# 1NC

### 1

#### A1. Authority is not ability

Forsythe and Hendrickson 96

[David P. Forsythe, Professor and Chair of Political Science University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Ryan C. Hendrickson, Ph.D. Candidate University of Nebraska-Lincoln. “U.S. Use of Force Abroad: What Law for the President?” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4]

The crisis is most precisely about authority, not power. Authority, in the legal sense, concerns the right to do something. Power refers to the capability to do something. Part of the problems ¶ in the U.S. constitutional crisis over use of force abroad is that the president has the power to ¶ make war, and to obtain congressional deference most of the time, whatever the proper under ¶ standing of authority.

#### A2. Introducing armed forces only refers to human troops, not weapons systems like nukes

Lorber 13

Eric Lorber, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. January 2013, "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?" University of Pennsylvania Journal of Contsitutional Law, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, lexis nexis

C. The War Powers Resolution as Applied to Offensive Cyber Operations As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers Resolution - especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation - are the definitions of key terms, particularly "armed forces," as the relevant provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President "introduc[es armed forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent ... hostilities," n172 or if such forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces." n173 The requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed forces "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." n174 As is evident, the definition of "armed forces" is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over executive actions. The definition of "hostilities," which has garnered the majority of scholarly and political attention, n175 particularly in the recent Libyan conflict, n176 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes important if "armed forces" exist in the situation. ¶ As is **evident from a** textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and **the broad** policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that **only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR.** Though not dispositive, **the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.** n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that **expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (**such as non-members **constituting armed forces)**. n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ **An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces**. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that **Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.**¶ **The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities**. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.¶ This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). **Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the** W**ar** P**owers** R**esolution likely does not cover such activities**. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, **individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.** Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Violations

#### B1. NFU is not presidential authority

 Schultz 2004 PREEMPTING PREEMPTION: NUCLEAR FIRST-USE AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS JEFFREY L. SCHULTZ Mr. Schultz is an associate at Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis. Schultz is engaged in the practice of business litigation, with significant experience in trade secret, non-compete, unfair competition and intellectual property matters Kennedy School Review;2004, Vol. 5, p27

Under uninterrupted constitutional practice since the use of the first nuclear weapons by the United States against Japan in the closing days of World War II, Congress has demonstrated that it has the authority to pass the affirmative legislation necessary to control nuclear first use. Even if Congress chooses not to impose a legislative straitjacket,45 the president alone does not have sufficient authority to make first-use of nuclear weapons absent some congressional approval.46 The wisdom of Congress’s reticence in declaring war from the standpoint of its own institutional prerogatives is clear. According to the Constitution, the power to attack first requires that one also be able to declare war—a power belonging exclusively to Congress under the express language of the document, as we have seen. But if the president can argue that we are already in a war, such as an ongoing “War on Terror” in the aftermath of the Iraq War, for which he received Congress’s blessing, then he can claim expansive independent powers in the prosecution of such a war, including the choice of weapons and tactics. In such a “zone of twilight,” only an act of Congress—such as the recently repealed ban on “mini-nukes” and bunker-busters—can tilt the constitutional balance clearly in its favor. If Congress wishes to force the president to consult prior to launching a nuclear preemptive strike, it had better say so by means of legislation.

#### B2. Intro of forces is not nuclear weapons

Forrester ’89 (Professor, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. Former dean of the law schools at Vanderbilt, Tulane, and Cornell) Ray 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1636

Even if the Court assumed its responsibility to tell us whether the Constitution gives Congress the necessary power to check the President, the War Powers Resolution itself is unclear. Does the Resolution require the President to consult with Congress before launching a nuclear attack? It has been asserted that "introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities" refers only to military personnel and does not include the launching of nuclear missiles alone. In support of this interpretation, it has been argued that Congress was concerned about the human losses in Vietnam and in other presidential wars, rather than about the weaponry.

#### B3. Introduction/Hostilities doublebind. Escalation to nuclear weapons from a conventional conflict is NOT “Introduction” of forces—its augmentation of forces. Bolt from the Blue first strike is NOT hostilities, because no US forces will be at risk, since first strike begins and ends the war, hence no on-going hostilities. Extra T is voter as it dejustifies the resolution.

#### C. Standards

#### Ground. Their interp explodes the resolution to mean any weapons system, restrictions on asserted authority. That crushes neg predictability.

#### Topic education. Our interp ensures a narrow but robust debate on war powers, ensuring indepth topic education, which outweighs aff whines for creativity.

#### Precision. Our interp is evidence by topic specific ev, not generic definitions that define words

#### T is a voter for ground and topic education.

### 2

#### The President of the United States should issue a presidential directive announcing that the United States will not introduce nuclear weapons forces first into hostilities.

#### Solves the case

Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring 11-30-2012; Rebeccah Heinrichs is a Visiting Fellow and Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century”

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century>

Principles for Contemporary Targeting Policy Nuclear targeting policy is ultimately established through presidential guidance, which typically takes the form of a directive. Meeting the demands of this guidance, more than anything else, determines the overall size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force. According to a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the current guidance was issued in 2002, although new presidential guidance may be issued as soon as later this year.[24 ] Following the application of more detailed guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Command produces the Nuclear Forces Employment Plan. Given the overall structure of this process, presidential guidance has the potential to do enormous damage to U.S. national security if it is conceptually flawed.

### 3

#### The United States Federal Government should enter into binding negotiations with the Russian Federation and offer to restrict the authority of the President of the United States to introduce nuclear weapons first into hostilities if the Russian Federation agrees to reciprocal changes in the role for its nuclear weapons arsenal.

Formal negotiations mean Russia says yes – they want reductions, but want them on paper

Christian Science Monitor, 2001 (Peter Grier, “Disarmament’s new look: fewer warheads, no treaty, “, 93:247, November 15)

We like the idea of massive weapons reductions, said Putin. But we like written treaties, too. In particular, we still like the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - the very pact that for months President Bush has been calling a dead letter. The bottom line: The US sees the nuclear future as paperless, with two friendly nations no longer needing treaties to bind them. Russia still wants the assurance of an overall nuclear-treaty regime. Whatever the agreement on weapon numbers, the disagreement on this important point needs to be resolved if the relationship between the two nations is to match the rhetoric of their leaders. "This [warhead] agreement [raises] a host of questions - if you can call it an agreement," says Christopher Paine, a research associate in nuclear issues at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington. It's possible that the final word on Putin's near-term intentions has not been written. Perhaps the two presidents will now announce a further dramatic breakthrough on missile defenses and related nuclear issues at the dramatic locale of Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas. Furthermore, the nuclear accomplishments of Putin's US visit are already significant. The two sides pledged to reduce their respective nuclear stockpiles by approximately two-thirds over the next decade. For the US, that would mean a range of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, said Bush. That's similar to the range of warhead levels discussed by President Bill Clinton and Russia President Boris Yeltsin in 1997 talks about a notional Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) III. It goes well beyond the 3,000 to 3,500 limits set by the START II pact, which was signed by President George H. W. Bush and Mr. Yeltsin in 1993. Indeed, the lower end of Bush's announced range is well below the warhead levels that Adm. Richard Mies, head of US Strategic Command, said during a congressional appearance earlier this year were necessary to ensure US security. START II has never gone into effect, since political difficulties in both Russia and the US clogged up the legislative ratification process. And that's the beauty part of the unilateral cuts envisioned by Bush, say US officials. They won't get derailed by peripheral issues. They'll be clean and simple. No large negotiating delegations will live in plush neutral cities like Geneva and take months arguing over minute points of Subsection C, Protocol 14. "Current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect today's strategic realities," concluded Bush. But Tuesday's reduction pledges left a number of important issues unaddressed, say some nuclear experts. Among them may be the actual warhead number US officials envision for the future. That's because Bush used the phrase "operationally deployed" weapons. Several hundred warheads are being refurbished or stored at any one time, and it's not clear whether they will be counted as part of the stockpile, as they have been in the past. Furthermore, it holds out the prospect that large numbers of warheads could simply be unbolted from delivery vehicles and stored somewhere, awaiting a day when rising tensions might necessitate their redeployment. "Will those warheads simply go into a strategic reserve? Look out for fuzzy math here," says Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. Putin may be of similar mind. He did propose reductions in Russia's arsenal that would proportionally match the US cuts. But he also appeared to insist on them being accompanied by written agreements that would address the verification of what had happened, and perhaps ensure it could never be undone. "Today, the world is far from having international relations based on trust," said Putin in remarks at the Russian Embassy on Tuesday evening. "That is why it's so important today to rely on the existing foundation of treaties and agreements in the arms-control ... area." It remains to be seen how important this objection could become. Would Russia really hold on to some warheads if the US refuses to enter into some form of written pact on the subject? Would the US risk that happening? While US and Russia relations now appear as warm as at any time since World War II, it's only a nascent friendship, say some US experts. There are many ways it could sour. Why not hammer out a quick weapons-cut pact?

Failure to engage Russia leads to backlash and turns case

Blank 2009 (Dr. Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, “Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration?,” March, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=908>) Bankey

For these reasons, even if one, like this author, is skeptical about many of the claims made on behalf of arms control and deterrence, certain hard facts and outcomes remain indisputable. Certainly for Russia, America’s willingness to engage it seriously over these issues means that America respects it as a power and potential interlocutor, if not a partner. On the other hand, numerous and constant Russian complaints are that America will not respond to its proposals, consult with it, etc. Although these are likely false claims, it has long been the case that the Bush administration’s preference is to maximize its freedom of action by claiming that (at least until now) Russia and the United States were no longer enemies. Therefore we need not go back to the Cold War, and each side can pursue its own agenda in security. Furthermore, as President Bush has consistently argued since 2001, I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world.15 The current discord on arms control reflects not only Moscow’s wounded egoand foreign policy based to a considerable degree on feelings of resentment and revanche, but also America’s unwillingness to take Russiaasseriously as Moscow’s inflated sense of grandiose self-esteem demands.16 But even if Moscow’s constant need of reassurance is invariably affronted by governments who refuse to accept its inflated demands for compensation and status, it is still the case that the bilateral strategic relationship is a factor of enormous consequence in international affairs beyond their own bilateral relationship. If Russia and America reach a strategic impasse, the global situation as a whole deteriorates correspondingly.

### 4

#### Iran sanctions are at the top of the docket – Obama is spending capital to persuade Democrats to sustain a veto

Lobe, 12-27

Reporter for Inter Press Service(Jim, “Iran sanctions bill: Big test of Israel lobby power”

<http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=World&article=8046>)

WASHINGTON - This week’s introduction by a bipartisan group of 26 senators of a new sanctions bill against Iran could result in the biggest test of the political clout of the Israel lobby here in decades.¶ The White House, which says the bill could well derail ongoing negotiations between Iran and the U.S. and five other powers over Tehran’s nuclear program and destroy the international coalition behind the existing sanctions regime, has already warned that it will veto the bill if it passes Congress in its present form.¶ The new bill, co-sponsored by two of Congress’s biggest beneficiaries of campaign contributions by political action committees closely linked to the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), would impose sweeping new sanctions against Tehran if it fails either to comply with the interim deal it struck last month in Geneva with the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany) or reach a comprehensive accord with the great powers within one year.¶ To be acceptable, however, such an accord, according to the bill, would require Iran to effectively dismantle virtually its entire nuclear program, including any enrichment of uranium on its own soil, as demanded by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.¶ The government of President Hassan Rouhani has warned repeatedly that such a demand is a deal-breaker, and even Secretary of State John Kerry has said that a zero-enrichment position is a non-starter.¶ The bill, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, also calls for Washington to provide military and other support to Israel if its government “is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapon program.”¶ The introduction of the bill last week by Republican Sen. Mark Kirk and Democratic Sen. Robert Menendez followed unsuccessful efforts by both men to get some sanctions legislation passed since the Geneva accord was signed Nov. 24.¶ Kirk at first tried to move legislation that would have imposed new sanctions immediately in direct contradiction to a pledge by the P5+1 in the Geneva accord to forgo any new sanctions for the six-month life of the agreement in exchange for, among other things, enhanced international inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities and a freeze on most of its nuclear program.¶ Unable to make headway, Kirk then worked with Menendez to draw up the new bill which, because of its prospective application, would not, according to them, violate the agreement. They had initially planned to attach it to a defense bill before the holiday recess. But the Democratic leadership, which controls the calendar, refused to go along.¶ Their hope now is to pass it – either as a free-standing measure or as an amendment to another must-pass bill after Congress reconvenes Jan. 6.¶ To highlight its bipartisan support, the two sponsors gathered a dozen other senators from each party to co-sponsor it.¶ Republicans, many of whom reflexively oppose President Barack Obama’s positions on any issue and whose core constituencies include Christian Zionists, are almost certain to support the bill by an overwhelming margin. If the bill gets to the floor, the main battle will thus take place within the Democratic majority.¶ The latter find themselves torn between, on the one hand, their loyalty to Obama and their fear that new sanctions will indeed derail negotiations and thus make war more likely, and, on the other, their general antipathy for Iran and the influence exerted by AIPAC and associated groups as a result of the questionable perception that Israel’s security is uppermost in the minds of Jewish voters and campaign contributors (who, by some estimates, provide as much as 40 percent of political donations to Democrats in national campaigns).¶ The administration clearly hopes the Democratic leadership will prevent the bill from coming to a vote, but, if it does, persuading most of the Democrats who have already endorsed the bill to change their minds will be an uphill fight. If the bill passes, the administration will have to muster 34 senators of the 100 senators to sustain a veto – a difficult but not impossible task, according to Congressional sources.¶ That battle has already been joined. Against the 13 Democratic senators who signed onto the Kirk-Menendez bill, 10 Democratic Senate committee chairs urged Majority Leader Harry Reid, who controls the upper chamber’s calendar, to forestall any new sanctions legislation.

