounts of the surrender of the Japanese Empire that downplay the role of the atomic bombings in comparison to early research can produce a similar effect, even if that may not have been the intention. 28 However desirable it has been, the end of atmospheric nuclear testing 29 has removed for more than three decades the periodic reminders that such monstrous detonations made as to the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons. There is a real and growing risk that we forget what was obvious to those who first described in 1941 the unique nature of yet-to-be produced nuclear weapons. 30 The risk is no doubt higher in those states for which the history of World War II has little relevance and that have not had the will or the opportunity to wrestle at the time or ex post facto with the moral and strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. Unsustainable strains are possibly the single most compelling feature of contemporary proliferation. Examples include tight geographical constraints–with, for instance, New Delhi and Islamabad, located within 300 miles of each other; nuclear multi-polarity against the backdrop of multiple, crisscrossing sources of tension in the Middle East, as opposed to the relative simplicity of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation; the existence of doctrines, such as India’s “cold start,” and force postures, such as Pakistan’s broadening array of battle- field nukes, that rest on the expectation of early use; and the role of non-state actors as aggravating or triggering factors when they are perceived as operating with the connivance of an antagonist state (in the past, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914; and in the future, Hezbollah operatives launching rockets with effect against Israel or Lashkar-e-Taiba commandos doing a “Bombay” redux in India?). Individually or in combination, **these factors test crisis management capabilities** more severely than anything seen during the Cold War with the partial exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even the overabundant battlefield nuclear arsenals in Cold War Central Europe, with their iffy weapons’ safety and security arrangements, were less of a challenge: The U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so deployed were not putting U.S. and Soviet territory and capitals at risk. It may be argued that these risk factors are known to potential protagonists and that they therefore will be led to avoid the sort of nuclear brinksmanship that characterized U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War in crises such as the Korean War, Berlin, Cuba or the Yom Kippur War. Unfortunately, the multiple nuclear crises between India and Pakistan demonstrate no such prudence, rather the contrary. And were such restraint to feed into nuclear policy and crisis planning, along the lines of apparently greater U.S. and Soviet nuclear caution from the mid-seventies onwards, the fact would remain that initial intent rarely resists the strains of a complex, multiactor confrontation between inherently distrustful antagonists. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that during the 1980s there was real and acute fear in Soviet ruling circles that the West was preparing an out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, a fear which in turn fed into Soviet policies and dispositions. 31 The Cold War was a set of crises and misunderstandings that came within a whisker of a nuclear holocaust. India and Pakistan’s nuclear standoff is deeply unstable, not least as a result of the interaction with non-state actors. A multipolar nuclear Middle East would make the Cuban Missile Crisis look easy in comparison.

Great conflicts tend to occur when one or several of the antagonists views the status quo as sufficiently undesirable and/or unsustainable to prompt forceful pro-action. Notwithstanding widespread perceptions to the contrary, this was not the case of the USSR and the United States during the Cold War. The U.S. had chosen a policy of containment, as opposed to roll-back, of the Soviet Empire within the limits established as a result of World War II. The Soviet Union seized targets of opportunity outside of its 1945 area of control but avoided direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Messianic language from the USSR on the global victory of communism or from the U.S. about the end of the Evil Empire did not take precedence over the prime Soviet concern of preserving the Warsaw Pact and the U.S. pursuit of containment, or, no less crucially, their mutual con¿- dence that they could achieve these aims without going to war with each other No such generalization can be made about the Middle East, a region in which the very existence of a key state, Israel, is challenged, while other states have gone to war with each other (e.g. Iran-Iraq War, and the Gulf War of 1990-1991), or are riven by deep internal conflicts. Actors such as Hezbollah, with its organic and functional links with Islamic Iran and Alawite Syria, add to the complexities and dangers. Extreme views and actions vis à vis the strategic status quo are widely prevalent. Although the India-Pakistan relationship corresponds to something akin to the U.S.-Soviet “adversarial partnership,” that does not apply to radical non-state actors prevalent in Pakistan with more or less tight links to that country’s military intelligence services (ISI, Inter-Services Intelligence). The potential for danger is compounded by the variety of such groups: the Pashtu-related Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Kashmiri-related groups, and Jihadi militants from the core provinces of Punjab and Sind. Their common characteristics are extreme radicalism, high levels of operational pro¿ciency, and shared enmity of India. Their potential for triggering a conflict between the two countries is substantial, above and beyond the intentions of government of¿cials. sum, some seventy years after the launch of the Manhattan Project, there is every reason to upgrade and reinforce nonproliferation policies if nuclear use is to be avoided during the coming decades. Some markers to that end will be laid in our concluding section. What Is to Be Done? In light of the preceding analysis, the most obvious short run implication is the absolute need to secure a satisfactory conclusion of the Iranian file. Anything that feeds the perception of less-than full compliance of Iran with the strictest international safeguards or, worse, that creates the impression that recessed deterrence is in place, would lead to further proliferation in the Middle East and beyond. What happens to the Iranian nuclear program will be essential to the future of proliferation and nonproliferation prospects.

#### Iran proliferation is uniquely destabilizing -- multiple actors.

Joshi, 13 (Shashank, Research Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute. IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR IRAN. Whitehall Papers Volume 79, Issue 1, 2012 Special Issue: The Permanent Crisis: Iran's Nuclear Trajectory.)

