### 2AC PMS/FWK

####  “USFG should” proscribes both a stable agent of the government and mechanism

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### USFG is the government established in the constitution

US Legal 13 "Legal Terms, Definitions, and Dictionary" http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/

 The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

Resolved is legislative

AOS 4, Army Officer School, 5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### The abandonment of fiat destroys the future of political engagement and of any possible change in society – link turns exclusion and turns the neg

Coverstone, 05 – masters in communication from Wake Forest and longtime debate coach

(Alan H., “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact,” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference, 11/17/05)

It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. ¶ However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place.¶ I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith inthe power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57)¶ The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism.¶ Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

#### Don’t buy their arguments that traditional debate is stale – repetition is key to education – we don’t retain information without it – studies prove

Freeland 05(Alan E. (MD) and Jennifer T. Freeland (PhD), February 2005, Dr Alan E. Freeland is from the Department of Orthopedic Surgery and Rehabilitation, University of Mississippi Medical Center, Jackson, Miss and Dr Jennifer T. Freeland is from the Department of Educational and School Psychology, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Ind., “Repetition Makes a Scholar”, http://www.healio.com/orthopedics/journals/ORTHO/%7B2183B2BF-9E7B-4C76-9357-324B3B920B28%7D/Repetition-Makes-a-Scholar)

Discipline The first of these fundamentals is discipline. Discipline requires passion and sacrifice. One must go to class, pay attention, take notes, discuss, defend, debate, study, review, and apply. Repetition makes a scholar. The human brain is somewhat similar to both computers and batteries. The brain will logically organize information for recall, interpretation, problem-solving, and creativity (some of the “taxonomies” of learning). Repetition builds, reinforces, and sustains the learning curve. Repeat a word three times, imprint it indelibly on your left temporal lobe, and make it part of your working vocabulary. Computers have revolutionized our methods of data retrieval and storage, but good study habits remain consummate. Leonard Goldner, Professor Emeritus and former Chairman of the Division of Orthopedic Surgery at Duke University, required that his residents maintain a notebook detailing all conferences attended. Dr Goldner said that at the end of one week, an individual may retain 80% of lecture information, but after one month, the figure is closer to 20%. Taking notes helps to reinforce information retention and provides a ready reference for further review and continued reinforcement. *Information retention correlates with repetition, familiarity, frequency of repetition, and the time framework within which it occurs.* Modern personal digital assistants may replace or supplement conventional notebooks, but the concept remains the same. Notes are part of our paper or electronic brain (database). Organization Standardized handouts are very helpful. Teachers may use them to tell students what they want them to learn. Information is organized. References may be provided. The student is less likely to “get lost” during the presentation owing to a missed or misunderstood word or phrase. Handouts do not preclude note-taking, but rather facilitate it. Important notes may be underlined (further reinforcement). Useful information may be added. Don’t allow the gift of standardized notes to be converted to intellectual vagrancy. One should always carry and use a pen or pencil. Studies have demonstrated that physicians and centers performing greater numbers of procedures have better patient outcomes and fewer complications. Again, repetition makes a scholar and improves psychomotor skills. The Learning Process Teaching and learning are two sides of the same coin. Students learn from teachers and teachers learn from students. Through interactive discussion and challenging ourselves and each other by analyzing, discussing, defending, and applying our concepts, we maintain and strengthen our intellectual growth. This constitutes the modern application of the Socratic method of teaching and learning. Although individuals have different talents and capacities, we can all strive to do our best. Many of us learned from painful experience that our studies cannot be neglected. Others inherently knew this to be true. Every credit hour of class requires approximately 2 hours of study a week. Sustained study over a broad period of time is far superior to “cramming.” It takes time to charge a battery, and use to sustain the charge. These principles persist throughout life. The best time to review and study a problem is when that problem is seen in a specific patient. Relating problems to a particular patient is much superior to abstract study in reinforcing information. Your experience with the patient will reinforce your knowledge immeasurably. Abstract reading and review courses are helpful, but studying in specific patient care situations is even more effective. Experience is a great teacher and in time produces wisdom. Problem-oriented simulated case studies are playing an increasingly more prominent role in education-oriented self-assessment and certification examinations.

#### Our argument doesn’t preclude revolutionary conceptions of the resolution – grounding radical activism in the rules of political contest is the only truly subversive act

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 180

'Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subver­sive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, fi­nally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the bound­aries of behavior—if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"—be­cause he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited— "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce any­thing" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace ev­erything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's pur­poses and to that which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will some­thing "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or ex­clude those who reject civility and democracy.

#### Academic debate over policy issues like the response to War Powers is critical to improve policymaking---the K’s abstractions cedes the political

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

#### And disengagement causes worse atrocities and ultimately extinction

Boggs ’97 (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

#### SP C) Best way to evaluate the alt – a methodology that includes the state is necessary for engagement with racist policies

#### Even if they win that the law is inherently racist, the proper response to is to fight for reforms that are necessary bulwarks against historical injustice

Delgado 98

(Richard, Jean N. Lindsley Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School, “Is American Law Inherently Racist”, Debate w/ Prof. Farber, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=facpubs)

AUDIENCE: If we accept the premise that American law is inherently racist, what can be done about it? Where do we start? And related to that, how can an inherently racist law be made unracist, or are we just doomed to a perpetual battle to decrease the level of racism in our laws? PROFESSOR DELGADO: No. I don't think that it is a dispiriting or an overly pessimistic view, if one accepts the position-as I do, that American law is recurrently, inherently racist any more than, it is enervating to accept the proposition that the human body, let's say, is inherently frail. From which it follows then that one ought to take reasonable measures. One ought to wear safety belts, one ought to vaccinate children, and one does not simply give up from the recognition that something is inherently a difficulty or a problem. Vigilance is what is called for, not giving up. So no, I do not take the position that the inherent racism that seems to inflict our society requires any sort of surrender. Quite the contrary, it requires all of our efforts if we are to be the society that we can be and that we are in other respects. I will address this point later in my talk.

#### 3. Making the speaker the gateway for listening to the speech demands ever-greater levels of purification and escalating rhetoric of oppressive history as the source for authority.

