# 1NC

### 1

#### A. The plan is not presidential war powers authority -Regulation is congressional war powers authority

Bejesky 12 ROBERT BEJESKY, M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American government and constitutional law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami. St. Mary's Law Journal 2012 44 St. Mary's L. J. 1 ARTICLE: WAR POWERS PURSUANT TO FALSE PERCEPTIONS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN THE "ZONE OF TWILIGHT"

Congressional war powers include the prerogatives to "declare War;" "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," which were operations that fell short of "war"; "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;" "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia;" "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;" "raise and support Armies;" and "provide and maintain a Navy." n46 Alternatively, the President is endowed with one war power, that of "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy." n47 Numerical comparison indicates that the intended dominant branch in war powers decisions is Congress.

#### B. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate. Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash. They make the topic too big. All the rules, regulations, orders etc of the military become topical.

Dehn 11 John C. Dehn, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy Temple Law Review Spring, 2011 83 Temp. L. Rev. 599 ARTICLE: THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE NECESSITIES OF WAR: A

While some commentary has suggested that this relative vesting of constitutional powers over the military implies that the President has no power to regulate the military, [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n58) this is clearly inaccurate. The directive authority of military command equates to a near infinite power of internal regulation. [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n59) A commander need not repeatedly issue the same order to assert his or her directive authority over routine tasks. Effective command requires that many directives be made generally applicable and remain in effect until rescinded or superseded. [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n60) Therefore, some power to establish standing orders, or regulations, must necessarily exist. [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n61) As Madison explained, "no axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included." [n62](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n62) This understanding was later echoed by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland. [n63](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n63)  [\*613]  Equally clear was both Madison and Marshall's belief that these "necessary' powers are implied from the nature of the power expressly granted. [n64](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true#n64) The general directive authority intrinsic to "military command" is undoubtedly why the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the internal regulatory authority of the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders. [n65](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.328472.6824377424&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18289623894&parent=docview&rand=1380754736175&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n65)

#### D. T is a voter because it is necessary for debate.

### 2

#### Obama’s pressuring the GOP by staying on the debt message – the GOP will blink.

Dovere 10/1 [Edward, Politico, “Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line”

http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3]

President Barack Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no. For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk. “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend. “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

#### Going off message undermines Obama’s constant pressure on the GOP.

Milbank 9/27 [Dana, Washington Post, “Obama should pivot to Dubya’s playbook” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-obama-should-try-pivoting-to-george-bushs-playbook/2013/09/27/c72469f0-278a-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9\_story.html]

If President Obama can stick to his guns, **he will win** his October standoff with Republicans. That’s an awfully big “if.” This president has been consistently inconsistent, predictably unpredictable and reliably erratic. Consider the events of Thursday morning: Obama gave a rousing speech in suburban Washington, in defense of Obamacare, on the eve of its implementation. “We’re now only five days away from finishing the job,” he told the crowd. But before he had even left the room, his administration let slip that it was delaying by a month the sign-up for the health-care exchanges for small businesses. It wasn’t a huge deal, but it was enough to trample on the message the president had just delivered. Throughout his presidency, Obama has had great difficulty delivering a consistent message. Supporters plead for him to take a position — any position — and stick with it. His shifting policy on confronting Syria was the most prominent of his vacillations, but his allies have seen a similar approach to the Guantanamo Bay prison, counterterrorism and climate change. Even on issues such as gun control and immigration where his views have been consistent, Obama has been inconsistent in promoting his message. Allies are reluctant to take risky stands, because they fear that Obama will change his mind and leave them standing alone. Now come the budget showdowns, which could define the rest of his presidency. Republican leaders are trying to shift the party’s emphasis from the fight over a government shutdown to the fight over the debt-limit increase, where they have more support. A new Bloomberg poll found that Americans, by a 2-to-1 margin, disagree with Obama’s view that Congress should raise the debt limit without any conditions. But Obama has a path to victory. That poll also found that Americans think lawmakers should stop trying to repeal Obamacare. And that was before House Republicans dramatically overplayed their hand by suggesting that they’ll allow the nation to default if Obama doesn’t agree to their laundry list of demands, including suspending Obamacare, repealing banking reforms, building a new oil pipeline, easing environmental regulations, limiting malpractice lawsuits and restricting access to Medicare. To beat the Republicans, Obama might follow the example of a Republican, George W. Bush. Whatever you think of what he did, he knew how to get it done: by **simplifying his message and repeating it**, ad nauseam, until he got the result he was after. Obama instead tends to give a speech and move along to the next topic. This is why he is forever making “pivots” back to the economy, or to health care. But the way to pressure Congress is to be **President One Note**. In the debt-limit fight, Obama already has his note: He will not negotiate over the full faith and credit of the United States. That’s as good a theme as any; it matters less what the message is than that he delivers it **consistently.** The idea, White House officials explained to me, is to avoid getting into a back-and-forth over taxes, spending and entitlement programs. “We’re right on the merits, but I don’t think we want to argue on the merits,” one said. “Our argument is not that our argument is better than theirs; it’s that theirs is stupid.” This is a clean message: Republicans are threatening to tank the economy — through a shutdown or, more likely, through a default on the debt — and Obama isn’t going to negotiate with these hostage-takers. Happily for Obama, Republicans are helping him to make the case by being publicly belligerent. After this week’s 21-hour speech on the Senate floor by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), the publicity-seeking Texan and Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) objected to a bipartisan request to move a vote from Friday to Thursday to give House Republicans more time to craft legislation avoiding a shutdown. On the Senate floor, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) accused them of objecting because they had sent out e-mails encouraging their supporters to tune in to the vote on Friday. The Post’s Ed O’Keefe caught Cruz “appearing to snicker” as his colleague spoke — more smug teenager than legislator. Even if his opponents are making things easier for him, Obama still needs to stick to his message. As in Syria, the president has drawn a “red line” by saying he won’t negotiate with those who would put the United States into default. **If he retreats, he will embolden his opponents and demoralize his supporters.**

#### Failure to lift the ceiling collapses the global economy.

Davidson 9/10 [Adam, co-founder of NPR’s "Planet Money," Our Debt to Society, New York Times, 9/10/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all]

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy **would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.** Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar. While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy. The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war.

Merlini, Senior Fellow – Brookings, 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

### 3

#### The President of the United States should issue an executive order substantially increasing environmental regulations on non-nuclear armed forces.

#### DoD obeys the counterplan

WSGR 8/17/11, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich – Law Firm “Department of Defense Announces Billions of Dollars

in Opportunities for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Companies

Navy Declares Domestic Biofuel Production Critical for National Energy Security &

"Net Zero" Army Bases Signify a Wealth of Opportunities”, http://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-dod-renewable-energy.htm//jchen

Policy Drivers

Federal agencies, including DOD, are held to several energy-related policy drivers. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) requires federal agencies to purchase 7.5 percent of their energy from renewable sources by 2013. Presidential Executive Order 13423 requires that half of this renewable energy comes from new sources, and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 (NDAA) requires that 25 percent of DOD's total electricity comes from renewable sources by 2025.

The Navy expanded these objectives to include consuming 50 percent of its energy from renewable energy sources by 2020, producing 50 percent of its shore-based energy from alternative sources by 2020, reducing petroleum use by 50 percent in commercial fleets by 2015, and sailing the "Great Green Fleet" by 2016. The Army, in contrast, has begun focusing on sector-specific initiatives such as the acquisition of electric and hybrid vehicles and the development of renewable energy projects at key army installations. With the Army's recent announcement of an Energy Initiatives Office, we expect the Army to build momentum and visibility similar to the Navy in communicating programmatic goals and energy-related project opportunities.

### Exchanges

#### 1. Disregard their impact evidence - it’s from a cult which has an incentive to label the CCP as evil and doesn’t have a warrant for why they’d lashout.

Chien 6 [Eugenia, Chinese media monitor for New America Media, Falun Gong-Linked Media Venture Makes Waves, Raises Questions, May 16, 2006, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view\_article.html?article\_id=6ce9872ebb88b3aaa3ff48b6c1ffc19a]

Religious groups and political movements have historically turned to the media as a way to express their opinions. But the New York-based Epoch Times, with its vast distribution and access to the Chinese community, presents a unique and influential way to bring solidarity to an embattled religious group that aims to have its voice heard. Along the way, some critics have called the newspaper's credibility into question. Falun Gong is a spiritual group that practices a form of qigong, breathing exercises that are associated with martial arts and meditation. After Falun Gong was outlawed in China in 1999 as an "evil cult," many practitioners were arrested and tortured. According to a 2004 Amnesty International report, "detained Falun Gong practitioners, including large numbers of women, were at risk of torture, including sexual abuse, particularly if they refused to renounce their beliefs." In 2001, Ian Johnson of the Wall Street Journal won the Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the torture and death of a Falun Gong practitioner in China. Today, Falun Gong is one of the most vocal of China critics. The Chinese government estimates that there are 70 million practitioners of Falun Gong in China. Falun Gong Soon after Falun Gong was banned, a group of overseas Chinese who were Falun Gong practitioners founded the Epoch Times in 2000 in Atlanta, with a mission to "uphold universal human values, rights, and freedoms," according to the newspaper's Web site. The Epoch Times now distributes in over 30 countries worldwide, with a weekly circulation of 1.5 million. Its circulation, like many ethnic newspapers, is not audited by the Audit Bureau of Circulation. The newspaper's English edition launched in New York in 2004 and rapidly grew. In New York alone, the newspaper has a 150,000 weekly distribution, in addition to 40,000 home deliveries, according to the newspaper. Chinese-language editions of the Epoch Times are scattered in Chinese restaurants, supermarkets, and Chinese bookstores in 500 American cities including Los Angeles, Boston, Washington, D.C., and Houston. Shiny newspaper boxes of its English edition rest on tree-lined suburban sidewalks and busy downtowns. Some in the overseas Chinese community see the Epoch Times as one of the few newspapers not controlled by the Chinese government. But others see it primarily as a mouthpiece for Falun Gong. The newspaper frequently runs editorials critical of China and is heavy on stories of human rights abuses, particularly against Falun Gong practitioners. Coverage often includes pictures of Falun Gong practitioners the paper describes as scarred by electrodes or bruised by severe beating. Typically a 16-page broadsheet, the Epoch Times also runs mainstream newswire stories and can resemble a community newspaper, with reports of local school budget, recipe swaps and a community calendar of jazz concerts. The newspaper denies any direct ties to Falun Gong. "We are not funded by Falun Gong, we don't speak for Falun Gong, and we don't represent Falun Gong," said Epoch Times spokesperson Stephen Gregory. The Epoch Times is hardly the only newspaper owned by a religious group in the United States. In fact, the Christian Science Monitor, founded by the Church of Christ, Scientist, and the Deseret Morning News, founded by the Church of Latter Day Saints in Salt Lake City, and The Washington Times, owned by the Unification Church, are prominent examples of newspapers owned by religious groups. Though some of these newspapers have been criticized for shying away from negative news about their parent organizations, many of them viewed as independent. "The Christian Science Monitor is considered one of the most even-handed, sober, and unsensationalistic newspapers," said James Bettinger, a Communications professor at Stanford University and the director of the John S. Knight Journalism Fellowships. Though the Washington Times is perceived as conservative, Bettinger said, it does not proselyte church doctrine. "The owners of the Washington Times have always guaranteed the newspaper's editorial independence, an independence which I have never known them to violate in my 19 years here," said Fran Coombs, managing editor of the Washington Times. In contrast, many in the overseas Chinese community see the Epoch Times as a Falun Gong newspaper. "Among the readers from mainland China, this is a kind of **propaganda** for Falun Gong group," said Liu Kang, the director of the Program in Chinese Media and Communication Studies at Duke University. "It is **not viewed** as an independent objective news media," he said. "Even if the Epoch Times is not associated with Falun Gong, if they consistently write about Falun Gong in the same perspective, or if there are no articles examining Falun Gong, people would perceive it as being not credible," Bettinger said. Many of the Epoch Times' critics, including Liu, say the paper **does not adhere to basic journalistic standards** of professionalism and objectivity. In the newspaper's stories of human rights abuses, many sources are unnamed. For example, in the article that prompted Wang's outburst at the White House, transcripts of telephone conversations between unnamed sources in Chinese hospitals and an unnamed Falun Gong researcher were used to support allegations of organ harvesting.

#### 2. CCP collapse spurs peaceful elite-led transition to democracy.

Liu 8 [Alan P. L., is a professor emeritus of political science at the University of California at Santa Barbara specializing in contemporary Chinese political culture and development, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead, China Review International, Volume 15, Number 1, 2008]

At the same time, Chinese society has been undergoing **rapid changes** because of increasing exposure to the West. New ideas about justice, individualism, democracy, and a feel for community have spread far and wide in the country. More and more Chinese have gone abroad as tourists, and they know how ridiculous the CCP system is. An increasing number of urban people are organizing into civil society-type groups, with the help of the media. These constitute facilitating conditions for a **mass movement** for democracy. A major crisis of any kind would **galvanize these** new **forces and confront the CCP**, in the styles of the People Power in the Philippines in 1986 or the Velvet Revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989. According to Gilley, when the moment comes for democracy, an insider—maybe a closet reformer in the CCP—would come forth to take the lead. This is the Russian path; someone like Gorbachev or Yeltsin would guide the Chinese push toward democracy. Gilley called this the “extrication” model. He is banking on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) not wanting to repeat its bloody deeds in 1989; the PLA had learned the lesson (so Gilley believes). Then an interim regime will follow to open up the political system, hold elections, enact new legislation to establish rule of law, keep the bureaucracy together, and plan rationally for democratization. Finally, the new government would consolidate democracy by writing a new constitution, carrying out a national election based on proportionate representation, organizing a federalist political system, installing a government structure resembling Sun Yat-sen’s five branches (adding “special Chinese” departments of anticorruption and civil service examination to the usual legislative-judiciary-executive model).

