### Advantage 1: US Strikes

#### US is committed to attacking Iran now.

Greenwald, 12 (Glen, former Constitutional and civil rights litigator and is the author of three New York Times Bestselling books: two on the Bush administration's executive power and foreign policy abuses, and his latest book, With Liberty and Justice for Some, an indictment of America's. Obama, Iran and preventive war. http://www.salon.com/2012/03/05/obama\_iran\_and\_preventive\_war/)

President Obama yesterday joined virtually every U.S. political leader in both parties in making the obligatory, annual pilgrimage and oath-taking to AIPAC: a bizarre ritual if you think about it. During his speech, he repeatedly emphasized that he “has Israel’s back,” rightfully noting that his actions in office prove this (“At every crucial juncture – at every fork in the road – we have been there for Israel. Every single time”). One of his goals was commendable — to persuade the Israelis not to attack Iran right now – but in order to accomplish that, he definitively vowed, as McClatchy put it, that “he’d call for military action to prevent Iran from securing a nuclear weapon.” In other words, he categorically committed the U.S. to an offensive military attack on Iran in order to prevent that country from acquiring a nuclear weapon; as AP put it: “President Barack Obama said Sunday the United States will not hesitate to attack Iran with military force to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”¶ Is that not the classic case of a “preventive” war (as opposed to a “preemptive” war), once unanimously scorned by progressives as “radical” and immoral when the Bush administration and its leading supporters formally adopted it as official national security doctrine in 2002? Back in 2010, Newsweek‘s Michael Hirsh documented the stark, fundamental similarities between the war theories formally adopted by both administrations in their national security strategies, but here we have the Bush administration’s most controversial war theory explicitly embraced: that the U.S. has the right not only to attack another country in order to preempt an imminent attack (pre-emptive war), but even to prevent some future, speculative threat (preventive war). Indeed, this was precisely the formulation George Bush invoked for years when asked about Iran. This theory of preventive war continues to be viewed around the world as patently illegal — Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Minister last week said of the “all-options-on-the-table” formulation for Iran: some of those options “are contrary to international law” — and before 2009, the notion of “preventive war” was universally scorned by progressives.¶ Again, one can find justifications, even rational ones, for President Obama’s inflexible commitment of a military attack on Iran: particularly, that this vow is necessary to stop the Israelis from attacking now (though it certainly seems that the U.S. would have ample leverage to prevent an Israeli attack if it really wanted to without commiting itself to a future attack on Iran). And I’ve noted many times that I believe that the Obama administration — whether for political and/or strategic reasons — does seem genuinely to want to avoid a war with Iran, at least for now.¶ But what this really shows, as was true for the run-up to the Iraq War, is how suffocatingly narrow the permissive debate has become. The so-called “gulf” between Israel and the U.S. — the two viable sides of the debate — consists of these views: (1) Iran should be attacked when it develops the capacity to develop nuclear weapons (Israel) or (2) Iran should be attacked only once it decides to actually develop a nuclear weapon (the U.S.). Those are the two permissible options, both grounded in the right and even duty to attack Iran even if they’re threatening to attack nobody — i.e., a preventive war. That it’s unjustified to attack Iran in the absence of an actual or imminent threat of attack by Iran, or that international law (as expressed by the U.N. Charter) bars the use of threats of military attack, or that Iran could be contained even if it acquired a nuclear weapon, has been removed from the realm of mainstream debate (meaning: the debate shaped by the two political parties). Obama yesterday:¶ Iran’s leaders should understand that I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And as I have made clear time and again during the course of my presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States and its interests.¶ Just as was true in 2002 and early 2003, everyone agrees that a preventive war would be justifiable and may be necessary, and the only permitted debate is whether it should happen now or a bit later (where should the “red lines” be?).¶ Whatever else is true, by having President Obama issue these clear and inflexible threats against Iran to which the nation is now bound, the once-controversial notion of “preventive war” just became much more normalized and bipartisan. Witness the virtually complete lack of objections to President Obama’s threats from either party to see how true that is.

#### Iran strikes causes nuclear war.

Chossudovsky 5 Michel Chossudovsky, Centre for Research on Globalisation 1 May 2005 Planned US-Israeli Attack on Iran

<http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO505A.html>

The Bush Administration has embarked upon a military adventure which **threatens the future of humanity**.¶ Iran is the next military target. The planned military operation, which is by no means limited to punitive strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities, is part of a project of World domination, a military roadmap, launched at the end of the Cold War.¶ Military action against Iran would directly involve Israel's participation, which in turn is likely to trigger a broader war throughout the Middle East, not to mention an implosion in the Palestinian occupied territories. Turkey is closely associated with the proposed aerial attacks.¶ Israel is a nuclear power with a sophisticated nuclear arsenal. (See text box below). The use of nuclear weapons by Israel or the US cannot be excluded, particularly in view of the fact that tactical nuclear weapons have now been reclassified as a variant of the conventional bunker buster bombs and are authorized by the US Senate for use in conventional war theaters. ("they are harmless to civilians because the explosion is underground")¶ In this regard, Israel and the US rather than Iran constitute a nuclear threat.¶ The planned attack on Iran must be understood in relation to the existing active war theaters in the Middle East, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. ¶ The conflict could easily spread from the Middle East to the Caspian sea basin. It could also involve the participation of Azerbaijan and Georgia, where US troops are stationed.¶ An attack on Iran would have a direct impact on the resistance movement inside Iraq. It would also put pressure on America's overstretched military capabilities and resources in both the Iraqi and Afghan war theaters. (The 150,000 US troops in Iraq are already fully engaged and could not be redeployed in the case of a war with Iran.)¶ In other words, the shaky geopolitics of the Central Asia- Middle East region, the three existing war theaters in which America is currently, involved, the direct participation of Israel and Turkey, the structure of US sponsored military alliances, etc. raises the specter of a broader conflict. ¶ Moreover, US military action on Iran not only threatens Russian and Chinese interests, which have geopolitical interests in the Caspian sea basin and which have bilateral agreements with Iran. It also backlashes on European oil interests in Iran and is likely to produce major divisions between Western allies, between the US and its European partners as well as within the European Union.¶ Through its participation in NATO, Europe, despite its reluctance, would be brought into the Iran operation. The participation of NATO largely hinges on a military cooperation agreement reached between NATO and Israel. This agreement would bind NATO to defend Israel against Syria and Iran. NATO would therefore support a preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, and could take on a more active role if Iran were to retaliate following US-Israeli air strikes.

### Advantage 2: Proxy Wars

#### The moderate Iranian president Rouhani just took office but his failure to win concessions from the west will cause the ascension of extremists.

Pesaran, 9/17 (Hashem Pesaran is the John Elliot Distinguished Chair in Economics at the University of Southern California. Iran sanctions: now is the time to negotiate. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/17/world-powers-negotiate-nuclear-iran)

The only way to stop this vicious cycle is for both sides to negotiate in good faith and with open minds. Many western observers believe that recently elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani is sincerely seeking a diplomatic solution. However, there are politicians and officials in the capitals of the P5+1 group – the five permanent UN Security Council members, plus Germany – who will push to implement even harsher measures if a diplomatic solution is not reached relatively soon. Witness the recent 400-20 vote in the US House of Representatives in favour of further punishing sanctions against Iran.¶ If Iran and P5+1 do not take full advantage of the current opportunity, the consequences are likely to be even more serious than if the status quo had simply gone unchanged. While the general international reaction to Iran's new chief executive has so far been favourable, a lack of progress over the next few months could create new levels of frustration and desperation, bolstering the radicals on both sides in the sanctions/nuclear debacle and bringing us closer to military intervention with dire and unthinkable consequences. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu is already spreading doubts about the utility of negotiating with Iran, arguing that Rouhani is a "wolf in sheep's clothing".¶ Iranian citizens, academics, and intellectuals can help. This is the message of the "civil movement" against sanctions that has been initiated by three prominent economists inside Iran, and I am pleased to be able to contribute my voice to this movement outside of Iran. It should be recognised that Rouhani won office in a lively, contested election, with a large margin of victory thanks to the majority of Iranians who prefer negotiation to confrontation. It is hoped that the wishes of the Iranian people will be respected by the Iranian government and by the west. Rouhani, his government, and Iran's negotiating team as the representatives of the Iranian people deserve to be taken seriously and to be engaged with constructively.¶ Hurt by sanctions and economic mismanagement, the majority of Iranians have chosen a moderate politician to engage with western countries and to reach a diplomatic solution. Iran's presidential election process is not ideal; nevertheless, this most recent vote was freer than the election processes in many Middle Eastern countries that enjoy the support of the west. Instead of demonstrating unswerving hostility towards Iran, it is vital for western countries to understand the situation and create an atmosphere that will help to further empower the moderates within Iran.¶ The P5+1 countries need to offer a deal to help Rouhani's administration domestically and strengthen its ability to deal with the radicals inside Iran. Squander the current opportunity, and they will weaken Rouhani's administration to the extent that it could fail, paving the way for the ascension of extremists. It is now up to the moderates on both sides to deliver.¶ Ordinary Iranians need to be part of the dialogue both inside and outside Iran. They need to remind their politicians of the heavy costs of living continuously under sanctions. It is not to Iran's advantage to remain isolated from the global community. If Iran's isolation continues, if it cannot trade freely and engage fully in international financial markets, if it cannot attract foreign investment, and if it misses out on technological advances that are taking place, the consequences could be many decades of decline and lost opportunities.¶ It is also clear that another costly, protracted, and open-ended military intervention in the Middle East is not in the west's interest, particularly given the fragile state of the global economy and the recent troublesome political developments in Egypt and Turkey, the region's other two most populous nations. A negotiated settlement with Iran holds the key to the resolution of political and military troubles around the Middle East.