Rob Moore, Cambridge and Johan Muller, University of Cape Town, 99, “The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education" British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p. 199-200

The pedagogic device (Bernstein, 1990) of voice discourse promotes a methodology in which the explication of a method’s social location precludes the need to examine the content of its data as grounds for valid explanation. Who says it is what counts, not what is said: This approach favours an ethnography that claims to reveal the cultural specificity of the category – the ‘voice’ of membership. What is held to be the facts, to be the case, is only so – and can only be so – from a particular perspective. The world thus viewed is a patchwork of incommensurable and exclusive voices or standpoints. Through the process of sub-dicision, increasingly more particularized identity categories come into being, each claiming the unique specificity of its distinctive experience and the knowledge authorized by it. The consequence of the abolition of the knowledge boundary that follows from the epistemological theses of postmodernism is the increasing specialization of social categories (See Maton, 1998). Maton describes this process of proliferation in terms of the way such ‘knower’ discourses….base their legitimation upon the privileged insight of a knower, and work at maintaining strong boundaries around their definition of this knower – they celebrate difference where ‘truth’ is defined by the ‘knower’ or ‘voice’. As each voice is brought into the choir, the category of the privileged ‘knower’ becomes smaller, each strongly bounded from one another, for each ‘voice’ has its own privileged and specialized knowledge. The client ‘knower’ group thus fragments, each fragment with its own representative…The procession of the excluded thus becomes, in terms of the privileged ‘knower’, an accretion of adjectives, the ‘hyphenation’ which knower modes often proclaim as progress. In summary, with the emergence of each new category of knower, the categories of knowers become smaller, leading to proliferation and fragmentation within the knowledge formation. (ibid, p. 17) As Maton argues, this move promotes a fundamental change in the principle of legitimation – from what is known (and how) to who knows it. The device that welds knowledge to standpoint, voice and experience, produces a result that is inherently unstable, because the anchor for the voice is an inferior authenticity that can never be demonstrated, only claimed (Taylor, 1992; Siegel, 1997; Fuss, 1990, 1995). Since all such claims are power claims, the authenticity of the voice is constantly prone to a purifying challenge. If you do not believe it you are not one of us’ (Hammersly & Gomm, 1997, para. 3.3) that gears down to ever more rarefied specializations or iterations of the voice category; an unstoppable spiral that Bernstein (1997, p. 176) has referred to as the ‘shrinking of the moral imagination [10]. As Bernstein puts it, ‘The voice of a social category (academic discourse, gender subject, occupational subject) is constructed by the degree of specialization of the discursive rules regulation and legitimizing the form of communication’ (1990, p. 23). If categories of either agents or discourse are specialized, then each category necessarily has its own specific identity and its own specific boundaries. The speciality of each category is created, maintained and reproduced only if the relations between the categories of which a given category is a member are preserved. What is to be preserved? The insulation between the categories. It is the strength of the insulation that creates a space in which a category can become specific. If a category wishes to increase its specificity, it has to appropriate the means to produce the necessary insulation that is the prior condition to its appropriating specificity. (ibid.) Collection codes employ an organization of knowledge to specialize categories of person, integrated codes employ an organization of persons to specialize categories of knowledge (Bernstein, 1977, pp. 106-111) The instability of the social categories associated with voice discourse reflects the fact that there is no stable and agreed-upon way of constructing such categories. By their nature, they are always open to contestation and further fragmentation. In principle, there is no terminal point where ‘identities’ can finally come to rest. It is for this reason that this position can reappear so frequently across time and space within the intellectual field – the same move can be repeated endlessly under the disguise of ‘difference’. In Bernstein’s terms, the organization of knowledge is, most significantly, a device for the regulation of consciousness.¶ The pedagogic device is thus a symbolic ruler of consciousness in its selective creation, positioning and oppositioning of pedagogic subjects. It is the condition for the production, reproduction, and transformation of culture. The question is: whose ruler, what consciousness? (1990, p. 189) The relativistic challenge to epistemologically grounded strong classifications of knowledge removes the means whereby social categories and their relations can be strongly theorized and effectively researched in a form that is other than arbitrary and can be challenged by anyone choosing to assert an alternative perspective or standpoint.

#### 4. Permutation– it is possible to do both. These two strategies are not mutually exclusive – it’s net-beneficial, Wilderson’s ungendered black body can never explain the totality of black female experience—the alt alone ensures patriarchal domination

**Hodges** 20**12** – Asia Hodges University of California Irvine, African American Studies, Mama’s Baby & the Black Gender Problematic [http://www.academia.edu/2027925/Mamas\_Baby\_and\_the\_Black\_Gender\_Problematic](http://www.academia.edu/2027925/Mamas_Baby_and_the_Black_Gender_Problematic%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)