#### Obama’s strategy is working but failure scuttles the nuclear deal

Merry 1-1

Robert W. Merry, political editor of the National Interest, is the author of books on American history and foreign policy (Robert, “Obama may buck the Israel lobby on Iran” Washington Times, factiva)

Presidential press secretary Jay Carney uttered 10 words the other day that represent a major presidential challenge to the American Israel lobby and its friends on Capitol Hill. Referring to Senate legislation designed to force President Obama to expand economic sanctions on Iran under conditions the president opposes, Mr. Carney said: “If it were to pass, the president would veto it.”¶ For years, there has been an assumption in Washington that you can’t buck the powerful Israel lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, whose positions are nearly identical with the stated aims of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Mr. Netanyahu doesn’t like Mr. Obama’s recent overture to Iran, and neither does AIPAC. The result is the Senate legislation, which is similar to a measure already passed by the House.¶ With the veto threat, Mr. Obama has announced that he is prepared to buck the Israel lobby — and may even welcome the opportunity. It isn’t fair to suggest that everyone who thinks Mr. Obama’s overtures to Iran are ill-conceived or counterproductive is simply following the Israeli lobby’s talking points, but Israel’s supporters in this country are a major reason for the viability of the sanctions legislation the president is threatening to veto.¶ It is nearly impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Senate legislation is designed to sabotage Mr. Obama’s delicate negotiations with Iran (with the involvement also of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany) over Iran’s nuclear program. The aim is to get Iran to forswear any acquisition of nuclear weapons in exchange for the reduction or elimination of current sanctions. Iran insists it has a right to enrich uranium at very small amounts, for peaceful purposes, and Mr. Obama seems willing to accept that Iranian position in the interest of a comprehensive agreement.¶ However, the Senate measure, sponsored by Sens. Robert Menendez, New Jersey Democrat; Charles E. Schumer, New York Democrat; and Mark Kirk, Illinois Republican, would impose potent new sanctions if the final agreement accords Iran the right of peaceful enrichment. That probably would destroy Mr. Obama’s ability to reach an agreement. Iranian President Hasan Rouhani already is under pressure from his country’s hard-liners to abandon his own willingness to seek a deal. The Menendez-Schumer-Kirk measure would undercut him and put the hard-liners back in control.¶ Further, the legislation contains language that would commit the United States to military action on behalf of Israel if Israel initiates action against Iran. This language is cleverly worded, suggesting U.S. action should be triggered only if Israel acted in its “legitimate self-defense” and acknowledging “the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force,” but the language is stunning in its brazenness and represents, in the view of Andrew Sullivan, the prominent blogger, “an appalling new low in the Israeli government’s grip on the U.S. Congress.”¶ While noting the language would seem to be nonbinding, Mr. Sullivan adds that “it’s basically endorsing the principle of handing over American foreign policy on a matter as grave as war and peace to a foreign government, acting against international law, thousands of miles away.”¶ That brings us back to Mr. Obama’s veto threat. The American people have made clear through polls and abundant expression (especially during Mr. Obama’s flirtation earlier this year with military action against Bashar Assad’s Syrian regime) that they are sick and weary of American military adventures in the Middle East. They don’t think the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have been worth the price, and they don’t want their country to engage in any other such wars.¶ That’s what the brewing confrontation between Mr. Obama and the Israel lobby comes down to — war and peace. Mr. Obama’s delicate negotiations with Iran, whatever their outcome, are designed to avert another U.S. war in the Middle East. The Menendez-Schumer-Kirk initiative is designed to kill that effort and cedes to Israel America’s war-making decision in matters involving Iran, which further increases the prospects for war. It’s not even an argument about whether the United States should come to Israel’s aid if our ally is under attack, but whether the decision to do so and when that might be necessary should be made in Jerusalem or Washington.¶ 2014 will mark the 100th anniversary of beginning of World War I, a conflict triggered by entangling alliances that essentially gave the rulers of the Hapsburg Empire power that forced nation after nation into a war they didn’t want and cost the world as many as 20 million lives. Historians have warned since of the danger of nations delegating the power to take their people into war to other nations with very different interests.¶ AIPAC’s political power is substantial, but this is Washington power, the product of substantial campaign contributions and threats posed to re-election prospects. According to the Center for Responsive Politics’ Open Secrets website, Sens. Kirk, Menendez and Schumer each receives hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in pro-Israel PAC money and each of their states includes concentrations of pro-Israel voters who help elect and re-elect them.¶ Elsewhere in the country, AIPAC’s Washington power will collide with the country’s clear and powerful political sentiment against further U.S. adventurism in the Middle East, particularly one as fraught with as much danger and unintended consequence as a war with Iran. If the issue gets joined, as it appears that it will, Mr. Obama will see that it gets joined as a matter of war and peace. If the Menendez-Schumer-Kirk legislation clears Congress and faces a presidential veto, the war-and-peace issue could galvanize the American people as seldom before.¶ If that happens, the strongly held opinions of a democratic public are liable to overwhelm the mechanisms of Washington power, and the vaunted influence of the Israel lobby may be seen as being not quite what it has been cracked up to be.

#### The plan causes an inter-branch fight – saps PC and derails his agenda

Kriner 10

Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 67-69

Raising or Lowering Political Costs by Affecting Presidential Political Capital Shaping both real and anticipated public opinion are two important ways in which Congress can raise or lower the political costs of a military action for the president. However, focusing exclusively on opinion dynamics threatens to obscure the much broader political consequences of domestic reaction—particularly congressional opposition—to presidential foreign policies. At least since Richard Neustadt's seminal work Presidential Power, presidency scholars have warned that costly political battles in one policy arena frequently have significant ramifications for presidential power in other realms. Indeed, two of Neustadt's three "cases of command"—Truman's seizure of the steel mills and firing of General Douglas MacArthur—explicitly discussed the broader political consequences of stiff domestic resistance to presidential assertions of commander-in-chief powers. In both cases, Truman emerged victorious in the case at hand—yet, Neustadt argues, each victory cost Truman dearly in terms of his future power prospects and leeway in other policy areas, many of which were more important to the president than achieving unconditional victory over North Korea." While congressional support leaves the president's reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president's foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president's political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races." Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War.6° In addition to boding ill for the president's perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson's dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking both the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush's highest second-term domestic priorities, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failedperhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq. When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### That causes a US-Iran war and Iranian prolif

WORLD TRIBUNE 11-13

[Obama said to suspend Iran sanctions without informing Congress, http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/11/13/obama-said-to-suspend-iran-sanctions-without-informing-congress/]

The administration has also pressured Congress to suspend plans for new sanctions legislation against Iran. The sources said the White House effort has encountered resistance from both Democrats and Republicans, particularly those in the defense and foreign affairs committees.¶ “I urge the White House and the Senate to learn from the lessons of the past and not offer sanctions relief in return for the false hopes and empty promises of the Iranian regime,” Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, said. “Instead, new rounds of sanctions must be implemented to gain further leverage because any misstep in calculations at this juncture will have devastating and irreversible consequences that will be difficult to correct retroactively.”¶ On Nov. 12, the White House warned that additional sanctions on Iran would mean war with the United States. White House press secretary Jay Carney, in remarks meant to intensify pressure on Congress, said sanctions would end the prospect of any diplomatic solution to Iran’s crisis. ¶ “The American people do not want a march to war,” Carney said. “It is important to understand that if pursuing a resolution diplomatically is disallowed or ruled out, what options then do we and our allies have to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?”¶ Still, the Senate Banking Committee has agreed to delay any vote on sanctions legislation until a briefing by Secretary of State John Kerry on Nov. 13. The sources said Kerry was expected to brief the committee on the P5+1 talks in Geneva that almost led to an agreement with Teheran.¶ “The secretary will be clear that putting new sanctions in place would be a mistake,” State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said on Nov. 12. “We are still determining if there’s a diplomatic path forward. What we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause, in sanctions.”

#### Iran war escalates

White 11

July/August 2011 (Jeffrey—defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, What Would War With Iran Look Like, National Interest, p. http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982)

A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the United States and Iran alone. Each would have partners or allies, both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding relationships, the course of operations and other factors would place the United States and Iran at the center of more or less structured coalitions of the marginally willing. A Western coalition could consist of the United States and most of its traditional allies (but very likely not Turkey, based on the evolution of Turkish politics) in addition to some Persian Gulf states, Jordan and perhaps Egypt, depending on where its revolution takes it. Much would depend on whether U.S. leaders could persuade others to go along, which would mean convincing them that U.S. forces could shield them from Iranian and Iranian-proxy retaliation, or at least substantially weaken its effects. Coalition warfare would present a number of challenges to the U.S. government. Overall, it would lend legitimacy to the action, but it would also constrict U.S. freedom of action, perhaps by limiting the scope and intensity of military operations. There would thus be tension between the desire for a small coalition of the capable for operational and security purposes and a broader coalition that would include marginally useful allies to maximize legitimacy. The U.S. administration would probably not welcome Israeli participation. But if Israel were directly attacked by Iran or its allies, Washington would find it difficult to keep Israel out—as it did during the 1991 Gulf War. That would complicate the U.S. ability to manage its coalition, although it would not necessarily break it apart. Iranian diplomacy and information operations would seek to exploit Israeli participation to the fullest. Iran would have its own coalition. Hizballah in particular could act at Iran’s behest both by attacking Israel directly and by using its asymmetric and irregular warfare capabilities to expand the conflict and complicate the maintenance of the U.S. coalition. The escalation of the Hizballah-Israel conflict could draw in Syria and Hamas; Hamas in particular could feel compelled to respond to an Iranian request for assistance. Some or all of these satellite actors might choose to leave Iran to its fate, especially if initial U.S. strikes seemed devastating to the point of decisive. But their involvement would spread the conflict to the entire eastern Mediterranean and perhaps beyond, complicating both U.S. military operations and coalition diplomacy.

### Threats Fail

#### The military hates the plan--- they want total operational control of nuclear policy

**Sagan 12**

[Scott, Professor of Political Science @ Stanford, ‘Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons’, <http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/civilmilitary_relations_and_nuclear_weapons>, mg]

When a state develops a nuclear arsenal, these destructive weapons must be initially integrated into existing military forces and initially managed through existing civil and military institutions. The subsequent relationship between nuclear weapons and civil-military relations in possessor states is complex, however, and presents an important two-way puzzle. First, it is important to ask how existing patterns of civil-military relations in nuclear states have influenced the likelihood of nuclear-weapons use. Some scholars believe that military officers are less war-prone and hawkish than civilian leaders; others believe the opposite, that the military tends to be bellicose and biased in favor of aggressive military postures. Which view is right, especially when nuclear weapons are involved, is a question that has not been fully addressed in the literature. Second, it is important to flip the question around and also ask how nuclear weapons have influenced civil-military relations in the states that have acquired the ultimate weapon. Again, the answer is not clear. One might expect that the massive destructive power of these weapons would encourage much greater civilian involvement in military affairs. Yet, at the same time, one might predict that **military organizations** would **maintain significant** control over nuclear policy **as they want to protect their** operational autonomy**, and because the** perceived need for a prompt response **would mitigate** against tight civilian control**.**

#### Military will Rollback the plan

Owens 13

[Mackubin Owens is Editor of *Orbis,* FPRI’s quarterly journal of international affairs, and Senior Fellow at its Program on National Security, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College; July, <https://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/07/what-military-officers-need-know-about-civil-military-relations>, mg]

All too often, **US military officers seem to believe that** if the United States does not face the prospect of a Latin-American or African style military coup d’état, then **all is well in** the realm of **civil-military relations.** But this is a straw man. A number of scholars, including Richard Kohn, Peter Feaver, the late Russell Weigley, Michael Desch, and Eliot Cohen have argued that although there is no threat of a coup on the part of the US military, **American civil-military relations have** nonetheless **deteriorated over the past two decade**s.¶ ¶ For example, **the US military has “pushed back” against civilian leadership** on numerous occasions during the last two decades. **This pushback has manifested itself in** “foot dragging,” “slow rolling” and leaks to the press designed to undercut policy **or individual policy-makers**. Such actions were rampant during the Clinton presidency and during the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. **Such** pushback **is based on the claim that** civilians were making decisions without paying sufficient attention to the military point of view.

#### Nuclear deterrence is inevitable for a billion more reasons than you can fathom.

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[bert, in defense of nuclear deterrence, ifri, Master’s degree in Public Law of the University of Paris (1985), and a Doctorate in Political Science of the *Institut d'études politiques de Paris*(1994), n 2007-2008, he was a member of the French presidential commission on the White Paper on Defense and Security, as well as a member of the French ministerial commission on the White Paper on Foreign and European policy, proliferation papers]

But one could also claim that the very legitimacy of nuclear deterrence has been bolstered in the past 20 years –or, at the veryleast, that the evolutions of the political and strategic context have not delegitimized it.¶ From the point of view of customary law, the legality of the possession of nuclear weapons can be said to have been confirmed by the unanimous extension for an indefinite duration of the NPT (1995), by the vote of resolution 984 (1995) of the UN Security Council on security assurances, and by the conclusion of several new treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free-zones, with protocols to be ratified by the Nuclear Weapons States.¶ The fact that all the new nuclear-armed nations have adopted –at least rhetorically –doctrines of deterrence, and the continuation of nuclear restraint (the absence of any operational use) have reinforced the taboo or tradition of non-use which exists regarding nuclear weapons. ¶ An acute regional nuclear crisis would certainly lead to an immediate intervention of major powers –as was seen in 1990, 1999 and 2002 in South Asia –or even, had nuclear weapons been used, to military action to“quench the nuclear fire”. Again, the risk of fast escalation to the extremes is never zero: but it is weaker than it was in the past.¶ Technological progress with regard to accuracy and intelligence collection (as well as MIRVing) has led to the adoptionin Western countries, of more discriminate targeting strategies, and to the abandonment of their most powerful, “city-busting” weapons. 103 Such countries, which also benefit from conventional superiority in relation to most of their adversaries, were also able to give up for good the temptation of seeing nuclear weapons as a means to compensate for conventional imbalances, and thus associated nuclear deterrence with “extreme circumstances of self-defense” (an expression used by the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion). The development of missile defenses reinforces that trend. 104¶ At the same time, drilling machines have become cheaper and more efficient: the burial of sensitive installations, which can be much more easily ¶ threatened by nuclear weapons than by conventional ones (with the caveats mentioned above), seems to be a long-term trend.

#### US nuclear deterrence credibility is strong

Donna Miles citing CR Kehler, 4-5-2013; head of US Strategic Command, “Nuclear Deterrence Remains Key Stratcom Mission, Commander Says” http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119703

American Forces Press Service

Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent -- and the ability to operate its nuclear capabilities effectively if directed by the president -- was a foundation of U.S. national security throughout the Cold War, said Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler, the Stratcom commander. Yet Stratcom’s nuclear deterrence mission remains as critical as at any time in U.S. history, Kehler said, injected with a renewed focus and sense of urgency by the president’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the new national defense strategy. So even as the United States began withdrawing numerous weapons abroad, deactivated entire classes of weapons and reduced its nuclear stockpile by 75 percent since the height of the Cold War, it has ensured that it maintains sufficient deterrent capability. “As long as nuclear weapons exist, U.S. Strategic Command’s top priority must be to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective strategic nuclear deterrent force,” Kehler told the House and Senate armed services committees earlier this month. Kehler’s job is to look across the entire nuclear enterprise to ensure it remains operationally viable, and to verify the safety and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. That includes the triad of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them. “I can assure you that today’s nuclear weapons and triad of delivery platforms are safe, secure and effective,” Kehler reported in testimony to the congressional panels.

### China

China’s modernization is exceptionally slow

Lieber and Press, 2006 (Keir A., is Assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Daryl G., Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, “The end of MAD,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4, Spring)

China’s ability to redress the nuclear imbalance is even more suspect. Much has been made of China’s ongoing defense modernization, but the country’s strategic arsenal is growing at a glacial pace. China has only 18 ICBMs, a number that has remained essentially unchanged for more than a decade. In addition, these missiles are kept unfueled, and their warheads are stored separately. U.S. intelligence predicts that China will eventually deploy a new generation of ICBMs—modern mobile missiles—and field as many as 100 by 2020. This is certainly possible, but analysts have been expecting this deployment since the mid-1980s. According to unclassified reports, U.S. intelligence analyses repeatedly forecast the imminent deployment of advanced Chinese mobile ICBMs because they based their estimates on calculations of what China could conceivably do, rather than on concrete evidence of missile production. 50 Beyond its small ICBM force, China deployed 1 SSBN in 1983, but it had such poor capabilities that it never left Chinese waters and is no longer operational. China is designing a new class of SSBNs, but progress has been slow; even the U.S. Defense Department estimates that operational deployment is many years away.51

#### China has no reason to modernize – they rely on ambiguity to get by with minimal deterrence

Lewis, 2005

 (Jeffrey, research fellow at the center for international and security studies at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, “The ambiguous arsenal,” May/June, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

Beijing doesn't publish detailed information about the size and composition of its nuclear forces. With a very small nuclear arsenal relative to the United States and Russia, China seems intent on letting ambiguity enhance the deterrent effect of its nuclear forces. Chinese force deployments suggest that Beijing's leadership believes that even a very small, unsophisticated force will deter nuclear attacks by larger, more sophisticated nuclear forces. While some Western analysts spent the Cold War fretting about the "delicate balance of terror," the Chinese leadership appears to have concluded that technical details such as the size, configuration, and readiness of nuclear forces are largely irrelevant. China's declaration that it would "not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances" reflects the idea that nuclear weapons are not much good, except to deter other nuclear weapons. In deciding what sort of nuclear arsenal to build, China settled on what Marshal Nie Rongzhen, the first head of China's nuclear weapons program, called "the minimum means of reprisal."

