## XO CP

#### Perm do both

#### Doesn’t solve Iran – the president alone isn’t credible. Iran needs to believe that the grand bargain would be approved in congress. That’s Alterman.

#### Doesn’t solve Israel – the strongest support for Iran strikes is coming from congress.

Times of Israel, 13 (Senate backs Israel in event of strike on Iran nuclear weapon program. http://www.timesofisrael.com/senate-votes-to-back-possible-strike-on-iran-nuclear-weapon-program/)

NEW YORK — In a show of force, the United States Senate on Wednesday unanimously passed a resolution urging an uncompromising US stance against Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, calling for Washington’s support should Israel strike the program.¶ “If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with United States law and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence,” the resolution reads.¶ It also calls for the US to take “such action as may be necessary” to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability.¶ While senators are careful in their calls for US military intervention, the resolution, which passed 99-0, is seen as the most direct expression yet heard from Washington reflecting support for a potential Israeli strike.¶ “I cannot emphasize enough my strong concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and the extraordinary threat it poses to the United States, to Israel and to the entire international community,” Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ), the powerful chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a speech on the Senate floor before Wednesday’s vote.¶ Diploma tic efforts “have failed to achieve their central objective — getting Iran to make concessions on the nuclear program,” Menendez said. “It is clear to me that we cannot allow the Iranians to continue to drag their feet by talking while all the while they grow their nuclear program.”¶ Menendez cited an International Atomic Energy Agency report released earlier Wednesday which said Iran was speeding up its enrichment work at Natanz.¶ “We cannot allow Iran to buy more time talking — even as the centrifuges keep spinning. There is no doubt, there has never been a doubt – not in my mind – that a nuclear-armed Iran is not an option,” he said.¶ The resolution, he said, “makes clear that a nuclear Iran is not an option, and that the Unites States has Israel’s back… Iran’s leaders must understand, that unless they change course their situation will only get worse and economic struggles and international isolation will only grow. They must understand that at the end of the day their pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability will make them less, not more secure.”¶ It also contained a message for Israel, Menendez continued.¶ “The bottom line: Israel should always understand that the United States has its back, that we will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons capability, and, if we are forced to, we will take whatever means necessary to prevent this outcome,” he said.¶ The resolution itself “declares that the United States has a vital national interest in, and unbreakable commitment to, ensuring the existence, survival, and security of the State of Israel, and reaffirms United States support for Israel’s right to self-defense.”¶ The resolution was introduced by Menendez and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and had 92 cosponsors (out of 100 senators) by the time it reached the Senate floor for a vote. It passed unanimously.¶ Reactions to the resolution included enthusiastic support by pro-Israel groups and criticism by groups opposed to further sanctions or military measures against Iran’s nuclear program.¶ The “Senate action…comes at a critical moment as Iran stands on the verge of attaining nuclear weapons capability following repeated defiance of the international community,” the American Israel Public Affairs Committee said on Wednesday.¶ “The passage of this resolution is an extremely significant and timely statement of solidarity with Israel and a restatement of America’s determination to thwart Iran’s nuclear quest – which endangers American, Israeli, and international security,” AIPAC said.¶ Meanwhile, the National Iranian American Council said the resolution amounted to “saber rattling.”¶ “Apparently the Senate thinks the standoff between the US and Iran suffers from a lack of brinksmanship,” the group’s policy director Jamal Abdi said. “Washington and Tehran are stuck in a vicious cycle of mutual escalation that can only be broken through the give and take of serious negotiations, not through further saber rattling.”¶ He called on Congress to “abstain from any more reckless threats or sanctions that push us closer to the brink of war with Iran. Instead, Congress should ensure diplomacy can succeed by making it absolutely clear and credible that, in exchange for verifiable concessions that prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, sanctions will be lifted.”

#### NO legal basis to prevent Obama from sending troops into one area and not another

#### Perm do the cp

#### We fiat the usfg – means that the president is included in the plan.

#### Xo’s are statutory – they carry the force of law and are codified.

#### Credibility only links to the cp – the plan only limits the president in one country. The cp is seen as part of a doctrinal shift by the president. Also CP links to the DA because it’s a legal ruling so he won’t be able to send troops to countries in the future

#### The next president could repeal an xo and it would be ignored while Obama is in office.

Pope 11 [Robert S. Pope, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Former Research Fellow, Belfer International Security Program, 2009–2010 Interagency Task Forces The Right Tools for the Job Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2011]

Large changes to the national security system above the single agency or department level would most certainly require action by the president and Congress. Some have argued that a presidential executive order would be sufficient to enact the proposed reforms.93 While an executive order might change the interagency system during the current administration, **history indicates it would be unlikely to remain under the next president.94** For example, President Clinton’s new process for interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations, described in Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56), did not outlast his presidency, nor was it generally followed while he was in office.95 Nor does an executive order presuppose any support from Congress, which funds the executive branch agencies. Because political power in Congress is often strongly tied to the large sums of money associated with the defense budget, Congress will certainly want to be involved in any reforms that change the national security structure. The CSIS “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” study team noted: “The role of Congress in the process is the most crucial determinant of the prospects for a reform effort. The recommendations that flow from congressionally mandated groups, commissions, or blue ribbon panels are more likely to lead to lasting changes than efforts launched exclusively at the executive branch level.”96 **Enduring change comes from legislation.** Examples include the 1947 National Security Act which created, among other things, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense; the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Act which created the joint military team; the 2002 act which created the Department of Homeland Security; and the 2004 act which created the office of the Director of National Intelligence.

