# 2AC

#### 1. FRAMEWORK—The aff is a normative statement. Vote aff if plan is a good idea, neg if it isn’t.

A. Solves their offense –the impact of the K is a reason the aff is bad.

B. Aff choice – they arbitrarily steal 9 minutes of offense, destroys the aff’s only advantage.

c. Vague alts are a voting issue – skews 2AC offense and creates a form of sandbagging which unfairly privileges the time benefits of the block

#### 2. Their narrative approach to debate and identity is neurophysiologically fallacious and ethically undesirable.

**Strawson 2k4**

[galen, chair philosophy, university of texas, against narrativity, Ratio, XVII, 4, Dec., 420-460]

On the strong form of Schechtman’s view, I am not really a person. Some sentient creatures, she says ‘weave stories of their lives, and it is their doing so which *makes* them persons’; to have an ‘identity’ as a person is ‘to have a narrative self-conception . . . to experience the events in one’s life as interpreted through one’s sense of one’s own life story’. This is in fact a common type of claim, and Schechtman goes further, claiming at one point that ‘elements of a person’s narrative’ that figure only in his ‘implicit self-narrative’, and that ‘he cannot articulate . . . are only partially his – attributable to him to a lesser degree than those aspects of the narrative he can articulate’.45 This seems to me to express an ideal of control and selfawareness in human life that is mistaken and potentially pernicious. The aspiration to explicit Narrative self-articulation is natural for some – for some, perhaps, it may even be helpful – but in others it is highly unnatural and ruinous. My guess is that it almost always does more harm than good – that the Narrative tendency to look for story or narrative coherence in one’s life is, in general, a gross hindrance to self-understanding: to a just, general, practically real sense, implicit or explicit, of one’s nature. It’s well known that telling and retelling one’s past leads to changes, smoothings, enhancements, shifts away from the facts, and recent research has shown that this is not just a human psychological foible. It turns out to be an inevitable consequence of the mechanics of the neurophysiological process of laying down memories that every studied conscious recall of past events brings an alteration.46 The implication is plain: the more you recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you risk moving away from accurate self-understanding, from the truth of your being. Some are constantly telling their daily experiences to others in a storying way and with great gusto. They are drifting ever further off the truth. Others never do this, and when they are obliged to convey facts about their lives they do it clumsily and uncomfortably and in a way that is somehow essentially narrative-resistant. Certainly Narrativity is not a necessary part of the ‘examined life’ (nor is Diachronicity), and it is in any case most unclear that the examined life, thought by Socrates to be essential to human existence, is always a good thing. People can develop and deepen in valuable ways without any sort of explicit, specifically Narrative reflection, just as musicians can improve by practice sessions without recalling those sessions. The business of living well is, for many, a completely non-Narrative project. Granted that certain sorts of self-understanding are necessary for a good human life, they need involve nothing more than form-finding, which can exist in the absence of Narrativity; and they may be osmotic, systemic, not staged in consciousness. Psychotherapy need not be a narrative or Narrative project. It regularly involves identifying connections between features of one’s very early life and one’s present perspective on things, but these particular explanatory linkings need not have any sort of distinctively narrative character to them. Nor need they be grasped in any distinctively Narrative way. Nor need they interconnect narratively with each other in any interesting way. I don’t need to take up any sort of Narrative attitude to myself in order to profit from coming to understand how the way X and Y treated me when I was very young is expressed in certain anxieties I have now. The key explanatory linkings in psychotherapy are often piecemeal in nature, as are many of the key impacts of experience. Ideally, I think, one acquires an assorted basketful of understandings, not a narrative – an almost inevitably falsifying narrative.

#### THEIR FRAMEWORK ONLY MAKES SENSE WHEN ONE ASSUMES PEOPLE UNIVERSALLY CONCIEVE OF IDENTITY OR EXPERIENCE AS NARRATIVE, SOMETHING THAT COULD BE EXPLAINED IN A COHERENT WAY IN A DEBATE. THIS EXCLUDES NON-NARRATIVE CULTURES AND IDENTITIES.

**Strawson 2k4**

[galen, chair philosophy, university of texas, against narrativity, Ratio, XVII, 4, Dec., 420-460]

The descriptive thesis and the normative thesis have four main combinations. One may, to begin, think the descriptive thesis true and the normative one false. One may think that we are indeed deeply Narrative in our thinking and that it’s not a good thing. The protagonist of Sartre’s novel La nausée holds something like this view.1 So do the Stoics, as far as I can see. Second, and contrariwise, one may think the descriptive thesis false and the normative one true. One may grant that we are not all naturally Narrative in our thinking but insist that we should be, and need to be, in order to live a good life. There are versions of this view in Plutarch2 and a host of present-day writings. Third, one may think both theses are true: one may think that all normal non-pathological human beings are naturally Narrative and also that Narrativity is crucial to a good life. This is the dominant view in the academy today, followed by the second view. It does not entail that everything is as it should be; it leaves plenty of room for the idea that many of us would profit from being more Narrative than we are, and the idea that we can get our selfnarratives wrong in one way or another. Finally, one may think that both theses are false. This is my view. I think the current widespread acceptance of the third view is regrettable. It’s just not true that there is only one good way for human beings to experience their being in time. There are deeply non-Narrative people and there are good ways to live that are deeply non-Narrative. I think the second and third views hinder human self-understanding, close down important avenues of thought, impoverish our grasp of ethical possibilities, needlessly and wrongly distress those who do not fit their model, and are potentially destructive in psychotherapeutic contexts.

#### And, their narrative framework doesn’t make sense – whatever is meant by the word “I” cannot convey my identity through discussion of the past because my past life did not happen to the I before you now.

