# 1NC

## K of Butler

#### Butler’s politics of vulnerability is based on an abstract notion of the suffering white, American subject. Her appeals to a universal “we” or global community can only reinscribe whiteness.

Thobani 2007

(Sunera, Professor at the University of British Columbia.  White wars: Western feminisms and the `War on Terror' - Feminist Theory 2007; 8; 169 – Sage Publications)

**Butler’s analytic frame begins with the injury done to the US by the 9/11 attacks**: **‘That U.S. boundaries were breached, that an unbearable vulnerability was exposed, that a terrible toll on human life was taken, were, and are, cause for fear and mourning**; **they are also instigations for patient political reflection’** (2004: xi). **The breaching by the US of the boundaries of other countries in the decades preceding the attacks, including Afghanistan and Iraq, are mentioned in passing, but do not shape the discursive field**, although Butler does note that ‘others have suffered arbitrary violence at the hands of the U.S.’ (p. xiv). **But this** suffering of others, concretized **most pertinently** in the bodies of the Iraqi and Afghan populations prior to 9/11**, and the many, many other well-known victims of US aggression,** is not the starting point for her analysis (Mamdani, 2004; Johnson, 2000). **Instead,** a particular attack on the US, from which she attends to the generalized suffering of a generic humanity, shapes the frame. **This framing foregrounds, however unintentionally, the experience of the (white) American subject**, **who has suddenly and graphically discovered its own vulnerability, as it does the imperialist perspective** articulated by the Bush Administration. **That this subject neither revels in nor denies the violence done by the US** state, complicates, but **does not contest, the imperial perspective**. **Butler seems to be deeply disturbed by the US violence in this War because of the violent *response* it is likely to engender, and which will likely threaten US populations in the future.** Butler searches for an understanding of the injury done to the self and to the Other by positing a vulnerability that shapes the experience of human beings: ‘[t]o be injured means that one has the chance to reflect upon injury, to find out the mechanisms of its distribution, to find out who else suffers from permeable borders, unexpected violence, dispossession, and fear, and in what ways’ (2004: xii). **Although she allows that** this **vulnerability is not equally distributed, her analysis nevertheless proceeds on just such an assumption as she reflects on the possibility of a political community based on this shared experience of vulnerability and loss.** **Such a community becomes the ‘we’ of her text: ‘Despite our differences in location and history’**, she argues, . . . my guess is that it is possible to appeal to a “we,” for all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost somebody. Loss has made a tenuous “we” of us all. And if we have lost, then it follows that we have had, that we have desired and loved, that we have struggled to find the conditions for our desire. (Butler, 2004: 20) **In the absence of a discussion of the particularities of the loss of others, the (white) subject’s experience of loss becomes the ground on which this community is to be identified.** Although **Butler repeatedly and explicitly** cautions against the assumption of a universally shared human condition, her analysis also repeatedly and explicitly **reproduces the notion of a universalized human experience**: I am referring to violence, vulnerability, and mourning, but there is a more general conception of the human with which I am trying to work here, one in which we are, from the start, even prior to individuation itself, and by virtue of bodily requirements, given over to some set of primary others: this conception means that we are vulnerable to those we are too young to know and to judge, and hence, vulnerable to violence; but also vulnerable to another range of touch, a range that includes the eradication of our being at the one end, and the physical support for our lives at the other. (2004: 31)

#### Butler is just wrong. When compared to the bodies of Afghani, Egyptian, Syria, and host of other peoples, we in the US are not vulnerable. She ignores the historical differences between different peoples to assert a universal humanity, which means a white, American, imperialist humanity.

Thobani 2007

(Sunera, Professor at the University of British Columbia.  White wars: Western feminisms and the `War on Terror' - Feminist Theory 2007; 8; 169 – Sage Publications)