#### Object fiat – the counterplan fiats the object of the resolution. Means we can’t generate offense since it fiats what the plan attempts to effect and justifies counterplans like Iran shouldn’t proliferate or Israel shouldn’t attack.

#### Statute makes congress a stakeholder -- key to permanence and stability.

Lederman 9 [Gordon, National Security Reform for the Twenty-first Century: A New National Security Act and Reflections on Legislation’s Role in Organizational Change, headed the Project on National Security Reform’s Legal Working Group from 2007 to 2009. Currently a Congressional staffer, he served on the staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”) from May 2003 to July 2004. This article is based on an address delivered to the National Security Law Section at the Association of American Law Schools’ annual meeting in 2009. JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW &POLICY [Vol. 3:363 2009] LEGISLATION’S ROLE IN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 367]

However, a statute brings benefits as well, despite the lengthy period of time necessary to enact it. A statute creates **permanence**, which **provides stability** for the system and also can overcome resistance from entrenched bureaucrats who might otherwise think that they can wait out an administration until the next President issues a new executive order. In addition, a statute makes Congress a stakeholder and makes it more likely that Congress will conduct **vigorous oversight** – including by getting commitments from nominees that they will implement the statute aggressively. Finally, a statute can tap into Congress’s premier constitutional power for compelling executive branch action: the power of the purse. The President may create structures and processes and fund them temporarily by transferring resources, but ultimately it is Congress that provides resources on a sustained basis. Without Congress’s input and resources, a presidentially imposed solution to interagency integration may wither for lack of funding.

#### Israel doesn’t trust the president acting alone.

Kalb, 13 (Marvin, James Clark Welling Fellow at The George Washington University and a member of Atlantic Community Advisory Board, and a Guest Scholar in Foreign Policy at The Brookings Institution. The Road to War

Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed. http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2013/the-road-to-war)

No dosubt, presidential commitments are seen as serious, almost sacred, promises to act made by a chief executive on behalf of his administration. And other nations may view these commitments as binding nation-to-nation promises that succeeding administrations will honor, too. But there is a problem. Will they?¶ In 1982, for example, President Ronald Reagan pledged America’s “iron- clad commitment to the defense of Israel.” The commitment made sense to Reagan at the time, and it has been echoed by one president after another ever since. But does Reagan’s pledge have the same resonance now that it did then? Does it mean that if Israel feels it must bomb Iran to stop its nuclear program that America must join in the attack? Much has to do with trust between leaders and countries. Do Israeli leaders trust President Barack Obama as much as they did Bill Clinton and George W. Bush? These are questions that cut to the heart—and viability—of a presidential commitment.¶ Words have consequence. Spoken by a president, they can often become American policy, with or without congressional approval. When a president “commits” the United States to a controversial course of action, he may be setting the nation on the road to war or on a road to reconciliation. In matters of national security, his powers have become awesome—his word decisive. Who decides when we go to war? The president decides. As former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski told me, it “all depends” on the president. “It’s his call.” Likewise, it is his decision when and whether, and under what conditions, to support a friendly nation.¶ A president, such as Barack Obama, for example, pledges that the United States has “an ironclad commitment” to Israel’s security—meaning, one would imagine, that if Israel were attacked, the United States would come to Israel’s defense. Is there anything more to this commitment than a presidential promise? Obviously, yes. Israel enjoys broad-based support from Congress and the American people. For the most part, both nations share common values and common aims. But the president is the key to determining the flow and texture of this delicate relationship.¶ A question often asked by political leaders in Israel is whether Obama will live up to his word. Will his commitment be honored or betrayed by him or by a successor? The answer to this question can mean war or peace. Might it not be better for both nations to negotiate a formal defense treaty—and, in this way, try to reduce or even eliminate areas of doubt in their relationship? Those who question the value or relevance of a U.S.-Israeli defense treaty point out that in recent years Obama has tried to organize Israeli-Palestinian peace talks only to fail abysmally because of Palestinian objections to Israeli settlements and Israeli insistence on building such settlements in the name of security. How would a treaty resolve these problems, they ask? Indeed, even the effort to negotiate a defense treaty would likely kick up fresh tumult and anxiety among Arab states, which are apt to see a U.S. treaty with Israel as proof that the United States can no longer be counted on as an impartial negotiator.¶ Another question: Obama has warned, more than once: “Let there be no doubt—America is determined to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.” Though the world has heard this warning, there are still many, especially in the Middle East, who question whether Obama would really use American military power to stop Iran from “getting nuclear weapons,” however that phrase might be defined. It is said in Washington and Jerusalem that never before have Israel and the United States been in closer alignment on stopping Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. True, and yet not quite true. In the final analysis, for reasons both political and military, Israel may, on its own, strike Iran. Would it then expect American diplomatic and military support? Obama has strongly implied yes. But, without a mutual defense treaty, there may always be a question about the durability and reliability of a presidential commitment.