**Strawson 2k4**

[galen, chair philosophy, university of texas, against narrativity, Ratio, XVII, 4, Dec., 420-460]

I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself to be relatively Episodic, I’ll use myself as an example. I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember some of my past experiences ‘from the inside’, as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future. That’s one way to put it – to speak in terms of limited interest. Another way is to say that it seems clear to me, when I am experiencing or apprehending myself as a self, that the remoter past or future in question is not my past or future, although it is certainly the past or future of GS the human being. This is more dramatic, but I think it is equally correct, when I am figuring myself as a self. I have no significant sense that I – the I now considering this question – was there in the further past. And it seems clear to me that this is not a failure of feeling. It is, rather, a registration of a fact about what I am – about what the thing that is currently considering this problem is. I will use ‘I\*’ to represent: that which I now experience myself to be when I’m apprehending myself specifically as an inner mental presence or self. ‘I\*’ comes with a large family of cognate forms – ‘me\*’, ‘my\*’, ‘you\*’ ‘oneself \*’, ‘themselves\*’, and so on. The metaphysical presumption built into these terms is that they succeed in making genuine reference to an inner mental something that is reasonably called a ‘self’. But it doesn’t matter whether or not the presumption is correct.8 So: it’s clear to me that events in my remoter past didn’t happen to me\*. But what does this amount to? It certainly doesn’t mean that I don’t have any autobiographical memories of these past experiences. I do. Nor does it mean that my autobiographical memories don’t have what philosophers call a ‘from-the-inside’ character. Some of them do. And they are certainly the experiences of the human being that I am. It does not, however, follow from this that I experience them as having happened to me\*, or indeed that they did happen to me\*. They certainly do not present as things that happened to me\*, and I think I’m strictly,literally correct in thinking that they did not happen to me\*

**2. Problem-solution impact is backwards---acting with a flawed epistemology allows us to change that epistemology.**

**Harris 7** (Graham, Adjunct Prf. @ Centre for Environment University of Tasmania, Seeking Sustainability in an age of complexity p. 9-10)

1 am not going to address the global 'litany' at length here. The arguments have been well made by others, especially and most elegantly by E. O. Wilson. What 1 wish to address here is the question: 'Can we grasp the complexity of it all and, if so, what do we do about it?' Given the fundamental nature of the problem the destruction of the biosphere and its ecosystem ser- vices together with the huge changes going on in human societies and cultures driven by globalisation and technological change the precautionary principle would suggest that even if the epistemology is flawed, the data are partial and the evidence is shaky, we should pay attention to the little we know and do whatever is possible to mitigate the situation even if we fundamentally disagree about the means and the ends. The only ethical course of action is, as John Ral- ston Saul writes," based on 'a sense of the other and of inclusive responsibility'. We know enough to act. Ethics is about uncertainty, doubt, system thinking and balancing difficult choices. It is about confronting the evidence**.** Over the past two or three decades, as there has been an increasing appre- ciation of the importance of good environmental management, and as western societies have become more open and the ICT revolution has made informa- tion much more widely available there has been a growing debate between the worlds of science, industry, government and the community around environ- mental ethics and environmental issues and their management. During this period new knowledge has been gained, ideas have changed (sometimes quite fundamentally) and there have been huge changes in government and social institutions and policies. We are all on a recursive journey together: we are lit- erally 'making it up as we go along'. This is not easy and there are no optimal solutions. This is an adaptive process requiring feedback from all parts of the system. Yes, there will be surprises. This is why it is so important that when we act we constantly reflect on what we know and what we are doing about it and where it is all going. As we reach the physical limits of the global biosphere the values we place on things are changing and must change further. A new environmental ethic is required, one that is less instrumental and more embracing. Traditionally there has tended to be a schism between those who take an anthropocentric view (that the world is there for us to use) and those who take the non-anthropocentric view (those who value nature in its own right). Orthodox anthropocentrisni dictates that non-human value is instrumental to human needs and interests. In contrast, non-anthropocentrics take an objectivist view and value nature intrinsically; some may consider the source of value in non-human nature to be independent of human consciousness.45 What is required is a more complex and systems view of ethics which finds a middle ground between the instrumentalist and objectivist views. Norton '46 for example, proposes an alternative and more complex theory of value - a universal Earth ethic - which values processes and dynamics as well as entities and takes an adaptive management view of changing system properties. For sustainable development to occur, choices about values will remain within the human sphere but we should no longer regard human preferences as the only criterion of moral significance. 'Humans and the planet have entwined destinies"' and this will be increasingly true in many and complex ways as we move forward. There are calls for an Earth ethic beyond the land ethic of Aldo Leopold.45 The science of ecology is being drawn into the web .49 Ecologists are becoming more socially and culturally aware and engaged" and the 'very doing' of ecology is becoming more ethical.tm' Some scientists are beginning to see themselves more as agents in relationships with society and less as observers.

#### 3. Permutation – delink the affirmative from any western epistemology – doesn’t disprove the desirability of the plan

#### 4. Kritiks of western imperialism and hegemony justify violence and genocide. This is a reason why the epistemology of liberal democratic is a good one.