 First, nuclear deterrence depends on attribution. Only by accurately attributing a nuclear strike to a single, deterrable entity can we hope to make our deterrent threats credible. When there are multiple nuclear entities, such a process of attribution grows more difficult. According to a recently declassified intelligence assessment from 1984, ‘the existence of the separately controlled US, British, and French strategic nuclear strike systems increase[d] Moscow's uncertainty about nuclear escalation’.89 This was not only because it was unclear which Soviet adversaries might participate in a retaliatory strike, but also because it would not always be clear which ones might have launched a first strike – particularly from submarines (it is notable that the US, too, had doubts over its ability to make such distinctions).90 The existence of separately controlled US and Israeli nuclear weapons therefore presents a challenge for Iran. Separately controlled Iranian and, say, Saudi Arabian nuclear weapons would generate similar problems for the US, Israel and Europe – and perhaps even Pakistan and India. The problem would worsen if India were in the future to deploy nuclear-armed submarines in the region. This problem is especially acute for three further reasons: first, the proximity of these states and the correspondingly short missile and, to a lesser extent, aircraft flight times;91 second, the lack of sophisticated early-warning systems that could compensate for such short flight times; and third, the possession and deployment of dual-use ballistic missiles – that is, those capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Each of these problems is a feature of the scenario in South Asia, where missile flight times are a matter of a few minutes.92 However, they assume greater prominence in a multipolar setting in which identifying the source of a nuclear strike may not be simple. Calculating Sufficiency and Vulnerability Second, multipolar nuclear relationships can complicate a state's calculations about the survivability and sufficiency of its own nuclear arsenal. States might resort to worst-case calculations and develop arsenals based on the aggregate nuclear capability of any plausible coalition of nuclear states ranged against them. Moreover, efforts to configure a deterrent to a number of different states is difficult, and increases the probability of error. As Christopher Ford observes, ‘the more players there are, the more chances there will be for the system to break down, through accident, error, miscalculation, miscommunication, or some other pathology’.93

#### Hegemony guarantees eventual escalation.

Maass 10 [Richard, PhD candidate – Notre Dame, Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony, http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass\_article.pdf]

Conclusions Allison’s ideas seem sound in theory, but cannot be applied in practice. Proliferation is inevitable, and its effects will ultimately deteriorate U.S. hegemony. The world could very plausibly witness the proliferation of five or ten new nuclear states within the next few decades. As more states acquire nuclear instruments, the U.S. will be forced to further change its policies and adapt to a multi-lateral nuclear theater. Proliferation places conventionally weaker states in a better bargaining position with the United States, forcing the U.S. into a position of acquiescence. A multilateral nuclear theater poses **too many issues** for the United States to resolve unilaterally. States such as North Korea and Pakistan refuse U.S. intervention; North Korea even withdrew from the 1994 Agreed Framework and “may have diverted fissile material for nuclear weaponry”(US Department of Defense, 2001). Though riddled with domestic instability and stricken by insurgency, Pakistan refuses U.S. aid in directly securing its nuclear sites and continues to hide their locations. Russia’s control over its vast nuclear arsenal slowly diminishes with time, increasing the likelihood that terrorist groups may seize a weapon. To continue as the sole hegemon, the U.S. inevitably must violate national sovereignty to promote its interests. Infringement on states’ rights would only escalate tensions, **eventually leading to conflict**. In order to fight a multi-front war on such a large scale, the U.S. needs to radically change its policies. Regardless, the U.S. cannot continue to project power in the manner it has done since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Steve Sagan is right in asserting that more is worse regarding the spread of nuclear weapons. The U.S. no longer will be the sole international hegemon; rather it will merely be the first among states equally capable of instigating the ultimate catastrophe.

#### Prolif spurs new arms races and rapid weapons deployments that cause miscalculation and nuclear extinction. That’s Sokolski.

#### Retrenchment solves.

Mearsheimer 10 [John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interest, and his most recent book, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics, was published in January 2011 by Oxford University Press. Imperial by Design December 16, 2010 http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576]

Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. It has two main virtues. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world, and even then, only as a matter of last resort. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now. As a result, the United States would be less threatening to other countries, which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U.S. attack. Furthermore, because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia, Europe and the Gulf, there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas, thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. Certainly, the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis; and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. But all things considered, offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check.

### AT: Allies

#### Allies can’t solve—US commitments cause free riding

Walt 12 [Stephen, IR – Harvard, Connecting the dots, Foreign Policy, 7/18/2012, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/18/connecting\_the\_dots]

Item #4: A new report by the Project for Defense Alternatives, reminding readers of the following basic facts: a) the U.S. and its allies spend four times more on defense than our potential adversaries do. I like a margin of safety as much as anyone, but this is ridiculous. b) Key U.S. allies perennially free ride on Uncle Sucker. The United States spends 4.8 percent of GDP on defense while our NATO allies in Europe spend an average of 1.7 percent, Japan spends 1 percent of GDP and South Korea spends only 2.8 percent. c) China, our supposed emerging "peer competitor," a rising China, devotes only about 2 percent of GDP to defense. Either we have our strategic priorities all mixed up, or the DoD is doing something very wrong. I would note in passing that Mitt Romney thinks we aren't spending enough, that we ought to cut taxes even more and that we also need to balance the federal budget. Needless to say, this combination makes no sense, and Romney (who seems to know a lot about clever accounting when his own fortune is involved) is being disingenuous or simply lying. Is there a direct connection between these various items? No, because economies are complicated and cutting U.S. defense spending wouldn't automatically translate into more money for other items (include state and local governments). But there is clearly a connection between the amount the U.S. spends (trying to) provide global security in lots of far-flung places and our ability to pay for desirable things here at home, including things like education and infrastructure that are **essential to our long-term** well-being and **strength** as a nation.

### 2NC China

#### First, China’s rise isn’t a threat to U.S. interests.

Allin and Jones 6/22 [Dana H., Editor of Survival and Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs at The International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Erik, Professor and Director of European Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS Director, Bologna Institute for Policy Research Head of Europe, Oxford Analytica Adelphi Series Conclusion: Realist Dilemmas Version of record first published: 22 Jun 2012 Adelphi Series, 52:430-431, 183-198]

Getting the balance right is obviously an overriding demand on US strategy and diplomacy. Along with the danger of provoking Beijing with a posture that might appear aggressive, the obverse risk is that the spectre of American disarray and decline could embolden nationalists in a still-growing China to demand more aggressive and assertive policies. In theory, such assertiveness would be enabled by the possibility that China’s GDP and military spending could exceed America’s by the middle of the century. Yet, we should not let hypothetical future dangers scare us out of recognising some **stabilising realities** of the present. ‘China’, Dobbins observes, ‘is seeking neither territorial aggrandise-ment nor ideological sway over its neighbours. It shows **no interest** in matching US military expenditures, achieving comparable global reach, or assuming defence commit-ments beyond its immediate periphery’.8 Indeed, insofar as Beijing is not eager to be a supplier of global public goods, its grand strategy at least implicitly confers upon the United States a continued leadership role. All of this might change, of course, but the United States would have ample time to observe these changes and adjust its own strategic planning and posture.

