# 1NC

## T

#### A. Interpretation

#### Substantial increase is 30% to 50%.

Hantash 06, Patent Attorneys & Engineers Lynch Kneblewski - Sâo Paulo

[Feras, 3/16, http://www.freshpatents.com/Method-for-detecting-cystic-fibrosis dt20060316ptan20060057593.php]

[0011] A substantial increase in the amount of a CFTR target segment identified means that the segment has been duplicated while a substantial decrease in the amount of a CFTR target segment identified means that the target segment has been deleted. The term "substantial decrease" or "substantial increase" means a decrease or increase of at least about 30-50%. Thus, deletion of a single CFTR exon would appear in the assay as a signal representing for example of about 50% of the same exon signal from an identically processed sample from an individual with a wildtype CFTR gene. Conversely, amplification of a single exon would appear in the assay as a signal representing for example about 150% of the same exon signal from an identically processed sample from an individual with a wildtype CFTR gene.

#### Violation- The plan increases restrictions on only a small part of the targeted killing area. That’s not a substantial increase of restrictions on war power authority in the area of targeted killings.

#### Targeted Killings include a wide variety of practices-not just drones

Abresch 9 (William, 2009, “Targeted Killing in International Law” book review, original book by Nils Melzer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, <http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/2/449.full>)

Studies of targeted killing are often situated within the politically fraught debate over Hellfire missile attacks on suspected terrorists. The scope of Melzer's analysis is, then, refreshingly broad, covering equally sniper shots used to end hostage stand-offs, poison letters sent to insurgent commanders, and commando raids launched with orders to liquidate opponents. These diverse practices are marked off from other uses of lethal force by states, such as soldiers shooting in a firefight, with a precise and intuitively satisfying definition. Melzer defines targeted killing as a use of lethal force by a subject of international law that is directed against an individually selected person who is not in custody and that is intentional (rather than negligent or reckless), premeditated (rather than merely voluntary), and deliberate (meaning that ‘the death of the targeted person [is] the actual aim of the operation, as opposed to deprivations of life which, although intentional and premeditated, remain the incidental result of an operation pursuing other aims’) (at 3–4). It is a strength of Melzer's book that, although the concepts deployed in this definition do not correspond with those found in either international human rights law or international humanitarian law (IHL), he eschews de lege ferenda argumentation in favour of a rigorous elaboration of the implications of the lex lata for the practices covered by his definition.

#### “In the area” means all of the activities

United Nations 13

(United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\_agreements/texts/unclos/part1.htm)

PART I¶ INTRODUCTION¶ Article 1

Use of terms and scope¶ 1. For the purposes of this Convention:¶ (1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;¶ (2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority;¶ (3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area;

#### Best interp

#### Ground- Our interpretation employs a flexible and reasonable definition of substantially but still excludes tiny subsets of each of areas.

#### Education: Our interp ensures the entire category of targeted killings are explored, ensuring the best topic debates.

#### T is a voter for fairness and education.

## Anthro

#### Their impact claims signal a valuing of the survival of the human good life above all other forms of life. That abandons bare life.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8 [tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

If only some of our genes but not our species has survived, maybe the emphasis we place upon the notion of ‘survival’ is more cultural than simply genetic. Such an emphasis stems not only from our higher cognitive powers of ‘self-consciousness’ or self-awareness, but also from our conscious celebration of this fact: the image we create for ourselves of ‘humanity’, which is produced by via language, collective memory and historical narrative. The notion of the ‘human’ involves an identification of our species with particular characteristics with and upon which we ascribe certain notions of value. Amongst others such characteristics and values might be seen to include: the notion of an inherent ‘human dignity’, the virtue of ethical behaviour, the capacities of creative and aesthetic thought, and for some, the notion of an eternal soul. Humans are conscious of themselves as humans and value the characteristics that make us distinctly ‘human’. When many, like Hawing, typically think of the notion of the survival of the human race, it is perhaps this cultural-cognitive aspect of homo sapiens, made possible and produced by human self-consciousness, which they are thinking of. If one is to make the normative argument that the human race should survive, then one needs to argue it is these cultural-cognitive aspects of humanity, and not merely a portion of our genes, that is worth saving. However, it remains an open question as to what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity would survive in the future when placed under radical environmental and evolutionary pressures. We can consider that perhaps the fish people, having the capacity for self-awareness, would consider themselves as the continuation or next step of ‘humanity’. Yet, who is to say that a leap in the process of evolution would not prompt a change in self awareness, a different form of abstract reasoning about the species, a different self-narrative, in which case the descendents of humans would look upon their biological and genetic ancestors in a similar manner to the way humans look upon the apes today. Conceivably the fish people might even forget or suppress their evolutionary human heritage. While such a future cannot be predicted, it also cannot be controlled from our graves. In something of a sense similar to the point made by Giorgio Agamben (1998), revising ideas found within the writings of Michel Foucault and Aristotle, the question of survival can be thought to involve a distinction between the ‘good life’ and ‘bare life’. In this instance, arguments in favour of human survival rest upon a certain belief in a distinctly human good life, as opposed to bare biological life, the life of the gene pool. It is thus such a good life, or at least a form of life considered to be of value, that is held up by a particular species to be worth saving. When considering the hypothetical example of the fish people, what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity’s good life would survive? The conditions of life under water, which presumably for the first thousand years would be quite harsh, would perhaps make the task of bare survival rather than the continuation of any higher aspects of a ‘human heritage’ the priority. Learning how to hunt and gather or farm underwater, learning how to communicate, breed effectively and avoid getting eaten by predators might displace the possibilities of listening to Mozart or Bach, or adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or playing sport, or of even using written language or complex mathematics. Within such an extreme example it becomes highly questionable to what extent a ‘human heritage’ would survive and thus to what extent we might consider our descendents to be ‘human’. In the case where what survives would not be the cultural-cognitive aspects of a human heritage considered a valuable or a good form of life, then, what really survives is just life. Such a life may well hold a worth or value altogether different to our various historical valuations and calculations. While the example of the fish people might seem extreme, it presents a similar set of acute circumstances which would be faced within any adaptation to a new habitat whether on the earth or in outer space. Unless humans are saved by radical developments in technology that allow a comfortable colonisation of other worlds, then genetic adaptation in the future retains a reasonable degree of probability. However, even if the promise of technology allows humans to carry on their cultural-cognitive heritage within another habitat, such survival is still perhaps problematic given the dark, violent, cruel and brutal aspects of human life which we would presumably carry with us into our colonisation of new worlds. Thinkers like Hawking, who place their faith in technology, also place a great deal of faith in a particular view of a human heritage which they think is worth saving. When considering the question of survival, such thinkers typically project a one-sided image of humanity into the future. Such a view presents a picture of only the good aspects of humanity climbing aboard a space-craft and spreading out over the universe. This presumes that only the ‘good aspects’ of the human heritage would survive, elements such as ‘reason’, creativity, playfulness, compassion, love, fortitude, hope. What however happens to the ‘bad’ aspects of the human heritage, the drives, motivations and thoughts that led to the Holocaust for example?