Reiff 99

David Reiff, Famous Author and Columnist, Summer 99

<http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/rieff2.html>, WPJ, XVI, No. 2

The conclusion is inescapable. At the present time, **only the West has both the power and**, however intermittently, the **readiness to act.** And by the West, one really means the United States. Obviously, to say that America could act effectively if it chose to do so as, yes, the world's policeman of last resort, is not the same thing as saying that it should. Those who argue, as George Kennan has done, that we overestimate ourselves when we believe we can right the wrongs of the world, must be listened to seriously. So should the views of principled isolationists. And those on what remains of the left who insist that the result of such a broad licensing of American power will be a further entrenchment of America's hegemony over the rest of the world are also unquestionably correct.What Is to Be Done But the implications of not doing anything are equally clear. Those who fear American power are-this is absolutely certain-**condemning other people to death**. Had the U.S. armed forces not set up the air bridge to eastern Zaire in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of thousands of people would have perished, rather than the tens of thousands who did die. This does not excuse the Clinton administration for failing to act to stop the genocide militarily; but it is a fact. And analogous situations were found in Bosnia and even, for all its failings, in the operation in Somalia. Is this proposal tantamount to calling for a recolonization of part of the world? Would such a system make the United States even more powerful than it is already? Clearly it is, and clearly it would. But what are the alternatives? Kosovo demonstrates how little stomach the United States has for the kind of military action that its moral ambitions impel it to undertake. And there will be many more Kosovos in the coming decades. With the victory of capitalism nearly absolute, the choice is not between systems but about what kind of capitalist system we are going to have and what kind of world order that system requires. However controversial it may be to say this, our choice at the millennium seems to **boil down to imperialism or barbarism.** Half-measures of the type we have seen in various humanitarian interventions and in Kosovo represent the worst of both worlds. Better to grasp the nettle and accept that liberal imperialism may be the best we are going to do in these **callous and sentimental times.**  Indeed, the real task for people who reject both realism and the utopian nihilism of a left that would **prefer to see genocide** in Bosnia and the mass deportation of the Kosovars rather than strengthen, however marginally, the hegemony of the United States, is to try to humanize this new imperial order-assuming it can come into being-and to curb the excesses that it will doubtless produce. The alternative is not liberation, or the triumph of some global consensus of conscience, but, to paraphrase Che Guevara, **one, two, three, many Kosovos**.

#### 5. Perm do both – the alternative should overcome any link to the plan

**6.** **The alt fails to account for the intersections of colonialism and creates fragmentation that prevents effective political action**

Andrea **Smith. 2012**. “Indigeneity, Settler Colonialism, White Supremacy” in Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century. p 77.

As mentioned previously, many Native studies scholars have refused engagement with ethnic studies or critical race theory because they think such engagement relegates Native peoples to the status of racial minorities rather than as members of sovereign nations. Yet, even as Native studies articulates its intellectual framework around sovereignty, some strands within it also presume the continuance of settler colonialism. Glen Coulthard sheds light on this contradiction in noting that in the name of sovereignty, Native nations have shifted their aspirations from decolonization to recognition from the settler state (Coulthard 2007). That is, they primarily articulate their political goals in terms of having political, economic, or cultural claims recognized or funded by the settler state within which they reside. In doing so, they unwittingly relegate themselves to the status of “racial minority,” seeking recognition in competition with other minorities seeking the same thing. One example can be found in the work of Ward Churchill. **Churchill offers searing critiques of the United States’ genocidal policies toward Native peoples and calls for “decolonizing the Indian nations”** (Churchill 1983, 202). **Nevertheless, he contends that we must support the continued existence of the U.S. federal government because there is no other way “to continue guarantees to the various Native American tribes [so] that their landbase and other treaty rights will be continued”** (Churchill 1983, I). Thus, in the name of decolonization, his politics are unwittingly grounded in a framework of liberal recognition whereby the United States will continue to exist as the arbiter and guarantor of indigenous claims. In such a framework, Native peoples compete with other groups for recognition. For instance, **in some of his work Churchill opposes a politics that would address racism directed against nonindigenous peoples, arguing that Native peoples have a special status that should take primacy over other oppressed groups** (Churchill 1983, 419). **Such analyses do not take into account how the logics of settler colonialism are enabled through the intersecting logics of white supremacy, imperialism, heteropatriarchy, and capitalism. Consequently, when Native struggles become isolated from other social justice struggles, indigenous peoples are not in a position to build the necessary political power to actually end decolonization and capitalism. Instead, they are set up to be in competition rather than in solidarity with other groups seeking recognition**. This politics of recognition then presumes the continuance of the settler state that will arbitrate claims from competing groups. When one seeks recognition, one defines indigenous struggle as exclusively as possible so that claims to the state can be based on unique and special status. In contrast, if one seeks to actually dismantle settler colonialism, one defines indigenous struggle broadly in order to build a movement of sufficient power to challenge the system. (As I discuss later, indigenous peoples’ struggles in Latin America that are based on a politics of decolonization have articulated indigeneity as an expansive rather than an exclusive category.)

#### 7. The alt would necessarily result in the removal of the US as a stabilizing force - Without it the globe would collapse into violence, nuclear war, and disease

Niall **Ferguson**, Professor, History, School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September-October **2004** (“A World Without Power” – Foreign Policy) <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html>

So **what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the** Dark Age **experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving.** The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. **Tech**nology **has upgraded destruction**, too, **so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it.** For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. **The reversal of globalization**--which a new Dark Age would produce--**would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression**. **As the U**nited **S**tates **sought to protect itself** after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, **it would inevitably become a less open society**, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, **as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew**, **Islamist extremists' infiltration** of the EU **would become irreversible**, **increasing trans-Atlantic tensions** over the Middle East **to the breaking point**. An economic **meltdown** in China **would plunge the Communist system into crisis**, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. **The wealthiest ports of the global economy**--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--**would become the targets of plunderers and pirates**. With ease, **terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas**, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, **limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions**, **beginning in** **the Korean peninsula and Kashmir**, perhaps **ending** catastrophically **in the Middle East**. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, **the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work.** The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. **If the U**nited **S**tates **retreats from global hegemony**--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its **critics** at home and abroad **must not pretend that they are ushering** **in** a new era of **multipolar harmony**, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. **The alternative to unipolarity** would not be multipolarity at all. It **would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder**.