No chance of China changing its no first use doctrine

Zhenquiang, 2005 (Pan, Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defence University of the People's Liberation Army of China, Beijing, where he earlier served as Director of the Institute “China Insistence on No-First-Use of nuclear Weapons,” China Security, Issue 1, http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=258&Itemid=8)

In my view, No-First Use (NFU) has been a theoretical pillar of China’s nuclear policy.  This rationale of NFU of nuclear weapons serves Beijing’s foremost security interests.   It also contributes to the maintenance of world strategic stability.  There are at least five reasons to explain why China has consistently stuck to that principle, and will continue to do so in the future.   1.   Underlying Principles      First, NFU highlights China’s philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against a nuclear attack, pending complete nuclear disarmament.  Indeed, their extremely large destructive capability renders nuclear weapons the only truly inhumane weapon of mass destruction and are of little other use to China. Faced with U.S. nuclear blackmail in the 1950s, China had no alternative to developing its own nuclear capability so as to address the real danger of being a target of a nuclear strike.  But even so, Beijing vowed that having a nuclear capability would only serve this single purpose.   From the very beginning of acquiring a nuclear capability, Beijing announced that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any conditions; it also pledged unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon states.  This claim is not merely rhetoric that cannot be verified, as some Western pundits accused.  On the contrary, China’s nuclear rationale has determined the defensive nature of its nuclear force, its posture, size and operational doctrine, which have been highly visible and have stood the test of time.  It is in this sense that China is NOT a nuclear weapon state in the Western sense.  Unlike all the other nuclear weapon states, for example, China has never intended to use its nuclear capability to make up for the inefficiency of conventional capabilities vis-à-vis other world powers nor has China an interest in joining a nuclear arms race with other nuclear states.  And thanks to the insistence of this policy based on NFU, China succeeds in reducing the nuclear element to the minimum in its relations with other nuclear nations, avoiding a possible nuclear arms race, and contributing to the global strategic stability at large.  If this policy serves well its core security interests, why should Beijing change it?

#### Relations are resilient- single disputes don’t spiral out of control

Economy ‘12

[Elizabeth C. Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. Interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org. <http://www.cfr.org/china/maturing-us-china-relations/p28184> ETB]

In many respects, this was a fairly astonishing set of discussions that these two countries managed to have in the midst of this emerging crisis surrounding Chen Guangcheng. The fact that Beijing and Washington were able not only to conduct the two days of discussions but also to arrive at some concrete agreements was a sign that there may be an emerging maturity in the relationship. Both sides are clearly committed to maintaining stability in the relationship and were very unwilling to allow this one striking and important incident to cause the relationship to spiral downward, or to cause a real deterioration in the relationship. So perhaps ironically, in some respects, this strategic and economic dialogue demonstrated as positive a state in the relationship as we've seen in a while.

#### Political confrontations wont escalate past rhetoric

Sambor 09

[Jean Charles, Writer for the SGAM Group, an Assets Management Group in France, <http://www.sgam.se/portal/binary/staticFile/STATIC%20FILE/SGAMCOM%20-%20EN/Global%20Snapshots/2009/GS120209_article2.pdf>]

President Obama will be no exception to the rule in this regard, even though in general Democrats maintain a tougher stance against China than Republicans. An outright US-China confrontation is an unlikely scenario in our view. While it is clear that China and the US will continue this awkward chicken and the egg finger pointing exercise for a while – Did China save too much or did the US spent too much? – we expect few escalations and economic sanctions beyond the political rhetoric.

#### China won’t let relations collapse

Shirk ‘7

Susan Shirk, served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State Department from 1997 2000.CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 219-20

How do China's leaders resolve this quandary"! Jiang Zemin first tried to have it both ways, improving relations with the United States while simultaneously pumping up nationalism to bolster his domestic stand­ing. But making progress with the United States was stymied by congres­sional insistence on improvements in human rights, the one area in which the CCP was most afraid to bend. Then several unpredictable events such as the Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade triggered destabilizing domestic reactions. China's leaders learned the hard way that when public opinion has been inflamed, international crises can become dangerous domestic crises. After a heated internal debate, the Chinese government decided that from then on, it would swallow its pride to preserve good relations with the United States and try to minimize the domestic fallout. A major effort to improve crisis management and tone down nationalist rhetoric with the goal of insulating Sino-U.S. relations from the pressures of domestic politics resulted. And superficially, China's relations with the United States improved significantly. Under the surface, however, the Chinese public and the military continue to suspect U.S. intentions and the gap between nationalist public opinion and pragmatic foreign policy remains.

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#### China has a philosophical belief against first use – that’s enough

Zhenqiang 2005 (Pan; China Security (World Security Institute China Program); http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=403)

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#### On-going US/China dialogue and mutual interests ensure good relations

BOIESA ’09

**(**U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs) 8-22-09 US Feds News

As a result of two days of high-level meetings, both sides gave a positive assessment of the current development of U.S.-China relations. They recognized that U.S.-China relations have maintained strong, positive momentum. In particular, the meeting between President Barack Obama and President Hu Jintao in London in April charted the course for the growth of U.S.-China relations in a new era and provided a strong impetus to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation. The two sides also affirmed that the Dialogue provides an important framework for strengthening relations on the basis of the April Summit.¶ The two sides noted that, at a time of continued challenges in international financial markets, and when the international situation is undergoing complex and profound changes, the United States and China share ever more important responsibilities, extensive common interests, and a broader basis for cooperation. Increased U.S.-China cooperation not only serves the common interests of the two peoples, but also contributes to peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. The two sides stressed that close high-level contacts and exchanges play an irreplaceable role in developing U.S.-China relations and confirmed that President Barack Obama will visit China this year at the invitation of President Hu Jintao. The two sides will work together to prepare well for upcoming bilateral interactions at various levels.

### Prolif

“Disarmament credibility” is a stupid argument – the US already has it, it’s not key to the NPT and if they win their uniqueness then they don’t solve

Ford, 2009 (Christopher, Senior fellow and director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at Hudson, “Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the ‘credibility thesis,’” Briefing Paper from the Hudson Institute, September, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Nuclear%20DisarmamentCF909.pdf)

Just how non-“credible” are the NWS disarmament commitments, and where, precisely, does any problem in this regard really lie? One must begin here with an understanding of just what the NPT does (and does not) require with respect to disarmament. Under Article VI of the treaty, all states party are obliged to do no more than pursue “negotiations in good faith” toward disarmament. With respect to both the clarity of its legal obligation and the specificity of the conduct described, this provision certainly pales in comparison to the nonproliferation rules of Articles I and II that form the core—rather than just one coequal “pillar”—of the NPT. Nevertheless, the arms control community commonly asserts that lawyerly details, such as the text and negotiating history of the treaty with respect to disarmament,4 do not matter too much; what counts instead is the purported “political” bargain behind the NPT, pursuant to which concrete and specific disarmament progress is the sine qua non of achieving multilateral cooperation against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. With those who claim there is such a bargain, it is often useful to press for specific evidence, since they usually assert that the bargain was merely “understood,” or privately promised by the NWS during the debates that led up to the NPT’s indefinite extension in 1995.5 Nevertheless, even assuming the existence of such a political bargain for concrete disarmament progress, is there any reason to think that the NWS lack disarmament credibility? And if the NWS do lack this credibility, is there any reliable basis for identifying the United States as the key to a solution? When the NPT was opened for signature, the United States had just passed its Cold War peak of some 32,500 nuclear weapons. Its geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union, was still building up its arsenal, which would, according to some sources, reach 36,300 by about 1980. For the first twenty years of the NPT’s existence, the United States slowly reduced the size of its nuclear forces, but retained an enormous arsenal on account of its strategic competition with the USSR. After the Cold War ended in 1991, however—and in fact, even beforehand, with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987—both the United States and Russia embarked upon dramatic programs of nuclear reductions, partly through negotiated instruments such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and partly unilaterally. Many thousands of warheads have thus been removed from service and subjected to ongoing dismantlement campaigns, which were actually accelerated in the middle years of this decade; hundreds of tons of fissile materials have been removed from weapons stocks; and hundreds of delivery systems have been eliminated. Pursuant to the Moscow Treaty that President Bush signed in 2002, by 2012, each party will possess only 1,700–2,200 operationally deployed warheads. Thus far have the nuclear superpowers reduced their arsenals without, apparently, acquiring any disarmament credibility in the eyes of the disarmament community or adherents of the credibility thesis.

US isn’t key to the NPT – it’s already the only NWS doing anything helpful

Ford, 2009 (Christopher, Senior fellow and director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at Hudson, “Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the ‘credibility thesis,’” Briefing Paper from the Hudson Institute, September, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Nuclear%20DisarmamentCF909.pdf)

Inconveniently for proponents of the credibility thesis, the truth seems to be that the United States has, for some time, been arguably the most serious about disarmament of the five NPT nuclear weapons states—or at least, perhaps more accurately, the least serious of the five about its nuclear weaponry. After all, the United States today is the only NWS that is not building new and more modern strategic nuclear delivery systems or new nuclear weapons. The British, French, Russians, and Chinese are all building new ballistic missile submarines, while the Russians and Chinese are also building new land-based mobile missiles. The Russians are working hard on new warhead designs, apparently in part through the use of secret low-yield nuclear testing, in violation of their own proclaimed testing moratorium, and have developed a chillingly nuclear-friendly strategic doctrine that envisions the early and liberal use of nuclear weaponry (including so-called “tactical” devices) in a range of warfighting scenarios, by no means limited to situations of nuclear threat or attack. China, for its part, despite decades of disarmament rhetoric, may also be conducting such secret low-yield tests, and is certainly—and uniquely, among the five—increasing the overall size of its nuclear arsenal. Even the ostentatiously disarmament-friendly British, in addition to building their new class of ballistic missile submarines, will likely soon need to build new warheads to tip the missiles they will deploy aboard these new vessels. Yet Washington has now abandoned its plans even to study the possibility of replacing existing warheads with a new model designed not to need underground nuclear testing, and has stopped its program to build a follow-on to the B-2 Spirit (a.k.a. “Stealth”) bomber. The United States is also the only power in the world to have a credible chance of replacing with sophisticated long-range conventional capabilities many missions that could previously only be accomplished with the relatively crude hammer blow of a nuclear weapon. Washington has for some years gradually been reducing, rather than increasing, the salience of nuclear weapons in its strategic posture.7 The United States’ continued possession of a sizeable (if shrinking) arsenal should not blind observers to the remarkable degree to which nuclear weaponry is no longer particularly relevant in U.S. thinking, and to which the United States seems ever more uninterested in its own nuclear capabilities. One frequently hears it argued that because the United States invented and first used nuclear weapons, it bears a “special responsibility” for “leading by example” in bringing about their abolition. This is, for instance, the professed view of President Obama himself, who proclaimed in Prague not long ago that “as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act.”8 That may be so, though how far it is both morally appropriate and strategically sensible for America to go by itself will surely be the subject of much debate. Even if one accepts this argument, however, how far out in front the United States happens to be bears no necessary relationship to whether the disarmament process as a whole has credibility. (Indeed, one could imagine making the argument that the more the United States has to be in the vanguard, the less credible the disarmament process should be considered as a whole. The easiest way for one to get in front, after all, is for other parties to stand still or walk backwards—as, for instance, Russia and China are presently doing by further entrenching their reliance upon nuclear weaponry.) In any event, if there is a credibility problem in the disarmament field, it seems clearly not to be a problem of U.S. policy, nor does it seem very likely to be a problem that can be cured by an American vanguard role. This is because some of the same sophisticated conventional strike capabilities that are making the United States more willing to contemplate further nuclear weapons reductions seem to be making Russia and China—not to mention other possessors or would-be possessors, such as North Korea and Iran—more attached to the idea of nuclear weaponry than ever. As outlined above, moreover, the United States is already playing a notable vanguard role in nuclear disarmament, and has done so for years, by cutting its nuclear arsenal dramatically during the four presidential administrations before President Obama. Where, one might ask, is the credibility-derived “payoff” in nonproliferation cooperation for U.S. progress and leadership in this field to date? And what reason do we have to believe, in its absence, that such a payoff will materialize in the future?

Disarmament empirically doesn’t help with non-proliferation

Ford, 2009 (Christopher, Senior fellow and director of the Center for Technology and Global Security at Hudson, “Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the ‘credibility thesis,’” Briefing Paper from the Hudson Institute, September, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Nuclear%20DisarmamentCF909.pdf)

The evidence in support of this “catalytic” prong of the credibility thesis is not encouraging. Does nuclear weapons possession impede nonproliferation, and do reductions increase multilateral support for vigorous nonproliferation policies? If this is so, it is a well-kept secret. The NPT itself was negotiated, opened for signature, and entered into force in a Cold War environment in which the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR were staggeringly huge—indeed, in the Soviet case, still growing for years after the treaty entered into force—and in which there was no immediate prospect of this arms race ending, much less of massive numerical reductions taking place. During the nuclear standoff of the Cold War, moreover, multiple countries were persuaded by various means to abandon nuclear weapons development efforts. Whereas many analysts in the 1960s had projected a terrifying cascade of proliferation, by the end of the Cold War the most striking thing about the nonproliferation environment was not the proliferation that had occurred (for example, to India) but the proliferation that had not. Whatever alchemy lay behind this relative success, the nonproliferation regime performed with a degree of respectability—and against the backdrop of enormous superpower nuclear arsenals and a fierce numerical and technological nuclear arms race between Washington and Moscow. But what happened after the end of the Cold War, when the number of nuclear weapons held by the superpowers—and most of the other NWS, excepting China— finally started to fall, and to fall dramatically? To be sure, the transition out of the Cold War saw some resounding nonproliferation successes. Faced with the prospect of imminent regime change, South Africa’s white Afrikaaner leadership decided to abandon that county’s nuclear weapons program. Iraq’s nuclear weapons effort was smashed by American bombs in 1991, and its resurgence stifled by a stringent regime of sanctions and international arms inspections. Furthermore, while Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons upon the breakup of the Soviet Union, they were quickly cajoled into relinquishing them. These were nonproliferation successes indeed. When it comes to reining in nuclear weapons development work actually undertaken in the post–Cold War era, however, the international community has been singularly unsuccessful. The sole exception to this conclusion has been Libya, whose mercurial leader was apparently sufficiently spooked by the U.S. decision in 2003 to invade Iraq on the grounds that it had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that he decided to put his own illicit programs on the table in secret negotiations with the United States and Britain. India and Pakistan, however, both conducted nuclear tests in 1998, openly inaugurating a tense new age of nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent. (Neither country is or was a state party to the NPT, so one cannot describe their nuclear weapons programs as unlawful. This, however, makes them no less troubling a part of the eruption of proliferation challenges in the post–Cold War era.) Iran accelerated its nuclear weapons development work during the 1990s with secret programs to develop both uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, and it pressed ahead with these efforts even after these programs were embarrassingly revealed in the media in August 2002. North Korea also accelerated its nuclear weapons work after the end of the Cold War. It separated plutonium from its reactor at Yongbyon for the manufacture of implosion weapons, then pursued uranium enrichment while the United States pretended it had solved the North Korean proliferation problem by bribing Pyongyang with two nuclear reactors merely to stop plutonium production. When this uranium program came to light, North Korea resumed its plutonium work as well, subsequently announcing two separate nuclear weapons tests, while provocatively pursuing new ballistic missile technology for the delivery of such devices. Soon, Syria was apparently secretly building a nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance.9 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is reported even to have begun warning her counterparts about possible North Korean nuclear support for the military junta in Burma. In the face of these challenges, the international community has done shockingly little. North Korea’s expulsion of IAEA inspectors was quickly referred to the UN Security Council, but Russia and China blocked further action there by the use or threat of their veto privileges. The United States managed to organize a six-party diplomatic process of regional actors in pursuit of a negotiated solution, but after many frustrating years and a continuing series of diplomatic concessions to the North Koreans, this, too, has come to naught, given Pyongyang’s refusal to honor even the few promises it was willing to make during the course of the talks. Once Iran’s secret enrichment and reprocessing program was revealed to the public in August 2003, momentum seemed to be building for a Security Council referral, but this effort was quickly undercut by a concessionary side deal that Britain, France, and Germany cut with Iran. (This deal produced only a “suspension” agreement, which Tehran appears never to have honored, but which nonetheless succeeded in enticing these governments to derail American efforts to involve the council.) Iran’s unchecked pursuit of the capability to produce fissile materials usable in nuclear weapons exhausted even the Europeans’ capacious patience, but the issue was not reported to the Security Council until 2006. Mild sanctions were then imposed upon Iran, but Russia and China opposed tougher measures, and these penalties have had no apparent effect in arresting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Meanwhile, IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei—though conceding that Iran has been seeking the technology that would allow it to build nuclear weapons10—bizarrely described himself not as a nuclear truth-teller devoted to discovering and reporting safeguards violations, but rather as a “secular pope” whose job it was to protect Iran from “crazies” who might use (accurate) information about Tehran’s nuclear ambitions as an excuse for war.11 Strikingly, these various proliferation challenges—and the sad and all-too-often willful limpness of the international community’s response—all took place during a period of extraordinary nuclear weapons reductions by the United States and Russia. These reductions have already been described, but the point bears re-emphasizing: These problems with proliferation, and an international community unwilling to address them effectively, occurred when the nuclear superpowers were making massive and unprecedented reductions in their nuclear weapons holdings. What does this tell us about the purported link between disarmament credibility and the international community’s willingness to bear burdens in support of nonproliferation? To put it gently, the historical record offers little support for the credibility thesis. (If anything, it could be said to point in the opposite direction. While one should certainly always be careful about asserting a causal connection between succeeding events, it is certainly possible to imagine skeptics advancing a counter-argument—with at least as much facial plausibility—that this history suggests that the interests of nonproliferation might be better served by the maintenance of robust superpower arsenals!) Under the circumstances, what is perhaps most remarkable about the credibility thesis is that anyone dares to advance it at all.