#### But pursuing primacy ensures escalating rivalry.

White 12 [Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, America’s choices about China August 5th, 2012 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/05/america-s-choices-about-china/]

Washington’s message to Beijing is that everything will be fine, as long as China agrees to do things America’s way. If not, America will use ‘every element of America’s power’ to pull it into line. Don’t believe me? Go back and read President Obama’s big speech in Canberra last November, and ask yourself how it sounds to Chinese ears — which are the ones that really matter. The problem is that China will not accept America’s pre-conditions for a good relationship, and the more its wealth and power grows relative to America’s, the more willing Beijing will be to make that plain. The rest of us might regret that, but we can hardly be surprised by it, and we cannot wish it away. If America insists on maintaining the status quo of US primacy as China’s power and ambitions grow, **escalating strategic rivalry with China is** close to **a certainty.**

[If no extinction impact]

#### Escalates and goes nuclear.

White 11 [Mr. Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. The Obama Doctrine WSJ, 11/25/11 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577057660524758198.html]

One risk is that escalating strategic competition will disrupt the vital economic relationship between the U.S. and China. Many hope that the two countries' deep interdependence will prevent their rivalry getting out of hand. But that will only happen if both sides are willing to forgo strategic objectives to protect their economic cooperation. With the Obama Doctrine, the President has declared that he has no intention of doing that. Why should we expect the Chinese to act any different? So it is more likely that escalating rivalry will soon start to erode economic interdependence between the two nations, at great cost to both. The other risk is the growing chance of conflict. A war with China over Taiwan or the Spratly Islands is simple to start but hard to end, and could **very easily escalate**. China is a nuclear-armed power capable of destroying American cities, and the **threshold** for nuclear exchanges in a U.S.-China clash **might be dangerously unclear and disastrously low.**

#### Independently, containment destroys the dollar – crushes growth and hegemony.

Kirshner 10 [Jonathan Kirshner, Prof of IR - Cornell University, USA The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China August 2010 European Journal of International Relations March 2012 vol. 18 no. 1 53-75]

China holds over two trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves, most of which are in the form of US dollar assets, in particular US government debt. This can sound ominous, but, in practice, this position gives China much less practical coercive leverage over the US than it might seem. China has found itself (if with mixed emotions after the financial crisis of 2007–8) with considerable vested interests in both the future of the dollar and in the general health of the US economy, its largest export market. China would be a big loser in a confrontation that undermined either the greenback or American consumer demand. But if push came to shove cooler heads would be unlikely to prevail, and a Sino-American macroeconomic tussle that seriously implicated the dollar would leave both countries much worse off. 15 But it is not hard to imagine China going ‘financially nuclear’ in response to US policies explicitly designed to take down the People’s Republic. In aggressively confronting China, the US would be inviting the very high costs of an unwanted and major crisis of the dollar, which would seriously harm not just its economy, but America’s global military capacity as well (Kirshner, 2008: 431).

#### Retrenchment solves Asian war.

Friedman and Logan 12 [Benjamin H. research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, and Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable’, Orbis, Volume 56, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 177–191, February 2012]

Chinese efforts to engage in old-fashioned conquest are unlikely, at least beyond Taiwan. Its more probable objective is a kind of Asian Monroe doctrine, meant to exclude the United States.6 China naturally prefers not to leave its maritime security at the whim of U.S. policymakers and, thus, has sought to improve its anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In the longer term, China's leaders will likely pursue the ability to secure its trade routes by building up longer-range naval forces. They may also try to leverage military power to extract various concessions from nearby states. Washington's defense analysts typically take those observations as sufficient to establish the necessity that U.S. forces remain in Asia to balance Chinese military power. But to justify a U.S. military presence there, one also needs to show both that Asian nations cannot or will not balance Chinese power themselves and that their failure to do so would greatly harm U.S. security. Neither is likely. Geography and economics suggest that the states of the region will successfully balance Chinese power—even if we assume that China's economic growth allows it to continue to increase military spending.7 Bodies of water are natural defenses against offensive military operations. They allow weaker states to achieve security at relatively low cost by investing in naval forces and coastal defenses. That defensive advantage makes balances of power **more stable.** Not only are several of China's Asian rivals islands, but those states have the wealth to make Chinese landings on their coast prohibitively expensive. India's mountainous northern border creates similar dynamics. The prospects of Asian states successfully deterring future Chinese aggression will get even better if, as seems likely, threats of aggression provoke more formal security alliances. Some of that is already occurring. Note for example, the recent joint statement issued by the Philippines and Japan marking a new “strategic partnership” and expressing “common strategic interests” such as “ensuring the safety of sea lines of communication.”8 This sort of **multilateral cooperation would likely deepen with a more distant U.S. role.** Alliances containing disproportionately large states historically produce free-riding; weaker alliance partners lose incentive to shore up their own defenses.9 Even if one assumes that other states in the region would fail to balance China, it is unclear exactly how U.S. citizens would suffer. China's territorial ambitions might grow but are unlikely to span the Pacific. Nor would absorbing a few small export-oriented states slacken China's hunger for the dollars of American consumers.

#### Attempts at containment ensure war.

Clemens 12 [Walter C. Clemens, Jr. is Professor of Political Science, Boston University, and Associate, Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. This article originally appeared in Global Asia here. Why Pick a Fight With China? May 05, 2012 http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/05/why-pick-a-fight-with-china/?all=true]

Having achieved little and lost much in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House and Pentagon in 2012 are turning their focus to the Asia-Pacific region. Top U.S. leaders seem to believe that the world’s oldest major democracy must confront the world’s oldest civilization and most populous country. Washington orphans engagement and upgrades containment. A tough line toward China may buttress President Barack Obama’s prospects in this November elections, but could also jeopardize long-term U.S. and world security. Washington risks becoming **trapped in a self-fulfilling policy**. Expecting and preparing for a confrontation with China, U.S. policies may push China to the very behaviors Washington would like to prevent, and toward a collision that no sane person could welcome.

#### Retrenchment key to solve China war.

Layne 12 [Christopher, IR at Texas A&M, The National Interest - April 25, 2012, nationalinterest.org/article/world-transformation-6794]

Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now Beijing aims to dominate its own East and Southeast Asian backyard, just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago. The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington has been the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreign-policy establishment view China’s quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. This contest for regional dominance is **fueling escalating tensions** and possibly **could lead to war.** In geopolitics, two great powers cannot simultaneously be hegemonic in the same region. **Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities.** Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include the unstable Korean Peninsula; the disputed status of Taiwan; competition for control of oil and other natural resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry between the two powers.