#### 8. Link of omission at best – we do not preclude the inclusion of other epistomologys, even if they win we are inherently western

#### 9. Criticizing Western “coloniality” obscures more insidious practices by regional powers

Shaw 2 **–** Sussex IR Professor (Martin, The Problem of the Quasi-Imperial State, www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm)

Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to.

**10. Wholesale rejection of imperialism justifies genocide and denies the capacity of indigenous people**

Ray **Kiely. 1995** Lecturer in Development Studies, University of East London. “Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form Of Imperialism” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 25 No. 2 (1995)

Nevertheless, the point remains that **conflict exists within the Third World, and this cannot simply be read off from the machinations of "western imperialism." To do so is to deny the capacity of the peoples in the periphery to forge their own history -a classic example of imperialist thinking.** It is the case that power is concentrated firmly in the hands of the western powers, but it is not the case that this [a]ffects [sic] all nations of the periphery in a uniform way.¶ It is in this light that there is a basis for a re-assessment of nationalism, and therefore the case for intervention by western powers, in the developing world.¶ Third World Nationalism and Western Intervention¶ There is a long history of western intervention in the periphery, which can easily be denounced as imperialism. This applies to the colonial period, and to the alarming number of interventions which have taken place since 1945. These interventions occurred for a variety of reasons, such as access to important raw materials, strategic interests in the context of the Cold War, and (not least) a US political culture in which the ruling elite has consistently believed that it has a divine right to expand beyond its territorial boundaries (Kiernan 1980). Western rhetoric concerning the promotion of democracy against Communism during the Cold War can be dismissed as nonsense when one considers the countless interventions designed to prop up right-wing dictators, and even overturn liberal-democracies (see Blum 1986; Pearce 1982). Moreover, during the Cold War western intervention in the Third World was far more common than so-called communist expansion (Halliday 1983: 97-104).¶ Nevertheless, there is now a belief in the west, even among those on the Left, that there is case for western intervention in the Third World in the post-Cold War era. This is said to be the case because "**oppressed peoples are looking for forms of western intervention that can save them from the horrors visited on them by their 'own' and neighbouring regimes....To uphold national sovereignty and damn intervention is to give a free hand to genocide"** (Shaw 1993: 16). What is crucial here is that **Shaw justifies intervention on the basis of the sound observation that conflicts exist within the Third World, and these cannot simply be read off from the actions of an omnipresent "West."** This is made clear when Shaw (1993: 17) argues that **"(t)he left has a particular duty to respond, not to the self-serving nationalist rhetoric of corrupt and repressive third world governments, but to the people who suffer from them/'** This statement echoes Bill Warren's critique of (some versions of) dependency theory, which all too easily justified a reactionary nationalism in the name of so-called anti-imperialism (Warren 1980: chs.l and 7).¶ On the other hand, **many people on the western Left argue that intervention and imperialism amount to one and the same thing, and they cite the history of reactionary and bloody interventions by the western world** since 1945 (or earlier - Chomsky's 1993 taken us back to 1492). On this basis, interventions in the 1990s in the Gulf and Somalia are regarded as imperialist in character (Pilger 1993: 10-11). There are however competing strands within this school of thought, which I allude to below. The problem with these two views is that they tend to talk past each other. While both approaches may appeal to the justice of their respective positions, it is seldom spelt out what is meant by this concept, a weakness intensified by the one-sided nature of both approaches. On the one hand, the interventionists appeal to justice and the rights of subjects (rather than states) in the periphery, but they tend to do so in isolation from the real world of international politics. On the other hand, opponents of intervention focus on realpolitik and the bloody history of western interventions, but in so doing they tend to provide no clear grounds for any forms of intervention. These points can be illustrated by an examination of the competing positions in the Gulf War. The interventionists argued that United Nations' action to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait was largely justifiable (Halliday 1991). The best criterion for what constitutes a just war can be found in the work of Michael Walzer (1977). He argues that war is justified when it is in response to an act of aggression by one state against the territorial integrity of another. In a new edition of this work Walzer (1992: xi-xxiii) has argued that the Gulf War constitutes a just war. This is so for the following reasons: (i) the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was against the wishes of its citizens, and the rest of the population; (ii) the declared aims of the UN forces were to liberate Kuwait, and to ensure that Iraq would be incapable of further aggression; (iii) the UN forces did not go on to overthrow Saddam Hussein or to occupy Iraq, except to guarantee some safety for the Kurds after their unsuccessful uprising. On the other hand, others have argued that United States' imperialism is so om-nipotent that the only correct position was to support the Iraqi regime. The United Nations is simply a tool of US imperialism, and the US' chief concern was economic (oil) and/or strategic (the preservation of Israel and Arab client regimes). Proponents of this view pointed out the double standards by which Iraq was condemned for its occupation of Kuwait, while there were no calls for "just wars" against Israel, Indonesia or in the past, South Africa (Samara 1991: 265-6). This point is more relevant than the interventionists would sometimes have us believe, as I show below. First, however, the pro-Iraq position needs further clarification. The key argument of this position is that Saddam Hussein represented a challenge to the status quo in the Middle East, whereby there were great discrepancies between the wealth of Arab states, and local "comprador" classes deposited their oil wealth in western banks. In this respect, the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait represented a liberation for that country (Samara 1991: 260-1). There are strong grounds for dismissing this position as every bit as opportunist as that of the worst hawks in successive United States' administrations. Saddam Hussein's nationalism can hardly be described as progressive - he was an old ally of the United States, especially during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war, his treatment of Kurds within Iraq has been brutal and he has persistently attempted to control the cause of Palestinian national liberation (Halliday 1990: 73). To simply assume that Saddam Hussein was now a progressive anti-imperialist because he had fallen out with his old allies is naive at best, and at worst represents a mirror-image of the US approach that "our enemy's enemy is our friend." (Elliott 1992: 11) Furthermore, Iraqi treatment of those living in Kuwait during the occupation can hardly be described as a 'liberation" - rather, it was characterised by extremely repressive measures against the population. Moreover, to point to isolated examples of successful social pro¬grammes in Iraq (Gowan 1991) is hardly sufficient (and indeed is patronising) to secure progressive credentials. Once again. Warren's point that **anti-imperialist rhetoric is not necessarily progressive** seems pertinent.¶ **A less extreme anti-interventionist position was to not take sides in the war, but at the same time not call for action against the Iraqi regime.** The basic justification for this view was that the international order was so unjust and exploitative that no one had the right to impose their will on anyone else. Of course this view abstracts from the fact that the Iraqi regime had done just that, and **it becomes a call for lack of action - the logic of this view is that there can be no change for the better until the glorious day of world-wide socialism**. Moreover, this view implicitly rests on the view that the capitalist state always unproblematically serves the functional needs of capital, and so actions by capitalist states are always seen as inherently "bad." So, according to this view the West intervened in the Gulf because it suited its interests, but is reluctant to intervene in Bosnia because it too suits its interests. While I think that there is a great deal of truth in this assertion, it takes things too far. Just because the West has no intrinsic interest in intervention in Bosnia does not mean that we should simply leave it there (or worse still appeal to the Yugoslavian "class struggle" in a way that totally abstracts from the concrete conditions in the region), as many Marxists in the west imply (see Callmicos 1993) ~ instead, **when there is a case for some form of intervention** (as I believe there is in Bosnia**) there should be criticism of western governments precisely on the grounds that strategic or economic interests should not determine foreign policy** (Magas 1992). **The common assertion that these interests always win the day is to dismiss the struggle for alternatives from the outset. Similarly, just because intervention in one place may take imperialist forms** (such as in Somalia in 1992-3) **does not mean that the case against any form of intervention is established.¶ Standard western Left views** (which I show below have much in common with post-modernism) **can again be seen as based on an approach which is defeatist. The structures of international capitalism are seen as so universally bad that there is no room for reform within this system. Struggle for reforms against this system is thereby discounted at the outset. We are therefore forced back to the logic of a Frankian "pessimism of the intellect, pessimism of the will"** (Bernstein and Nicholas 1983), **in which there is no hope for the Third World until the glorious day of redemption (that is world-wide revolution led by "the vanguard party").** As Elliott (1992: 11) argues, **this perspective "proffered an abstract internationalism whereby the cure for all remediable ills was postponed to an indefinite future...."¶** So, to summarise: the pro-Iraq position is based on a patronising Third Worldist/ dependency approach in which all the ills of a country are blamed on the West, and so anti-western positions are automatically progressive. The anti-sanctions position rests on a similarly misguided view that the "world-system" is so omnipresent and bad that the call for reforms within it is doomed to failure.¶ Does this mean then, that the interventionist view is correct? In terms of the Gulf War, I think not. In terms of interventions in other places at other times, the only answer that can be given is that it depends on the concrete circumstances (rather than by recourse to an omnipresent imperialism which is assumed to always win the day). On the question of the Gulf War, the pro-intervention position abstracts from the motives that guided US-led intervention. As already stated, there were enormous double standards in the decision to punish Saddam's invasion whilst other equally illegal occupations had not led to military action, or even sanctions. It does seem odd that interventionists such as Fred Halliday and Norman Geras supported the US actions in the Gulf but made no call for similar action against South Africa, Israel or Indonesia (Cockbum 1991: 15-16). According to this view, the US intervened in the Gulf in order to maintain its hegemony in the region, and to help preserve regimes that had entered into an effective partnership with the West whereby the former deposited oil profits in the metropolitan countries in return for military protection (Stork and Lesch 1990; Bromley 1991; Brenner 1991: 134).