Asia Nichole Hodges Undergraduate Critical Theory Conference 2012 Mentor: Tamara Beauchamp Mama’s Baby & the Black Gender Problematic For me, this paper represents an opportunity to bring focus to the ungendered black subject of afropessimist thought, a concept I was first introduced to in winter quarter of 2011, which was the most theoretically rich coursework I have ever undertaken. In retrospect, the work of Frank Wilderson, III also appeared at a very critical moment in my development, both as a thinker and as a black woman engaged in organizing around issues affecting the black community on campus as well as back home. Afropessimist thought resonated deeply because it spoke to the terrifying truths of antiblack racism, black structural positionality and black life, corroborating my own experience but more importantly providing the language and a framework through which to approach a more thorough explanation of this experience theoretically. Further, when I use the term ‘’black” I mean it in the sense closest to the truth of the paradigm of afropessimist thought as described by Wilderson in Red, White & Black: Cinema & the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms. It is my intent to critique Wilderson’s argument for an ungendered black subject using the work of black feminist scholar, Hortense Spillers, and explore the categories she protects in her work. She is indispensible here not only because she was an impetus for Wilderson’s project, but also because it was her thought that mothered my own. In conversation with the seminal article of Hortense Spillers, Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book, Wilderson explains that, for him, antiblackness functions as a prohibition on gender, thus the black subject is inherently genderless. He writes, “Gratuitous violence relegates the Slave to the taxonomy, the list of things. That is, it reduces the Slave to an object. Motherhood, fatherhood, and gender differentiations can only be sustained in the taxonomy of subjects.”1 While this framework has helped me to understand of the structuring properties of violence, and grasp its role in subject formation more generally, this explanation features an ungendered black subject and cannot be extended to the truth of my life as a black and as a female. This is not to say that afropessimism does not hold the potential to speak to the effect of antiblackness on gender. To the contrary, it was Spillers who first argued that such work was fruitful, writing that in “undressing these conflations of meaning, as they appear under the rule of dominance… we would gain… the potential for gender differentiation as it might express itself along a range of stress points, including human biology in its intersection with the project of culture.”2 Both Wilderson and Spillers take the dereliction of the black from civil society as their point of departure, but in many ways, Spillers has offered us a great deal more than we know what to do with on Wilderson, III, Frank B., Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010, 136. 2 Spillers, Hortense. "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe."Diacritics. (1987): 66. Print. 1 matters of gender and antiblackness. In Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe she theorizes that there is a profundity to the particularities of the position of the female black that is exemplified through regimes of naming. In the spirit of black feminism, though its ensemble of questions cannot help me here, I must occasion an explanation of black positionality that accounts for the manner of existential negation and the modes of violence which position me, moving beyond the concerns with black patriarchy. Theoretically, antiblackness does not only lend itself to an argument against a gendered understanding of my condition, it also offers an opportunity for a more nuanced understanding of gender itself. This begs the question, what does a genderless black subject help us to understand that a more complicated rendering [or gendering] of the black subject would obscure? In my view, black political thought lags here, unable to describe its condition without relegating the particularities of the female black to the abyss. Moreover, it seems the black female labors in service of civil society in ways we have yet to fully understand. Spillers supports an argument for the necessity of this work in building a more robust theoretical foundation for black political thought, and afropessimism could be our point of departure. For Wilderson, there is a line of recognition and incorporation. Above it are human beings, civil society made up of white men and women, and below it is the black in absolute dereliction, a concept he draws from Frantz Fanon writings on the black condition. I mean to suggest that the distinction we’re looking for under the line of recognition and incorporation is not “man” and “woman”, which Wilderson would reject, but that is not to say there is no distinction to be made whatsoever. It seems we may too hastily disregard the possibility for distinction for three reasons, described loosely as outlined by Spillers: 1) there was no distinction made between male and female slaves on the ships, 2) men and women performed the same hard, physical labor and lastly, 3) gender is a category requiring the symbolic integrity from which the black is barred. I am unable to go into each in detail here, but the validity of these points of contention is not what is in question for Spillers. The distinctions made on ships or on fields are not the only sites we should scourer for insight into the black gender problematic, and evidence that captives are not regarded as “men” and “women,” like their captors, is elucidating but not explanatory. In Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe, Spillers uses naming as a point of entry into black gender problematic. She revisits Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s report on the state of the black community in America during the late 1960s, and meditates on the significance of black women emerging as the locus of black pathology. She writes that for Moynihan, “the ‘Negro Family’ has no Father to speak of—his Name, his Symbolic function mark the impressive missing agencies in the essential life of the black community… and it is, surprisingly, the fault of the Daughter, or the female line”. Thus, it is the “displacing [of] the Name and the Law of the father to the territory of the Mother and Daughter [that] becomes an aspect of the African-American female’s misnaming.”3 The black is without the gendered symbolic integrity that the subjects of civil society enjoy; the black performs to both genders, as well as anything in between and beyond, and is not granted the protections of motherhood or the entitlements of fatherhood for example. Moynihan observes the behavior of the black family and concludes that it is a manifestation of the backwardness of blackness generally, and the pathology of black women in particular. But a structural analysis would include a discussion of historical context, relations to power and positionality, with an understanding of the black as positioned through the violence of captivity. Moreover, the emergence of the female black marks the divergence between chattel slavery and racial slavery. Peter Wood, professor of history at Duke University, explains that partus sequitir ventrem, “that which is brought forth follows the womb”, is a legal doctrine which mandates that the child follows the status of the mother, or rather in the case of the female black, her child is doomed to captivity. Woods notes that there was a “shift from indentured servitude to lifelong slavery to heredity slavery, where not only am I enslaved but my children as well” and emphasizes that it was indeed “a remarkable shift”4. However, the problem is not that we do not know this history, but rather we have not dealt with it theoretically, and even in the most likely 3 4 Ibid, 66. of discourses, particularity on the basis of sex is not explored. In chapter 11 of Red, White and Black, Wilderson takes up the issue of gender and sex under captivity, but largely leaves the work Spillers does in Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe untouched. Earlier in the chapter, she is employed as support for Wilderson’s claim that the position of white women and black females are made distinct as a direct consequence of captivity. However, when Wilderson addresses blackness and gender, specifically gender ontology and the reification of gender, Spillers absence is haunting. Moreover, the effect of captivity on gender is not simply a reversal of power between the categories of “man” and “woman” as suggested by Moynihan, but rather that these categories are in fact eviscerated entirely where the black is concerned. Though the black does not hold the symbolic integrity for gender normativity, as argued by both Wilderson and Spillers, the categories of male and female are still apt here; “man” and “woman” representing the body and the latter, eviscerated categories, representing Spillers’ notion of the flesh. She writes: Before there is the ‘body’ there is the ‘flesh,’ that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography. Even though the European hegemonies stole bodies—some of them female… we regard this human and social irreparability as high crimes against the flesh, as a person of African females and African males registered the wounding. 5 Here, Spillers shows that the violence of captivity registers on multiple levels, and of course that the violence can be understood from multiple registers, however the flesh that registers the wounding is sexed, the violence at times sexualized. So how, then, does the female black function within the structure, positioned through regimes of sexualized violence? My project is to seek answers to the questions developed here by acquiescing to the chasms in our understanding. I do not aim to fill the chasm here, but only to make the conceptual leap and let the matter remain unresolved so that we might titter on the edge and engage further with the black gender problematic. To conclude, the closing thoughts of Spillers in Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe, “The female breaks in upon the imagination with a forcefulness that marks both a denial and an ‘illegitimacy’… In this play of paradox, only the female stands in the flesh, both mother and mother-dispossessed. This problematizing of gender places her, in my view, out of the traditional symbolics of female gender, and it is our task to make a place for this different social subject.“ 5 Spillers, 67.

**5. Power is fluid and the state is not a unitary institution—our politics recognizes the contradictory nature of the state and uses it to advance our struggle**

**Rhode 94**

Deborah L. Rhode, Law Prof @ Stanford, April 1994, “Changing Images of the State,” 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, p ln

**Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men's interests.** As a threshold matter, what constitutes those interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion serve male objectives by enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives by reducing female autonomy. n23 In effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology. **Almost any gender-related policy can be seen as either directly serving men's immediate interests, or as compromising short-term concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "normalizing" the system and stabilizing power relations. A framework that can characterize all state interventions as directly or indirectly patriarchal offers little practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns.** And if women are not a homogenous group with unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if **the state is best understood as a network of institutions with complex, sometimes competing agendas**, then the patriarchal model of single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. **It is difficult to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to "male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created**] [\*1186] **leverage for the representation of women's interests.**" n24 Cross-cultural research also suggests that **the status of women is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that patriarchal frameworks imply**. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many feminists challenge the claim that they are the same. As Carole Pateman notes, women do not "live with the state and are better able to make collective struggle against institutions than individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, **feminists need more concrete and contextual accounts of state institutions** than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. Lumping together police, welfare workers, and Pentagon officials as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to obscure than to advance analysis. What seems necessary is a contextual approach that can account for greater complexities in women's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal theories underscore an insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental institutions are implicated in the most fundamental structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it. ¶ These tensions within the women's movement are, of course, by no means unique. **For any subordinate group, the state is a primary source of both repression and assistance in the struggle for equality. These constituencies cannot be "for" or "against" state involvement in any categorical sense. The questions are always what forms of involvement, to what ends, and who makes these decisions**. From some feminist perspectives, liberalism has failed to respond adequately to those questions because of deeper difficulties. In part, the problem stems from undue faith in formal rights. The priority granted to individual entitlements undermines the public's sense of collective responsibility. This critique has attracted its own share of criticism from within as well as from outside the feminist community. As many left feminists, including critical race theorists, have noted, **rights-based claims have played a crucial role in advancing group as well as individual interests. n32 Such claims can express desires not only for autonomy, but also for participation in the struggles that shape women's collective existence. The priority that state institutions place on rights is not in itself problematic.** The central difficulty is the limited scope and inadequate enforcement of currently recognized entitlements. Since rights-oriented campaigns can advance as well as restrict political struggle, evaluation of their strategic value demands historically-situated contextual analysis.