#### Strat and time skew – kills 2AC time allocation and offense – Fairness should be reciprocal

#### Dispo solves

#### Makes neg a moving target – 2AC can’t generate stable offense against unstable advocacy

#### Kills education and fairness – we have to read offense against ourselves to get back on equal footing

## 2AC Resolve

#### Iran outweighs and turns – if Obama can get a grand bargain with Iran he will secure a major goal of his administration and improve his credibility. Prefer our specific Iran war scenario over their vague threats of credibility.

#### Credibility/ Resolve low now.

Barnes, 13 (Fred, Executive editor of the weekly standard. Hesitation, Delay, and Unreliability. http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/hesitation-delay-and-unreliability\_752788.html)

In his World War II memoirs, Winston Churchill offered this lesson: “In war, resolution; in defeat, defiance; in victory, magnanimity; in peace, good will.” Being resolute—that is, steadfast and determined—comes first. It is normally regarded as a critical component of success.¶ Obama and resolve don’t seem to mix. As the death toll in the Syrian civil war mounted, he opposed American intervention. Then, in an offhand remark a year ago, he said his policy would change if the Assad regime crossed a “red line” and used chemical weapons. Still, he ignored unsubstantiated reports of gas attacks that Secretary of State John Kerry said numbered in the “teens.” He decided to act only when American intelligence confirmed an estimated 1,400 people had been killed in a gas attack by the Syrian military on August 21.¶ A bombing assault was planned for Labor Day weekend to “deter” further use of chemical weapons and “degrade” Assad’s arsenal. But Obama abruptly jettisoned that plan and announced he would seek the approval of Congress. An attack, if there is to be one, could be postponed for weeks, jeopardizing what’s known as “peak” military readiness.¶ Earlier, in June, the White House announced it would send small arms and munitions to the Syrian rebels. By early September, however, no weapons had reached the rebels.¶ So hesitation, delay, and unreliability are the hallmarks of Obama’s approach to Syria, for now. This amounts to presidential “fecklessness,” says Steven F. Hayward, author of Greatness: Reagan, Churchill, and the Making of Extraordinary Leaders. “A strong war leader needs one quality above others,” he says, “a ruthlessness to see it through, coupled with a touch of legerdemain to keep our enemies off balance and fearful of what the United States might do.”¶ Obama certainly lacks that “touch” of cunning. There’s a gulf between his mission and his military. His goal is the removal of Assad as Syrian leader —in other words, regime change. But Obama insists a bombing attack in Syria would be solely to stop further use of chemical weapons. He’s publicly ruled out a wider assault aimed at regime change or deployment of ground troops.¶ “Calling for Assad’s downfall and warning him not to use chemical weapons but being hesitant to back up his strong words with commensurate actions is not how successful commanders in chief behave in wartime,” says Max Boot, author of Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present.

#### No specific impacts – make them read scenarios

#### First strike is a bluff—undermines credibility

Riedel and O'Hanlon 10 Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, 3-16-10, “The Case Against Threatening Iran,” Politico

In addition, even if the charge is unfair, Obama’s critics at home could accuse him of weakness, increasing the pressure on him to consider an attack. America’s credibility might also be weakened, since Washington would be seen as having its bluff called. Future scenarios in which the United States might wish to credibly threaten an attack against an adversary, perhaps even Iran, would then be harder to handle. So the Obama administration would do well to stop talking publicly about a military option and, instead, tell regional allies a strike is highly unlikely unless Iran’s behavior becomes far more egregious.

#### Credibility not hurt by the plan.

Balkin, 13 ( JACK M. BALKIN is Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law School, and the founder and director of Yale's Information Society Project, an interdisciplinary center that studies law and new information technologies. What Congressional Approval Won't Do: Trim Obama's Power or Make War Legal. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/what-congressional-approval-wont-do-trim-obamas-power-or-make-war-legal/279298/)

Wouldn’t congressional refusal make the United States look weak, as critics including Senator John McCain warn loudly? Hardly. The next dictator who acts rashly will face a different situation and a different calculus. The UN Security Council or NATO may feel differently about the need to act. There may be a new threat to American interests that lets Obama or the next president offer a different justification for acting. It just won’t matter very much what Obama said about red lines in the past. World leaders say provocative things all the time and then ignore them. Their motto is: That was then, and this is now.¶ If Congress turns him down, won’t Obama be undermined at home, as other critics claim? In what sense? It is hard to see how the Republicans could be less cooperative than they already are. And it’s not in the interest of Democrats to fault a president of their own party for acceding to what Congress wants instead of acting unilaterally.