#### 3. Chinese democracy transforms global politics – consolidates global democracy.

Gilley 5 [Bruce, Ph.D. candidate in politics at Princeton University. His research interests include comparative politics, especially of the Asia-Pacific region, democratization, and political philosophy, especially theories of domestic and global justice. The author of three books on China and several peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters, he holds a Masters in economics from the University of Oxford, and a Bachelors in international relations from the University of Toronto, China’s Democratic Future, 246-8]

If it has not already been brought into serious question by the continued spread of democracy to every corner of the world, Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a world dominated by a “clash of civilizations” rent between a liberal and progressive West and a conservative and benighted “other” should be give a final burial by China’s embrace of democracy. It will confirm that the real clash in our world remains a clash of just versus unjust political conceptions, between dictatorship and democracy or minimal democracy and full democracy, not between some imagined, essentialized, and monoistic “cultures.” The very terms “East” and “West” will finally be exposed as so bereft of any cultural or social meaning as to be virtually useless in our modern world except as geographic shorthand. Still, if democracy is merely the most efficient and far mechanism for organizing a policy - any polity - the its meaning will continue to change as each finds new ways to improve that mechanism. While “history” as defined by the monumental struggle between the notion of the political equality of individuals and rival conceptions appears to have ended, it will go on being spun out in competing conceptions of democracy. Debates about issues like compulsory voting, fair electoral systems, money in politics, judicial review, and the like will be the dominant “historical” issues of our time. As an ongoing experiment in best-practice politics, democracy is sure to be influenced by its practice in China, which will come to the game with a rich tradition of indigenous innovation and, arguably, deeper cultural roots in the essential principles of democracy such as tolerance, compromise, and egalitarianism. How will democracy change as a result? There has been much recent discussion in the West of a “democratic malaise” where the associational and norms-oriented life of a democracy is breaking down. Many scholars see the democratic waves of the past as having ended and the old democracies in a state of slow regression. Some countries are thought to be stuck in minimal democracies of dispersed power but not true equality. To some, the value of political power is unequal, some freedoms more cared for than others, and economic justice unachieved. If modern-day social contractarians are right, a failure to achieve these things make a democracy’s claim to goodness very thing indeed. It is here that China’s democratization may play a vital role. Most Chinese scholars harbor the hope that China will “surpass” traditional forms of democracy as practiced in the rest of the world - especially the imagined “Western model” - and introduce to the world a new system that will be “even better.” This is the so-called “surpass sentiment” (chaoyue quingxu) mentioned earlier. Of course, there is not a little bit of cultural chauvinism at work here, the desire for China to retake its rightful place as the dispenser of civilization to the world’s benighted peoples, especially the stubbornly dynamic West. Even so, we should not rule out, nor rue, the possibility that China will pioneer a unique version of democracy. As one Western scholar notes: “It remains possible that some day the Asian, perhaps even the Chinese vision of the best form of government will become the dominant vision.” If so, it would be a cause for celebration because everyone benefits when a more just system is available. Many Chinese scholars conjure up a new form of political order that is both strongly democratic and strongly social-oriented. One talks of the emergence of a “Creative ambiguity,” in China which defies easy labels, in which a “mixed economy” with a state sector will exist alongside “mixed politics” with elements of both liberal democracy and social democracy. Others seem to echo classical republican political theorists of the West with dreams of “deliberate democracy” (shangyi minzhu) or “policy democracy (zhengce minzhu) in which people’s considered views on issues actually translate into outcomes. Here, elections lose their pride of place as the hallmark of democracy, being replaced by other mechanisms for contesting state power and proposing interests and views of the good. One Chinese scholar anticipates a vast laboratory of democratic experimentation which, given the sheer size of the country, would create a whole new lexicon of democratic forms and theories: “There are actual opportunities for transcending historically known systems and they might be seized by a conscious people.” There is much here that meshes with recent thinking on democracy I the West, which stresses issues like social capital, popular deliberation, equality of political opportunity, and more. In other words, the ongoing struggle to move from mere formal democracy to a substantive democracy of equal citizens will be helped by China. Its efforts at “real democracy” **may** **inspire and push** established democracies to “**deepen**” their own democratic experiences. One Indian author has said that “the future of Western political theory will be decided outside the West,” nothing, rightly, that India would loom large in that experience. One could not but add China. Indeed, given that it was never imprinted with colonialism and given its long isolation from Western theory, China’s impact may be much greater. Notes one scholar: “The final destination of the search remains veiled, but China’s preoccupation with local innovation and adaptation certainly goes beyond mere rhetoric. Even without any major innovations in the practice of democracy emanating from China, the mere adoption of this long-evolving and never-perfected system by the largest country in the world and one of the most ancient will have a **profound effect on deepening democracy**. Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall reinstated some confidence in liberal regimes, and just as the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Asia has undermined advocates of soft authoritarianism there, so too China’s democracy may **shore up** the **loss of interest** in the West about democracy. To return to a quotation cited earlier, China’s democratization will probably **transform global politics at every level**. It will mean that roughly **three quarters of the world**’s population lives in democratic states, creating “an historic opportunity to bring a **truly democratic world into being,”** notes one scholar. Relations among the world’s peoples could for the first time be governed according to the same norms that apply to their domestic polities. Much of this has already begun in the post-cold war era as new democracies in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America forged alliances grounded in these norms. With China aligned with that global movement, the possibilities for positive change will be immense.

#### 4. Impact is human survival and global war.

Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 1995, [December, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. **The very source of life** on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the **only reliable foundation** on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

#### 5. CCP makes China-Taiwan war inevitable – democracy swiftly makes peace attractive.

Friedman 2K [Edward, University of Wisconsin-Madison Hawkins Chair of Political Science and professor, former China specialist on the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Preventing War Between China and Japan,” in What if China Doesn’t Democratize?, ed. By Friedman and McCormick, 111]

Yet many American analysts treat Chinese words of pure defensiveness as gospel. It, however, was not Lee Teng-hai’s alleged provacativeness, but changes in China, including a growing anti-Japanese nationalism that sparked Beijing’s military action against Taiwan in Summer 1995 and 1996. Unless there are changes in Chinese politics, **more military action should be expected** from Beijing if Taiwan does not capitulate. This threat to the peace is real and new. There was no Chinese irredentism toward Taiwan from the Mao camp before the 1943 Cairo Conference, when Nationalist Party leader Chiang Kai-shek persuaded the Allies arrayed against Showa-era Japanese military expansionism to agree to give Taiwan to Chiang’s Republic of China after imperial Japan’s armies, which had first occupied Taiwan in the Meiji era, were defeated. It is not surprising that Taiwan had not been part of Mao’s nationalism, since during the many millennia of Chinese history, Taiwan had never been a province of China until the expansionist imperialism of the Manchu Empire, and then, for just one decade. (Mongolia is unique in having regained its independence after the fall of Manchu imperialism in 1911.) When Chiang’s forces fled from Mao’s conquering army to safety on Taiwan in 1949, Mao treated Taiwan mainly as a home to a defeated civil war military force that wrongly sat in Beijing’s rightful seat in international bodies. Mao saw no need for a war over Taiwan in his lifetime. For the post-Mao generation out to build up China, Taiwan might be seen as a partner in a common project. After all, Taiwan is a major source of foreign exchange helping to speed China’s economic growth, a partner in trade, a well-spring of foreign investment, a part of a huge tourist influx. There was no cross-straits civil war. Millions of people from the mainland of China and the island of Taiwan went back and forth peacefully. It is possible to imagine European Common Market-style mutual benefit. Indeed were China to democratize and federalize or confederate, it would swiftly become **irresistibly attractive** to Taiwanese. It is dictatorship in China which **perpetuates war-prone division.**

#### 6. The impact is extinction.

Strait Times 2K [“No one gains in war over Taiwan,” June 25 2000, L/N]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- **raise the possibility of a nuclear war.** Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, **east Asia will be set on fire.** And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the **nuclear option**. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons **mandatory** if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the **destruction of civilisation**. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

#### 7. Democracy’s key to solve environmental destruction in China - bolsters public awareness.

Yue 6 [Pan, deputy director of China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), The environment needs public participation, December 05, 2006, China Dialogue, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/604-The-environment-needs-public-participation]

In China, environmental protection is an increasingly pressing issue. Not only are pollution and ecological degradation becoming ever more serious, but also people are more and more unsatisfied about the situation. The speed with which we are polluting the environment **far outstrips** our efforts to clean it up. Why is this? China has a large population but few resources, and our production and consumption methods are too out of date. But at the **root of the problem** lies a more significant cause -- the lack of public participation in China. The initial motivation for the world environmental protection movement came from the public, without their participation it **would not exist**. In 1962, the US marine biologist Rachel Carson published her landmark book, Silent Spring, which focused on the environmental and human costs of pesticide use. This was a starting point in the development of environmental protection. On April 22, 1970, 20 million Americans took part in environmental demonstrations across the US. “Earth Day” is still celebrated on that date, and was a major event in the development of modern environmental participation. Take Japan as an example; although the country faces a greater pressure on resources than China, it is a world leader in protecting the environment. Visitors to Japan in recent years are invariably impressed by the country’s clean environment. But Japan also experienced the serious social consequences of pollution midway through the last century, when it underwent large-scale industrialisation. In the 1960s, Japanese victims of pollution first brought lawsuits against the companies responsible for environmental degradation. Japan’s media began to investigate and report on environmental accidents. In many places, grass-roots environmental groups were founded to combat polluting industries. By 1970, 45% of Japanese citizens opposed economic development that did not take environmental protection into account, overwhelming the 33% who polled in favour of unrestricted economic growth. Electoral support for Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) declined from 58% to 48% as a result. Broad public participation forced both the LDP and the Diet to take notice of the environmental and social effects of pollution. In 1967, Japan issued the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control, and enacted the Law for the Compensation of Pollution-Related Health Injuries in 1973. A series of other environmental rules and regulations were put into place in the following years. In particular, the Basic Law for the Recycling–based Society employs the concept of “environmental culture” to promote public awareness of environmental protection and its moral value. The law promotes the use of new energy sources and compulsory limits on the consumption of natural resources. It not only regulates waste output but also encourages recycling and the safe disposal of non-recyclable waste. In the past 10 years, Japan has become a recycling-based society which strikes a balance between environmental protection and economic growth. Their example can show us that resolving the problems of pollution needs both governmental and citizen engagement, and that public participation and a democratic legal system are **important factors** in environmental protection. In China, the major problem is that environmental protection laws are not strictly observed and implemented due to a lack of democratic legal mechanisms for public participation. As early as 1978, the government stated clearly that where serious pollution is occurring, if no measures are put in place to improve this for a long time, it will be established who is personally responsible, and the enterprise in question will be shut down. Financial penalties are also to be applied and legal action taken in serious cases. But in the past 20 years, how many polluters -- businesspeople or officials -- have ever been penalised? How many government policies that have caused pollution and ecological damage have ever been corrected? And to what extent are we following the sustainable development strategy that was put forward in 1992?

#### 8. Chinese environmental destruction causes extinction.

Hertsgaard 97 [Mark, whose investigation of the Chinese environmental crisis appears in the November Atlantic Monthly, is the author of the forthcoming "Blue Planet, Red Sky," a book about the global environmental future, SALON | Oct. 29, 1997, The real China threat, http://www.salon.com/news/1997/10/29news.html]

China's environmental disaster threatens not only the Chinese people -- who are dying in the hundreds of thousands every year from staggering levels of air and water pollution -- but **all humanity.** With its gigantic population and booming economy, China can **single-handedly** guarantee that climate change, ozone depletion and other deadly hazards become a **reality for people the world over.** In the back of our minds, Americans may suspect that China is an environmental wasteland -- after all, we know what happened in the Soviet Union. But the truth has yet to be revealed in all its ghastly vividness, not least because of China's restrictions on foreign journalists. I recently spent six weeks traveling unmonitored throughout China, interviewing everyone from senior government officials and scientific experts to unpaid workers and newly prosperous peasants. Everywhere, it seemed, the land had been scalped, the water poisoned, the air made toxic and dark. Five of the 10 most air-polluted cities in the world are in China, and one of every four deaths is caused by lung disease. Yet coal consumption will triple over the next 25 years, making China the world's leading greenhouse gas producer and all but dooming global efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by the 60 to 80 percent recommended by U.N. scientists.

#### Human diversity, medicine and evolutionary limits check bioweapons.

Gladwell 95 [Malcolm, New York bureau chief of The Washington Post, New Republic, July 17]

This is what is wrong with the Andromeda Strain argument. Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost, and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is almost invariably lethal because its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms. If there are any conclusions to be drawn about disease, they are actually the opposite of what is imagined in books such as The Hot Zone and The Coming Plague. It is true that the effect of the dramatic demographic and social changes in the world over the past few decades is to create new opportunities for disease. But they are likely to create not homogeneous patterns of disease, as humans experienced in the past, so much as heterogeneous patterns of disease. People are traveling more and living in different combinations. Gene pools that were once distinct are mixing through intermarriage. Adults who once would have died in middle age are now living into their 80s. Children with particular genetic configurations who once died at birth or in infancy are now living longer lives. If you talk to demographers, they will tell you that what they anticipate is increasing clusters of new and odd diseases moving into these new genetic and demographic niches. Rare diseases will be showing up in greater numbers. Entirely unknown diseases will emerge for the first time. But the same diversity that created them within those population subgroups will keep them there. Laurie Garrett's book is mistitled. We are not facing "the coming plague." We are facing "the coming outbreaks."

#### Their water pollution internal link is a joke – just says that PLA barracks dispose of water improperly. Those barracks only hold 270,000 soldiers in a country of over a billion.

#### Squo solves.

One India 10/1 [Read more at: http://news.oneindia.in/international/china-bars-water-polluting-projects-in-five-cities-1316171.html]

The Chinese government has prohibited five cities from setting up new projects likely to cause water pollution. The Ministry of Environmental Protection has said new projects that risk causing water pollution will not be approved in counties and districts of five Chinese cities after they failed to meet pollution control targets, reported Xinhua. China unveiled the 2011-2015 guideline on fighting water pollution in 2012 The districts and counties of cities of Siping, Hefei, Liu'an, and Kunming as well as Enshi Tujia and Miao prefecture have failed to meet the standards set in a five-year water pollution control guideline released in 2012. The decision to call off such projects was made after the ministry evaluated the implementation of two water pollution control guidelines that cover China's major drainage areas including the Yangtze river and Yellow river. Under the plans, the Chinese government will allocate 500 billion yuan (about $82 billion) for prevention and control of water pollution in major drainage areas from 2011 to 2015, up from 300 billion yuan for the previous five-year period.

#### Solving water pollution doesn’t prevent Russia-China conflict – their impact evidence says that it’s Russian fears of Chinese population growth and nationalism, not water shortages, that hurt relations – disregard their selective highlighting.

Russian politicians already allege possible Chinese territorial designs on the region. They note Russia’s falling population in the Far East, currently estimated at some 6 to 7 million, and argue that the growing Chinese population along the border, more than 80 million, may soon take over. While these concerns smack of inflated nationalism and scare tactics, there could be some truth to them. The method by which China might annex the territory can only be speculated upon, but would surely result in full-scale war between two powerful, nuclear-equipped nations.

#### No Russia-China war.

Mazza and Blumenthal 12 [DAN BLUMENTHAL is current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). MICHAEL MAZZA is a research fellow at the Ameri- can Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the program man- ager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy. CHAPTER 3 CHINA’S STRATEGIC FORCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY’S CHANGING NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND FORCE POSTURE Strategic Studies Institute Book THE NEXT ARMS RACE July 2012]

If China develops adequate strategic forces to re- spond to the U.S. strategic threat, it will also have suf- ficient forces to deal with Russian and South Asian contingencies. Even so, China is not nearly as worried about Russia as it once was. China no longer views Russia as a serious threat and no longer fears a Rus- sian invasion into Manchuria. The most likely source of conflict between China and Russia is resource com- petition. China depends on pipelines from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, countries traditionally within Russia’s sphere of influence. There are also abundant resources in eastern Siberia (along with a relatively large and growing Chinese population), which Beijing might want to control some day. Still, Russia and China have developed closer relations since the Cold War’s end, often cooperating on the United Nations (UN) Secu- rity Council and together providing leadership and direction for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These developments, supplemented by each country’s deterrent force, are likely to ensure that any conflict that arises remains bloodless, at least in the foreseeable future.

