### Advantage 1: US Strikes

#### US is committed to attacking Iran now.

Greenwald, 12 (Glen, former Constitutional and civil rights litigator and is the author of three New York Times Bestselling books: two on the Bush administration's executive power and foreign policy abuses, and his latest book, With Liberty and Justice for Some, an indictment of America's. Obama, Iran and preventive war. http://www.salon.com/2012/03/05/obama\_iran\_and\_preventive\_war/)

President Obama yesterday joined virtually every U.S. political leader in both parties in making the obligatory, annual pilgrimage and oath-taking to AIPAC: a bizarre ritual if you think about it. During his speech, he repeatedly emphasized that he “has Israel’s back,” rightfully noting that his actions in office prove this (“At every crucial juncture – at every fork in the road – we have been there for Israel. Every single time”). One of his goals was commendable — to persuade the Israelis not to attack Iran right now – but in order to accomplish that, he definitively vowed, as McClatchy put it, that “he’d call for military action to prevent Iran from securing a nuclear weapon.” In other words, he categorically committed the U.S. to an offensive military attack on Iran in order to prevent that country from acquiring a nuclear weapon; as AP put it: “President Barack Obama said Sunday the United States will not hesitate to attack Iran with military force to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”¶ Is that not the classic case of a “preventive” war (as opposed to a “preemptive” war), once unanimously scorned by progressives as “radical” and immoral when the Bush administration and its leading supporters formally adopted it as official national security doctrine in 2002? Back in 2010, Newsweek‘s Michael Hirsh documented the stark, fundamental similarities between the war theories formally adopted by both administrations in their national security strategies, but here we have the Bush administration’s most controversial war theory explicitly embraced: that the U.S. has the right not only to attack another country in order to preempt an imminent attack (pre-emptive war), but even to prevent some future, speculative threat (preventive war). Indeed, this was precisely the formulation George Bush invoked for years when asked about Iran. This theory of preventive war continues to be viewed around the world as patently illegal — Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Minister last week said of the “all-options-on-the-table” formulation for Iran: some of those options “are contrary to international law” — and before 2009, the notion of “preventive war” was universally scorned by progressives.¶ Again, one can find justifications, even rational ones, for President Obama’s inflexible commitment of a military attack on Iran: particularly, that this vow is necessary to stop the Israelis from attacking now (though it certainly seems that the U.S. would have ample leverage to prevent an Israeli attack if it really wanted to without commiting itself to a future attack on Iran). And I’ve noted many times that I believe that the Obama administration — whether for political and/or strategic reasons — does seem genuinely to want to avoid a war with Iran, at least for now.¶ But what this really shows, as was true for the run-up to the Iraq War, is how suffocatingly narrow the permissive debate has become. The so-called “gulf” between Israel and the U.S. — the two viable sides of the debate — consists of these views: (1) Iran should be attacked when it develops the capacity to develop nuclear weapons (Israel) or (2) Iran should be attacked only once it decides to actually develop a nuclear weapon (the U.S.). Those are the two permissible options, both grounded in the right and even duty to attack Iran even if they’re threatening to attack nobody — i.e., a preventive war. That it’s unjustified to attack Iran in the absence of an actual or imminent threat of attack by Iran, or that international law (as expressed by the U.N. Charter) bars the use of threats of military attack, or that Iran could be contained even if it acquired a nuclear weapon, has been removed from the realm of mainstream debate (meaning: the debate shaped by the two political parties). Obama yesterday:¶ Iran’s leaders should understand that I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And as I have made clear time and again during the course of my presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States and its interests.¶ Just as was true in 2002 and early 2003, everyone agrees that a preventive war would be justifiable and may be necessary, and the only permitted debate is whether it should happen now or a bit later (where should the “red lines” be?).¶ Whatever else is true, by having President Obama issue these clear and inflexible threats against Iran to which the nation is now bound, the once-controversial notion of “preventive war” just became much more normalized and bipartisan. Witness the virtually complete lack of objections to President Obama’s threats from either party to see how true that is.

#### Iran strikes causes nuclear war.

Chossudovsky 5 Michel Chossudovsky, Centre for Research on Globalisation 1 May 2005 Planned US-Israeli Attack on Iran

<http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO505A.html>

The Bush Administration has embarked upon a military adventure which **threatens the future of humanity**.¶ Iran is the next military target. The planned military operation, which is by no means limited to punitive strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities, is part of a project of World domination, a military roadmap, launched at the end of the Cold War.¶ Military action against Iran would directly involve Israel's participation, which in turn is likely to trigger a broader war throughout the Middle East, not to mention an implosion in the Palestinian occupied territories. Turkey is closely associated with the proposed aerial attacks.¶ Israel is a nuclear power with a sophisticated nuclear arsenal. (See text box below). The use of nuclear weapons by Israel or the US cannot be excluded, particularly in view of the fact that tactical nuclear weapons have now been reclassified as a variant of the conventional bunker buster bombs and are authorized by the US Senate for use in conventional war theaters. ("they are harmless to civilians because the explosion is underground")¶ In this regard, Israel and the US rather than Iran constitute a nuclear threat.¶ The planned attack on Iran must be understood in relation to the existing active war theaters in the Middle East, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. ¶ The conflict could easily spread from the Middle East to the Caspian sea basin. It could also involve the participation of Azerbaijan and Georgia, where US troops are stationed.¶ An attack on Iran would have a direct impact on the resistance movement inside Iraq. It would also put pressure on America's overstretched military capabilities and resources in both the Iraqi and Afghan war theaters. (The 150,000 US troops in Iraq are already fully engaged and could not be redeployed in the case of a war with Iran.)¶ In other words, the shaky geopolitics of the Central Asia- Middle East region, the three existing war theaters in which America is currently, involved, the direct participation of Israel and Turkey, the structure of US sponsored military alliances, etc. raises the specter of a broader conflict. ¶ Moreover, US military action on Iran not only threatens Russian and Chinese interests, which have geopolitical interests in the Caspian sea basin and which have bilateral agreements with Iran. It also backlashes on European oil interests in Iran and is likely to produce major divisions between Western allies, between the US and its European partners as well as within the European Union.¶ Through its participation in NATO, Europe, despite its reluctance, would be brought into the Iran operation. The participation of NATO largely hinges on a military cooperation agreement reached between NATO and Israel. This agreement would bind NATO to defend Israel against Syria and Iran. NATO would therefore support a preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, and could take on a more active role if Iran were to retaliate following US-Israeli air strikes.

### Advantage 2: Proxy Wars

#### The moderate Iranian president Rouhani just took office but his failure to win concessions from the west will cause the ascension of extremists.

Pesaran, 9/17 (Hashem Pesaran is the John Elliot Distinguished Chair in Economics at the University of Southern California. Iran sanctions: now is the time to negotiate. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/17/world-powers-negotiate-nuclear-iran)

The only way to stop this vicious cycle is for both sides to negotiate in good faith and with open minds. Many western observers believe that recently elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani is sincerely seeking a diplomatic solution. However, there are politicians and officials in the capitals of the P5+1 group – the five permanent UN Security Council members, plus Germany – who will push to implement even harsher measures if a diplomatic solution is not reached relatively soon. Witness the recent 400-20 vote in the US House of Representatives in favour of further punishing sanctions against Iran.¶ If Iran and P5+1 do not take full advantage of the current opportunity, the consequences are likely to be even more serious than if the status quo had simply gone unchanged. While the general international reaction to Iran's new chief executive has so far been favourable, a lack of progress over the next few months could create new levels of frustration and desperation, bolstering the radicals on both sides in the sanctions/nuclear debacle and bringing us closer to military intervention with dire and unthinkable consequences. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu is already spreading doubts about the utility of negotiating with Iran, arguing that Rouhani is a "wolf in sheep's clothing".¶ Iranian citizens, academics, and intellectuals can help. This is the message of the "civil movement" against sanctions that has been initiated by three prominent economists inside Iran, and I am pleased to be able to contribute my voice to this movement outside of Iran. It should be recognised that Rouhani won office in a lively, contested election, with a large margin of victory thanks to the majority of Iranians who prefer negotiation to confrontation. It is hoped that the wishes of the Iranian people will be respected by the Iranian government and by the west. Rouhani, his government, and Iran's negotiating team as the representatives of the Iranian people deserve to be taken seriously and to be engaged with constructively.¶ Hurt by sanctions and economic mismanagement, the majority of Iranians have chosen a moderate politician to engage with western countries and to reach a diplomatic solution. Iran's presidential election process is not ideal; nevertheless, this most recent vote was freer than the election processes in many Middle Eastern countries that enjoy the support of the west. Instead of demonstrating unswerving hostility towards Iran, it is vital for western countries to understand the situation and create an atmosphere that will help to further empower the moderates within Iran.¶ The P5+1 countries need to offer a deal to help Rouhani's administration domestically and strengthen its ability to deal with the radicals inside Iran. Squander the current opportunity, and they will weaken Rouhani's administration to the extent that it could fail, paving the way for the ascension of extremists. It is now up to the moderates on both sides to deliver.¶ Ordinary Iranians need to be part of the dialogue both inside and outside Iran. They need to remind their politicians of the heavy costs of living continuously under sanctions. It is not to Iran's advantage to remain isolated from the global community. If Iran's isolation continues, if it cannot trade freely and engage fully in international financial markets, if it cannot attract foreign investment, and if it misses out on technological advances that are taking place, the consequences could be many decades of decline and lost opportunities.¶ It is also clear that another costly, protracted, and open-ended military intervention in the Middle East is not in the west's interest, particularly given the fragile state of the global economy and the recent troublesome political developments in Egypt and Turkey, the region's other two most populous nations. A negotiated settlement with Iran holds the key to the resolution of political and military troubles around the Middle East.

#### **Renouncing threats of violence is a concession to Iran that would empower moderates and prevent regional aggression.**

Mousavian ’13, Hossein Mousavian, Winter 2013, The Washington Quarterly, “An Opportunity for a U.S.-Iran Paradigm Shift,” <http://csisdev.forumone.com/files/publication/TWQ_13Winter_Mousavian.pdf>, p. 138-139

Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney told CNN in August that Iran potentially poses the greatest national security threat to the United States.26 Similarly, Michele Flournoy, President Obama’s top campaign foreign policy adviser, identified Iran as a chief threat in the Middle East.27 Due to such assessments, despite not understanding the true nature of the Iranian government, ‘‘regime change’’ has been the core policy of all recent U.S. administrations.28 This policy has played a tremendous role in Iran—U.S. rivalries in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, and will likely continue to be one of the focal points shaping the future of the region. The United States needs a broader strategic policy that goes beyond the current obsession with Iran’s nuclear program in order to make a ‘‘big deal’’ possible, the United States needs to address its regime change strategy. A U.S. policy based on coercive sanctions, pressure, containent, and isolation of Iran has not achieved its objectives. Furthermore, the United States has been unable to achieve other policy objectives including promoting stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, achieving an agreement on a Palestinian state, and avoiding further military engagements in the region. It is crucial for U.S. policymakers, especially those who advocate sanctions and regime change, to understand that Iranian clerics are radicalized under threat. If this pressure were alleviated, it would inversely lead to their moderation. The history of the Islamic Republic suggests that clerics have been more cooperative and flexible on international and regional issues when approached with consolatory policies. There are many examples that strengthen this view, such as when the clerics in the 1990s facilitated the biggest humanitarian exchange between Hezbollah and Israel, and also permitted the UN Special Representative on Human Rights for Iran, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, to visit the country.29 In another case, President George H.W. Bush’s inaugural speech in 1989, which proposed that ‘‘goodwill begets goodwill,’’ paved the way for the constructive role Iran played in the release of the Western hostages held in Lebanon.30 Washington’s request for Iranian cooperation in the War on Terror also led to Iranian support in fighting al-/Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001.31

#### Hardline resurgence causes proxy wars

Keynoush 12, Banafsheh, independent scholar lecturer and private-sector consultant, she specializes in Iranian and Middle Eastern affairs, she was an accredited interpreter with the European Commission and worked as an interpreter with three Iranian Presidents and a Nobel Laureate; “Iran after Ahmadinejad”, Survival, Vol 54, No 3

Iran’s odd combination of theocracy and elected institutions has ¶ produced generally cautious and pragmatic behavior at the state-tostate level, combined with the use of subversion, terrorism, propaganda, ideology, and religion to undermine neighboring regimes it ¶ regards as adversaries. Conservative and reformist governments have ¶ sometimes sought to emphasize the overt and more positive strain of ¶ Iranian policy, but the security establishment and the religious leadership have never been willing to entirely abandon the darker tools ¶ of statecraft. Iran continues to sponsor and train terrorist and insurgent groups throughout the Middle East. Controversy in Iran over ¶ the results of the 2009 Iranian presidential election have strengthened ¶ this latter, more fundamentalist faction, consolidating the power of ¶ the Revolutionary Guards and the position of the Supreme Leader, ¶ Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the final arbiter of Iranian policy. As long ¶ as these forces remain dominant, there is little prospect of overcoming ¶ the many differences that divide the United States and Iran, least of all ¶ that of Iran’s nuclear program.