**11. Epistemology focus causes endless paradigm wars.**

**Wendt**,**1998**. professor of international security – Ohio State University, (Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such **the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion** (after all, **after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time**). Moreover, **as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions** either. **It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge**. In that light, **going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance**, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, **not second-order issues of method.** Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to **epistemological discourse**. The problem is that this discourse **has** already **contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’**. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And **do post-positivists really** mean to **suggest that students** of social life **should not ask causal questions or** attempt to **test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation**. On both sides, in other words, the result of **the** Third Debate’s **sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.**

#### 12. It isn’t a question of whether or not the US will be colonialistic, but the ways that is deployed. The inevitable intervention is still better than none at all.

**Kagan 11** (Robert Kagan 11 is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. "The Price of Power" Jan 24 Vol 16 No18 [www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3](http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3))

In theory, **the U**nited **S**tates **could refrain from intervening abroad. But,** in practice, **will it?** Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet **the reality has been that after each intervention**, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and **the U**nited **S**tates **has intervened again.**Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898. The Philippines, 1898-1902. China, 1900. Cuba, 1906. Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912. Mexico, 1914. Haiti, 1915. Dominican Republic, 1916. Mexico, 1917. World War I, 1917-1918. Nicaragua, 1927. World War II, 1941-1945 . Korea, 1950-1953. Lebanon, 1958. Vietnam, 1963-1973. Dominican Republic, 1965. Grenada, 1983. Panama, 1989