#### Unwillingness to escalate to take out the link and impact

Dianne R. Pfundstein PhD Candidate, Columbia University Paper prepared for the ISA Annual Convention 3-19-2011 Compelling Compliance with the International Order: The United States, the Threat of Force, and Resolve in the Era of Unipolarity

This paper applies this new model of state resolve to the United States to demonstrate how its twenty-first century war-fighting model, and its position as sole superpower, undermine the United States’ ability to employ threats of force to coerce weak target states. The United States enjoys unique freedom to escalate conflicts, both because of its military superiority and because of the absence of a peer competitor in most regions of the world to check its actions. Despite this freedom and its unquestioned conventional military superiority, the United States has over the last sixty-five years steadily and increasingly insulated the bulk of its population from both the human and financial costs of war. Furthermore, norms about the use of violence have evolved such that the U.S. military goes to great lengths to avoid inflicting pain on the civilian populations of target states. I will demonstrate that these trends have given rise to a unique American way of war that renders the United States incapable of compelling weak states to change their behavior without having to actually force compliance: the United States may be willing to escalate, but not to suffer or inflict the costs necessary to defeat strongly motivated but conventionally weak target states, making resistance an attractive option even in the face of a credible U.S. threat to escalate. I will begin by demonstrating how the United States’ unique strategic position since the end of the Cold War has granted it the freedom to escalate most conflicts at little risk to its own safety, rendering escalation itself an uninformative signal of its willingness to suffer and destroy in order to achieve its objectives from target states. I will then examine the United States’ unwillingness to pay the human and material costs of war. My analysis reveals that, despite high absolute levels of defense spending, the United States does not want to pay for major wars, and has embraced many elements of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to insulate its military from the dangers of combat. I will then evaluate the evolution in norms about the infliction of pain on target states’ civilian populations. These trends, in combination with the demise of bipolarity, have freed U.S. policymakers to threaten and escalate military conflicts when the United States’ vital interests are not engaged and rendered the threat of military force an ineffective tool of coercion against weak but highly motivated target states.

#### Resolve doesn’t solve conflict.

Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US **hegemony is not the** primary **cause of** the current era of s**tability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2\* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has **already rid itself of crime.** Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection** between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict **declined** while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T 15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—**nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms** necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co\*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-\*7 exis\*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.

#### Their impact evidence is old – prez powers checked North Korea and Middle East – they have no evidence saying that conflict will break out with North Korea and plan solves Middle east conflict

## 2AC Security K

#### Case outweighs

#### A) Iran war escalates – It would embroil Russia and China and would result in the deaths of millions.

#### B) Negotiations reduce tensions – a successful grand bargain would reduce the threat construction and war mongering that has made the status quo so dangerous. We reverse the tensions they criticize.

#### C.) They reject the quest of survival means extinction inevitable in the world of the alt

#### Perm do both

#### This is a K of the SQ – the Limbert card concludes we should stop being hostile towards Iran – which is what the plan does – their evi also says we should continuously pursue negotiations whether or not they succeed

#### Desecuritization fails in practice – strategic planning to prevent crisis escalation is the only way out of the security dilemma.

PH Liotta, Pell Center for IR & Public Policy, ‘5 [Security Dialogue 36.1, “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security,” p. 65-6]

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environ- mental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to water-sheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come– is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment. Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and estab- lished the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increas- ingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action. Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international com- munity, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them. One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address – or fail to address – security.

#### The discourse of belligerence is what forces Iran to prolif – the plan changes that discourse through security assurance – if you don’t like what they’re saying about you, change the conversation – Don draper

#### Anti-proliferation is good. We should try to get rid of as many nuclear weapons as possible.

Paul Schulte, Director of Prolif & Arms Control - Ministry of Defense @ UK, ‘7 [*International Affairs* 83.3, “Universal vision or bounded rationality?” p. Blackwell]