#### 6. Wilderson’s unverifiable generalizations are understandable because he relies of Lacanian and Marxist structuralism – We’ll quote Wilderson’s method section

Wilderson 10

A Note on Method¶ Throughout this book I use White, Human, Master, Settler, and sometimes non‑Black interchangeably to connote a paradigmatic entity that exists ontologically as a position of life in relation to the Black or Slave position, one of death. The Red, Indigenous, or "Savage" position exists liminally as half‑death and half‑life between the Slave (Black) and the Human (White, or non‑Black). I capitalize the words Red, White, Black, Slave, Savage, and Human in order to assert their importance as ontological positions and to stress the value of theorizing power politically rather than culturally. I want to move from a politics of culture to a culture of politics (as I argue in chapter a). Capitalizing these words is consistent with my argument that the array of identities that they contain is important but inessential to an analysis of the paradigm of power in which they are positioned. Readers wedded to cultural diversity and historical specificity may find such shorthand wanting. But those who may be put off by my pressing historical and cultural particularities‑culled from history, sociology, and cultural studies, yet neither historical, sociological, nor, oddly enough, cultural‑should bear in mind that there are precedents for such methods, two of which make cultural studies and much of social science possible: the methods of Karl Marx and Jacques Lacan. Marx pressed the microcosm of the English manufacturer into the service of a project that sought to explain economic relationality on a global scale. Lacan's exemplary cartography was even smaller: a tiny room with not much more than a sofa and a chair, the room of the psychoanalytic encounter. As Jonathan Lee reminds us, at stake in Lacan's account of the psychoanalytic encounter is the realization of subjectivity itself, "the very being of the subject. "31 I argue that "Savage' Human, and Slave should be theorized in the way we theorize worker and capitalist as positions first and as identities second, or as we theorize capitalism as a paradigm rather than as an experience‑that is, before they take on national origin or gendered specfficity Throughout the course of this book I argue that "Savage' Human, and Slave are more essential to our understanding of the truth of institutionality than the positions from political or libidinal economy. For in this trio we find the key to our world's creation as well as to its undoing. This argument, as it relates to political economy, continues in chapter i, "The Ruse of Analogy:' In chapter 2, "The Narcissistic Slave," I shift focus from political economy to libidinal economy before undertaking more concrete analyses of films in parts 2, 3, and 4.¶ No one makes films and declares their own films "Human" while simultaneously asserting that other films (Red and Black) are not Human cinema. Civil society represents itself to itself as being infinitely inclusive, and its technologies of hegemony (including cinema) are mobilized to manufacture this assertion, not to dissent from it. In my quest to interrogate the bad faith of the civic "invitation;' I have chosen White cinema as the sine qua non of Human cinema. Films can be thought of as one of an ensemble of discursive practices mobilized by civil society to "invite:' or interpellate, Blacks to the same variety of social identities that other races are able to embody without contradiction, identities such as worker, soldier, immigrant, brother, sister, father, mother, and citizen. The bad faith of this invitation, this faux interpeLlation, can be discerned by deconstructing the way cinema's narrative strategies displace our consideration and understanding of the ontological status of Blacks (social death) onto a series of fanciful stories that are organized around conflicts which are the purview only of those who are not natally alienated, generally dishonored, or open to gratuitous violence, in other words, people who are White or colored but who are not Black. (I leave aside, for the moment, the liminality of the Native American position‑oscillating as it does between the living and the dead.)¶ Immigrant cinema of those who are not White would have sufficed as well; but, due to its exceptional capacity to escape racial markers, Whiteness is the most impeccable embodiment of what it means to be Human. As Richard Dyer writes, "Having no content, we [White people] can't see that we have anything that accounts for our position of privilege and power . . . . The equation of being white with being human secures a position of power:' He goes on to explain how "the privilege of being white... is not to be subjected to stereotyping in relation to one's whiteness. 'White people are stereotyped in terms of gender, nation, class, sexuality, ability and so on, but the overt point of such typification is gender, nation, etc. Whiteness generally colonises the stereotypical definition of all social categories other than those of race.'¶ Unlike Dyer, I do not meditate on the representational power of Whiteness, "that it be made strange:' divested of its imperial capacity, and thus make way for representational practices in cinema and beyond that serve as aesthetic accompaniments for a more egalitarian civil society in which Whites and non‑Whites could live in harmony. Laudable as that dream is, I do not share Dyer's assumption that we are all Human. Some of us are only part Human ("Savage") and some of us are Black (Slave). I find his argument that Whiteness possesses the easiest claim to Humanness to be productive. But whereas Dyer offers this argument as a lament for a social ill that needs to be corrected, I borrow it merely for its explanatory power‑as a way into a paradigmatic analysis that clarifies structural relations of global antagonisms and not as a step toward healing the wounds of social relations in civil society. Hence this book's interchangeable deployment of White, Settler, and Master with‑and to signify‑Human. Again, like Lacan, who mobilizes the psychoanalytic encounter to make claims about the structure of relations writ large, and like Marx, who mobilizes the English manufacturer to make claims about the structure of economic relations writ large, I am mobilizing three races, four films, and one subcontinent to make equally generalizable claims and argue that the antagonism between Black and Human supercedes the "antagonism" between worker and capitalist in political economy, as well as the gendered "antagonism" in libidinal economy. To this end, this book takes stock of how socially engaged popular cinema participates in the systemic violence that constructs America as a "settler society" (Churchill) and "slave estate" (Spilers). Rather than privilege a politics of culture(s)‑that is, rather than examine and accept the cultural gestures and declarations which the three groups under examination make about themselves‑1 privilege a culture of politics: in other words, what I am concerned with is how White film, Black film, and Red film articulate and disavow the matrix of violence which constructs the three essential positions which in turn structure US. antagonisms.

#### 8. This is non-falsifiable and fails – no support for generalizing from the particular

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05

(Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique)

One of the functions of myth is to cut out what Trevor Pateman terms the "middle level" of analytical concepts, establishing a short-circuit between high-level generalizations and ultra-specific (pseudo-) concrete instances.  In Barthes's classic case of an image of a black soldier saluting the French flag, this individual action is implicitly connected to highly abstract concepts such as nationalism, without the mediation of the particularities of his situation.  (These particularities, if revealed, could undermine the myth.  Perhaps he enlisted for financial reasons, or due to threats of violence).  Thus, while myths provide an analysis of sorts, their basic operation is anti-analytical: the analytical schema is fixed in advance, and the relationship between this schema and the instances it organizes is hierarchically ordered to the exclusive advantage of the former.  This is precisely what happens in Lacanian analyses of specific political and cultural phenomena.  Žižek specifically advocates 'sweeping generalizations' and short-cuts between specific instances and high-level abstractions, evading the "middle level".  'The correct dialectical procedure... can be best described as a direct jump from the singular to the universal, bypassing the mid-level of particularity'.  He wants a 'direct jump from the singular to the universal', without reference to particular contexts.