#### Only attempts at containment trigger China buildup.

Monteiro 11 [Nuno, I’m an assistant professor of political science at Yale. My research and teaching focus on international politics and security. My commentary covers books, ideas, academia, and current events in international relations. Read more or follow me on twitter. What Would a Chinese Hegemon Look Like? 21June201 http://www.nunomonteiro.org/what-would-a-chinese-hegemon-look-like]

Friedberg acknowledges en passant the opposite argument — that “in a world of global markets and nuclear weapons, the fears and ambitions that motivated previous rising powers are no longer as potent” — but he dismisses it without much engagement. Friedberg grounds this dismissal on evidence that Chinese ideology has for centuries asserted that, in the words of Martin Jacques, “their natural position lies at the epicentre of East Asia”. I think this line of reasoning has two glitches. First, a desire to put China at the epicenter of East Asia is different from a desire to put China in a global hegemonic position. Second, China can become the epicenter of East Asia and beyond by asserting its economic might, with no need to assert convert such power into military assets. The key question here is to figure out whether in an age of global markets and nuclear werapons, military competition is the right strategy for a rising economic power. In Friedberg’s view, it is. In my view, not necessarily. As I argue in this working paper, whether China will put up a global military challenge to US power preponderance depends on whether the US accommodates or tries to contain Chinese economic growth. For Friedberg, this makes no difference — accommodation, which he would call appeasement, would only whet China’s appetite for influence.

#### Forward deployments crushes relations.

Klare 11 [Michael T. Klare, Nation defense correspondent, is professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College.... Playing With Fire: Obama's Risky Oil Threat to China December 6, 2011 This article originally appeared at TomDispatch.com. To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to receive the latest updates from TomDispatch.com. Click here to listen to the author discuss the American military build-up in the Pacific.]

Such thinking, with its distinctly military focus, appears dangerously provocative. The steps announced entail an increased military presence in waters bordering China and enhanced military ties with that country’s neighbors—moves certain to arouse alarm in Beijing and strengthen the hand of those in the ruling circle (especially in the Chinese military leadership) who favor a more activist, militarized response to US incursions. Whatever forms that takes, one thing is certain: the leadership of the globe’s number-two economic power is not going to let itself appear weak and indecisive in the face of an American buildup on the periphery of its country. This, in turn, means that we may be sowing the seeds of a **new cold war** in Asia in 2011.

#### They’re wrong

Johnston ’13, Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard Professor of China in World Affairs, Spring 2013, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness,” <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22951/how_new_and_assertive_is_chinas_new_assertiveness.html?breadcrumb=%2Ftopic%2F16%2Finternational_security_and_defense%3Fpage%3D14>

There has been a rapidly spreading meme in U.S. pundit and academic circles since 2010 that describes China's recent diplomacy as “newly assertive.” This “new assertiveness” meme suffers from two problems. First, it underestimates the complexity of key episodes in Chinese diplomacy in 2010 and overestimates the amount of change. Second, the explanations for the new assertiveness claim suffer from unclear causal mechanisms and lack comparative rigor that would better contextualize China's diplomacy in 2010. An examination of seven cases in Chinese diplomacy at the heart of the new assertiveness meme finds that, in some instances, China's policy has not changed; in others, it is actually more moderate; and in still others, it is a predictable reaction to changed external conditions. In only one case—maritime disputes—does one see more assertive Chinese rhetoric and behavior. The speed and extent with which the newly assertive meme has emerged point to an understudied issue in international relations—namely, the role that online media and the blogosphere play in the creation of conventional wisdoms that might, in turn, constrain policy debates. The assertive China discourse may be a harbinger of this effect as a Sino-U.S. security dilemma emerges.

### 2NC Iran

#### Iran is ready for a grand bargain that would end Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a security guarantee. Rouhani’s election establishes a window of opportunity for negotiations. Congressional threats of force are ineffective and undermine these negotiations.

Walt 13 (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. Congress to Iran: Drop Dead. http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/05/congress\_to\_iran\_drop\_dead)

About six weeks ago, I wrote a blog post about the election of new Iranian President Hasan Rouhani. I said it was precisely the sort of opportunity that Barack Obama's administration had been looking for back in 2009, but I was pretty sure the United States and Iran would find a way to squander it. Here's one paragraph from that post, dated June 17, 2013: Back in Washington, any attempt at a serious rapprochement will also have to overcome relentless opposition not only from AIPAC and the other major groups in the Israel lobby, but also from Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states. Unfortunately, the U.S. political system doesn't reward patience, and Obama has not shown himself to be especially bold or courageous when it comes to foreign policy. Indeed, he has yet to take and stick to any foreign-policy position that requires him to buck powerful political forces at home. By the time his finger-in-the-wind approach to diplomacy has run its course, the opportunity for a new approach to Iran may be lost, thereby reinforcing the Iranian belief that the only thing the United States will accept is the end of the Islamic Republic, and strengthening the American conviction that even reformist Iranian leaders are beyond the pale. It's a bit too soon to say, "I told you so," but so far my initial prediction is on track. Although Rouhani has appointed a series of moderate officials (many associated with former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani), softened Iranian rhetoric about Israel somewhat, and pledged to seek the path of "détente," we still have little idea how the Obama administration intends to respond. I'm not even sure who is taking the lead in figuring that out. In the meantime, hawks in the United States -- led by the always-helpful lobbyists at AIPAC -- are already doing everything they can to derail a possible rapprochement. Unfortunately, they can always count on the help of a timorous and craven Congress, including a number of prominent "progressive" Democrats. Just last week, the House passed H.R. 850, an AIPAC-sponsored resolution tightening sanctions for the umpteenth time. The bill was called the "Nuclear Iran Prevention Act," but as Paul Pillar blogged on National Interest's website, a more honest title would be the "Nuclear Iran Promotion Act." The vote was 400-20 (with 378 co-sponsors!), and I'm sorry to say that my own representative, Joe Kennedy III, wasn't exactly a "profile in courage" on this issue. Of course, he had plenty of company. And now 76 supine Senators are sending Obama one of those stern AIPAC-drafted letters warning him to keep up the pressure. Negotiating with Iran is OK, they concede, provided that any discussions are backed up by the constant threat of military force. Never mind that the United States has been threatening force and conducting various forms of covert action against Iran for years, and Iran hasn't said "uncle" yet. Never mind that Congress has repeatedly called for regime change in Tehran (now there's a confidence-building measure!), and Iran has responded by building more centrifuges. Never mind that Iran has said all along that it won't be bullied into concessions. Never mind the obvious fact that threats of military force are a pretty silly way to convince a much weaker country that it doesn't need some sort of deterrent. And please ignore the fact that America's key allies in Europe and even conservative publications like the Economist are urging the Obama administration to seize this and give Rouhani a serious chance. So is Bloomberg News. I'm still fairly confident that Obama and the White House have little or no interest in another Middle East war. The State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence services aren't pushing for a war that could only delay but not eliminate Iran's nuclear potential either. And I'm 100 percent sure that the United States should engage Iran's new government seriously and patiently to see whether a deal can be struck. I even suspect that most of the senators and representatives who voted for or signed those silly but dangerous documents last week know all this too. But nobody ever went broke betting on the spinelessness of elected representatives in Congress, especially on just about anything concerning the Middle East.