### Environment

#### Judicial climate policy would be a nightmare – more likely to make things worse

Tribe, Branson, and Duncan 10 Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; Joshua D. Branson, J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School (June 2010), has been an Article Editor of the Harvard Law and Policy Review, and will be clerking for a federal circuit court judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit beginning August 2010 (and he's pretty much a goober); Tristan L. Duncan is a Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.; 1988-89 Post Doctoral Scholar, Yale Law School, 1988-89; J.D., University of Iowa Law School, 1989. TOO HOT FOR COURTS TO HANDLE: FUEL TEMPERATURES, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE Washington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues WORKING PAPER Series Number 169 January 2010 <http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf>

Had the Second Circuit looked beyond the face of the plaintiffs’ complaint, it would have recognized that nuisance doctrine is woefully ill-suited to that task. Unlike traditional pollution cases, where discrete lines of causation can be drawn from individual polluters to their individual victims, climate change results only from the non-linear, collective impact of millions of fungible, climactically indistinguishable, and geographically dispersed emitters.32 Given this fact, granting a plaintiff relief from the coastline-changing or other adverse consequences of global climate change bears no genuine resemblance to identifying a responsible defendant and ordering a reduction in its emissions. To the contrary, worldwide climate change is a systemic phenomenon that is intractable to anything but a systemic political solution, one that the adversarial and insulated model of nuisance litigation is structurally incapable of providing.33

The incompatibility of climate change and nuisance doctrine is further demonstrated by the lack of connection between the plaintiffs allegedly injured by climate change and the conduct of the defendants they target. The principle that plaintiffs lack standing to sue in Article III courts unless they present “something more than generalized grievances”34 is as axiomatic as Marbury’s declaration that courts should not adjudicate political questions. To move beyond such “generalized grievances,” plaintiffs must articulate a chain of causation from challenged conduct to injury that possesses a constitutionally “essential dimension of specificity.”35 Such specificity is sorely lacking in the climate change context. In terms of coastal erosion or species destruction allegedly caused by climate change, each carbon emission is like every other; the plaintiffs sue specific emitters not for their particular responsibility for the injuries alleged, but instead for their generic contribution to a collective global problem.

Indeed, the undifferentiated nature of any one defendant’s contribution to plaintiffs’ injuries enables plaintiffs—if courts let them—to wield the hammer of federal common law against any emitter of their choosing. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution forbids such a contortion of standing principles for the same reason that it forbids courts from entertaining nonjusticiable political questions; the adjudication of such abstract and undifferentiated claims “open[s] the Judiciary to [the] charge of providing ‘government by injunction.’”36 And government by injunction is neither accountable to majority will nor a product of the “consent of the governed.” These bedrock democratic principles are what the separation of powers generally, and the political question doctrine specifically, protect. But the unique and daunting nature of the climate change problem could not shake the Second and Fifth Circuits’ quixotic and unyielding faith in nuisance doctrine. Although conceding that climate change is vastly larger in scale and complexity than traditional pollution problems, both courts were confident in the ability of nuisance doctrine to adapt to the idiosyncrasies of climate change litigation. Yet nuisance doctrine, even if capable of giving courts the tools with which to accurately weigh the costs and benefits of fossil fuel consumption—a questionable conclusion, to be sure37— provides no coherent remedy for the harms caused by carbon emissions. Indeed, both remedies countenanced by the Second and Fifth Circuits—an injunction ordering emissions reductions, and damages for climate-related injuries—are conceptually incommensurable with the problems associated with human-induced climate change. The Second Circuit, in allowing the plaintiffs’ claim for an injunction to proceed, presumed that any reduction in carbon emissions, no matter how bluntly calibrated or poorly targeted, contributes in some measure, however small, to the overall project of reducing the long-term injurious consequences of climate change. That simply is not so. Wielding the sledgehammer of injunctive relief against arbitrarily selected groups of carbon emitters and producers is as likely to exacerbate as to ameliorate those injurious effects. For one thing, many climate change scholars have identified the phenomenon of “carbon leakage,” whereby poorly thought out carbon reductions in one section of the global economy result in increased emissions elsewhere, as fossil fuel price reductions, coupled with the tendency for global corporations to shift their bases of operations to avoid stringent regulation, spark rising energy consumption in other jurisdictions.38 Such leakage would exacerbate the injuries about which the plaintiffs complain since carbon emissions from non-defendants—even those halfway around the world—“cause” coastal erosion in exactly the same undifferentiated and attenuated manner as do carbon emissions from the defendants they have randomly targeted.

Moreover, there are serious complexities involved in any process of carbon reduction, particularly with respect to the questions of how fast and how much. Slash emissions too fast or too far, and courts risk forcing industry to prematurely retire capital stock, “locking in” inferior technology as companies rush to innovate quickly enough to comply with short-term reduction requirements.39 Such a result would not only entail severe and irretrievable economic costs, but it would exacerbate the longrun harms of climate change by distorting the renewable energy market. On the other hand, slash emissions too little or too slowly, and courts do nothing to ameliorate climate change, while still shaping entitlements in a way that can only inhibit the emergence of any ultimate legislative solution.40 To ask a court to strike the right balance, given that even a stringent injunction will have no statistically significant impact on global temperatures, is to ask it to do the impossible.

#### Alt cause – conflict is inevitable. Parsons concedes that any conflict conflict increase environmental damage also means the disad turns this advantage.

#### Their internal link is miniscule – Nevins says the dod uses 330,000 barrles of oil a year. That’s one hundredth of a percent of yearly oil consumption.

EIA, 12 (How much oil does the United States consume per year?. http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=33&t=6)

The United States consumed a total of 6.87 billion barrels (18.83 million barrels per day) in 2011 and 7.0 billion barrels (19.18 million barrels per day) of refined petroleum products and biofuels in 2010. For both years, this was about 22% of total world petroleum consumption.

#### Don’t solve peacetime pollution – bases in Germany and japan aren’t going to see wartime use. Also domestic bases wouldn’t be changed.

#### biodiversity collapse and doesn’t cause extinction – keystone species dont exist

Doremus, Berkeley Law, 2K [Holly, Law Professor – Cal Berkeley, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, L/N]

Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. **Nor is human extinction probable any time soon.** Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 [\*47] One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by **multiple species.** This **functional redundancy** means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse. n217

#### Alt causes to biodiversity.

Pynn 7 [Larry, staff writer at The Vancouver Sun, “Global warming not biggest threat: expert,” The Vancouver Sun, http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=6e2988da-31ab-4697-810d-7a008306d571&p=1]

"We all worry about climate change, as we should, but it doesn't mean we shouldn't worry about protecting habitat," says James Grant, a biology professor at Concordia University in Montreal and co-author of a new report on threats to endangered species in Canada. "The really immediate causes right now for many species are things like farming, urbanization and habitat loss caused by the direct things we do." Research by Grant and his pupils shows the **biggest threat** is habitat loss at 84 per cent, overexploitation 32 per cent, native species interactions 31 per cent, natural causes 27 per cent, pollution 26 per cent, and introduced species 22 per cent. On average, species are threatened by at least two of the six categories. Human activities representing the biggest source of habitat loss and pollution are not industrial resource extraction, but agriculture at 46 per cent and urbanization at 44 per cent. "Farming is huge," Grant said in an interview. "The Prairies are one of the most affected habitats in the world. We've turned them into wheat fields." The southern Okanagan-Similkameen is another example, home to about one-third of species at risk in B.C. as well as a thriving agricultural industry, including vineyards, and increased urban development.

#### No climate multilateralism – nationalism and economic interests.

Held 13 [David, Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation]

Gridlock exists across a range of different areas in global governance today, from security arrangements to trade and finance. This dynamic is, arguably, most evident in the realm of climate change. The diffusion of industrial production across the world—a process enabled by economic globalization—has created a situation in which the basic consumption of each individual directly affects the life chances of every other individual on the planet, as well as the life chances of future generations.¶ This is a powerful and entirely new form of global interdependence. Bluntly put, the future of our civilization depends on our ability to cooperate across borders. And yet, despite twenty years of multilateral negotiations under the UN, a global deal on climate change mitigation or adaptation remains elusive, with differences between developed countries, which have caused the problem, and developing countries, which will drive future emissions, forming the core barrier to progress. Unless we overcome gridlock in climate negotiations, as in other issue areas, we will be unable to continue to enjoy the peace and prosperity we have inherited from the postwar order.¶ There are, of course, several forces that might work against gridlock. These include the potential of social movements to uproot existing political constraints, catalysed by IT innovation and the use of associated technology for coordination across borders; the capacity of existing institutions to adapt and accommodate factors such as emerging multipolarity (the shift from the G-5/7 to the G-20 is one example); and efforts at institutional reform which seek to alter the organizational structure of global governance (for example, proposals to reform the Security Council or to establish a financial transaction tax). ¶ Whether there is the political will or leadership to move beyond gridlock remains a pressing question. Social movements find it difficult to convert protests into consolidated institutional change. At the same time, the political leadership of the great power blocs appears dogged by national concerns: Washington is sharply divided, Europe is preoccupied with the future of the Euro and China is absorbed by the challenge of sustaining economic growth as the prime vehicle of domestic legitimacy. Against this background, the further deepening of gridlock and the continuing failure to address global collective action problems appears likely.