#### 9. Endorsing a USfg action doesn’t mean we endorse the USfg

Mervyn **Frost**, U of Kent, **1996**, Ethics in Int’l Relations, p. 90-1

A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach is that utilizing the modern state domain of discourse in effect sanctifies the state: it assumes that people will always live in states and that it is not possible within such a language to consider alternatives to the system. This objection is not well founded, by having recourse to the ordinary language of international relations I am not thereby committed to argue that the state system as it exists is the best mode of human political organization or that people ought always to live in states as we know them. As I have said, my argument is that whatever proposals for piecemeal or large-scale reform of the state system are made, they must of necessity be made in the language of the modern state. Whatever proposals are made, whether in justification or in criticism of the state system, will have to make use of concepts which are at present part and parcel of the theory of states. Thus,for example. any proposal for a new global institutional arrangement superseding the state system will itself have to be justified, and that justification will have to include within it reference to a new and good form of individual citizenship, reference to a new legislative machinery equipped with satisfactory checks and balances, reference to satisfactory law enforcement procedures, reference to a satisfactory arrangement for distributing the goods produced in the world, and so on. All of these notions are notions which have been developed and finely honed within the theory of the modern state. It is not possible to imagine a justification of a new world order succeeding which used, for example, feudal, or traditional/tribal, discourse. More generally there is no worldwide language of political morality which is not completely shot through with state-related notions such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.

#### 10. No method for Wilderson’s study – treat their arguments as assertions

Ellison (Ph.D. from University College, London) 11

 (Mary, “Book Review: Red, White and Black: cinema and the structure of US antagonisms,” Race Class October–December 2011 vol. 53 no. 2 100-103)

These are two illuminating, but frustratingly flawed books. Their approaches are different, although both frequently quote Frantz Fanon and Jacques Lacan. Frank Wilderson utilises the iconic theoreticians within the context of a study that concentrates on a conceptual ideology that, he claims, is based on a fusion of Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism and psychology. He uses a small number of independent films to illustrate his theories. Charlene Regester has a more practical framework. She divides her book into nine chapters devoted to individual female actors and then weaves her ideological concepts into these specific chapters. Both have a problem with clarity. Regester uses less complex language than Wilderson, but still manages to be obtuse at times. Wilderson starts from a position of using ontology and grammar as his main tools, but manages to consistently misuse or misappropriate terms like fungible or fungibility. Wilderson writes as an intelligent and challenging author, but is often frustrating. Although his language is complicated, his concepts are often oversimplified. He envisions every black person in film as a slave who is suffering from irreparable alienation from any meaningful sense of cultural identity. He believes that filmmakers, including black filmmakers, are victims of a deprivation of meaning that has been condensed by Jacques Lacan as a ‘wall of language’ as well as an inability to create a clear voice in the face of gratuitous violence. He cites Frantz Fanon, Orlando Patterson and Hortense Spiller as being among those theorists who effectively investigate the issues of black structural non-communicability. His own attempts to define ‘what is black?’, ‘a subject?’, ‘an object?’, ‘a slave?’, seem bound up with limiting preconceptions, and he evaluates neither blackness nor the ‘red’ that is part of his title in any truly meaningful way.

#### 11. The history of racism, while terrible, does not represent exceptional/gratuitous violence – white societies have produced equally excessive violence against one another – refuse their historiography because it relies on transforming a historically inaccurate claim about violence into an entire theory of ideology and subject formation

Coates 13

(Ta-Nehisi, senior editor for The Atlantic, “A Flawed America in Context”, February 13, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/a-flawed-america-in-context/273546/)

Toward the end of our meal we began discussing how one can look at racism in history and avoid falling into depression. My answer was two-fold. 1) I enjoy the history for its own sake. I love history whether it has a political lesson to teach, or not. And 2) the history of white racism and its attendent victims is horrifying, but it should be seen in scale. A taste of what I mean: The fugitives who fled from the south after Nordlingen died of plague, hunger and exhaustion in the refugee camp at Frankfort or the overcrowded hospitals of Saxony; seven thousand were expelled from the cantons of Zurich because there was neither food nor room for them, at Hanau the gates were closed against them, at Strasbourg they lay thick in the streets through the frosts of winter, so that by day the citizens stepped over their bodies, and by night lay awake listening to the groans of the sick and starving until the magistrates forcibly drove them out, thirty thousand of them. The Jesuits here and there fought manfully against the overwhelming distress; after the burning and desertion of Eichstatt they sought out the children who were hiding in the cellars, killing and eating rats, and carried them off to care for and educate them; at Hagenau they managed feed the poor out of their stores until the French troops raided their granary and took charge of the grain for the Army. By the irony of fate the wine harvest of 1634, which should have been excellent, was trampled down by fugitives, and invaders after Nordlingen; that of 635 suffered a like fate, and in the winter, from Wuttemberg to Lorraine, there raged the worst famine of many years. At Calw the pastor saw a woman gnawing on the raw flesh of a dead horse on which a hungry dog and some ravens were also feeding. In Alsace the bodies of criminals were torn from the gallows and devoured; in the whole Rhineland they watched the graveyards against marauders who sold the flesh of the newly buried for food; at Zweibrucken a woman confessed to having eater her child. Acorns, goats' skins, grass, were all cooked in Alsace; cats, dogs, and rats were sold in the market at Worms. In Fulda and Coburg and near Frankfort and the great refugee camp, men went in terror of being killed and eaten by those maddened by hunger... That is the great C.V. Wedgwood describing the last years of the Thirty Years War, in which eight million people died, and the population of "Germany" (to the extent it existed) was reduced by a third. One of my professors followed this up by noting that ten million Russians died in the first World War, and then 15 million more died in the second. When you study racism, with all its attendent woes, there is something comforting about those kind of numbers. It tells you that whatever you are struggling with here is not a deviation from the human experience, but an expression of it. There is very little that "white people" have done to "black people" that I can't imagine them doing to each other. America's particular failings are remarkable because America is remarkable, but they are not particularly deviant or outstanding on the misery index. This is just sort of what we do. The question hanging over us though is this: Is this what we what we will always do?