#### Independent of Rowhani’s administration, providing security assurances solves proxy wars.

Leverett and Leverett 09 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow and director of the New America Foundation’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. The Grand Bargain. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.leverett.html)

First, while the United States and the Soviet Union were roughly matched in their military capabilities, the United States is and will remain vastly superior to Iran in every category of military power, conventional or otherwise. Almost thirty years after the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic is incapable of projecting significant conventional military force beyond its borders, and would be severely challenged to mount a conventional defense against U.S. invasion. Absent a broader strategic understanding with Washington, Tehran would continue to assume and act as if the ultimate objective of U.S. policy toward Iran were the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.¶ Second, in an atmosphere of ongoing uncertainty about America’s ultimate intentions toward the Islamic Republic, Iranian leaders would continue working to defend their core security interests in ways that are guaranteed to provoke the United States. Candid conversations with Iranian officials confirm what long observation of Iranian policies strongly suggests: lacking significant conventional military capabilities, Iran pursues an "asymmetric" national security strategy. This strategy includes the use of proxy actors—political, paramilitary, and terrorist—in neighboring states and elsewhere, to ensure that those states will not be used as anti-Iranian platforms, providing Tehran a measure of strategic depth it otherwise lacks. Iran’s asymmetric strategy also includes developing unconventional military capabilities (missiles, chemical weapons, and at least a nuclear weapons option). No U.S. administration, of either party, would be able to sustain détente with Iran as it pursues such policies.

#### Iran maintains its proxies to deter an American strike.

Frankel, 12 (Rafael D. Frankel was a Middle East correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor¶ and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University. Keeping Hamas and¶ Hezbollah Out of a War¶ with Iran. http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallFrankel.pdf)

One crucial element that the Obama or Romney and Netanyahu¶ administrations must consider is what kind of regional response a preventative¶ strike might provoke. Since the early 1980s, when the Iranian Revolutionary¶ Guard played a crucial role in creating Hezbollah to counter the Israeli presence¶ in Lebanon, Iran has built a powerful, self-proclaimed ‘‘Axis of Resistance’’¶ meant to promote Iranian interests around the Middle East. Hezbollah’s and later¶ Hamas’ gain in power, and Syria’s movement into the Iranian orbit after Bashar¶ Assad assumed control following his father’s death in 2000, all gave Iran a strong¶ deterrent to its chief enemies, the United States and Israel. Iran’s alliances nodoubt emboldened the regime to continue to¶ pursue nuclear technology, despite continual¶ international demands and increasingly harsh¶ sanctions since 2005.¶ For most of those seven years, the prevailing¶ assumption among Israeli and American¶ intelligence agencies has been that an Israeli¶ attack on Iran would trigger a coordinated¶ response from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas,¶ resulting in a full-blown regional war and mass¶ casualties in Israel as well as among American troops stationed in the Middle¶ East. (The response from Syria was less clear as Damascus has also long used¶ Hamas and Hezbollah as its proxies to hit Israel, rather than risk directly igniting¶ or involving itself in a war it was sure to lose.) This assumption was at the heart¶ of former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan’s analysis and his ultimately public¶ recommendation that Israel refrain from a military strike.2¶ But at the very moment when Tehran may be counting on its decades of¶ investment in the two Islamist militant groups to pay its largest dividends, the¶ upheaval in the Arab world has shuffled the deck. The current strife in Syria has¶ sent ripple effects from the Mediterranean Sea to the Strait of Hormuz, ¶ destabilizing the Axis of Resistance and nominally placing Hamas and¶ Hezbollah on different sides of the fissures that have blown open in the Arab¶ and Muslim worlds. This geopolitical reorientation presents an opportunity¶ for Israel and the United States to reclaim the upper hand in regional¶ deterrenceif they are willing to act quickly and modify their own regional¶ strategies.¶ Hezbollah’s Calculations¶ The extent to which non-state militant groups are susceptible to deterrence¶ strategies depends on five main factors: the group’s ideology; organizational¶ structure; elements of statehood (including political authority, territorial control,¶ and ties to a dependent population); external support; and inter-factional¶ competition. In the wake of the extraordinary changes in the Middle East over¶ the last year, an examination of Hamas and Hezbollah utilizing these factors¶ yields diverging results when it comes to a possible confrontation with Iran.¶ Hezbollah’s ideology and organizational structure are closely tied. It is a Shia¶ Islamist group which preaches allegiance above all others to the wali-al-faqih, or¶ the person who is both Shia jurist and Shia theologian. Currently, that person is¶ Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Hezbollah may be a Lebanese¶ party, as it always insists to its domestic audience, but its ideology compels it to‘‘unconditionally follow’’ the religious rulings of the wali-al-faqih, as Hezbollah¶ Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said in 1987.3¶ Among many other similar¶ statements, the Hezbollah chief added in 1997 that ‘‘the decision of peace and¶ war is in the hands of the wali-al-faqih.’’4¶ Though those statements are more than¶ a decade old, and political considerations have constrained Nasrallah’s proIran rhetoric, he has never contradicted those fundamental ideological¶ proclamations. Thus, if Khamenei orders Hezbollah to war, its cadres are¶ religiously bound to obey that directive

#### Proxy wars escalate to nuclear

Edelman 11 Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery Reply. Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 90, Issue 2 The War Over Containing Iran EBSCO

A second important issue Adamsky raises is that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase the threat that Israel faced from Iranian proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, either because Tehran would provide increased assistance and encouragement to these groups or because they would become more reckless once they had a nuclear-armed patron. A premeditated attack by Iran against Israel is not the only scenario that could lead to a nuclear exchange, or even the most plausible one. Instead, a limited conflict in southern Lebanon or the Gaza Strip might spiral out of control. Iranian proxies could escalate their attacks against Israel, assuming that it would be deterred by its fear of a nuclear Iran. Israel could then defy their expectations and conduct major reprisals to demonstrate its resolve, prompting Iran to make nuclear threats in defense of its clients. The results would be unpredictable and potentially disastrous. Although debates over Iran's nuclear program often turn on the issue of Iranian "rationality," it is important to remember that there are many different paths to conflict, and the dynamics of Iranian-Israeli relations could be prone to miscalculation and escalation.

### Advantage 3: Iranian Proliferation

#### Iran is ready for a grand bargain that would end Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a security guarantee. Rouhani’s election establishes a window of opportunity for negotiations. Congressional threats of force are ineffective and undermine these negotiations.

Walt 13 (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. Congress to Iran: Drop Dead. http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/05/congress\_to\_iran\_drop\_dead)

About six weeks ago, I wrote a blog post about the election of new Iranian President Hasan Rouhani. I said it was precisely the sort of opportunity that Barack Obama's administration had been looking for back in 2009, but I was pretty sure the United States and Iran would find a way to squander it. Here's one paragraph from that post, dated June 17, 2013:¶ Back in Washington, any attempt at a serious rapprochement will also have to overcome relentless opposition not only from AIPAC and the other major groups in the Israel lobby, but also from Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states. Unfortunately, the U.S. political system doesn't reward patience, and Obama has not shown himself to be especially bold or courageous when it comes to foreign policy. Indeed, he has yet to take and stick to any foreign-policy position that requires him to buck powerful political forces at home. By the time his finger-in-the-wind approach to diplomacy has run its course, the opportunity for a new approach to Iran may be lost, thereby reinforcing the Iranian belief that the only thing the United States will accept is the end of the Islamic Republic, and strengthening the American conviction that even reformist Iranian leaders are beyond the pale.¶ It's a bit too soon to say, "I told you so," but so far my initial prediction is on track. Although Rouhani has appointed a series of moderate officials (many associated with former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani), softened Iranian rhetoric about Israel somewhat, and pledged to seek the path of "détente," we still have little idea how the Obama administration intends to respond. I'm not even sure who is taking the lead in figuring that out. In the meantime, hawks in the United States -- led by the always-helpful lobbyists at AIPAC -- are already doing everything they can to derail a possible rapprochement.¶ Unfortunately, they can always count on the help of a timorous and craven Congress, including a number of prominent "progressive" Democrats. Just last week, the House passed H.R. 850, an AIPAC-sponsored resolution tightening sanctions for the umpteenth time. The bill was called the "Nuclear Iran Prevention Act," but as Paul Pillar blogged on National Interest's website, a more honest title would be the "Nuclear Iran Promotion Act." The vote was 400-20 (with 378 co-sponsors!), and I'm sorry to say that my own representative, Joe Kennedy III, wasn't exactly a "profile in courage" on this issue. Of course, he had plenty of company.¶ And now 76 supine Senators are sending Obama one of those stern AIPAC-drafted letters warning him to keep up the pressure. Negotiating with Iran is OK, they concede, provided that any discussions are backed up by the constant threat of military force. Never mind that the United States has been threatening force and conducting various forms of covert action against Iran for years, and Iran hasn't said "uncle" yet. Never mind that Congress has repeatedly called for regime change in Tehran (now there's a confidence-building measure!), and Iran has responded by building more centrifuges. Never mind that Iran has said all along that it won't be bullied into concessions. Never mind the obvious fact that threats of military force are a pretty silly way to convince a much weaker country that it doesn't need some sort of deterrent. And please ignore the fact that America's key allies in Europe and even conservative publications like the Economist are urging the Obama administration to seize this and give Rouhani a serious chance. So is Bloomberg News.¶ I'm still fairly confident that Obama and the White House have little or no interest in another Middle East war. The State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence services aren't pushing for a war that could only delay but not eliminate Iran's nuclear potential either. And I'm 100 percent sure that the United States should engage Iran's new government seriously and patiently to see whether a deal can be struck. I even suspect that most of the senators and representatives who voted for or signed those silly but dangerous documents last week know all this too. But nobody ever went broke betting on the spinelessness of elected representatives in Congress, especially on just about anything concerning the Middle East.

#### Although Rouhani’s election created the possibility for successful negotiations, Iran is still pursuing a strategy of nuclearization.

Heinonen and Henderson, 13 (Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Rouhani and Iran's Nuclear Progress. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rouhani-and-irans-nuclear-progress)

Uranium enrichment. Iran continues to enrich uranium and increase the number of centrifuges installed, including around 18,000 of the IR-1 type centrifuge and 1,000 of the more efficient IR-2m type. Yet it will not need more than a small fraction of the enriched uranium it has already produced in the foreseeable future, let alone new uranium. Its sole nuclear power reactor uses low-enriched fuel supplied by Russia. Tehran persists in claiming that it needs some of the new enriched uranium it is producing to fuel a research reactor in the capital, despite refusing a past international offer to supply such fuel.¶ Worryingly, this research reactor requires 19.75 percent enriched uranium; Iran is currently producing 20 percent enriched fuel for it. In 20 percent fuel, the ratio of ordinary uranium-238 to its fissile isotope uranium-235 has already been processed from the 993:7 figure seen in natural uranium to 28:7, just short of the 1:7 needed for weapons-grade uranium. Iran continues to convert some of its 20 percent uranium into an oxide form, but most of this oxide (apart from a small amount that has been further processed into fuel plates) should be considered part of the enriched stockpile because it is comparatively easy to reconvert into centrifuge feedstock.¶ The increase in Iran's centrifuges and enriched uranium stockpile has opened the door for multiple breakout scenarios at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants, especially if there are other undeclared plants available. For the past three years, discussions of Iran's breakout potential centered on its steadily growing stockpile of 20 percent uranium, but the number of centrifuges is now so great that the arithmetic has changed: the government's huge stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium is now a crucial part of the calculation. As a result, a previous diplomatic proposal -- asking Iran to cap enrichment at 20 percent and ship most of that material abroad -- is now much less relevant in terms of curbing the risk of breakout.¶ The Arak heavy-water reactor. This research reactor will use natural-uranium (i.e., non-enriched) fuel rods, and it will be "moderated" using heavy water. Yet such reactors also produce plutonium, which could serve as an alternative nuclear explosive if separated from the spent fuel. Although Iranian officials told the IAEA that construction delays had pushed the reactor's start-up date to after the "first quarter of 2014," they subsequently indicated that "start-up" means "commissioning using nuclear material," according to a footnote in the latest report. This ambiguous phrasing could complicate any attempt to take military action against the facility if it became necessary, though another footnote indicates that Iranian officials told the IAEA three days before the report was published that they would give the agency notice "at least six months prior to the first introduction of nuclear material into the facility."¶ As soon as nuclear fuel is brought to a reactor site, the whole facility becomes politically "unbombable" because of IAEA resolutions regarding attacks on safeguarded nuclear plants. And once the fuel is inserted and the reactor has gone critical, any military strikes could cause huge radiation emissions. (Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor and its reported 2007 raid on Syria's reactor both took place before nuclear material was inserted.)¶ Possible military dimensions. The IAEA remains frustrated at Iran's lack of cooperation regarding "undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." Tehran has dismissed these concerns, which focus on the Parchin facility on the outskirts of the capital. Unidentified "member states" have told the agency that Iran conducted "hydrodynamic experiments" at Parchin, an indication that it may be trying to perfect the type of implosion device needed to make an atomic bomb using highly enriched uranium or plutonium. The government continues to block IAEA requests to visit the site and has bulldozed and asphalted the areas of concern, preventing the agency from taking potentially revealing samples even if it were allowed there.¶ IMPACT OF SYRIA DEBATE¶ Since the IAEA released its Iran report, Washington and other capitals have been absorbed in the debate over allegations that Syrian used chemical weapons on its own people. President Obama decided to delay a U.S. response until Congress has had time to debate the evidence; intentionally or not, this approach may well affect the Iranian nuclear issue.¶ Washington's current policy toward Iran is based on the belief that U.S. intelligence will provide timely warning if Tehran decides to make a nuclear bomb. The assumption is that Iran cannot break out and produce sufficient nuclear explosive for a weapon without the international community having time to spot what is going on, debate it, and counter it. Yet President Obama's delay on Syria creates doubt that he would behave in a sufficiently timely fashion to counter Iran.¶ Meanwhile, Israel has long indicated that it will make its own assessment of Iran's nuclear progress. Last September, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu presented his redline during a speech before the UN General Assembly: namely, Israel did not want Iran to acquire enough 20 percent enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb if the material was further processed. Yet when one factors in gaseous centrifuge feedstock and oxide that could be reconverted to feedstock, Iran is now past this line.¶ ROUHANI'S POSITION¶ Despite being inaugurated only weeks ago, President Rouhani should hit the ground running on the nuclear issue. He served as Iran's top nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005 and was also involved in crafting nuclear policies as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 1989 to 2005. His election was widely attributed to his campaign promises of bringing relief from international nuclear sanctions.¶ Since winning office, Rouhani has been assessing his strengths within Iran's power structure, which is dominated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He has also been crafting a new nuclear negotiating team. Although he has already publicly indicated that suspending the nuclear program is not an option, his administration's actual negotiating strategy has not yet crystallized. This strategy will be at least partly shaped by Tehran's assessment of President Obama's determination to act in Syria, a close ally of Iran. In other words, events in Damascus could be an important indicator of the direction and progress of nuclear negotiations with Iran.

