### 2AC

#### Yes Escalation – 5 reasons

#### A. Clarke and Knake – Only seconds of decision making time, ability to spread globally, and difficulty of attribution make retaliation likely and haphazard.

#### B. CSM – Lack of a framework for decision making means that retaliation is more likely

#### C. Pressure to retaliate

Owens et al 9

(William A. Owens, as an Admiral in the United States Navy and later Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, \*\*Kenneth W. Dam, served as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 2001 to 2003, where he specialized in international economic development, \*\*Herbert S. Lin, Senior Scientist and Study, “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities” 4/27/2009, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NRC-Report.pdf>, KB)

But **in many kinds of cyberattack, the magnitude of the impact of the** ¶ **first cyberattack will be uncertain** at first, and may remain so for a considerable period of time. **Decision makers may then be caught between two** ¶ **challenges—a policy need to respond quickly and the technical fact that it** ¶ **may be necessary to wait until more information about impact and damage can be obtained**. (As noted in Section 2.5, these tensions are especially ¶ challenging in the context of active defense.)¶ **Decision makers often feel intense pressure to “do something” immediately after the onset of a crisis**, and sometimes such pressure is warranted by the facts and circumstances of the situation. On the other hand, ¶ **the lack of immediate information may prompt decision makers to take a** ¶ **worst-case view of the attack and** thus to **assume that the worst that might** ¶ **have happened was indeed what actually happened**. **Such a situation has** ¶ **obvious potential for inappropriate and unintended escalation.**

# Heid

#### Framework - the aff is a normative statement. Vote aff if plan is a good idea, neg if it isn’t.

#### A. Solves their offense – the impact of the K is a reason the aff is bad

#### B. Aff choice – they arbitrarily steal 9 minutes of offense, destroys the aff’s only advantage

**Perm do the plan and the alt - nothing about our plan precludes “embracing anxiety and authenticity”**

**Their link framing precludes us from using anxiety to motivate political action – that is bad because apocalyptic framing is necessary to ensure survival**

JL **Schatz. 2012**. Professor of English and Feminist Evolutionary Studies & Director of Debate at Binghamton University. The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of-The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism. Journal of Ecocriticism: A New Journal of Nature, Society and Literature. 4(2)