#### Iran’s military is a joke – we can deter them from afar.

Friedman 12 [Benjamin H. Friedman is a Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute. Iran's Bluster Proves Its Weakness. This article appeared in The Atlantic on January 9, 2012]

The obviousness of Iran's bluster suggests its weakness. Empty threats generally show desperation, not security. And Iran's weakness is not confined to water. Though Iran is more populous and wealthier than most of its neighbors, its military isn't equipped for conquest. Like other militaries in its region, Iran's suffers from coup-proofing, the practice of designing a military more to prevent coups than to fight rival states. Economic problems and limited weapons-import options have also undermined its ability to modernize its military, while its rivals buy American arms. Here's how Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press summarize Iran's conventional military capability: Iran...lacks the equipment and training for major offensive ground operations. Its land forces, comprising two separate armies (the Artesh and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), are structured to prevent coups and to wage irregular warfare, not to conquer neighbors. Tehran's air force is antiquated, and its navy is suited for harassment missions, not large amphibious operations across the Gulf. Furthermore, a successful invasion is not enough to monopolize a neighbor's oil resources; a protracted occupation would be required. But the idea of a sustainable and protracted Persian Shi'a occupation of any Gulf Arab society—even a Shi'a-majority one like Bahrain—is far-fetched. Despite Iran's weakness, most U.S. political rhetoric—and more importantly, most U.S. policy—treats it as a potential regional hegemon that imperils U.S. interests. Pundits eager to bash the president for belatedly allowing U.S. troops to leave Iraq say it will facilitate Iran's regional dominance. The secretary of defense, who says the war in Iraq was worth fighting, wants to station 40,000 troops in the region to keep Iran from meddling there. Even opponents of bombing Iran to prevent it from building nuclear weapons regularly opine on how to "contain" it, as if that required great effort. Empty threats generally show desperation, not security. Some will object to this characterization of Iran's capabilities, claiming that asymmetric threats—missiles, the ability to harass shipping and nasty friends on retainer in nearby states—let it punch above its military weight. But from the American perspective—a far-off power with a few discrete interests in the region—these are complications, not major problems. Our self-induced ignorance about Iran's limited military capabilities obscures the fact that we can defend those interests against even a nuclear Iran at far lower cost than we now expend. We could do so from the sea.

### 2NC No War

#### Heg doesn’t solve conflict –

1. Neocons ignore overwhelming data that proves no correlation between interventions and stability. In the 90s we made cuts and no rivalries developed. That’s Fettweis.

2. Other explanations still hold true in multipolarity – nuclear peace, economic interdependence, and other entrenched norms will exist regardless of power distribution.

3. Their list of vague impacts is academic junk – you should correct for cognitive bias.

Fettweis 11 [Political Science – Tulane, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO]

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America's detriment.” 53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.” 54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case. 55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.” 57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

### 2NC Adaptation

### 1nc

#### Barnett has a myopic view of violence – hegemony drives proliferation, counterbalancing, and is statistically the most war-prone system – ensures tensions that create the circumstances for nuclear miscalculation. That’s Montiero.

#### Their empirics are a joke. Barnett took the casualty numbers of World War I and II and said that causualities have decreased since then. No shit. That’s not an argument for heg.

#### Barnett is a hack and paid off by weapons contractors—heg just leads to war

Robb 5 John, expert military analyst who has consulted the DoD, JCS, House Armed Services Committee, and CIA; “Barnett's Neo-Conservative Redux” *John Robb’s Weblog*; December 14, 2005; http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2005/12/barnetts\_neocon.html

Thomas Barnett, an author and an evangelist for a military contractor, is making progress pushing the DoD into a buying binge to build a new nation-building force out of the legacy military. According to him, non-state forces don't have a chance against this new government run super-bureaucracy. The tech, the ideas, and the people will be so great that it can't fail.¶ Of course, I hope he is right that America, armed with this new sys-Admin force will sweep the world of failed states and accelerate the end of history (where everyone lives in a US-aligned capitalist democracy). However, I know he is wrong and this will only result in buckets of grief, blood, and red ink.

#### Warming is slow and adaptable – it takes a CENTURY for sea level rise or agriculture – only VERY mild consequences in the status quo – that’s Mendohlson

#### And, Mitigation Solves – their ev assumes NO future climate policies, which is false – we're already developing clean energy and sustainable practices – that’s Moore

#### Oceans buffer the heat – impact takes decades

Walker and King 8—Director of the School of Environment @Oxford

Gabrielle, PhD in Chemistry, Sir David, Director of the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment at the University of Oxford, and a senior scientific adviser to UBS, The Hot Topic, pg. 47

Most people have now realized that climate change is upon us. If pushed, most would probably say that if we don’t do something to change the way we live, things are more likely to get worse. But few seem to have noticed one of the most important points to emerge from the last few years of scientific projections. All the evidence suggests that the world will experience significant and potentially highly dangerous changes in climate over the next few decades no matter what we do now. That’s because the ocean has a built in lag. It takes time to heat up, which is why the nicest time to swim is often the end of the summer rather than the middle. The same principle holds for global warming, but on a longer timescale: Because the oceans gradually soak up heat generated by the extra greenhouse gases, the full effect won’t be felt for decades to centuries. This means that whatever we do now to change our carbon habits will take several decades to have any effect. In other words, according to our most sophisticated models, the next twenty to thirty years will be more or less the same whether we quickly kick the carbon habit or continue burning as many fossil fuels as we can. Whatever we do today to reduce emissions will matter for our children’s generation and beyond, but not for our own. The problem of climate change is one of legacy.