#### Taking strikes off the table establishes a policy of nonintervention that makes successful negotiations possible.

Pillar ’13, Paul R. Pillar, 28 year CIA veteran, visiting prof at Georgetown for security studies and a member of the Center for Peace and Security Studies, International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013 “Correspondence: Nuclear Negotiations with Iran,” p. 179

Sebenius and Singh do acknowledge another difficulty: that Iran would perceive negotiations as merely a cover for a U.S. strategy of regime change. Oddly, they try to brush aside this problem by saying that the threat of military action “is not incompatible with negotiations, because it is a consequence of no deal rather than the actual U.S. objective” (p. 81). What matters for this purpose, however, is not the actual U.S. objective but the Iranian perception of it. American public discourse about Iran has already given Tehran ample reason to suspect that the objective is regime change. One of the most recent applications of U.S. military force in the Middle East— participation in the Western intervention to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya—probably has worsened the problem. The intervention ousted a regime that several years earlier had reached an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom not only to give up its nuclear and other unconventional weapons programs, but to eschew international terrorism. That experience exacerbated what may be the biggest challenge in negotiating a nuclear deal with Tehran: convincing the Iranians that the United States not only wants an agreement with the Islamic Republic but would abide by it for the long term rather than, as with Libya, seizing the first good opportunity to overthrow the regime. Further saber rattling directed at Iran would exacerbate that challenge, as well as stoke whatever interest the Iranians have in acquiring nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

#### A credible security assurance secures a grand bargain – only way to prevent Iran proliferation

Forbes, 13 (Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, lecturer at HEC Paris business school, journalist at Business Insider, business and economics columnist at Atlantico, A Completely Unrealistic Iran Grand Bargain Proposal. http://www.forbes.com/sites/pascalemmanuelgobry/2013/03/12/a-completely-unrealistic-iran-grand-bargain-proposal/)

It’s a testament to how dim the prospects of a sustainable solution to Iran‘s nuclear weapons program that we’ve forgotten what a good Endgame would look like: a Grand Bargain where Iran gets a wholesale lifting of sanctions and introduction into the “respectable” international community, access to civilian nuclear technology and acceptable security guarantees in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons program, submitting to international control thereof, and ending its sponsorship of terror groups.¶ It’s at least possible to imagine a sanctions/sabotage program so crippling that the Iranian regime would fear losing the support of its middle class and seek a better way. The example of Burma shows that it’s at least conceivable that an international sanctions regime can motivate a tyrannical regime to implement some degree of reform.¶ If we grant that the Iranian leadership would at least be theoretically amenable to such a Grand Bargain, it seems to me that the biggest holdup concerns the security guarantees. The Iranian leadership evidently believes (and, from their perspective, not without reason) that the United States wants not so much a nuclear-free Iran as regime change, and sees building nuclear capability as the only insurance policy against regime change.¶ This is why I think that the US Libya intervention was such a blunder of epic proportions. Remember that Ghadafi struck a deal with the international community to abandon its WMDs, renounce terror and indemnize terror victims in exchange for respectability for the regime. The international community then reneged on the deal and militarily effected regime change in Libya (regardless of the humanitarian reasons for doing so, that is what happened). Much more than throwing the Sahel into turmoil (though that headache will be with us for decades), this is the key reason why Libya was such a fantastic blunder.¶ Think about it from your average tinpot dictator’s perspective; the combined examples of Libya, Iraq and North Korea point to a very simple conclusion: if you have nukes, the US will mostly leave you alone; if you don’t, the US will jump at any pretext to bomb you into oblivion. Why US policymakers haven’t looked at the whole chessboard is mystifying to me.¶ Any Grand Bargain deal that would have any chance of getting the Iranian leadership onboard would therefore have to square that circle and provide iron-clad security guarantees to the Iranian regime. It can’t be a “cross your heart” promise from the US and Israel not to attack Iran, because that wouldn’t be credible. Iran would have to get an ironclad, credible security guarantee.

#### Commitment to end US interference in Iran’s internal affairs is a prerequisite to reset relations and open negotiations

Leverett and Leverett 08 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow and director of the New America Foundation’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. The Grand Bargain. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.leverett.html)

A U.S-Iranian grand bargain is a tall order. The commitments required of each side are not easy. They are, however, what each side needs to do to address the other’s core concerns. No other approach explicitly seeks to resolve the most significant differences between the United States and Iran; therefore, no other diplomatic approach will actually resolve those differences.¶ Based on numerous conversations with senior current and former Iranian officials—including, most recently, with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in July—we strongly believe that there is a critical mass of interest in and support for genuine strategic rapprochement with the United States. However, our conversations with Iranian officials also lead us to believe that a new U.S. administration interested in a more positive relationship with Iran will have to demonstrate that, under the right conditions, it is seriously willing to accept and live with the Islamic Republic. In this regard, the advocates of an incremental approach to engaging Iran have a point—a certain level of bilateral confidence needs to be restored.¶ One way for a new U.S. administration to get started with a redefinition of America’s Iran policy would be to affirm the continuing validity of the Algiers Accord, the 1981 agreement that ended the crisis prompted by Iran’s seizure of U.S. diplomats and other official personnel in Tehran as hostages following the Iranian revolution. The Algiers Accord includes a provision committing the United States not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. Every subsequent U.S. administration has in some way affirmed its validity—except for the current Bush administration, which has publicly characterized the agreement as a contract signed "under duress" and hence not valid.¶ Affirmation of the Algiers Accord’s validity by a new U.S. administration would send a powerful signal to Tehran about the potential for substantial improvement in U.S.-Iranian ties. We believe that, in an atmosphere of enhanced confidence, it would be possible for U.S. and Iranian representatives to explore and set down a strategic framework for the reordering of U.S.-Iranian relations. The next U.S. administration will not have a more important foreign policy task.

#### Security concerns are the primary motivator of Iranian nuclearization – the plan causes denuclearization regardless of the success or failure of negotiations.

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Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran. Orbis 52.4)

As the Bush administration began the verbal escalation to war, Iran¶ opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The relative ease with which the U.S.¶ military overthrew Saddam Hussein and occupied Baghdad in three weeks—¶ something Iran could not do in eight years—seems to have caused great¶ consternation in Tehran. After the Iraq invasion, then-Iranian President¶ Mohammad Khatami said, ‘‘They tell us that Syria is the next target, but¶ according to our reports, Iran could well follow.’’¶ 14¶ In April 2003, Iran found¶ itself essentially surrounded by U.S. forces commanded by a U.S. administra-¶ tion suggesting that Iran could be next. To Iran’s south, a powerful U.S. naval¶ presence patrolled the Persian Gulf, augmented by an impressive string of U.S.¶ military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirate¶ (UAE). To Iran’s west, over 100,000 American troops guarded Iraq. To Iran’s¶ North, U.S. troops were present in Azerbaijan and the central Asian republics.¶ 15¶ To Iran’s east, significant numbers of U.S. and other NATO troops patrolled¶ Afghanistan.¶ This sense of encirclement and strategic vulnerability prompted Iran¶ to seek a ‘‘grand bargain’’ with the United States in May 2003, only three¶ weeks after the Iraq invasion. This offer, apparently approved by the¶ Supreme Leader and the result of intense internal debate in Tehran, repre-¶ sented a major shift in Iranian policy, offering to address every major U.S.¶ objection to Iranian foreign policy.¶ 16¶ When the United States rejected the¶ offer out-of-hand, it confirmed the arguments of the hardliners and undercut¶ those of the moderates, convincing many Iranians that the United States had¶ a greater interest in regime change than in policy change. This rejection of¶ the Iranian negotiating proposal may also have left some Iranians believing¶ that the United States opposed Iranian power and regional influence, not just¶ its policies. Such an Iranian perception lead many in Tehran to conclude¶ that they are unable to negotiate with the United States, motivating their¶ leadership to push ahead with policies they might otherwise view as¶ negotiable.¶ Some leading observers dismiss the security motivation for the Iranian¶ nuclear weapons program, citing examples of confident and dismissive Iranian¶ rhetoric. In a comment, before the 2007 NIE release, for instance, Brigadier¶ General Mohammad-Ali Jafari, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,¶ downplayed a U.S. attack as ‘‘highly unlikely.’’ If the United States were to mount an attack on Iran, Jafari said Iran has ‘‘the proper means to nullify its¶ aggression.’’¶ 17¶ U.S. analysts and decision makers should not consider such¶ comments evidence that security from a U.S. attack does not represent an¶ important motivation for the Iranian nuclear program. High level Iranian¶ officials put forward a brave face in public, but are fearful in private. In¶ public, Iranian officials issue the standard lines similar to those of Jafari; in¶ private, these individuals quietly and anxiously ask questions such as, ‘‘Do you¶ think the United States will attack?’’ These Iranian responses were echoed in¶ multiple interviews with Arab Government leaders and scholars. There is a¶ genuine concern in the region—among both Arabs and Iranians—that the¶ United States will attack Iran. While the December 2007 Iran NIE undoubtedly¶ diminished some of these fears, subsequent statements by Khamenei suggest¶ Iranian fears of a U.S. attack are reduced but still palpable. For example, in¶ January 2008, Khamenei argued that the time was not right for establishing¶ relations with the United States by underscoring that relations between¶ Washington and Baghdad did not preclude the United States from attacking¶ Iraq.¶ 18¶ Some argue that Iranian fears of a U.S. attack will compel the Iranians¶ to negotiate. However, my interviews suggest these Iranian fears are having¶ the opposite effect. Fears of a U.S. attack validate a long-running Iranian belief¶ that Iran needs nuclear weapons to deter a U.S. attack. Consequently, a self-¶ reinforcing interplay has developed in which Iranian nuclear progress invites¶ escalating U.S. threats, and these threats, in turn, encourage Iran to push ahead¶ with its nuclear program. Until this cycle is broken, the likelihood of war or a¶ nuclear-armed Iran will grow.