#### **Renouncing threats of violence is a concession to Iran that would empower moderates and prevent regional aggression.**

Mousavian ’13, Hossein Mousavian, Winter 2013, The Washington Quarterly, “An Opportunity for a U.S.-Iran Paradigm Shift,” <http://csisdev.forumone.com/files/publication/TWQ_13Winter_Mousavian.pdf>, p. 138-139

Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney told CNN in August that Iran potentially poses the greatest national security threat to the United States.26 Similarly, Michele Flournoy, President Obama’s top campaign foreign policy adviser, identified Iran as a chief threat in the Middle East.27 Due to such assessments, despite not understanding the true nature of the Iranian government, ‘‘regime change’’ has been the core policy of all recent U.S. administrations.28 This policy has played a tremendous role in Iran—U.S. rivalries in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, and will likely continue to be one of the focal points shaping the future of the region. The United States needs a broader strategic policy that goes beyond the current obsession with Iran’s nuclear program in order to make a ‘‘big deal’’ possible, the United States needs to address its regime change strategy. A U.S. policy based on coercive sanctions, pressure, containent, and isolation of Iran has not achieved its objectives. Furthermore, the United States has been unable to achieve other policy objectives including promoting stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, achieving an agreement on a Palestinian state, and avoiding further military engagements in the region. It is crucial for U.S. policymakers, especially those who advocate sanctions and regime change, to understand that Iranian clerics are radicalized under threat. If this pressure were alleviated, it would inversely lead to their moderation. The history of the Islamic Republic suggests that clerics have been more cooperative and flexible on international and regional issues when approached with consolatory policies. There are many examples that strengthen this view, such as when the clerics in the 1990s facilitated the biggest humanitarian exchange between Hezbollah and Israel, and also permitted the UN Special Representative on Human Rights for Iran, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, to visit the country.29 In another case, President George H.W. Bush’s inaugural speech in 1989, which proposed that ‘‘goodwill begets goodwill,’’ paved the way for the constructive role Iran played in the release of the Western hostages held in Lebanon.30 Washington’s request for Iranian cooperation in the War on Terror also led to Iranian support in fighting al-/Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001.31

#### Hardline resurgence causes proxy wars

Keynoush 12, Banafsheh, independent scholar lecturer and private-sector consultant, she specializes in Iranian and Middle Eastern affairs, she was an accredited interpreter with the European Commission and worked as an interpreter with three Iranian Presidents and a Nobel Laureate; “Iran after Ahmadinejad”, Survival, Vol 54, No 3

Iran’s odd combination of theocracy and elected institutions has ¶ produced generally cautious and pragmatic behavior at the state-tostate level, combined with the use of subversion, terrorism, propaganda, ideology, and religion to undermine neighboring regimes it ¶ regards as adversaries. Conservative and reformist governments have ¶ sometimes sought to emphasize the overt and more positive strain of ¶ Iranian policy, but the security establishment and the religious leadership have never been willing to entirely abandon the darker tools ¶ of statecraft. Iran continues to sponsor and train terrorist and insurgent groups throughout the Middle East. Controversy in Iran over ¶ the results of the 2009 Iranian presidential election have strengthened ¶ this latter, more fundamentalist faction, consolidating the power of ¶ the Revolutionary Guards and the position of the Supreme Leader, ¶ Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the final arbiter of Iranian policy. As long ¶ as these forces remain dominant, there is little prospect of overcoming ¶ the many differences that divide the United States and Iran, least of all ¶ that of Iran’s nuclear program.

#### Independent of Rowhani’s administration, providing security assurances solves proxy wars.

Leverett and Leverett 09 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow and director of the New America Foundation’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. The Grand Bargain. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.leverett.html)

First, while the United States and the Soviet Union were roughly matched in their military capabilities, the United States is and will remain vastly superior to Iran in every category of military power, conventional or otherwise. Almost thirty years after the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic is incapable of projecting significant conventional military force beyond its borders, and would be severely challenged to mount a conventional defense against U.S. invasion. Absent a broader strategic understanding with Washington, Tehran would continue to assume and act as if the ultimate objective of U.S. policy toward Iran were the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.¶ Second, in an atmosphere of ongoing uncertainty about America’s ultimate intentions toward the Islamic Republic, Iranian leaders would continue working to defend their core security interests in ways that are guaranteed to provoke the United States. Candid conversations with Iranian officials confirm what long observation of Iranian policies strongly suggests: lacking significant conventional military capabilities, Iran pursues an "asymmetric" national security strategy. This strategy includes the use of proxy actors—political, paramilitary, and terrorist—in neighboring states and elsewhere, to ensure that those states will not be used as anti-Iranian platforms, providing Tehran a measure of strategic depth it otherwise lacks. Iran’s asymmetric strategy also includes developing unconventional military capabilities (missiles, chemical weapons, and at least a nuclear weapons option). No U.S. administration, of either party, would be able to sustain détente with Iran as it pursues such policies.

#### Iran maintains its proxies to deter an American strike.

Frankel, 12 (Rafael D. Frankel was a Middle East correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor¶ and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University. Keeping Hamas and¶ Hezbollah Out of a War¶ with Iran. http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallFrankel.pdf)

One crucial element that the Obama or Romney and Netanyahu¶ administrations must consider is what kind of regional response a preventative¶ strike might provoke. Since the early 1980s, when the Iranian Revolutionary¶ Guard played a crucial role in creating Hezbollah to counter the Israeli presence¶ in Lebanon, Iran has built a powerful, self-proclaimed ‘‘Axis of Resistance’’¶ meant to promote Iranian interests around the Middle East. Hezbollah’s and later¶ Hamas’ gain in power, and Syria’s movement into the Iranian orbit after Bashar¶ Assad assumed control following his father’s death in 2000, all gave Iran a strong¶ deterrent to its chief enemies, the United States and Israel. Iran’s alliances nodoubt emboldened the regime to continue to¶ pursue nuclear technology, despite continual¶ international demands and increasingly harsh¶ sanctions since 2005.¶ For most of those seven years, the prevailing¶ assumption among Israeli and American¶ intelligence agencies has been that an Israeli¶ attack on Iran would trigger a coordinated¶ response from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas,¶ resulting in a full-blown regional war and mass¶ casualties in Israel as well as among American troops stationed in the Middle¶ East. (The response from Syria was less clear as Damascus has also long used¶ Hamas and Hezbollah as its proxies to hit Israel, rather than risk directly igniting¶ or involving itself in a war it was sure to lose.) This assumption was at the heart¶ of former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan’s analysis and his ultimately public¶ recommendation that Israel refrain from a military strike.2¶ But at the very moment when Tehran may be counting on its decades of¶ investment in the two Islamist militant groups to pay its largest dividends, the¶ upheaval in the Arab world has shuffled the deck. The current strife in Syria has¶ sent ripple effects from the Mediterranean Sea to the Strait of Hormuz, ¶ destabilizing the Axis of Resistance and nominally placing Hamas and¶ Hezbollah on different sides of the fissures that have blown open in the Arab¶ and Muslim worlds. This geopolitical reorientation presents an opportunity¶ for Israel and the United States to reclaim the upper hand in regional¶ deterrenceif they are willing to act quickly and modify their own regional¶ strategies.¶ Hezbollah’s Calculations¶ The extent to which non-state militant groups are susceptible to deterrence¶ strategies depends on five main factors: the group’s ideology; organizational¶ structure; elements of statehood (including political authority, territorial control,¶ and ties to a dependent population); external support; and inter-factional¶ competition. In the wake of the extraordinary changes in the Middle East over¶ the last year, an examination of Hamas and Hezbollah utilizing these factors¶ yields diverging results when it comes to a possible confrontation with Iran.¶ Hezbollah’s ideology and organizational structure are closely tied. It is a Shia¶ Islamist group which preaches allegiance above all others to the wali-al-faqih, or¶ the person who is both Shia jurist and Shia theologian. Currently, that person is¶ Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Hezbollah may be a Lebanese¶ party, as it always insists to its domestic audience, but its ideology compels it to‘‘unconditionally follow’’ the religious rulings of the wali-al-faqih, as Hezbollah¶ Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said in 1987.3¶ Among many other similar¶ statements, the Hezbollah chief added in 1997 that ‘‘the decision of peace and¶ war is in the hands of the wali-al-faqih.’’4¶ Though those statements are more than¶ a decade old, and political considerations have constrained Nasrallah’s proIran rhetoric, he has never contradicted those fundamental ideological¶ proclamations. Thus, if Khamenei orders Hezbollah to war, its cadres are¶ religiously bound to obey that directive