#### Slow warming is empirically survivable

Michaels in ‘7

(Patrick, Senior Fellow in Environmental Studies @ Cato and Prof. Environmental Sciences @ UVA, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “Global Warming: No Urgent Danger; No Quick Fix”, 8-21, http://cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=8651)

We certainly adapted to 0.8 C temperature change quite well in the 20th century, as life expectancy doubled and some crop yields quintupled. And who knows what new and miraculously efficient power sources will develop in the next hundred years. The stories about the ocean rising 20 feet as massive amounts of ice slide off of Greenland by 2100 are also fiction. For the entire half century from 1915 through 1965, Greenland was significantly warmer than it has been for the last decade. There was no disaster. More important, there's a large body of evidence that for much of the period from 3,000 to 9,000 years ago, at least the Eurasian Arctic was 2.5 C to 7 C warmer than now in the summer, when ice melts. Greenland's ice didn't disappear then, either. Then there is the topic of interest this time of year — hurricanes. Will hurricanes become stronger or more frequent because of warming? My own work suggests that late in the 21st century there might be an increase in strong storms, but that it will be very hard to detect because of year-to-year variability. Right now, after accounting for increasing coastal population and property values, there is no increase in damages caused by these killers. The biggest of them all was the Great Miami Hurricane of 1926. If it occurred today, it would easily cause twice as much damage as 2005's vaunted Hurricane Katrina. So let's get real and give the politically incorrect answers to global warming's inconvenient questions. Global warming is real, but it does not portend immediate disaster, and there's currently no suite of technologies that can do much about it. The obvious solution is to forgo costs today on ineffective attempts to stop it, and to save our money for investment in future technologies and inevitable adaptation.

#### <<runaway warming>>

### 2NC Tipping Point

#### We're past the tipping point – all recent scientific studies conclude too much CO2 has been emitted to prevent the effects. Oceans will release back stored CO2, causing future warming for centuries. Action now has no effect for one thousand years. – that’s Solomon et al.

#### Prefer academic consensus – they cite scientists that temperatures are rising but only journalists and environmentalists that the plan can reverse the effects of previous emissions.

#### Even cutting to zero emissions is too late

Gillett et al 10—director @ the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis

Nathan, “Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions”. *Nature Geoscience*

Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced 17 global mean temperature change is irreversible on human 18 timescales1\_5. We find that not only is this climate change 19 irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as Antarctic 20 temperature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate 21 changes are simulated to continue to worsen for many centuries 22 even after a complete cessation of emissions. Although it is 23 also well known that a large committed thermosteric sea level 24 rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions in 2100, 25 our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern Ocean 26 warming at intermediate depths suggests that this effect may be 27 compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the 28 Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres. 29 Quantitative results presen9ted here are subject to uncertainties 30 associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat 31 uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but our 32 findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere 33 warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone, 34 and delayed and ongoing ocean warming at intermediate depths 35 following a cessation of emissions are likely to be robust. Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming.

#### We’re past the tipping point – too much CO2 already

Hamilton 10 – Professor of Public Ethics @ ANU

Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics in Australia, 2010, “Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth About Climate Change,” pg 27-28

The conclusion that, **even if we act promptly and resolutely**, the world is on a path to reach 650 ppm is almost too frightening to accept. That level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will be associated with warming of about 4°C by the end of the century, well above the temperature associated with tipping points that would trigger further warming.58 So it seems that even with the most optimistic set of assumptions—the ending of deforestation, a halving of emissions associated with food production, global emissions peaking in 2020 and then falling by 3 per cent a year for a few decades—**we have no chance** of preventing emissions rising well above a number of critical tipping points that will spark uncontrollable climate change. The Earth's climate would enter a chaotic era lasting thousands of years before natural processes eventually establish some sort of equilibrium. Whether human beings would still be a force on the planet, or even survive, is a moot point. One thing seems certain: there will be far fewer of us. These conclusions arc alarming, co say the least, but they are not alarmist. Rather than choosing or interpreting numbers to make the situation appear worse than it could be, following Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows 1 have chosen numbers that err on the conservative side, which is to say numbers that reflect a more buoyant assessment of the possibilities. A more neutral assessment of how the global community is likely to respond would give an even bleaker assessment of our future. For example, the analysis excludes non-CO2, emissions from aviation and shipping. Including them makes the task significantly harder, particularly as aviation emissions have been growing rapidly and are expected to continue to do so as there is no foreseeable alternative to severely restricting the number of flights.v' And any realistic assessment of the prospects for international agreement would have global emissions peaking closer to 2030 rather than 2020. The **last chance to reverse the trajectory of global emissions** by 2020 **was forfeited** at the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009. As a consequence, a global response proportionate to the problem was deferred for several years.

# 1NR

Human diversity, medicine and evolutionary limits check.

Gladwell 95 [Malcolm, New York bureau chief of The Washington Post, New Republic, July 17]

This is what is wrong with the Andromeda Strain argument. Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost, and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is almost invariably lethal because its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms. If there are any conclusions to be drawn about disease, they are actually the opposite of what is imagined in books such as The Hot Zone and The Coming Plague. It is true that the effect of the dramatic demographic and social changes in the world over the past few decades is to create new opportunities for disease. But they are likely to create not homogeneous patterns of disease, as humans experienced in the past, so much as heterogeneous patterns of disease. People are traveling more and living in different combinations. Gene pools that were once distinct are mixing through intermarriage. Adults who once would have died in middle age are now living into their 80s. Children with particular genetic configurations who once died at birth or in infancy are now living longer lives. If you talk to demographers, they will tell you that what they anticipate is increasing clusters of new and odd diseases moving into these new genetic and demographic niches. Rare diseases will be showing up in greater numbers. Entirely unknown diseases will emerge for the first time. But the same diversity that created them within those population subgroups will keep them there. Laurie Garrett's book is mistitled. We are not facing "the coming plague." We are facing "the coming outbreaks."