#### That legitimizes genocide against all forms of politically unqualified life.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8 [tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC’s human survival ethic in order to understand the species-being – solves their species-level racism.

HUDSON 2K4 [Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, <http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23_2_04.pdf>]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

## Security

#### The affirmative’s call to SECURITY only FEEDS THE APORIAS by which security apparatuses CONTINUOUSLY ORDER AND PROBLEMATIZE LIFE

Dillon and Reid 2K0

Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster and lecturer in international relations at Kings College in London, 2000 [Michael and Julian, Alternatives vol. 25, issue 1, spring, EbscoHost]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, ¶ in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] ¶ More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations.¶ Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. ¶ Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] ¶ Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

**Their terrorism impacts are a rhetorical trope that justifies the worst excesses of biopower – These atrocities devalue the lives they attempt to save and make violence inevitable**

**Gorrelick 8**

(Nathan, Ph.D. student of Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo, where he holds a Presidential Fellowship. Theory & Event, Volume 11, Issue 2 “Imagining Extraordinary Renditions” 2008. Project Muse AD 7/29/09)

**Analogously, the war on terror, even in its very name, displaces the terror of the other night, attempts to contain it within the terror of the "enemy combatant," and, through this new knowing subject, frantically gropes for the knowledge that promises complete security. This is the purpose of extraordinary rendition: to exercise total domination over the body of the enemy -- the artificial signifier of this unsignifiable darkness at the core of liberal humanism -- and in so doing to render it knowable, to destroy it, to become the destroyer who watches.**42 **It is no accident that the body of the suspected terrorist is the object against which this violent will to knowledge is directed**; in Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault suggests that state-sanctioned brutality and the commitment to calculative reason codified by the Enlightenment intersect here, in the systematization of torture. **The codification of torture as a disciplinary technique exhibits a "whole quantitative art of pain" which is "calculated according to detailed rules" designed to inflict a punishment proportionate to the crime and to exhibit the authority of the state through the scarred body of the prisoner**.43 Of course, Foucault's analysis concerns the spectacle of public torture, which obviously differs from the secretive politics of extraordinary rendition. However, this difference primarily concerns torture's punitive function in the 17th century, as opposed to its biopolitical function today, in the context of globalized security. **The science of torture has only grown far more sophisticated; the calculated application of cruelty to the suspect's body is, after all, a matter of national security. The role of the terrorist suspect is no longer simply to express the painful reality of sovereign vengeance to a paralyzed citizenry, but rather to speak, to proffer a knowledge that promises to maintain the integrity of the innocent, vulnerable population.** Foucault thus reveals that the technologies **of control exercised, on the one hand, against individual bodies and, on the other, against whole populations are not isolated phenomena. They are the products of a historically contingent system of thought**.44 **They are founded upon the obsessive rationality of Enlightened liberal humanism, and their intersection in the shadows of the dark chamber give expression to the aggressive anxiety of that rationality's confrontation with the other night**.

#### The discourse of the 1AC contributes to the emergence of destructive security-state that becomes indistinguishable from the forms of violence it seeks to prevent.

Agamben 2K2,

[ Professor of Philosophy at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris, [Giorgio, Theory & Event 5:4, ProjectMuse]

Security as the basic principle of state politics dates back to the birth of the modern state. Hobbes already mentions it as the opposite of the fear which compels human beings to unite and form a society together. But not until the 18th century does the paradigm of security reach its fullest development. In an unpublished lecture at the Collège de France in 1978, Michel Foucault showed how in the political and economic practice of the Physiocrats security opposes discipline and the law as instruments of governance.¶ Neither Turgot and Quesnay nor the Physiocratic officials were primarily concerned with the prevention of famine or the regulation of production, but rather wanted to allow for their development in order to guide and "secure" their consequences. While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, discipline wants to produce order, while security wants to guide disorder. Since measures of security can only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and individual initiative, Foucault can show that the development of security coincides with the development of liberal ideology.¶ Today we are facing extreme and most dangerous developments of this paradigm of security. In the course of a gradual neutralisation of politics and the progressive surrender of traditional tasks of the state, security imposes itself as the basic principle of state activity. What used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation. Security reasoning entails an essential risk. A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic.¶ We should not forget that the first major organisation of terror after the war, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) was established by a French General who thought of himself as patriotic and who was convinced that terrorism was the only answer to the guerilla phenomenon in Algeria and Indochina. When politics, the way it was understood by theorists of the "Polizeiwissenschaft" in the eighteenth century, reduces itself to police, the difference between state and terrorism threatens to disappear. In the end it may lead to security and terrorism forming a single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' actions.¶ The risk is not merely the development of a clandestine complicity of opponents but that the hunt for security leads to a worldwide civil war which destroys all civil coexistence. In the new situation -- created by the end of the classical form of war between sovereign states -- security finds its end in globalisation: it implies the idea of a new planetary order which is, in fact, the worst of all disorders. But there is yet another danger. Because they require constant reference to a state of exception, measures of security work towards a growing depoliticization of society. In the long run, they are irreconcilable with democracy.¶ Nothing is therefore more important than a revision of the concept of security as the basic principle of state politics. European and American politicians finally have to consider the catastrophic consequences of uncritical use of this figure of thought. It is not that democracies should cease to defend themselves, but the defense of democracy demands today a change of political paradigms and not a world civil war which is just the institutionalization of terror. Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them. On the contrary, we can say that politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.