#### Proxy wars escalate to nuclear

Edelman 11 Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery Reply. Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90, Issue 2 The War Over Containing Iran EBSCO

A second important issue Adamsky raises is that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase the threat that Israel faced from Iranian proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, either because Tehran would provide increased assistance and encouragement to these groups or because they would become more reckless once they had a nuclear-armed patron. A premeditated attack by Iran against Israel is not the only scenario that could lead to a nuclear exchange, or even the most plausible one. Instead, a limited conflict in southern Lebanon or the Gaza Strip might spiral out of control. Iranian proxies could escalate their attacks against Israel, assuming that it would be deterred by its fear of a nuclear Iran. Israel could then defy their expectations and conduct major reprisals to demonstrate its resolve, prompting Iran to make nuclear threats in defense of its clients. The results would be unpredictable and potentially disastrous. Although debates over Iran's nuclear program often turn on the issue of Iranian "rationality," it is important to remember that there are many different paths to conflict, and the dynamics of Iranian-Israeli relations could be prone to miscalculation and escalation.

### Advantage 3: Iranian Proliferation

#### Iran is ready for a grand bargain that would end Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a security guarantee. Rouhani’s election establishes a window of opportunity for negotiations. Congressional threats of force are ineffective and undermine these negotiations.

Walt 13 (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. Congress to Iran: Drop Dead. http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/05/congress\_to\_iran\_drop\_dead)

About six weeks ago, I wrote a blog post about the election of new Iranian President Hasan Rouhani. I said it was precisely the sort of opportunity that Barack Obama's administration had been looking for back in 2009, but I was pretty sure the United States and Iran would find a way to squander it. Here's one paragraph from that post, dated June 17, 2013:¶ Back in Washington, any attempt at a serious rapprochement will also have to overcome relentless opposition not only from AIPAC and the other major groups in the Israel lobby, but also from Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states. Unfortunately, the U.S. political system doesn't reward patience, and Obama has not shown himself to be especially bold or courageous when it comes to foreign policy. Indeed, he has yet to take and stick to any foreign-policy position that requires him to buck powerful political forces at home. By the time his finger-in-the-wind approach to diplomacy has run its course, the opportunity for a new approach to Iran may be lost, thereby reinforcing the Iranian belief that the only thing the United States will accept is the end of the Islamic Republic, and strengthening the American conviction that even reformist Iranian leaders are beyond the pale.¶ It's a bit too soon to say, "I told you so," but so far my initial prediction is on track. Although Rouhani has appointed a series of moderate officials (many associated with former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani), softened Iranian rhetoric about Israel somewhat, and pledged to seek the path of "détente," we still have little idea how the Obama administration intends to respond. I'm not even sure who is taking the lead in figuring that out. In the meantime, hawks in the United States -- led by the always-helpful lobbyists at AIPAC -- are already doing everything they can to derail a possible rapprochement.¶ Unfortunately, they can always count on the help of a timorous and craven Congress, including a number of prominent "progressive" Democrats. Just last week, the House passed H.R. 850, an AIPAC-sponsored resolution tightening sanctions for the umpteenth time. The bill was called the "Nuclear Iran Prevention Act," but as Paul Pillar blogged on National Interest's website, a more honest title would be the "Nuclear Iran Promotion Act." The vote was 400-20 (with 378 co-sponsors!), and I'm sorry to say that my own representative, Joe Kennedy III, wasn't exactly a "profile in courage" on this issue. Of course, he had plenty of company.¶ And now 76 supine Senators are sending Obama one of those stern AIPAC-drafted letters warning him to keep up the pressure. Negotiating with Iran is OK, they concede, provided that any discussions are backed up by the constant threat of military force. Never mind that the United States has been threatening force and conducting various forms of covert action against Iran for years, and Iran hasn't said "uncle" yet. Never mind that Congress has repeatedly called for regime change in Tehran (now there's a confidence-building measure!), and Iran has responded by building more centrifuges. Never mind that Iran has said all along that it won't be bullied into concessions. Never mind the obvious fact that threats of military force are a pretty silly way to convince a much weaker country that it doesn't need some sort of deterrent. And please ignore the fact that America's key allies in Europe and even conservative publications like the Economist are urging the Obama administration to seize this and give Rouhani a serious chance. So is Bloomberg News.¶ I'm still fairly confident that Obama and the White House have little or no interest in another Middle East war. The State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence services aren't pushing for a war that could only delay but not eliminate Iran's nuclear potential either. And I'm 100 percent sure that the United States should engage Iran's new government seriously and patiently to see whether a deal can be struck. I even suspect that most of the senators and representatives who voted for or signed those silly but dangerous documents last week know all this too. But nobody ever went broke betting on the spinelessness of elected representatives in Congress, especially on just about anything concerning the Middle East.

#### Although Rouhani’s election created the possibility for successful negotiations, Iran is still pursuing a strategy of nuclearization.

Heinonen and Henderson, 13 (Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Rouhani and Iran's Nuclear Progress. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rouhani-and-irans-nuclear-progress)