2. Self-interest means no extinction.

MacPhee and Marx 98 [Ross, American Museum of Natural History and Preston, Aaron, Diamond AIDS Research Facility, http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit1.html]

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

No resource wars.

Tertrais 12 [Bruno, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Strat gique (FRS) The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It? The Washington Quarterly • 35:3 pp. 722]

Future resource wars are unlikely. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent. 61 The invasion of Kuwaita nationwide bank robberymay go down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources. China’s and India’s energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts. 62 As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan’s decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.) 63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons. Only in civil wars does the question of resources such as oil, diamonds, minerals, and the like play a significant role; this was especially true as Cold War superpowers stopped their financial patronage of local actors. 64 Indeed, as Mueller puts it in his appropriately titled The Remnants of War, ‘‘Many [existing wars] have been labeled ‘new war,’ ‘ethnic conflict,’ or, most grandly ‘clashes of civilization.’ But in fact, most. . .are more nearly opportunistic predation by packs, often remarkably small ones, of criminals, bandits, and thugs.’’ 65 It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels such conflicts. The risk is particularly high when the export of natural resources represents at least a third of the country’s GDP. 66

Food shocks inevitable – too many alt causes.

Tipson 12 [Frederick, special advisor to the Center for Science,Technology and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where hewas a 2011-12 Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow. He worked previously for the UN Development Programme, Microsoft, the MarkleFoundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, Hongkong Telecom,AT&T, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the University ofVirginia School of Law. Global Food Insecurity and "Political Malnutrition," June 2012, Number 7, German Marshall Fund Connections, http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files\_mf/1339595984Tipson\_GlobalFoodInsecurity\_Jun12.pdf]

Meanwhile, the political dimensions of “food insecurity” go well beyond our compassion for people in the poorest countries who are most vulnerable to famine and malnutrition. Even during the remainder of this decade, we face a transition from localized food shortages and insecurities toward a more pervasive environment of global “food shocks” that have serious political consequences even for the richer world. 3 The combined effects of population trends, climate changes, water shortages, soil erosion or contamination, increased meat consumption, fisheries depletion, major livestock epidemics, or serious crop failures in overlapping and cascading ripple effects will strain already-vulnerable economies and political systems. Sudden price increases or shortages could prompt volatile popular reactions, especially if citizens even in “well-fed” locations lose trust in markets and governments to assure their access to adequate food supplies.

#### Hostilities are periods during which the armed forces are engaged in armed conflict with a foreign force

U.S. Legal Code, No Date (SERVICE LAW BOOKS MENU \ TITLE 8 OF CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (8 CFR) \ 8 CFR PART 392 -- SPECIAL CLASSES OF PERSONS WHO MAY BE NATURALIZED: PERSONS WHO DIE WHILE SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY WITH THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES DURING CERTAIN PERIODS OF HOSTILITIES \ § Sec. 392.1

Definitions.http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-11261/0-0-0-33060/0-0-0-33065.html

Other periods of military hostilities means any period designated by the President under Executive Order as a period in which Armed Forces of the United States are or were engaged in military operations involving armed conflict with a hostile foreign force.

No threatening programs and current defenses solve.

Orent 9 [Wendy, Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Michigan, leading freelance science writer, and author of Plague: The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease, "America's Bioterror Bugaboo." Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA) 17 Jul 2009: A.29. SIRS Researcher. Web. 29 January 2010]

After the anthrax letter attacks of October 2001, the Bush administration pledged $57 billion to keep the nation safe from bioterror. Since then, the government has created a vast network of laboratories and institutions to track down and block every remotely conceivable form of bioterror threat. The Obama administration seems committed to continuing the biodefense push, having just appointed a zealous bioterror researcher as undersecretary of science and technology in the Department of Homeland Security. But is the threat really as great as we've been led to believe? Last summer, the FBI concluded that the anthrax letters that killed five Americans came not from abroad but from an American laboratory, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Meanwhile, the Russian bioweapons program was officially shut down in 1992, and it's unlikely that anything remaining of it could pose much of a threat. Iraq, it has turned out, had no active program. And Al Qaeda's rudimentary explorations were interrupted, according to an Army War College report, by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

Not an existential risk.

Fettweis 10 [Christopher J., fifth year doctoral student in the University of Maryland's Department of Government and Politics. His primary interests include US foreign and national security policies. His dissertation, currently titled The Geopolitics of Energy and the Obsolescence of Major War, focuses on the relationship between oil and conflict. Mr. Fettweis has a BA in History from the University of Notre Dame, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, April 2010 Survival, 52:2, 59 - 82]

Even terrorists equipped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be incapable of causing damage so cataclysmic that it would prove fatal to modern states. Though the prospect of terrorists obtaining and using such weapons is one of the most consistently terrifying scenarios of the new era, it is also highly unlikely and not nearly as dangerous as sometimes portrayed. As the well-funded, well-staffed Aum Shinrikyo cult found out in the 1990s, workable forms of weapons of mass destruction are hard to purchase, harder still to synthesise without state help, and challenging to use effectively. The Japanese group managed to kill a dozen people on the Tokyo subway system at rush hour. While tragic, the attack was hardly the stuff of apocalyptic nightmares. Super-weapons are simply not easy for even the most sophisticated non-state actors to use.31 If terrorists were able to overcome the substantial obstacles and use the most destructive weapons in a densely populated area, the outcome would of course be terrible for those unfortunate enough to be nearby. But we should not operate under the illusion that doomsday would arrive. Modern industrialised countries can cope with disasters, both natural and man-made. As unpleasant as such events would be, they do not represent existential threats.

#### Can’t solve – oil spills happen every day.

Live Science 09. "Natural Oil 'Spills': Surprising Amount Seeps into the Sea." *LiveScience.com*. Tech Media, 20 May 2009. Web. 18 July 2013. <http://www.livescience.com/5422-natural-oil-spills-surprising-amount-seeps-sea.html>.