#### Iran proliferation causes regional proliferation.

Brookes, 10 (Peter, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow, is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, Congressional staffer, CIA and State Department officer, and navy veteran. The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade. Journal of International Security Affaris. Fall Winter 2010. 19. http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/brookes.php)

In just the last four years, no fewer than fourteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa have announced their intention to pursue civilian nuclear programs–programs which, irrespective of their stated purpose, many believe are a hedge against the possibility of a nuclear Iran.¶ Possible Atomic Aspirants¶ Syria¶ United Arab Emirates¶ Jordan¶ Egypt¶ Yemen¶ Saudi Arabia¶ Bahrain¶ Kuwait¶ Oman¶ Qatar¶ Algeria¶ Libya¶ Morocco¶ Tunisia¶ Of course, it is possible that the intentions of these states are honest ones, spurred on by domestic energy needs. Not all countries are blessed with abundant natural resources, and consequently could be seeking an efficient and durable source of energy. There are even those that may be attempting to diversify their energy sources beyond simply oil and natural gas, or seeking to free up their energy reserves for profitable international export instead of costly domestic consumption. In addition, due to increasing concerns about climate change, some have come to see nuclear power, once considered an expensive investment, as an attractive alternative to fossil fuels, due to its reduced emissions and potential cost efficiency.¶ In some cases, it could also be an issue of national pride–a matter of keeping up with the nuclear Jones-es; or even an effort to demonstrate to your neighbors and the world the scientific and technical achievement involved in developing, building, and safely operating a peaceful, civilian nuclear power industry.¶ Of course, developing an indigenous nuclear industry is a significant undertaking. A nuclear reactor can take a decade and three to ten billion dollars to build. Even more time and money is required if a full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment capacity, is desired.¶ But such work is transformative. The development of scientific and technical capabilities for a civilian nuclear power program is instrumental to the subsequent building of the bomb. Even if it remains in compliance with the tenets of the NPT, a state can go quite a long way toward developing a nuclear program with a potential military dimension. Having the necessary nuclear infrastructure, especially that which would provide for a full nuclear fuel cycle, would allow concerned states to offset an Iranian nuclear breakout by possessing the theoretical potential to create a nuclear arsenal themselves.¶ Indeed, some analysts see the construction of nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia as symbolic of Riyadh’s dread over Iran’s nuclear activities, and as a move which will surely deepen tensions between the cross-Gulf rivals. In fact, many are convinced that the development of an Iranian Shi’a bomb will inevitably be matched by a Saudi Sunni bomb. It has long been rumored the Saudis have a deal with the Pakistanis for access to its nuclear inventory, or the stationing of Islamabad’s nuclear-capable missiles in the Kingdom in the likelihood of a change in Iran’s nuclear status.5¶ Of course, while this is possible, it does pose a number of political and strategic dilemmas for Pakistan, such as the health of its relationship with neighboring Iran, and a potential dilution of its nuclear deterrent against rival India. Egypt, the long-standing leader of the Arab world, operates two research reactors, has significant scientific and technical capabilities on nuclear matters, and is interested in nuclear power. Of course, developing a nuclear program with a military dimension is a possibility; however, doing so would surely hurt its ties with United States, could increase tensions with neighboring Israel, and drain less-than-plentiful government coffers.¶ Other countries that have expressed an interest in nuclear power, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, are likely doing so because of more local concerns. None of them have significant indigenous energy sources, and as a result are focused on the development of alternative energy sources. But that isn’t true for all of the states that have launched atomic plans. Kuwait and Qatar have significant holdings of oil and natural gas, which makes their respective decisions to pursue a nuclear program difficult to explain in a context other than that of a hedge against Iran’s growing capabilities.¶ And in some cases, these nuclear dreams have started to become reality. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country with the fifth largest proven oil reserves in the Middle East, last year completed a “123” agreement with the United States, paving the way for heightened nuclear cooperation and technology transfer between Washington and Abu Dhabi. During the Bush administration, Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also signed Memoranda of Understanding related to nuclear cooperation that–if pursued by the Obama White House–could lead to additional agreements such as the one struck with the UAE.¶ Turkey, another major regional power and NATO member, is also considering its nuclear options. Since taking power in 2002, the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has plotted a friendlier course toward neighboring Iran, a country Ankara historically has seen as a competitor. But despite the current, warm ties, Ankara may eventually come to see Tehran as a regional rival that could “undercut Turkey’s desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west,” according to a 2008 Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.6 Indeed, a shift in Ankara’s sentiments toward Tehran could incite interest in a nuclear program with a military dimension. And the current strains in Turkey’s existing relationships with the United States and Europe may make such a decision less taboo than in the past.¶ Then there is Syria. Damascus was caught with its hands in the nuclear cookie jar when Israel destroyed its undeclared nuclear facility at al-Kibar back in 2007. That plant–likely a reactor capable of producing fissile material–was being built with North Korean assistance.7 Of course, Syria’s nuclear activities are not focused on checking Iran; indeed, given the enduring partnership between the two countries, Syria might be receiving nuclear assistance from Iran. Rather, Syria’s strategic efforts are directed toward Israel.¶ Regional states are also banding together in pursuit of nuclear status. Most directly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)–consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Qatar–is now said to be contemplating a joint nuclear program that would pool resources and share electrical power among member states.8 And although some of the members’ interest in nuclear issues is stronger than others, as evidenced by the existence of separate indigenous programs, many analysts believe this joint effort was sparked specifically in response to Iran’s nuclear activities.9.

#### **Mid east proliferation causes nuclear war.**

Heisbourg ’12, [Francois Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, prof at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, July 2012, “How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?”, <http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/file/oving%20Beyond%20Pretense%20web%20version.pdf#page=182>]

Human societies tend to **lack the imagination to think through**, and to act upon, what have become known as “**black swan” events** 26 : **That which has never occurred** (or which has happened very rarely and in a wholly different context) **is deemed not to be in the field of reality,** and to which must be added eventualities that are denied because their consequences are too awful to contemplate. The extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11) bear testimony to this hardwired trait of our species. This would not normally warrant mention as a factor of growing salience if not for the recession into time of the original and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945. Nonuse of nuclear weapons may soon be taken for granted rather than being an absolute taboo. Recent writing on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs 27 may contribute to such a trend, in the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent, and often compelling, historical accounts of the surrender of the Japanese Empire that downplay the role of the atomic bombings in comparison to early research can produce a similar effect, even if that may not have been the intention. 28 However desirable it has been, the end of atmospheric nuclear testing 29 has removed for more than three decades the periodic reminders that such monstrous detonations made as to the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons. There is a real and growing risk that we forget what was obvious to those who first described in 1941 the unique nature of yet-to-be produced nuclear weapons. 30 The risk is no doubt higher in those states for which the history of World War II has little relevance and that have not had the will or the opportunity to wrestle at the time or ex post facto with the moral and strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. Unsustainable strains are possibly the single most compelling feature of contemporary proliferation. Examples include tight geographical constraints–with, for instance, New Delhi and Islamabad, located within 300 miles of each other; nuclear multi-polarity against the backdrop of multiple, crisscrossing sources of tension in the Middle East, as opposed to the relative simplicity of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation; the existence of doctrines, such as India’s “cold start,” and force postures, such as Pakistan’s broadening array of battle- field nukes, that rest on the expectation of early use; and the role of non-state actors as aggravating or triggering factors when they are perceived as operating with the connivance of an antagonist state (in the past, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914; and in the future, Hezbollah operatives launching rockets with effect against Israel or Lashkar-e-Taiba commandos doing a “Bombay” redux in India?). Individually or in combination, **these factors test crisis management capabilities** more severely than anything seen during the Cold War with the partial exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even the overabundant battlefield nuclear arsenals in Cold War Central Europe, with their iffy weapons’ safety and security arrangements, were less of a challenge: The U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so deployed were not putting U.S. and Soviet territory and capitals at risk. It may be argued that these risk factors are known to potential protagonists and that they therefore will be led to avoid the sort of nuclear brinksmanship that characterized U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War in crises such as the Korean War, Berlin, Cuba or the Yom Kippur War. Unfortunately, the multiple nuclear crises between India and Pakistan demonstrate no such prudence, rather the contrary. And were such restraint to feed into nuclear policy and crisis planning, along the lines of apparently greater U.S. and Soviet nuclear caution from the mid-seventies onwards, the fact would remain that initial intent rarely resists the strains of a complex, multiactor confrontation between inherently distrustful antagonists. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that during the 1980s there was real and acute fear in Soviet ruling circles that the West was preparing an out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, a fear which in turn fed into Soviet policies and dispositions. 31 The Cold War was a set of crises and misunderstandings that came within a whisker of a nuclear holocaust. India and Pakistan’s nuclear standoff is deeply unstable, not least as a result of the interaction with non-state actors. A multipolar nuclear Middle East would make the Cuban Missile Crisis look easy in comparison.

Great conflicts tend to occur when one or several of the antagonists views the status quo as sufficiently undesirable and/or unsustainable to prompt forceful pro-action. Notwithstanding widespread perceptions to the contrary, this was not the case of the USSR and the United States during the Cold War. The U.S. had chosen a policy of containment, as opposed to roll-back, of the Soviet Empire within the limits established as a result of World War II. The Soviet Union seized targets of opportunity outside of its 1945 area of control but avoided direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Messianic language from the USSR on the global victory of communism or from the U.S. about the end of the Evil Empire did not take precedence over the prime Soviet concern of preserving the Warsaw Pact and the U.S. pursuit of containment, or, no less crucially, their mutual con¿- dence that they could achieve these aims without going to war with each other No such generalization can be made about the Middle East, a region in which the very existence of a key state, Israel, is challenged, while other states have gone to war with each other (e.g. Iran-Iraq War, and the Gulf War of 1990-1991), or are riven by deep internal conflicts. Actors such as Hezbollah, with its organic and functional links with Islamic Iran and Alawite Syria, add to the complexities and dangers. Extreme views and actions vis à vis the strategic status quo are widely prevalent. Although the India-Pakistan relationship corresponds to something akin to the U.S.-Soviet “adversarial partnership,” that does not apply to radical non-state actors prevalent in Pakistan with more or less tight links to that country’s military intelligence services (ISI, Inter-Services Intelligence). The potential for danger is compounded by the variety of such groups: the Pashtu-related Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Kashmiri-related groups, and Jihadi militants from the core provinces of Punjab and Sind. Their common characteristics are extreme radicalism, high levels of operational pro¿ciency, and shared enmity of India. Their potential for triggering a conflict between the two countries is substantial, above and beyond the intentions of government of¿cials. sum, some seventy years after the launch of the Manhattan Project, there is every reason to upgrade and reinforce nonproliferation policies if nuclear use is to be avoided during the coming decades. Some markers to that end will be laid in our concluding section. What Is to Be Done? In light of the preceding analysis, the most obvious short run implication is the absolute need to secure a satisfactory conclusion of the Iranian file. Anything that feeds the perception of less-than full compliance of Iran with the strictest international safeguards or, worse, that creates the impression that recessed deterrence is in place, would lead to further proliferation in the Middle East and beyond. What happens to the Iranian nuclear program will be essential to the future of proliferation and nonproliferation prospects.

#### Iran proliferation is uniquely destabilizing -- multiple actors.

Joshi, 13 (Shashank, Research Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute. IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR IRAN. Whitehall Papers¶ Volume 79, Issue 1, 2012¶ Special Issue: The Permanent Crisis: Iran's Nuclear Trajectory.)

 First, nuclear deterrence depends on attribution. Only by accurately attributing a nuclear strike to a single, deterrable entity can we hope to make our deterrent threats credible. When there are multiple nuclear entities, such a process of attribution grows more difficult. According to a recently declassified intelligence assessment from 1984, ‘the existence of the separately controlled US, British, and French strategic nuclear strike systems increase[d] Moscow's uncertainty about nuclear escalation’.89 This was not only because it was unclear which Soviet adversaries might participate in a retaliatory strike, but also because it would not always be clear which ones might have launched a first strike – particularly from submarines (it is notable that the US, too, had doubts over its ability to make such distinctions).90¶ The existence of separately controlled US and Israeli nuclear weapons therefore presents a challenge for Iran. Separately controlled Iranian and, say, Saudi Arabian nuclear weapons would generate similar problems for the US, Israel and Europe – and perhaps even Pakistan and India. The problem would worsen if India were in the future to deploy nuclear-armed submarines in the region.¶ This problem is especially acute for three further reasons: first, the proximity of these states and the correspondingly short missile and, to a lesser extent, aircraft flight times;91 second, the lack of sophisticated early-warning systems that could compensate for such short flight times; and third, the possession and deployment of dual-use ballistic missiles – that is, those capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Each of these problems is a feature of the scenario in South Asia, where missile flight times are a matter of a few minutes.92 However, they assume greater prominence in a multipolar setting in which identifying the source of a nuclear strike may not be simple. Calculating Sufficiency and Vulnerability¶ Second, multipolar nuclear relationships can complicate a state's calculations about the survivability and sufficiency of its own nuclear arsenal. States might resort to worst-case calculations and develop arsenals based on the aggregate nuclear capability of any plausible coalition of nuclear states ranged against them. Moreover, efforts to configure a deterrent to a number of different states is difficult, and increases the probability of error. As Christopher Ford observes, ‘the more players there are, the more chances there will be for the system to break down, through accident, error, miscalculation, miscommunication, or some other pathology’.93

### Advantage 4: Israeli Strikes

#### An Israeli attack on Iran is coming by the end of the year.

Serwer ’13, (Daniel Serwer is a professor at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the Middle East Institute. Will this be the year that Israel goes to war with Iran?, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/03/will-this-be-the-year-that-israel-goes-to-war-with-iran/)