Uranium enrichment. Iran continues to enrich uranium and increase the number of centrifuges installed, including around 18,000 of the IR-1 type centrifuge and 1,000 of the more efficient IR-2m type. Yet it will not need more than a small fraction of the enriched uranium it has already produced in the foreseeable future, let alone new uranium. Its sole nuclear power reactor uses low-enriched fuel supplied by Russia. Tehran persists in claiming that it needs some of the new enriched uranium it is producing to fuel a research reactor in the capital, despite refusing a past international offer to supply such fuel.¶ Worryingly, this research reactor requires 19.75 percent enriched uranium; Iran is currently producing 20 percent enriched fuel for it. In 20 percent fuel, the ratio of ordinary uranium-238 to its fissile isotope uranium-235 has already been processed from the 993:7 figure seen in natural uranium to 28:7, just short of the 1:7 needed for weapons-grade uranium. Iran continues to convert some of its 20 percent uranium into an oxide form, but most of this oxide (apart from a small amount that has been further processed into fuel plates) should be considered part of the enriched stockpile because it is comparatively easy to reconvert into centrifuge feedstock.¶ The increase in Iran's centrifuges and enriched uranium stockpile has opened the door for multiple breakout scenarios at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants, especially if there are other undeclared plants available. For the past three years, discussions of Iran's breakout potential centered on its steadily growing stockpile of 20 percent uranium, but the number of centrifuges is now so great that the arithmetic has changed: the government's huge stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium is now a crucial part of the calculation. As a result, a previous diplomatic proposal -- asking Iran to cap enrichment at 20 percent and ship most of that material abroad -- is now much less relevant in terms of curbing the risk of breakout.¶ The Arak heavy-water reactor. This research reactor will use natural-uranium (i.e., non-enriched) fuel rods, and it will be "moderated" using heavy water. Yet such reactors also produce plutonium, which could serve as an alternative nuclear explosive if separated from the spent fuel. Although Iranian officials told the IAEA that construction delays had pushed the reactor's start-up date to after the "first quarter of 2014," they subsequently indicated that "start-up" means "commissioning using nuclear material," according to a footnote in the latest report. This ambiguous phrasing could complicate any attempt to take military action against the facility if it became necessary, though another footnote indicates that Iranian officials told the IAEA three days before the report was published that they would give the agency notice "at least six months prior to the first introduction of nuclear material into the facility."¶ As soon as nuclear fuel is brought to a reactor site, the whole facility becomes politically "unbombable" because of IAEA resolutions regarding attacks on safeguarded nuclear plants. And once the fuel is inserted and the reactor has gone critical, any military strikes could cause huge radiation emissions. (Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor and its reported 2007 raid on Syria's reactor both took place before nuclear material was inserted.)¶ Possible military dimensions. The IAEA remains frustrated at Iran's lack of cooperation regarding "undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." Tehran has dismissed these concerns, which focus on the Parchin facility on the outskirts of the capital. Unidentified "member states" have told the agency that Iran conducted "hydrodynamic experiments" at Parchin, an indication that it may be trying to perfect the type of implosion device needed to make an atomic bomb using highly enriched uranium or plutonium. The government continues to block IAEA requests to visit the site and has bulldozed and asphalted the areas of concern, preventing the agency from taking potentially revealing samples even if it were allowed there.¶ IMPACT OF SYRIA DEBATE¶ Since the IAEA released its Iran report, Washington and other capitals have been absorbed in the debate over allegations that Syrian used chemical weapons on its own people. President Obama decided to delay a U.S. response until Congress has had time to debate the evidence; intentionally or not, this approach may well affect the Iranian nuclear issue.¶ Washington's current policy toward Iran is based on the belief that U.S. intelligence will provide timely warning if Tehran decides to make a nuclear bomb. The assumption is that Iran cannot break out and produce sufficient nuclear explosive for a weapon without the international community having time to spot what is going on, debate it, and counter it. Yet President Obama's delay on Syria creates doubt that he would behave in a sufficiently timely fashion to counter Iran.¶ Meanwhile, Israel has long indicated that it will make its own assessment of Iran's nuclear progress. Last September, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu presented his redline during a speech before the UN General Assembly: namely, Israel did not want Iran to acquire enough 20 percent enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb if the material was further processed. Yet when one factors in gaseous centrifuge feedstock and oxide that could be reconverted to feedstock, Iran is now past this line.¶ ROUHANI'S POSITION¶ Despite being inaugurated only weeks ago, President Rouhani should hit the ground running on the nuclear issue. He served as Iran's top nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005 and was also involved in crafting nuclear policies as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 1989 to 2005. His election was widely attributed to his campaign promises of bringing relief from international nuclear sanctions.¶ Since winning office, Rouhani has been assessing his strengths within Iran's power structure, which is dominated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He has also been crafting a new nuclear negotiating team. Although he has already publicly indicated that suspending the nuclear program is not an option, his administration's actual negotiating strategy has not yet crystallized. This strategy will be at least partly shaped by Tehran's assessment of President Obama's determination to act in Syria, a close ally of Iran. In other words, events in Damascus could be an important indicator of the direction and progress of nuclear negotiations with Iran.

#### Taking strikes off the table establishes a policy of nonintervention that makes successful negotiations possible.

Pillar ’13, Paul R. Pillar, 28 year CIA veteran, visiting prof at Georgetown for security studies and a member of the Center for Peace and Security Studies, International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013 “Correspondence: Nuclear Negotiations with Iran,” p. 179

Sebenius and Singh do acknowledge another difficulty: that Iran would perceive negotiations as merely a cover for a U.S. strategy of regime change. Oddly, they try to brush aside this problem by saying that the threat of military action “is not incompatible with negotiations, because it is a consequence of no deal rather than the actual U.S. objective” (p. 81). What matters for this purpose, however, is not the actual U.S. objective but the Iranian perception of it. American public discourse about Iran has already given Tehran ample reason to suspect that the objective is regime change. One of the most recent applications of U.S. military force in the Middle East— participation in the Western intervention to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya—probably has worsened the problem. The intervention ousted a regime that several years earlier had reached an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom not only to give up its nuclear and other unconventional weapons programs, but to eschew international terrorism. That experience exacerbated what may be the biggest challenge in negotiating a nuclear deal with Tehran: convincing the Iranians that the United States not only wants an agreement with the Islamic Republic but would abide by it for the long term rather than, as with Libya, seizing the first good opportunity to overthrow the regime. Further saber rattling directed at Iran would exacerbate that challenge, as well as stoke whatever interest the Iranians have in acquiring nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

#### A credible security assurance secures a grand bargain – only way to prevent Iran proliferation

Forbes, 13 (Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, lecturer at HEC Paris business school, journalist at Business Insider, business and economics columnist at Atlantico, A Completely Unrealistic Iran Grand Bargain Proposal. http://www.forbes.com/sites/pascalemmanuelgobry/2013/03/12/a-completely-unrealistic-iran-grand-bargain-proposal/)

It’s a testament to how dim the prospects of a sustainable solution to Iran‘s nuclear weapons program that we’ve forgotten what a good Endgame would look like: a Grand Bargain where Iran gets a wholesale lifting of sanctions and introduction into the “respectable” international community, access to civilian nuclear technology and acceptable security guarantees in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons program, submitting to international control thereof, and ending its sponsorship of terror groups.¶ It’s at least possible to imagine a sanctions/sabotage program so crippling that the Iranian regime would fear losing the support of its middle class and seek a better way. The example of Burma shows that it’s at least conceivable that an international sanctions regime can motivate a tyrannical regime to implement some degree of reform.¶ If we grant that the Iranian leadership would at least be theoretically amenable to such a Grand Bargain, it seems to me that the biggest holdup concerns the security guarantees. The Iranian leadership evidently believes (and, from their perspective, not without reason) that the United States wants not so much a nuclear-free Iran as regime change, and sees building nuclear capability as the only insurance policy against regime change.¶ This is why I think that the US Libya intervention was such a blunder of epic proportions. Remember that Ghadafi struck a deal with the international community to abandon its WMDs, renounce terror and indemnize terror victims in exchange for respectability for the regime. The international community then reneged on the deal and militarily effected regime change in Libya (regardless of the humanitarian reasons for doing so, that is what happened). Much more than throwing the Sahel into turmoil (though that headache will be with us for decades), this is the key reason why Libya was such a fantastic blunder.¶ Think about it from your average tinpot dictator’s perspective; the combined examples of Libya, Iraq and North Korea point to a very simple conclusion: if you have nukes, the US will mostly leave you alone; if you don’t, the US will jump at any pretext to bomb you into oblivion. Why US policymakers haven’t looked at the whole chessboard is mystifying to me.¶ Any Grand Bargain deal that would have any chance of getting the Iranian leadership onboard would therefore have to square that circle and provide iron-clad security guarantees to the Iranian regime. It can’t be a “cross your heart” promise from the US and Israel not to attack Iran, because that wouldn’t be credible. Iran would have to get an ironclad, credible security guarantee.

#### Commitment to end US interference in Iran’s internal affairs is a prerequisite to reset relations and open negotiations

Leverett and Leverett 08 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow and director of the New America Foundation’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. The Grand Bargain. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.leverett.html)

A U.S-Iranian grand bargain is a tall order. The commitments required of each side are not easy. They are, however, what each side needs to do to address the other’s core concerns. No other approach explicitly seeks to resolve the most significant differences between the United States and Iran; therefore, no other diplomatic approach will actually resolve those differences.¶ Based on numerous conversations with senior current and former Iranian officials—including, most recently, with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in July—we strongly believe that there is a critical mass of interest in and support for genuine strategic rapprochement with the United States. However, our conversations with Iranian officials also lead us to believe that a new U.S. administration interested in a more positive relationship with Iran will have to demonstrate that, under the right conditions, it is seriously willing to accept and live with the Islamic Republic. In this regard, the advocates of an incremental approach to engaging Iran have a point—a certain level of bilateral confidence needs to be restored.¶ One way for a new U.S. administration to get started with a redefinition of America’s Iran policy would be to affirm the continuing validity of the Algiers Accord, the 1981 agreement that ended the crisis prompted by Iran’s seizure of U.S. diplomats and other official personnel in Tehran as hostages following the Iranian revolution. The Algiers Accord includes a provision committing the United States not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. Every subsequent U.S. administration has in some way affirmed its validity—except for the current Bush administration, which has publicly characterized the agreement as a contract signed "under duress" and hence not valid.¶ Affirmation of the Algiers Accord’s validity by a new U.S. administration would send a powerful signal to Tehran about the potential for substantial improvement in U.S.-Iranian ties. We believe that, in an atmosphere of enhanced confidence, it would be possible for U.S. and Iranian representatives to explore and set down a strategic framework for the reordering of U.S.-Iranian relations. The next U.S. administration will not have a more important foreign policy task.