There are three things ecocriticism must keep in mind to retain its effectiveness in the poststructuralist era. First and foremost ecocritics must not allow their infighting over tactics and academic maneuvers to become debilitating. Ecocritics have enough on their plate fighting dominant political institutions. To never directly take up arms against ecologically destructive practices will merely cede potential avenues of resistance while we fight amongst ourselves. We must take from those ecocritics we partially disagree with what we can and then operate from a different platform so as to always be spectral in our resistance. Adopting varied tactics enables an ecological coalition centered on the connectedness that arises from the belief that we all have a shared stake in the planet. Awakening to our collective stake in the environment can overcome the illusionary boundaries of the nation-­‐state, species, or even sentience. Every molecule of the Earth’s ecology is interconnected. When one part dies we all stand on the brink of extinction. For ecocriticism to embrace this interconnection it must not erect borders between different approaches so long as the foundation of the struggle is premised upon the commons of our universe. Unfortunately, “what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies[, leaving] ... absent ... a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans ... who do not believe that the discourse of ‘anti-­‐imperialism’ speaks to their lives” (Isaac). As a result, there is a need for ecocritics to not just speak to the choir that mostly already agrees with them. They must also speak to the populations who don’t intuitively see the link between imperialism, technology, and capitalism with environmental destruction. Apocalyptic rhetoric can do precisely that because of its underlying tenant of self-­preservation. The above point is absolutely crucial because ecocriticism cannot be effective if its focus never goes beyond the individual alone. No single person is the entire ecology so no individual can save it. While each individual undoubtedly impacts the environment and can cause change, no large scale transformation can take place if we never inspire collective action. In evolutionary terms, ideas, thoughts, and actions must be passed on in order to survive. For that to happen it takes a combined effort, even though it can start by a single mutation. Luke reminds us that the typical consumer does not control the critical aspects of his or her existence[.] ... The absurd claim that average consumers only need to shop, bicycle, or garden their way to an ecological future merely moves most of the responsibility and much of the blame away from the institutional centers of power whose decisions actually maintain the wasteful, careless ways of material exchange[. It also] ... ignores how corporate capital, big government, and professional experts pushed the practices of ... affluent society ... as a political strategy to sustain economic growth, forestall mass discontent, and empower scientific authority. People did choose to live this way, but their choices were made from a very narrow array of alternatives presented to them as rigidly structured, prepackaged menus of very limited options. (Luke, 1997: 127-­‐128) In turn, ecocritics must not displace the blame away from current hegemonic structures by calling on individuals to act alone. Instead ecocriticism must articulate its arguments to influence change in both institutions of power and the very people whose mindsets make up the current collective. Many environmental groups have been able to do precisely that. For instance, “NGOs and social movements active in global civil society have ... introduce[ed] ... dystopian scenarios ... as rhetorical devices that act as ‘wake-­up calls’... to jolt citizens out of their complacency and ... foster ... public deliberation about the potential cataclysms facing humankind” (Kurasawa 464). Ecocritics must not cut down such NGOs for adopting end-­of-­the-­world tactics even though their rhetoric might get co-opted when specific policies get enacted. Secondly, ecocriticism must never forget that what they do is politics. There are two implications to this. On the one hand it means that activists who directly lobby the government should not denounce the academically-oriented ecocritic for struggling within the academy. On the other hand it means that those who denounce the managerial tendencies that come along with governmental policies shouldn’t condemn activists who operate within the system. Instead of attacking one another, ecocritics should understand opposing discourses and ontologies as part of a spectral strategy that works against the environmental imperialism of the status-quo. We should take each opportunity for its fullest even in the face of failure. Once we acknowledge the virtual inevitability of co-optation the emphasis should be on creating successive struggles from a variety of standpoints. Captain Paul Watson, for instance, does not merely pack up his flagship the Steve Irwin and head home after the Japanese whaling season ends. He goes on to fight for seals, dolphins, and a number of other animals all the while participating within a larger discourse surrounding planetary ecology. Not all of Watson’s tactics have been successful. Neither has anyone else’s. However, that doesn’t mean we should give up. Quite the opposite. For example, just because revolutionaries like Che Guevara have been turned into trendy t-­‐shirts, fueling the industries of capitalism, doesn’t mean he shouldn’t have fought against imperialism in the first place. In the same way, just because environmental activists are inevitably going to fall victim to constructing an image of the planet on the brink of extinction, it doesn’t mean that we should discount their battles against such destruction. Their counter constructions enable a contestation over what it means to be human in relationship to the rest of the world. Absent these counter narratives only a singular construction of anthropocentric managerial domination would exist. A consequence to this second point is that the