#### ALTERNATIVE: VOTE NEGATIVE. ONLY TOTALLY ESCHEWING THE LOGIC OF SECURITY SOLVES.

NEOCLEOUS 2K8.

[Mark, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), “Critique of Security.” Pg. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favor of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that cannot be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics, dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text *Critical Security Studies*, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilized or gendered or humanized or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipator in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognizing that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

## Solvency

#### Drone court doesn’t appropriately promote effective control over drones

Roth 2013

(Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, April 4, 2013, “What Rules Should Govern US Drone Attacks?,” New York Review of Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/apr/04/what-rules-should-govern-us-drone-attacks/?pagination=false)

Whatever the rules governing drone attacks, many object to the covert, unilateral way the administration decides who should be killed. In the heat of battle, that is a necessity. But drone targets are typically selected over lengthy periods, with more than enough time for independent scrutiny. Under US law, the executive branch cannot even secure a wiretap without court oversight, so why should it be allowed to select drone targets unilaterally? Senator Dianne Feinstein has thus put forward the idea of a drone court similar to the courts that review wiretap applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).¶But replicating the FISA courts would provide little by way of effective control because, by their nature, they must be kept secret from the target, so they provide no opportunity for an independent attorney to challenge the government’s claims. At least for wiretaps the law is reasonably settled. But the administration, as we have seen, seems to accept in only vague terms the law governing drone attacks. In the absence of an adversarial process, a judge cannot be counted on to challenge the administration’s permissive interpretation of the law.¶Moreover, a drone court could at most approve placing someone on a kill list, not whether the circumstances of a prospective attack, including the risk to civilians in a changing situation, would be lawful. That would require a determination of the sort that a court can’t possibly undertake in advance. In any event, most proposals for drone courts envision them being used only for targeted US citizens—not much help to the great majority of targets from other nationalities. Though of no help to those killed, permitting after-the-fact lawsuits against the government would be a better way to allow the courts to define the limits of the law. But the administration has blocked such suits through various claims of secrecy.

#### CIA keeps drone info secret and courts won’t enforce – signature strikes prove

Marsden 13

(William, journalist, The Montreal Gazette, 2/2/2013, “Drone warfare comes under increasing attack; Controversial U.S. program cloaked in frayed veil of secrecy,” Lexis, accessed 7/6/2013, BS)

Both for political reasons and because of the questionable legality of it, the U.S. drone program is cloaked in a frayed veil of secrecy. While U.S. courts have refused to order the government to release information about a program that officially doesn't exist, the administration of President Barack Obama leaks when it benefits Obama's image. It's hard to keep Hellfire air-to-surface missile attacks secret. Pre-election concerns that Obama was appearing weak resulted in a series of New York Times stories in which unnamed administration sources depicted him as tough enough to make the weekly drone-kill decisions. Obama became the moral man saddled with a troubling but necessary drone war to keep America safe. This article was followed by a speech last June by Obama's "high priest" of killer drones, John Brennan, who at the time, was his lead terrorism adviser and is now his nominee to head the CIA. He said that "in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives, the United States government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qaida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as 'drones.' " The killer drone program began under former president George H.W. Bush in 2002. Fifty strikes occurred under his administration. Obama has accelerated the program sevenfold with 350 strikes, says Zenko and other experts. Estimates vary as to how many "terrorists" and how many "civilians" have been killed. Of the 32 al-Qaida leaders on Obama's kill list, 22 have been killed, 21 by drones, Zenko said. The total number of people killed is much higher - more than 3,000, according to some accounts. How many of these were civilians depends on how "civilian" is defined. The administration says civilian deaths are minimal. Nongovernment organizations say the figure is more than 2,000. Naureen Shah, association director of the counterterrorism and human rights project at Columbia Law School, said the criteria for a drone strike fall into two categories. So-called "personality" attacks means that the government knows the identity of the person targeted. "Signature" attacks target people whose identities are unknown but whose behaviour gives a terrorist signature. For example, they could be seen carrying a weapon or transporting, say, fertilizer that could be used in improvised explosive devices. Or they could be simply giving first aid to a victim of a drone strike. "The U.S. has never acknowledged that they conduct signature strikes," Zenko said. "When John Brennan was asked the question specifically, he refused to answer. And the reason is it gets into a lot of sort of international legal problems."