Israel did not bomb Iran last year. Why should it happen this year? Because it did not happen last year. The Iranians are proceeding apace with their nuclear program. The Americans are determined to stop them. Sanctions are biting, but the diplomatic process produced nothing visible in 2012. Knowledgeable observers believe there is no “zone of possible agreement.” Both the United States and Iran may believe that they have viable alternatives to a negotiated agreement. While Israel has signaled that its “red line” (no nuclear weapons capability) won’t be reached before mid-2013, it seems likely it will be reached before the end of the year. President Barack Obama has refused to specify his red line, but he has made it amply clear that he prefers intensified sanctions and eventual military action to a nuclear Iran that needs to be contained and provides incentives for other countries to go nuclear. If and when he takes the decision for war, there is little doubt about a bipartisan majority in Congress supporting the effort. Still, attitudes on the subject have shifted in the past year. Some have concluded that the consequences of war with Iran are so bad and uncertain that every attempt should be made to avoid it. Most have also concluded that Israel could do relatively little damage to the Iranian nuclear program. It might even be counter-productive, as the Iranians would redouble their efforts. The military responsibility lies with President Obama. There has been a recent flurry of hope that the Iranians are preparing to come clean on their past nuclear weapons activities, which could be a prelude to progress on the diplomatic track. The issue is allegedly one of timing and sequencing: the Iranians want sanctions relief up front. The Americans want to see enrichment to 20 percent stopped and the enriched material shipped out of the country, as well as a full accounting for past activities, before considering any but minor sanctions relief. Some would also like to see dismantling of the hardened enrichment plant at Fordow. But the fundamental issue is whether Iran is prepared to give up its nuclear weapon ambitions, or whether it is determined to forge ahead. Iranian behavior in the last year suggests no let-up in the country’s regional (and wider) pretensions. It has supported Bashar al-Assad to the hilt in Syria, armed Hamas for its confrontation with Israel, continued to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, assisted North Korea’s ballistic missile satellite launch and made trouble in Iraq. Why would it not also seek nuclear weapons, which would make it immune (or so many in the Iranian regime seem to think) from American regime change efforts? There are not a lot of good answers to that question, except this: a reasonable man in Tehran might well conclude that Iranian national security is better served by stopping the nuclear program before it actually produces weapons. Once Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the United States will target it. Israel will launch on warning. This hair trigger situation will be more perilous than the nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, when each side assumed the rationality of the other and communications between them were good. Neither Iran nor Israel assumes the other will behave rationally, making deterrence unreliable, and communications between the two governments are virtually non-existent. The distance between Tehran and Jerusalem makes quick decisions necessary. Two big political uncertainties loom over the nuclear issue next year: Iran is scheduled to hold presidential elections in June and the Supreme Leader is thought to be ill. The identity of neither Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s successor as president nor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s as Supreme Leader is clear. While it may be too much to hope that the successors will be any better than the incumbents, any transition introduces diplomatic delays and uncertainties, even though the nuclear program should be expected to proceed. But will the transitions be orderly, or will the Greens who roiled Iran’s political sphere last time around revive? Iran’s regime has deep roots in revolutionary fervor, which has made it more resilient than Egypt’s. But that does not mean it will last forever. There is still a slim hope for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The prospects are not good, but the consequences of failure are dreadful. The Obama Administration has managed to avoid overt commentary on Iran in the last couple of months. Candidate Romney was cautious during the campaign. The door is clearly open to the Iranians, if they want to come in from the cold of sanctions and isolation. If they fail to do so, and continue to buck the international community, war in 2013 is likely. Not because it is a good solution, but because President Obama might regard it as the only solution, albeit a temporary and highly uncertain one.

#### Perception of U.S. support is a key factor in Israel’s decision to strike

NYT ’12, (Will Israel Attack Iran?, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/magazine/will-israel-attack-iran.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0)

Netanyahu and Barak have both repeatedly stressed that a decision has not yet been made and that a deadline for making one has not been set. As we spoke, however, Barak laid out three categories of questions, which he characterized as “Israel’s ability to act,” “international legitimacy” and “necessity,” all of which require affirmative responses before a decision is made to attack: 1. Does Israel have the ability to cause severe damage to Iran’s nuclear sites and bring about a major delay in the Iranian nuclear project? And can the military and the Israeli people withstand the inevitable counterattack? 2. Does Israel have overt or tacit support, particularly from America, for carrying out an attack? 3. Have all other possibilities for the containment of Iran’s nuclear threat been exhausted, bringing Israel to the point of last resort? If so, is this the last opportunity for an attack? For the first time since the Iranian nuclear threat emerged in the mid-1990s, at least some of Israel’s most powerful leaders believe that the response to all of these questions is yes. At various points in our conversation, Barak underscored that if Israel or the rest of the world waits too long, the moment will arrive — sometime in the coming year, he says — beyond which it will no longer be possible to act. “It will not be possible to use any surgical means to bring about a significant delay,” he said. “Not for us, not for Europe and not for the United States. After that, the question will remain very important, but it will become purely theoretical and pass out of our hands — the statesmen and decision-makers — and into yours — the journalists and historians.” Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s vice prime minister and minister of strategic affairs, is the third leg in the triangle supporting a very aggressive stance toward Iran. When I spoke with him on the afternoon of Jan. 18, the same day that Barak stated publicly that any decision to strike pre-emptively was “very far off,” Ya’alon, while reiterating that an attack was the last option, took pains to emphasize Israel’s resolve. “Our policy is that in one way or another, Iran’s nuclear program must be stopped,” he said. “It is a matter of months before the Iranians will be able to attain military nuclear capability. Israel should not have to lead the struggle against Iran. It is up to the international community to confront the regime, but nevertheless Israel has to be ready to defend itself. And we are prepared to defend ourselves,” Ya’alon went on, “in any way and anywhere that we see fit.”

#### Strong US support is a prerequisite to an Israeli strike—leaders value ties very highly.

Zanotti et al 12 (Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. CRS. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42443.pdf)

Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support, particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S. policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress regarding an attack. Not surprisingly, Israeli leaders are extremely sensitive to U.S. views for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to: • Strong U.S.-Israel relations dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize the provisional Jewish government as the de facto government of Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • Robust ongoing military and security cooperation, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • Trade ties and important bilateral economic and scientific cooperation.141 Israeli leaders’ perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145

#### Israeli strike on Iran triggers world war III.

Reuveny, 10 (Rafael Reuveny is a professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. Con: Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression, <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.tGUOoSDf.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ ¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should statutorily preclude the use of United States Armed Forces in military conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran that is initiated by the United States or others.

### Solvency

#### **A demonstration of congressional support is a prerequisite to negotiations – Iran doesn’t think Obama can deliver on his promises.**

Alterman, 13 (Jon B. Alterman holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and directs the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Al-monitor. US-Iran Nuclear Deal Hinges On Syria Vote. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/us-iran-nuclear-deal-hinges-on-syria-vote.html)

To start, it is worth noting the extent to which foreign governments are sophisticated consumers of American political information. Decades of international cable news broadcasts and newspaper websites have brought intimate details of US politics into global capitals. Foreign ministers in the Middle East and beyond are US news junkies, and they seem increasingly distrustful of their embassies. For key US allies, the foreign minister often seems to have made him- or herself the US desk officer. Most can have a quite sophisticated discussion on congressional politics and their impact on US foreign relations. The Iranian government is no exception. While former president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was emotional and shrill in his opposition to the United States, there remains in Iran a cadre of Western-trained technocrats, fluent in English and nuanced in their understanding of the world. President Hassan Rouhani has surrounded himself with such people, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has charged them with investigating a different relationship between Iran and the United States. As they do so, they cannot help but be aware that on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration, the US House of Representatives voted 400–20 to impose stiff additional sanctions on Iran. The House saw Rouhani’s electoral victory as a call for toughness, not potential compromise. If Iran were to make concessions in a negotiation with the United States, they would surely seek sanctions relief and other actions requiring congressional approval. To make such concessions to Obama, they would need some confidence that he can deliver. A president who cannot bring around a hostile Congress is not a president with whom it is worth negotiating.

#### The United States should provide a security assurance to Iran.

Leverett and Leverett 08 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow and director of the New America Foundation’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, served as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council. Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy, is a former Foreign Service officer who served as director for Iran, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. The Grand Bargain. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0808.leverett.html)

From an Iranian perspective, one of the essential found-ations for a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain is a clear explanation of the American position toward the Islamic Republic. The United States would need to clarify that it is not seeking a change in the nature of the Iranian regime, but rather changes in Iranian policies that Washington considers problematic. The United States would also need to emphasize its commitment to the ongoing improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations.¶ In this regard, Iran would need the following assurances from the United States:¶ 1. As part of a strategic understanding addressing all issues of concern to both sides, the United States would commit not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is the essential substance of a U.S. security assurance.

#### Congress can effectively curtail the presidents war powers.

Howell and Pevehouse, 07 (Willam G. Howell, Prof @ U Chicago, Jon C. Pevehouse, Prof @ U Chicago. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Xii-xiii)

In several ways' this book advances our understanding of the domestic politics of war. For starters, it considers many more manifestations of congressional influence than previous scholars have recognized. Inter- branch struggles do not typically resemble duels wherein the president and Congress mark ten strides and fire, leaving the victor rr".rJing and the vanquished bleeding in the dirt. In politics, both often end up ,nlounded, just as both can claim a measure of success. The trick, \*e think, is to ac- count for a fuller range of possible outcomes when two branches of gov- ernment, with opposing objectives and differenr resources at theirlis- posal, square off against one another. This book does more rhan identify instances when Congress, with one carefully fired shot, fells a president. It documents those occasions when it maims him, whe n jt grurrs a rimb, and- perhaps most importantly, when a president walks away from a fight he feared losing. If we hold as our standard of proof the obliteration of white House military planning, we overlook the copious ways in which Congress influences presidential decisions about how often to use force, which kinds of foreign crises warrant actions and which kinds do not, the timing of a deployment, and its scope. The counterfactual to a world of congressional irrelevance does ,not require the elimination of the largest and most vital deploymenrs from the historical record. Instead, the correct counterfactual may be a delayed deployment in some in\_ stances' a shorter one in others, or the ,.urrigrr-.nt oi national priorities in others still. This book also pays careful attention to the mechanisms by which Congress manages to influence presidential decision making on the use of force' Sometimes Congress intervenes directly, establishiig reporting re- quirements, setting budgets, holding hearings, or passing l"\*, that re\_ strict the scope or duration of military deployment in these in\_ stances, the connection between the action, tirut-corrg..r, takes and the decisions that presidents make are more easily discerned. In other rn stances, though, congressional influence follows a more circuitous route When members of Congress proclaim their reluctance to use force abroad they may encourage U.S. adversaries who then fight longer and hardel jusr as they may influence the public's willingness to back their president in either case, the president may have cause to scale back or even aban don a military venture, even though Congress has not passed a single bil or resolution that formally curtails his war powers. He does so, though not so much because Congress itself matters, but rather because the ac tions that members take set in motion forces that materially impact hi capacity to wage war successfully. Additionally, this book assembles and analyzes a tremendous amoun of data. Some datasets allow us to systematically examine Congress' influence over the frequency with which presidents deploy troops abroad others allow us to examine whether Congress affects the probability tha presidents respond militarily to different kinds of foreign crises. We introduce another dataset-the only of its kind-that allows us to trac congressional deliberation about an impending military ventured througl a wide variety of local and national print and television media outlets; we then compile other observational and experimental public opinion data that allow us to examine whether congressional influence over the media extends to influence over public's willingness to support a war. 'We knov of no other book on the domestic politics of war that compiles so man' or so diverse a set of original databases.

Congress has effectively enforced specific statutory restrictions – examples prove

Fisher 97 Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress

U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy Spring, 1997 3 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 107

Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse \*

II. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS

Through its prerogative to authorize programs and appropriate funds, Congress can define and limit presidential power by withholding all or part of an appropriation. n20 It may attach "riders" to appropriations measures to proscribe specific actions. n21 It has become the custom in Congress to admit certain "limitations" in an appropriations bill. Since Congress, under its rules, may decline to appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, "so it may by limitation prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder of it." n22

It is sometimes argued that the power of the purse is ineffective in [\*111] restraining presidential wars. Senator Jacob Javits said that Congress "can hardly cut off appropriations when 500,000 American troops are fighting for their lives, as in Vietnam." n23 The short answer is that Congress can and has used the power of the purse to restrict presiden tial war power. If members of Congress are worried about American troops fighting for their lives in a futile war that is unrelated to American national interests, those lives are not protected by voting for continued funding. The proper and sensible action is to terminate appropriations and bring the troops home. Members need to make that case to their con-stituents. It can be done.