#### No prolif uniqueness

Kahl et. al 13 (Colin H., Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Melissa G. Dalton, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, February, “If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf>, 2013)

\*\*\*cites Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR\*\*\*

I I I . LESSONS FRO M HISTOR Y Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have started down the nuclear path have found the road more difficult than imagined, both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Analysts predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives. Yet, as it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh the potential benefits.19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state’s leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time, the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly declined.26 Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran’s program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970, even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival’s acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but leaders have to weigh these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear weapons will produce strains in strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the United States (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly reduced proliferation proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.

#### NFU can’t solve prolif – NPT cred does nothing and it collapses extended deterrence

Pierre Hassner 2007, Emeritus Research Director and Research Associate at The Centre for International Studies and Research, Sciences Po, Paris, France; Who killed nuclear enlightenment? International Affairs 83: 3 (2007) 427–430)

I shall dwell a little more on the strategic and moral dimensions of the ‘nuclear bargain’. The first concerns the promise of extended deterrence and its role in limiting proliferation. This involves a series of dilemmas and a debate which predates the Non-Proliferation Treaty and may well be re-emerging today in connection with the Middle East. Advocates of the NPT are normally also advocates of minimum deterrence as a step towards nuclear disarmament, and of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons as a step towards their marginalization and as a way to emphasize that their only use is to deter their use by others, or even that this deterrence should operate by their existence alone. The result in terms of a nuclear order should then be based on ‘mutual assured destruction’. This posture has the virtue of avoiding the ‘mad momentum’ of a nuclear arms race and the illusion of victory in a nuclear war. However, both its credibility and its morality if deterrence fails have been strongly criticized. Its real weakness, I think, is in terms of extended deterrence. It may be the least bad solution if states have only to deter an attack against themselves, but what is its credibility if they have to deter an attack upon their allies, let alone upon other non-nuclear states party to the NPT? Would they not need what Herman Kahn used to call a ‘not too uncredible threat of a first strike’, and does that not mean a strike which would not be suicidal? Would this kind of strike not require a counterforce capability and would it not be enhanced by missile defense? Hence the anti-MAD, pro-counterforce school has argued that the best strategy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one that maintains the flexibility and, if possible, the superiority made impossible by ‘minimum’ or, even more, by ‘existential’ mutual deterrence. But if one adopts this argument, does it not set us on the road to what Walker calls ‘counter-enlightenment’—that is, the refusal of universality and reciprocity in favour of war-fighting postures, the mutual search for superiority, the likelihood of an intensified arms race and an increased risk of nuclear war? The only possible way of avoiding both the pitfalls of mutual vulnerability and the dangers of the search for unilateral invulnerability may be essentially political, involving a tightening of alliances and a strategy of engagement materialized by visible physical presence on the territory of one’s non-nuclear allies. But this would look more like NATO than like collective security, and it would leave the unattached without a credible security guarantee unless the alliance were extended to the whole world, which would give it all the characteristics of an empire. These dilemmas are insoluble; I mention them not as an argument for inaction, but to indicate that, like enlightenment in general according to Adorno and Horkheimer, nuclear enlightenment may lead to dialectical reversals and unwanted results. Above all, they indicate that while universal treaties (like the convention against genocide) and declarations of intention are inspiring and legitimizing documents or institutions, their application can never be detached from political interests and priorities, from relations of power and of alliance, of dependence or of rivalry. The question is whether their value as inspirations, as guides or, in Kantian terms, as ‘regulatory ideas’ is morally useful or can lead to hypocrisies and disaffections when confronted with reality. Here lies my main political and moral objection to the idealized picture presented by William Walker of nuclear enlightenment in general and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular. It is contained in one word: hypocrisy. Walker directs all his attacks against the cynicism or scepticism of counter-enlightenment, represented by the Bush administration, and its abandonment of the goal of denuclearization. It has certainly made matters much worse, in particular by de-emphasizing the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting, and between nuclear and conventional weapons. But what Walker tends to forget or to downplay is the hypocrisy which prevailed almost without exception among nuclear powers, and to a large extent also among non-nuclear states, about getting rid of their own nuclear weapons and reaching universal nuclear disarmament. I think it is fair to say that none of the leaders of the nuclear powers, with the possible exceptions of Gorbachev and Reagan, ever seriously contemplated following the South African example and abandoning nuclear weapons. At any rate I have no hesitation whatsoever in stating that the thought never crossed the mind of any French political or military authority. Nor can I blame them for their skepticism in this respect, even though I emphatically do not share their belief in the automatic stabilizing, equalizing and, above all, moderating effect of nuclear weapons. I remain convinced that you cannot eliminate knowledge, that nuclear weapons cannot be dis-invented, and that the calculations of the most serious of arms controllers, such as Thomas Schelling in the 1960s, according to which a situation of minimal deterrence, with a few tens of nuclear missiles instead of thousands, would be more stable than the abolition of nuclear weapons, which could not be verified and would give rise to permanent suspicion of surprise attack, remain valid. Nor do I believe that the non-fulfilment by the great powers of their pledge to work towards total nuclear disarmament is a basic cause of proliferation. I think that if they were to keep their word, the power of their example would not be sufficient, in most cases, to prevail against the motivations in terms of status, domination or security that may push some of the non-nuclear states to seek nuclear status. The non-compliance of the nuclear powers with article VI of the treaty simply provides these other states with a ready-made alibi for continuing their quest, and some of them might even be encouraged or reinforced in their decision to go nuclear by the removal of the threat of nuclear retaliation by one of the existing nuclear powers.

#### Prolif is inevitable, there’s no modeling, and the plan can’t save the NPT or US nonprolif leadership

Pierre Hassner 2007, Emeritus Research Director and Research Associate at The Centre for International Studies and Research, Sciences Po, Paris, France; Who killed nuclear enlightenment? International Affairs 83: 3 (2007) 427–430)

Probably the most important reason for the crisis of the nuclear order, and for my rather pessimistic assessment of its chances of being solved any time soon, is the sharp decline of the international political order on which the NPT was based. The two elements on which any such order has to rely—power and legitimacy—have been profoundly modified in a direction unfavourable to the West. As a result, inequality is seen by the have-nots as less inevitable and acceptable, and belief in reciprocity is in short supply, both among the nuclear powers and among the nonnuclear states aspiring either to join the club or to fight it. The authority of the West, in particular of the United States, and that of the international institutions it has created but within which its control is increasingly challenged, have been considerably weakened in the last few years. Conversely, the rise of new centres of powers outside the West (whether potential challengers like China and India, a Russia newly powerful thanks to the energy crisis, violent and fanatical but wealthy and technologically able subnational or transnational groups, or armed militias resisting conventional armies) has given rise to a general feeling in ‘the rest’ that they no longer have to accept and follow rules which they have not created and which they feel are intended to perpetuate a domination which belongs to the past. As Bruno Tertrais has pointed out, to the regional reasons which are usually predominant in the decision to acquire nuclear weapons is added a global one: the feeling that the old international order is no longer legitimate, that the world is entering a period of uncertainty where new rules have to be written, and that these rules should be written less by a declining ‘West’ than by an ascending ‘Rest’.10 This feeling has, of course, been enormously strengthened and accelerated by the Iraq disaster. The loss in American prestige and influence since 2003 is quite unprecedented. Some of the reasons for this are profoundly debatable: practically all Muslim countries and most countries of the South see not only the Iraq war but also the Afghan war as basically anti-Islamic, or neo-colonial, or both, and most of us now accept this lumping together of the two interventions. Other reasons are shared even by those of America’s allies that believe in the necessity of fighting terrorism, genocide and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The way the Iraq war has been conducted projects an image of recklessness, of mendacity, of resort to immoral practices like torture and, on top of all this, of ineffectiveness and incoherence. All this has eroded whatever trust previously existed in America’s promises and protection, and in its wisdom and predictability, and this loss of trust obviously has deeply damaging consequences for the NPT bargain. Other actions or omissions by the Bush administration are more directly linked to the nuclear issue. The tolerance of the nuclearization of Israel, India and Pakistan that preceded it has been more wholehearted under its tenure. It may have justified the agreement to help India in nuclear matters, in violation at least of the spirit of the NPT, by appealing to political circumstances. But in any case such decisions show a clear choice of political alliances over general collective security and the general doctrine of non-proliferation. The legalistic argument that these countries had not signed the treaty, as if that made their possession of the bomb any less dangerous, is not very convincing. Similarly, the Bush administration’s commitment to regime change, coupled with the contrast between the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the lack of military action against the no less evil but nuclear-armed North Korea, creates a clear incentive for any ‘rogue state’ or member of the ‘axis of evil’ to acquire nuclear arms as quickly as possible.11 Of course, the United States and the West more generally are not alone in wishing the failure of such attempts. They are joined in this wish by China and Russia, who play the role of balancers or arbiters, and by the regional neighbours and rivals of countries like North Korea or Iran, who fear their domination or their aggressiveness and would not mind being spared agonizing decisions by the success of western sanctions. But even these regional adversaries of the would-be proliferators are not immune to the powerful and ubiquitous wave of anti-American and, by extension, anti-western resentment and accusations of hypocrisy. As Kishore Mahbubani has put it, ‘All across the world, from street bazaars to university corridors, from corporate boardrooms to government offices, in daily conversations there is disbelief that America is “threatening” Iran with UN Security Council sanctions when America itself has demonstrated—most clearly in the case of Iraq—that it will not accept the authority of the council.’ Similarly, ‘while the treaty remains alive on paper, it has become spiritually dead. Many middle powers have quietly decided that it is a question of when, and not if, they will go nuclear.’12 None of these countries would find it acceptable to be branded as criminal or punished by nuclear powers for trying to follow in their footsteps. Only ‘country-neutral’ measures which apply equally to all have a chance of being accepted. Even a proposal such as that formulated by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn in January 2007,13 aiming at a world free of nuclear weapons and calling for intermediate measures that run counter to current American policies (such as the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), is likely to be greeted by the non-nuclear states with irony and distrust. They are bound to ask why respected American statesmen who for decades made the case for nuclear deterrence are suddenly in favour of banning the bomb. They are bound to think that the American strategic establishment saw nothing wrong with nuclear weapons as long as they were confined to the developed world and has discovered their madness when they have become accessible to newcomers. Their response is bound to be: ‘Start by abandoning your own nuclear weapons, or wait until we join the club and abandon them together.’ The situation, then, is every bit as dire as Walker sees it; but its roots are deeper than he implies and the remedies he suggests are not very likely to succeed. Sticking to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and relying on the IAEA and the UN Security Council to enforce it, while permitting and encouraging civilian nuclear energy, looks more and more like a losing proposition. Governments are not seriously intending to commit themselves to the revolutionary step of the universal renunciation of nuclear weapons; and while this goal is making new converts, its chances of adoption are rather decreasing than increasing, for reasons both technical (easier access to the weapons, even, probably, by non-state groups) and political (lack of mutual trust).

#### They don’t solve—compensatory fear

Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala 2013; Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT”, The Nonproliferation Review, 20:1, 107-122, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2012.761790

While the idea of increasing the role of advanced conventional weaponry as a component of US national security thinking and practice is not new, Obama is the first president to strongly link these plans with the goal of pursuing a world free from nuclear weapons.3 As a result, the administration’s domestic policy focus must also take into consideration the international impact of the disarmament agenda on the major military fault lines in key US nuclear relationships with Russia, China, and other nuclear weapon states. When the dynamics of these relationships are considered, the Obama plan to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons through\*at least in part\*a greater role for advanced conventional weaponry in order to foster larger nuclear reductions appears unlikely to succeed. The central problem is that US superiority in advanced conventional weaponry makes it very difficult for any US rival to agree to work toward a nuclear-free world when such a move\*already made difficult by existing conventional imbalances\* will magnify US power. More specifically, the close link between nuclear reductions and increases in conventional capabilities essentially works to decrease US vulnerability in a nuclear disarmed world, while at the same time increasing the vulnerability of its current or future rivals and adversaries. As the former US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has written, ‘‘U.S. conventional power-projection capability and the concern that it may be used to intimidate, attack, or overthrow regimes’’ is far more important in terms of driving proliferation and increasing Russian and Chinese reliance on nuclear weapons than ‘‘fear of U.S. nuclear capability or the content of U.S. nuclear policy.’’4As such, a growing role for advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking\*even if it helps to facilitate US nuclear reductions\*appears likely to make Obama’s quest for global zero far more difficult, and perhaps impossible.5’

#### Changes in US policy are irrelevant

Bruce M. Sugden 2008; defense analyst in the Washington, DC area. He does consulting for the Department of Defense and commercial clients on combating weapons of mass destruction, future global strike force structure alternatives, nuclear policy and strategy, and emerging deterrence requirements and technology issues. He earned master's degrees in international relations and public policy studies at the University of Chicago and served for six years in the U.S. Air Force as a missile launch officer; ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC HORIZON; Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2008

While U.S. nuclear policy is certainly a major consideration in Russian and Chinese nuclear strategic thought, there is mixed evidence regarding it as a strong causal factor across cases of nuclear proliferation over the past twenty years. First, Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests were based heavily on its perception of India as a threat.14 Second, in 2004, the Central Intelligence Agency’s special advisor report on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program assessed that ‘‘Iran was the pre-eminent motivator’’ underlying Iraq’s latent WMD program.15 Subordinate reasons for Iraq’s program were to balance against Israel and wield influence throughout the Arab world. Third, although the case of India shows some evidence that states might link their proliferation efforts to the connection between U.S. nuclear policy\*and the policies of other nuclear states recognized by the NPT\*and the status and international prestige of being a great power, some analysts disagree on the relative causal weight of factors behind India’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. For example, in the 1970s Paul Power showed that the leadership of India viewed the NPT as a discriminatory treaty that produced a monopoly of power and failed to prevent the growth of existing nuclear arsenals.16 Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai said that India would sign the NPT only if the other nuclear weapon states destroyed their arsenals.17 In 1998, following India’s detonation of nuclear devices, T.V. Paul assigned primary causal weight to India’s perception of NPT-recognized nuclear states as a privileged class in international politics. Their unwillingness to recognize India as an equal exacerbated the perception.18 In 1999, Sumit Ganguly argued that three factors were behind India’s 1998 nuclear tests: scientific advances in India’s nuclear research and development program; ideological and domestic political influences that were constrained by national security considerations; and perceived security threats in the absence of security assurances from the NPT recognized nuclear states.19 Rodney Jones, however, disagrees with Ganguly’s analysis. Jones argues that India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which directed the nuclear tests, sought to raise India’s global status through the tests to improve the BJP’s political popularity.20 Furthermore, nuclear reversals have occurred despite the largely static nature of U.S. nuclear policy at the time of the reversals. Several states\*Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt, for example\*tried to develop nuclear weapons programs but then gave up.