#### Security concerns are the primary motivator of Iranian nuclearization – the plan causes denuclearization regardless of the success or failure of negotiations.

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Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran. Orbis 52.4)

As the Bush administration began the verbal escalation to war, Iran¶ opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The relative ease with which the U.S.¶ military overthrew Saddam Hussein and occupied Baghdad in three weeks—¶ something Iran could not do in eight years—seems to have caused great¶ consternation in Tehran. After the Iraq invasion, then-Iranian President¶ Mohammad Khatami said, ‘‘They tell us that Syria is the next target, but¶ according to our reports, Iran could well follow.’’¶ 14¶ In April 2003, Iran found¶ itself essentially surrounded by U.S. forces commanded by a U.S. administra-¶ tion suggesting that Iran could be next. To Iran’s south, a powerful U.S. naval¶ presence patrolled the Persian Gulf, augmented by an impressive string of U.S.¶ military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirate¶ (UAE). To Iran’s west, over 100,000 American troops guarded Iraq. To Iran’s¶ North, U.S. troops were present in Azerbaijan and the central Asian republics.¶ 15¶ To Iran’s east, significant numbers of U.S. and other NATO troops patrolled¶ Afghanistan.¶ This sense of encirclement and strategic vulnerability prompted Iran¶ to seek a ‘‘grand bargain’’ with the United States in May 2003, only three¶ weeks after the Iraq invasion. This offer, apparently approved by the¶ Supreme Leader and the result of intense internal debate in Tehran, repre-¶ sented a major shift in Iranian policy, offering to address every major U.S.¶ objection to Iranian foreign policy.¶ 16¶ When the United States rejected the¶ offer out-of-hand, it confirmed the arguments of the hardliners and undercut¶ those of the moderates, convincing many Iranians that the United States had¶ a greater interest in regime change than in policy change. This rejection of¶ the Iranian negotiating proposal may also have left some Iranians believing¶ that the United States opposed Iranian power and regional influence, not just¶ its policies. Such an Iranian perception lead many in Tehran to conclude¶ that they are unable to negotiate with the United States, motivating their¶ leadership to push ahead with policies they might otherwise view as¶ negotiable.¶ Some leading observers dismiss the security motivation for the Iranian¶ nuclear weapons program, citing examples of confident and dismissive Iranian¶ rhetoric. In a comment, before the 2007 NIE release, for instance, Brigadier¶ General Mohammad-Ali Jafari, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,¶ downplayed a U.S. attack as ‘‘highly unlikely.’’ If the United States were to mount an attack on Iran, Jafari said Iran has ‘‘the proper means to nullify its¶ aggression.’’¶ 17¶ U.S. analysts and decision makers should not consider such¶ comments evidence that security from a U.S. attack does not represent an¶ important motivation for the Iranian nuclear program. High level Iranian¶ officials put forward a brave face in public, but are fearful in private. In¶ public, Iranian officials issue the standard lines similar to those of Jafari; in¶ private, these individuals quietly and anxiously ask questions such as, ‘‘Do you¶ think the United States will attack?’’ These Iranian responses were echoed in¶ multiple interviews with Arab Government leaders and scholars. There is a¶ genuine concern in the region—among both Arabs and Iranians—that the¶ United States will attack Iran. While the December 2007 Iran NIE undoubtedly¶ diminished some of these fears, subsequent statements by Khamenei suggest¶ Iranian fears of a U.S. attack are reduced but still palpable. For example, in¶ January 2008, Khamenei argued that the time was not right for establishing¶ relations with the United States by underscoring that relations between¶ Washington and Baghdad did not preclude the United States from attacking¶ Iraq.¶ 18¶ Some argue that Iranian fears of a U.S. attack will compel the Iranians¶ to negotiate. However, my interviews suggest these Iranian fears are having¶ the opposite effect. Fears of a U.S. attack validate a long-running Iranian belief¶ that Iran needs nuclear weapons to deter a U.S. attack. Consequently, a self-¶ reinforcing interplay has developed in which Iranian nuclear progress invites¶ escalating U.S. threats, and these threats, in turn, encourage Iran to push ahead¶ with its nuclear program. Until this cycle is broken, the likelihood of war or a¶ nuclear-armed Iran will grow.

#### Iran proliferation causes regional proliferation.

Brookes, 10 (Peter, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow, is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, Congressional staffer, CIA and State Department officer, and navy veteran. The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade. Journal of International Security Affaris. Fall Winter 2010. 19. http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/brookes.php)

In just the last four years, no fewer than fourteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa have announced their intention to pursue civilian nuclear programs–programs which, irrespective of their stated purpose, many believe are a hedge against the possibility of a nuclear Iran.¶ Possible Atomic Aspirants¶ Syria¶ United Arab Emirates¶ Jordan¶ Egypt¶ Yemen¶ Saudi Arabia¶ Bahrain¶ Kuwait¶ Oman¶ Qatar¶ Algeria¶ Libya¶ Morocco¶ Tunisia¶ Of course, it is possible that the intentions of these states are honest ones, spurred on by domestic energy needs. Not all countries are blessed with abundant natural resources, and consequently could be seeking an efficient and durable source of energy. There are even those that may be attempting to diversify their energy sources beyond simply oil and natural gas, or seeking to free up their energy reserves for profitable international export instead of costly domestic consumption. In addition, due to increasing concerns about climate change, some have come to see nuclear power, once considered an expensive investment, as an attractive alternative to fossil fuels, due to its reduced emissions and potential cost efficiency.¶ In some cases, it could also be an issue of national pride–a matter of keeping up with the nuclear Jones-es; or even an effort to demonstrate to your neighbors and the world the scientific and technical achievement involved in developing, building, and safely operating a peaceful, civilian nuclear power industry.¶ Of course, developing an indigenous nuclear industry is a significant undertaking. A nuclear reactor can take a decade and three to ten billion dollars to build. Even more time and money is required if a full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment capacity, is desired.¶ But such work is transformative. The development of scientific and technical capabilities for a civilian nuclear power program is instrumental to the subsequent building of the bomb. Even if it remains in compliance with the tenets of the NPT, a state can go quite a long way toward developing a nuclear program with a potential military dimension. Having the necessary nuclear infrastructure, especially that which would provide for a full nuclear fuel cycle, would allow concerned states to offset an Iranian nuclear breakout by possessing the theoretical potential to create a nuclear arsenal themselves.¶ Indeed, some analysts see the construction of nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia as symbolic of Riyadh’s dread over Iran’s nuclear activities, and as a move which will surely deepen tensions between the cross-Gulf rivals. In fact, many are convinced that the development of an Iranian Shi’a bomb will inevitably be matched by a Saudi Sunni bomb. It has long been rumored the Saudis have a deal with the Pakistanis for access to its nuclear inventory, or the stationing of Islamabad’s nuclear-capable missiles in the Kingdom in the likelihood of a change in Iran’s nuclear status.5¶ Of course, while this is possible, it does pose a number of political and strategic dilemmas for Pakistan, such as the health of its relationship with neighboring Iran, and a potential dilution of its nuclear deterrent against rival India. Egypt, the long-standing leader of the Arab world, operates two research reactors, has significant scientific and technical capabilities on nuclear matters, and is interested in nuclear power. Of course, developing a nuclear program with a military dimension is a possibility; however, doing so would surely hurt its ties with United States, could increase tensions with neighboring Israel, and drain less-than-plentiful government coffers.¶ Other countries that have expressed an interest in nuclear power, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, are likely doing so because of more local concerns. None of them have significant indigenous energy sources, and as a result are focused on the development of alternative energy sources. But that isn’t true for all of the states that have launched atomic plans. Kuwait and Qatar have significant holdings of oil and natural gas, which makes their respective decisions to pursue a nuclear program difficult to explain in a context other than that of a hedge against Iran’s growing capabilities.¶ And in some cases, these nuclear dreams have started to become reality. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country with the fifth largest proven oil reserves in the Middle East, last year completed a “123” agreement with the United States, paving the way for heightened nuclear cooperation and technology transfer between Washington and Abu Dhabi. During the Bush administration, Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also signed Memoranda of Understanding related to nuclear cooperation that–if pursued by the Obama White House–could lead to additional agreements such as the one struck with the UAE.¶ Turkey, another major regional power and NATO member, is also considering its nuclear options. Since taking power in 2002, the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has plotted a friendlier course toward neighboring Iran, a country Ankara historically has seen as a competitor. But despite the current, warm ties, Ankara may eventually come to see Tehran as a regional rival that could “undercut Turkey’s desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west,” according to a 2008 Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.6 Indeed, a shift in Ankara’s sentiments toward Tehran could incite interest in a nuclear program with a military dimension. And the current strains in Turkey’s existing relationships with the United States and Europe may make such a decision less taboo than in the past.¶ Then there is Syria. Damascus was caught with its hands in the nuclear cookie jar when Israel destroyed its undeclared nuclear facility at al-Kibar back in 2007. That plant–likely a reactor capable of producing fissile material–was being built with North Korean assistance.7 Of course, Syria’s nuclear activities are not focused on checking Iran; indeed, given the enduring partnership between the two countries, Syria might be receiving nuclear assistance from Iran. Rather, Syria’s strategic efforts are directed toward Israel.¶ Regional states are also banding together in pursuit of nuclear status. Most directly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)–consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Qatar–is now said to be contemplating a joint nuclear program that would pool resources and share electrical power among member states.8 And although some of the members’ interest in nuclear issues is stronger than others, as evidenced by the existence of separate indigenous programs, many analysts believe this joint effort was sparked specifically in response to Iran’s nuclear activities.9.