First Persian Gulf war, 1991. Somalia, 1992. Haiti, 1994. Bosnia, 1995. Kosovo, 1999. Afghanistan, 2001-present. Iraq, 2003-present. That is **one intervention every 4.5 years on average.** Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. **Since the end of the Cold War**, it is true, **the rate of U.S. interventions has increased**, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall.  **The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United** **S**tates? **The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention.** This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit.  Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued. To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure.  Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history.  So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression.  Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it.  Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then **there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United** **S**tates **into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners?** Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of **refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force** to help? Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. **More likely,** however, **it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan.** Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. **The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity,** as well as large annual expenditures. **Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to bothplaces and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting?** The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. **Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the U**nited **S**tates **is out of the intervention business?** Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. **No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons,** **and for** **the U**nited **States the lesson has been** fairly **clear: The world is better off**, and the United States is better off, **in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.**

#### 13. Responsibility for survival of the human community should be prioritized over building alliances with Indigenous communities

Harsha **Walia. 2012**.“Moving Beyond a Politics of Solidarity toward a Practice of Decolonization” Organize!: Building from the Local for Global Justice. P. 252

**Striving toward decolonization requires us to challenge a dehumanizing social organization that** perpetuates our isolation from each other and **normalizes a lack of responsibility to one another and the Earth. I have been encouraged to think of human interconnectedness rather than isolation in building alliance with Indigenous communities.** **This has not translated to a simple unity across our differences**, in particular those that are rooted in systems of power and privilege. Rather **it** **has created a radical terrain of struggle where our common visions for justice do not erase our different social locations, and** similarly, that **our** different **identities do not prevent us from walking together toward transformation and mutual respect.**

**14. Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

**15. Policies should be evaluated via cost benefit analysis**

Earl C**. Ravenal. 2009**. Distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of Designing Defense for a New World Order. What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

These large-scale and **generic objectives—national security and hegemonic order—translate themselves into the more specific politics and actions of the state; and they dispose the nation**, broadly, **in the matter of “intervention**.” But **these dispositions can be changed or reinforced by the success or failure of certain military interventions, and perceptions of their costs and benefits, and the capacity of the American domestic “political economy” to sustain such ventures—all of that in the face of the configuration of power in the overarching structure of the international system**. Thus, the “answers” to questions about the requisites of national security and, even more so, the assumption of “hegemonic” status, are to be sought (though perhaps never conclusively found) on a “level” at least one above that on which most critics think that they can be settled. For one thing, **even if you recognize that a system is operating on the basis of “cost-benefit” decisions, even before one can do the “trade-offs,” there must be some set of “values,” which inform, and enable the quantification of, the costs and benefits. In neglecting these factors, the critics of “empire” can make only partial sense o////f the strategic choices between “forward” arid “retrenched” positions, and between “proactive” and “reactive” moves; and cannot concede much sense at all to a grand strategy of “hegemony” or control as a national orientation to the international system**—since they superficially interpret it as part of some “imperial” conspiracy, or (alternatively) mindlessness. The category of security contains two elements that can be said to constitute the dispositive factors in U.S. foreign and military policy, and the motive factors in what I have called a nation’s “propensity to intervene.”

# 1AR

#### Debating legal solutions to war powers develops transferable skills through active assessment—no risk of passive spectators

Farrar-Myers, 07

[Victoria A. Farrar-Myers, professor University of Texas at Arlington, PROMOTING ACTIVE LEARNING THROUGH SIMULATIONS IN PRESIDENCY CLASSES, <http://cstl-cla.semo.edu/Renka/PRG/PRG_Reports/Fall_2007.pdf>]