**The analysis of the current destruction of sovereignties by the US, its invasions and occupations, becomes grounded in a shared primal, preindividuated psycho-existential experience of vulnerability that elides the alterity historically instantiated between those doing the occupying and those being occupied.** The common experience of vulnerability that Butler’s conceptualization of the human subject foregrounds may be relevant in some phenomenological, existential sense. But **the use of such ‘primal vulnerability’ as the primary lens for an examination of an imperialist war places her discussion in a liberal-individualist frame so abstract as to severely hinder understandings of how geo-political power relations are being restructured by the US** through this War. Indeed, **the specific vulnerabilities created by imperialist relations become secondary to the primary vulnerability of the infant condition**. **Consequently, Butler’s imposition of the collective ‘we’ in prioritizing a condition of infancy assumes the primacy of this condition as also the ontological point of departure for the Other** (if they are to beincluded in her conception of the human). **The implication is that the experiences of occupied peoples can be approached as being essentially the same as those of imperial subjects**. **Such a commonality of experience**,I argue, **is practicably impossible in the absence of the transformation of the conditions of imperialist domination**. **Butler seems to reject humanist assumptions** *and* **yet applies them to develop her analysis of violence. Her generic ‘human’ subject relies on an implicit denial of the recognition that the injuries, violence and losses suffered by occupied populations are significantly different, and that these peoples are immensely more threatened with violence and injury than are the subjects of imperialist powers**. **In making the racialized distinctions between the forms and degrees of violence experienced by Afghans, Iraqis and other Muslims and white subjects disappear through her resort to humanist assumptions**, **the experience and perspective of the (imperial) white subject is restored to centrality.** Richard Dyer points out that one way in which **whiteness is reproduced** is **through the treatment of whites as a human norm**. He argues that **it is racial power that enables white subjects to claim this position of the human: ‘There is no more powerful position than that of being “just” human. The claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity. Raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race’** (Dyer, 1997: 2). **Butler reproduces a classic feature of racial power by making whiteness invisible, even as the definition of the human is claimed by the white subject.**

#### ALTERNATIVE: Rather than begin from shared vulnerability, we must recognize how vulnerability is differently constituted by different populations. We are not vulnerable the way that detainees in GTMO are vulnerable. For them, Butler’s politics of nonviolence, grief, and memorialization are unacceptable. For them burning down the entire system of indefinite detention is the only alternative.

Farley ’05

(Anthony Paul, Professor of Law @ Boston College, “Perfecting Slavery”, 1/27/2005, [http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=lsfp -](http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=lsfp%20-) SG)

**What is to be done? Two hundred years ago, when the slaves in Haiti rose up, they, of necessity, burned everything:** They burned San Domingo flat so that at the end of the war it was a charred desert. **Why do you burn everything?** asked a French officer of a prisoner. **We have a right to burn what we cultivate because a man has a right to dispose of his own labour, was the reply of this unknown anarchist. The slaves burned everything because everything was against them. Everything was against the slaves, the entire order that it was their lot to follow, the entire order in which they were positioned as worse than senseless things, every plantation, everything.** “Leave nothing white behind you,” said Toussaint to those dedicated to the end of white-over black. “God gave Noah the rainbow sign. No more water, the fire next time.” **The slaves burned everything, yes, but, unfortunately, they only burned everything in Haiti. Theirs was the greatest and most successful revolution in the history of the world but the failure of their fire to cross the waters was the great tragedy of the nineteenth century.** At the dawn of the twentieth century, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, “The colorline belts the world.” Du Bois said that the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the colorline. **The problem, now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline. The colorline continues to belt the world. Indeed, the slave power that is the United States now threatens an entire world with the death that it has become and so the slaves of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, those with nothing but their chains to lose, must, if they would be free, if they would escape slavery, win the entire world.** We begin as children. We are called and we become our response to the call. **Slaves are not called. What becomes of them? What becomes of the broken-hearted? The slaves are divided souls, they are brokenhearted, the slaves are split asunder by what they are called upon to become.** The slaves are called upon to become objects but objecthood is not a calling. **The slave, then, during its loneliest loneliness, is divided from itself. This is schizophrenia.** The slaves are not called, or, rather, the slaves are called to not be. The slaves are called unfree but this the living can never be and so the slaves burst apart and die. **The slaves begin as death, not as children, and death is not a beginning but an end.** There is no progress and no exit from the undiscovered country of the slave, or so it seems. **We are trained to think through a progress narrative, a grand narrative, the grandest narrative, that takes us up from slavery. There is no up from slavery. The progress from slavery to the end of history is the progress from white-over-black to white-over-black to white-overblack. The progress of slavery runs in the opposite direction of the past present future timeline.** The slave only becomes the perfect slave at the end of the timeline, only under conditions of total juridical freedom. **It is only under conditions of freedom, of bourgeois legality, that the slave can perfect itself as a slave by** *freely choosing* **to bow down before its master. The slave perfects itself as a slave by offering a prayer for equal rights. The system of marks is a plantation. The system of property is a plantation. The system of law is a plantation. These plantations, all part of the same system,** *hierarchy***, produce white-overblack, white-over-black only, and that continually.** The slave perfects itself as a slave through its prayers for equal rights. **The plantation system will not commit suicide and the slave, as stated above, has knowing non-knowledge of this fact.** The slave finds its way back from the undiscovered country only by burning down every plantation. When the slave prays for equal rights it makes the free choice to be dead, and it makes the free choice to not be. Education is the call. We are called to be and then we become something. We become that which we make of ourselves. We follow the call, we pursue a calling. **Freedom is the only calling—it alone contains all possible directions, all of the choices that may later blossom into the fullness of our lives. We can only be free. Slavery is death. How do slaves die? Slaves are not born, they are made.** The slave must be trained to be that which the living cannot be. The only thing that the living are not free to be is dead. The slave must be trained to follow the call that is not a call. The slave must be trained to pursue the calling that is not a calling. The slave must be trained to objecthood. The slave must become death. **Slavery is white-over-black. White-over-black is death. White-over-black, death, then, is what the slave must become to pursue its calling that is not a calling.**