#### No widespread prolif

Hymans 12

Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [April 16, 2012, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age. As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### No war - history supports

Tepperman ‘9

(Jonathan Tepperman a journalist based in New York City. “Why Obama should learn to love the bomb” Newsweek Nov 9, 2009 <http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome_files/nukes_Final.pdf>)

**A growing** and compelling **body of research suggests** that **nuclear weapons** may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually **make us safer**. In this era of rogue states and trans-national terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that’s a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama’s idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it’s not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn’t be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke free planet) that’s both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, **there’s never been a** nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, **war between two states that possess them**. Just stop for a second and think about that: it’s hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading “nuclear optimist” and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, “We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that **all states are rational** on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they’re pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: **a country will start a fight only when it’s almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price**. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn’t think they could win. The problem **historically** has been that **leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side**—and millions of innocents pay the price. **Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war** obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button— and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, “Why fight if you can’t win and might lose everything?” Why indeed? **The iron logic of deterrence** and mutually assured destruction **is so compelling**, it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world’s major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight **proxy wars**, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these **never matched the** furious **destruction of** full-on, great**-power war** (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there’s very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, “It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time.” The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. **The best recent example is India and Pakistan**, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. **Getting their hands on weapons** of mass destruction didn’t do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war.

#### So does the best statistical evidence

Asal and Beardsley ‘7

(Victor Asal Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany and Kyle Beardsley Department of Political Science, Emory University “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior” Journal of Peace Research 2007; 44; 139)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, **the number of nuclear actors** involved in the crisis, **has a** negative relationship **with the severity of violence** and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that **nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior**, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors – Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992) – and five nuclear actors – Gulf War (1990) – only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. **The positive and statistically significant coefficient** on the variable that counts the number of crisis actorshas a magnitude greaterthan that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors – by extension, many general actors as well – experienced war. Therefore, **the results can only suggest** that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, **increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect**. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. **All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities.** While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that **nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents**.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, **the analysis** lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, **it** significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war**,** with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases.

# 2NC

## XO CP

## T

### 2NC Overview - Mini-Monster

### 2NC Limits DA – Short

#### They allow affs like EMPs, ICBMs (both land-based and sub-based), TNWs, ALL versions of gravity bombs, and B-61’s

#### Even HAARP

MIHALKO ‘13

Mark <http://theringmastersrealm.blogspot.com/2013/01/the-executive-order-haarp-natural.html>

As I was driving home today, the words of Vice President Biden about the potential use of Executive Order for gun control struck a nerve. Sure, it is unconstitutional and an outrageous idea, but there was another reason. That secondary reason stems from my research on the use of HAARP and the signing of borderline-to-illegal executive orders by this administration. This was originally posted in separate pieces, but I believe it is time to put this all together and publish it for all people to read and dissect. Yes, it is a long post, but it is full of information that I believe is very important. Some of the ideas may seem speculative, but when you pull back the curtain and look at what is beginning to transpire, these are some signs to be monitoring. ¶ For many American citizens, the information that I have provided on HAARP and Weather Manipulation sits as just conspiracy theory. To them, there is no way that the government can or will control the weather, especially in a way that can harm or injure innocent victims. In looking at the evidence that we have discovered, there is no question that this type of activity could be possible. Of course, the major question would be why. While the true reasons could be many, it seems to come down to a somewhat common thread of this administration, New World Order or a World Government. That is right, the NWO that have ideals that promote Population Control, Gun Control, Martial Law, and a Police State. Yes, the theory is out there, but before you call me crazy, look at the facts and hear me out. This may not be easy to read, and you may not want to believe it, but there are just too many twists to be anything else.¶ While we found some disturbing activities that happened during the days, we outlined in that article, it was important to determine a point where these types of occurrences started. In my view, the precision that was demonstrated by placing a HAARP signal in the perfect spot at the precise power ratio that would steer Hurricane Sandy almost to a 90-degree turn would have to be an outcome and not a chance placement. With that in mind, I did a random Google search for natural disaster and HAARP, just in a chance something would hit, and something did. In searching for answers, a disturbing trend started to appear with natural disasters and a long stretch of what many consider unconstitutional executive orders or legislation.¶ The date was January 12, 2010 and the massive 7.0 Earthquake struck Haiti, destroyed much of a country that was barely hanging on after being hit with four hurricanes, and guess what, there were major HAARP testing events taking place that day. Now that may be coincidence, but it was what was happening in the Executive Offices that added some clarity to the ordeal. Executive Order 13528 the Establishment of the Council of Governors was signed. Sure, from the name, it may sound harmless, but in reality, it is the Executive Order that for all intensive purposes outline how and when Martial Law is to be set in the United States. That is right, Martial Law here inside our borders. Ironically, all test data for the HAARP system on this date has been deleted.¶ Incredibly, the foray into the ultimate goal of New World Order seems to be growing and the cloak of misdirection is just beginning. Yesterday, I covered what seemed to be the beginning of the use of HAARP to control the weather for political gain in this current administration. At this point, I am still researching strange weather phenomena and governmental actions in previous administrations, which I am positive, will exist. Now, it is time to continue on breaking down this string of concentrated coincidences. We will spend this article documenting the eventful year of 2011, starting with the tragedies suffered in Joplin, Missouri.¶ From all accounts, there were some extreme HAARP readings in the time preceding the devastating tornados that ravaged Joplin, Missouri. While the specific numerical values of those levels are not available to the extent they are now, “HAARP Rings” were found on multiple weather RADAR systems prior to the ordeal. In a strange twist, this storm, coupled with some recent flooding not only fit the profile of the United Nations famed Agenda 21 for population control, it also coincided with the signing of another Executive Order, Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011, Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended. It authorizes the government to seize assets of a “sanctioned person” in a battle against terrorism.¶ This is the first time you see the term “sanctioned” person in use and it will be a key theme moving forward. What is a sanctioned person? By loose definition, it could be someone with multiple guns, someone with a stockpile of ammunition, someone who has a stash of gold or silver, and the best someone with seven days of stored food. Honestly, that describes many Americans. Of course, some will argue that this mentions Iran specifically, but in reading it, it only calls Iran by name once and uses the reference United States Person on more than one occasion.¶ The next date is September 9, 2011, the same day that we outlined in one of our other HAARP articles, when Hurricane Irene bore down on the East Coast, an earthquake hit Vancouver, and there was destruction in Central America. On that date, we did not see President Obama intently watching the devastation in real time in the White House Situation Room like with Hurricane Sandy. In fact, he was busy signing Executive Order 13584 - Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism Communications Initiative and Establishing a Temporary Organization to Support Certain Government-wide Communications Activities Directed Abroad. From the name, and for the most part in reading it, it is an anti-terrorism order. Yet, a closer look would reveal that it authorizes a special agency inside the State Department to create a communications link monitoring terrorist activities against American citizens in national and international areas. Really, this one is not extremely dangerous by itself, but again, this is one of many to come.¶ After this order, things quieted down, until Executive Order 13590 - Authorizing the Imposition of Certain Sanctions with Respect to the Provisions of Goods, Services, Technology, or Support for Iran's Energy and Petrochemical Sectors signed on November 20, 2011. This was an interesting order because the term “sanctioned person” was used again. Coincidently, that date also matched a day where severe weather along with heavy rain started for the parts of the United States, including heavy precipitation in the Northwest that measured at least seven inches in some areas.¶ To close out 2011, we move to December, when President Obama signs the extremely contentious National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This act has been in place since the early 2000s and has been controversial since its inception. If you have not heard of the act, you must be out of the loop. This act authorizes $662 billion in funding for the defense of the United Statesand its interests abroad. It includes items such as Department of Defense health care costs, counter-terrorism within the U.S. and abroad and military modernization. It also imposes economic sanctions against Iran (section 1045), commissions appraisals of the military capabilities of countries such as Iran, China, and Russia, refocuses the strategic goals of NATO, and gives governors the ability to request the help of military reservists in the event of a hurricane, earthquake, flood, terrorist attack or other disaster.¶ While those issues may not seem out of line, the most controversial provisions are contained in Title X, Subtitle D, entitled Counter-Terrorism. These include sub-sections 1021 and 1022, which deal with detention of persons the government suspects of involvement in terrorism. The controversy was to their legal meaning and potential implications for abuse of Presidential authority. Although the White House and Senate sponsors maintain that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) already grants presidential authority for indefinite detention, or the creation of a kill list, the act states that Congress "affirms" this authority and makes specific provisions as to the exercise of that authority for indefinite detention without trial. Of course, separately these mean little, but as a whole, create a tangled web. Especially when you dig a bit deeper in natural disasters with somewhat troubling political undercurrents involved.¶ Do you see how these events are connected, and at the price of the freedoms granted in the Constitution of the United States. The combination of the unconstitutional portions of the NDAA, coupled with the powers granted in these executive orders sit at the heart of something bigger than the War on Terror. Think about what we have heard, Osama Bin Laden is Dead; the terrorists are on the run. Even if that was the case, and it is not, why do we have a need for so many covert orders that have to potential to suppress Constitutional Rights? The only reason I can see is something much darker, something mentioned by President George H.W. Bush, the New World Order. A reference he made multiple times including once on September 11, 1990 and then again in his most famous statement in March 1991.

#### And Rods from God, global strike, space lasers, and heat weapons

SpaceDaily ‘05

<http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/White_House_Says_It_Is_Not_Looking_At_Weaponizing_Space.html>

The White House said Wednesday that it is not looking at weaponizing space in the face of a newspaper report stating the US Air Force was seeking presidential authority that could lead to such a program.¶ "Let me make that clear right off the top, because you asked about the weaponization of space, and the policy that we're talking about is not looking at weaponizing space," White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters.¶ However, McClellan said that the administration of US President George W. Bush wants to ensure that its space assets are adequately protected.¶ "We have a draft updated national space policy that is going through the interagency review process," he said.¶ McClellan spoke in the wake of a New York Times report Wednesday which said the US Air Force was seeking a national security directive from President Bush that could lead to fielding offensive and defensive space weapons.¶ An unidentified senior administration official, cited by the Times, said a new presidential directive to replace a 1996 policy that emphasized a more pacific use of space is expected within weeks.¶ McClellan said that Bush had directed in June 2002 "that there be a review of our national space policies."¶ The White House spokesman said it had been "about seven or eight years" since US space policy had been updated.¶ "And certainly during the last eight or nine years there have been a number of domestic and international developments that have changed the threats and challenges facing our space capabilities," McClellan said.¶ "And so the space policy needed to be updated to take into account those changes. And at this point it's still going through that review process.¶ "We believe in the peaceful exploration of space," he stressed.¶ Officials told the Times that the aim of the directive was not to place weapons permanently in orbit - which is banned under the 30-year-old Antiballistic Missile Treaty the US withdrew from in 2002 - but to use space as a platform for weapons systems currently being developed.¶ The daily mentioned Air Force programs such as Global Strike, calling for a military space plane carrying precision-guided weapons that could strike from halfway around the world in 45 minutes.¶ The 'Rods From God' program aims to launch cylinders of tungsten, titanium or uranium from space to strike targets on the ground at speeds of about 11,500 kilometers per hour (7,200 miles per hour) with the force of a small nuclear weapon.¶ Other programs call for bouncing lethal laser beams off orbiting mirrors or high-altitude blimps, or turning radio waves into heat weapons. In April the Air Force launched an experimental XSS-11 microsatellite able to disrupt reconnaissance and communications satellites.

#### Tons of military statutes already make it extremely hard to be neg – that means you should hold the line of what constitutes an introduction of Armed Forces into hostilities

#### Independent limits link to their evidence standard – they don’t have a single 2AC card that has intent to define – they only have ev that’s contextual - the justifies contextual definitions in any part of the topic - immigrant detention and quarantine and detain cellphones because of the NSA are considered broadly part of detention policy – means they split the topic

#### Limits outweighs – education is inevitable, but unfocused education isn’t productive – limits determine the direction and productivity of learning

#### Depth over breadth – forces debaters to do in-depth research on affs – leads to better understanding of the intricacies of war powers and overall better debates – it’s incentivizes innovation and creativity

#### Broad interpretations cause unmanageable research burdens

Taylor 5

Taylor III, now a JD from William and Mary, 2005¶ (Jarred, “Searching for a More Perfect Union,” <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ypiOXjRVPWzNxDsFVJ0S1n-QfIGtXzp7Y59meEwd-bE/edit?hl=en_US>)

**It would take even the most seasoned scholar years of research and hundreds of pages to** adequately **analyze** the development of **any presidential power** over the course of American history; **war power is** certainly **no exception**. Every President since George Washington has interpreted the martial prerogatives of his office in different ways, and most have set some sort of precedent for succeeding officeholders. Nevertheless, some of the major changes in executive military power bear highlighting.

## CP

### Negotiations Good 2NC

1. Massive literature base differentiates unilateral cuts and reciprocal cuts, means the aff has predictable ground and this CP is key to education

Blechman, 2009 (Barry M., co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and a Stimson Distinguished Fellow currently working on developing solutions for the nuclear threat, “Don’t reduce the US nuclear arsenal Unilaterally,” January 21, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=734)

President Obama does not lack advice on the nuclear policies he should pursue. Six projects, at least, are providing such recommendations. Prominent among them are suggestions that the US should reduce its nuclear arsenal unilaterally, eliminating weapons that most observers agree are no longer needed for military purposes. Unilateral cuts, it is argued, would set a good example for other countries and would strengthen US non-proliferation credentials, making it easier to persuade Iran and North Korea to give up their aspirations for nuclear weapons and permitting the US to enter the 2010 Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference from a position of strength. Recommendations differ on the size of the cut, but most believe that around 1,000 weapons would provide all the nuclear deterrence the US needs -- and then some. Such a significant unilateral reduction would be a terrible mistake. The cuts would not accomplish the goals claimed for them and would create new problems that could, ironically, increase the risk of proliferation. Most importantly, they would diminish opportunities to negotiate mutual reductions in US and Russian arsenals that could eventually lead to a nuclear-free world.

2. CP is key to test the opportunity cost of the plan – unilateral reductions make it impossible to use nuclear weapons as an incentive for Russian reciprocity

EconEdLink, No Date (http://www.econedlink.org/cyberteach/sample.cfm)

Opportunity cost is a fundamental concept in economics, which states that every economic choice has a cost. It further states that every choice has a cost because every choice involves a trade-off: you give up something in favor of your first choice. The very fact that you are able to choose means that there were alternatives to consider. When you choose to use your limited income for one thing, you give up other goods. When you choose to use your limited time one way, for example, seeing a movie, you give up other uses of that time, say, studying. The opportunity cost is defined and measured as the "best alternative foregone" when a choice is made. In other words, the opportunity cost is the next best thing, in your own view, that you could have done with your limited resources, your income or time, for example. This notion that resources are limited is an important aspect of the opportunity cost concept since, if resources were unlimited, you would not have to choose at all. The opportunity cost of a choice reflects the real consequences you expect will follow from making a particular decision. This cost is usually the difference between your first and second choices. Thus, evaluating the opportunity cost creates a recognition of the consequences - both benefits and costs - of a choice and helps you make an informed and rational decision. Some of these consequences may not be apparent for quite a while. Business and government decisions have opportunity costs as well, as their limited resources are needed to accomplish many tasks.