willingness to continually deploy different tactics is more powerful for ecocriticism than coming up with the perfect strategy. That way even when we become co-opted in one place we are already struggling from somewhere else. In turn, ecocriticism should focus on the underlying motivations that compel others to act in order to determine which ecocritics to be allies with. Through this way human beings can repair the willed manipulation inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient equanimity toward Life. It is only in the context of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that revolutionary action gains an authentic basis. It is the engagement with “the Other” that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant and animal life, and they demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as part of a ... profound solidarity ... [that] serves as a general basis for a post-­‐Enframing, post-­‐capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society. (Best and Nocella 83) This shift allows ecocriticism to formulate ever-­‐greater coalitions while at the same time preventing a descent into moral relativism. We can still utilize political action by eco-activists and NGOs such as PETA and Greenpeace productively, even if they result in reformist managerialism, so long as the sole focus doesn’t fall upon a singular tactic. Only a profound orientation of solidarity will ever have the hopes of succeeding. Everything we do is deeply political and we must understand that in acting or in thinking we necessarily impact the world. Uniting behind images of planetary omnicide holds the potential to collectively bring us together by awakening humanity to its shared stake in the global environment. Third, and most importantly, ecocritics must adopt tactics that can most effectively influence other people without proscribing end goals. By this I mean that ecocritics must use those tools that can appeal to the masses while simultaneously making their appeals in such a way as not to force a choice upon them. Apocalyptic imagery is ideal for this task. It appeals to notions of shared planetary concerns that serve as motivation for others to act, even without fully knowing how the apocalypse can truly be averted. By creating a compelling urge to do something that arises out of the image of planetary annihilation ecocriticism can influence a variety of people to take up arms through a multitude of techniques. Society as a whole will never mobilize to halt the very practices that threaten life without such compelling inspiration. When ecocriticism helps other people see how certain actions risk their very survival it will enable our planet to evolve differently. So long as ecocriticism never gives up on the struggle, even if this different direction may bring new scenarios of apocalypse, humanity as a species can continually evolve its patterns and behaviors to advert extinction. This is not to say we will live forever. Rather it is to say that as a species we can continue to exist in harmony with the lives all around us and give our deaths meaning. Ultimately, it is through imagining the end of the world that we will be able to envision how to save it.

**Perm do the alt – it in no way repudiates the plan or the thesis of the 1ac. Justifies severance because the alt. is not an opportunity/cost on our prescription.**

**Nuclear war makes the alt impossible- can’t rethink relationship to nature while nuclear war is occurring, societies would focus on protecting themselves**

**World War II proves that attempting to predict the impact of a particular ontology is futile – it cannot explain why modernity produced varying responses to the conflict within the same population from genocidal nationalist militarism to pacifism.**

**Prior focus on ontology causes paralysis – having “good enough knowledge” is a sufficient condition for action**

**Kratochwil 8**

Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, ‘8

(Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

The lesson seems clear. **Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice**” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), **we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference** (pointing to some property of the object under study), **in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR,** therefore, **does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation**. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, **I will sketch out the reasons for which a prag- matic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise**. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas.¶ Firstly, **a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects** **or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology**), **but with “acting**” (prattein), **thereby preventing some false starts**. Since, **as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information.** Pre- cisely **because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions**, **and the multiple possibilities** are rife with incentives for (dis)information. **This puts a premium on** quick **diagnostic** and cognitive **shortcuts informing actors** about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. **Instead of** relying on **certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction** and controlled experiments, **we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail**, rather than to generality, **matter**. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic.¶ These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position.¶ Secondly, **since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” some- one, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem**. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, **we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case**. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, **we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge**, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, **there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act**. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