#### We're past the tipping point – scientific consensus

Solomon et al 10

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Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse gases increased over the course of the 20th century due to human activities. The human-caused increases in these gases are the primary forcing that accounts for much of the global warming of the past fifty years, with carbon dioxide being the most important single radiative forcing agent (1). Recent studies have shown that the human-caused warming linked to carbon dioxide is nearly irreversible for more than 1,000 y, even if emissions of the gas were to cease entirely (2–5). The importance of the ocean in taking up heat and slowing the response of the climate system to radiative forcing changes has been noted in many studies (e.g., refs. 6 and 7). The key role of the ocean’s thermal lag has also been highlighted by recent approaches to proposed metrics for comparing the warming of different greenhouse gases (8, 9). Among the observations attesting to the importance of these effects are those showing that climate changes caused by transient volcanic aerosol loading persist for more than 5 y (7, 10), and a portion can be expected to last more than a century in the ocean (11–13); clearly these signals persist far longer than the radiative forcing decay timescale of about 12–18 mo for the volcanic aerosol (14, 15). Thus the observed climate response to volcanic events suggests that some persistence of climate change should be expected even for quite short-lived radiative forcing perturbations. It follows that the climate changes induced by short-lived anthropogenic greenhouse gases such as methane or hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) may not decrease in concert with decreases in concentration if the anthropogenic emissions of those gases were to be eliminated. In this paper, our primary goal is to show how different processes and timescales contribute to determining how long the climate changes due to various greenhouse gases could be expected to remain if anthropogenic emissions were to cease. Advances in modeling have led to improved AtmosphereOcean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) as well as to Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs). Although a detailed representation of the climate system changes on regional scales can only be provided by AOGCMs, the simpler EMICs have been shown to be useful, particularly to examine phenomena on a global average basis. In this work, we use the Bern 2.5CC EMIC (see Materials and Methods and SI Text), which has been extensively intercompared to other EMICs and to complex AOGCMs (3, 4). It should be noted that, although the Bern 2.5CC EMIC includes a representation of the surface and deep ocean, it does not include processes such as ice sheet losses or changes in the Earth’s albedo linked to evolution of vegetation. However, it is noteworthy that this EMIC, although parameterized and simplified, includes 14 levels in the ocean; further, its global ocean heat uptake and climate sensitivity are near the mean of available complex models, and its computed timescales for uptake of tracers into the ocean have been shown to compare well to observations (16). A recent study (17) explored the response of one AOGCM to a sudden stop of all forcing, and the Bern 2.5CC EMIC shows broad similarities in computed warming to that study (see Fig. S1), although there are also differences in detail. The climate sensitivity (which characterizes the long-term absolute warming response to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations) is 3 °C for the model used here. Our results should be considered illustrative and exploratory rather than fully quantitative given the limitations of the EMIC and the uncertainties in climate sensitivity. Results One Illustrative Scenario to 2050. In the absence of mitigation policy, concentrations of the three major greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide can be expected to increase in this century. If emissions were to cease, anthropogenic CO2 would be removed from the atmosphere by a series of processes operating at different timescales (18). Over timescales of decades, both the land and upper ocean are important sinks. Over centuries to millennia, deep oceanic processes become dominant and are controlled by relatively well-understood physics and chemistry that provide broad consistency across models (see, for example, Fig. S2 showing how the removal of a pulse of carbon compares across a range of models). About 20% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon remains in the atmosphere for many thousands of years (with a range across models including the Bern 2.5CC model being about 19 4% at year 1000 after a pulse emission; see ref. 19), until much slower weathering processes affect the carbonate balance in the ocean (e.g., ref. 18). Models with stronger carbon/climate feedbacks than the one considered here could display larger and more persistent warmings due to both CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gases, through reduced land and ocean uptake of carbon in a warmer world. Here our focus is not on the strength of carbon/climate feedbacks that can lead to differences in the carbon concentration decay, but rather on the factors that control the climate response to a given decay. The removal processes of other anthropogenic gases including methane and nitrous oxide are much more simply described by exponential decay constants of about 10 and 114 y, respectively (1), due mainly to known chemical reactions in the atmosphere. In this illustrative study, we do not include the feedback of changes in methane upon its own lifetime (20). We also do not account for potential interactions between CO2 and other gases, such as the production of carbon dioxide from methane oxidation (21), or changes to the carbon cycle through, e.g., methane/ozone chemistry (22). Fig. 1 shows the computed future global warming contributions for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide for a midrange scenario (23) of projected future anthropogenic emissions of these gases to 2050. Radiative forcings for all three of these gases, and their spectral overlaps, are represented in this work using the expressions assessed in ref. 24. In 2050, the anthropogenic emissions are stopped entirely for illustration purposes. The figure shows nearly irreversible warming for at least 1,000 y due to the imposed carbon dioxide increases, as in previous work. All published studies to date, which use multiple EMICs and one AOGCM, show largely irreversible warming due to future carbon dioxide increases (to within about 0.5 °C) on a timescale of at least 1,000 y (3–5, 25, 26). Fig. 1 shows that the calculated future warmings due to anthropogenic CH4 and N2O also persist notably longer than the lifetimes of these gases. The figure illustrates that emissions of key non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as CH4 or N2O could lead to warming that both temporarily exceeds a given stabilization target (e.g., 2 °C as proposed by the G8 group of nations and in the Copenhagen goals) and remains present longer than the gas lifetimes even if emissions were to cease. A number of recent studies have underscored the important point that reductions of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions are an approach that can indeed reverse some past climate changes (e.g., ref. 27). Understanding how quickly such reversal could happen and why is an important policy and science question. Fig. 1 implies that the use of policy measures to reduce emissions of short-lived gases will be less effective as a rapid climate mitigation strategy than would be thought if based only upon the gas lifetime. Fig. 2 illustrates the factors influencing the warming contributions of each gas for the test case in Fig. 1 in more detail, by showing normalized values (relative to one at their peaks) of the warming along with the radiative forcings and concentrations of CO2, N2O, and CH4. For example, about two-thirds of the calculated warming due to N2O is still present 114 y (one atmospheric lifetime) after emissions are halted, despite the fact that its excess concentration and associated radiative forcing at that time has dropped to about one-third of the peak value. Two factors contribute to the differences between decreases in concentrations of greenhouse gases and persistence of the resulting warming, discussed further below: (i) Radiative forcing may not simply follow concentration because of optical depth effects (for CO2 and CH4), and (ii) warming may not match decreases in radiative forcing because of climate inertia, particularly due to the ocean. Climate Change Persistence: (I) Optical Depth Effects. The physics of absorption spectroscopy dictate that radiative forcing will be linearly related to concentration changes for those gases whose atmospheric optical depth is thin, whereas nonlinear forcing occurs for thicker optical depths (24). Because CO2 absorption is not optically thin, the fractional increase in radiative forcing per parts per million by volume of CO2 increase becomes smaller for larger CO2 concentrations. Fig. 2 shows how this factor acts in the reverse sense during relaxation from a peak, enhancing the CO2 radiative forcing relative to the calculated concentration decrease. For example, for a 535 ppmv peak (as in the calculation in Fig. 1), the excess CO2 concentration above the preindustrial value of 278 ppmv remaining in the year 2200 is about 55% of the peak value, whereas the fractional radiative forcing remaining in that year is about 63% of the peak value (i.e., the relative change in forcing is greater than the relative change in concentration by about 14%). Nonlinear optical effects grow as the concentration change grows. For example, for a peak of CO2 of 1,200 ppmv in the 21st century followed by a stop of emissions, the relative change in forcing compared to the relative change in concentration in the year 3000 is about 30%. Thus nonlinear spectroscopy, although not the dominant factor, contributes to rendering the warming from CO2 nearly irreversible, especially for larger values of peak concentration. Methane also displays significant nonlinearities in its radiative absorption, whereas these effects are very small for N2O (Fig. 2). HFCs and perfluorocarbons absorb in the atmospheric window and are optically thin over the full range of plausible future concentrations; therefore, these gases display no nonlinear optical absorption. We find that nonlinear spectral effects exceed 10% contributions to the persistence of warming only for carbon dioxide and methane, and not for any of the other anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Climate Change Persistence: (II) Physical Processes. Climate change is linked to a range of phenomena displaying varying timescales (see, e.g., ref. 28). The atmosphere, clouds, and water vapor respond within a few months following a change in radiative forcing (29). The transfer of heat from the atmosphere to the ocean’s mixed layer (top 100 m or so) is thought to occur on timescales on the order of a decade or less (30), whereas multiple centuries are required to warm or cool the deep ocean (31), and changes in the great ice sheets and vegetation coverage may occur over many thousands of years (4). Much of the energy that has been added to the Earth’s climate system in the 20th century through net radiative forcing has been taken up by the ocean (32). However, a large fraction of the energy that could be trapped due to the impact of radiative forcing has not been added to the climate system at all but rather has been lost to space, because the Earth has already warmed and therefore must radiate more energy. Observations and models both suggest that about two-thirds of the net radiative forcing (warming by anthropogenic greenhouse gases less cooling by stratospheric and tropospheric aerosols) of the past half century has been radiated to space, while about one-third has been absorbed by the ocean (33–35). If anthropogenic radiative forcing were to be stabilized, atmospheric warming would continue for many centuries as the components of the climate system reach a balance. On the other hand, if such forcing were to abruptly cease, some energy would be expected to be lost rapidly through radiation to space, while some would be lost more slowly as the coupled ocean mixed layer/atmosphere system adjusts. Some of the energy loss would occur over centuries depending mainly upon the amount of heat that has been stored in the deep ocean. These processes are linked both to transient climate response and ocean heat uptake, and the uncertainties in these parameters are of order 50% between current state-of-the-art AOGCMs (4, 35). Ocean heat uptake and changes in ocean circulation are not well characterized by observations and contribute to the differences in future climate responses between models (3, 4, 31). Carbon cycle processes that may slowly release carbon back to the atmosphere in a warming world (e.g., through changes in forest cover and soil carbon dynamics) also affect the long-term behavior of warming and differ from model to model (3, 36). Understanding the warming persistence from various forcing agents with different lifetimes and radiative forcing histories is aided by considering energy balance for a time horizon long enough for the Earth to return to its original temperature. The energy balance equation can be written as N ¼ F − λΔTsurface; [1] where F is the added energy due to anthropogenic radiative forcing, N is the net heat flux, and λΔTsurface is the energy radiated to space by a warmer Earth. Earth loses energy via a surface and atmosphere that are warmer than their equilibrium values. The quantity λ expresses how much energy is lost per unit rise in temperature. In the long term, it is the inverse of the climate sensitivity because, at a new steady state, N becomes zero and ΔTsurface ¼ F∕λ. If emissions are stopped and treturn is a time in the future when the Earth has returned to its initial temperature (including the average temperature of the oceans), then <equation1.jpg> Integrating both sides of Eq. 1 for this time interval and making the additional assumption that the radiative response is independent of time and the rate of warming over this timescale (i.e., λ is approximately constant, or uncorrelated with the forcing), then <equation2.jpg> The left-hand integral is just the energy trapped by the radiative forcing. Eq. 3 states that the time-integrated warming is approximately proportional to the integrated forcing, because the only way the Earth can get rid of trapped energy is to radiate it to outer space. Ocean heat uptake delays and spreads the warming out in time, and also defines the warming that must continue after emissions cease, i.e., the amount of time-integrated warming that must eventually occur before the Earth returns to its original temperature. Consequences for climate change, ecosystems, and people can depend on the time history: A long, modest increase in temperature is likely to be less harmful than a short pulse of extreme warming. In practice, Eq. 3 is less useful for gases such as CO2 and SF6 that have such long lifetimes that the time horizon for their forcing to decay to zero and the Earth to return to an equilibrium temperature is many millennia. In those cases, a simplified way to view future warming persistence is that emissions of CO2 and a handful of other extremely long-lived gases imply warming that is essentially irreversible on human timescales without geoengineering or active sequestration. All shorter-lived gases and aerosols imply a transient warming whose time integral is approximately determined simply by the time integral of the forcing and the equilibrium climate sensitivity. Fig. 3 shows how the energy budget of the earth–atmosphere system in the Bern 2.5CC EMIC would behave in response to increases in radiative forcing over 100 y followed by a stop of emissions for a greenhouse gas with a 10 or 100 y lifetime. The peak forcing in both cases is 1 W∕m2. A linear increase is assumed for the first 10 y followed by a 2%per year increase from that time until year 100. After the peak, the forcing decays with the assumed lifetime. Of particular interest is the behavior of ocean heat uptake (Fig. 3, Left) as well as the atmospheric temperature and sea level rise (Fig. 3, Right). In the case of a gas with a 10-y lifetime, for example, energy is slowly stored in the ocean during the period when concentrations are elevated, and this energy is returned to the atmosphere from the ocean after emissions cease and radiative forcing decays, keeping atmospheric temperatures somewhat elevated for several decades. Elevated temperatures last longer for a gas with a 100-y lifetime because, in this case, radiative forcing and accompanying further ocean heat uptake continue long after emissions cease. As radiative forcing decays further, the energy is ultimately restored from the ocean to the atmosphere. Fig. 3 shows that the slow timescale of ocean heat uptake has two important effects. It limits the transfer of energy to the ocean if emissions and radiative forcing occur only for a few decades or a century. However, it also implies that any energy that is added to the ocean remains available to be transferred back to the atmosphere for centuries after cessation of emissions. Fig. 4 further illustrates how the computed warmings due to a broader range of specific different greenhouse gases would evolve assuming an idealized 21st century ramp of emissions to 1 W∕m2 in 100 y (as in Fig. 3), followed by cessation of emissions in the Bern 2.5CC model. If the rate of radiative forcing were to increase at 2% per year (about the average value observed over the past several decades for CO2), the computed warming or “realized” warming (33) in the Bern 2.5CC model is about 60% of the quasi-equilibrium value, similar to that of the range of models recently assessed (4). Put differently, the climate system response under increasing radiative forcing (even on the timescale of a century) will be smaller than the response would be if the forcing were maintained at a constant level and the system were to largely equilibrate. The smaller response is related to the transient climate response and to the considerations indicated above regarding the partitioning of energy flow between the ocean and loss to space under increasing forcing. The simulations presented in Fig. 4 illustrate the importance of realized warming versus quasi-equilibrium warming. For a gas such as CF4 with a very long lifetime of about 50,000 y, concentrations and forcing remain essentially constant for more than 1,000 y following cessation of emissions (Fig. 4, Upper). But the warming due to CF4 ’s radiative forcing continues to increase slowly as the ocean and atmosphere adjust over centuries, reaching a quasi-equilibrium atmospheric warming that is about 60% larger than the transient value obtained when emissions stopped in this model for the test case considered here (and this value is approximately the inverse of the realized warming noted above). The same behavior would be expected if, for example, atmospheric concentrations of any gas were to be stabilized but, for shorter-lived gases, stabilization requires continued emission (in contrast to CF4). Carbon dioxide concentrations display an initial fast decay for several decades in carbon cycle models after cessation of emissions, followed by a much slower subsequent decline (see Fig. S2), but temperatures remain nearly constant throughout as shown in Fig. 4. The above discussion of CF4 illuminates a key reason for this behavior. The near-irreversibility of the CO2-induced warming after emissions cease and concentrations peak is linked mainly to a near balance between concentration changes (which slowly decrease to a value that is about 40% of the peak of excess concentration above preindustrial, see Fig. 4) and the fact that the ratio of quasi-equilibrium to transient warming is about 1.6 in this model (compare the range of about 1.3–2.3 across models in ref. 4). Thus the decrease in CO2 concentration is roughly compensated by the way that the transient warming evolves to a near equilibrium warming (i.e., the warming is realized over time), together with a significant but lesser contribution due to the nonlinear dependence of radiative forcing on CO2 concentration. These long-term changes in both CO2 concentration and warming are robust across a broad range of coupled carbon/ climate models (3, 4) and are both linked to the slow timescales of transport in the ocean. For forcing agents shown in Fig. 4 with lifetimes of years to centuries, some forcing due to these gases will continue even as concentrations decay, leading to some persistence of the induced warming. Fig. 4 illustrates the persistence for HFC152a, CH4, and N2O, and Fig. S3 shows the behavior calculated in the Bern 2.5CC model for a range of halocarbons with lifetimes ranging from years to centuries. An important qualitative conclusion of Fig. 4 is that the warming induced by even a very shortlived gas such as HFC-152a can persist longer than the gas itself and its associated forcing (see also Figs. 3 and 4). The extent to which warming is prolonged is linked to the competition between decay of the radiative forcing and ocean heat uptake and will also depend on the carbon cycle feedback; the carbon cycle feedback and ocean heat uptake will differ somewhat among models. Persistence of the induced climate change should be expected to be larger for gases with lifetimes long enough to transfer more heat to the ocean, i.e., several decades to centuries or more, and much smaller for gases with short lifetimes of a year to a decade. Similarly, the persistence of the warming will be greater if radiative forcing is maintained over longer periods through sustained anthropogenic emissions (17, 27); i.e., the longer humans continue to emit greenhouse gases, the longer the climate memory of that emission will become, even for very short-lived substances, due to ocean thermal inertia (9). This paper focuses on emissions over a century.

#### Alt causes –

#### A. Deforestation.

Nordhaus 8 [Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, Founders-Break Through Institute, Break Through, p. 64]

None of this is to deny the ecological reality. The burning of forests, the loss of their role as net absorbers and storage banks of carbon, and the reality of global warming make the increasingly rapid destruction of the Amazon even more alarming than it was back in the mid-1980s, when the Amazon first became appreciated for its biodiversity. **Even if we reduced greenhouse gases by 70 percent worldwide overnight**, the continued destruction of the Amazon would **still leave the global climate system in jeopardy.**

#### B. Agriculture

Mead 11 [January 30, 2011 Mad Meat Making Scientist Proves Climate Doomsayers Wrong Walter Russell Mead Via Meadia http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/01/30/mad-meat-making-scientist-proves-climate-doomsayers-wrong/]

According to a United Nations report (which must as we all know be completely and unquestionably true when referring to matters of climate science having nothing to do with glacier melt), “**Cattle-rearing generates more global warming greenhouse gases**, as measured in CO2 equivalent, **than transportation.”** Ronald Reagan was widely and no doubt justly mocked for saying that trees cause more pollution than cars do; had he said cows instead of trees he could have appealed to the UN for support. In any case, the report (from the Food and Agricultural Organization) goes on: When emissions from land use and land use change are included, the livestock sector accounts for 9 per cent of CO2 deriving from human-related activities, but produces a much larger share of even more harmful greenhouse gases. It generates 65 per cent of human-related nitrous oxide, which has 296 times the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of CO2. Most of this comes from manure. And it accounts for respectively 37 per cent of all human-induced methane (23 times as warming as CO2), which is largely produced by the digestive system of ruminants, and 64 per cent of ammonia, which contributes significantly to acid rain. With increased prosperity, people are consuming more meat and dairy products every year, the report notes. Global meat production is projected to more than double from 229 million tonnes in 1999/2001 to 465 million tonnes in 2050, while milk output is set to climb from 580 to 1043 million tonnes.

#### ------C. Cosmic rays and CFCs.

University of Waterloo 9 [From the University of Waterloo press release. Study shows CFCs, cosmic rays major culprits for global warming 22 12 2009, http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/12/22/study-shows-cfcs-cosmic-rays-major-culprits-for-global-warming/]

Cosmic rays and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), both already implicated in depleting the Earth’s ozone layer, are also responsible for changes in the global climate, a University of Waterloo [Lu, a professor of physics and astronomy] scientist reports in a new peer-reviewed paper. In his paper, Qing-Bin Lu, a professor of physics and astronomy, shows how CFCs – compounds once widely used as refrigerants – and cosmic rays – energy particles originating in outer space – are mostly to blame for climate change, rather than carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. His paper, derived from observations of satellite, ground-based and balloon measurements as well as an innovative use of an established mechanism, was published online in the prestigious journal Physics Reports. “My findings do not agree with the climate models that conventionally thought that greenhouse gases, mainly CO2, are the major culprits for the global warming seen in the late 20th century,” Lu said. “Instead, the observed data show that CFCs conspiring with cosmic rays most likely caused both the Antarctic ozone hole and global warming. These findings are totally unexpected and striking, as I was focused on studying the mechanism for the formation of the ozone hole, rather than global warming.” His conclusions are based on observations that from 1950 up to now, the climate in the Arctic and Antarctic atmospheres has been completely controlled by CFCs and cosmic rays, with no CO2 impact. “Most remarkably, the total amount of CFCs, ozone-depleting molecules that are well-known greenhouse gases, has decreased around 2000,” Lu said. “Correspondingly, the global surface temperature has also dropped. In striking contrast, the CO2 level has kept rising since 1850 and now is at its largest growth rate.” In his research, Lu discovers that while there was global warming from 1950 to 2000, there has been global cooling since 2002. The cooling trend will continue for the next 50 years, according to his new research observations. As well, there is no solid evidence that the global warming from 1950 to 2000 was due to CO2. Instead, Lu notes, it was probably due to CFCs conspiring with cosmic rays. And from 1850 to 1950, the recorded CO2 level increased significantly because of the industrial revolution, while the global temperature kept nearly constant or only rose by about 0.1 C.