3. Resolutional solvency advocate solves your offense – negotiating the plan with Russia is probably the most predictable counterplan especially since it was a potential resolution and was explicitly mentioned in the topic paper

4. Default to neg flex – aff has structural advantages by setting the ground for debate, persuasion of the last speech which outweighs any time benefits in the block and a literature base that recognizes that it’s illogical to maintain a massive stockpile after the cold war. Means the neg needs generic CPs like this just to get to ground zero

5. At worst, reject the argument not the team

### NB

#### Russia wants

Jun, 1998 (Wu, Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, “on no-first-use treaty,” The Sixty ISODARCO Beijing seminar on Arms Control, November 1, http://www.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/papers/Wu\_JunISODARCO.PDF)

With the end of the cold war, the risk of catastrophic damage on the world caused by nuclear weapons has dramatically reduced. But the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the initiation of nuclear war by error or by accident have not been ruled out. Nuclear force reductions would decrease these dangers and enhance global security and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. I believe that the conclusion of a No-First-Use treaty will be a key step in the deep nuclear disarmament. MOST NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES RELY ON THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS VERY MUCH Currently, most nuclear powers adopt nuclear police in which they rely on their nuclear weapons very much. This would be harmful to the Non-proliferation regime. The nuclear posture of the US was formed during the Cold War. The roles and missions of nuclear forces were intended to deter any forms of military aggression. They were against both nuclear attack and conventional attack. The end of the Cold War created new nuclear environment, in which the threats of massive nuclear war, and a large-scale military conflict have receded to an all-time low. In the new security era, the US still persists in the nuclear extended deterrence posture as mentioned above and it remains in the center of the US national security strategy. Russia has gave up the no first use commitment by the former Soviet Union and reserves a nuclear option in response to a conventional attack from any quarters. The document “strategy for Russia” which was published in middle of 1992 declared that “Russia’s present economic and political weakness, as well its interests, make it necessary to preserve its reliance on nuclear weapons and on nuclear deterrence policy.” France insists on making it clear that its nuclear strategy is not only independent but also conceptually distinct from that of NATO and that of the United States in particular. They take the nuclear weapons as the basis of their security. The “last resort” doctrine is the center of their nuclear police. The UK takes the importance of Atlantic Alliance as a key factors in nuclear policy. It enjoys the “special relationship” with US. Its view of deterrence was based on readiness to use nuclear weapon to defend British territory, its armed forces, or its interests in the event of attack or coercion by an adversary with nuclear weapons or with significant or overwhelming conventional strength. NO-FIRST-USE REGIME IS PROFITABLE TO ALL THE COUNTRIES. All of the countries mentioned above take their nuclear weapons as a key factor in their national defense. This kind of nuclear strategy will give the non-nuclear weapon countries a signal that the nuclear disarmament is very limited. The nuclear weapons will exist forever. It will undermine the Non-proliferation Regime and arouse some countries trying to establish nuclear capability. Therefore, for the reason of nuclear non-proliferation, these nuclear countries should change their nuclear doctrine. No first use is a good strategy for all states. No first use is profitable to both the world and nuclear countries, and should be possibly accepted by all the nuclear countries. For the small nuclear countries (France, Britain and China), they can not make first attack on any nuclear countries. Because they have very limited nuclear abilities, they could not win in a nuclear war, especially conflict with the super nuclear countries (USA and Russia). The No First Use regime would reduce the risk of the nuclear attack. Therefore, I believe the nuclear weapon in these countries should be used only to deter nuclear attack. For USA and Russia, the threat of a large-scale conventional conflict has receded from each other. Both countries have emerged from the Cold War as the world\_ preeminent conventional military power and they are well equipped to deter or defeat conventional attacks using conventional weapon alone. With the technology and industry background, they will keep the preeminent conventional military power for very long time. Nuclear proliferation is the biggest threat to the national security of the U.S and Russia. The NFU Pledges of the U.S. and Russia can encourage the non-nuclear-states to abide by their commitments not to develop nuclear weapon. THERE ARE SOME VISIBLE CHARACTERISTICS TO EXPLAIN NFU. As some arms control experts suggested, There are some visible characteristics to explain NFU. First, the size of an operational nuclear arsenal will be very limited. The number of nuclear warheads used in retaliation to produce intolerable damage was estimated as hundreds. Considering the new social environment in which human lives are more respected, we think a hundred of highly survived nuclear weapon should be able to deter nuclear strikes. Second, the tactical nuclear weapons are specially to attack military targets and they have lower threshold to be used. They are not suitable for retaliatory strike. Therefore, retain tactical nuclear weapon in operation is a dangerous sign of using them first. Third, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles should be limited. They are more suitable to first strike than retaliation. Some intrusive and sensitive arrangement could be used to strengthen Non-First-Use treaty. For example, constraining accuracy, unloading nuclear warheads from delivery systems and sealing operational nuclear weapon. SEVERAL MEASUREMENTS SHOULD BE PUSHED FOR THE NFU TREATY Now, with the impetus of the end of the cold war, the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia are shrinking significantly. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and USA made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Belarus, Kazakhastan and Ukraine have relinquished their nuclear weapon. South Africa has dismantled their 6 nuclear warheads and joined NPT. Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the UN General Assembly in 1996 also made the favorable environment to nuclear disarmament. Canberra Commission has stated “The opportunity now exists, perhaps without precedent or recurrence, to make a new and clear choice to enable the world to conduct its affairs without nuclear weapons and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” I believe several steps we should take to push for the NFU Treaty. The United States and Russia must continue to take lead in reducing nuclear arsenal. Although START II limits the number of warheads that can be mounted on strategic delivery vehicles, it does not limit the number or types of warheads that each side may possess. That is, under the terms of the treaty, each side can keep as many warheads as they desire. The treaty only limited how many of those warheads may be mounted on long-range missiles or bombers. This failure to limit warheads, combined with the inherent capability of some delivery vehicles to carry many more warheads than START II permits, provides the possibility of rapid breakout. Russia or US could relatively quickly place additional warheads on land- and sea- based missiles and bombers. Now US and Russia Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed on a framework for START III. To make nuclear disarmament more solid, more practical and irreversible, it should be carry out the talk on monitor warhead stockpiles and dismantling activities during the START III negotiation. Scientists should study a method to deal with the weapon used material more economic and more practical. SUMMARY The nuclear weapons should have played much less importance in the world than they do now. People know that the nuclear war could not be happened, because no one would be the winner. The nuclear states should take real steps to show that they abide by the pledge of Article 6 of NPT. “NFU” can play an important role in non-proliferation. Nuclear weapon is only a retaliatory strike tools under NFU; the roles of nuclear weapon will be reduced. This will give the world a sign that producing nuclear weapon is useless in any case but just cost money. Nuclear states should negotiate NFU treaty to constrain their first strike capabilities. If all nuclear weapon states seriously take their responsibilities and people have confidence in that, the NFU regime will automatically become a no use regime.

#### Mistrust in the relationship means the CP is key

Diakov, 2009 (Anatoli, Ph.D., Professor of Physics at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, “The US-Russian Process of Nuclear Weapons Reduction,” 29 March, http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=283:challenges-and-priorities-for-the-obama-administration&catid=138:disarmament-times-spring-2009&Itemid=2)

The whole world is expecting and eagerly awaits extensive changes in US policy from the new administration of Barack Obama. One area where a new direction is expected is the US-Russian process of strategic nuclear weapons reduction. The US and Russia, the world’s two nuclear superpowers, have a special responsibility, commitments, and experience in nuclear weapons reduction. During most of the Cold War and for a decade thereafter, negotiations on nuclear arms limitations and reductions were at the center of the Moscow-Washington relationship. These negotiations and the discussions around them created channels of communication between the two governments and kept them open; helped limit their nuclear arms buildups; and made them partners in the great project of reducing the danger of nuclear war. This cooperation and the resulting shared understanding of the dangers of nuclear weapons laid a foundation for the Moscow-Washington partnership in building the nuclear non-proliferation regime. But after the end of the Cold War, some in the United States started to argue that because Russia and the United States were not rivals anymore, arms control was simply the wrong paradigm for their modern relations and an outmoded approach to the achievement of strategic stability. Based on such views, the administration of George W. Bush decided to prioritize its own freedom of action in deploying and operating its nuclear forces rather than working to retain START and other arms control agreements with Russia. As a result, bilateral consultations on the maintenance of strategic stability and negotiations of further reductions were virtually stopped. The military security system based on treaties and agreements was dismantled, and the US-Russian dialogue on arms control came to an impasse. However, Russia and the United States have not become true partners and deep mistrust remains in their relationship.  Each deploys today more than 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads with more than 1,000 warheads on each side on hair-trigger alert. As a result, nuclear deterrence continues to be a central part of their relationship. All this would be bad enough in a world free of other problems, but there are additional stresses — notably stemming from NATO expansion, Russian-US competition for influence in Russia’s “near abroad,” and the US embrace of ballistic-missile defense and Prompt Global Strike with conventional weapons, both of which Russia sees as threatening. But in a situation where the central threat to the security of our world is the spread of nuclear weapons, the reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is becoming increasingly dangerous. The only realistic solution to this threat is reversing our reliance on nuclear weapons. It will require a verified reduction of nuclear weapons globally over some period of time. Today Russia and the US possess more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. Without agreement between these two on further nuclear weapons reductions, it will be impossible to convince other nuclear weapon states to verifiably reduce their arsenals. It will likewise be impossible to consolidate the efforts of the international community towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. With a new administration in Washington, the door appears to be open for Russia and the United States to renew their dialogue on the nuclear danger and reach agreements on how to reduce it — initially involving deeper, faster and irreversible reductions in Russian and US deployed strategic nuclear warheads to levels more compatible with the end of the Cold War. Russia has consistently expressed interest in negotiating a new treaty on further verifiable reductions of strategic nuclear arms. In a speech on 10 October 2008, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev stated that Russia attaches “exceptional importance to concluding a new, legally binding US-Russian agreement on nuclear disarmament.” Policy makers in the United States articulated recently the need for a new US nuclear policy. In his first press conference, President Obama expressed the desire to “restart conversations [with Russia] about how we can start reducing our nuclear arsenals in an effective way so that we then have the standing to go to other countries and start stitching back together the nonproliferation treaties that, frankly, have been weakened over the last several years.” These statements give grounds to expect that Russia and the United States could resolve the existing deadlock and reach a new agreement on deep, verifiable and irreversible reductions in their strategic nuclear forces. The levels of cuts remain unknown and will depend at least in part on resolving the dispute over missile defense. But if that dispute is resolved positively, then reductions to 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads on each side could be achieved. Deeper cuts and the possibility of the abolition of nuclear weapons remain thorny issues. President Obama has said he supports the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons, and Moscow, at least theoretically, could share this idea. But getting to zero would involve overcoming not only skepticism, but a number of practical hurdles. Some nuclear weapon states, including Russia, consider nuclear weapons to be a deterrent not only to nuclear threats, but also to non-nuclear threats to their security. Today there is no understanding of how global strategic stability could be maintained without nuclear weapons. Quite practically, verification would also be problematic. Complete elimination of nuclear weapons would also require introducing some constraints on conventional weapons, especially those of the US. Reaching the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons is a very complex task and will require sustained efforts from the international community. If that goal is to be reached, it will be a long, step-by-step process. For Moscow, the first steps on this path must be a continuation of the US-Russian verifiable nuclear weapons reduction process. Anatoli Diakov is a professor of physics at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and since 1991 the Director of its Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies.

### Net benefit

Only the CP solves relations – formal institutions for negotiation are key

The Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, 2009 (Joint project of The Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs from Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” March, http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf)

Protecting and advancing America’s national interests in the decades ahead requires a strategic reassessment of the United States’ relationship with Russia with an emphasis on exploring common interests. A constructive relationship with Russia will directly influence the United States’ ability to advance effectively vital national-security interests in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and energy security, and to deal with many specific challenges such as Iran or European security. If left unchecked, the ongoing deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations will begin to seriously damage our ability to achieve objectives across these interests. The Obama administration must establish an effective, comprehensive bilateral structure to facilitate consultation, dialogue, and negotiation. U.S. priorities must be defined more clearly. And we must more realistically assess Russia’s views of its interests. Though leaders in both countries have made encouraging statements in recent weeks suggesting a new commitment to improving relations, we are deeply concerned by the gap between the current U.S.-Russian relationship and the level of cooperation that the United States needs with Russia in order to advance vital American interests. Not only rhetoric but swift action is essential to build a relationship with Moscow that addresses critical U.S. goals in Iran, Afghanistan, and around the world. Both governments are to blame for the decline in U.S.-Russian relations; thus, rebuilding the relationship will not be easy and is not solely the responsibility of the United States. Moreover, cooperation is not a panacea. American and Russian interests are not identical and the United States cannot address some of its important interests through cooperation alone, such as preventing Russia from using Europe’s energy dependence for political leverage. Moscow is clearly a difficult partner at best, with its own perspectives, approaches, and foreign-policy preferences. The United States will have to work toward some goals without Russia or over Russian objections. We must also entertain the possibility that despite America’s best efforts, Russia will choose an unacceptable direction. The United States should avoid contributing to such a decision, but must be prepared to respond to it if necessary. Part of the problem is that the United States and Russia have yet to develop an effective set of structures that allows for not only frank and comprehensive dialogue, but also exploration of possible cooperative projects and prompt, coordinated implementation of leadership decisions. The Bush and Clinton administrations attempted to develop many such structures, including the Strategic Dialogue, the Camp David Checklist, and the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. None can or should be replicated: all depended heavily on the personalities involved and each had its own shortcomings. But the United States and Russia must find an institutional basis for their relationship befitting its strategic necessity.

#### Relations key to controlling proliferation: this is the greatest threat to US security

Graham 09

Thomas, senior director at Kissinger Associates, Inc. He served as special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff “ Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purprposes” The Century Foundation, foreign policy and economic think tank, http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev257/Graham.pdf NEH )

 **There is no graver threat to U.S. security than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to states or terrorist organizations intent on doing us harm. Dealing with this threat entails strengthening the nonproliferation regime, enhancing the security and reducing the quantity of fissile material and chemical and biological agents that can be used for weapons of mass destruction, controlling the knowledge and know-how to build such weapons, and preparing to mitigate the consequences should such a weapon be used.** Russia is the second major nuclear power (**the U**nited **S**tates **and Russia** • **together control 95 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal**), **with long experience in the development, manufacturing, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons; massive stockpiles of** plutonium and highly enriched uranium (the **fuel for nuclear weapons**) **and biological and chemical agents; and a long history in civil nuclear power. It is indispensable to any effort to manage the proliferation problem and prevent terrorist organizations from gaining possession of weapons of mass destruction.**

#### Russian relations solve Chinese belligerence

Graham 09

 Thomas, senior director at Kissinger Associates, Inc. He served as special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff “ Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purprposes” The Century Foundation, foreign policy and economic think tank, http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev257/Graham.pdf NEH )

 The rise of **China** already **is having a major impact on the global economy, including** increasing the **scarcity of critical commodities, such as oil, gas, and metals. China’s geopolitical weight will only grow as its economy expands,** reshaping in particular the balance of power in Northeast and Central Asia. **The U.S. interest is in integrating China as a responsible stakeholder into global economic and security structures**. **Russia’s massive territorial presence in Northeast Asia and its continu• ing political, economic, and security presence in Central Asia make it a major player in the construction of new security structures** in both those regions, along **with China, the United States, and other powers. Its treasure trove of natural resources in Siberia and its Far Eastern region could play a central role in fueling Chinese economic growth. A continued strong Russian presence increases the possibilities for building stable security structures**; a weak Russia would make those tasks harder. The United States, of course, could work with others, minus Russia, to build these structures, but **cooperation with Russia would ease the task.**

#### Relations solve miscalc and nuclear war

Gottemoeller 8

(Rose Gottemoeller was appointed Director of carnegie moscow center in January 2006. formerly, Gottemoeller was a senior associate at the carnegie endowment, where she held a joint appointment with the Russian and eurasian Program and the Global Policy Program. a specialist on defense and nuclear issues in Russia and the other former soviet states, Gottemoeller’s research at the endowment focused on issues of nuclear security and stability, nonproliferation, and arms control, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States, “Russia-US Security Relations after Georgia” available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/russia_us_security_relations_after_georgia.pdf>)