It is also very much worth remembering that, despite Walker’s criticisms, the effect of the imperfect NPT regime is not simply to exploit the non-nuclear weapon states and keep them at a permanent disadvantage. Crucial benefi ts of Walker’s manged system of abstinence still apply: ‘the nuclear umbrellas (extended deterrence) held over … allies, which reduced incentives to acquire nuclear arms; and security assurances to states renouncing nuclear weapons that they would not be used against them’. And, while the treaty holds, non-nuclear weapon states can generally (though to inevitably varying degrees) expect also to avoid regional nuclear arms races, in which they might have to cope with newly nuclear-armed neighbours, whether or not they obtain nuclear weapons themselves. These systemic incentives surely explain much of the continuing and still significant strength of the NPT regime. In the particular, undoubtedly critical, case of Iran, the IAEA has, as intended, been functioning effectively in bringing objective verification evidence to the world’s attention. In response, rather than unduly concerning themselves with Walker’s abstract ‘hydra-headed problem of reconciliation’, the UN Security Council and the EU, as well as the United States, with the discreet support of Gulf governments, have so far, as Walker in fact concedes, indicated a willingness to act strongly. This international determination takes into account Iran’s previous undertakings and compliance history, its specific political culture, and its fateful geopolitical position in the centre of an unstable region of immense worldwide importance. As they used to say, grudgingly, during the Northern Ireland Troubles, ‘It’s the kind of solution which might work in practice but will never stand up in theory.’ Conclusion There is a permanent role for eloquent reminders of universal background imperatives. Walker’s article in this issue of International Affairs fulfils that role, emphasizes the importance of a sense of overall coherence related to a hopeful destination, and vividly expresses the intellectual frustration felt by non-nuclear weapon states and anti-nuclear campaigners. But, while so many decision-makers—and not only those in the American government—remain in practice unpersuaded of the strength and practical applicability of his interpretation of the nuclear disarmament imperative, there is also a case for bounded rationality and dogged engagement with current strategic and political realities. (Game theory, too, came out of the enlightenment.) It is not unenlightened to work to counter further proliferation which would permanently weaken the present regime and create additional obstacles to the eventual project of total nuclear abolition. The NPT regime is the best we have. As so many experts have so often observed, the treaty would not be achievable now—perhaps even a little less so after Walker’s critique. It would be unfortunate, therefore, if his passion for abstract systemic perfection led to further undermining of regime legitimacy and credibility. In nuclear matters, as in others, we should not exalt a universal vision of the best by destructively deprecating the actually existing, though contingent, good. Even Kant saw the necessity to work sometimes with things as they are, because ‘Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made’.6

#### No link between statutory restrictions and the endless global violence – their authors would agree with the prospect of the plan

#### Perm do the plan and reject the logic of security – key to prevent conflict miscalculation from proliferation – stopping horizontal spread is a pre-requisite to ending nuclear apartheid.

David S. Yost, Phd-Prof. @ Naval Postgraduate School, ‘7 [*International Affairs* 83.3, “Analysing international nuclear order,” p. Blackwell]

Bull’s reminder that great powers may behave like ‘great predators’ instead of the ‘great responsibles’ that would consistently pursue a nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament agenda helps to explain why the major powers are likely to retain their nuclear deterrence postures for the indefinite future. Rivalries may be contained within certain bounds indefi nitely through threats of nuclear retaliation, but distrust is likely to persist. Despite the apparently reduced risks of major-power nuclear war in the past two decades, there cannot be any absolute guarantees. Aside from the risks of deterrence failure, accidents or breakdowns of control arrangements, Bull noted,¶ the preservation of mutual nuclear deterrence obstructs the long-term possibility of establishing international order on some more positive basis. The preservation of peace among the major powers by a system in which each threatens to destroy or cripple the civil society of the other, rightly seen as a contemporary form of security through the holding of hostages, refl ects the weakness in international society of the sense of common interest.67 Bull’s observation about ‘the weakness in international society of the sense of common interest’ remains entirely pertinent. It should be noted, moreover, that the concept of ‘common interest’ normally emphasizes material interests such as peace and prosperity. Martin Wight argued that ‘in the long run the idea of a common moral obligation is probably a more fruitful social doctrine than the idea of a common material interest’.68 The sense of ‘a common moral obligation’ in international society is, however, probably even weaker at the current juncture than the sense of shared material interests.¶ The generally insufficient level of commitment to ‘a common moral obligation’ includes a low level of allegiance in key regions of the world to the non- proliferation and disarmament ideals championed by Walker. The most serious obstacles to the realization of his vision reside not, as he suggests, in the United States but in the rise of new power centres, particularly in Eurasia, and the emergence of violent and highly capable non-state actors. As Pierre Hassner observes,¶ Probably the most important reason for the crisis of the nuclear order, and for my rather pessimistic assessment of its chances of being solved any time soon, is the sharp decline of the international political order on which the NPT was based. The two elements on which any such order has to rely—power and legitimacy—have been profoundly modifi ed in a direction unfavourable to the West.69¶ Although Walker deprecates the idea of ‘muddling through’ and deplores ¶ the focus in US policy on ‘certain actors in the world whose possession of nuclear weapons or weapon-related technologies would be intolerable’, there is a certain practical logic in focusing on the cases and tasks immediately at hand while pursuing broader positive political changes. Aside from concentrating on the most dangerous specific proliferants, the most pressing priority—while maintaining a reliable posture for deterrence, dissuasion and defence—is reforming and strengthening the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole; and that includes remedying (to the maximum extent possible) the signifi cant deficiencies present in the treaty since its origin. Further proliferation would probably make the achievement of nuclear disarmament an even more remote prospect and might well ¶ increase the risk of nuclear war.