#### 12. Their use of ontological blackness creates reliance on white superiority and erases individuality – ontological blackness opposes itself to whiteness, affirming white superiority by grounding blackness in suffering and the experience of anti-blackness – that reduces all experience to negative experience of racial constitution, which crushes individuality and causes social death

Pinn 97

(Anthony, Agnes Cullen Arnold Professor of Humanities and Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University whose work focuses on black liberation theology, African-American religion, and African-American humanism, Review of “Beyond Ontological Blackness: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural Criticism by Victor Anderson”, *African American Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Summer, 1997), pp. 320-323)

In chapter one Anderson defines religious criticism, cultural criticism, and other terms that comprise the core of his essay's vocabulary. Using critical theorists such as Edward Said and Hans Blumenberg, Anderson leads the reader through a discussion of central issues in modern criticism: religious vs. secular criticism debates and internal inconsistency based upon false dichotomies. And with the larger critical theory debate outlined, he places criticism within the "racialized culture" of the United States by using a racial genealogy reminiscent of Cornel West's approach. By grounding the humanistic sciences in a theory of natural inequality, Anderson argues that figures such as Immanuel Kant and Thomas Jefferson gave voice to a European genius (i.e., spirit of the age) that justified the bloody movement of modernity. He contends that categorical racism and white racial ideology are parts of a long list of exclusionary tactics justifying differentiation of humanity for overt economic, political, social, and spiritual goals. In response to this racism, Black criticism developed a counter-discourse that Anderson labels ontological blackness. Generally, Black apologists refute claims of white supremacy by presenting Black cultural genius-the uniqueness of African American contributions to culture-as the rationale for Black participation in social progress and democratic humanism. Although one might want initially to recognize the appealing quality of this argument with respect to Black survival, Anderson insightfully claims that it is fundamentally flawed because it is predicated upon acceptance of the whiteness-white superiority-Black apologists reject. Beyond embracing a reactionary identity, ontological blackness also denotes a provincial or "clan-ness" understanding of Black collective life, one that is synonymous with Black genius and its orthodox activities and attitudes. Collective identity so defined creates conflict between the group and the individual because desires and lifestyles at odds with the "party-line" are labeled "nonblack." Individuality is lost, and the freedom to "live, move and have one's being" is compromised through obsession with race. To avoid these dilemmas, African American criticism must be pragmatic enough to subvert all racial discourse and "cultural idolatry," and sensitive enough to appreciate diverse and utopian or transcendent visions of life. When this is done, both the friction between cultural and religious criticism highlighted by Said and Blumenberg and the preoccupation with blackness are resolved. Room is made for a religiously informed cultural criticism. Anderson grounds this new approach in Howard Thurman's theory of radical consciousness and human action, Cornel West's prophetic pragmatism and politics of difference, and the literary criticism of Toni Morrison and bell hooks. He highlights the manner in which these thinkers promote the existential condition of Black people as informed by race, but not limited to race. For them, life is not binary-black and white-or communal at the expense of individual choices and rights. So conceived, African American criticism draws from the best of critical theory and has an appreciation for the human impulse toward creative transformation. Cultural fulfillment, not blackness, is normative. The end product is a utopian yet pragmatic vision of life-fulfillment-forged in the arena of public (politicized) scrutiny. Beyond Ontological Blackness is, in short, an insightful movement toward African American public and critical theology. Yet the question remains: "What should African American cultural and religious criticism look like when they are no longer romantic in inspiration and the cult of heroic genius is displaced ... ? " Since Anderson is professionally entrenched in religious studies, it is not odd that application of his critical gaze would concretely involve a significant challenge to the Black theology enterprise. According to Anderson, Black theological discussions are entangled in ontological blackness. Accordingly, discussions of Black life revolve around a theological understanding of Black experience limited to suffering and survival in a racist system. The goal of this theology is to find the "meaning of black faith" in the merger of Black cultural consciousness, icons of genius, and post-World War II Black defiance. An admirable goal one would think, but here is the rub: Black theologians speak in opposition to ontological whiteness when they are actually dependent upon whiteness to legitimize their agenda. Furthermore, in a bizarre twist, ontological blackness's strong ties to suffering and survival result in blackness being dependent on these issues, and as a result social transformation brings into question what it means to be Black. Liberative outcomes ultimately force an identity crisis, a crisis of legitimation and utility. This conversation becomes more "refined" and more "Afrocentric" as new cultural resources are unpacked and various religious alternatives acknowledged. Yet the bottom line remains racialization of issues and agendas, life and love. Falsehood is perpetuated through the "hermeneutic of return" (Anderson uses Edward Said's term), by which ontological blackness is the paradigm of Black existence and sets the agenda of Black liberation within the "post-revolutionary context" of present-day America. By keeping ontological blackness alive, theologians maintain their raison d'etre and the vitality of their enterprise. Within the work of these theologians one ever finds the traces of the Black aesthetic which pushes for a dwarfed understanding of Black life and a sacrifice of individuality for the sake of an illusional unified Black "faith." Implicit in all of this is a crisis of faith, a fear to address both the glory and guts of Black existence- nihilistic tendencies that unless held in tension with claims of transcendence have the potential to overwhelm, to suffocate. How does one maintain this balance? Anderson looks to Nietzsche.

#### 13. Their alt fails and their args are nonfalsifiable

Feldheim (Prof of Philosophy @ SUNY) 8

(Andrew, REPLY TO WARD CHURCHILL, dspace.sunyconnect.suny.edu, GoogleScholar)