## Terror

#### Allied terror coop is high now, despite frictions

Kristin Archick, European affairs specialist @ CRS, 9-4-2013, “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism,” Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf>

As part of the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism since September 11, 2001, the EU made improving law enforcement and intelligence cooperation with the United States a top priority. The previous George W. Bush Administration and many Members of Congress largely welcomed this EU initiative in the hopes that it would help root out terrorist cells in Europe and beyond that could be planning other attacks against the United States or its interests. Such growing U.S.-EU cooperation was in line with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations that the United States should develop a “comprehensive coalition strategy” against Islamist terrorism, “exchange terrorist information with trusted allies,” and improve border security through better international cooperation. Some measures in the resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) and in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) mirrored these sentiments and were consistent with U.S.-EU counterterrorism efforts, especially those aimed at improving border controls and transport security. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Despite some frictions, most U.S. policymakers and analysts view the developing partnership in these areas as positive. Like its predecessor, the Obama Administration has supported U.S. cooperation with the EU in the areas of counterterrorism, border controls, and transport security. At the November 2009 U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, DC, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to work together to combat terrorism and enhance cooperation in the broader JHA field. In June 2010, the United States and the EU adopted a new “Declaration on Counterterrorism” aimed at deepening the already close U.S.-EU counterterrorism relationship and highlighting the commitment of both sides to combat terrorism within the rule of law. In June 2011, President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism asserted that in addition to working with European allies bilaterally, “the United States will continue to partner with the European Parliament and European Union to maintain and advance CT efforts that provide mutual security and protection to citizens of all nations while also upholding individual rights.”

#### No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability

Mueller, 2010

(John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p, 187-190

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

#### Too many obstacles to overcome – even if overcoming isn’t impossible – even generous odds ensure the chances of success are 1 in 3 billion statistically – small enough to vote on presumption

Mueller, 2010

(John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p. 197-8

As Allison appropriately points out, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their likelihood is small.33 At some point, however, probabilities, become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it begins to make sense to ignore, or at least to backburner, them: the risk becomes "acceptable:' Consider the odds that a wheel on a speeding automobile will suddenly shear off. That horror is surely"not impossible;' yet legions of motorists effectively find it so improbable that they are routinely willing to risk their lives that it will not happen-it is, in short, an acceptable risk. The British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans-far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential (and fully possible) calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially, it is "accepted:' Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States enjoys a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that goes substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls "a case for fear," Cass Sunstein notes that if there is a yearly probability of one in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to one in 10,000 over 10 years and to one in 5,000 over 20 years. These odds, he suggests, are "not the most comforting:'34 Comfort, ofcourse, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably h~ difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at some of the levels suggested here: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt. The same consideration holds for Vice President Dick Cheney's "one percent doctrine:' A top CIA analyst late in 2001 told him that al-Qaeda probably did not have a nuclear weapon, but that he couldn't "assure yoo that they don't:' To this, Cheney replied, "If there's a one percent chance that they do, you have to pursue it as if it were true:'35 Cheney'S observation : is a somewhat confused, but effective, way of saying that one should t:ake low probability events that could have an exceedingly high impact very seriously indeed. And a one percent chance of a terrorist atomic attack would dearly fit into that category. It's just that the chances, while perhaps not zero, .:: do not seem to be anywhere remotely near one percent. It's not that they are necessarily one in 3.5 billion, but they aren't anything like one in ten, one in a hundred, or one in a thousand. Perhaps, in fact, they are comparable to, or even lower than, those for a thermonuclear attack from Russia.’

## Prolif

#### Drone prolif now AND US restrictions don’t solve

Anderson 10 (Kenneth Anderson is a law professor at Washington College of Law, American University, a research fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, April 10th 2010, “Acquiring UAV Technology”, http://www.volokh.com/2010/04/09/acquiring-uav-technology/, AB)

I’ve noticed a number of posts and comments around the blogosphere on the spread of UAV technology. Which indeed is happening; many states are developing and deploying UAVs of various kinds. The WCL National Security Law Brief blog, for example, notes that India is now acquiring weaponized UAVs: India is reportedly preparing to have “killer” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in response to possible threats from Pakistan and China. Until now India has denied the use of armed UAVs, but they did use UAVs that can detect incoming missile attacks or border incursions. The importance of obtaining armed UAVs grew enormously after the recent attack on paramilitary forces in Chhattisgarh that killed 75 security personnel. Sources reveal that the Indian Air Force (IAF) has been in contact with Israeli arms suppliers in New Delhi recently. The IAF is looking to operate Israeli Harop armed UAVs from 2011 onwards, and other units of the armed forces will follow. I’ve also read comments various places suggesting that increased use of drone technologies by the United States causes other countries to follow suit, or to develop or acquire similar technologies. In some cases, the dangling implication is that if the US would not get involved in such technologies, others would not follow suit. In some relatively rare cases of weapons technologies, the US refraining from undertaking the R&D, or stopping short of a deployable weapon, might induce others not to build the same weapon. Perhaps the best example is the US stopping its development of blinding laser antipersonnel weapons in the 1990s; if others, particularly the Chinese, have developed them to a deployable weapon, I’m not aware of it. The US stopped partly in relation to a developing international campaign, modeled on the landmines ban campaign, but mostly because of a strong sense of revulsion and pushback by US line officers. Moreover, there was a strong sense that such a weapon (somewhat like chemical weapons) would be not deeply useful on a battlefield – but would be tremendously threatening as a pure terrorism weapon against civilians. In any case, the technologies involved would be advanced for R&D, construction, maintenance, and deployment, at least for a while. The situation is altogether different in the case of UAVs. The biggest reason is that the flying-around part of UAVs – the avionics and control of a drone aircraft in flight – is not particularly high technology at all. It is in range of pretty much any functioning state military that flies anything at all. The same for the weaponry, if all you’re looking to do is fire a missile, such as an anti-tank missile like the Hellfire. It’s not high technology, it is well within the reach of pretty much any state military. Iran? Without thinking twice. Burma? Sure. Zimbabwe? If it really wanted to, probably. So it doesn’t make any substantial difference whether or not the US deploys UAVs, not in relation to a decision by other states to deploy their own. The US decision to use and deploy UAVs does not drive others’ decisions one way or the other. They make that decision in nearly all cases – Iran perhaps being an exception in wanting to be able to show that they can use them in or over the Iraqi border – in relation to their particular security perceptions. Many states have reasons to want to have UAVs, for surveillance as well as use of force. It is not as a counter or defense to the US use of UAVs. The real issue is not flying the plane or putting a missile on it. The question is the sensor technology (and related communication links) – for two reasons. One is the ability to identify the target; the other is to determine the level, acceptable or not, of collateral damage in relation to the target. That’s the technologically difficult part. And yet it is not something important to very many of the militaries that might want to use UAVs, because not that many are going to be worried about the use of UAVs for discrete, targeted killing. Not so discrete and not so targeted will be just fine – and that does not require super-advanced technology. China might decide that it wants an advanced assassination platform that would depend on such sensors, and in any case be interested in investing in such technology for many reasons – but that is not going to describe Iran or very many other places that are capable of deploying and using weaponized UAVs. Iran, for example, won’t have super advanced sensor technology (unless China sells it to them), but they will have UAVs. (The attached weaponry follows the same pattern. Most countries will find a Hellfire type missile just fine. The US will continue to develop smaller weapons finally capable of a single person hit. Few others will develop it, partly because they don’t care and partly because its effectiveness depends on advanced sensors that they are not likely to have.) Robots are broadly defined by three characteristics – computation, sensor inputs, and gross movement. Movement in the case of a weaponized robot includes both movement and the use of its weapon – meaning, flying the UAV and firing a weapon. The first of those, flying the UAV, is available widely; primitive weapons are available widely as well, and so is the fundamental computational power. Sensors are much, much more difficult – but only to the extent that a party cares about discretion in targeting. But it is not the case that they are making these decisions on account of US decisions about UAVs; UAVs are useful for many other reasons for many other parties, all on their own.