No holds barred, no rules—the United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation more unpredictable and dangerous than any we have seen since the Cuban missile crisis. A confrontation today would be different—the two countries are in constant and intense communication, unlike the situation in 1962—but if those exchanges provoke mutual anger and recrimination, they have the potential to spark a dangerous crisis. This effect is especially dangerous because both countries are in presidential transitions. Russia, whose government is riven by corruption, internal competition, and disorder, is attempting an unprecedented tandem leadership arrangement. The United States is in the midst of its quadrennial election season, with both political parties competing to show that their man is more skilled and tough on national security issues than his opponent. **The unpredictability of these two transitions stokes the potential for misunderstanding and descent into crisis. We must avoid such a crisis, because we have never succeeded in escaping the nuclear existential threat that we each pose to the other**. We never even came close to transforming the U.S.–Russian relationship into one that is closer to that which the United States has with the United Kingdom or France. What if Russia had refused to confirm or deny that no nuclear weapons were on the bombers it flew to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons are still faced off **to launch on warning of an attack, and in a no-holds-barred confrontation between us, we could come close to nuclear catastrophe** before we knew it. What next? Is it possible to outrun confrontation and return to a pragmatic working relationship in pursuit of mutual interests? Clearly the answer should be “yes,” if the Russian Federation completely withdraws its troops from Georgian territory according to the Sarkozy–Medvedev plan. But, following Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that process may take months and perhaps years. Some Russian commentators have been arguing that a relevant time frame to consider is how long Cyprus has been the site of an unresolved territorial dispute between Turkey and Greece: nearly thirty years. In the meantime, the United States and Russia have about six months of intense political transition to get through, until the new U.S. president settles into place. This begs for a short-term modus vivendi that would enable the two countries to avoid a potential crisis and establish an agenda to confront some of the severe problems that have emerged in their relationship. Ultimately, the United States and Russia should want to re-create a book of rules that both will embrace, corresponding to international law and in fact strengthening it. Seize the Superstructure **The first step in this process, and the best way to begin it, is to grab onto the existing superstructure of the U.S.–Russia relationship**. This is the system of established and well-understood treaties, agreements, and arrangements that has been built up over time. Beginning in the 1950s, many efforts have been made to insert predictability and mutual confidence into the relationship in the form of both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. For the next six months, both governments need to take advantage of this established and well understood system. Derided in recent years as a Cold War relic not worthy of the friendship the two countries had developed, it could now be a lifeline.

# 1NR

### 2NC Impact Overview

#### We control timeframe – sanctions cause a global nuclear war in months

Press TV 11/13

“Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail”, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/>

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war. ¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney called on Congress to allow more time for diplomacy as US lawmakers are considering tougher sanctions. ¶ "This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue," Carney said. "The American people do not want a march to war." ¶ Meanwhile, US Secretary of State John Kerry is set to meet with the Senate Banking Committee on Wednesday to hold off on more sanctions on the Iranian economy. ¶ State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Kerry "will be clear that putting new sanctions in place would be a mistake." ¶ "While we are still determining if there is a diplomatic path forward, what we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause in sanctions. We are not taking away sanctions. We are not rolling them back," Psaki added.

#### DA turns case case – sets a precedent to delegate authority – draws us into war

**Richman, 12/29/13** (Sheldon, Counterpunch, “AIPAC's Stranglehold Congress Must Not Cede Its War Power to Israel”, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/12/27/congress-must-not-cede-its-war-power-to-israel/>)

The American people should know that pending right now in Congress is a bipartisan bill that would virtually commit the United States to go to war against Iran if Israel attacks the Islamic Republic. “The bill outsources any decision about resort to military action to the government of Israel,” Columbia University Iran expert Gary Sick wrote to Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) in protest, one of the bill’s principal sponsors.¶ The mind boggles at the thought that Congress would let a foreign government decide when America goes to war, so here is the language (PDF):¶ If the government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people and existence.¶ This section is legally nonbinding, but given the clout of the bill’s chief supporter outside of Congress — the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC [PDF]), leader of the pro-Israel lobby — that is a mere formality.¶ Since AIPAC wants this bill passed, it follows that so does the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposes American negotiations with Iran and has repeatedly threatened to attack the Islamic Republic. Against all evidence, Netanyahu insists the purpose of Iran’s nuclear program is to build a weapon with which to attack Israel. Iran says its facilities, which are routinely inspected, are for peaceful civilian purposes: the generation of electricity and the production of medical isotopes.¶ The bill, whose other principal sponsors are Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Sen. Mark Kirk (R-IL), has a total of 26 Senate cosponsors. If it passes when the Senate reconvenes in January, it could provoke a historic conflict between Congress and President Obama, whose administration is engaged in negotiations with Iran at this time. Aside from declaring that the U.S. government should assist Israel if it attacks Iran, the bill would also impose new economic sanctions on the Iranian people. Obama has asked the Senate not to impose additional sanctions while his administration and five other governments are negotiating with Iran on a permanent settlement of the nuclear issue.¶ A six-month interim agreement is now in force, one provision of which prohibits new sanctions on Iran. “The [Menendez-Schumer-Kirk] bill allows Obama to waive the new sanctions during the current talks by certifying every 30 days that Iran is complying with the Geneva deal and negotiating in good faith on a final agreement,” Ali Gharib writes at Foreign Policy magazine. That would effectively give Congress the power to undermine negotiations. As Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, told Time magazine, if Congress imposes new sanctions, even if they are delayed for six months, “The entire deal is dead. We do not like to negotiate under duress.”¶ Clearly, the bill is designed to destroy the talks with Iran, which is bending over backward to demonstrate that its nuclear program has no military aims.

#### Turns heg and cred

**Daremblum 11** Jaime, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow, “Iran Dangerous Now, Imagine it Nuclear,” Real Clear World, 10/25/11, <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=8439>

What would it mean if such a regime went nuclear? Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that a nuclear-armed Iran would never use its atomic weapons or give them to terrorists. Even under that optimistic scenario, Tehran's acquisition of nukes would make the world an infinitely more dangerous place. For one thing, it would surely spark a wave of proliferation throughout the Greater Middle East, with the likes of Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - all Sunni-majority Muslim countries - going nuclear to counter the threat posed by Shiite Persian Iran. For another, it would gravely weaken the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. After all, Washington has repeatedly said that the Islamic Republic will not be permitted to get nukes. If Tehran demonstrated that these warnings were utterly hollow, rival governments and rogue regimes would conclude that America is a paper tiger. Once Tehran obtained nuclear weapons, it would have the ultimate trump card, the ultimate protection against outside attack. Feeling secure behind their nuclear shield, the Iranians would almost certainly increase their support for global terrorism and anti-American dictatorships. They would no longer have to fear a U.S. or Israeli military strike. Much like nuclear-armed North Korea today, Iran would be able to flout international law with virtual impunity. If America sought to curb Iranian misbehavior through economic sanctions, Tehran might well respond by flexing its muscles in the Strait of Hormuz. As political scientist Caitlin Talmadge explained in a 2008 analysis, "Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz tops the list of global energy security nightmares. Roughly 90 percent of all Persian Gulf oil leaves the region on tankers that must pass through this narrow waterway opposite the Iranian coast, and land pipelines do not provide sufficient alternative export routes. Extended closure of the strait would remove roughly a quarter of the world's oil from the market, causing a supply shock of the type not seen since the glory days of OPEC." Think about that: The world's leading state sponsor of terrorism has the ability to paralyze destabilize the global economy, and, if not stopped, it may soon have nuclear weapons. As a nuclear-armed Iran steadily expanded its international terror network, the Western Hemisphere would likely witness a significant jump in terrorist activity. Tehran has established a strategic alliance with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, and it has also developed warm relations with Chávez acolytes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua while pursuing new arrangements with Argentina as an additional beachhead in Latin America Three years ago, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Venezuelan government of "employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers." More recently, in July 2011, Peru's former military chief of staff, Gen. Francisco Contreras, told the Jerusalem Post that "Iranian organizations" are aiding and cooperating with other terrorist groups in South America. According to Israeli intelligence, the Islamic Republic has been getting uranium from both Venezuela and Bolivia. Remember: Tehran has engaged in this provocative behavior without nuclear weapons. Imagine how much more aggressive the Iranian dictatorship might be after crossing the nuclear Rubicon. It is an ideologically driven theocracy intent on spreading a radical Islamist revolution across the globe. As the Saudi plot demonstrates, no amount of conciliatory Western diplomacy can change the fundamental nature of a regime that is defined by anti-Western hatred and religious fanaticism.

### 2NC Uniqueness Wall

#### Second, err neg on veto overrides---they’re intrinsically unlikely, but Lobe says it’s uniquely possible now---means we control uniqueness but it doesn’t overwhelm

Lindsay 11/25

James, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations“Will Congress Overrule Obama’s Iran Nuclear Deal?” <http://blogs.cfr.org/lindsay/2013/11/25/will-congress-overrule-obamas-iran-nuclear-deal/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+jlindsay+%28James+M.+Lindsay%3A+The+Water%27s+Edge%29>

Does this mean that Congress is going to take Iran policy out of Obama’s hands? Not quite. Any sanctions bill could be vetoed, something the president presumably would do to save his signature diplomatic initiative. The odds that sanctions proponents could override a veto aren’t good. Congress hasn’t overridden one in foreign policy since it imposed anti-apartheid sanctions on South Africa over Ronald Reagan’s objections back in 1986. In that respect, Obama is in a much stronger position than he was back in September when he sought to persuade Congress to authorize a military strike on Syria. Then the difficulties of passing legislation worked against him; now they work for him.¶ One reason Obama should be able to make a veto stick is party loyalty. Many congressional Democrats won’t see it in their interest to help Republicans rebuke him, and he only needs thirty-four senators to stand by him. Senator Reid has already begun to soften his commitment to holding a sanction vote. As Majority Leader he has considerable freedom to slow down bills and to keep them from being attached to must-pass legislation that would be politically hard for Obama to veto.

#### HERE’S THE UNHIGHLIGHTED PART OF THEIR EV:

#### Sanctions will pass now – and have enough votes to override the veto.

Politico 1/10/14 Support builds for Senate’s Iran sanctions bill http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/iran-sanctions-senate-bill-102024.html

A Senate bill that would slap new economic penalties on Iran is quietly approaching a level of support that would overcome a filibuster — and perhaps even a presidential veto. Bipartisan legislation spearheaded by Sens. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) has accumulated the support of 59 senators this week, including all but two Senate Republicans: Rand Paul of Kentucky and Jeff Flake of Arizona. Sources tracking the legislation believe the well of the support is much deeper among Senate Democrats than the 16 public supporters. But many Democrats remain on the sidelines due to the Obama administration’s opposition to new Iran sanctions while international negotiations continue over a permanent nuclear deal. “I guess they are responding to administration’s request not to pass new sanctions. I think that’s crazy. I think that the current sanctions are becoming slowly but surely unraveled,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.). But boosters of the legislation believe that if and when Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) allows a vote, the legislation is sure to clear the 67 votes needed to overcome a possible veto by President Barack Obama. Supporters believe the cosponsorship of Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Chairman Michael Bennet (D-Colo.) is indicative of a trend line of rising Democratic support. “DSCC chairman coming on board this week is [a] big signal,” said a senior Senate aide tracking the legislation.

#### Their second piece of evidence just proves that PC is key – they are not completely decided yet, they are the ones Obama needs to get

Here’s uniqueness evidence from today

JTA 1/10 [http://www.jta.org/2014/01/10/news-opinion/politics/iran-sanctions-has-majority-backing-but-veto-proof-number-is-stalled-among-dems, Iran sanctions have majority backing in Senate, but not enough to override veto](http://www.jta.org/2014/01/10/news-opinion/politics/iran-sanctions-has-majority-backing-but-veto-proof-number-is-stalled-among-dems%2C%20Iran%20sanctions%20have%20majority%20backing%20in%20Senate%2C%20but%20not%20enough%20to%20override%20veto)

WASHINGTON (JTA) — More than half the United States Senate has signed on to a bill that would intensify sanctions against Iran. But in a sign of the so-far successful effort by the White House to keep the bill from reaching a veto-busting 67 supporters, only 16 Democrats are on board.

The number of senators cosponsoring the bill, introduced by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), reached 58 this week, up from just 33 before the Christmas holiday break.

Notably only one of the 25 who signed up in recent days — Sen. Michael Bennet (D-Colo.) — is a Democrat, a sign of intense White House lobbying among Democrats to oppose the bill.

#### The threshold is low – but undecided Dems matter

Davnie and Gould, 1/5/14

(Davnie retired in 2007 after 26 years in the Foreign Service; Kate Gould is the legislative associate for Middle East policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation in Washington, D.C (William and Kate, “Iran sanctions bill threatens progress; pressure is on Franken, Klobuchar” <http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/238660021.html>)

Without a significant public outcry, support for this sanctions bill could potentially reach a veto-proof majority of 67 senators and 290 representatives in the House.¶ Minnesota could play an important role in this showdown between supporters of using hard-nosed diplomacy to avoid military action and reduce nuclear risk, and those who would upend sensitive negotiations and make war likely. About half of the senators have staked out their positions, but neither Sen. Amy Klobuchar nor Sen. Al Franken have yet taken a public stance.¶ Minnesota is one of just 10 states where neither senator has taken a public position on whether or not to sign onto sanctions that would sink the deal — and risk another war in the Middle East.¶ While some new-sanctions proponents are banking on partisan politics to earn support from Republicans, it would still take seven of the remaining 23 undecided Democrats, along with all Republicans, to reach a veto-proof majority. All eyes will be on those 23 undecided Democrats — including Klobuchar and Franken.

### AT: Reid

#### 2nd internal link is Reid - PC keeps Reid from bringing the bill up for a vote

Kaper 12-6

(Stacy, National Journal, “Reid in Hot Seat on Iran Sanctions” This article appears in the December 6, 2013, edition of NJ Daily. http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/reid-in-hot-seat-on-iran-sanctions-20131205

Harry Reid is in the hot seat on the question of whether to allow a vote on Iran sanctions legislation, and it will only get hotter when the Senate returns from recess next week.¶ The administration is unleashing a full-court press to sell its interim nuclear deal with Iran, and it has been waging a campaign for months to convince Congress to hold off on any additional sanctions action. But several lawmakers on both sides of the aisle who strongly support Israel insist that it was the pressure of sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table on its nuclear-weapons capabilities. They argue the threat of additional sanctions now is necessary to hold Iran's feet to the fire.¶ This all puts Reid in an incredibly tough bind.¶ The Senate majority leader has so far blocked any vote on additional Iran sanctions from coming to the floor. Despite comments that he madebefore the interim agreement was announced that the Senate needs to leave "legislative … options open to act on a new bipartisan sanctions bill in December," he has since hedged, saying the Senate will act "appropriately" and that "if we need stronger sanctions, I am sure we will do that."¶ Senior Republican Senate aides say they don't see signs of Reid capitulating.¶ Many on and off Capitol Hill monitoring the situation closely say they have a hard time imagining Reid would call for a vote on Iran sanctions legislation any time soon.¶ "I believe Senator Reid will try to give the administration the time it needs to sell this deal a little bit more on the Hill," former Reid spokesman Jim Manley said. "His job as leader is to protect the administration's priorities."¶ Danielle Pletka, a vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, said Reid might find the pressure from the White House overwhelming.¶ "I believe that Reid's caucus will want a vote, but Reid may well refuse in order to protect the president's desire to have a free hand to warm up with Iran," she said.¶ But it is also unclear how long Reid can resist pressure from his colleagues.