#### **Mid east proliferation causes nuclear war.**

Heisbourg ’12, [Francois Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, prof at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, July 2012, “How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?”, <http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/file/oving%20Beyond%20Pretense%20web%20version.pdf#page=182>]

Human societies tend to **lack the imagination to think through**, and to act upon, what have become known as “**black swan” events** 26 : **That which has never occurred** (or which has happened very rarely and in a wholly different context) **is deemed not to be in the field of reality,** and to which must be added eventualities that are denied because their consequences are too awful to contemplate. The extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11) bear testimony to this hardwired trait of our species. This would not normally warrant mention as a factor of growing salience if not for the recession into time of the original and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945. Nonuse of nuclear weapons may soon be taken for granted rather than being an absolute taboo. Recent writing on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs 27 may contribute to such a trend, in the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent, and often compelling, historical accounts of the surrender of the Japanese Empire that downplay the role of the atomic bombings in comparison to early research can produce a similar effect, even if that may not have been the intention. 28 However desirable it has been, the end of atmospheric nuclear testing 29 has removed for more than three decades the periodic reminders that such monstrous detonations made as to the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons. There is a real and growing risk that we forget what was obvious to those who first described in 1941 the unique nature of yet-to-be produced nuclear weapons. 30 The risk is no doubt higher in those states for which the history of World War II has little relevance and that have not had the will or the opportunity to wrestle at the time or ex post facto with the moral and strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. Unsustainable strains are possibly the single most compelling feature of contemporary proliferation. Examples include tight geographical constraints–with, for instance, New Delhi and Islamabad, located within 300 miles of each other; nuclear multi-polarity against the backdrop of multiple, crisscrossing sources of tension in the Middle East, as opposed to the relative simplicity of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation; the existence of doctrines, such as India’s “cold start,” and force postures, such as Pakistan’s broadening array of battle- field nukes, that rest on the expectation of early use; and the role of non-state actors as aggravating or triggering factors when they are perceived as operating with the connivance of an antagonist state (in the past, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914; and in the future, Hezbollah operatives launching rockets with effect against Israel or Lashkar-e-Taiba commandos doing a “Bombay” redux in India?). Individually or in combination, **these factors test crisis management capabilities** more severely than anything seen during the Cold War with the partial exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even the overabundant battlefield nuclear arsenals in Cold War Central Europe, with their iffy weapons’ safety and security arrangements, were less of a challenge: The U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so deployed were not putting U.S. and Soviet territory and capitals at risk. It may be argued that these risk factors are known to potential protagonists and that they therefore will be led to avoid the sort of nuclear brinksmanship that characterized U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War in crises such as the Korean War, Berlin, Cuba or the Yom Kippur War. Unfortunately, the multiple nuclear crises between India and Pakistan demonstrate no such prudence, rather the contrary. And were such restraint to feed into nuclear policy and crisis planning, along the lines of apparently greater U.S. and Soviet nuclear caution from the mid-seventies onwards, the fact would remain that initial intent rarely resists the strains of a complex, multiactor confrontation between inherently distrustful antagonists. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that during the 1980s there was real and acute fear in Soviet ruling circles that the West was preparing an out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, a fear which in turn fed into Soviet policies and dispositions. 31 The Cold War was a set of crises and misunderstandings that came within a whisker of a nuclear holocaust. India and Pakistan’s nuclear standoff is deeply unstable, not least as a result of the interaction with non-state actors. A multipolar nuclear Middle East would make the Cuban Missile Crisis look easy in comparison.

Great conflicts tend to occur when one or several of the antagonists views the status quo as sufficiently undesirable and/or unsustainable to prompt forceful pro-action. Notwithstanding widespread perceptions to the contrary, this was not the case of the USSR and the United States during the Cold War. The U.S. had chosen a policy of containment, as opposed to roll-back, of the Soviet Empire within the limits established as a result of World War II. The Soviet Union seized targets of opportunity outside of its 1945 area of control but avoided direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Messianic language from the USSR on the global victory of communism or from the U.S. about the end of the Evil Empire did not take precedence over the prime Soviet concern of preserving the Warsaw Pact and the U.S. pursuit of containment, or, no less crucially, their mutual con¿- dence that they could achieve these aims without going to war with each other No such generalization can be made about the Middle East, a region in which the very existence of a key state, Israel, is challenged, while other states have gone to war with each other (e.g. Iran-Iraq War, and the Gulf War of 1990-1991), or are riven by deep internal conflicts. Actors such as Hezbollah, with its organic and functional links with Islamic Iran and Alawite Syria, add to the complexities and dangers. Extreme views and actions vis à vis the strategic status quo are widely prevalent. Although the India-Pakistan relationship corresponds to something akin to the U.S.-Soviet “adversarial partnership,” that does not apply to radical non-state actors prevalent in Pakistan with more or less tight links to that country’s military intelligence services (ISI, Inter-Services Intelligence). The potential for danger is compounded by the variety of such groups: the Pashtu-related Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Kashmiri-related groups, and Jihadi militants from the core provinces of Punjab and Sind. Their common characteristics are extreme radicalism, high levels of operational pro¿ciency, and shared enmity of India. Their potential for triggering a conflict between the two countries is substantial, above and beyond the intentions of government of¿cials. sum, some seventy years after the launch of the Manhattan Project, there is every reason to upgrade and reinforce nonproliferation policies if nuclear use is to be avoided during the coming decades. Some markers to that end will be laid in our concluding section. What Is to Be Done? In light of the preceding analysis, the most obvious short run implication is the absolute need to secure a satisfactory conclusion of the Iranian file. Anything that feeds the perception of less-than full compliance of Iran with the strictest international safeguards or, worse, that creates the impression that recessed deterrence is in place, would lead to further proliferation in the Middle East and beyond. What happens to the Iranian nuclear program will be essential to the future of proliferation and nonproliferation prospects.

#### Iran proliferation is uniquely destabilizing -- multiple actors.

Joshi, 13 (Shashank, Research Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute. IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR IRAN. Whitehall Papers¶ Volume 79, Issue 1, 2012¶ Special Issue: The Permanent Crisis: Iran's Nuclear Trajectory.)