## Anthro K

#### The 1AC ignores that racism is merely one amongst many tools of axiological anthropocentrism whereby violence can always be justified when applied to racially inferior groups. Only a critique which focuses on rejecting subhuman thinking can contest the myriad forms of racism.

Deckha 2k10 [Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

While the intersection of race and gender is often acknowledged in understanding the etiology of justificatory narratives for war, the presence of species distinctions and the importance of the subhuman are less appreciated. Yet, the race (and gender) thinking that animates Razack’s argument in normalizing violence for detainees (and others) is also centrally sustained by the subhuman figure. As Charles Patterson notes with respect to multiple forms of exploitation: Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animas and do the same to them. Patterson emphasizes how the human/animal hierarchy and our ideas about animals and animality are foundational for intra-human hierarchies and the violence they promote. The routine violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans. For example, in discussing the specific dynamics of the Nazi camps, Patterson further notes how techniques to make the killing of detainees resemble the slaughter of animals were deliberately implemented in order to make the killing seem more palatable and benign. That the detainees were made naked and kept crowded in the gas chambers facilitated their animalization and, in turn, their death at the hands of other humans who were already culturally familiar and comfortable with killing animals in this way. Returning to Razack’s exposition of race thinking in contemporary camps, one can see how subhuman thinking is foundational to race thinking. One of her primary arguments is that race thinking, which she defines as “the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not”, is “a defining feature of the world order” today as in the past. In other words, it is the “species thinking” that helps to create the racial demarcation. As Razack notes with respect to the specific logic infusing the camps, they “are not simply contemporary excesses born of the west’s current quest for security, but instead represent a more ominous, permanent arrangement of who is and is not a part of the human community”. Once placed outside the “human” zone by race thinking, the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them and the increasing “culture of exception” which sustains these human bodily exclusions. Although nonhumans are not the focus of Razack’s work, the centrality of the subhuman to the logic of the camps and racial and sexual violence contained therein is also clearly illustrated in her specific examples. In the course of her analysis, to determine the import of race thinking in enabling violence, Razack quotes a newspaper story that describes the background mentality of Private Lynndie England, the white female soldier made notorious by images of her holding onto imprisoned and naked Iraqi men with a leash around their necks. The story itself quotes a resident from England’s hometown who says the following about the sensibilities of individuals from their town: To the country boys here, if you’re a different nationality, a different race, you’re sub-human. That’s the way that girls like Lynndie England are raised. Tormenting Iraqis, in her mind, would be no different from shooting a turkey. Every season here you’re hunting something. Over there they’re hunting Iraqis. Razack extracts this quote to illustrate how “race overdetermined what went on”, but it may also be observed that species “overdetermined what went on”. Race has a formative function, to be sure, but it works in conjunction with species difference to enable the violence at Abu Ghraib and other camps. Dehumanization promotes racialization, which further entrenches both identities. It is an intertwined logic of race, sex, culture and species that lays the foundation for the violence.

#### This species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8 [tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### The alternative is that the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE. This rejection enables an understanding of the species-being. That solves the ethical contradiction of their species-level racism.