Churchill’s assumption that, when a nonviolent group becomes a viable threat to an oppressive government, this group would be destroyed or become self-eliminating, does not match the evidence, since both Dr. King’s movement in the United States and Gandhi’s movement in India survived their successes. In many of the cases under discussion, violent resistance simply does not make good practical sense, and would result in unacceptable losses, while contributing relatively little to the overall cause. One reason for the inappropriateness of violent action in these circumstances is stressed repeatedly by Sharp and others. Implicit in almost all the situations under discussion is the assumption that the group doing the oppressing has more weapons, soldiers and all the other necessary ingredients for violent action than the group being oppressed. In such cases, if the subjugated group insisted on using violent means as their primary mode of operation, their movements would effectively amount to suicide, and the actual benefit to their cause would probably be negligible. It may be objected at this point that some groups and individuals protesting in this way, and willingly giving their lives, could inspire others through their martyrdom. Their sacrifice could possibly elicit the sympathy of other groups that may be willing to help their cause. In answer to this, one only has to consider the response that people are likely to elicit using this method in a nonviolent, as opposed to a violent, way. The Buddhist monks who immolated themselves in protest during the Vietnam War, and the followers of Gandhi who were beaten and killed, represent this method done nonviolently. They sacrificed their lives while making sure to harm no one else. In contrast, consider the suicide bomber who kills herself in the middle of a crowded marketplace, taking as many people as possible along with her. She is representative of martyrdom conducted violently. Both are types of martyrdom; but to the former, we assign virtue, while, to the latter, condemnation. The nonviolent variation is far more likely to elicit the support of other groups and even nations. It is practically superior. There is also something to be said about the difference in results that are obtained when a dictatorship is overthrown through violent means, as opposed to nonviolent means. Gene Sharp notes that, essential to the removal of a dictatorship and the establishment of democracy, is a fundamental redistribution of the governmental power structure. Violence may be less conducive towards this goal. According to Sharp, A military coup d’ etat against a dictatorship might appear to be relatively one of the easiest and quickest ways to remove a particularly repugnant regime. However, there are very serious problems with that technique. Most importantly, it leaves in place the existing maldistribution of power between the population and the elite in control of the government and its military forces. The removal of particular persons and cliques from the government positions most likely will merely make it possible for another group to take their place. (Sharp, 2002, p. 5) Sharp feels that, unless the dictatorial power structure is changed to a more democratically oriented power structure, the stage is set for another tyrannical group to simply take the place of the deposed one. At this point, in order to avoid the same reliance on absolutes that I find inappropriate in Churchill’s argument, it is important to recognize the crucial role that the uniqueness of every situation has in determining the proper methods to be employed on behalf of an oppressed or subjugated group. There are kernels of truth in Churchill’s contentions that have more or less import in accordance with the specific situation. There are cases, both historical and theoretical, for which violent action seems the only logical alternative. The extermination of the European Jews during World War II seems like such an instance. One important difference between this example and the oppression of Indians by the English, or African-Americans by the United States, is that, in the case of the Nazis, it was not an instance of the same type of repression. They did not wish to subjugate or exploit the Jews; they simply wished to kill them. Fortunately, however, the Nazi example is the exception rather than the rule. Most cases of oppression stem from a wish to subjugate a population in order to profit unfairly from their labors, or to usurp their property. To give Mr. Churchill his due, even in cases such as these, there may be factors, specific to particular situations, which call for violent resistance or a mixture of violent and nonviolent resistance. Each situation must be evaluated on its own merits. My contention is not that there is no truth in Churchill’s position. Rather, it is his use of absolutes, his insistence that violence or the threat of violence is always necessary, that demands a refutation. Churchill presents his contention, that violence or the threat of violence is a necessary constituent of successful resistance to tyranny, in a way that makes it unfalsifiable. This, however, does not add to its merit. To potential counterexamples, Churchill simply relies on the presence of groups which may be potentially violent. The very nature of tyranny, however, naturally encourages feelings of resentment and hostility on the part of the oppressed. If one looked hard enough, he could always find some indication of potential violence, even if not overt. Churchill’s argument will, in this sense, always be true, but gives us no more actual information than a tautology. Also, since Churchill supposes a causal relationship between violent resistance and the defeat of dictatorships, and this construct is placed within an historical context, we can never know what would have happened if there had been no violence or the threat of violence, but only nonviolent resistance. While it may not be possible to prove Churchill’s argument unsound, its very nature makes it of limited utility.

#### 14. The immediate impact of the alternative would be an increase in racist violence

Fire Rider (advocate from the Northern Ontario Ojibwe and American Indian Movement) 5
(Marty, Why Churchill Political Agenda is Wrong for Indians, February 2005, http://aimfireca.tripod.com/id44.html)

I think we can agree that Churchill's political philosophy is liberal socialism regarding foreign policy. If that is his position he is entitled to that. In describing his fellow Americans, for instance, Churchill cannot refrain from using the language of spite. The victims of the Sept. 11 attacks he compares to Nazis; even middle-class Americans he disparages as vapid hedonists too engrossed in materialism to care about the sufferings of "brown-skinned" people overseas. Basically, he advocates that America is the evil empire of the world and needs to be replaced or severely weakened. But if America was to collapse as a legal government does Churchill or anyone believe that in a chaotic world with no laws that Indians would fair any better. It would be a world of unchecked Indian racism and discrimination by all hate groups be it left or right. If the September 11th victims are technocrats supporting the evil economic empire of America as Churchill professes, then is not he a hypocrite by educating American youth who will graduate with degrees to enter the technocratic economy of America? But what does the U.S. foreign policy have to do with a starving Indian on the Reservation or urban living? What has Churchill done for the poor Indian. Our AIM organization has helped to repair Indian elders homes; provide reservation security to protect the people against police abuse and tribal goons; written legal constitutions for reservations; legal research for tribes and individuals; feeding and clothing Indians; having the local Bureau of Indian Affairs office investigated for incompetence and complacency by the Inspector Generals Office, including other agencies as well, or advising Tribal governments. Further, our national Indian radio talk show is effective in educating and empowering our people. In other words we are in the field fighting daily for our people. We are AIM and we would lay our lives down in defense of our people, but only if attacked. If violence was the only Indian way we as a people would have been exterminated a long time ago. We in AIM do not support, nor condone violence. We do not need someone making noisy speeches about foreign policy, we need leaders fighting for and helping our people on domestic issues, that is the real AIM. Sadly, there is much discrimination in the world regarding indigenous people. But American Indians have problems nearly as equal such as third world living conditions on many reservations. Churchill's foreign policy speeches using the September 11th victims to make his political point only reflects negatively on all Indians and harms the good name of the American Indian Movement and it true leaders. Unfortunately, Churchill is causing division in Indian country. Indian strength lies in our unity, not disunity. And his actions and words only leads to Indian disunity. That was the same strategy used by non Indians to divide and conquer Indian people to take our lands. If ones walks the Red Path they remain balanced in the middle thus avoiding the political extremes of left or right. Remember being Indian is not a democrat or republican, liberal or conservative. Being Indian is following the traditional ways of tolerance, accepting all races and culture, spirituality with respect for all life. Taking of any life was only for defense, not taking a life for a political belief or to make a statement. Churchill's ways of advocating violence against innocent lives makes a mockery of the Great Spirits teachings that all life is sacred. If you are going to be an Indian activist you have to do more than beat the drum to make a lot of noise. You have feel the drum beat in your heart. Times have changed, and people like Churchill can stand outside the government while make all the noise, however very little has changed in 30 years for American Indians. Our future success will come through not only our unity, but by Indians learning the American political and legal landscape while working from within the system to change the system for Indian justice and sovereignty. We need to remove the path of ignorance, apathy and hatred to build a bridge of respect and honor of those who have walked before us. We need to never lose site of our culture by staying spiritually strong. Eventually the changes can be positive for our people. But advocating the overthrow of the American government is irresponsible resulting in a destabilizing political environment where Indians would be subject to further violence, racism and discriminating.

#### 15. Without the state authority warlords will take control -- they use violence, exploit the people, and replicate the worst aspects of the state structure

Jackson 3 Paul Jackson, International Development Department of the University of Birmingham, UK (2003):

Warlords as alternative forms of Governance, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 14:2, 131-150 Tandfonline

Use of Violence to Reassert Local Power

With the complete breakdown of moral authority and the law, let alone any means of enforcement, the only recourse is to establish rule through force.¶ The violence associated with warlords is the most publicised aspect of their activity, and its seeming randomness is undoubtedly one of the most horrific characteristics of warlords. The casual nature of violence within areas held by warlords is symptomatic of the gang culture outlined by Lary in China, but equally resonant of earlier cultures of violence.¶ Replacement of Formal Structures with Gang Mentality¶ The collapse of formal structures and norms, including formal military structures, lead warlords to develop their own internal structures. In particular, the replacement of hierarchical structures with gang cultures, with the warlord and close associates at the core of the gang. This gang culture manifests itself in particular ways, not least of which is the fact that gangs act as a spur to further violence by subgroups. In other words, the replacement of formal structures by ad hoc, primitive and personalised control leads to a behavioural logic based on the licensing of gratuitous violence.¶ The gang culture has a further element of interest: the development of subgroups. These subgroups may be smaller gangs, or alternatively part of the larger group aiming to progress up the pecking order. One of the features of all periods of warlord rule has been the behaviour of smaller groups of armed men on the periphery of the gang, which adds a further element of randomness into the violence. We will return to this below.