Congress used the power of the purse to end the war in Vietnam. n24 In 1976, by adopting the Clark amendment, n25 Congress prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from operating in Angola other than to gather intelligence. Legislation also prohibited the CIA from conducting military or paramilitary operations in Angola and denied any appropriated funds to finance directly or indirectly any type of military assistance to Angola. n26

Beginning in 1982, Congress drafted increasingly tighter language to prohibit the use of appropriated funds to assist the Contras in Nicaragua. In 1986, Congress placed language in an appropriations bill to restrict the President's military role in Central America by stipulating that U.S. personnel "may not provide any training or other service, or otherwise participate directly or indirectly in the provision of any assistance, to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance pursuant to this title within those areas of Honduras and Costa Rica which are within 20 miles of the border with Nicaragua." n27 The statute defined U.S. personnel to mean "any member of the United States Armed Forces who is on active duty or is performing inactive duty training" and any employee of any department, agency, or other component of the executive branch. n28 The clear purpose was to prevent military activities in Honduras and Costa Rica from spilling over into Nicaragua. The Reagan Administration never offered any constitutional objections to this statutory restriction.

Statutory restrictions were again used in 1991, when Congress authorized President Bush to use military force against Iraq. The statutory authority was explicitly linked to UN Security Council Resolution 678, which was adopted to expel Iraq from Kuwait. n29 Thus, the legislation did not [\*112] authorize any wider action, such as using U.S. forces to invade and occupy Iraq, perhaps by reaching as far into the country as Baghdad. Two years later, Congress established a deadline for U.S. troops to leave Somalia. No funds could be used for military action after March 31, 1994, unless the President requested an extension from Congress and received express statutory authority. n30 From 1993 to 1995, Congress considered, but discarded, language to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for the invasion of Haiti and the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia. n31

## T-Authority

#### We limit the president’s authority regarding Iran.

#### Authority is power to influence or command

Goodman 93 OPINION BY: BY THE COURT; JAMES A. GOODMAN, judge In re: JANICE T. BOURQUE, Debtor Case No. 91-10570 Chapter 13 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 153 B.R. 87; 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 563; 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,327; 71 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1626 April 12, 1993, Decided lexis

The court in In re Premo, supra, considered whether the ultimate authority to control corporate tax payments is equivalent for purposes of section 6672 to having a "duty" to make such payments. It noted that the term "duty" is defined as "obligatory tasks, conduct, service, or function that arise from one's position", while the word "authority" is defined as the "power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior." 116 Bankr. at 525, quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985). Accordingly, it determined that the terms were not synonymous, and the IRS's reliance upon Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir.), [\*\*21] cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821, 27 L. Ed. 2d 48, 91 S. Ct. 38 (1970), was misplaced. In Monday, the court ruled that HN7Go to this Headnote in the case.corporate office does not per se impose the duties imposed by section 6672: "liability attaches to those with the power and responsibility within the corporate structure for seeing that the taxes withheld from various sources are remitted to the Government." 421 F.2d at 1214-15. The court went on to state that "this duty is generally found in high corporate officials charged with general control over corporate business affairs who participate in decisions concerning payment of creditors and the disbursal of funds. Id. (emphasis in original).

#### Discretion is limited to the range of authority ---- topical action must limit the authority, not discretion within authority

Luna, 2k Erik Luna, Associate Professor, University of Utah College of Law Iowa Law Review May, 2000

85 Iowa L. Rev. 1107 ARTICLE: Transparent Policing

For present purposes, a modest definition will suffice--discretion is the power to choose between two or more courses of conduct. An official, therefore, has discretion when the boundaries of hisauthority leave him with the freedom to choose how to act--or not to act. n88 This discretionary power is a "residual" n89 concept, the latitude remaining after the authority and decisions of other actors have been tallied. Dworkin employed a colorful simile for discretion to capture its relative, contextual nature: "Discretion, like the hole of a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction." n90 Using this pastry-based metaphor, imagine a box containing a single doughnut. If the box's total area represents all potential courses of conduct for a particular actor, and the doughnut symbolizes the restrictions on the actor's discretion, the region within the doughnut--the doughnut hole--delineates the totality of his discretionary power. Outside of this area, the actor has no freedom of choice; he must either act in a prescribed manner or not act at all. In other words, the actor is without discretion.

#### Limits – they prevent the aff from debating any specific use of force.

#### Ground – all their da’s should apply to the use of force against Iran.

#### Reasonability – competing interpretations causes a race

#### We meet – we prohibit the president from deploying forces into Iran.

## 2AC Courts

#### Perm do both

#### Not a change in strategy – congressional security guarantees are an olivebranch to Iran that build trust and allow negotiations. That’s Leverett and Alterman.

#### Israel doesn’t solve – they aren’t a foreign policy actor and can’t dictate US policy.

#### Perm do the cp – we only specify the usfg. Judicial restrictions are still topical.

#### Links to the net benefit – congress and the president would still have to enforce the ruling.

#### Agent Cp’s bad

#### A) Moots 1ac – we can’t generate offense against the plan.

####  B) Topic education – they can just go for the same terrible cp on every topic

#### C) Literature should be the standard – there is no literature base about whether or not the courts should ban the invasion of a specific country.

#### 7) Can’t fiat enforcement – courts will not enforce the precedent.

Howell and Pevehouse, 07 (Willam G. Howell, Prof @ U Chicago, Jon C. Pevehouse, Prof @ U Chicago. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. xvi)

Unlike the military, courts during the past half century have wielded re- markably little influence over prJrid.rrtial decision making during the ongoing conduct of a milit"ry u.rrture.a As Edward Keynes notes, The contemporary record of the Federal courts suggests that the government is free to initiate and conduct undeclared wars and military hostility with very few constitutional limitations."5 Rarely in the modern era have judges or justices intervened directly into a president's military campaign. The Supreme Court, for instance, still has not ruled on the constitutionality of theWar Powers Resolution, usually finding some reason (typically lack of standing or the political questionare doctrine) to deny certiorari, even numerous plaintiffs, including members of Congress, have sought injunc- tions that presidents invoke the resolution before using force. During the entire Vietnam 'War, only two federal district courts ever challenged the president's power to oversee military operations without a formal con- gressional authorization; and in both instances, these decisions were over- turned on appeal.6 Not once in the modern era have the courts repudiated a military action and demanded that the president bring the troops home.

#### NO ground to rule over Iran – the CP needs to have

Deference is necessary to stop citizen environmental suits against the DOD

Latham 2k

[Latham, Editor at the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2K (Joshua, “The Military Munitions Rule and Environmental Regulation of Munitions,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 467)]

With the EPA powerless to institute judicial proceedings or issue administrative orders against federal facilities, only citizens and the [\*474] states were left to seek enforcement of environmental statutes by federal facilities. n55 Although the EPA did not interfere with such suits, the success of citizen- and state-instituted judicial actions were limited due to the doctrine of "sovereign immunity." n56 Very simply put, the sovereign immunity doctrine provides that unless Congress explicitly waives federal sovereign immunity under each of the environmental statutes, the federal government is not liable for statutory violations. n57 In the 1992 case of Ohio v. United States Department of Energy, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of sovereign immunity. n58 The Supreme Court held that unless Congress unequivocally waives the sovereign immunity of the federal government, states may not institute lawsuits and may not impose penalties against federal facilities for statutory violations. n59 Even when the military was brought to the courts to enforce environmental compliance, the judicial branch was extremely reluctant to force the military to conform to environmental legislation. n60 Courts often cited the need for the judiciary to distance itself from military issues because of their bearing on international policy, or the lack of judicial experience or expertise to deal with such issues. n61 Similarly, judges often refused to enforce environmental compliance based upon the judge's perceptions that a case might compromise national security. n62

Forcing more environmental pressure on the DOD undermines training and combat readiness

Montalvo ‘02

Montalvo, of the Temple Environmental Law & Technology Journal, 2K2 (Eric, “Operational Encroachment: Woodpeckers and their Congressman,” Temple Environmental Law & Technology Journal, Spring, 20 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 219)

The judicial granting of injunctive relief for an administrative error resulting in temporary or permanent cease of military operations is of no small consequence. The harshness of a choice between environmental concerns and the deprivation of essential training from the men and women of the Armed Forces cannot be what Congress intended by the incorporation of injunctive relief in the citizen suit provisions of the various environmental statutes. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on encroachment issues and their impact on military readiness n23, Admiral Amerault described the deprivation of training "impact" as follows: When our vital ranges are not available for training because they are encumbered by encroachments, our state of readiness is at risk. This is complicated by the fact that encroachment issues are complex, varied, and involve multiple federal, state, and local agencies, the Congress, non-governmental organizations and the public. In dealing with its effects, we have borne a significant increase in administrative and human costs (time away from home, flight hour costs, travel expenses etc.) to achieve an acceptable level of readiness. In some instances, we have been unable to achieve the desired level. Encroachment negatively affects readiness by reducing the number of available training days; reducing training realism as tactics are modified (altitudes, airspeeds, profiles) ... causing a loss of range access altogether (either temporary or permanent); decreasing scheduling flexibility and complexity ... and increasing time away from home during training prior to deployment. Encroachment is often gradual and can go unnoticed, but its impacts cumulatively erode our ability to deploy combat ready Sailors and Marines. Knowledge of these domestic pressures by our allies may influence them to deny use of their ranges by our forces ... This loss of training opportunities will reduce fleet combat readiness proportionately. n24 Congress, in its efforts to address deepening concerns over the deterioration of our environment and historical non-compliance by federal facilities, enacted environmental legislation with the intent of reversing the effects of years of non-compliance and encouraging future compliance and prevention. n25 A seemingly unintended consequence, however, of the inclusion of citizen suit provisions - more specifically the availability of injunctive relief has been the creation of a litigation battleground between national security interests and the environment. A "line in the sand" has been drawn between national security interests and environmental concerns. The adversarial process has produced just that - adversaries. An added wrinkle is that a number of the noncompliance allegations against the DOD maintain dubious environmental claims, keeping hidden what may truly set the parties apart. n26 It seems unlikely that Congress intended the training of a Carrier Battle Group n27 to be stopped by an alleged siting of an endangered turtle - especially in today's climate of terror. n28

Readiness is critical to global conflict prevention

Spencer 2k

Spencer, Defense and National Security Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, 9-15-2K (Jack, “THE FACTS ABOUT MILITARY READINESS,” Heritage Foundation Reports, N. 1394, P. 1)

Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from many different nations at once. America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, n3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." n4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. n5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War. n6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

## 2AC Debt Ceiling

#### Case outweighs -- Iran war is the conflict Merlini describes. The middle east is where miscalculation from economic collapse could escalate. Prefer our specific impact of their generic claims of war.

#### Iran conflict turns economic collapse – Iran would shut the strait of Hormuz and Venezuela would stop selling oil. Stronger internal to the global economy

Neither side will back down.

NBC 10/4 [http://firstread.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/10/04/20818520-first-thoughts-conservatives-arent-backing-down]

\*\*\* Conservatives aren’t backing down: Here we are in Day 4 of the government shutdown, and after a brief period of comity yesterday (given the violent episode on Capitol Hill), both sides in the stalemate are **back into their respective corners.** That’s especially true for conservatives. Despite polls showing that more Americans are blaming Republicans than Democrats for the shutdown, and despite establishment Republicans admitting they aren’t winning this fight, **conservatives aren’t backing down.** In fact, they feel they have survived the fallout from the first few days. Case in point is Sen. Rand Paul’s (R-KY) admission in that hot-mic moment that “We’re gonna win this, I think.” Is that the reality of this standoff? Or it is simply due to the conservative echo chamber? After all, one of the major differences between the last shutdown (in 1995-1996) and now is the rise of FOX News, Drudge, and Breitbart News. As the New York Times recently wrote, “a fervent group of conservatives — bloggers, pundits, activists and even members of Congress — is harnessing the power of the Internet, determined to tell the story of the current budget showdown on its terms.” It explains why conservatives aren’t as convinced as many others are that this will do significant damage to the party.

#### Plan doesn’t cause a tradeoff. Negotiations would occur within the republic caucus and republicans would be lockstep in support of limiting Obama’s power.

Sargent 9/12 [Greg, Washington Post, The Morning Plum: Senate conservatives stick the knife in House GOP leaders

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/09/12/the-morning-plum-senate-conservatives-stick-the-knife-in-house-gop-leaders/]

All of this underscores a basic fact about this fall’s fiscal fights: Far and away the **dominant factor** shaping how they play out will be the d**ivisions among Republicans. There’s** a great deal of chatter (see Senator Bob Corker for one of the most absurd examples yet) to the effect that Obama’s mishandling of Syria has diminished his standing on Capitol Hill and will weaken him in coming fights. But those battles at bottom will be about whether the Republican Party can resolve its internal differences. Obama’s “standing” with Republicans — if it even could sink any lower — is **utterly irrelevant to that question**. The bottom line is that, when it comes to how aggressively to prosecute the war against Obamacare, **internal GOP differences may be unbridgeable.** Conservatives have adopted a deliberate strategy of deceiving untold numbers of base voters into believing Obamacare will be stopped outside normal electoral channels. Central to maintaining this fantasy is the idea that any Republican leader who breaks with this sacred mission can only be doing so because he or she is too weak and cowardly to endure the slings and arrows that persevering against the law must entail. GOP leaders, having themselves spent years feeding the base all sorts of lies and distortions about the law, are now desperately trying to inject a does of reality into the debate by pointing out that the defund-Obamacare crusade is, in political and practical terms alike, insane. But it may be too late. The time for injecting reality into the debate has long since passed.