#### Surveillance drones independently cause escalation – aff can’t solve –1AC author

Read pink

Boyle 13

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf> (//mtc)

A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional concepts which have underwritten stability in the international system will be radically reshaped by drone technology. For example, much of the stability among the Great Powers in the international system is driven by deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence.135 Deterrence operates with informal rules of the game and tacit bargains that govern what states, particularly those holding nuclear weapons, may and may not do to one another.136 While it is widely understood that nuclear-capable states will conduct aerial surveillance and spy on one another, overt military confrontations between nuclear powers are rare because they are assumed to be costly and prone to escalation. One open question is whether these states will exercise the same level of restraint with drone surveillance, which is unmanned, low cost, and possibly deniable. States may be more willing to engage in drone overflights which test the resolve of their rivals, or engage in ‘salami tactics’ to see what kind of drone-led incursion, if any, will motivate a response.137 This may have been Hezbollah’s logic in sending a drone into Israeli airspace in October 2012, possibly to relay information on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.138 After the incursion, both Hezbollah and Iran boasted that the drone incident demonstrated their military capabilities.139 One could imagine two rival states—for example, India and Pakistan—deploying drones to test each other’s capability and resolve, with untold consequences if such a probe were misinterpreted by the other as an attack. As drones get physically smaller and more precise, and as they develop a greater flying range, the temptation to use them to spy on a rival’s nuclear programme or military installations might prove too strong to resist. If this were to happen, drones might gradually erode the deterrent relationships that exist between nuclear powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict between them.

#### China won’t use drones to resolve territorial disputes – fears international backlash and creating a precedent for U.S. strikes in the area

Erickson and Strange 5-29

Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, and Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and graduate student at Zhejiang University, 5-29-13 (Andrew and Austin, China has drones. Now how will it use them? Foreign Affairs, McClatchy-Tribune, 29 May 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html, da 8-3-13) PC

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.

#### No Senkaku or Asian conflict- empirically denied, economic interdependence checks, and China avoids nationalism.

Carlson ’13

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At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the **Senkaku** (Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was imminent. **Yet,** months later,nothing has happened. And **despite** their **aggressive posturing** in the disputed territory, **both** sides **now show** glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to reestablish stability**.** Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict. They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict -- and the reasons it has not yet exploded -- are much deeper. Put simply, **China** cannot afford military conflict **with** any of its **Asian neighbors.** It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However**, Chinese officials see** thateven the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damagethat such a use of force would cause **to Beijing's** two most fundamental national interests **--** economic **growth and preventing the escalation of** radical **nationalist sentiment at home.** These constraints, rather than any external deterrent**, will keep** Xi Jinping, **China's new leader, from** authorizing the use of deadly **force** in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, **Beijing has promoted** peace and stability **in Asia** to facilitate conditions amenable to **China's** **economic** **development**. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, **although** often seen as **a promoter of conflict**, further limits the prospects for armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. **Ever since** the **Tiananmen Square** massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, **successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance** between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the **coming months it will quietly** seek a way to **shelve the dispute in return for** securing **regional stability**, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

# Block

## Solvency

#### Evidentiary standards means the court will default to the executive

Marcy 13

Marcy – 2/15/13, BA Amherst College, PhD program Michigan, Department of Pre-Crime, Part 3: What Law Would the Drone (and/or Targeted Killing) Court Interpret?, http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/02/15/department-of-pre-crime-part-3-what-law-would-the-drone-andor-targeted-killing-court-interpret/#sthash.5iwHrHQW.dpufhttp://www.emptywheel.net/2013/02/15/department-of-pre-crime-part-3-what-law-would-the-drone-andor-targeted-killing-court-interpret/