The infamous 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, one of the largest in U.S. history, dumped more than 10 million gallons of crude into Prince William Sound.While the amount of oil and its ultimate fate in such manmade disasters is well known, the effect and size of natural oil seeps on the ocean floor is murkier. A new study finds that the natural petroleum seeps off Santa Barbara, Calif., have leaked out the equivalent of about eight to 80 Exxon Valdez oil spills over hundreds of thousands of years.¶These spills create an oil fallout shadow that contaminates the sediments around the seep, with the oil content decreasing farther from the seep.¶ There is effectively an oil spill every day at Coal Oil Point (COP), the natural seeps off Santa Barbara where 20 to 25 tons of oil have leaked from the seafloor each day for the last several hundred thousand years. The oil from natural seeps and from man-made spills are both formed from the decay of buried fossil remains that are transformed over millions of years through exposure to heat and pressure.

**An LNG explosion would do minimal damage-4 reasons**

**Lloyd's Register 2004** (Leading participants in the safety and verification of LNG facilities around the world

(“Statement on LNG risks from Lloyd's Register North America, Inc.” 9-23-2004, http://www.lr.org/News+and+Events/News+Archive/2004/Statement+on+LNG+risks+from+Lloyds+Register+North+America+Inc.htm)//NR

LNG. The real risks In the US, regulators and other interested parties have identified as key concerns the possibility of a terrorist attack involving an LNG terminal or an LNG carrier, and the consequences for the surrounding population and infrastructure. Global terrorism is certainly a major threat and all reasonable measures should and must be taken to mitigate the risks and consequences of any actions, however, commentators and observers are incorrect if they believe that a terrorist attack on an LNG carrier would have the impact of a nuclear explosion. There are several technical reasons which bear this out: 1. LNG is transported globally in insulated tanks on specialised ships. These tanks provide four physical barriers and two layers of insulation between the LNG and the outside environment. Further, the separation between the inner and outer hulls of an LNG carrier is typically over two meters. These two factors combined mean that LNG cargo carried at sea has a very high in-built level of protection from external blast sources. 2. In the event of an attack, even if a one-meter hole were to be formed in the inner hull, the resultant holes in the primary containment barrier would be significantly smaller due to the increased separation distance from the blast source combined with the pressure absorption properties of the secondary containment barrier and insulation materials. 3. It is unrealistic to imagine that the entire cargo of any ship can be instantaneously released. To mount an attack on an LNG carrier that would result in the instantaneous release of all of its cargo would require the equivalent of a full scale military operation, not a clandestine terrorist operation like those carried out against the USS Cole and the Limburg. 4. The idea that LNG carriers are potential nuclear devices is erroneous. There is a lot of energy in LNG and natural gas, as in any hydrocarbon. However, the 'nuclear explosion' statement describes the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate at which the energy would be released in an incident. For example, a lump of coal contains lots of energy, but when set on fire, its energy doesn't all come out instantly like a bomb. Instead, the coal burns over a period of time releasing its energy as it goes. Similarly, LNG carriers contain large quantities of energy, but the energy can only be released slowly in the event of a spill or a fire. 5. An LNG spill in open air will not result in a bomb-like explosion. This has been consistently demonstrated in experiments. Not everything that is ignited explodes like a bomb. For example, when a match is lit, it burns but does not explode. Similarly, the natural gas vapour that could result from an LNG carrier spill also falls under the category of substances that will burn but not explode like a bomb. Reason and caution Paul Huber, Director of LRNA, says: "There are risks associated with the transport and storage of LNG, as there are with any hydrocarbon energy source, and these are precisely the reasons that the LNG industry operates with extensive international and national regulations which govern the safety of LNG transport and storage. The effectiveness of these regulations is apparent in the LNG shipping sector, which has an unblemished safety record spanning 40 years - a track record which is unrivalled by any other maritime sector and most land-based industries. It should also be remembered that LNG itself is one of the cleanest-burning and most environmentally friendly energy sources currently available on a global scale. "While the shadow of terrorism hangs over us, we have to do as much as we can to protect ourselves and our borders, but it is misleading to state, as some have, that an attack on an LNG carrier would be similar to a nuclear event. It is difficult for us to know the rationale behind the assertion contained in the speech to the Houston Forum, but it is clear that it is not supported by fact.

### No Long-term Affects

#### Oil Spills do not have any long-term effect – empirically proven

American Thinker 10 (American Thinker is a daily internet publication devoted to the thoughtful exploration of issues of importance to Americans. Contributors are accomplished in fields beyond journalism and animated to write for the general public out of concern for the complex and morally significant questions on the national agenda. Simpson, James. "Time for a Little Perspective on Oil Spills." *American Thinker*. American Thinker, 5 July 2010. <http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/07/time\_for\_a\_little\_perspective.html>.)

The Deepwater Horizon disaster killed eleven men, and a large amount of oil has been released into the Gulf of Mexico, some of the most important fishing grounds in the U.S. But to claim that it spells the end of a way of life to many Gulf residents is questionable at best. Surely, the Gulf coast economic outlook is not good for the near future, especially with the current recession. But oil spill disasters of equal or greater magnitude have occurred over the past century with little or no long-term consequences.This spill began on April 20. According to the most recent flow-rate estimates of the gusher, it exceeded the Exxon-Valdez spill, which released 259,000 barrels of oil, within the first week. It is interesting to note that Hurricane Katrina caused the release of approximately 167,000 barrels of oil from broken pipelines, storage tanks, and industrial plants, according to the Coast Guard. There was not much environmental damage reported from these leaks, which presumably would have affected the same waters.¶ But these incidents are dwarfed by the 1979 Gulf of Mexico Pemex/Ixtoc I Oil blowout -- until now the largest accidental spill in history. This spill lasted almost ten months, releasing between ten and thirty thousand barrels per day (BPD). In total, it released approximately 3.3 million barrels into the Gulf. Using the current upper end estimate of 60,000 BPD, the Deepwater Horizon spill has now surpassed the Pemex spill, so it can rightfully claim its place as record-holder for accidental spills. But it still is dwarfed by Saddam Hussein's deliberate release of somewhere between 5.7 and 11 million barrels from tankers ten miles off the Kuwaiti coast. While the Pemex spill affected 162 miles of coastline in Texas and Mexico, the long-term environmental consequences were negligible. As one marine biologist put it, "To be honest, considering the magnitude of the spill, we thought the Ixtoc spill was going to have catastrophic effects for decades. ... But within a couple of years, almost everything was close to 100 percent normal again."