#### No global tech transfer – trade barriers prevent adoption

Hall and Helmers 10 [Bronwyn H. Hall, Professor of the Graduate School – UC Berkeley, Christian Helmers, University of Oxford - Department of Economics, The role of patent protection in (clean/green) technology transfer 24 October 2010 http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5706]

There are a number of other issues apart from intellectual property rights that are of first-order importance in setting incentives for the development and transfer of technologies. Developing countries themselves may generate **powerful distortions inhibiting** the production and transfer of green technologies. A report by Copenhagen Economics (2009) suggests that subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels in some developing countries, such as Venezuela, Iran and Indonesia, may represent a **significant barrier** to the development and transfer of green technologies in these countries. Barton (2007) suggests that import tariffs on photo-voltaic and wind technology in place in India and China may also act as a barrier to technology development and transfer. In contrast, import tariffs and subsidies for biofuels in place in industrialised countries, above all the EU and US, are viewed as hampering the development of this industry in developing countries, such as Brazil (World Bank 2010). Such import barriers on green technologies represent a complex issue. Due to the environmental externality, it is desirable to have policy interventions in place in developed countries dedicated to market creation, such as subsidies, to promote demand for green technologies (Taylor 2008). From a political economy perspective, however, it is unclear to what extent developed economies are willing to subsidise demand for green technology produced abroad, in particular in large emerging economies.

#### Worst climate impacts take decades to arrive and don’t assume adaptation

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from numerous warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human- induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a, 2007c; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007a), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007a), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007a), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007a), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20 and 30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007a). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets, causing severe sea-level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta and others 2009). Proponents argue that there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well-being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic conse- quences. The science and economics of climate change are quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two, accord- ing to Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume that there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold, and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long-range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

#### Risks are hyped. Climate info scandals prove.

Lieberman, 2/19/10 (Ben, Specialist in Energy and Env. Issues and Senior Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, “Hype of Global Warming Far Scarier Than Science Shows”, 2010, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/02/19/hype-of-global-warming-far-scarier-than-science-shows/)

Q: As the controversy swirling around the IPCC deepens at the same time some are questioning the significance of global warming now that large portions of the U.S. are buried under record-breaking snow, what kind of information do policymakers need to make decisions about climate change? Any risks of global warming need to be weighed against the risks of global warming policies. Policymakers must have accurate information on both sides of the equation in order to avoid measures that do more harm than good. Most of the recent proposals — the Senate’s Boxer-Kerry cap-and-trade bill, a new UN treaty, EPA’s regulatory scheme — fail to accurately weigh the risks because they are based on the false premise that climate change is a dire threat. Simply put, global warming is not a crisis and should not be addressed as one. The recent wave of climate science scandals — climategate, glaciergate, hurricanegate, amazongate, others — have exposed a number of efforts initially crafted to hype the issue into something far scarier than the underlying science actually shows. Climategate — the release of internal emails from scientists with key roles in the UN’s 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report — largely centered around the strained attempt to portray temperatures in recent decades as unprecedented throughout recorded history. The researchers had to go to extreme lengths to create this impression — grafting one data set onto another to manufacture the desired “hockey stick” effect, using computer programs that add warming to the underlying temperature data and then destroying that data before others could see it — which speaks volumes about the weakness of their case. To his credit, Phil Jones, the head of the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit who had to step down pending the climategate investigation, recently conceded that temperatures have been statistically flat since 1995 and that the Medieval Warm Period may have been as warm as modern times. Slowly but surely, the hype and false certainty is being replaced by a more accurate picture of what the science really tells us about the earth’s temperature history. Similarly, most of the IPCC Report’s apocalyptic claims about the consequences of global warming – that Himalayan glaciers would completely melt by 2035, that damage from hurricanes and other extreme weather events has increased, that African agricultural production is poised to plummet, and that the Amazon rainforest is under grave threat – have been shown to be far-fetched speculation devoid of scientific support. Yvo de Boer, the UN’s top climate official, has just announced his resignation, in part due to the fact that so much so much alarmist junk made its way into the IPCC Report. There is a reason proponents of costly measures to address global warming have so exaggerated the risks – they essentially had to for there to be any chance the public would accept the high price tag for action to ratchet down carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions. Once the gloom and doom is replaced by a more accurate assessment of the risk, such measures as the Senate’s Boxer-Kerry bill, a new UN treaty, or EPA regulations look like an especially bad deal.

#### 2) Single issues not key – perceptions change slowly.

Gray, International Politics at Reading, 11 [COLIN S. GRAY is Professor of International Poli- tics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and at Hudson Institute (Croton-on-Hudson, NY) before founding the Na- tional Institute for Public Policy, a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington, DC, area. Dr. Gray served for 5 years in the Reagan administration on the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms SSI Monograph HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Colin S. Gray April 2011]

The error lies in the search for, and inevitable finding of, “golden keys” and “silver bullets” to resolve current versions of **en- during problems.** Soft-power salesmen have a potent product-mix to sell, but they fail to appreciate the real- ity that **American soft power is a product essentially unalterable over a short span of years.** As a country with a cultural or civilizational brand that is unique and mainly rooted in deep historical, geographical, and ideational roots, America is not at liberty to emu- late a major car manufacturer and advertise an exten- sive and varied model range of persuasive soft-power profiles. Of course, some elements of soft power can be emphasized purposefully in tailored word and deed. However, foreign perceptions of the United States are no more developed from a blank page than the American past can be retooled and fine-tuned for contemporary advantage. Frustrating though it may be, a country cannot easily escape legacies from its past.

#### 3) doesn’t solve- soft power is hard to use

Kroenig, Government at Georgetown, et al. 10 [Matthew, Department of Government, Georgetown University Melissa McAdam, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley Steven Weber, Information School, University of California, Berkeley, Taking Soft Power Seriously, Comparative Strategy, Volume 29, Issue 5 November 2010 , pages 412 – 431]

Foreign policy actors have many reasons to experiment with soft power, not merely because its use can be less costly than hard power. But, soft power comes with its own **quite striking limitations**. Our research suggests that soft power strategies will be **unlikely to succeed** except under fairly restrictive conditions. It may very well be, then, that the U.S. foreign policy elite is at risk of **exaggerating** the effectiveness of soft power (rather than underutilizing it) as a tool of foreign policy. After all, international communication is fraught with difficulties, persuading people to change firmly held political views is hard, and individual attitudes are often thought to have an **insignificant role** in determining international political outcomes. Soft power, therefore, will probably be considered a niche foreign policy option useful for addressing a small fraction of the problems on Washington's foreign policy agenda. Analysts who suggest that soft power can easily be substituted for hard power or who maintain that soft power should provide an overarching guide to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy are **badly mistaken**. It is not conducive to good policy to employ the idea of soft power as a way of arguing against the use of military force, for example.

#### 4) cooperation impossible- competing interests

Scoblete 9 [Gregory, associate editor at RealClearWorld, July 22, 2009 America's Last Stab at Global Leadership http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/07/22/americas\_last\_stab\_at\_global\_leadership\_96965.html]

The hope is that the world will rally to President Obama's humbled America more than they rallied to President Bush's "cowboy" America. "We have taken off the table reflexive anti-Americanism as a reason not to deal with us," White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel recently told the Washington Post's David Ignatius. The problem, of course, is that "reflexive anti-Americanism" was hardly the reason for a lack of global cooperation. The nations of the world have competing interests that **owe nothing to the disposition or tone of American diplomacy**. The administration's hope that a clean slate, with fulsome presidential apologies, will provoke a change of heart seems at odds with this reality. All countries share a generic interest in not seeing a terrrorist detonate a nuclear weapon on their soil, they may all be concerned about the impacts of climate change, and they all seek routes to prosperity. But none of that implies that America's preferred solutions are universally acceptable. In **North Korea**, the pro-forma desire for a "nuclear free peninsula" routinely take a back seat to China and South Korea's more urgent interest in not seeing North Korea collapse. **In Iran**, while China and Russia have acceded to rhetorical swipes at the Islamic Republic, they have balked at imposing the kinds of biting sanctions that could bring about a change in the regime's behavior. At the most recent G8 meeting of industrialized nations in Italy, China and India firmly rebuffed efforts to put a binding cap on **carbon emissions**. **Time and time again**, the vision of America rallying the world to confront common dangers blurs into the less-than-thrilling reality of a world with **more important things to do**. This should not surprise anyone. During the Cold War, when U.S. leadership was arguably at its apex, even allied nations (most famously France) **bucked America's will.** While the Obama administration has sought to paint the 21st century's threats in menacing terms, climate change and nuclear proliferation haven't quite sharpened as many minds as the Red Army.

#### 5) soft power is counterproductive- results in resentment and blowback

Gray, International Politics at Reading, 11 [COLIN S. GRAY is Professor of International Poli- tics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and at Hudson Institute (Croton-on-Hudson, NY) before founding the Na- tional Institute for Public Policy, a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington, DC, area. Dr. Gray served for 5 years in the Reagan administration on the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms SSI Monograph HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Colin S. Gray April 2011]

7. Soft power lends itself too easily to mischaracter- ization as the (generally unavailable) alternative to military and economic power. The first of the three questions posed above all but invites a misleading answer. Nye plausibly offers the co-option of people rather than their coercion as the defining principle of soft power. 38 The source of pos- sible misunderstanding is the fact that merely by con- juring an alternative species of power, an obvious but unjustified sense of equivalence between the binary elements is produced. Moreover, such an elementary shortlist implies a fitness for comparison, an impres- sion that the two options are like-for-like in their conse- quences, though not in their methods. By conceptually corralling a country’s potentially attractive co-optive assets under the umbrella of soft power, one is near certain to devalue the significance of an enabling con- text. Power of all kinds **depends upon context for its value**, but especially so for the soft variety. For power to be influential, those who are to be influenced have a decisive vote. But the effects of contemporary warfare do not allow recipients the luxury of a vote. They are coerced. On the other hand, the willingness to be co- opted by American soft power **varies hugely among recipients.** In fact, there are many contexts wherein the total of American soft power would add up in the negative, not the positive. When soft power capabili- ties are strong in their values and cultural trappings, there is always the danger that they will incite **resent- ment, hostility, and a potent “blowback.**” In those cases, American soft power would indeed be strong, but in a **counterproductive direction**. These conclu- sions imply no criticism of American soft power per se. The problem would lie in the belief that soft power is a reliable instrument of policy that could complement or in some instances replace military force.

#### 6) Credibility doesn’t solve- decades of scholarship prove

Fettweis 10 [Christopher J., fifth year doctoral student in the University of Maryland's Department of Government and Politics. His primary interests include US foreign and national security policies. His dissertation, currently titled The Geopolitics of Energy and the Obsolescence of Major War, focuses on the relationship between oil and conflict. Mr. Fettweis has a BA in History from the University of Notre Dame, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, April 2010 Survival, 52:2, 59 - 82]

For individuals as well as states, pathologies - mistaken or incorrect beliefs that inspire irrational action - create their own reality and drive behaviour accordingly. In individuals, pathologies reside in the mind, while state-level pathologies exist as shared irrational beliefs among leaders and the public. Strategic pathologies, then, are incorrect beliefs that drive destructive, or at least counterproductive, state behaviour. The United States suffers from several. The credibility imperative is a clear example, one that continues to have a particularly strong influence upon the United States.7 Credibility, when used in policy debates, is a code word for the prestige and reputation of a state; it is, in Henry Kissinger's words, 'the coin with which we conduct our foreign policy', an intangible asset that helps states influence the actions of others.8 In periods of high credibility, policymakers believe, a state can deter and compel behaviour and accomplish goals short of war. When credibility is low, sceptical adversaries and allies may be tempted to ignore threats and promises. To national leaders, therefore, healthy credibility seems to be the equivalent of many armed divisions, and is worth protecting at almost any cost. **This belief rests on a shaky foundation**, to put it mildly. **Decades of scholarship** have been unable to produce much evidence that high credibility helps a state achieve its goals, or that low credibility makes rivals or allies act any differently.9 Although **study after study** has refuted the basic assumptions of the credibility imperative, the pathology continues to affect policymaking in the new century, inspiring new instances of irrational, unnecessary action. The imperative, like many foreign-policy pathologies, typically inspires belligerence in those under its spell.10 Credibility is always maintained through action, usually military action, no matter how small the issue or large the odds.

#### 7) aff is a drop in the bucket compared to current budget cuts

Nye 11 [JOSEPH S. NYE JR. | APRIL 12, 2011 The War on Soft Powerhttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/12/the\_war\_on\_soft\_power]

Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama and Congress struggled until the 11th hour to agree on budget cuts that would avert a government shutdown. The United States' budget deficit is a serious problem, and there have been serious proposals to deal with it, such as those by the bipartisan Bowles-Simpson Commission. But last week's efforts were not a serious solution. They were focused solely on the 12 percent of the budget that is non-military discretionary expenditure, rather than the big-ticket items of entitlements, military expenditure, and tax changes that increase revenue. Yet while last week's cuts failed to do much about the deficit, they could do serious damage to U.S. foreign policy. On Tuesday, the axe fell: The State Department and foreign operations budget was slashed by $8.5 billion -- a pittance when compared to military spending, but one that could put a serious dent in the United States' ability to positively influence events abroad.

#### 8) Doesn’t spill over in between issues.

Brooks and Wohlforth, Government at Dartmouth, 5 [Professors Government – Dartmouth, Perspectives on Politics 3:509-524]

Drawing on rational choice theory, Downs and Jones show that a far more compelling theoretical case can be made that states have multiple reputations—each particular to a specific agreement or issue area. For this reason, they find that "the reputational consequences of defection are usually more bounded" than institutionalist scholarship currently presumes." 67 If America has, for example, one reputation associated with the UN and another regarding the WTO, then lack of compliance with the former organization will in **no way** directly undercut its ability to gain cooperation in the latter. As Downs and Jones note, viewing states as having multiple reputations "helps to explain why, despite the prevalence of the unitary reputation assumption, examples of a state's defection from an agreement in one area (for example, environment) jeopardizing its reputation in every other area (for example, trade and security) **are virtually nonexistent** in the literature."68 This conclusion is consistent with the **two most detailed studies of reputation in IR**, which decisively undercut the notion that states have a general reputation that will strongly influence how other states relate across different issue areas.69 In the end, the current lack of an empirical or theoretical justification for the notion that states carry a single reputation means that we have **no basis** for accepting the institutionalists' argument that America must endorse multilateralism across the board because to do otherwise has consequences that endanger the entire institutional order. That, together with theory's lack of purchase on the issues of coordination costs and bargaining power, invalidates the institutionalist argument about the high cost of unilateralism.

#### Norms check.

Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoreti¬cal and empirical reasons, however, to believe that **US hegemony is not the primary cause of** the current era of s**tability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2\* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T 15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co\*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-\*7 exis\*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are **less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.**

# 2NC

### 2NC Yee and Storey

#### 1. This is from a book with different chapters about different countries’ perceptions about what might happen – no academic basis for these sorts of predictions.

Yee and Storey 2 [Herbert and Ian, The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, pg. 11]

This book, as the title suggests, deals with **perceptions of the China threat** from various countries and regions. The focus is on perceptions and policies in the United States, Europe, Russia, Northeast Asia (Japan and South Korea), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam), South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the Middle East. The Chinese perspective of the China threat is also examined.

#### 3. No threat from warlords – nukes are de-alerted.

Civiak et al. 9 [Robert L., former Office of Management and Budget Examiner for the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Weapons Programs, Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture and Weapons Complex for Transition to a Nuclear Weapons-Free World Prepared by the Nuclear Weapons Complex Consolidation Policy Network, April 2009, http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc\_09040701b.pdf]

At least three other nations with nuclear weapons already maintain their forces in reduced states of readiness. China stores its warheads separately from their delivery vehicles and keeps its missiles unfueled. Britain has not provided details of its readiness posture, but has stated that it would take days rather than minutes to launch its missiles.17 And, Pakistan reportedly keeps the nuclear and nonnuclear portions of its warheads separate from each other and from its delivery systems.