I’ve been writing about the nascent plan, on the part of a few Senators who want to avoid hard decisions, to establish a FISA Court to review Drone (and/or Targeted Killings) of American citizens. A number of people presumably think it’d be easy. Just use the AUMF — which authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States” — and attach some kind of measure of the seriousness of the threat, and voila! Rubber-stamp to off an American. And while that may while be how it would work in practice, even assuming the reviews would be halfway as thorough as the Gitmo habeas cases (with the selective presumption of regularity for even obviously faulty intelligence reports adopted under Latif, as well as the “military age male” standard adopted under Uthman, habeas petitions are no longer all that meaningful), that would still mean the Executive could present any laughably bad intelligence report showing a military aged male was hanging around baddies to be able to kill someone. The Gitmo habeas standard would have authorized the killing of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, in spite of the fact that no one believes he was even a member of AQAP. Then there’s the problem introduced by the secrecy of the Drone (and/or Targeted Kiling) Court. One of the several main questions at issue in US targeted killings has always been whether the group in question (AQAP, in the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, which didn’t even exist on 9/11) and the battlefield in question (Yemen, though the US is one big question) is covered by the AUMF. Congress doesn’t even know the answers to these questions. The Administration refuses to share a list of all the countries it has already used lethal counterterrorism authorities in. So ultimately, on this central issue, the Drone (and/or Targeted Killing) Court would have no choice but to accept the Executive’s claims about where and with whom we’re at war, because no list exists of that, at least not one Congress has bought off on.

#### CIA will deny existence of drones program in court – means aff can’t be enforced

Daily News 6/8

(New York, 6/8/2013, “Open secrets,” Lexis, accessed 7/8/2013, BS)

On the one hand, the Obama administration, citing national security, asserts that the American public has little right to know anything, even after the fact, about a drone campaign that has killed many Al Qaeda terrorists. On the other hand, the administration has turned into a veritable sieve on a range of sensitive national security matters. Readers have been treated to detailed insider accounts of American victories in cyberwarfare against Iran and in special operations against Osama Bin Laden. They have also been afforded a fly-on-the-wall account - on the administration's terms - of the President's role in approving terrorists for targeting on a "kill list." The selectivity - or, less charitably, hypocrisy - must stop. Exhibit A is the White House's treatment of drone warfare, an essential tactic in the fight against Al Qaeda. By one unofficial count gathered from media reports, drones have struck more than 300 times in Pakistan alone, killing between 1,800 and 2,800 people. Yet when Obama counterterrorism adviser John Brennan spoke in broad terms about the program in April, it was the first official administration acknowledgment that armed drones are being used at all. Indeed, since these attacks are considered deniable covert CIA actions, the administration will not even cop to the existence of such operations in court.

## Terrorism

#### EU cooperation on terrorism intel high and inevitable – in their self interest

Kristin Archick, European affairs specialist @ CRS, 9-4-2013, “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism,” Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf>

As part of its drive to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities, the EU has also made promoting law enforcement and intelligence cooperation with the United States a top priority. Washington has largely welcomed these efforts, recognizing that they may help root out terrorist cells both in Europe and elsewhere, and prevent future attacks against the United States or its interests abroad. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Contacts between U.S. and EU officials on police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001. A number of new U.S.-EU agreements have also been reached; these include information-sharing arrangements between the United States and EU police and judicial bodies, two new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, and accords on container security and airline passenger data. In addition, the United States and the EU have been working together to curb terrorist financing and to strengthen transport security.

#### SQ solves US-EU dialogue and Europe is too interdependent to dump us over drone policy

Anthony Dworkin 7-3-2013; Senior Policy Fellow working on human rights, international justice and international humanitarian law at the European Council on foreign relations “Drones and targeted killing: defining a European position” http://ecfr.eu/publications/summary/drones\_and\_targeted\_killing\_defining\_a\_european\_position211

Torn between an evident reluctance to accuse Obama of breaking international law and an unwillingness to endorse his policies, divided in part among themselves and in some cases bound by close intelligence relationships to the US, European countries have remained essentially disengaged as the era of drone warfare has dawned. Yet, as drones proliferate, such a stance seems increasingly untenable. Moreover, where in the past the difference between US and European conceptions of the fight against al-Qaeda seemed like an insurmountable obstacle to agreement on a common framework on the use of lethal force, the evolution of US policy means that there may now be a greater scope for a productive dialogue with the Obama administration on drones.

## Prolif

#### Zero chance of precedent setting – other countries don’t act based on the United States policy

Wright 12

(Robert Wright, finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, former writer and editor at The Atlantic, “The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate” NOV 14 2012, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-incoherence-of-a-drone-strike-advocate/265256/>, KB)

Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised the possibility that America is setting a dangerous precedent with drone strikes. If other people start doing what America does--fire drones into nations that house somebody they want dead--couldn't this come back to haunt us? And haunt the whole world? Shouldn't the U.S. be helping to establish a global norm against this sort of thing? Host Warren Olney asked Boot to respond.¶ Boot started out with this observation:¶ I think the precedent setting argument is overblown, because I don't think other countries act based necessarily on what we do and in fact we've seen lots of Americans be killed by acts of terrorism over the last several decades, none of them by drones but they've certainly been killed with car bombs and other means.¶ That's true--no deaths by terrorist drone strike so far. But I think a fairly undeniable premise of the question was that the arsenal of terrorists and other nations may change as time passes. So answering it by reference to their current arsenal isn't very illuminating. In 1945, if I had raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might one day have nuclear weapons, it wouldn't have made sense for you to dismiss that possibility by noting that none of the Soviet bombs dropped during World War II were nuclear, right?¶ As if he was reading my mind, Boot immediately went on to address the prospect of drone technology spreading. Here's what he said:¶ You know, drones are a pretty high tech instrument to employ and they're going to be outside the reach of most terrorist groups and even most countries. But whether we use them or not, the technology is propagating out there. We're seeing Hezbollah operate Iranian supplied drones over Israel, for example, and our giving up our use of drones is not going to prevent Iran or others from using drones on their own. So I wouldn't worry too much about the so called precedent it sets..."