HUDSON 2K4 [Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, <http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23_2_04.pdf>]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

## Framework

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development – it overcomes preconceived ideological notions and breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

Esberg & Sagan 12

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Switch-side is key - effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation – the impact is mass violence

Roberts-Miller 3

Patricia Roberts-Miller 3 is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism¶ Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)¶ What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."¶ Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.¶ It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.¶ Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.¶ Continued…¶ Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).¶ Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,¶ Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)¶ Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.¶ Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).¶ Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies.¶ Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).¶ By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:¶ Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)¶ There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.¶ Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).¶ Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).¶ The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.¶ Arendt's Polemical Agonism¶ As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).¶ Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.¶ Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:¶ You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)¶ Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).¶ In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.¶ This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.¶ Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).¶ Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).¶ Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).¶ Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism.¶ Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.¶ In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Decision-making outweighs – it’s the most portable skill - key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

## Case

#### The affirmative challenges the current memory of September 11, 2001, but all such treatments maintain the same imperative. Whether they come from the left or the right, the demand is always to remember. At best, the affirmative can claim they're a more accurate remembering, but while attempting to correct the historical record they only reinscribe the very memory they critique.

Maja Zehfuss (department of politics and international studies at University of Warwick). “Forget September 11.” Third World Quarterly 24:3. 2003.

**The footage of the two planes crashing, on September 11**, 2001, **into the** towers of the **World Trade Center has been broadcast over and over again. We cannot forget it**. And just in case we should, there are websites which allow us to replay the footage as shown on different television stations across the globe. September 11 has been etched on our memories not just because it can be seen as a momentous event: the superpower attacked on its very own territory, caught off guard, humiliated; a symbol of global capitalism devastated; nearly 3000 dead, innocent victims of a terrorist attack. Perhaps (although only perhaps) this was in some way new, as both US President George W Bush and Noam Chomsky argue in what must be a rare instance of agreement. That isn’t, however, why we remember. We remember not (only) the interpretation of the event. We remember the picture. The planes hitting the towers, the burst of fire—and then the collapse. This was a tragic event for those whose loved ones died. But at the same time, it was a spectacle. The ‘greatest work of art ever’, as composer Karlheinz Stock-hausen controversially, and apparently spontaneously, put it. We might not agree with this particular assessment, but some certainly argue that whoever masterminded this (and let’s just say for the moment that it was Osama **Bin Laden**) **wanted you to see it**. New York is not only a symbol of the American way of life, it is also a media metropolis with an exceptionally developed communication infrastructure and a large number of journalists. Thanks to the time lapse between the two aircraft hitting the two different towers of the World Trade Center TV crews were sure to be on site for the second, even had the first impact been missed. However, the interval between the first and the second collision was small and may rather have been the result of the difficulty of ensuring the simultaneity that was crucial for success; any longer interval between the two attacks would have increased the likelihood that the aircraft would have been shot down before impact. Yet professor of media studies Joan Deppa claims: **‘It was meant to be right before our eyes’. The event**, in this interpretation, **was designed to humiliate the superpower publicly, to impress, to show off**; accordingly, **those who staged it would** certainly **not want you to forget**. This view has to be voiced with some caution. We know very little about the plans and aims of the terrorists. Imputing their motives and intentions from how we may have experienced the events of that day is a dangerous move, and one which I will indeed criticise later in this article. Nevertheless, wherever you may have been that day, you probably did see the impact of the two aircraft on the towers of the World Trade Center. And if you didn’t see it then, you certainly have seen it by now. You, very probably, cannot forget and we may suspect, although we certainly don’t know, that those behind the events don’t want you to. Perhaps we can say with more confidence that President **Bush does not want you to forget. He is convinced that you do, and will, remember: ‘Each of us will remember what happened that day**, and to whom it happened. We’ll remember **the moment the news came—where we were and what we were doing**. Some will remember the image of a fire, or a story of rescue. **Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.’** Despite this confidence that you are unable to forget, **he will not stop reminding you. He needs you to remember. Remember**, will you, **that** everything our governments are doing in the so-called war against terrorism **(or, alternatively** of course, **against evil)** is a response to the events of September 11. **Killing civilians in Afghanistan**, arguably **violating the human rights of those detained by US forces, curbing our civil liberties, this is all justified because of** the events of **September 11.** Remember. You saw it. **Thousands dead.** We owe it to their memory, they say, to fight back, to make sure this doesn’t happen again. As Bush put it: ‘When we fight terror, we fight tyranny; and so we remember’. ‘We will remember the dead and what we owe them’, ‘we will always honor their memory’. So **there is one thing Osama Bin Laden and President Bush** may agree on: **we must remember September 11; for both** can be seen to **have an interest in our memory of the events**. Bin Laden might wish us to remember what his network is able to do, in other words, to grasp his power, so that we are susceptible to fear. Bush, on the other hand, can use our memory to justify his war against terrorism, and to ensure that we accept this reaction. This ‘agreement’ between Bin Laden and Bush is as good a reason as any to be suspicious. **My concern** here **is**, however, with Bush or rather with the Western reaction and **the political deployment of memory** involved in it, not least **because much of what we may wish to say about the terrorists is necessarily based on our interpretation, rather than theirs**. This article therefore explores the uses and problems of memory in relation to responses to the events of September 11, focusing largely on material from the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany as illustration. The ever present exhortation to remember is used, I claim, as justification for both a military response abroad and for curtailing civil liberties at home. However, I argue that, as long as the questions raised by this memory are not posed, **we might** in fact **be better off forgetting September 11**.