 First, nuclear deterrence depends on attribution. Only by accurately attributing a nuclear strike to a single, deterrable entity can we hope to make our deterrent threats credible. When there are multiple nuclear entities, such a process of attribution grows more difficult. According to a recently declassified intelligence assessment from 1984, ‘the existence of the separately controlled US, British, and French strategic nuclear strike systems increase[d] Moscow's uncertainty about nuclear escalation’.89 This was not only because it was unclear which Soviet adversaries might participate in a retaliatory strike, but also because it would not always be clear which ones might have launched a first strike – particularly from submarines (it is notable that the US, too, had doubts over its ability to make such distinctions).90¶ The existence of separately controlled US and Israeli nuclear weapons therefore presents a challenge for Iran. Separately controlled Iranian and, say, Saudi Arabian nuclear weapons would generate similar problems for the US, Israel and Europe – and perhaps even Pakistan and India. The problem would worsen if India were in the future to deploy nuclear-armed submarines in the region.¶ This problem is especially acute for three further reasons: first, the proximity of these states and the correspondingly short missile and, to a lesser extent, aircraft flight times;91 second, the lack of sophisticated early-warning systems that could compensate for such short flight times; and third, the possession and deployment of dual-use ballistic missiles – that is, those capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Each of these problems is a feature of the scenario in South Asia, where missile flight times are a matter of a few minutes.92 However, they assume greater prominence in a multipolar setting in which identifying the source of a nuclear strike may not be simple. Calculating Sufficiency and Vulnerability¶ Second, multipolar nuclear relationships can complicate a state's calculations about the survivability and sufficiency of its own nuclear arsenal. States might resort to worst-case calculations and develop arsenals based on the aggregate nuclear capability of any plausible coalition of nuclear states ranged against them. Moreover, efforts to configure a deterrent to a number of different states is difficult, and increases the probability of error. As Christopher Ford observes, ‘the more players there are, the more chances there will be for the system to break down, through accident, error, miscalculation, miscommunication, or some other pathology’.93

### Advantage 4: Israeli Strikes

#### An Israeli attack on Iran is coming by the end of the year.

Serwer ’13, (Daniel Serwer is a professor at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the Middle East Institute. Will this be the year that Israel goes to war with Iran?, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/03/will-this-be-the-year-that-israel-goes-to-war-with-iran/)

Israel did not bomb Iran last year. Why should it happen this year? Because it did not happen last year. The Iranians are proceeding apace with their nuclear program. The Americans are determined to stop them. Sanctions are biting, but the diplomatic process produced nothing visible in 2012. Knowledgeable observers believe there is no “zone of possible agreement.” Both the United States and Iran may believe that they have viable alternatives to a negotiated agreement. While Israel has signaled that its “red line” (no nuclear weapons capability) won’t be reached before mid-2013, it seems likely it will be reached before the end of the year. President Barack Obama has refused to specify his red line, but he has made it amply clear that he prefers intensified sanctions and eventual military action to a nuclear Iran that needs to be contained and provides incentives for other countries to go nuclear. If and when he takes the decision for war, there is little doubt about a bipartisan majority in Congress supporting the effort. Still, attitudes on the subject have shifted in the past year. Some have concluded that the consequences of war with Iran are so bad and uncertain that every attempt should be made to avoid it. Most have also concluded that Israel could do relatively little damage to the Iranian nuclear program. It might even be counter-productive, as the Iranians would redouble their efforts. The military responsibility lies with President Obama. There has been a recent flurry of hope that the Iranians are preparing to come clean on their past nuclear weapons activities, which could be a prelude to progress on the diplomatic track. The issue is allegedly one of timing and sequencing: the Iranians want sanctions relief up front. The Americans want to see enrichment to 20 percent stopped and the enriched material shipped out of the country, as well as a full accounting for past activities, before considering any but minor sanctions relief. Some would also like to see dismantling of the hardened enrichment plant at Fordow. But the fundamental issue is whether Iran is prepared to give up its nuclear weapon ambitions, or whether it is determined to forge ahead. Iranian behavior in the last year suggests no let-up in the country’s regional (and wider) pretensions. It has supported Bashar al-Assad to the hilt in Syria, armed Hamas for its confrontation with Israel, continued to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, assisted North Korea’s ballistic missile satellite launch and made trouble in Iraq. Why would it not also seek nuclear weapons, which would make it immune (or so many in the Iranian regime seem to think) from American regime change efforts? There are not a lot of good answers to that question, except this: a reasonable man in Tehran might well conclude that Iranian national security is better served by stopping the nuclear program before it actually produces weapons. Once Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the United States will target it. Israel will launch on warning. This hair trigger situation will be more perilous than the nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, when each side assumed the rationality of the other and communications between them were good. Neither Iran nor Israel assumes the other will behave rationally, making deterrence unreliable, and communications between the two governments are virtually non-existent. The distance between Tehran and Jerusalem makes quick decisions necessary. Two big political uncertainties loom over the nuclear issue next year: Iran is scheduled to hold presidential elections in June and the Supreme Leader is thought to be ill. The identity of neither Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s successor as president nor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s as Supreme Leader is clear. While it may be too much to hope that the successors will be any better than the incumbents, any transition introduces diplomatic delays and uncertainties, even though the nuclear program should be expected to proceed. But will the transitions be orderly, or will the Greens who roiled Iran’s political sphere last time around revive? Iran’s regime has deep roots in revolutionary fervor, which has made it more resilient than Egypt’s. But that does not mean it will last forever. There is still a slim hope for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The prospects are not good, but the consequences of failure are dreadful. The Obama Administration has managed to avoid overt commentary on Iran in the last couple of months. Candidate Romney was cautious during the campaign. The door is clearly open to the Iranians, if they want to come in from the cold of sanctions and isolation. If they fail to do so, and continue to buck the international community, war in 2013 is likely. Not because it is a good solution, but because President Obama might regard it as the only solution, albeit a temporary and highly uncertain one.

#### Perception of U.S. support is a key factor in Israel’s decision to strike

NYT ’12, (Will Israel Attack Iran?, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/magazine/will-israel-attack-iran.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)

Netanyahu and Barak have both repeatedly stressed that a decision has not yet been made and that a deadline for making one has not been set. As we spoke, however, Barak laid out three categories of questions, which he characterized as “Israel’s ability to act,” “international legitimacy” and “necessity,” all of which require affirmative responses before a decision is made to attack: 1. Does Israel have the ability to cause severe damage to Iran’s nuclear sites and bring about a major delay in the Iranian nuclear project? And can the military and the Israeli people withstand the inevitable counterattack? 2. Does Israel have overt or tacit support, particularly from America, for carrying out an attack? 3. Have all other possibilities for the containment of Iran’s nuclear threat been exhausted, bringing Israel to the point of last resort? If so, is this the last opportunity for an attack? For the first time since the Iranian nuclear threat emerged in the mid-1990s, at least some of Israel’s most powerful leaders believe that the response to all of these questions is yes. At various points in our conversation, Barak underscored that if Israel or the rest of the world waits too long, the moment will arrive — sometime in the coming year, he says — beyond which it will no longer be possible to act. “It will not be possible to use any surgical means to bring about a significant delay,” he said. “Not for us, not for Europe and not for the United States. After that, the question will remain very important, but it will become purely theoretical and pass out of our hands — the statesmen and decision-makers — and into yours — the journalists and historians.” Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s vice prime minister and minister of strategic affairs, is the third leg in the triangle supporting a very aggressive stance toward Iran. When I spoke with him on the afternoon of Jan. 18, the same day that Barak stated publicly that any decision to strike pre-emptively was “very far off,” Ya’alon, while reiterating that an attack was the last option, took pains to emphasize Israel’s resolve. “Our policy is that in one way or another, Iran’s nuclear program must be stopped,” he said. “It is a matter of months before the Iranians will be able to attain military nuclear capability. Israel should not have to lead the struggle against Iran. It is up to the international community to confront the regime, but nevertheless Israel has to be ready to defend itself. And we are prepared to defend ourselves,” Ya’alon went on, “in any way and anywhere that we see fit.”

#### Strong US support is a prerequisite to an Israeli strike—leaders value ties very highly.

Zanotti et al 12 (Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. CRS. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42443.pdf)

Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support, particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S. policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress regarding an attack. Not surprisingly, Israeli leaders are extremely sensitive to U.S. views for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to: • Strong U.S.-Israel relations dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize the provisional Jewish government as the de facto government of Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • Robust ongoing military and security cooperation, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • Trade ties and important bilateral economic and scientific cooperation.141 Israeli leaders’ perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145

#### Israeli strike on Iran triggers world war III.

Reuveny, 10 (Rafael Reuveny is a professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. Con: Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression, [http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf](http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/%22%20%5Cl%20%22sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf))

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ ¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should statutorily preclude the use of United States Armed Forces in military conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran that is initiated by the United States or others.