#### 4. The middle of this evidence also concedes that the CCP destroys the environment. [card for cross-x if you need it]

Yee and Storey 2 [Herbert and Ian, The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, pg. 5]

Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of international problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively.

### 2NC No Lashout – Takes out Taiwan

#### 1. No lashout – perception of its interests.

Hale 6 [David, Chicago-based economist and founding chairman of Hale Advisors and China Online, March 1, 2006, The Australian]

There is a natural suspicion in Washington about the geo-political and military consequences of China's new status as an economic power. Many fear China will use its new wealth to develop sophisticated weapons and challenge the US's traditional military dominance in the region. Some Pentagon analysts estimate that China's defence spending could be two or three times as large as the official estimate of $22 billion. There is concern that if China continues to spend about 2.7 per cent of gross domestic product on defence, its defence budget could rise to as much as $130 billion in 10 years or become the second largest in the world after the US. But the fact remains that China has become so engaged in the global economy that it now has a diminishing capacity for radical foreign policy action. China has the world's third largest stock of foreign direct investment. China's ratio of exports to GDP is three times higher than the US, Europe, or Japan. China could be the world's largest exporting nation within two or three years. As a result of these circumstances, China must be a good global citizen because it now depends upon other countries to absorb nearly half of its manufacturing output.

#### 2. Any lashout is purely posturing – they’ll reverse course.

Zakaria 8 [Fareed, Newsweek, Don’t Feed China’s Nationalism April 12, 2008 http://www.newsweek.com/id/131751/page/2]

So why doesn't the Chinese regime see this? Beijing has a particular problem. Now that communism is dead, the Communist Party sees its legitimacy as linked to its role in promoting and defending Chinese nationalism. It is especially clumsy when it comes to such issues. Clever technocrats though they are, China's communist leaders—mostly engineers—have not had to refine their political skills as they have their economic touch. In the past they have stoked anti-Japanese and anti-American outbursts, only to **panic that things were getting out of control and then reverse course.** They fear that compromising over Tibet would set a precedent for the unraveling of the Chinese nation. China has grown and shrunk in size over the centuries, and its dynasties have often been judged by their success in preserving the country's geography.

#### 3. No offense – after the CCP and PLA fight they’ll cut back on all modernization programs.

Gunness 9 [Kristen, China Advisor, U.S. Department of the Navy, Feburary, Building a Modern Military: The Economic Crisis and its Impact on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army The Brookings Institution February 2009 http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/02\_china\_military\_gunness.aspx]

The PLA’s ability to adapt to rapidly changing domestic circumstances also hinges on the state of its relationship with the Party. For the moment, the Party appears to support the PLA in its modernization goals and seems to be providing it with the resources and funding required, but this may not always be the case depending on the economic or domestic situation. One could imagine that Party-PLA tensions could arise if, for example, the internal stability situation worsens and the PLA is called in to suppress mass incidents, bringing it closer to the level of involvement in domestic politics in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Additionally, changes in China’s external security situation could drive future “guns vs. butter” debates between the Party and the PLA, particularly as the Party faces mounting social pressures and tighter budgets. For example, with Ma Ying-jeou’s election and reduced tensions between the Mainland and Taiwan, one could argue that the PLA has less immediate reason for the continued fast-paced acquisition of advanced equipment. If China’s domestic problems become bad enough, it could **provide impetus** for the Party to decide that now is the time to **cut back on expensive defense spending** and invest in social services instead.

#### Lashout not related to domestic instability.

Newmyer 7 [Jacqueline, president and chief executive officer of Long Term Strategy Group, LLC, a Cambridge, MA-based defense consultancy, and a postdoctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. April 04, 2007 Domestic Instability and Chinese Foreign Policy http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/domestic\_instability\_and\_chine.html]

Recent history bears out the continuing relevance of this advice in China. Under Mao and Deng, as Iain Johnston argues, the PRC proved remarkably prone to escalate against other powers. In its first half-century, at moments of domestic tumult and in periods of calm alike - from the end of the Civil War through the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the height of the Cultural Revolution to the relatively tranquil mid-1990s - the PRC launched unexpected military operations against the U.S., India, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The principal aim of each action was to secure a concrete gain or decisively defeat a foreign power. As Beijing continues to navigate domestic challenges, then, U.S. policy makers would be wise to keep in mind that internal disorder itself has not disposed the PRC to peace or triggered aggression. Rather, the PRC has tended to strike when a rival's guard is perceived to be down, offering an opportunity to inflict a devastating blow.

### Slowed Growth Causes Democracy

#### Economic downturn spurs democracy.

Fukuyama 11 [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42318&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+CarnegieEndowmentForInternationalPeacePublications+%28DC+-+Publications%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader \* Home > o Publications > US Democracy Has Little To Teach China Francis Fukuyama Financial Times, January 17, 2011]

The Communist party seems to think it can deal with the problem of inequality through improved responsiveness on the part of its own hier­archy to popular pressures. China’s great historical achievement during the past two millennia has been to create high-quality centralised government, which it does much better than most of its authoritarian peers. Today, it is shifting social spending to the neglected interior, to boost consumption and to stave off a social explosion. I doubt whether its approach will work: any top-down system of accountability faces unsolvable problems of monitoring and responding to what is happening on the ground. Effective accountability can only come about through a bottom-up process, or what we know as democracy. This is not, in my view, likely to emerge soon. However, down the road, in the face of a major economic downturn, or leaders who are less competent or more corrupt, **the system’s fragile legitimacy could be openly challenged. Democracy’s strengths are often most evident in times of adversity.**

#### Slowed growth tanks legitimacy.

Fukuyama 11 [Mr. Fukuyama is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. His new book, "The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution," will be published next month. close window Close \* Dow Jones Reprints: This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers, use the Order Reprints tool at the bottom of any article or visit www.djreprints.com See a sample reprint in PDF format. Order a reprint of this article now \* The Wall Street Journal \* THE SATURDAY ESSAY \* MARCH 12, 2011 Is China Next? http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703560404576188981829658442.html?mod=WSJ\_hp\_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond]

The bottom line is that China will not catch the Middle Eastern contagion anytime soon. But it could easily face problems down the road. China has not experienced a major recession or economic setback since it set out on its course of economic reform in 1978. If the country's current property bubble bursts and tens of millions of people are thrown out of work, the government's legitimacy, which rests on its management of the economy, would be **seriously undermined.**

#### Transition will be stable.

Gilley 7 [Bruce, an assistant professor of political studies at Queen's University in Canada. He is a former contributing editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of China's Democratic Future (2004), Is China Stuck?, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, 2006. 306 pp., Journal of Democracy 18.1 (2007) 171-174]

Yet what if the CCP is actually quite responsive? What if it is in tune with popular demands, and finds ways to move and adapt as those demands change? In other words, what if the party stays or goes because of [End Page 173] popular pressures? Pei himself recognizes this possibility. He cites "rising public dissatisfaction" (p.14) as one thing that would prod the regime to change. "A democratic opening may emerge in the end, but not as a regime-initiated strategy undertaken at its own choosing, but more likely as the result of a sudden crisis" (p. 44). Perhaps the word crisis is being used in two different senses here. One crisis and another can, after all, vary in urgency: There are crises and there are crises. The crisis of which Pei speaks seems to be of the more benign sort, a mere shift in public preferences that prods the regime to change. Such a crisis will not require democracy to rise upon the ashes of a razed public square, but rather will **stir the regime to recognize that its time has come**, and to do the right thing by going **fairly gentle** into that good night. If so, then the prospects for a relatively **smooth democratic transition** in China are **bright** and **no collapse is likely.**

#### Elite-led extrication is the most likely outcome – empirics and key CCP figures.

Gilley 4 [Bruce, assistant professor of political studies at Queen's University in Canada, The "End of Politics" in Beijing, The China Journal, No. 51 (Jan., 2004), pp. 115-135, Contemporary China Center, Australian National University, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3182149]

Is there a third way between popular overthrow and voluntary liberalization? There is, and it has been the **dominant mode** of democratic transitions: elite-led extrication. In the worldwide Third Wave of democratization from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, roughly 29 of 41 transitions were of this type.83 In this scenario, elites under pressure from a mobilized society and unable to govern effectively or to buy off the population calculate that their interests lie in change. Democracy can be seen as a structural means of control when the old levers of repression and co-optation no longer work. When volatile middle-class opinion suddenly rejects the anti-democratic discourse of the regime, the process of change happens quickly, leading to a skeletal democracy, usually one dominated by the former authoritarian elites. It may be the **only feasible exit** left for the CCP.84 Within the Standing Committee, Zeng Qinghong is a key figure who might argue in favour of such a shift. He is a "political" person who sees contestation as necessary and good. One high-level Party exile expresses a grudging admiration for him: "If he were in the U.S., he would be a congressman, leader of the opposition party, or even President".85 Wen Jiabao's frequent use of the term "democratic decision-making" makes him a potential ally if his scientism recedes.86 Some younger members of the Fifth Generation, like Bo Xilai, also appear more willing to embrace politics. As so often, a political opening in authoritarian regimes depends not on principled liberals but on politically-aware self-interested members of the political elite like Zeng, Wen and Bo who see in open politics a **better field for their ambitions.**

#### China’s key to global democracy - they bailout authoritarian regimes and prevent global consolidation.

Friedman 9 [Edward, a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he specializes in Chinese politics. A recent book is Revolution, Resistance and Reform in Village China (Yale University Press, 2005), China: A Threat to or Threatened by Democracy?, Winter 2009, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1318]

There is no other long-lasting basis for trustful cooperation with the government in Beijing than to accept the regime’s legitimacy. CCP ruling groups imagine foreign democracy-promotion as a threat to China’s—and the world’s—better future, identified, of course, as at one with the interests of CCP ruling groups. Can the world afford not to treat China as the superpower it is? The CCP imagines a chaotic and war-prone world disorder of American-led democracy-promotion being replaced by a beneficent Chinese world order of authoritarian growth with stability. There may be far less of a challenge to China from democracy than there is a challenge to democracy from China. Democracy-promoter Larry Diamond concludes in his recent book The Spirit of Democracy that **democracy is in trouble** across the world because of the **rise of China,** an authoritarian superpower that has the **economic clout** to back and bail out authoritarian regimes **around the globe**. “Singapore . . . could foreshadow a resilient form of capitalist-authoritarianism by China, Vietnam, and elsewhere in Asia,” which delivers “booming development, political stability, low levels of corruption, affordable housing, and a secure pension system.” Joined by ever richer and more influential petro powers leveraging the enormous wealth of Sovereign Investment Funds, “**Asia will determine the fate of democracy**,” at least in the foreseeable future. Authoritarian China, joined by its authoritarian friends, is well on the way to **defeating the global forces of democracy.**

And Global economic liberalism solves great power wars

Griswold, Associated Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the CATO Institute in Washington, 02 (Daniel, “seven Moral Arguments for Free Trade,” The Insider, 01 May, http://www.insideronline.org/feature.cfm?id=106)

In an 1845 speech in the British House of Commons, Richard Cobden called free trade “that advance which is calculated to knit nations more together in the bonds of peace by means of commercial intercourse.” Free trade does not guarantee peace, but it does strengthen peace by raising the cost of war to governments and their citizens. As nations become more integrated through expanding markets, they have more to lose should trade be disrupted.

In recent years, the twin trends of globalization and democratization have produced their own “peace dividend”: since 1987, real spending on armaments throughout the world has dropped by more than one-third. Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of major international wars has receded. Those nations most closely associated with international terrorism – Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea – are among the least globalized countries in the world in terms of non-oil trade and foreign investment. Not one of them belongs to the World Trade Organization.

During the 1930s, the industrialized nations waged trade wars against each other. They raised tariffs and imposed quotas in order to protect domestic industry. The result, however, was that other nations only raised their barriers even further, choking off global trade and deepening and prolonging the global economic depression. Those dark economic times contributed to the conflict that became World War II. America’s post-war policy of encouraging free trade through multilateral trade agreements was aimed at promoting peace as much as it was prosperity.

#### Democracy solves Taiwan conflict.

Friedberg 11 [Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, June 21, 2011 http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439]

One Chinese advocate of political reform, Liu Junning, summarizes the prospects well. Whereas a “nationalistic and authoritarian China will be an emerging threat,” a liberal, democratic China will ultimately prove “a constructive partner.” This expectation is rooted in more than mere wishful thinking. As the values and institutions of liberal democracy become more firmly entrenched, there will begin to be open and politically meaningful debate and real competition over national goals and the allocation of national resources. Aspiring leaders and opinion makers preoccupied with prestige, honor, power and score settling will have to compete with others who emphasize the virtues of international stability, cooperation, reconciliation and the promotion of social welfare. The demands of the military and its industrial allies will be counterbalanced, at least to some degree, by groups who favor spending more on education, health care and the elderly. The assertive, hypernationalist version of China’s history and its grievances will be challenged by accounts that acknowledge the culpability of the Communist regime in repressing minorities and refusing to seek compromise on questions of sovereignty. A leadership obsessed with its own survival and with countering perceived threats from foreign powers will be replaced by a government secure in its legitimacy and with no cause to fear that the world’s democracies are seeking to encircle and overthrow it. A democratic China would find it easier to get along with Japan, India and South Korea, among others. The trust and mutual respect that eventually grows up between democracies, and the diminished fear that one will use force against another, should increase the odds of attaining negotiated settlements of outstanding disputes over borders, offshore islands and resources. A democratic government in Beijing would also stand a better chance of achieving a mutually acceptable resolution to its sixty-year standoff with Taiwan. In contrast to today’s CCP rulers, a popularly elected mainland regime would have less to gain from keeping this conflict alive, it would be more likely to show respect for the preferences of another democratic government, and it would be more attractive to the Taiwanese people as a partner in some kind of federated arrangement that would satisfy the desires and ease the fears of both sides.

#### CCP expansionism guarantees escalating conflict.

Friedman 11 [Edward, professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, specializing in Chinese foreign policy, international political economy and democratization. Understanding China’s Global Impact, Feburary 2011, The Diplomat, http://the-diplomat.com/whats-next-china/understanding-china%E2%80%99s-global-impact/?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+the-diplomat+%28The+Diplomat+RSS%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader]

That foreign exchange has given China its global clout to buy commodities, make investments and offer huge loans all around the world, helped make China the world power it has become. But the CCP’s expansive territorial and military agenda, however right it seems from the perspective of China’s Opium Wars victimhood, is seen by many of China’s neighbours as aggressive and threatening. The CCP’s misunderstanding of its growth therefore contains some potentially **explosive risks**. If ruling groups in Beijing act on the notion that the Chinese don’t need the industrial democracies and can simply impose an imperial agenda upon their neighbors while expecting its military assertiveness to be treated as national justice, then there’s a danger China’s leadership will behave as Wilhemite Germany did. Of course, international forces lack the means to alter Chinese domestic politics, meaning that there’s the difficult question of what exactly the industrialized democracies can do, even if they abandon their illusions. The problem is made all the harder because it’s not clear that the industrialized democracies are even succeeding in facing up to their own significant domestic challenges. If they don’t, then they’ll be in no position to contest the global agenda of a CCP that pursues foreign policies aimed at ‘restoring’ regional predominance and global centrality, all while checking democracy and human rights globally. Such Chinese policies, energized by enormous economic clout, would construct facts on the ground. They would make the world safe and secure for China’s ruling groups, who would no doubt be infused by a self-blinding nationalism in which the core interests of CCP foreign policy come to seem moral—and become virtually unstoppable.