## Anthro

#### Even full detonation of all nuclear arsenals would not destroy the biosphere.

Wang 2k9 [brian, a long time futurist (he won second place in the Honeywell University Futurist contest, Member of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology taskforce. Advisor to the Nanoethics Group. Director of Research for the Lifeboat Foundation, <http://nextbigfuture.com/2009/02/nuclear-war-effects-and-battlestar.html>]

Expending the current level or even the highest nuclear arsenals that we have ever had would do nothing to the long term survival of the biosphere based on radiation and fallout. The world is too big. The stuff settles out and the most dangerous stuff has a short life. The long life stuff is long lived because it is giving off low energy level of radiation.  That is why the long term debate about nuclear war is about altering the climate or ozone in a lasting way. Plenty of atmospheric big nuclear tests have been done and the biosphere can take it. Killing a biosphere with nukes would take lot more nukes and radiation would not be the main and lasting problem ever after 2000 years.

#### The reason they think nuclear war outweighs is because of their concept of humanity as ordered and non-humanity as not ordered. Their impact calculus ignores endless genocides in order to try and fail to reform humanism. Instead, we need to calculate human and non-human animal lives equally – that requires total rejection.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8 [tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Putting aside the old, false assumptions of a teleological account of history, social-environmental revolution is dependent upon widespread political action which short-circuits and tears apart current legal, political and economic regimes. This action is itself dependent upon a widespread change in awareness, a revolutionary change in consciousness, across enough of the populace to spark radical social and political transformation. Thought of in this sense, however, such a response to environmental destruction is caught by many of the old problems which have troubled the tradition of revolutionary socialism. Namely, 3how might a significant number of human individuals come to obtain such a radically enlightened perspective or awareness of human social reality (i.e. a dialectical, utopian anti-humanist ‘revolutionary consciousnesse’) so that they might bring about with minimal violence the overthrow of the practices and institutions of late capitalism and colonial-speciesism? Further, how might an individual attain such a radical perspective when their life, behaviours and attitudes (or their subjectivity itself) are so moulded and shaped by the individual’s immersion within and active self-realisation through, the networks, systems and habits constitutive of global capitalism? (Hardt & Negri, 2001). While the demand for social-environmental revolution grows stronger, both theoretical and practical answers to these pressing questions remain unanswered. Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to run into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the promise of a future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity characterised by reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can only happen if the old idea of the progress of the human species, exemplified by Hawking’s cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-comprehension. This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical anti-humanism.

#### Their fear of the decay of the Westphalian order of sovereign states into the dissolution of a chaotic world of terrorism is a nonunique impact from the perspective of the species war. All of these perspectives require the systemic mass annihilation of nonhuman organisms as a means of daily sustenance. If anything, we need inner-species terrorism carried out on the behalf of nonhumans.

KOCHI 2K9 [tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, “species war: law, violence, and animals”, ‘law, culture, and the humanities’, 353-359]

While thinkers such as Carl Schmitt had seen the re-emergence of religious war within the moral and humanitarian claims of twentieth century inter- national law, the contemporary re-sacralization of war has been taken a step further by the language and motivations of the so-called “war on terror.” In many ways competing actors within the climate of contemporary post-secular war no longer hide behind the language and concepts of secular cosmopolitan morality but now more openly justify the asserted “legitimacy” of their acts of war with reference to religious faith, divine law and the word of God.38 This breakdown of the Westphalian order is driven further by the renewal of partisan, guerrilla, or non-sovereign warfare39 carried out by groups who justify their violence with reference to transcendent religious concepts.¶ Precisely what this might mean for the future of “secular” and humanitarian international law is unclear. It is possible that the humanism of twentieth century international law and its attempts to ground the legitimacy of violence upon human rights might, in the not too distant future, be displaced by a more dominant conceptual language that places “humanity” again as secondary to “God” – a clash of messianisms between Jewish, Christian and Islamic fundamentalists. Such a movement involving the re-assertion of religious, cosmic hierarchies of life-value pushes species war further out of mainstream conceptions of what constitutes the laws of war.¶ Viewed from the perspective of species war, the breakdown of the Westphalian international order and the re-sacralization of war via an emerging clash of messianisms does not really usher-in anything new. The Westphalian conception of war, international human rights law and the cosmic hierarchies of life-value invoked by Jewish, Christian and Islamic fundamentalists all share a conception of the “good” that contains at its heart the everyday slaughter of non-human animals. From the perspective of species war, all of these concep- tions, regardless of whether they are secular, humanist, liberal or religious, are “fundamentalist,” in that they rigidly and uncompromisingly hold onto a world-view that promotes the killing of non-human animals.¶ It is possible that in the future the fundamentalism of species war may be challenged in ways that mirror a history of secular and religious guerrilla and partisan wars waged against Western colonialism and Western economic and cultural hegemony. The re-emergence of non-state violence in the form of “terrorism” linked with a contemporary trend towards perhaps a greater concern for the environment, may lay the groundwork for a new global battlefield. The “eco-warriors” of the present who have so far generally relied upon non-violent forms of protest might transform into eco-partisans and openly use violence to defend the lives of animals. Under another “just war” banner such eco-partisans may claim to bring an otherwise hidden species war back into the center of the debate about the laws of war by carrying out acts of war against humans on behalf of non-human animals.

#### The role of the ballot is to use the debate site as a space for the practice of post humanities as an operative displacement of anthropocentrism inherent to the 1AC.