#### Intrinsicness – a logical policymaker controls the disad and the passage of the plan. Kills education.

#### No trade off – no negotiations over debt ceiling.

CNN 9/15 [Obama economic adviser's refrain: No debt ceiling negotiations Posted by CNN's Dan Merica, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/15/obama-economic-advisers-refrain-no-debt-ceiling-negotiations/]

Washington (CNN) - President Barack Obama and his closest advisers are making it clear: They will not negotiate on the looming debt ceiling. In an interview on Sunday with ABC, Obama said he "will not negotiate...on the debt ceiling" because making a debate over the credit of the United States the norm would alter "the constitutional structure of this government entirely." Gene Sperling, a senior economic adviser to Obama, echoed his boss's pledge on a Sunday call with reporters. "All (Obama) has said is that he cannot and will not and should not negotiate on the debt limit because to do so gives credence to the idea of any side threatening the default of the United States of America over a policy dispute," said Sperling, the outgoing director of the National Economic Council. "As you heard the president say, he is not going to negotiate over the debt limit, that we should not be negotiating over whether to pay our bills."

#### Debt ceiling would be attached the plan as a rider—plan guarantees passage.

#### Link is false – the Republicans wouldn’t hate a decrease in presidential power

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war.

Jervis 11 [Robert, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science, and a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Force in Our Times Saltzman Working Paper No. 15 July 2011 http://www.siwps.com/news.attachment/saltzmanworkingpaper15-842/SaltzmanWorkingPaper15.PDF]

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, **it will not make war thinkable.**

#### Empirically doesn’t collapse the economy.

Tanner 11 [Michael Tanner 11, National Review, “No Surrender on Debt Ceiling”, Jan 19, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/257433/no-surrender-debt-ceiling-michael-tanner]

Of course the Obama administration is already warning of Armageddon if Congress doesn’t raise the debt ceiling. Certainly it would be a shock to the economic system. The bond market could crash. The impact would be felt at home and abroad. But would it necessarily be worse than the alternative? While Congress has never before refused to raise the debt ceiling, it has in fact frequently taken its time about doing so. In 1985, for example, Congress waited nearly three months after the debt limit was reached before it authorized a permanent increase. In 1995, four and a half months passed between the time that the government hit its statutory limit and the time Congress acted. And in 2002, Congress delayed raising the debt ceiling for three months. It took three months to raise the debt limit back in 1985 as well. **In none of those cases did the world end.** More important, what will be the consequences if the U.S. government fails to reduce government spending? What happens if we raise the debt ceiling then continue merrily on our way spending more and running up ever more debt? Already Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have warned that our credit rating might be reduced unless we get a handle on our national debt. We’ve heard a lot recently about the European debt crisis, but, as one senior Chinese banking official recently noted, in some ways the U.S. financial position is more perilous than Europe’s. “We should be clear in our minds that the fiscal situation in the United States is much worse than in Europe,” he recently told reporters. “In one or two years, when the European debt situation stabilizes, [the] attention of financial markets will definitely shift to the United States. At that time, U.S. Treasury bonds and the dollar will experience considerable declines.” Moreover, unless we do something, federal spending is on course to consume 43 percent of GDP by the middle of the century. Throw in state and local spending, and government at all levels will take 60 cents out of every dollar produced in this country. Our economy will not long survive government spending at those levels.

####  **Winners win – Plan lets the Obama sweep through gridlock and raise the debt ceiling more quickly.**

Hirsch, 13 (Michael, Chief correspondent for the National Journal. There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital. http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207)

But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”

## 2AC Apoc Rhetoric

FW – We’re not responsible for all simulation, nor language. We just had an idea we thought would be good if the government enacted it. You shouldn’t blame our aff for being responsible for something like all science. They have to win a substantial link.

#### No impact – case outweighs – we prevent intervention – we have created policy for the purpose of non-intervention – no link between staturoy restrictions and impact

#### Their absolutist refusal to evaluate the plan causes paradigm wars, not change.

Wendt ‘98, 3rd Most Influential Scholar of IR in the World According to Survey of 1084 IR Scholars, ‘98

(“On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The **central point** of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will **inevitably lead to confusion** (after all, **after 2000 years, even** the **specialists are still having a hard time**). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. **Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance**, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, **not second-order issues of method**.

Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contamin- ated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘**paradigm wars’**. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is **not clear by what criteria their work should be judged**, **or how it differs from art or revelation**. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s **sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures** of science.

And our form of imagination is good for resisting the hyper-reality of the government. It’s a resistance against expertism

Kulynych, '97 [JESSICA, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT WINTHROP UNIVERSITY, “PERFORMING POLITICS," POLITY, WINTER, V.XXX, N.2, PAGES 336-346; FULL TEXT ON BACK]

When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. **Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers** in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding.

#### Perm do both

#### Representational violence DOESN’T preclude the need for concrete action

Richard Rorty, Professor of Humanities, University of Virginia, Truth, Politics, and Postmodernism, Spinoza Lectures, 97, p. 51-2

This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by Derrida, another writer who enjoys demonstrating that something very important – meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship – is both necessary and impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida usually replies that the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled `post‑modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post‑modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox‑mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self‑contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency ‑ and more generally, to the `metaphysics of presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible. I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way to describe intellectual progress. Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post‑modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment offered. We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.

#### Scenario planning is possible in a catastrophe-ridden world—it’s vital to make predictions about the future.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Independently of this contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

#### Their Criticism is an excuse to Ignore the Material Realities of Nuclear Conflict - Level Headed Political Engagement is Required to Prevent Use

Christopher Norris, Prof. @ Univ. of Wales, ’94 [*Prose* 17.2, “Nuclear Criticism Ten years on,” p. 135-6]

One could venture various explanations for the fact that nuclear criticism enjoyed only a brief period of high visibility in the pages of Diacritics and other such organs of advanced cultural and literary theory. One is the lessening of tension that has occurred with the break-up of the Soviet empire, the decommissioning of (at least some) nuclear weapons, and the advent - supposedly - of a "New World Order" in which there no longer appears any imminent threat of global catastrophe. But these are hardly reasons for unqualified optimism, as Ruthven does well to remind us in the sombre epilogue to his book. After all, there remain vast stockpiles of warheads and delivery systems, some of them now unaccounted for and most likely under the control - such as it is - of forces in the warring ex-Soviet republics and other violently unstable regions. From this point of view the situation is perhaps more dangerous (or less amenable to "expert" forms of strategic thinking, rational calculation, crisis-management, etc.) than at the time when Derrida delivered his lecture at Cornell. What has changed is that highly specific conjuncture - of rhetorical "escalation" to the point of aporia or absolute "undecidability" - from which this movement first took rise and in which it discovered a short-lived pretext for some fairly arcane and wire-drawn argumentation. At its best nuclear criticism offered a focus (albeit, at times, an oddly angled focus) for exposing the sheer illogicality of deterrence theory and alternative strategic doctrines. To this extent it made common cause with other approaches - for instance, by philosophers in the broadly analytic (or Anglo-American) camp - which addressed similar issues in a different, less apocalyptic style (see for instance Blake and Pole 1983 and 1984). But the suspicion still hangs over many of these texts - Derrida's included - that by thus raising the rhetorical stakes they are indulging a form of runaway doomsday paranoia which itself partakes of that same pseudo-logic, that escalating language of crisis and terminal catastrophe whose effects they purport to analyze. For in this context more than most it is important that certain distinctions not be blurred. These include the boundaries between fact and fiction, reason and unreason, or reality and its various counterfeit guises - war-game scenarios etc. - where any such confusion is likely to generate real-world crises and catastrophes of the kind so vividly prefigured three decades ago in the film Dr Strangelove. Which is also to see, pace Derrida, that theorists should not make light of the distinction between constative and performative speech-act genres, whatever their seeming "undecidability" when encountered in certain (surely aberrant) forms of nuclear-strategic discourse. Nor should they devise ingenious pretexts for distracting attention from the nuclear "referent," whether this be construed in terms of an all-too-real nuclear arsenal or in cognizance of the all-too-present and future possibility that those weapons will actually be used. What is required is a level-headed analysis which underestimates neither the capacities of critical reason nor the forces ranged against it in the name of so-called "deterrence," "realism," "containment," "first-strike potential," "damage-limitation," etc. Otherwise - to adapt Karl Krauss's famous remark about psychoanalysis - there is a risk that nuclear criticism will become just one more symptom of the selfsame disease for which it purports to offer a cure.

#### The Negative is *Reductionist* - Risk, Calculation, and Politics are part of Positive and Deliberative Approach to Nuclear Weapons

Bryan Hubbard, MA in Political Science @ ASU, ’97 [*Rhetorical Analysisis of Two Contemporary Atomic Campaigns*, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA327948]

Tim O'Brien (1979) ends his novel The Nuclear Age by saying, "even then I will hold to a steadfast orthodoxy, confident to the end that E will somehow not quite equal mc2, it's a cunning metaphor, that the terminal equation will somehow not quite balance" (p. 312). The danger of a textual simulacra (Baudrillard, 1983) stems from the lack of an anchor. At that point, critics and textual construction drift on a fabric unconcerned with the political distribution of risk and ignorant of the historical and intertextual threads which break the seamless self-producing knowledge of nuclearism. Tracing the continuities of our present conversation through a history of events and practices shows that each assumption and each step taken in the nuclear age feels the influence of earlier moments and affects future actions and arguments. Critics can facilitate this awareness by talking about nuclear issues and recognizing that these issues affect the shape of political, material and social relations. This project noted that the nuclear age continues a variety of impulses from antiquity. Though these impulses of perfection, control and apocalypticism impel the search for technology and their accompanying dangers, these are the same impulses that inspire us to try to better understand the communicative aspect of the nuclear age before it is too late. Hope drives us to affect and influence the direction of policy and culture through opening conversation to more views, more values and more ideas. Though control and perfection may escape our reach these impulses can inspire benefits as much as they have inspired our downward spiral toward nuclearism. Peter Partner (1987) reflected on the crusades of the middle ages by saying: The Crusades grew from that part of men's minds in which the boundaries between the real and the metaphorical, the signifier and signified, are shifting and uncertain. They are evidence of man's [sic] idealism, but also of his cruelty and folly: like other episodes in the history of religion they tell us that religious metaphors can be turned into political realities by means ofbloodshed and terror. (p. xiv) Our experience of nuclear knowledge also approaches problems with the zeal of crusaders and romanticism of alchemists trying to save the world for absolute ideals sanctioned by higher powers. Though these ideals often inspire the inhumanity which fills the pages of history, the milestones documenting our humanity are carved from these same stones. So the potential always exists for choices. These choices never occur independently from the discursive influences and weight of history, but always contain the potential for deflection from tragic trajectories as long people can hear the voices potentially influencing their choices and the other voices expressing concern for where those decisions might lead. As this nuclear project ends, it recognizes its fate as becoming part of an archive of fossilized talk about nuclear issues. Yet, a compound of fossils may cement into an odd aggregate to pave a nuclear future. At its best nuclear criticism's journey starts and ends with an idea of humanity provided by K. Burke (1966). The disease of nuclearism which infects this organism may be one of those diseases that knows no cure and is only managed through sustained treatment. The treatment for this "symbol-using, (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal" (K. Burke, p. 16) comes not in global educational campaigns and universal values but small injections "of political patchwork here and there" (p. 20) so that "things might be improved somewhat if enough people began thinking along the lines of this definition" (p. 21) and creating a perpetual practice of nuclear criticism.

#### Discourse of nuclear weapons prevent use – deterrence

Rajaraman, 2 – Professor of Theoretical Physics at JNU (R., “Ban battlefield nuclear weapons,” 4/22/2, *The Hindu*, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/2002042200431000.htm>)

There were a variety of different reasons behind each of these examples of abstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factor contributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nuclear devastation. The well documented images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the awesome photographs of giant mushroom clouds emerging from nuclear tests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclear Armageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psyche of all but the most pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacceptability of nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrier against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of serious military crises.

## 2AC Resolve

#### Iran outweighs and turns – if Obama can get a grand bargain with Iran he will secure a major goal of his administration and improve his credibility. Prefer our specific Iran war scenario over their vague threats of credibility.