**Case outweighs and turns the case – the material destruction of the body is the cessation of life. Even if their relationship to death is good, it can only come about as a result of dwelling in the material world long enough to reflect on these questions – our impact timeframe is much faster than their vague alt. solvency claims meaning all lives will be snuffed out before their alt can ever be embraced.**

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

**Kacou 8**

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

**Nuke war kills all types of organic, alive beings – our impacts aren’t exclusively about human death meaning their analysis only accounts for a small fraction of our impacts – these other deaths have no pre-meditation meaning their alt can’t access them but the plan can save them. Try or die for the aff or perm.**

**Krieger 4/30/12**

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**Nuclear war would preclude a sustainable future. It would destroy the global environment, leading to ¶ the extinction of many forms of plant and animal life. Complex forms of life, such as humans, would be ¶ particularly at risk. A nuclear war fought with existing nuclear arsenals could leave the Earth ¶ uninhabitable for humans**. ¶ Leading atmospheric scientists, who warn of the utterly catastrophic effects nuclear war would have ¶ upon global climate and the environment, argue, “The combination of nuclear proliferation, political ¶ instability and urban demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society ¶ since the dawn of humans. Only abolition of nuclear weapons will prevent a potential nightmare.”¶ 23¶ The ¶ scientists call for immediate reductions in US and Russian arsenals to a few hundred nuclear weapons to ¶ “reduce the possibility of nuclear winter and encourage the rest of the world to continue to work toward ¶ the goal of elimination.”¶ 24¶ ¶ It is necessary to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used again as instruments of war, risking the ¶ destruction of civilization, nuclear famine and the extinction of most or all humans and other forms of ¶ complex life. Exposing the dangers of launch-on-warning nuclear policies and the dysfunctional and ¶ counterproductive nature of nuclear deterrence theory is essential for awakening policy makers and the ¶ public to the imperative goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. It is a goal that demands ¶ boldness by all who seek a sustainable future for humanity and the planet. The non-nuclear weapon states ¶ that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have both the right and the responsibility to assert ¶ leadership in assuring that the nuclear weapon states fulfill their obligations for good faith negotiations ¶ for complete nuclear disarmament.

**Double bind – either the alt does the aff so they link to all of their tech bad arguments, or they don’t which means there are multiple extinction scenarios to the alternative**

**Value to life is subjective- we are determine our own values - their emphasis on existential “authenticity” denies this right to choose for others.**

**Their competition framing and alt result in existential relativism – causes slavery, economic exploitation and poverty, and mass slaughter.**

**Graham ‘99**

(Phil, Graduate School of Management, University of Queensland, Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace, Identities in Action! 1999, <http://www.philgraham.net/HH_conf.pdf>)

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). **Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview**: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997). **Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills**, several Wagner records, **and** an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin **Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats** of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, **Heidegger pronounced the end of thought**, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘**No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself**, and he alone, **is the present and future reality for Germany’** (in Bullock 1991: 345). **Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics:** Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. **Hitler took control of the means of propaganda**: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. **He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past.** Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). **History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”.** **“The problem” is** also **a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses**. **By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’** (Giddens 1991: 49), **informationalism** and ‘consumerism’ **confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future** (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). **Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, ~~raping~~ [ruining] the environment;** **swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase** (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). **There is no “problem of the subject”,** just as there is no “global society**”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda**, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. **Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique** and objective **history** of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. **The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity.** This is their condition. **People are not theoretical entities; they are people.** As such**, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value**. **No amount of theory** or propaganda **will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society** and **hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth**, indeed, **as the path to an** inevitable**, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way,** once again, **to unprecedented mass slaughter.** **The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries**.

**Worst-case scenarios calculate for the sake of responsibility – mobilization is key to effective to political movements that prevent the worst forms of their impact.**

Michael **Williams**, Professor of International Politics – U. Wales, Aberystwyth**, ‘5**

(*The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* p. 165-7)

Moreover, the links between sceptical realism and prevalent post-modern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.80 In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully charactised, to borrow Stephen White’s illuminating contrast, as expressions of ‘responsibility to otherness’ which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succeumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that **the willful Realist tradition does not lack** understanding of the **contingency** of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, **its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a wilfully liberal vision. The construction** of a realm of objectivity and **calculation** is not just a consequence of a need to act – the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It **is** a form of **responsibility to otherness**, **an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability** precisely **by** – at least initially – **reducing the self and** the **other to** a **structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability**. It is, in short, a strategy of *limitation*: a wilful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited – both epistemically and politically – **in the name of a politics of toleration**: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of *modus vivendi*.82 If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity, action, and responsibility.83 As Neumann points out, **the insight that identities are** inescapably contingent and relationally **constructed**, and even the claim that identities are inescapably *indebted* to otherness, **do** **not in themselves provide a foundation for practice**, particularly **in situations where identities are** **‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined**. In these cases, **deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice and not just in philosophic practice** the essentialist dynamics it confronts.84 Here, a responsibility to act must go **beyond** **deconstruction** **to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices**. To take **this** critique seriously **is not** necessarily **to be subjec**t yet again t**o the** straightforward **‘blackmail of the Englightenment** and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility.85 While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such **situations demand** also an evaluation of the **structures** (of identity and institutions) **that might viably be mobilized** in order **to offset the worst implications** of violently exclusionary identities. **It requires**, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of **compelling ‘as if’ stories around which** counter-subjectivities **and political practices can coalesce.** Wilful Realism, I submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such ‘stories’ within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dicohotomies.