# 2NC

## Anthro

#### The discursive construct of dehumanization/the subhuman operationalizes global speciest, gendered, racialized, and economic violence. We need to refuse the attempt to partially include groups into the concept of human and instead reject humanizing discourse because it merely displaces the violence of the 1ac impact scenarios onto whom-ever is considered nonhuman.

Deckha 2k10 [Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

The category of the ‘subhuman’ is inherent in global gendered, racialized and economic violence, throwing up questions around the relevance of concepts of ‘human rights’ and ‘human dignity’ for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. We need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for “subhuman” humans, writes Maneesha Deckha. 13 December 2010 One of the organizing narratives of western thought and the institutions it has shaped is humanism and the idea that human beings are at the core of the social and cultural order. The cultural critique humanism has endured, by way of academic theory and social movements, has focused on the failure of its promise of universal equal treatment and dignity for all human beings. To address this failing, a rehabilitative approach to humanism is usually adopted with advocates seeking to undo humanism’s exclusions by expanding its ambit and transporting vulnerable human groups from “subhuman” to “human” status. Law has responded by including more and more humans under the coveted category of “personhood”. Yet, the logic of the human/subhuman binary typically survives this critique with the dependence of the coveted human status on the subhuman (and the vulnerabilities it enables) going unnoticed. This gap in analysis is evident in how most of us think about violence and its related concept of vulnerability. Some would even say that what sets us apart from nonhumans is a capacity for vulnerability. Others who address human-nonhuman relationships more closely might say that what sets human apart from nonhuman animals, if anything, is our capacity for violence. More particular still, feminists would highlight the masculinist orientation of this violence against nonhumans, animals and otherwise, noting that institutionalized violence against nonhumans primarily occurs in male-dominated industries. Yet, the discourse around (hu)man violence against animals is muted in mainstream debates about violence, vulnerability and exploitation in general. More common is a concern with violence against humans and how to eliminate it and make humans less vulnerable. This theorizing largely proceeds through affirmations of the inviolability or sanctity of human life and human dignity, establishing what it means to be human through articulation of what it means to be animal. The humanist paradigm of anti-violence discourse thus does not typically examine the human/nonhuman boundary, but often fortifies it. The failure to address this boundary and its creation and maintenance of the figure of the subhuman undermines anti-violence agendas.

#### Perm links more: it attempts to direct criticism towards politics conducted in the name of a life which excludes bare life in favor of the voice of the citizen, the politically qualified. This excludes bare life and establishes a realm beyond of the markers of the “political” in which to conduct genocidal violence against exceptional beings.