**2NC AT Hirsch – Winners Win**

#### No uniqueness – the shutdown fight was a win

Parnes 10-16

Amie Parnes, 10/16/2013 (staff writer, “Obama hails debt deal's passage as lifting 'cloud of unease'” <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/328985-obama-hails-debt-deals-passage-as-lifting-cloud-of-unease>, Accessed 10/17/2013, rwg)

President Obama signed a deal to reopen the government and raise the debt ceiling on Thursday morning.¶ Hundreds of thousands of federal workers will return to their jobs on Thursday, and national parks and memorials shuttered for 16 days will reopen.¶ Obama, who won a political victory with the congressional votes, hailed the deal, saying it would “begin to lift this cloud of uncertainty and unease from our businesses and the American people.”

#### Wins on foreign policy don’t matter to Congress – Obama could cure cancer and they wouldn’t care

Rooks 11

Doug Rooks 8-28-11 Obama needs to step up leadership at home http://www.sunjournal.com/columns-analysis/story/1079510

**The fall of Moammar Gaddafi, Libya’s brutal dictator, is the latest evidence that Barack Obama**, 31 months into his first term, **is compiling the strongest foreign policy record of any president since Ronald Reagan**, and possibly longer. **Though in Washington’s poisonous political atmosphere** Obama is not going to get credit **for any achievement** short of curing cancer**,** his astute balancing act beyond our shores is impressive indeed. More to the point, Obama has studiously avoided the pitfalls that bedeviled his two most recent Democratic predecessors, Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter, the only others Democrats to hold the office in the past 35 years.

**Hirsh admits winners win relies on winning on popular issues**

**Hirsh 2-7**

Michael is the Chief Correspondent at National Journal, “There’s no Such Thing as Political Capital,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>

In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But **if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support**—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—**there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories** than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction.¶ Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, **a** new, **more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly**. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.”

**It’s about the perception of the other side working with you - Obama proves**

**Hirsh 2-7**

Michael is the Chief Correspondent at National Journal, “There’s no Such Thing as Political Capital,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>

Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So **Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan** that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” **The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal**. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. **But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialis**t**.¶ After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said.** If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. **But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different**. **He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit**. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote.¶ Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

#### Second-term jinx outweighs

Raum 13

Tom Raum 13 1/16 (Writer for the Associated Press, "Obama not only faces big battles ahead with Congress but must navigate second-term jinx" [www.startribune.com/politics/187154791.html?page=2&c=y](http://www.startribune.com/politics/187154791.html?page=2&c=y))

President Barack Obama acknowledges the dangers of overreach but vows to steer cautiously. The odds are against him. He's the 20th U.S. president to serve all or parts of two terms. Most of the others have encountered setbacks and frustrations. He's also the third in a row to win a second four-year term. Both predecessors stumbled. President Bill Clinton was impeached by the House over lying about an affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, although the Senate declined to remove him from office. President George W. Bush failed to get a big Social Security overhaul through Congress and was slammed for his handling of Hurricane Katrina and growing voter anxiety over the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. From Inauguration Day, a second term president's influence and power begin to ebb. "It's called fatigue, people burn out. Typically, the top people are recruited for the first term. For the second term, you kind of go to the bench," said Ross Baker, a political science professor at Rutgers University. "It's a little less illustrious than the starting lineup. You're going to get more people perhaps a little less sure-footed. That's putting it, perhaps, mildly." There's something of a political Continental Divide with second terms. At some point everybody's attention starts flowing in the other direction as those in both parties start shifting their focus to the next election. Also, Obama sets out against a backdrop of looming new fiscal showdowns that will come to a head in March — another battle over the debt limit, mandatory spending cuts postponed from January and the expiration of spending authority for the entire government. And some of his top second-term goals such as immigration and tax-code overhaul, gun control and climate-change legislation come as grim budget realities cast a long shadow over what he can accomplish. History is littered with troubled second terms.

#### Even if winners win, regeneration is too slow to affect the debt ceiling

Lashof 10

Dan Lashof, director of NRDC's climate and clean air program,¶ “Lessons from Senate climate fail”¶ <http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-28-lessons-from-senate-climate-fail/>

Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I'm sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. **White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success.** A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama's political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. **Healthcare reform was eventually enacted, but only after an exhausting battle that eroded public support, drained political capital, and created the Tea Party movement**. Public support **for healthcare reform is slowly rebounding** as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. B**ut this is occurring** too slowly to rebuild Obama's political capital **in time to help push climate legislation** across the finish line.

### 2NC Link Wall – Generic

#### Forcing a vote on questions of war powers authority destroys dem unity and saps Obama’s PC by putting him on the defensive, rather than the offensive – decisions like the aff empirically spillover to other agenda items – that’s Kriner

#### Prefer Kriner - only comprehensive study

Fowler 10

Professor of Government, Chair in Policy Studies at Dartmouth [Linda L. Fowler, After the Rubicon, CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS, AND THE POLITICS OF WAGING WAR, http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo10156999.html]

Studies of war and research on Congress typically stand in isolation from each other. Kriner’s new book demonstrates big payoffs from examining the two in concert. He shows how the balance of party power in the legislature trumps conventional strategic variables in explaining the duration of U.S. military conflicts. Kriner also reveals how informal legislative actions, such as hearings, investigations, and resolutions, limit the president’s use of force. The book draws on a wide range of statistical and qualitative evidence and should cause even diehard realists to look more seriously at domestic constraints on U.S. actions abroad. In sum, Kriner’s work suggests that reports of Congress’s death as a participant in international relations are greatly exaggerated.

#### Our link is uniquely true in the context of Iran sanctions – the aff would obviously draw immense backlash from war hawks which would make delaying sanctions more difficult, so he would give in to save face

Chait 13

(Jonathon, “Obama Guards His Left Over Terrorism”, <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/05/obama-guards-his-left-over-terrorism.html>)

President Obama’s speech today defending his conduct in the waron terrorwas notablefor what he was defending it against — not against the soft-on-terror (and maybe sorta-kinda-Muslim) attack that Republicans have lobbed against him since he first ran for president, but against critics on the left.¶ It is a sudden and welcome turnabout. When Obama first appeared on the national scene, he was a political novice, a liberal Democrat who had made his name opposing the Iraq War, a constitutional law professor, and his middle name was Hussein. The need to defend his hawkish credentials was an, and perhaps the, essential task of his 2008 election. And the dynamic persistedthroughout his first term, as Republicans used events like Obama’s attempt to close the Guantanamo Bay prison and the Christmas bomber to revive their weak-on-terror caricature.¶ Having fortified his right flank, Obama’s left was totally exposed. Rand Paul signaled the first volley, by launching a high-profile filibuster speech on drones that attracted the sudden support of fellow Republicans who had expressed zero previous qualms. The Department of Justice leak-prosecution story was the event that turned Obama’s civil liberties weakness into a gaping vulnerability. As I’ve written, its political importance was a pure accident of timing. A new (inaccurate) report on Benghazi, followed by the IRS scandal, created a sudden frenzy.¶ That’s when the DOJ leak story dropped. And what would ordinarily be considered a policy dispute — and one that attracted the interest only of a handful of liberals and libertarians — became a scandal pursued by Republicans, who previously had stood to Obama’s right on the issue. The DOJ story was a problem for Obama because it was a legitimate case of abuse, unlike the nothing-burger Benghazi story or the IRS episode for which the White House seemed to bear no responsibility. The legitimacy of the DOJ policy, even though it’s not a “scandal” by any normal definition, kept the damaging “scandal” meme alive.¶ Obama used his speech today to shore up his exposed left flank. He did so in several ways. He argued for his administration’s drone strikes, which have become a symbol of out-of-control military power, as a flawed but necessary step that minimizes civilian casualties in comparison with the alternative. Obama promised “to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of war zones that go beyond our reporting to Congress.” He insisted that he would not and could not use drones to attack an American citizen on U.S. soil. He promised “to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorists without keeping America on a perpetual war-time footing.” And he pledged a review of the DOJ’s approach to prosecuting national security leaks.

#### **Losers lose - the plan saps capital and causes defections**

Loomis 7

Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

### AT Plan Popular

#### Doesn’t answer our 1nc link scenario – it’s a question of an Obama fight-back, not whether Congress supports the plan

#### Popularity is irrelevant—no capacity for the plan

John Grant, Minority Counsel for the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 8/13/2010, Will There Be Cybersecurity Legislation?, jnslp.com/2010/08/13/will-there-be-cybersecurity-legislation/

In the course of just a few decades, information technology has become an essential component of American life, playing a critical role in nearly every sector of the economy. Consequently, government policy affecting information technology currently emanates from multiple agencies under multiple authorities – often with little or no coordination. The White House’s Cyberspace Policy Review (the Review) wisely recognized that the first priority in improving cybersecurity is to establish a single point of leadership within the federal government and called for the support of Congress in pursuit of this agenda.¶ Congressional involvement in some form is inevitable, but there is considerable uncertainty as to what Congress needs to do and whether it is capable of taking action once it decides to do so. With an agenda already strained to near the breaking point by legislation to address health care reform, climate change, energy, and financial regulatory reform – as well as the annual appropriations bills – the capacity of Congress to act will depend, in some part, on the necessity of action. For the last eight years, homeland security has dominated the congressional agenda. With the memory of the terrorist attacks of September 11 becoming ever more distant, there may be little appetite for taking on yet another major piece of complex and costly homeland security legislation.

### 2NC PC Key Wall

#### Capital is not just about bargaining, it’s about focus – the plan’s expenditure of capital prevents Obama from maintaining a consistent message on Iran sanctions and it means he’ll lose the ability to ask for favors

Moore 13

Guardian's US finance and economics editor.(Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester>)

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

#### Political capital is key to the credibility of the veto threat

**Slezak, 7 -** University of California, Los Angeles(Nicole, “The Presidential Veto: A Strategic Asset,” <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Vater/Slezak.pdf>)

Spitzer states that the veto is the “key presidential weapon,”13 and I suggest that it offers him a strategy to take both the defensive and the offensive against an often divided and combative Congress. The president takes the defensive by waiting for legislation to be sent to him from Congress and then vetoing legislation that is unacceptable and offensive to his administration’s goals. The veto is a way for the president to “go public” and to show his dislike for the legislation through his veto message. In addition, he can prove to Congress that unless they amend the legislation in accordance with his suggestions, he will not pass the bills that they send him. Gattuso speaks on this matter by stating, “The veto, moreover, is a very effective device for grabbing the public’s attention and focusing it on the President’s struggle to pursue policies on behalf of all the people and against special interests. A veto message may be a President’s most effective bully pulpit.”14

However, the veto is more than a tool to block, and the president may also take the offensive by using the veto threat. Aside from the conventional use of the veto (blocking legislation from passing), it can also be used in this more subtle and less potentially damaging way. The veto threat is a special tool that allows the president to warn Congress of a veto before the legislation is even presented to him. The veto threat stems from the power that the veto has built over the centuries and which relies heavily on a president’s possession of political capital. If the president is in the fourth year of his term, when Congress is most likely to be confrontational, the president should not use the veto threat as often as he did in the first year of his term. This is due to the fact that when a president enters office he is riding on the mandate of his election and has a large amount of political capital to spend. This is why Spitzer warns that, “like a veto itself, a threat applied too often loses its potency, and a threat not considered credible is not a threat at all.”15

Once the president makes the decision to make a veto threat and does so, there are four outcomes that are possible. Congress can decide to shape the legislation in a manner that is acceptable to the president so that he will sign it into public law, Congress can construct a compromise with the president and pass an altered bill, the president can give in and sign the bill if Congress sends it unchanged, or neither side can compromise and will lead to Congress passing the bill unchanged and the president vetoing it.16

 In order to take advantage of the strategic uses of the veto, both in its defensive and offensive applications, it must be determined what factors lead a president to veto or pass legislation. To do this, I will assess what factors scholars believe influence a president’s decision to veto legislation. To determine if these widely supported factors are important in the president’s decision to veto, they will be tested to determine whether they are statistically significant. Once it is known what factors truly cause the president to veto legislation, and which actually matter, it will help the president create a reliable veto strategy. The veto strategy is a model to help the president assess when the use of the veto will maximize effectiveness. This allows the president to calculate when it is an opportune time to risk political capital and a potential override in order to veto legislation, or when he should avoid losing capital and attempt to bargain with Congress or simply pass legislation.

### 2NC Trade/China Impact

#### New round of sanctions would threaten broad enforcement of extraterritorial sanctions

Kahl-Director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security-11/13/13

<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20131113/101478/HHRG-113-FA00-Wstate-KahlC-20131113.pdf>

Second, and somewhat paradoxically, escalating sanctions at this moment could actually end up weakening international pressure on Iran. For better or worse, Rouhani has already succeeded in shifting international perceptions of Iran. If the United States, rather than Iran, comes across as the intransigent party, it will become much more difficult to maintain the international coalition currently isolating Tehran. In particular, if negotiations on a comprehensive framework collapse because of Washington’s unwillingness to make a deal on limited enrichment – a deal Russia and China and numerous other European and Asian nations support – it will likely become much harder to enforce sanctions. Some fence sitters in Europe and Asia will start to flirt with Iran again, leaving the United States in the untenable position of choosing between imposing extraterritorial sanctions on banks and companies in China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and elsewhere, or acquiescing to the erosion of the comprehensive sanctions regime.

#### That undermines US trade leadership and Sino-US relations

Leverett-professor at Pennsylvania State University's School of International Affairs-2/25/13

Imposing secondary sanctions on non-US entities transacting with Iran could backfire on Washington if implemented.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322584515426148.html>

Secondary sanctions Secondary sanctions are a legal and political house of cards. They almost certainly violate American commitments under the World Trade Organisation, which allows members to cut trade with states they deem national security threats but not to sanction other members over lawful business conducted in third countries. If challenged on the issue in the WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, Washington would surely lose. India aims to cash in on Iran sanctions Consequently, US administrations have been reluctant to impose secondary sanctions on non-US entities transacting with Iran. In 1998, the Clinton administration waived sanctions against a consortium of European, Russian and Asian companies developing an Iranian gas field; over the next decade, Washington declined to make determinations whether other non-US companies' Iranian activities were sanctionable. The Obama administration now issues blanket waivers for countries continuing to buy Iranian oil, even when it is questionable they are really reducing their purchases. Still, legal and reputational risks posed by the threat of US secondary sanctions have reduced the willingness of companies and banks in many countries to transact with Iran, with negative consequences for its oil export volumes, the value of its currency and other dimensions of its economic life. Last year, the European Union - which for years had condemned America's prospective "extraterritorial" application of national trade law and warned it would go to the WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism if Washington ever sanctioned European firms over Iran-related business - finally subordinated its Iran policy to American preferences, banning Iranian oil and imposing close to a comprehensive economic embargo against the Islamic Republic. In recent weeks, however, Europe's General Court overturned European sanctions against two of Iran's biggest banks, ruling that the EU never substantiated its claims that the banks provided "financial services for entities procuring on behalf of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes". The European Council has two months to respond - but removing sanctions against the banks would severely weaken Europe's sanctions regime. Other major players in Iran's economy, including the Central Bank of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company, are now challenging their own sanctioned status. On the other side of the world, America is on a collision course with China over sanctions. In recent years, Beijing has tried to accommodate US concerns about Iran. It has not developed trade and investment positions there as rapidly as it might have, and has shifted some Iran-related transactional flows into renminbito to help the Obama administration avoid sanctioning Chinese banks (similarly, India now pays for some Iranian oil imports in rupees). Whether Beijing has really lowered its aggregate imports of Iranian oil is unclear - but it clearly reduces them when the administration is deciding about six-month sanctions waivers for countries buying Iranian crude. The administration is taking its own steps to forestall a Sino-American conflict over sanctions. Besides issuing waivers for oil imports, the one Chinese bank Washington has barred from the US financial system for Iran-related transactions is a subsidiary of a Chinese energy company - a subsidiary with no business in the US. However, as Congress enacts additional layers of secondary sanctions, President Obama's room to manoeuver is being progressively reduced. Therein lies the looming policy train wreck.