#### Big Israel DA to the alt – the alt forces US to not take a stance on Iran means we can’t influence Israel to curb its attack – Iran-Israel conflict triggers WW3 – that’s – that’s relevant because that’s a war DA to the alt

#### Infinite number of non-falsifiable ‘root causes’ mean empirics and incentive theory are the only adequate methods to understand war

Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2.

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.I5 VI Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment. HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle,perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

**Our threats are real – Iran has been on record saying they are pursuing uranium enrichment programs and nukes – the US is responding to real threats – they can’t make the distinctions between which threats are real and which aren’t – prefer the specifity of our link arguments**

**Discourse doesn’t create security, it’s a response to *real* and *material* concerns – prefer our threat-specific internal links**

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Nicholas, “Does Security exist outside of the speech act?,” http://www.e-ir.info/2011/10/09/does-security-exist-outside-of-the-speech-act/

Significant to this theory is Waver’s notion of societal security, which invokes community and identity as key analytical tenets. This concept refers to the presentation of community identity being threatened by dynamics such as population movements (Williams, 2003: 513). The emphasis on threat and societal identity—its’ sense of we-ness—reflects the Copenhagen School’s focus on a particular type of speech act and thus a specific security—one which understands the politics of enmity. The essence of security in this understanding is existential threats and the production of the “other” as a political enemy. Hence, the speech act is a security act and securitisation relies on a specific rhetorical structure which identifies threats, proposes emergency action and effects interunit relations by breaking free of rules (Williams, 2003: 514). Securitisation is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats and accepted as convincing by an audience and by the empirical factors or situation to which these actors can make reference (Williams, 2003: 514). A successful securitising speech act depends on an adherence to the internal linguistic rules of the act and the legitimate positionality of the actor uttering the act. This narrow reading of the construction of security as a designation of threatening ‘others’ and the legitimation of emergency measures (military) by an elite actor, serves to reify the meaning of security and marginalises inclusive and non-statist definitions of values of security understood in particular contexts (McDonald, 2009: 579). For the Copenhagen School, security rests upon a symbiotic relationship between actor and audience. Hence, an issue is securitised when an audience accepts it as such. The significance of the audience in the process of securitisation is neatly encapsulated in the concept of intersubjectivity. A successful securitisation is decided by the audience of the speech act; it is they who must accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value (Buzan et al, 1998: 31). Speaking security does not guarantee success; therefore security rests among the subjects and their willingness to accept legitimacy of the discourse. The central problematic of the speech act theory relates to its’ casting of securitisation merely in terms of this discourse-legitimation-action sequence. Problematically, the classic application of the securitisation framework privileges the role of political leaders in the articulation and designation of threat and locates the logic of security among strategic actors imbued with intentionality. Such an image of strategic actors seeking to label threats as security and therefore justify emergency responses provides a narrow state-centric conception of the construction of security which fails to contextualise the processes involved and tackle the meaning of security. Hence, the Copenhagen School’s framework of securitisation focus overwhelmingly on the performative role of the speech act rather than the conditions in which securitisation itself becomes possible (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 72). Whilst alluding to the intersubjective nature of security, the focus on the speech act as performing security defines security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation (McDonald, 2009: 572). The social construction of security cannot be comprehensively understood in isolation from the role of the audience and the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security become possible. Thierry Balzacq (2005) supports this essay’s view that the securitisation cannot merely be understood as a speech act, inasmuch as he contends that the articulation of security is one part of the securitisation process: it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies. Security then involves stages of identification and mobilisation (Paul Roe, 2009: 616), in which the securityness of a threat and the appropriate response to it are negotiated within an interactive process between actors and audiences. Hence security is contextual; different threats are privileged by different communities, particular securitisations are legitimated across time and space according to narratives of history, culture and identity and different voices are empowered or marginalised to define security and threat. Waever (1995: 57) argues that security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites. This state-centricism serves to marginalise the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics. Hansen (2000: 306) postulates that “a focus on speech acts means contributing to the silencing of women, whose suffering and engagement with security discourses is neglected in a framework that focuses on the articulation of the powerful”. This focus on dominant voices renders the speech act framework impotent in terms of grappling with the plight of the most vulnerable in world politics—and their experiences of and engagement with security and threat. This paper’s proclivity to a hermeneutic approach to security problematises the decisionistic (Williams, 2003: 521) approach to the ‘moment’ at which threats are designated. Securitisation does not occur only at particular instances; issues can become institutionalised as security issues or threats without dramatic moments of intervention (Bigo, 2002). Looking ‘beyond the moment’ of intervention allows one to assess more comprehensively why an actor represents an issue as a threat in a particular context and why a specific constituency accepts it as such. Hence security is not merely that which fulfils the criteria of securitisation (Ciuta, 2009: 303), it does not have an unchanging essence—but rather is the product of historical structures and processes of struggles for power (Lipschutz, 1995: 8) between societal groups with competing interests. Immigration as a security threat in Europe for example, was the product of long-term processes of institutionalisation and related heavily to the incorporation of immigration within the jurisdiction of security professionals such as the police (Bigo 2000). Moreover, there is no simple dichotomy between the political and security. Such a dichotomy is problematic in that suggests an either/or approach, whereby an issue is either a security threat or a political issue. Immigration in the UK is not seen by all constituencies as a threat to security. For some it is a risk and for others the casting of immigration as a threat is a wholly disputable discourse. Thus, the meaning of security is not fixed within the speech act of an elite group, but rather is open to argumentation and can be questioned on the grounds of truth, rightness and sincerity (Wyn-Jones, 1999: 110). Security as a speech act frames the concept within communicative action and legitimation— involving a presentation of evidence and a commitment to convincing others of the validity of one’s position in a process of justification. A theory so reliant on speech for its’ explanatory position fails to address the dynamics of security in a world where political communication is increasingly bound with images and in which televisual communication is an essential communicative medium. The construction of the terrorist for example in the Bush and Blair discourse post 9/11 is inextricable from the image dominated context in which it takes place and through which meaning is communicated. The nexus between the discursive construction of the terrorist as a deadly threat and televisual imagery working to the same end is emblemised by the construction of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 as “acts of war”. Hence one cannot understand Bush’s rhetorical move to construct the attacks as unprecedented and new forms of warfare thereby invoking the nation’s right to self-defence (Jackson, 2007: 356), without assessing the impact that the extraordinary and repeated images of that act had on reactions to it. Here in lies the fundamental merit and pitfall of the speech act theory. On the one hand it provides us with an innovative understanding of the metaphorical constitution of terrorism in discourse and on the other it remains closed to the impact different mediums of communication have on the securitisation process. Thus, language is only one means through which meaning is communicated (Moller, 2007: 180). Drawing on Michel Foucault, this essay problematises the reduction by the speech act theory, of securitisation to a purely linguistic rhetoric. The meaning we attach to security and our knowledge of what constitutes security exists within both the material and textual realms, for they are not mutually exclusive. Foucault (1980: 63) holds that once a discursive utterance is considered an action or as a practice, this then begins to verge on the territory of materiality and becomes more easily linked to the array of physical activities through which the diagnosis may be made initially. To illuminate his concept of discursive practices, Foucault invokes the notion of extra-discursive—which relates to the idea that similar discursive acts can occur in a multitude of ways and various different forms that stretch from the textual to material level of discursive practice. The speech act theory defines security as language—thus language becomes security. Such an over-concentration on language signals a myopia of text, an over-evaluation of the linguistic and representational powers of language in isolation from the material arrangements of power in which they are entrenched and that they in turn extend (Foucault Journal, 2001: 540). The over-evaluation by the speech act theory of the linguistic powers of language in isolation from the material context of power, in which they are intermeshed, is problematised by the Didier Bigo (2002). Bigo (2002: 65) holds that “security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinised practices rather than only through speech acts that enable emergency measures”. Accordingly, practices of surveillance and border controls for example, can be central to the process of securitisation and are not simply those actions enabled by preceding speech acts (McDonald, 2009: 570). Recognising the role of physical systems in the construction of security, that is, the generation of meaning and the productive power of such systems—demands an acceptance that security exists outside of the speech act. Hence, the speech act framework of security problematically neglects physical action which can serve to communicate ideas about security in their own right (Hansen, 2000: 300-1). In summation, security is constructed through processes of social interaction, but cannot be defined narrowly as existing only within the speech act. Hence, the definition of security in terms of a discourse-action sequence is problematic, inasmuch as it fails to recognise the complexity of the construction of security in global politics. Assuming that security merely resides within the discursive positioning of threats, neglects the historical and social contexts in which security becomes possible. Thus, discourses of security are bound by the historical and social structures in which they are produced. The speech act then is just one dynamic of the securitisation process, the role of audiences, visual communication and physical practices must all be examined in order to understand how security is experienced in different contexts. Security exists within the interplay between self-identity and the construction of meaning, thus the feeling of threat and being secured is produced within all social structures. Security is what we make of it, different worldviews and discourses bound by social structures and communicated in diverse ways, deliver different discourses about security. Security can be constructed physically through bureaucratic systems, through the discourses of the state and within marginalised groups whose experience of threat and security may not be known or heard. Security therefore is not just a speech act.