#### Nuclear arsenal checks – countries still deterred by huge US retaliatory capability

Syria killed cred

#### Credibility/ Resolve low now.

Barnes, 13 (Fred, Executive editor of the weekly standard. Hesitation, Delay, and Unreliability. http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/hesitation-delay-and-unreliability\_752788.html)

In his World War II memoirs, Winston Churchill offered this lesson: “In war, resolution; in defeat, defiance; in victory, magnanimity; in peace, good will.” Being resolute—that is, steadfast and determined—comes first. It is normally regarded as a critical component of success.¶ Obama and resolve don’t seem to mix. As the death toll in the Syrian civil war mounted, he opposed American intervention. Then, in an offhand remark a year ago, he said his policy would change if the Assad regime crossed a “red line” and used chemical weapons. Still, he ignored unsubstantiated reports of gas attacks that Secretary of State John Kerry said numbered in the “teens.” He decided to act only when American intelligence confirmed an estimated 1,400 people had been killed in a gas attack by the Syrian military on August 21.¶ A bombing assault was planned for Labor Day weekend to “deter” further use of chemical weapons and “degrade” Assad’s arsenal. But Obama abruptly jettisoned that plan and announced he would seek the approval of Congress. An attack, if there is to be one, could be postponed for weeks, jeopardizing what’s known as “peak” military readiness.¶ Earlier, in June, the White House announced it would send small arms and munitions to the Syrian rebels. By early September, however, no weapons had reached the rebels.¶ So hesitation, delay, and unreliability are the hallmarks of Obama’s approach to Syria, for now. This amounts to presidential “fecklessness,” says Steven F. Hayward, author of Greatness: Reagan, Churchill, and the Making of Extraordinary Leaders. “A strong war leader needs one quality above others,” he says, “a ruthlessness to see it through, coupled with a touch of legerdemain to keep our enemies off balance and fearful of what the United States might do.”¶ Obama certainly lacks that “touch” of cunning. There’s a gulf between his mission and his military. His goal is the removal of Assad as Syrian leader —in other words, regime change. But Obama insists a bombing attack in Syria would be solely to stop further use of chemical weapons. He’s publicly ruled out a wider assault aimed at regime change or deployment of ground troops.¶ “Calling for Assad’s downfall and warning him not to use chemical weapons but being hesitant to back up his strong words with commensurate actions is not how successful commanders in chief behave in wartime,” says Max Boot, author of Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present.

#### No specific impacts – make them read scenarios

#### First strike is a bluff—undermines credibility

Riedel and O'Hanlon 10 Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, 3-16-10, “The Case Against Threatening Iran,” Politico

In addition, even if the charge is unfair, Obama’s critics at home could accuse him of weakness, increasing the pressure on him to consider an attack. America’s credibility might also be weakened, since Washington would be seen as having its bluff called. Future scenarios in which the United States might wish to credibly threaten an attack against an adversary, perhaps even Iran, would then be harder to handle. So the Obama administration would do well to stop talking publicly about a military option and, instead, tell regional allies a strike is highly unlikely unless Iran’s behavior becomes far more egregious.

#### Credibility not hurt by the plan.

Balkin, 13 ( JACK M. BALKIN is Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law School, and the founder and director of Yale's Information Society Project, an interdisciplinary center that studies law and new information technologies. What Congressional Approval Won't Do: Trim Obama's Power or Make War Legal. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/what-congressional-approval-wont-do-trim-obamas-power-or-make-war-legal/279298/)

Wouldn’t congressional refusal make the United States look weak, as critics including Senator John McCain warn loudly? Hardly. The next dictator who acts rashly will face a different situation and a different calculus. The UN Security Council or NATO may feel differently about the need to act. There may be a new threat to American interests that lets Obama or the next president offer a different justification for acting. It just won’t matter very much what Obama said about red lines in the past. World leaders say provocative things all the time and then ignore them. Their motto is: That was then, and this is now.¶ If Congress turns him down, won’t Obama be undermined at home, as other critics claim? In what sense? It is hard to see how the Republicans could be less cooperative than they already are. And it’s not in the interest of Democrats to fault a president of their own party for acceding to what Congress wants instead of acting unilaterally.

#### Unwillingness to escalate to take out the link and impact

Dianne R. Pfundstein PhD Candidate, Columbia University Paper prepared for the ISA Annual Convention 3-19-2011 Compelling Compliance with the International Order: The United States, the Threat of Force, and Resolve in the Era of Unipolarity

This paper applies this new model of state resolve to the United States to demonstrate how its twenty-first century war-fighting model, and its position as sole superpower, undermine the United States’ ability to employ threats of force to coerce weak target states. The United States enjoys unique freedom to escalate conflicts, both because of its military superiority and because of the absence of a peer competitor in most regions of the world to check its actions. Despite this freedom and its unquestioned conventional military superiority, the United States has over the last sixty-five years steadily and increasingly insulated the bulk of its population from both the human and financial costs of war. Furthermore, norms about the use of violence have evolved such that the U.S. military goes to great lengths to avoid inflicting pain on the civilian populations of target states. I will demonstrate that these trends have given rise to a unique American way of war that renders the United States incapable of compelling weak states to change their behavior without having to actually force compliance: the United States may be willing to escalate, but not to suffer or inflict the costs necessary to defeat strongly motivated but conventionally weak target states, making resistance an attractive option even in the face of a credible U.S. threat to escalate. I will begin by demonstrating how the United States’ unique strategic position since the end of the Cold War has granted it the freedom to escalate most conflicts at little risk to its own safety, rendering escalation itself an uninformative signal of its willingness to suffer and destroy in order to achieve its objectives from target states. I will then examine the United States’ unwillingness to pay the human and material costs of war. My analysis reveals that, despite high absolute levels of defense spending, the United States does not want to pay for major wars, and has embraced many elements of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to insulate its military from the dangers of combat. I will then evaluate the evolution in norms about the infliction of pain on target states’ civilian populations. These trends, in combination with the demise of bipolarity, have freed U.S. policymakers to threaten and escalate military conflicts when the United States’ vital interests are not engaged and rendered the threat of military force an ineffective tool of coercion against weak but highly motivated target states.

#### Heg doesn’t solve conflict.

Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US **hegemony is not the** primary **cause of** the current era of s**tability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2\* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has **already rid itself of crime.** Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection** between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict **declined** while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T 15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—**nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms** necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co\*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-\*7 exis\*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.

## 2AC CMR

#### Case outweighs – Iran strikes causes extinction

#### McChrystal going public destroyed CMR and counterinsurgencies mean tensions are inevitable.

Desch, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, 10-27-‘9 (Michael C. “Obama and His General: Should McChystal Solute and Obey?” Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65635/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general)

U.S. Commander Stanley McChrystal's very public participation in the Obama administration's internal debate about its Afghanistan strategy has highlighted the continuing challenges to civil-military relations that I wrote about in Foreign Affairs two years ago ("Bush and the Generals," May/June 2007). McChrystal first waded into the strategy debate with his leaked assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, which concluded that the United States should shift its strategy to population security and dedicate more resources and up to 40,000 additional troops to the war. Days later, he revealed that he had spoken to the president only once since his appointment as commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and, in an address in London, went on to dismiss as "short-sighted" Vice President Joe Biden's preferred strategy of cutting U.S. losses and prosecuting the campaign using Predator and cruise-missile strikes. Needless to say, senior Obama administration officials were not pleased. Obama's national security adviser, General James Jones, told CNN a few days later that it is "better for military advice to come up the chain of command." Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reinforced this message in a speech two days after that by saying, "It is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations -- civilians and military alike -- provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately." No one disputes McChrystal's right, indeed obligation, to provide the president with his candid assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and his frank advice on how to proceed. The issue is the public manner in which he did so. For his part, McChrystal maintained that his comments were simply intended to foster a healthier policy debate, and he promised to execute whatever policy the administration chose. McChrystal's defenders argue that he did nothing different than former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, who suggested in 2003 that the Bush administration's proposed force levels for the invasion of Iraq were too low. But there are important differences between Shinseki's and McChrystal's approaches. Shinseki registered his concerns about the Bush administration's Iraq strategy after having made the case privately. When he did make his reservations known, it was as sworn testimony during a congressional hearing. And rather than trying to shape policy, Shinseki was weighing in on the logistics of a policy that the administration had already chosen. Moreover, Shinseki's concerns quickly proved prescient. The brief euphoria that followed Iraq's liberation from Saddam Hussein's tyranny quickly dissolved into disorder, and then into all-out ethnic civil war, precisely because there were insufficient numbers of troops to maintain Iraq's fragile post-conflict stability. But for his part, Shinseki quietly endured the humiliation of being publicly corrected and replaced early as the army chief of staff. Meanwhile, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's continued mismanagement of Iraq prompted six recently retired generals to make the unprecedented call for his replacement in the midst of the war. As this history shows, civil-military rifts are not new. And as I argued in 2007, the approach to civil-military relations that Samuel Huntington called "objective civilian control" holds the most promise for overcoming tension between the generals and civilians. It argues that military leaders should be given wide latitude in the technical and operational realms of war in return for their complete subordination to civilian control of politics and grand strategy. This approach fosters military effectiveness while keeping the strategic decision of if and when to go to war in the hands of elected officials. According to objective control, McChrystal was clearly in the wrong when he inserted himself into the public strategy debate. But his case also illustrates some real limitations to that approach to civilian oversight. In politico-military operations such as counterinsurgency, there is no sharp, bright line between the political and military realms but rather a vast gray area. The United States' commitment to nation-building in Afghanistan, for example, includes decisions that are at once military and political. Indeed, irregular warfare -- whether counterinsurgency in Vietnam in the 1960s or peacekeeping in the Balkans in the 1990s -- has historically been a source of civil-military friction precisely because it blurs that boundary.

#### Empirically denied – CMR rifts happen all the time – the plan isn’t the straw that breaks the camel’s back

#### Military opposes using nuclear threats—fear of breaking the taboo.

Hirsch 6

Jorge Hirsch, analyst, 2006. [Antiwar.com, Nuclear Strike on Iran Is Still on the Agenda, What will Congress do?, http://www.antiwar.com/hirsch/?articleid=9868]

There have been many voices across the political spectrum calling for Rumsfeld's resignation for the botched Iraq war [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], yet he "retains the full confidence" of Bush. Why? Because Rumsfeld cannot be fired until he demolishes the "nuclear taboo," by detonating a small tactical nuclear weapon against an enemy. The U.S. military is **reluctant to even consider** the use of nuclear weapons against Iran, because it would provoke "an outcry over what would be the first use of a nuclear weapon in a conflict since Nagasaki." Only after a small tactical nuclear weapons strike against Natanz or another Iranian facility will this barrier fall, and Rumsfeld's transformation will be a fait accompli.

#### CMR’s tanked – 4 reasons.

King 9 [Will King, Fort Leavenworth Lamp, Panel discusses civil-military relations at Fort Leavenworth, Mar 27,

http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/03/27/18852-panel-discusses-civil-military-relations-at-fort-leavenworth/]

The four areas where Kohn sees potential civil-military problems in the future are in Afghanistan, the budget, gays in the military and the restructuring of military forces away from Cold War structure. He said budgetary issues would create the most problems of those four areas.

#### Military now has an institutional bias against nuclear weapons – they’ve been pushing reductions in their role.

Ritchie 9

Nick Ritchie, Ph.D., post doctoral research fellow at the Dept of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, 2009. [US Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War: Russians, 'rogues' and domestic division, p. 132-3]

There has also been a waning interest in nuclear weapons within the armed forces for a variety of reasons. Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union nuclear weapons were no longer considered central to addressing the post Cold War national security threats facing the nation. They were increasingly viewed as **obsolete and** disdained as 'an **embarrassing military artifact'** of the Cold War." The armed services have gradually dc emphasised and reduced the salience of nuclear weapons in military strategy. There has, for example, been little role for nuclear weapons in the three post Cold War Quadrennial Defense Reviews in 1997, 2001 and 2006 that have shaped military posture since the mid 1990s.68 Budgetary pressure halted any further nuclear modernisation and promoted cuts across the board in superfluous, expensive, single use military capabilities in the early 1990s, Nuclear weapons have since become **progressively drowned out** in terms of money and the volume of debate compared to the massive lobbies and interest groups around other key defence capabilities, in fact resource competition within DOD has had a decisive effect on the direction of nuclear weapons policy since the Joint Staff has been reluctant to spend money on items not regarded as particularly useful, such as nuclear weapons.

The post Cold War senior military leadership has had far less interaction with nuclear weapons compared to their Cold War predecessors and **less interest in nuclear roles** and requirements. An interviewee who has been heavily involved in nuclear weapons policy argued that there were now no advocates in the military for nuclear weapons because they are **not a priority,** they are not 'big ticket' items, and there is a **strong institutional bias** amongst senior military leaders **against them**." With fewer and fewer incentives to pursue a nuclear career in the armed services and no single dedicated nuclear career track, nuclear missions became secondary missions for most personnel assigned to them." As Joseph and Lehman argued in 1998, 'career military personnel today generally view the nuclear career fields as being out of the mainstream and having uncertain futures' 72 Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre also stated that 'in the last five to eight years, there's been just a significant reduction in interest of our best and brightest in this career field'." One of the key findings of a 2001 SAIC report for DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency was that there was 'a perceived lack of senior DOD leadership attention to "things nuclear.'