### Solvency

#### **A demonstration of congressional support is a prerequisite to negotiations – Iran doesn’t think Obama can deliver on his promises.**

Alterman, 13 (Jon B. Alterman holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and directs the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Al-monitor. US-Iran Nuclear Deal Hinges On Syria Vote. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/us-iran-nuclear-deal-hinges-on-syria-vote.html)

To start, it is worth noting the extent to which foreign governments are sophisticated consumers of American political information. Decades of international cable news broadcasts and newspaper websites have brought intimate details of US politics into global capitals. Foreign ministers in the Middle East and beyond are US news junkies, and they seem increasingly distrustful of their embassies. For key US allies, the foreign minister often seems to have made him- or herself the US desk officer. Most can have a quite sophisticated discussion on congressional politics and their impact on US foreign relations. The Iranian government is no exception. While former president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was emotional and shrill in his opposition to the United States, there remains in Iran a cadre of Western-trained technocrats, fluent in English and nuanced in their understanding of the world. President Hassan Rouhani has surrounded himself with such people, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has charged them with investigating a different relationship between Iran and the United States. As they do so, they cannot help but be aware that on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration, the US House of Representatives voted 400–20 to impose stiff additional sanctions on Iran. The House saw Rouhani’s electoral victory as a call for toughness, not potential compromise. If Iran were to make concessions in a negotiation with the United States, they would surely seek sanctions relief and other actions requiring congressional approval. To make such concessions to Obama, they would need some confidence that he can deliver. A president who cannot bring around a hostile Congress is not a president with whom it is worth negotiating.

#### The United States should provide a security assurance to Iran.

Leverett and Leverett 08 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow and director of the New America Foundation’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. The Grand Bargain. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.leverett.html)

From an Iranian perspective, one of the essential found-ations for a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain is a clear explanation of the American position toward the Islamic Republic. The United States would need to clarify that it is not seeking a change in the nature of the Iranian regime, but rather changes in Iranian policies that Washington considers problematic. The United States would also need to emphasize its commitment to the ongoing improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations.¶ In this regard, Iran would need the following assurances from the United States:¶ 1. As part of a strategic understanding addressing all issues of concern to both sides, the United States would commit not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the essential substance of a U.S. security assurance.

#### Congress can effectively curtail the presidents war powers.

Howell and Pevehouse, 07 (Willam G. Howell, Prof @ U Chicago, Jon C. Pevehouse, Prof @ U Chicago. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Xii-xiii)

In several ways' this book advances our understanding of the domestic politics of war. For starters, it considers many more manifestations of congressional influence than previous scholars have recognized. Inter- branch struggles do not typically resemble duels wherein the president and Congress mark ten strides and fire, leaving the victor rr".rJing and the vanquished bleeding in the dirt. In politics, both often end up ,nlounded, just as both can claim a measure of success. The trick, \*e think, is to ac- count for a fuller range of possible outcomes when two branches of gov- ernment, with opposing objectives and differenr resources at theirlis- posal, square off against one another. This book does more rhan identify instances when Congress, with one carefully fired shot, fells a president. It documents those occasions when it maims him, whe n jt grurrs a rimb, and- perhaps most importantly, when a president walks away from a fight he feared losing. If we hold as our standard of proof the obliteration of white House military planning, we overlook the copious ways in which Congress influences presidential decisions about how often to use force, which kinds of foreign crises warrant actions and which kinds do not, the timing of a deployment, and its scope. The counterfactual to a world of congressional irrelevance does ,not require the elimination of the largest and most vital deploymenrs from the historical record. Instead, the correct counterfactual may be a delayed deployment in some in\_ stances' a shorter one in others, or the ,.urrigrr-.nt oi national priorities in others still. This book also pays careful attention to the mechanisms by which Congress manages to influence presidential decision making on the use of force' Sometimes Congress intervenes directly, establishiig reporting re- quirements, setting budgets, holding hearings, or passing l"\*, that re\_ strict the scope or duration of military deployment in these in\_ stances, the connection between the action, tirut-corrg..r, takes and the decisions that presidents make are more easily discerned. In other rn stances, though, congressional influence follows a more circuitous route When members of Congress proclaim their reluctance to use force abroad they may encourage U.S. adversaries who then fight longer and hardel jusr as they may influence the public's willingness to back their president in either case, the president may have cause to scale back or even aban don a military venture, even though Congress has not passed a single bil or resolution that formally curtails his war powers. He does so, though not so much because Congress itself matters, but rather because the ac tions that members take set in motion forces that materially impact hi capacity to wage war successfully. Additionally, this book assembles and analyzes a tremendous amoun of data. Some datasets allow us to systematically examine Congress' influence over the frequency with which presidents deploy troops abroad others allow us to examine whether Congress affects the probability tha presidents respond militarily to different kinds of foreign crises. We introduce another dataset-the only of its kind-that allows us to trac congressional deliberation about an impending military ventured througl a wide variety of local and national print and television media outlets; we then compile other observational and experimental public opinion data that allow us to examine whether congressional influence over the media extends to influence over public's willingness to support a war. 'We knov of no other book on the domestic politics of war that compiles so man' or so diverse a set of original databases.

Congress has effectively enforced specific statutory restrictions – examples prove

Fisher 97 Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress

U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy Spring, 1997 3 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 107

Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse \*

II. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS

Through its prerogative to authorize programs and appropriate funds, Congress can define and limit presidential power by withholding all or part of an appropriation. n20 It may attach "riders" to appropriations measures to proscribe specific actions. n21 It has become the custom in Congress to admit certain "limitations" in an appropriations bill. Since Congress, under its rules, may decline to appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, "so it may by limitation prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder of it." n22

It is sometimes argued that the power of the purse is ineffective in [\*111] restraining presidential wars. Senator Jacob Javits said that Congress "can hardly cut off appropriations when 500,000 American troops are fighting for their lives, as in Vietnam." n23 The short answer is that Congress can and has used the power of the purse to restrict presiden tial war power. If members of Congress are worried about American troops fighting for their lives in a futile war that is unrelated to American national interests, those lives are not protected by voting for continued funding. The proper and sensible action is to terminate appropriations and bring the troops home. Members need to make that case to their con-stituents. It can be done.

Congress used the power of the purse to end the war in Vietnam. n24 In 1976, by adopting the Clark amendment, n25 Congress prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from operating in Angola other than to gather intelligence. Legislation also prohibited the CIA from conducting military or paramilitary operations in Angola and denied any appropriated funds to finance directly or indirectly any type of military assistance to Angola. n26

Beginning in 1982, Congress drafted increasingly tighter language to prohibit the use of appropriated funds to assist the Contras in Nicaragua. In 1986, Congress placed language in an appropriations bill to restrict the President's military role in Central America by stipulating that U.S. personnel "may not provide any training or other service, or otherwise participate directly or indirectly in the provision of any assistance, to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance pursuant to this title within those areas of Honduras and Costa Rica which are within 20 miles of the border with Nicaragua." n27 The statute defined U.S. personnel to mean "any member of the United States Armed Forces who is on active duty or is performing inactive duty training" and any employee of any department, agency, or other component of the executive branch. n28 The clear purpose was to prevent military activities in Honduras and Costa Rica from spilling over into Nicaragua. The Reagan Administration never offered any constitutional objections to this statutory restriction.

Statutory restrictions were again used in 1991, when Congress authorized President Bush to use military force against Iraq. The statutory authority was explicitly linked to UN Security Council Resolution 678, which was adopted to expel Iraq from Kuwait. n29 Thus, the legislation did not [\*112] authorize any wider action, such as using U.S. forces to invade and occupy Iraq, perhaps by reaching as far into the country as Baghdad. Two years later, Congress established a deadline for U.S. troops to leave Somalia. No funds could be used for military action after March 31, 1994, unless the President requested an extension from Congress and received express statutory authority. n30 From 1993 to 1995, Congress considered, but discarded, language to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for the invasion of Haiti and the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia. n31