#### Their evidence also assumes a retaliatory response towards threats – the plan is a diplomatic solution that isn’t hostile

#### Methodology is not a priori even incomplete knowledge is sufficient – specificity is key

Kratochwil 8 – professor of international relations – European University Institute

Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213

The lesson seems clear. Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference (pointing to some property of the object under study), in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR, therefore, does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, I will sketch out the reasons for which a pragmatic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas. Firstly, a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with “acting” (prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information. Pre- cisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” some- one, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

#### Change US policy – imperialist policy necessitates regime change and constant intervention – the plan would preclude that

#### Perm do the alt – the plan is the alt – we halt our belligerent discourse about Iran and pursue more diplomatic solutions

#### 1. Strat and time skew – kills 2AC time allocation and offense

#### 2. Dispo solves your offense – you can get your cps but fairness should be reciprocal and 2AC should have strategic offense against em

#### 3. Makes neg a moving target – 2AC can’t generate stable offense against unstable advocacy

#### 4. Kills education and fairness – we have to read offense against ourselves to get back on equal footing

#### No root cause of war.

Gat, Political Science at Tel Aviv, 9 [Azar, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War, European Journal of International Relations, 2009, Vol. 15(4): 571–599, http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/4/571]

Thus attempts to find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced. In all these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and the whole cannot be broken into pieces.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all molded in human nature (some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times, when all the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes of war — that obviously have to be filled with the particulars of the case in any specific war — are thus as follows: politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired goods. Wars have been fought for the attainment of the same objects of human desire that underlie the human motivational system in general — only by violent means, through the use of force. Politics — internal and external — of which war is, famously, a continuation, is the activity intended to achieve at the intra- and inter-state ‘levels’ the very same evolution-shaped human aims we have already seen. Some writers have felt that ‘politics’ does not fully encompass the causes of war. Even Thayer (2004: 178–9), who correctly argues that evolutionary theory explains ultimate human aims, nonetheless goes on to say, inconsistently, that Clausewitz needs extension because war is caused not only by political reasons but also by the evolutionarily rooted search for resources, as if the two were separate, with politics being somehow different and apart, falling outside of the evolutionary logic. What is defined as ‘politics’ is of course a matter of semantics, and like all definitions is largely arbitrary. Yet, as has been claimed here, if not attributed to divine design, organisms’ immensely complex mechanisms and the behavioral propensities that emanate from them — including those of human beings — ultimately could only have been ‘engineered’ through evolution. The challenge is to lay out how evolution-shaped human desires relate to one another in motivating war. The desire and struggle for scarce resources — wealth of all sorts — have always been regarded as a prime aim of ‘politics’ and an obvious motive for war. They seem to require little further elaboration. By contrast, reproduction does not appear to figure as a direct motive for war in large-scale societies. However, as we saw, appearance is often deceptive, for somatic and reproductive motives are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. In modern societies, too, sexual adventure remained central to individual motivation in going to war, even if it usually failed to be registered at the level of ‘state politics.’ This may be demonstrated by the effects of the sexual revolution since the 1960s, which, by lessening the attraction of foreign adventure for recruits and far increasing the attraction of staying at home, may have contributed to advanced societies’ growing aversion to war. Honor, status, glory, and dominance — both individual and collective — enhanced access to somatic and reproductive success and were thus hotly pursued and defended, even by force. The security dilemma sprang from this state of actual and potential competition, in turn pouring more oil onto its fire. Power has been the universal currency through which all of the above could be obtained and/or defended, and has been sought after as such, in an often escalating spiral. Kinship — expanding from family and tribe to peoples — has always exerted overwhelming influence in determining one’s loyalty and willingness to sacrifice in the defense and promotion of a common good. Shared culture is a major attribute of ethnic communities, in the defense of which people can be invested as heavily as in the community’s political independence and overall prosperity. Finally, religious and secular ideologies have been capable of stirring enormous zeal and violence; for grand questions of cosmic and socio-political order have been perceived as possessing paramount practical significance for securing and promoting life on earth and/or in the afterlife. In the human problem-solving menus, ideologies function as the most general blueprints. Rather than comprising a ‘laundry list’ of causes for war, all of the above partake in the interconnected human motivational system, originally shaped by the calculus of survival and reproduction.

#### Perm do the plan and focus on knowledge production

#### Floating piks bad

#### Their absolutist refusal to evaluate the plan causes paradigm wars, not change.

Wendt ‘98, 3rd Most Influential Scholar of IR in the World According to Survey of 1084 IR Scholars, ‘98

(“On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The **central point** of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will **inevitably lead to confusion** (after all, **after 2000 years, even** the **specialists are still having a hard time**). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. **Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance**, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, **not second-order issues of method**.

Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contamin- ated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘**paradigm wars’**. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is **not clear by what criteria their work should be judged**, **or how it differs from art or revelation**. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s **sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures** of science.