Lao-Tse’s insight captures the essence of an active learning based approach to education. Such an approach calls for students to have a role and responsibility in developing their own knowledge; in the words of John Dewey, learning is “something that an individual does when he studies. It is an active, personally conducted affair” (1924). Unlike more traditional teaching styles where the instructor simply transfers information to the student, who is required to do little more than act as a depository for such information (Freire, 1970) or as a sponge soaking it up (Keeley, Ali & Gebing, 1998; Fox-Cardamone & Rue, 2003), an active learning approach places an emphasis on students’ independent inquiry, restructuring of their knowledge, and other constructivist qualities (Niemi, 2002). Employing active learning strategies in political science classes not only has been shown to work (Brock & Cameron, 1999), but more importantly would seem to be a natural fit. “Learning is not a spectator sport” (Chickering and Gamson, 1987), and neither is the world of politics. As a result, one way to enhance students’ learning about the political world is for them to “talk about what they are learning, write about it, relate it to past experiences and apply it to their daily lives. They must make what they learn part of themselves” (Chickering and Gamson, 1987). Further, active learning techniques – particularly if tied to learning outcomes designed to promote higher order thinking skills such as analysis, application, synthesis, and evaluation (Bloom, 1956) – can help students prepare “to tackle a multitude of challenges that they are likely to face in their personal lives, careers, and duties as responsible citizens” (Tsui, 2002). As political scientists, we may be in the best position in the academy to promote a sense of civic engagement in our students, and the use of intentionally designed active learning techniques tied to specific learning outcomes can greatly assist us in helping to instill this sense. The use of active learning encompasses a wide array of teaching techniques that can be used in large classes as well as small ones; techniques such as: using guided lectures and answering open-ended, student-generated questions (Bonwell & Eison, 1991); using primary sources in the classroom (May, 1986); cooperative learning (Smith, 1986); and simulations and role-playing games (Shannon, 1986; for a general discussion on active learning strategies, see Bonwell & Eison, 1991; Astin et al., 1984; and Schomberg, 1986). However, finding a technique that works successfully can be influenced by: •Institutional variables: e.g., size of class, physical arrangement of classrooms, and lack of incentives for professors to undertake new active learning strategies (see generally Bonwell & Eison, 1991); •The professor: e.g., the professor’s comfort level with student interaction and the amount of control in the classroom the professor desires (see generally Bonwell & Sutherland, 1996); and •The students: e.g., prior exposure and experiences (Hoover, 2006), students’ different learning styles (Kolb, 1981; Cross, 1998), and student motivation (Gross Davis, 1993) or indifference (Warren, 1997) to participate in active learning activities. The POTUS and PASS projects were two semester-long, in-class simulations employing active learning techniques and designed to achieve desired course learning outcomes. Despite some initial reluctance by the students, these simulations helped them achieve the course outcomes, but more significantly generated a high level of efficacy, engagement, and understanding. Although the specific model employed may not work in every context (the variables noted above will create a different dynamic in each class), the process by which these projects were developed and employed may provide those who teach presidency-related classes with insights on how to best employ active learning techniques in their own setting. The 2008 presidential election marks the first time since 1952 that a sitting president or vice president will not be a candidate for nomination in either major party. As I was developing my general survey course on the U.S. Presidency in the fall of 2005, I contemplated how to make this factoid become more relevant to my students, especially since encouraging civic engagement and voter participation in the 18-24 year-old age group has been a focus in recent presidential races. I wanted a way to bring to life the usual discussion of presidential elections and encourage my students to become active participants in the process of identifying, evaluating, and promoting various candidates. Out of these thoughts germinated The POTUS Project – short for The President Of The United States Project. In this simulation, my students took on the role of political consultants responsible for developing a plan to guide their candidate to the Oval Office. Each student started by assessing the viability of a chosen candidate and then developing a strategy for winning that candidate’s party nomination. At mid-semester, the class divided into two groups – the two major parties – to hold a nomination convention where each party chose its own presidential-vice presidential ticket. Students had to caucus and advocate for their own candidate much like the Iowa caucus. From there, each team developed a “Vision Statement” for its candidate to let the voters know their candidate’s strategy for winning the general election, transitioning into power, and governing as president once in office. Each group presented its “Vision Statement” to the full class and to two real-world politiFall 2007 11 cal consultants. The students were not alone in their learning endeavor. I took the liberty of writing to each of our selected candidates, telling them about the project and asking them to write my students. Two of the candidates did and in sharing these letters with the class, my students and I became acutely aware that what we were learning has meaning outside the four walls of our classroom; the very lesson I hope to impart in each of my classes. In the end, The POTUS Project allowed the students to combine the course material with real life events and possibilities, and to work with their classmates to create a comprehensive electoral plan for someone who might become the next President of the United States. In doing so, the students were able to reinforce their learning through individual and group-effort written analysis and oral presentation. Further, the Project achieved the desired outcome of fostering collaborative action after individual analysis. Since most political enterprises take place within working groups or teams, these simulations allowed the students to gain experience with, as well as a direct appreciation for, this important political enterprise. Most significantly, through both a formal student evaluation of The POTUS Project and informal discussions with individual students, I found that they applied their knowledge in more sophisticated ways than in my more traditional course offering as well as reported more ownership and comfort with the core concepts of the class. They also reported a greater sense of efficacy and understanding of the presidential selection process; even two years later, I received an email from a student indicating how she is using the knowledge and insights gained from her class experience to be more engaged with this year’s actual presidential primaries. With the lessons I learned from The POTUS Project, I decided to employ a similar model in an upper-division course entitled Presidency and Foreign Policy. In The PASS Project (Presidential Advisory Strategy Simulation), the students played the role of foreign policy analysts and advisors. Each student selected his or her country of expertise, completed an assessment of the U.S. foreign relations with that country, and prepared a briefing paper for a current presidential candidate based upon a vision statement outlined by their candidate in the journal Foreign Affairs. Students then teamed-up with classmates who selected the same candidate and developed a comprehensive foreign policy/ national security strategy for that candidate. The students worked with their teams during the semester, and then shared their collective insights with their classmates in a final presentation during an “Advisory Summit.” The PASS Project required the students to play different roles throughout the simulation and, as a result, develop and employ different cognitive skills. In becoming a country expert, the students served as foreign policy analysts responsible for obtaining knowledge and being able to critically analyze it in meaningful ways. In fact, I was able to have a foreign policy analyst from the Department of State as a guest speaker by means of teleconferencing, and he showed the students how the skills they were using in class were the same ones that the speaker used in his job. The next portion of the simulation, where the students prepared a briefing paper, required them to apply their knowledge in a specific context of a presidential candidate’s general statements on foreign affairs. Finally, the group project required the students to synthesize their collective knowledge into a coherent plan for their presidential candidate and evaluate the effectiveness of their proposals. From the POTUS and PASS projects, a number of lessons emerged for effectively employing simulations in presidency classes, including: •Intentionality of design: Although the rewards in successfully employing an active-learning simulation are well worth it for both student and teacher, doing so requires that the instructor put substantial thought up front into the design of the program. Certainly, this lesson speaks to understanding the desired learning outcomes of the simulation, but also extends to such matters as evaluation and simulation mechanics. For example, students tend to be wary of group projects and free-riders who might bring a student’s grade down. To address this concern, I structured the evaluative aspects of the simulations so that most of the items for which the students were graded upon were based solely on their own work (e.g., individual assignments that were then later used in the group project or reflection papers on the group project process). In a few instances, though, where a student received the same grade as other group members for their collective effort, I limited both the number of people within each working subgroup, and also limited the percentage of the student’s overall grade attributed to the group effort. As far as design mechanics, the instructor needs to identify as many potential glitches as possible and develop prevention methods. For example, to ensure a proper balance of students working for either party in The POTUS Project or for any candidate in The PASS Project, I reserved the right to require students to switch to a different party or candidate as needed. •Assessing achievement of learning outcomes: Active learning techniques have been shown to have a powerful impact on students’ learning, for example on “measures of transfer of knowledge to new situations or measures of problem-solving, thinking, attitude change, or motivation for further learning” (McKeachie et al., 1986; for other studies measuring the impact of active learning techniques, see Kuh et al., 1997; Springer, 1997; Cabrera et al., 1998; McCarthy and Anderson, 2000; and Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005). Therefore, any simulation design should incorporate assessment tools that allow the instructor to measure the impact of the learning technique. For example, a pre- and post-test was administered to ascertain students’ base level of understanding of course material being covered by the simulation. Students also completed self-assessment and group assessments of their and their classmates’ participation in the simulation. Further, a reflection session was held to provide the students with the ability to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the simulation. The insights culled from all of these various Fall 2007 12 assessments were later employed to refine implementation of similar models in future classes. •Obtaining student buy-in: As one scholar noted, “many active learning techniques fail simply because teachers do not take time to explain them” (Warren, 1997). Perhaps the best way to obtain the necessary student buy-in, therefore, appears to be communication and guidance from the professor (Felder & Brent, 2006). To this end, I included a detailed addendum to my syllabus in each class outlining every step of the simulation process and then discussed the simulation in the first day of class. Doing so put the students on notice of what was expected of them and giving them the opportunity to drop the class if they were not willing to put forth the necessary effort. Further, I sought input and feedback from the students throughout the semester – something that has been known to mitigate students’ concern related to the simulation (Sutherland, 1996) – and found ways to act on the feed back. For example, based on discussions with students, I decided to provide an additional incentive for students to do well on their oral presentation in The PASS Project by giving the winning team, as voted on by the students themselves, two extra questions to chose from in the short-answer portion of their final exam (i.e., instead of answering all eight short answer questions I gave them, the winning team had to answer eight of ten questions with each student choosing which eight she would answer). •Surrendering control: Ultimately, if the simulation is going to be a “personally conducted affair” of learning, to use John Dewey’s words, the students at some point have to control the process for themselves. Certainly, as the instructor, I established the framework of the simulations, the minimum requirements that needed to be satisfied, and the desired outcomes. In the context of oral presentations, the students showed great initiative in their presentations – from complex slide shows, to informative and eye-catching displays, to even doing their presentation in the form of a game show (Foreign Policy Jeopardy). By my surrendering some of the control over the process to the students, they made it their own and, in doing so, learned greater lessons for themselves than I simply could have told them. Of all the ways to evaluate and document the success of these simulations, the best way to do so is in the words of the students themselves. At the end of The POTUS Project, I asked the students to evaluate the Project, their contributions, and the contributions of others. Many pointed to the nominating convention as an astonishing experience – one where they were using the course material to persuade others. They noted how one student, who was alone in backing his candidate, used his knowledge to lobby others to place the candidate on the party’s ticket as the vice presidential candidate. As one student indicated, “the power of one armed with knowledge can really rule the world of poli tics!” This is the lesson of civic engagement that I wanted my students to learn – that one person, with commitment, informa tion, and passion, can influence and better the world around them – and it is a lesson that the use of active learning simulations can help them achieve.