#### Ignoring the threat causes panic – worse than fear, stops solvency, turns their state power arguments

Sandman and Lanard, 2003

Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specializing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”

China is universally condemned for covering up SARS and putting the world at risk. Covering up an epidemic is about as bad a communication strategy as we can imagine. Among its outcomes: China actually does face a panic problem, as its people confront not just a raging epidemic but a government that lies to them about it. The West’s “soft cover-up” is much gentler and less dishonest — a cover-up of over-reassurance and minimization rather than of lies. But if SARS does keep getting worse in the West, as it has in China, the soft cover-up will also fail ... and may also provoke panic. Public anxiety can lead to genuine panic or to astonishing resilience. The paradox is that efforts to squelch the anxiety (“allay the public’s fear” is the usual phrase) can actually induce the panic it aims to prevent. Resilience is likelier when authorities ally with the anxiety, harness it, and steer it instead of trying to prevent it. Of course even superb handling of the public’s fears may not prevent panic if the epidemic gets bad enough. There has often been some panic during the great epidemics of the past. But panic will be likelier and more widespread if the authorities have been minimizing the risk than if they have been acknowledging it candidly and compassionately.

**The alt is vague and is a voting issue**

1. **Skews 2AC strategy because it will become more defined in the block or 2nr**
2. **Makes aff offense impossible because we can never know what the alt is – it’s a voter for fairness and education – at least we should get extreme latitude in evaluating our impact turns to their link without letting their vague alt moot all of our offense.**

**Privileging ontology and epistemology guarantees policy failure because of theoretical reductionism, and isn’t relevant to the truth value of our arguments.**

Owen 2

[David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

**Value to life should be individually determined – their impact claims invalidate personal autonomy**

**SCHWARTZ, HENDRY, & PREECE 2004** Professional Metaphysician, Senior Lecturer, General Practicianer Professor, Academic Surgeon [“Medical Ethics: A case based approach,” Lisa, Paul, and Robert]

Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, **quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations**. As a result, **no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality**. Nevertheless, **quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives** and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine's choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patient's interests. The quality of life criterion asserts that there is a difference between the type of life and the fact of life. This is the primary difference between it and the sanctity criterion discussed on page 115. Among quality of life considerations rest three assertions: 1. there is relative value to life 2. the value of a life is determined subjectively 3. not all lives are of equal value. Relative value The first assertion, that life is of relative value, could be taken in two ways. In one sense, it could mean that the value of a given life can be placed on a scale and measured against other lives. The scale could be a social scale, for example, where the contributions or potential for contribution of individuals are measured against those of fellow citizens. **Critics of quality of life criteria frequently name this as a potential slippery slope where lives would be deemed worthy of saving, or even not saving, based on the relative social value of the individual concerned.** So, for example, a mother of four children who is a practising doctor could be regarded of greater value to the community than an unmarried accountant. The concern is that the potential for discrimination is too high. **Because of the possibility of prejudice and injustice, supporters of the quality of life criterion reject this interpersonal construction in favour of a second, more personalized, option.** According to this interpretation, the notion of relative value is relevant not between individuals but within the context of one person's life and is measured against that person's needs and aspirations. So Katherine would base her decision on a comparison between her life before and after her illness. The value placed on the quality of a life would be determined by the individual depending on whether he or she believes the current state to be relatively preferable to previous or future states and whether he or she can foresee controlling the circumstances that make it that way. Thus, the life of an athlete who aspires to participate in the Olympics can be changed in relative value by an accident that leaves that person a quadriplegic. The athlete might decide that the relative value of her life is diminished after the accident, because she perceives her desires and aspirations to be reduced or beyond her capacity to control. However, if she receives treatment and counselling her aspirations could change and, with the adjustment, she could learn to value her life as a quadriplegic as much or more than her previous life. This illustrates how it is possible for a person to adjust the values by which they appraise their lives. For Katherine Lewis, the decision went the opposite way and she decided that a life of incapacity and constant pain was of relatively low value to her. It is not surprising that the most vociferous protesters against permitting people in Katherine's position to be assisted in terminating their lives are people who themselves are disabled. Organizations run by, and that represent, persons with disabilities make two assertions in this light. First, they claim that accepting that Katherine Lewis has a right to die based on her determination that her life is of relatively little value is demeaning to all disabled people, and implies that any life with a severe disability is not worth living. Their second assertion is that with proper help, over time Katherine would be able to transform her personal outlook and find satisfaction in her life that would increase its relative value for her. The first assertion can be addressed by clarifying that the case of Katherine Lewis must not be taken as a general rule. Deontologists, who are interested in knowing general principles and duties that can be applied across all cases would not be very satisfied with this; they would prefer to be able to look to duties that would apply in all cases. Here, a case-based, context-sensitive approach is better suited. Contextualizing would permit freedom to act within a particular context, without the implication that the decision must hold in general. So, in this case, Katherine might decide that her life is relatively valueless. In another case, for example that of actor Christopher Reeve, the decision to seek other ways of valuing this major life change led to him perceiving his life as highly valuable, even if different in value from before the accident that made him a paraplegic. This invokes the second assertion, that Katherine could change her view over time. Although we recognize this is possible in some cases, it is not clear how it applies to Katherine. Here we have a case in which a rational and competent person has had time to consider her options and has chosen to end her life of suffering beyond what she believes she can endure. Ten months is a long time and it will have given her plenty of opportunity to consult with family and professionals about the possibilities open to her in the future. Given all this, it is reasonable to assume that Katherine has made a well-reasoned decision. It might not be a decision that everyone can agree with but if her reasoning process can be called into question then at what point can we say that a decision is sound? She meets all the criteria for competence and she is aware of the consequences of her decision. It would be very difficult to determine what arguments could truly justify interfering with her choice. Subjective determination The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the **determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life.** The important addition here is that **the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved.** Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element**, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients' judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past.** As the deontological position puts it so well, **to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves**.