#### Democracy checks nationalist sentiment.

Pei 11 [Minxin Pei, political scientist and the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College, Carnegie, Peace, Democracy, and Nightmares in China National Interest, June 22, 2011 http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/90539/european-union-greece-bankruptcy-us-unemployment]

No doubt, democratization in China would bring an enormous expansion of press freedoms and would fundamentally change the political dynamics of public discourse on national-security issues. At the moment, the lack of freedom of the press makes it very difficult for the Chinese public to gain a well-informed view of issues critical to the country’s national security. Take the Taiwan question, for example. The mainland’s official press coverage of Taiwan is so distorted that it is impossible for ordinary Chinese people to have a decent understanding of the history of the matter, its complexity and the risks of a military conflict. If China were a liberal democracy, press freedom would allow far more open and objective discussion of foreign-policy issues. Hawkish views would be countered by more moderate voices. Nationalist sentiments would be constrained by more cosmopolitan perspectives. And dangers of an aggressive foreign policy would be readily apparent.

### A2 Impact D

#### Status quo peace is precarious – core differences.

Lee 10 [John, a foreign-policy fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, a visiting scholar at the Hudson Institute in Washington and the author of "Will China Fail?" (CIS, 2007), China's Rise and the Road to War, August 5, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703748904575410580240721848.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj]

What are the lessons for Asia? While economic interdependence and American attempts to "manage" China's rise has so far succeeded in preventing war, the recent diplomatic conflagration over the Chinese reiteration that its claims in the South China Sea are part of Beijing's "core interests" validates what scholars such as Aaron Friedberg have been saying for a decade: East Asia today has the potential to recreate the European situation at the turn of the previous century. When it comes to strategic goals, China is re-entering into a regional order not of its making after decades of self-imposed isolation. By virtue of Beijing's fundamental dissatisfaction with several of its land and maritime borders, it is a revisionist power. As it rises, the desperation to secure its "core interests" will deepen. Chinese grand strategy since the days of former leader Deng Xiaoping has been to avoid conflict with a much more formidable competitor (i.e., America) while China builds its "comprehensive national power." In favor of "winning Asia without fighting," as Chinese General Ma Xiaotian once put it, are many of the older generation of leaders who see caution as prudence, even if they relentlessly seek "windows of opportunity" to extend Beijing's power at the expense of America's. They still remember the suffering and humiliation of the Mao Zedong years, when an isolated China tried to achieve too much too quickly. Yet, as history reaffirms, a peace built on continued political skill, dexterity and restraint rather than a harmony of strategic interest is **inherently precarious**. Without personal experience of China's recent traumatic history, future generations of leaders will be more confident and assertive. Even now, emerging Communist Party and People's Liberation Army leaders argue that China is moving too slowly on securing its foreign-policy goals. The danger is that, just as Germany did in Europe a century ago, China's overestimation of its own capabilities, and underestimation of American strengths and resolve—combined with strategic dissatisfaction and impatience—is the fast way toward **disastrous miscalculation** and error.

#### No interdependence - economic AND political decoupling.

Bremmer 10 [Ian, president of Eurasia Group and author of “The End of the Free Market” (Portfolio), published in May, China vs America: fight of the century22nd March 2010 — Issue 169, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/]

The list of irritants in US-Chinese relations **is growing**. Google threatens to quit China over censorship and cyber-attacks. Washington and Beijing are at cross purposes over Iran’s nuclear programme. US lawmakers have again criticised China’s unwillingness to allow the value of its currency to rise and its failure to protect the intellectual property of foreign companies. There are trade disputes over tyres and steel pipes. Yet these problems are merely symptoms of an **illness that has progressed further than some observers realise**. Put bluntly, the Chinese leadership **no longer believes** that American power is as indispensable as it once was for either China’s economic expansion or the Communist party’s political survival. Nor does it accept that access to US capital or commercial know-how is quite so important for the next stage of China’s development—or that its growth depends on the spending habits of American consumers. China has embarked on a process of **economic “decoupling.”** The western financial meltdown put millions of Chinese out of work in early 2009, as factories that produced goods for export closed their doors. Over the past 18 months, Beijing has seen how dependence on western markets can produce unacceptably high levels of risk at home. The solution is to shift its model to rely more on China’s growing consumer base. This plan, however, must be undertaken with great care to ensure minimum industrial disruption. Meanwhile, **China’s political decoupling from the west is also in full swing**. We saw it at December’s climate change summit in Copenhagen, as China spearheaded resistance from developing states to western-proposed targets on carbon emissions. We saw it in the strong reaction to an announcement in February of US arms sales to Taiwan and to Barack Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama days later. We will see more public Chinese pushback against what Beijing considers “interference” from Washington in months to come.

#### Democracy key to check military.

Pei 11 [Minxin Pei, political scientist and the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College, Carnegie, Peace, Democracy, and Nightmares in China National Interest, June 22, 2011 http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/90539/european-union-greece-bankruptcy-us-unemployment]

One of the most important changes democratization would bring to China is a new civil-military relationship. This issue has not received adequate attention in discussions about how civilian control of the military influences a country’s external behavior. In the case of China, it is a critical factor. As we all know, at the moment, the Chinese military is under the control of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is not a national army, which would be politically neutral and loyal to the Chinese state not to a particular political party. The mission statement of the People’s Liberation Army is revealing: its top priority is to defend the political monopoly of the CCP. Understandably, the CCP has made it abundantly clear that it will not allow the military to become a national army. If China became democratic, the Chinese armed forces would be much less subject to political manipulation and more loyal to national interests. This fundamental change alone would reduce the likelihood of conflict between China and its neighbors. A democratic China would also have real political checks and balances. Opposition parties and civil society in a liberal democracy play an important part in constraining the freedom of action of the ruling party in national-security policy. At the moment, the CCP’s national-security policy is completely unchallenged. But that would change if China had well-organized opposition parties and strong nongovernmental organizations that could force the leadership to justify and seek public support for its agenda. The military establishment itself would be placed under greater scrutiny in a competitive political system as well. Opposition parties and NGOs would raise questions about defense expenditures and force the military to be more transparent regarding its doctrine and capabilities. Democratic institutions would also make the national-security-policy-making process more open and accessible to different interest groups. As a result, advocates for peace and cooperation would have the ability to rally public opinion and influence policy. Taken together, these institutional checks and balances would make the ruling party and the military more accountable.

#### Chinese nationalism ensures Senkaku conflict with U.S. involvement escalates to nuclear war

Scott Moore, Undergraduate Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, CNS, NTI, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 10/18/06, “Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat”, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_80.html {jchen}

The depth of Chinese nationalist sentiment towards Taiwan has a parallel, though not an exact one, in anti-Japanese feeling. Like the Taiwan issue, these feelings run both deep and broad in Chinese society. The memory of Japan's invasion during the Second World War is particularly poignant; one 1996 survey reported that the word "Japan" made 81.3% of Chinese youth think most easily of the "war of resistance against Japanese aggression."[44] The strength of anti-Japanese sentiment suggests that the Chinese government may take an aggressive stance on major increases in Japan's military capability in general, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons in particular. Anti-Japanese nationalism has been described as "the stomach-burning passion of Chinese patriots."[45] In April 2005, large protests erupted in many Chinese cities after United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged a plan intended to give Japan a permanent seat on the Security Council.[46] An online petition that allegedly garnered 42 million signatures in opposition to a permanent Security Council seat for Japan[47] suggests the popular resonance of these protests. Additional protests were organized in a grassroots, popular campaign largely conducted via the Internet, a feat accomplished because of the strength of anti-Japanese sentiment.[48] This phenomenon is particularly notable because much of this online protest occurred without direction by the government; an example is Japanpig.com, which simply features a sword piercing the Japanese flag.[49] This hyper-nationalism is at odds with official policy, most particularly with regards to the Diaoyu/Senkaku, a group of islands claimed by both China and Japan in the East China Sea. One internal Chinese government poll suggested that 82% of mainland citizens opposed the government's policy towards Japan and favored a more aggressive one.[50] The gap between popular opinion and elite policy suggests that under current circumstances a hyper-nationalist nexus is unlikely to form between elite and popular interests. However, if Japan pursues a policy of nuclearization, these circumstances may change. It also **bodes ill for the cause of moderation in the case of conflict.** Some already regard Japan as a "de facto nuclear weapons state" because it possesses stockpiles of plutonium, the necessary technological base to produce nuclear weapons, and because it possesses advanced space launch technology that could easily be applied to intercontinental ballistic missiles.[51] Furthermore, although Japan has a strong political tradition renouncing nuclear weapons, there are some signs this may be changing. In April 2002, Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of Japan's opposition Liberal Party, warned that "if China gets too inflated, the Japanese people will become hysterical," and claimed it would be easy for Japan to produce nuclear weapons.[52] Although the Chinese Foreign Ministry response to Ozawa's statements was muted,[53] there appears to be some perception that Japan is embarked on a long-term path of aggression towards China. In an article published in the Shanghai Journal of Social Studies, one analyst claimed that "all-out strategic precautions against China have become one of the main contents of Japan's strategy towards China."[54] If such a policy were seen to threaten China with Japanese nuclear weapons capabilities, hyper-nationalist elite and popular interests may converge to advocate an aggressive response. Despite the depth of anti-Japanese sentiment, there is no direct link between a nuclearized Japan and a nuclear conflict with China. Thus the threat of a nuclear-armed Japan is more one of instability. Given the resonance of anti-Japanese feeling, there may be significant potential for a hyper-nationalist nexus to form against Japan than against the United States, including the threatened use of nuclear weapons. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan would probably at a minimum induce Chinese decision makers to reconsider the NFU policy, particularly if Japan also acquired a ballistic missile capability. Any such situation would also involve the United States. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security obligates the United States to "act to meet the common danger" in the event of an attack on Japanese territory.[55] Chinese analysts, moreover, emphasize strong U.S.-Japan ties,[56] suggesting that were a conflict to develop, all parties expect the involvement of the United States. **The implications of any such conflict are enormous, involving** as it would **three of the world's most powerful militaries, all of which**, in this scenario, would **have** a mature or putative **nuclear weapons capability**. The specter of this kind of confrontation is worth considering as one contemplates the future of Sino-American relations in the nuclear context.

#### Try or die for Chinese democracy – even if the transition is somewhat violent, the longer we wait the more violent and less successful the transition.

Gilley 6 [Bruce, a Canadian scholar of China, currently working as an adjunct professor of international affairs at the New School University in New York Elite-led democratization in China International Journal | Spring 2006 | 341]

The longer that democratic change is delayed in China, the **more difficult** it will be for democracy to consolidate quickly in the country because inequalities will worsen and because the violence needed to overthrow one- party rule will be **more severe.** China had an opportunity in 1989 for a rel- atively smooth transition to democracy. It lost that chance. A transition today would be fraught, but would **still almost certainly succeed. With each passing year, however, those challenges mount**. If a democratic transition in China is difficult, we will have only ourselves to blame because we never took seriously the possibility or the responsibility for this momentous event.

#### Democratization solves.

Pei 8/9 [Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Superpower Denied? Why China’s ‘Rise’ May Have Already Peaked August 09, 2012, The Diplomat]

What this analysis reveals is that the growth of Chinese power under one-party rule has **peaked.** The seductive authoritarian state-capitalist development model may have delivered an economic miracle in the post-Tiananmen era, but for all practical purposes this model has lost its magic, if it has not gone totally bankrupt. However, China's future does not have to be a dismal one. The obverse of this analysis is that, with the right reforms, particularly a return to a pro-market growth strategy and a transition to democratic rule, China can comfortably confront these domestic and external challenges. A more liberal market-based economic system will utilize resources more efficiently and equitably than state-capitalism. Democratic reforms will give the regime a fundamental source of political legitimacy at home and also help reduce animosity and distrust of China abroad. China will have an excellent chance to lay the economic and political foundations for a 21st-century superpower. If this were to occur, China's best days would still be ahead, not behind.

### 2NC Collapse Inev

#### Collapse is inevitable – middle class.

Fukuyama 11 [Mr. Fukuyama is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. His new book, "The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution," will be published next month. close window Close \* Dow Jones Reprints: This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers, use the Order Reprints tool at the bottom of any article or visit www.djreprints.com See a sample reprint in PDF format. Order a reprint of this article now \* The Wall Street Journal \* THE SATURDAY ESSAY \* MARCH 12, 2011 Is China Next? http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703560404576188981829658442.html?mod=WSJ\_hp\_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond]

The central moral imponderable with regard to China is the middle class, which up to now has seemed content to trade political freedom for rising incomes and stability. But at some point this trade-off is likely to fail; the regime will find itself unable to deliver the goods, or the insult to the dignity of the Chinese people will become too great to tolerate. We shouldn't pretend that we can predict when this tipping point will occur, but its eventual arrival, as Samuel Huntington might have suggested, is bound up with the very logic of modernization itself.

#### Collapse inevitable – elites not adapting.

Chang 12 [Gordon G., Forbes, Green Protest In China Stops Chemical Plant, Economy To Suffer, 7/8/12 http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2012/07/08/green-protest-in-china-stops-chemical-plant-economy-to-suffer/?feed=rss\_author]

Now, however, a modernizing society is developing new values, and as it does so, the political stability of recent years is fast eroding. Since Deng took over at the end of the 1970s, the primary basis of legitimacy of the Communist Party has been the continual delivery of prosperity, but now leaders are not adapting as fast as they should to changing Chinese values. At times, the Party will make tactical retreats, as it did in Shifang, but it has been unable to develop a more sustainable form of governance. The recent events in Shifang, therefore, suggest China is entering a new phase, which is bound, at least in its initial years, to undercut economic development. With the economy faltering badly, this could not come at a worse time for the country’s shaky political system.

# 1NR

#### No spill over on cmr – courts won’t enforce the precedent

Howell and Pevehouse, 07 (Willam G. Howell, Prof @ U Chicago, Jon C. Pevehouse, Prof @ U Chicago. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. xvi)

Unlike the military, courts during the past half century have wielded re- markably little influence over prJrid.rrtial decision making during the ongoing conduct of a milit"ry u.rrture.a As Edward Keynes notes, The contemporary record of the Federal courts suggests that the government is free to initiate and conduct undeclared wars and military hostility with very few constitutional limitations."5 Rarely in the modern era have judges or justices intervened directly into a president's military campaign. The Supreme Court, for instance, still has not ruled on the constitutionality of theWar Powers Resolution, usually finding some reason (typically lack of standing or the political questionare doctrine) to deny certiorari, even numerous plaintiffs, including members of Congress, have sought injunc- tions that presidents invoke the resolution before using force. During the entire Vietnam 'War, only two federal district courts ever challenged the president's power to oversee military operations without a formal con- gressional authorization; and in both instances, these decisions were over- turned on appeal.6 Not once in the modern era have the courts repudiated a military action and demanded that the president bring the troops home.