#### Debating about specific policies is essential to promote more ethical and accountable policymaking – their abstract politics promotes disengagement and poor argumentation skills

 David Chandler. 2007. Centre for the Study of Democracy, Westminster, Area, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 118-119

This disjunction between the human/ethical/global causes of post-territorial political activism and the capacity to 'make a difference' is what makes these individuated claims immediately abstract and metaphysical – there is no specific demand or programme or attempt to build a collective project. This is the politics of symbolism. The rise of symbolic activism is highlighted in the increasingly popular framework of 'raising awareness'– here there is no longer even a formal connection between ethical activity and intended outcomes (Pupavac 2 006). Raising awareness about issues has replaced even the pretense of taking responsibility for engaging with the world – the act is ethical in-itself. Probably the most high profile example of awareness raising is the shift from Live Aid, which at least attempted to measure its consequences in fund-raising terms, to Live 8 whose goal was solely that of raising an 'awareness of poverty'. The struggle for 'awareness' makes it clear that the focus of symbolic politics is the individual and their desire to elaborate upon their identity – to make us aware of their 'awareness', rather than to engage us in an instrumental project of changing or engaging with the outside world. It would appear that in freeing politics from the constraints of territorial political community there is a danger that political activity is freed from any constraints of social mediation (see further, Chandler 2004a). Without being forced to test and hone our arguments, or even to clearly articulate them, we can rest on the radical 'incommunicability' of our personal identities and claims – you are 'either with us or against us'; engaging with those who disagree is no longer possible or even desirable. It is this lack of desire to engage which most distinguishes the unmediated activism of post-territorial political actors from the old politics of territorial communities, founded on struggles of collective interests (Chandler 2004b). The clearest example is old representational politics – this forced engagement in order to win the votes of people necessary for political parties to assume political power. Individuals with a belief in a collective programme knocked on strangers' doors and were willing to engage with them, not on the basis of personal feelings but on what they understood were their potential shared interests. Few people would engage in this type of campaigning today; engaging with people who do not share our views, in an attempt to change their minds, is increasingly anathema and most people would rather share their individual vulnerabilities or express their identities in protest than attempt to argue with a peer.This paper is not intended to be a nostalgic paean to the old world of collective subjects and national interests or a call for a revival of territorial state-based politics or even to reject global aspirations: quite the reverse. Today, politics has been 'freed' from the constraints of territorial political community – governments without coherent policy programmes do not face the constraints of failure or the constraints of the electorate in any meaningful way; activists, without any collective opposition to relate to, are free to choose their causes and ethical identities; protest, from Al Qaeda, to anti-war demonstrations, to the riots in France, is inchoate and atomized. When attempts are made to formally organize opposition, the ephemeral and incoherent character of protest is immediately apparent.