**Nuclear war destroys the environment faster**

**Managerialism is necessary to prevent global extinction –processes of environmental destruction are unstoppable without intervention**

**Levy 99**

Dr Neil Levy 1999. Fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. “Discourses of the Environment” p. 215

**If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world**. For we are faced with a situation in which **the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary**, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but **to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions**. More over, there is another reason why **our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is,** at least **in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice**. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of **Brazil**, who **will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood.** **It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by** ecologists, environmentalist, **people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are**, therefore, **very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them**’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For **it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided.**

**Managerialism is inevitable.**

**Leach 3**

date page modified (Neil, Professor at the University of Southern California, “Forget Heidegger”, August 15, <http://www.china-designer.com/magazine/leach/txt1.htm>)

Adorno's further example of the car reveals how the **technological has come to colonise our everyday lives not as standing reserve, but as something to which symbolic intention is always already being 'attached'**. The point here is that we have to understand that our engagement with technology involves a moment of 'proprioception'. **Technology may come to operate as a form of 'prosthesis' to the human body that is appropriated such that it becomes part of the motility of the body**. In driving a car we come to navigate the road through that car. As such, the car as an item of technology is not divorced - alienated - from the body. Indeed it becomes a form of extension to that body. What I am arguing here is not some simplistic manifesto for cyborgs, claiming that human beings can become part human and part machine. Rather I am trying to tease out the logic of mimesis itself. For according to this logic, **human beings have absorbed technology at an unconscious level, such that they have come to operate through technology**, as though by way of some tele-kinesis.¶ Not only this, but **technology may actually influence the way that human beings think. It may itself affect our consciousness**. Let us take the example of the computer. For, if as Walter Benjamin once argued, the factory worker in the modernist age comes to absorb the jolting, jarring repetitive action of the machine, such that those movements are appropriated into the worker's own behaviour, so too people today have absorbed the thinking and fluid circuitry behind the computer screen. **New conditions breed new ways of thinking**. As Douglas Rushkoff observes, a new computer generation is emerging. The computer kids of today come to behave like their computers. They identify with them, play with them, and mimic their operations. Analogical reasoning is out. Non-linear, multiple-layered thinking is in - Deleuzian surfing. Fractals, rhizomes and clones, fluidity and flux - these are the buzz words of this new generation. In such a context, those who argue against the use of the computer in the contemporary design studio are failing to address the concrete ontological reality of life today, and are doing no service to the students, for whom knowledge of computer has become a 'given' within the contemporary office. It may be that the still prevalent **antipathy towards digital technology is merely a form of 'denial'**. As in the case of homophobics, who often deny their latent homosexuality, critics of technology may be repressing a secret fascination with technology. An individual 'in denial' may be fascinated by some personal psychic obsession, but, not wishing to acknowledge it, will project that obsession on to some external object, and then criticise it. But **whether this antipathy towards digital technology is a form of repressed fascination or not, it is clearly out of place in what has become a highly digitalised world**.¶ This is not to say that the computer should be accepted unproblematically within the studio. Indeed the lessons of those design schools that have accepted the computer wholesale would seem to indicate that the concerns expressed in The Anaesthetics of Architecture about the potential aestheticisation and hence anaesthetisation of social issues are borne out only too clearly in such contexts. Rather it is a call for a self-critical, theoretically informed engagement with such realms. Theory may be unable in itself to combat the potential problems of aestheticisation. Yet it may provide the first crucial step. **Once a problem has been exposed, one is no longer trapped by that problem.**¶ **The consequences are all too obvious. Not only have we accepted technology as an essential part of our everyday life, such that the distinction once posed between techné and technology seems no longer valid, but our whole existence has become conditioned by technology**. In this new digital age, as Sarah Chaplin argues, we have adopted a form of cybervisuality. An important factor, then, is our interface with that technology. For **technology may take many forms**. Here the question of design becomes crucial. The message of mimesis is not that human beings will adapt to anything, so that design is unimportant, but precisely the opposite. Design becomes an important mechanism for making people feel at one with their world. This relates not simply to whether a piece of technology is itself aesthetically pleasing - as is the case, say, with the iMac computer - , but in the context of digital technology it relates also to the user interface - to software programming and its compatibility with human modes of operation. **Far from engendering alienation, well designed technology has the capacity to overcome alienation**.¶ There was a time when Heideggerian thought made a substantial and noteworthy contribution to architectural culture in challenging the spirit of positivism that was once so pervasive. But now **Heideggerian thinking must not** itself **go unchallenged, in that it threatens to install itself as a set of fixed values out of tune with the fluidity and flux of contemporary society**. And while some would criticise postmodern thought for being relativistic in accommodating plurality and difference, and questioning the ground on which any particular statement is made, the true relativism lies surely in a tradition that forecloses even the possibility of even asking these questions, by doggedly adhering to an out of date set of values, and by failing to engage substantively with any critical discourse.¶ In an increasingly digital world, it is time, it would seem, to adopt a more flexible and tolerant attitude towards digital technology. It is time to break free from the shackles of the past. **It is time**, perhaps, **to forget Heidegger**.