DOMANSKA 2K10 [ewa, adam mickiewicz university, poznon Poland, Stanford, beyond anthropocentrism in historical sciences]

It seems that in contemporary intellectual practice scholars are not connected by methods or theories but by the problems on which they focus their intellectual efforts, primarily because those problems are directly or indirectly related to controlling the life and death (biopolitics, necropolitics) of humans, on the one hand, and protecting “life” on earth, on the other. Protecting life is a “paternalistic” project and we have to be very aware of its results. Some scholars would call it “enlightened anthropocentrism” insomuch as it takes under consideration nature and nonhumans and presupposes that our ethical care for nature and nonhumans comes from our care of and responsibility to humans. This idea would be rejected by scholars working in the paradigm of “deep ecology” or the Gaia theory, who claim that nature or the earth will take care of itself. 14 Also, we should not forget that life (and the survival of species) is not necessarily the highest value for everybody. 15 Obviously, during the process of evolution, some specia become extinct and new ones appear and we should not desperately seek to preserve them. So, the survival paradigm is not by any means an unquestionable absolute. Historians themselves also express their awareness of this problem while asking: “How often do we consider the unwelcome but ineluctable ecological fact that, while life on earth could survive just fine without humans (indeed it would no doubt flourish in our absence), without ants the entire foundation would crumble?” 16 Keeping in mind the limitations of the survival paradigm, let us make the following assumption: the challenge for today’s research is not so much in asking new questions and proposing new theories or methods of analysis, which would spring from current research trends in humanities, but to place the research itself in the context of the emerging paradigm of nonanthropocentric knowledge, or posthumanities. Andrew Pickering called this strategy a “posthumanist displacement of our interpretative frameworks”. 17 Of course, the point is not to eliminate the human being from our studies (of the past) but – as I mentioned above – to displace the human subject from the centre of historical, archaeological and anthropological studies.

#### Permutation links more: it directs criticism towards politics – that excludes bare life in favor of the voice of the politically qualified citizen.

HUDSON 2K4 [Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

The rise of environmentalism, deep ecology, and animal rights can be seen as effects of this inability of law, or the Law, to distance the “natural world” as a state outside itself. **Natural objects reappear within the political realm not as political actors but as markers of bare life.** **Sovereignty, in seeking to establish a political life separate from the state of nature, produces both political life as the life proper to the citizen (the “good life”) and bare life**, which occupies a space in between bios and zoē, evacuated of meaning. **The state of nature is not separate from political life but a state that exists alongside political life, as a necessary corollary of its existence. Political life is alienation from an imagined state of nature that we cannot access as human beings because it appears only in shadow form as bare life. The state of exception is that which defines which lives lack value, which lives can be killed without being either murdered or sacrificed.** Agamben’s examples of the inextricable link between political and bare life focus on the limit cases of humanity rather than the ideal, providing an analysis of precisely the cases that prove problematic in Ferry’s liberal humanism. The exception, as that which proves the rule, cannot be avoided. It is necessary to look to the figure of the refugee, the body of the “overcomatose” or the severely mentally impaired, and, under the Third Reich, the life of the Jew to see how the law fails in the task Ferry sets for it. **These cases demonstrate the zone of indistinction that Agamben elaborates as the zone of “life that does not deserve to live**.” The refugee demonstrates the necessity of a link between nation and subject; **refugees are no longer citizens and, as such, lack a claim to political rights: “In the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state**.”[15] **Confronted with the figure of the refugee, human rights are faced with their hidden ground in national origin, where, as Agamben notes, the key term is birth: men are born free, invoking the natural codes from which law was to separate us. This freedom is, in actuality, a function of citizenship and incorporation in the nation-state rather than a fact of being human: “citizenship names the new status of life as origin and ground of sovereignty and, therefore, literally identifies** … les membres du souverain, **‘the members of the sovereign.’”[16] This makes the link between that which is proper to the nation and that which is proper to the citizen the determinant of the zone of sacred life: those who do not fulfill the role of the citizen are no longer guaranteed protection or participation in political life, their so-called human rights void in the absence of national identity. The refugee or refugees as a group have a claim only to bare life, to being kept alive, but have no political voice with which to demand the rights of the citizen.** Agamben, while noting the same trend toward politicizing natural life that concerns Ferry, demonstrates that this politicization is already contained within the structure of politics itself. **This corresponds to the position of animals in human society: the exemplar of the limit case, they have always existed in the state of exception that founds the political. There is thus a connection between the plight of the refugee and that of the animal: neither participates directly in the political, though both are absolutely subject to political decisions in which they have no voice. The establishment of a realm outside the political, where lives have no value and thus may be killed, is marked by the difference between the human and the animal.**

#### K turns the case. Anthropocentric communication of attempts to minimize violence fail – only confronting the anthropocentric foundations of the ordering of violence can solve.

Coward 6

(Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University 2006 Martin Against Anthropocentrism Review of International Studies 32.3 Cambridge Journals Online)

Whilst it is common to embark upon investigation of the nature of political violence out of due concern for individuals facing death or persecution, an exclusively anthropocentric focus fails to get to grips with the issues raised by destruction of objects it regards as secondary equipmental supplements to the lives of individual subjects. Moreover, in failing to get to grips with the issue of the disavowal of heterogeneity revealed by consideration of urbicide, anthropocentric understandings can lead to the enactment of political solutions that effectively perpetuate the politics of exclusion. Anthropocentrism, thus, is not simply concern for humanity. Indeed, the examination of urbicide presented above can be said to have the coexistential condition of humanity as its principal concern. Rather anthropocentrism comprises a conceptual horizon which takes the pre-social individual as its principle subject. For the anthropocentric imaginary sociality and materiality are, therefore, secondary aspects of being. The principal crimes against humanity for the anthropocentric imaginary are, thus, the persecution of an individual, alone or as part of a group who share the same characteristics, on the grounds of their identity. Given the urbanisation of warfare, and the prevalence of urbicide, it seems a failure of imagination to continue our investigations into political violence from within an anthropocentric imaginary. Indeed, if the contemporary era is one of rapid urbanisation and the increasing interconnection that is sometimes referred to as globalisation, the question of coexistence is of particular salience for our era. Given the problems that the anthropocentric imaginary has in addressing the politics of exclusion that attacks the conditions of possibility of such coexistence, it would seem to be a poor tool for examination of the violences that confront us in the contemporary era.