#### 1. Timeframe is laughable.

Cohen 97 [Eliot, Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins, “Civil-military relations – Are US Forces Overstretched?”]

The ills besetting civil-military relations in the United States are the **deeply rooted** product of historical developments dating back several decades or longer. Remedies will take time to have an effect. More important, they will require tough and imaginative civilian leadership, because they will be opposed by important (though by no means all) segments of military opinion and will be relatively unattractive politically. The military opinion will be bolstered by civilian allies, including military retirees (who can speak far more freely than those in uniform) and that large group of civilians who occasionally confuse unthinking support of military traditions and practice with patriotic support for the armed forces.

#### 2. SOP checks collapse.

Hooker 3 [Richard, National War College Army Staff, Winter, “Soldiers of the State,” Parameters,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_4\_33/ai\_111852934/print]

In American academe today the dominant view of civil-military relations is sternly critical of the military, asserting that civilian control of the military is dangerously eroded. (1) Though tension clearly exists in the relationship, the current critique is largely inaccurate and badly overwrought. Far from overstepping its bounds, America's military operates comfortably within constitutional notions of separated powers, participating appropriately in defense and national security policymaking with due deference to the principle of civilian control. Indeed, an active and vigorous role by the military in the policy process is and always has been essential to the common defense.

#### Court policy would destroy international control efforts

Tribe, Branson, and Duncan 10 Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law School; Joshua D. Branson, J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School (June 2010), has been an Article Editor of the Harvard Law and Policy Review, and will be clerking for a federal circuit court judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit beginning August 2010 (and he's pretty much a goober); Tristan L. Duncan is a Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.; 1988-89 Post Doctoral Scholar, Yale Law School, 1988-89; J.D., University of Iowa Law School, 1989. TOO HOT FOR COURTS TO HANDLE: FUEL TEMPERATURES, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE Washington Legal Foundation, Critical Legal Issues WORKING PAPER Series Number 169 January 2010 <http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf>

But that being said, if the Second Circuit was implying that such claims are justiciable in part because they are relatively costless, it was wrong again. In the wake of the recent Copenhagen climate negotiations, America is at a crossroads regarding its energy policy. At Copenhagen, the world—for the first time including both the United States and China—took a tremulous first step towards a comprehensive and truly global solution to climate change.44 By securing a modicum of international consensus—albeit not yet with binding commitments—President Obama laid the foundation for what could eventually be a groundbreaking congressional overhaul of American energy policy, an effort that will undoubtedly be shaped by considerations as obviously political as our energy independence from hostile and unreliable foreign regimes and that will both influence and be influenced by the delicate state of international climate negotiations.45

Against this backdrop, courts would be wise to heed the conclusion of one report that what “makes climate change such a difficult policy problem is that decisions made today can have significant, uncertain, and difficult to reverse consequences extending many years into the future."46 This observation is even more salient given that America—and the world—stand at the precipice of major systemic climate reform, if not in the coming year then in the coming decade. It would be disastrous for climate policy if, as at least one commentator has predicted,47 courts were to “beat Congress to the punch” and begin to concoct common law “solutions” to climate change problems before the emergence of a legislative resolution. Not only does judicial action in this field require costly and irreversible technological change on the part of defendants, but the prior existence of an ad hoc mishmash of common law regimes will frustrate legislators’ attempts to design coherent and systematic marketbased solutions.48 Indeed, both emissions trading regimes and carbon taxes seek to harness the fungibility of GHG emissions by creating incentives for reductions to take place where they are most efficient. But if courts were to require reductions of randomly chosen defendants—with no regard for whether they are efficient reducers— they would inhibit the effective operation of legislatively-created, market-based regimes by prematurely and artificially constricting the size of the market. And as one analyst succinctly put it before Congress, “[a]n insufficient number of participants will doom an emissions trading market.”49

There is no doubt that the “Copenhagen Accord only begins the battle” against climate change, as diplomats, bureaucrats, and legislators all now begin the lengthy struggle to turn that Accord’s audacious vision into concrete reality.50 But whatever one’s position in the debate between emissions trading and carbon taxes, or even in the debate over the extent or indeed the reality of anthropogenic climate change, one thing is clear: legislators, armed with the best economic and scientific analysis, and with the capability of binding, or at least strongly incentivizing, all involved parties, are the only ones constitutionally entitled to fight that battle.

#### Courts are not equipped to develop climate policy – that should be left to the political branches

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It has been axiomatic throughout our constitutional history that there exist some questions beyond the proper reach of the judiciary. In fact, the political question doctrine originates in no less august a case than Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall stated that “[q]uestions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”1 Well over a century after that landmark ruling, the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Carr, famously announced six identifying characteristics of such nonjusticiable political questions, which, primarily as a “function of the separation of powers,” courts may not adjudicate.2 Of these six characteristics, the Court recently made clear that two are particularly important: (1) the presence of “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;” and (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”3

The spectrum of nonjusticiable political questions in a sense spans the poles formed by these two principles. At one pole, the Constitution’s specific textual commitments shield issues expressly reserved to the political branches from judicial interference. At the other pole lie matters not necessarily reserved in so many words to one of the political branches but nonetheless institutionally incapable of coherent and principled resolution by courts acting in a truly judicial capacity; such matters are protected from judicial meddling by the requirement that “judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule” and by the correlative axiom that “law pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”4 At a deeper level, however, the two poles collapse into one. The reason emerges if one considers issues that courts are asked to address involving novel problems the Constitution’s framers, farsighted though they were, could not have anticipated with sufficient specificity to entrust their resolution to Congress or to the Executive in haec verba. A perfect exemplar of such problems is the nest of puzzles posed by human induced climate change. When matters of that character are taken to court for resolution by judges, what marks them as “political” for purposes of the “political question doctrine” is not some problem-specific language but, rather, the demonstrable intractability of those matters to principled resolution through lawsuits. And one way to understand that intractability is to view it as itself marking the Constitution’s textual, albeit broadly couched, commitment of the questions presented to the processes we denominate “legislative” or “executive”—that is, to the pluralistic processes of legislation and treaty-making rather than to the principle-bound process of judicially resolving what Article III denominates “cases” and “controversies.” In other words, the judicial unmanageability of an issue serves as powerful evidence that the Constitution’s text reserves that issue, even if broadly and implicitly, to the political branches.5

### No International Agreement

#### No modeling – states lack infrastructural capacity

Levi 11 [Michael A. Levi David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment Why Don’t States Cooperate More on Energy and Climate? Posted on Tuesday, January 18, 2011 http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2011/01/18/why-dont-states-cooperate-more-on-energy-and-climate/?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+mlevi+%28Michael+Levi%27s+Blog%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader]

I spent Friday and Saturday at an excellent (largely academic) workshop on international institutions and global governance. In our discussions about why states do and don’t cooperate, I was struck by how absent states’ capacity to cooperate was from the discussion. In particular, when it comes to energy and climate, it’s one of the bigger blind spots in how both practitioners and scholars think about cooperation. Here’s a simple example of what I’m referring to: People argue that international oil markets would function more smoothly if states would publish basic data on their domestic markets (supply, demand, stocks, etc). They observe that China (among others) doesn’t do that. The immediate conclusion is that Beijing doesn’t want to. The only policy recourse, then, is to pressure or persuade China to change tack. But in more than one recent conversation, people have emphasized to me that Beijing doesn’t have many of the needed statistics itself (though it’s working on developing its capacity). Badgering them won’t change that; until they develop the capacity to collect the right statistics, cooperation will fail. The same thing is true much more broadly. India, for example, won’t be able to force power plants to internalize pollution costs until it develops a serious environmental regulator. Brazil won’t get deforestation properly under control without stronger capacity to enforce the laws that it puts on the books. One might even argue that China won’t improve its IPR protection until its innovation system becomes much more capable of developing technologies itself. Our view of international politics, though, tends to focus much more on pure ambition than on these sorts of features that directly influence results.

#### No global tech transfer – trade barriers prevent adoption

Hall and Helmers 10 [Bronwyn H. Hall, Professor of the Graduate School – UC Berkeley, Christian Helmers, University of Oxford - Department of Economics, The role of patent protection in (clean/green) technology transfer 24 October 2010 http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5706]

There are a number of other issues apart from intellectual property rights that are of first-order importance in setting incentives for the development and transfer of technologies. Developing countries themselves may generate **powerful distortions inhibiting** the production and transfer of green technologies. A report by Copenhagen Economics (2009) suggests that subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels in some developing countries, such as Venezuela, Iran and Indonesia, may represent a **significant barrier** to the development and transfer of green technologies in these countries. Barton (2007) suggests that import tariffs on photo-voltaic and wind technology in place in India and China may also act as a barrier to technology development and transfer. In contrast, import tariffs and subsidies for biofuels in place in industrialised countries, above all the EU and US, are viewed as hampering the development of this industry in developing countries, such as Brazil (World Bank 2010). Such import barriers on green technologies represent a complex issue. Due to the environmental externality, it is desirable to have policy interventions in place in developed countries dedicated to market creation, such as subsidies, to promote demand for green technologies (Taylor 2008). From a political economy perspective, however, it is unclear to what extent developed economies are willing to subsidise demand for green technology produced abroad, in particular in large emerging economies.

### No Warming Impact

#### Can’t solve outside – states lack infrastructural capacity

Levi 11 [Michael A. Levi David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment Why Don’t States Cooperate More on Energy and Climate? Posted on Tuesday, January 18, 2011 http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2011/01/18/why-dont-states-cooperate-more-on-energy-and-climate/?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+mlevi+%28Michael+Levi%27s+Blog%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader]

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### A2: Soft Power

#### High food prices inevitable.

Romm 11 [Joe, Dr. Joseph Romm is the editor of Climate Progress and a Senior Fellow at the American Progress. In 2009, Time magazine named him one of the “Heroes of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger.” Romm was Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy during the Clinton Administration where he directed $1 billion in research, development, demonstration, and deployment of clean energy and carbon-mitigating technology. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT. In 2008, Romm was elected a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science for “distinguished service toward a sustainable energy future and for persuasive discourse on why citizens, corporations, and governments should adopt sustainable technologies.”Climate Progress, Global food prices hit new record high March 3, 2011]

Global food prices increased for the eighth consecutive month in February, with prices of all commodity groups monitored rising again, except for sugar, [UN Food and Agriculture Organisation] said today. What is driving up food prices to record levels? As I’ve discussed in CP’s food insecurity series, **it’s harvests ruined by extreme weather, coupled with rising oil prices, increasing demand from population growth and changing diets in a global market made all the tighter by unsustainable biofuels policies**. The only good news going forward is that the Chinese drought has abated somewhat. Here’s more from the FAO release: FAO expects a tightening of the global cereal supply and demand balance in 2010/11. In the face of a growing demand and a decline in world cereal production in 2010, global cereal stocks this year are expected to fall sharply because of a decline in inventories of wheat and coarse grains. International cereal prices have increased sharply with export prices of major grains up at least 70 percent from February last year. “Unexpected oil price spikes could further exacerbate an already precarious situation in food markets,” said David Hallam, Director of FAO’s Trade and Market Division. “This adds even more uncertainty concerning the price outlook just as plantings for crops in some of the major growing regions are about to start,” he added. Unless oil prices come down sharply and soon, **it’s likely to get worse** before it gets better.

#### Oil predictions always wrong – view their ev with skepticism.

Bailey 11 [Ronald, science editor for Reason magazine It's Hard to Make Predictions, Especially About the Future The new book Future Babble explains why dart-throwing monkeys are better at predicting the future than most pundits. Ronald Bailey | April 5, 2011 <http://reason.com/archives/2011/04/05/future-babble>]

As oil prices ascend once again, naturally many predict that the end of oil is nigh. Back in 1980, Gardner reminds us, The New York Times confidently declared, “There should be no such thing as optimism about energy for the foreseeable future. What is certain is that the price of oil will go up and up, at home as well as abroad.” By 1986 oil prices had fallen to around $10 per barrel. On the accuracy of oil price predictions, Gardner cites U.S. Foreign Service Officer James Akins, who said: “Oil experts, economists, and government officials who have attempted in recent years to predict the future demand and prices of oil have had only marginally better success than those who foretell the advent of earthquakes or the second coming of the Messiah.” Akins’ observation was made in 1973 and it’s as true today as it was then. Consider the 2008 claim made by analysts at the investment bank Goldman Sachs that oil prices could surge beyond $200 per barrel in as little as six months. In fact, in as little as six months, the price of petroleum had fallen to $34 per barrel.

#### No nuclear terror.

Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]

Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be **vanishingly small.”** The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American so

il. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has **only a minuscule chance** of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, **it** probably **won’t bother.**

#### 8) Doesn’t spill over in between issues.

Brooks and Wohlforth, Government at Dartmouth, 5 [Professors Government – Dartmouth, Perspectives on Politics 3:509-524]

Drawing on rational choice theory, Downs and Jones show that a far more compelling theoretical case can be made that states have multiple reputations—each particular to a specific agreement or issue area. For this reason, they find that "the reputational consequences of defection are usually more bounded" than institutionalist scholarship currently presumes." 67 If America has, for example, one reputation associated with the UN and another regarding the WTO, then lack of compliance with the former organization will in **no way** directly undercut its ability to gain cooperation in the latter. As Downs and Jones note, viewing states as having multiple reputations "helps to explain why, despite the prevalence of the unitary reputation assumption, examples of a state's defection from an agreement in one area (for example, environment) jeopardizing its reputation in every other area (for example, trade and security) **are virtually nonexistent** in the literature."68 This conclusion is consistent with the **two most detailed studies of reputation in IR**, which decisively undercut the notion that states have a general reputation that will strongly influence how other states relate across different issue areas.69 In the end, the current lack of an empirical or theoretical justification for the notion that states carry a single reputation means that we have **no basis** for accepting the institutionalists' argument that America must endorse multilateralism across the board because to do otherwise has consequences that endanger the entire institutional order. That, together with theory's lack of purchase on the issues of coordination costs and bargaining power, invalidates the institutionalist argument about the high cost of unilateralism.

#### Can’t substitute for hard power.

Kroenig, Government at Georgetown, et al. 10 [Matthew, Department of Government, Georgetown University Melissa McAdam, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley Steven Weber, Information School, University of California, Berkeley, Taking Soft Power Seriously, Comparative Strategy, Volume 29, Issue 5 November 2010 , pages 412 – 431]

Foreign policy actors have many reasons to experiment with soft power, not merely because its use can be less costly than hard power. But, soft power comes with its own quite **striking limitations**. Our research suggests that soft power strategies will be **unlikely to succeed** except under fairly restrictive conditions. It may very well be, then, that the U.S. foreign policy elite is at risk of **exaggerating** the effectiveness of soft power (rather than underutilizing it) as a tool of foreign policy. After all, international communication is fraught with difficulties, persuading people to change firmly held political views is hard, and individual attitudes are often thought to have an **insignificant role** in determining international political outcomes. Soft power, therefore, will probably be considered a niche foreign policy option useful for addressing a small fraction of the problems on Washington's foreign policy agenda. Analysts who suggest that soft power can easily be substituted for hard power or who maintain that soft power should provide an overarching guide to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy are **badly mistaken**. It is not conducive to good policy to employ the idea of soft power as a way of arguing against the use of military force, for example.