# 1AR

#### Psychological torture DA – the alternative’s attempt to reorient our relationship towards death represses the basic instinct of human beings which turns their offense

**Pyszczynski et al 6** – Tom, Prof. Psych. – U. Colorado, Sheldon Solomon, Prof. Psych. – Skidmore College, Jeff Greenberg, Prof. Psych. – U. Arizona, and Molly Maxfield, U. Colorado, Psychological Inquiry, “On the Unique Psychological Import of the Human Awareness of Mortality: Theme and Variations” 17:4, Ebsco

Kirkpatrick and Navarette’s (this issue) first specific complaint with TMT is that it is wedded to an outmoded assumption that human beings share with many other species a survival instinct. They argue that natural selection can only build instincts that respond to specific adaptive challenges in specific situations, and thus could not have designed an instinct for survival because staying alive is a broad and distal goal with no single clearly defined adaptive response. Our use of the term survival instinct was meant to highlight the general orientation toward continued life that is expressed in many of an organism’s bodily systems (e.g., heart, liver, lungs, etc) and the diverseapproach and avoidance tendencies that promote its survival and reproduction,ultimately leading to genes being passed on to fu- ture generations. Our use of this term also reflects the classic psychoanalytic, biological, and anthropological influences on TMT of theorists like Becker (1971, 1973, 1975), Freud (1976, 1991), Rank (1945, 1961, 1989), Zilborg (1943), Spengler (1999), and Darwin (1993). We concur that natural selection, at least initially, is unlikely to design a unitary survival instinct, but rather, a series of specific adaptations that have tended over evolutionary time to promote the survival of an organism’s genes. However, whether one construes these adaptations as a series of discrete mechanisms or a general overarching tendency that encompasses many specific systems, we think it hard to argue with the claim that natural selection usually orients organisms to approach things that facilitate continued existence and to avoid things that would likely cut life short. This is not to say that natural selection doesn’t also select for characteristics that facilitate gene survival in other ways, or that all species or even all humans, will always choose life over other valued goals in all circumstances. Our claim is simply that a general orientation toward continued life exists because staying alive is essential for reproduction in most species, as well as for child rearing and support in mammalian species and many others. Viewing an animal as a loose collection of independent modules that produce responses to specific adaptively-relevant stimuli may be useful for some purposes, but it overlooks the point that adaptation involves a variety of inter-related mechanisms working together to insure that genes responsible for these mechanisms are more numerously represented in future generations (see, e.g., Tattersall, 1998). For example, although the left ventricle of the human heart likely evolved to solve a specific adaptive problem, this mechanism would be useless unless well-integrated with other aspects of the circulatory system. We believe it useful to think in terms of the overarching function of the heart and pulmonary-circulatory system, even if specific parts of that system evolved to solve specific adaptive problems within that system. In addition to specific solutions to specific adaptive problems, over time, natural selection favors integrated systemic functioning(Dawkins, 1976; Mithen, 1997). It is the improved survival rates and reproductive success of lifeformspossessing integrated systemic characteristics that determine whether those characteristics become widespread in a population. Thus, we think it is appropriate and useful to characterize a glucose-approaching amoeba and a bear-avoiding salmon as oriented toward self-preservation and reproduction, even if neither species possesses one single genetically encoded mechanism designed to generally foster life or insure reproduction, or cognitive representations of survival and reproduction. This is the same position that Dawkins (1976) took in his classic book, The selfish gene: The obvious first priorities of a survival machine, and of the brain that takes the decisions for it, are individual survival and reproduction. … Animals therefore go to elaborate lengths to find and catch food; to avoid being caught and eaten themselves; to avoid disease and accident; to protect themselves from unfavourable climatic conditions; to find members of the opposite sex and persuade them to mate; and to confer on their children advantages similar to those they enjoy themselves. (pp. 62–63) All that is really essential to TMT is the proposition that humans fear death. Somewhat ironically, in the early days of the theory,we felt compelled to explain this fear by positing a very basic desire for life, because many critics adamantly insisted, for reasons that were never clear to us, that most people do not fear death. Our explanation for the fear of death is that knowledge of the inevitability of death is frightening because people know they are alive and because they want to continue living. Do Navarrete and Fessler (2005) really believe that humans do not fear death? Although people sometimes claim that they are not afraid of death, and on rare occasions volunteer for suicide missions and approach their death, this requires extensive psychological work, typically a great deal of anxiety, and preparation and immersion in a belief system that makes this possible (see TMT for an explanation of how belief systems do this). Where this desire for life comes from is an interesting question, but not essential to the logic of the theory. Even if Kirkpatrick and Navarrete (this issue) were correct in their claims that a unitary self-preservation instinct was not, in and of itself, selected for, it is indisputable that many discrete and integrated mechanisms that keep organisms alive were selected for. A desire to stay alive, and a fear of anything that threatens to end one’s life, are likely emergent properties of these many discrete mechanisms that result from the evolution of sophisticated cognitive abilities for symbolic, future- oriented, and self-reflective thought. As Batson and Stocks (2004) have noted, it is because we are so intelligent, and hence so aware of our limbic reactions to threats of death and of our many systems oriented toward keeping us alive that we have a general fear of death. Here are three quotes that illustrate this point. First, for psychologists, Zilboorg (1943), an important early source of TMT: **“**Such constant expenditure of psychological energy on the business of preserving life would be impossible if the fear of death **were not as consta**nt” (p. 467). For literature buffs, acclaimed novelist Faulkner (1990) put it this way: If aught can be more painful to any intelligence above that of a child or an idiot than a slow and gradual confronting with that which over a long period of bewil- derment and dread it has been taught to regard as an irrevocable and unplumbable finality, I do not know it. (pp. 141–142) And perhaps most directly, for daytime TV fans, from The Young and the Restless (2006), after a rocky plane flight: Phyllis: I learned something up in that plane Nick: What? Phyllis: I really don’t want to die. An important consequence of the emergence of this general fear of death is that humans are susceptible to anxiety due to events or stimuli that are not immediately present and novel threats to survival that did not exist for our ancestors,such as AIDS, guns, or nuclear weapons. Regardless of how this fear originates, it is abundantly clear that humans do fear death. Anyone who has ever faced a man with a gun, a doctor saying that the lump on one’s neck is suspicious and requires further diagnostic tests, or a drunken driver swerving into one’s lane can attest to that. If humans only feared evolved specific death-related threats like spiders and heights, then a lump on an x-ray, a gun, a crossbow, or any number of weapons pointed at one’s chest would not cause panic; but obviously these things do. Of what use would the sophisticated cortical structures be if they didn’t have the ability to instigate fear reactions in response to such threats?