16. Their kritik creates a false dichotomy between total rejection and oppression—their “all or nothing” alternative dooms coalitions and closes off space for political activism

Krishna ’93 [Sankaran, Dept. of Polit. Sci., Alternatives, 1993]

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic”, essential unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear oppression, the Nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s, that according to him, was operating along obsolete lines emphasizing “facts” and “realities” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4)Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms.This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality.¶ Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freedom movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics

#### 17. Wilderson’s hard ontological descriptions make fatalism inevitable - [if they win their ontological arguments, there is no reason why any ontic action could ever reverse it]

Bâ (teaches film at Portsmouth University (UK). He researches ‘race’, the ‘postcolonial’,  diaspora,  the  transnational  and  film  ‘genre’,  African  and  Caribbean cinemas  and film festivals) 11

(Saër Maty, The US Decentred, Cultural Studies Review, volume 17 number 2 September 2011)

In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

#### 18. Turns the case – greatest comparative threat

Miah quoting West in 94

(Malik Miah, Cornel West's Race Matters, May-June, http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/3079)

In the chapter, “Nihilism in Black America,” West observes “The liberal/conservative discussion conceals the most basic issue now facing Black America: the nihilistic threat to its very existence. This threat is not simply a matter of relative economic deprivation and political powerlessness -- though economic well-being and political clout are requisites for meaningful Black progress. It is primarily a question of speaking to the profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair so widespread in Black America.” (12-13) “Nihilism,” he continues, “is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine ... it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaningless, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness.” (14) “Nihilism is not new in Black America. . . . In fact,” West explains,”the major enemy of Black survival in America has been and is neither oppression nor exploitation but rather the nihilistic Threat -- that is, loss of hope and absence of meaning. For as long as hope remains and meaning is preserved, the possibility of overcoming oppression stays alive. The self-fulfilling prophecy of the nihilistic threat is that without hope there can be no future, that without meaning there can be no struggle.” (14-15)

### 2AC CP

#### The American legal system and state are not inherently racist – their overly fatalistic narrative ignores massive progress and incorrectly assumes that the US uniquely represents a site of anti-blackness

Farber 98 (Daniel, Prof. of the Minnesota School of Law, “Is American Law Inherently Racist”, w/ Prof. Delgado, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=facpubs)

Let me begin with the vision of the American legal system that Professor Delgado presented in his first twenty minutes. I do not intend to deny the reality of the dark side of American law in American legal history, and that dark side has indeed been very bad at times. Nevertheless, I think one might equally point to some more positive aspects of American legal society, and that we get only a skewed and incomplete picture if we focus only on one side of the picture: if we ignore the Thirteenth, 5 Fourteenth, 6 and Fifteenth 7 Amendments; if we ignore Brown v. Board of Education8" and the work of the Warren Court; if we ignore the Civil Rights Acts of 1964,' 9 1965,20 and 1990;2" and if we ignore or minimize the commitment to affirmative action that many American institutions, especially educational institutions, have had for the past two decades. I do not think you have to be a triumphalist to think that these are important developments-you only have to be a realist. Similarly, as serious as the problem of racial inequality remains in our society, it is also unrealistic to ignore the considerable amount of progress that has been made. Consider the emergence of the black middle class in the last generation or generation and a half, and the integration of important American institutions such as big-city police forces, which are important in the day-to-day lives of many minority people. The military has sometimes been described as the most successfully integrated institution in American society. We all know, as well, that the number of minority lawyers has risen substantially. In state and federal legislatures, there was no such thing as a black caucus in Congress thirty or forty years ago, because there would not have been enough black people present to call a caucus. And do not forget the considerable evidence of sharp changes in white attitudes over that period in a more favorable and tolerant direction. It is true that there is much in our history that we can only look back on with a feeling of shame, but there is also much to be proud of that we should not forget. I also think that the accusation that the American legal system is inherently racist lacks perspective in the sense that it seems to imply that there is something specifically American about this problem. If you look around the world, societies virtually everywhere are struggling with the problems of ethnic and cultural pluralism, and are trying to find ways to incorporate diverse groups into their governing structures. I think if you look around the world, including even countries like France which Professor Delgado referred to, it is far from clear that we are doing worse than the others. In some ways, I think we are doing considerably better than most.

#### Lack of state authority means endless war among factions

Woodward 99 Dr. Susan L. Woodward, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, served as Head, Analysis and Assessment Unit, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, UNPROFOR, in 1994, and was associate professor of political science at Yale University prior to joining Brookings Naval War College Review, 00281484, Spring 99, Vol. 52, Issue 2 “Failed states” Academic Search Premier

The loss of a state's monopoly on authority to legislate, tax, enforce, and restrict the right to bear arms creates a situation of relative balance in resources, especially arms, and in access to finances for war. Examples are regional control over trade routes and customs posts, as can be seen in Bosnia, and over mineral resources, as in Angola today. (The Angolan case shows that where there are such resources, lucrative financial offers are likely to appear from international businesses who have no scruples about dealing with warlords and who do not condition their payments on certain behavior and reforms, as do the United States and international organizations.) Contrary to the stabilizing effects of balance-of-power interstate relations, the most likely result of this anarchic balance of resources (particularly military ones) domestically is unending war of attrition.[ [7](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=13&sid=54f20012-08e1-4c38-892a-3ce935be2595%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#bib7)] The equilibrium result--a negative equilibrium, in economists' terms--is "stable anarchy," in which "all resources would be spent in fighting rather than production." There may be temporary cessations of fighting, but only as battlefield stalemates; internal actors cannot on their own end the fight. ¶ This relative balance also creates layer upon layer of security dilemmas. A spiraling dynamic of mutual fear continues to feed such wars once they begin.[ [8](http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=13&sid=54f20012-08e1-4c38-892a-3ce935be2595%40sessionmgr13&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#bib8)] To understand the disintegration of Yugoslavia or the Bosnian war, for example, one must recognize that once the federal state lost its authority, each group pressed for its own national fights and claimed to be at risk of exploitation and even extirpation by other groups in the same dissolving state; it became critical that each group was a numerical minority and perceived itself as acting only in defensive ways. Interventions that attempt to remain impartial, delivering food and shelter to all civilians but not intervening politically to stop the spiraling dynamic, thus are likely to perpetuate these perceptions and the stalemate; those that do intervene politically, taking one side but not going to war in support of that side (and thereby resolving the battlefield situation) also perpetuate the conflict, by demonstrating to the other sides that they are indeed endangered and that they cannot safely disarm, psychologically or physically.