#### 5. Value to life DA – only fearing death allows us to generate meaning in our lives – culture, morality, and belief in value means fear of death isn’t life negating anyways

Pyszczynski 4 – Tom, Prof. Psych. – U. Colorado, Social Research, “What are we so afraid of? A terror management theory perspective on the politics of fear”, Winter, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_4\_71/ai\_n13807478/

TMT starts with a consideration of how human beings are both similar to, and different from, all other animals. We start with the assumption that, like all other animals, humans are born with a very basic evolved proclivity to stay alive and that fear, and all the biological structures of the brain that produce it, evolved, at least initially, to keep the animal alive. This, of course, is highly adaptive, in that it facilitates survival, and an animal that does not stay alive very long has little chances of reproducing and passing on its genes. But as ourspecies evolved, it developed a wide range of other adaptations that helped us survive and reproduce, the most important being a set of highly sophisticated intellectual abilities that enable us to: a) think and communicate with symbols, which of course is the basis for language, b) project ourselves in time and imagine a future including events that have never happened before, and c) reflect back on ourselves, and take ourselves as an object of our own attention--self-awareness. These are all very adaptive abilities that play central roles in the system through which humans regulate their behavior--usually referred to as the self (cf. Carver and Scheier, 1998). These abilities made it possible for us to survive and prosper in a far wider range of environments than any other animal has ever done, and accomplish all that we humans have done that no other species ever has been capable of doing. However, these unique intellectual abilities also created a major problem: they made us aware that, although we are biologically programmed to stay alive and avoid things that would cut our life short, the one absolute certainty in life is that we must die. We are also forced to realize that death can come at any time for any number of reasons, none of which are particularly pleasant--a predator, natural disaster, another hostile human, and an incredible range of diseases and natural processes, ranging from heart attacks and cancer to AIDS. If we are "lucky" we realize that our bodies will just wear out and we will slowly fade away as we gradually lose our most basic functions. Not a very pretty picture. TMT posits that this clash of a core desire for life with awareness of the inevitability of death created the potential for paralyzing terror. Although all animals experience fear in the face of clear and present dangers to their survival, only humans know what it is that they are afraid of, and that ultimately there is no escape from this ghastly reality. We suspect that this potential for terror would have greatly interfered with ongoing goal-directed behavior, and life itself, if it were left unchecked. It may even have made the intellectual abilities that make our species special unviable in the long run as evolutionary adaptations--and there are those who think that the fear and anxiety that results from our sophisticated intelligence may still eventually lead to the extinction of our species. So humankind used their newly emerging intellectual abilities to manage the potential for terror that these abilities produced by calling the understandings of reality that were emerging as a result of these abilities into service as a way of controlling their anxieties. The potential for terror put a "press" on emerging explanations for reality, what we refer to as cultural worldviews, such that any belief system that was to survive and be accepted by the masses needed to manage this potential for anxiety that was inherent in the recently evolved human condition. Cultural worldviews manage existential terror by providing a meaningful, orderly, andcomforting conception of the world that helps us come to grips with the problem of death. Cultural worldviews provide a meaningful explanation of life and our place in the cosmos; a set of standards for what is valuable behavior, good and evil, that give us the potential of acquiring self-esteem, the sense that we are valuable, important, and significant contributors to this meaningful reality; and the hope of transcending death and attaining immortality in either a literal or symbolic sense. Literal immortality refer to those aspects of the cultural worldview that promise that death is not the end of existence, that some part of us will live on, perhaps in an ethereal heaven, through reincarnation, a merger of our consciousness with God and all others, or the attainment of enlightenment--beliefs in literal immortality are nearly universal, with the specifics varying widely from culture to culture. Cultures also provide us with the hope of attaining symbolic immortality, by being part of something larger, more significant, and more enduring than ourselves, such as our families, nations, ethnic groups, professions, and the like. Because these entities will continue to exist long after our deaths, we attain symbolic immortality by being valued parts of them.

### 1AR Extinnctio 1st

#### Extinction comes 1st – it’s the only impact you cant recover from and is a prerequisite to having value – default to util because it treats all lives as equal

#### Existence precedes the ability to ascribe value

Wapner 3

Paul Wapner. 2003. Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env’t. Policy Prog. – American U., Dissent, “Leftist criticism of “nature””, Winter, 50:1.

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. **Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence**. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. **We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character**. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that **a prerequisite of expression is existence**. This in turn suggests that **preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen** by eco-critics **as a fundamental good**. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean Francois Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, **respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist**. In our day and age, **this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman**. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

**Danger control strategies like the aff are best, solves anexiety and ethics better**

**Sandman and Lanard, 2003**

Peter M. PhD in Communications and Professor at Rutgers specialzing in crisis communication; Jody, Psychiatrist, 28 April, “Fear Is Spreading Faster than SARS — And So It Should!”

8.   Stop worrying excessively about panic.   Panic is rare. It is less rare during life-threatening epidemics than in most other sorts of crises, so you can’t afford to ignore the possibility altogether. But remember that **efforts to avert panic** — for example, **by withholding bad news** and making over-reassuring statements — tend to **backfire**. People often disobey in a crisis, or an impending crisis. But that’s not panic. Worry more about denial; worry more about apathy; don’t worry just about panic. 9.   Worry less about the public’s fear.   Of course excessive **fear can paralyze people**, or lead them to unwise, desperate attempts at self-protection. **But insufficient fear provokes insufficient self-protection** ... and insufficient efforts to protect the rest of the community, and insufficient support for the policy changes and public expenditures that may be needed. So guide people’s fear. Harness it. Channel it. Titrate it. Don’t try to squelch it. **Somewhere midway between apathy and panic is the level of emotional arousal that’s right** for a serious emergency. It’s more than concern, less than terror. Call it “fear” — and welcome it.

#### Fear can be channeled and productive – suppressing it causes panic

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WIlliasms

#### Risk framing motivates new social movements and re-democratizes politics

Borraz, ‘7 [Olivier Borraz, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po-CNRS, Paris, Risk and Public Problems, Journal of Risk Research Vol. 10, No. 7, 941–957, October 2007, p. 951]

These studies seem to suggest that risk is a way of framing a public problem in such a way as to politicize the search for solutions. This politicization entails, in particular, a widening of the range of stakeholders, a reference to broader political issues and debates, the search for new decision- making processes (either in terms of democratization, or renewed scientific expertise), and the explicit mobilization of non-scientific arguments in these processes. But if this is the case, then it could also be true that risk is simply one way of framing public problems. Studies in the 1990s, in particular, showed that a whole range of social problems (e.g., poverty, housing, unemployment) had been reframed as health issues, with the result that their management was transferred from social workers to health professionals, and in the process was described in neutral, depoliticized terms (Fassin, 1998). Studies of risk, on the contrary, seem to suggest that similar social problems could well be re-politicized, i.e., taken up by new social movements, producing and using alternative scientific data, calling for more deliberative decision-making procedures, and clearly intended to promote change in the manner in which the state protects the population against various risks (health and environment, but also social and economic). In other words, framing public problems as risks could afford an opportunity for a transformation in the political debate, from more traditional cleavages around social and economic issues, to rifts stemming from antagonistic views of science, democracy and the world order.