HUDSON 2K4 [Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

The rise of environmentalism, deep ecology, and animal rights can be seen as effects of this inability of law, or the Law, to distance the “natural world” as a state outside itself. **Natural objects reappear within the political realm not as political actors but as markers of bare life.** **Sovereignty, in seeking to establish a political life separate from the state of nature, produces both political life as the life proper to the citizen (the “good life”) and bare life**, which occupies a space in between bios and zoē, evacuated of meaning. **The state of nature is not separate from political life but a state that exists alongside political life, as a necessary corollary of its existence. Political life is alienation from an imagined state of nature that we cannot access as human beings because it appears only in shadow form as bare life. The state of exception is that which defines which lives lack value, which lives can be killed without being either murdered or sacrificed.** Agamben’s examples of the inextricable link between political and bare life focus on the limit cases of humanity rather than the ideal, providing an analysis of precisely the cases that prove problematic in Ferry’s liberal humanism. The exception, as that which proves the rule, cannot be avoided. It is necessary to look to the figure of the refugee, the body of the “overcomatose” or the severely mentally impaired, and, under the Third Reich, the life of the Jew to see how the law fails in the task Ferry sets for it. **These cases demonstrate the zone of indistinction that Agamben elaborates as the zone of “life that does not deserve to live**.” The refugee demonstrates the necessity of a link between nation and subject; **refugees are no longer citizens and, as such, lack a claim to political rights: “In the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they can no longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state**.”[15] **Confronted with the figure of the refugee, human rights are faced with their hidden ground in national origin, where, as Agamben notes, the key term is birth: men are born free, invoking the natural codes from which law was to separate us. This freedom is, in actuality, a function of citizenship and incorporation in the nation-state rather than a fact of being human: “citizenship names the new status of life as origin and ground of sovereignty and, therefore, literally identifies** … les membres du souverain, **‘the members of the sovereign.’”[16] This makes the link between that which is proper to the nation and that which is proper to the citizen the determinant of the zone of sacred life: those who do not fulfill the role of the citizen are no longer guaranteed protection or participation in political life, their so-called human rights void in the absence of national identity. The refugee or refugees as a group have a claim only to bare life, to being kept alive, but have no political voice with which to demand the rights of the citizen.** Agamben, while noting the same trend toward politicizing natural life that concerns Ferry, demonstrates that this politicization is already contained within the structure of politics itself. **This corresponds to the position of animals in human society: the exemplar of the limit case, they have always existed in the state of exception that founds the political. There is thus a connection between the plight of the refugee and that of the animal: neither participates directly in the political, though both are absolutely subject to political decisions in which they have no voice. The establishment of a realm outside the political, where lives have no value and thus may be killed, is marked by the difference between the human and the animal.**

#### ANTHRPOCENTRIC COMMUNICATION OF ATTEMPTS TO MINIMIZE VIOLENCE FAIL – ONLY CONFRONTING THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE ORDERING OF VIOLENCE CAN SOLVE.

Coward 6

(Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University 2006 Martin Against Anthropocentrism Review of International Studies 32.3 Cambridge Journals Online)

Whilst it is common to embark upon investigation of the nature of political violence out of due concern for individuals facing death or persecution, an exclusively anthropocentric focus fails to get to grips with the issues raised by destruction of objects it regards as secondary equipmental supplements to the lives of individual subjects. Moreover, in failing to get to grips with the issue of the disavowal of heterogeneity revealed by consideration of urbicide, anthropocentric understandings can lead to the enactment of political solutions that effectively perpetuate the politics of exclusion. Anthropocentrism, thus, is not simply concern for humanity. Indeed, the examination of urbicide presented above can be said to have the coexistential condition of humanity as its principal concern. Rather anthropocentrism comprises a conceptual horizon which takes the pre-social individual as its principle subject. For the anthropocentric imaginary sociality and materiality are, therefore, secondary aspects of being. The principal crimes against humanity for the anthropocentric imaginary are, thus, the persecution of an individual, alone or as part of a group who share the same characteristics, on the grounds of their identity. Given the urbanisation of warfare, and the prevalence of urbicide, it seems a failure of imagination to continue our investigations into political violence from within an anthropocentric imaginary. Indeed, if the contemporary era is one of rapid urbanisation and the increasing interconnection that is sometimes referred to as globalisation, the question of coexistence is of particular salience for our era. Given the problems that the anthropocentric imaginary has in addressing the politics of exclusion that attacks the conditions of possibility of such coexistence, it would seem to be a poor tool for examination of the violences that confront us in the contemporary era.

#### Humans are only excluded from nature by choice—the ethic of the alternative recognizes the multiplicity of centers of value in nature.

Marina 9 (Daniel, Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för Kultur och Kommunikation, “Anthropocentrism and Androcentrism – An Ecofeminist Connection” <http://www.projectsparadise.com/anthropocentrism-androcentrism/>)

Finally, I would like to summarize some of the reasons why **anthropocentrism is open to criticism**. I shall focus on those that Val Plumwood adduces. **According to her anthropocentrism is basically a framework of beliefs** and perceptions that generates a myriad of illusions. Nature is perceived as discontinuous from the human realm, as subordinate, as inessential, as a denied and disorderly Other, as passive, and so on. **Anthropocentrism disregards nature’s complexity, her uniqueness as a life-sustaining whole, and the plurality of legitimate centres with genuine interests and needs that it comprises.** **Humans are perceived as discontinuous from the natural realm, as essentially rational, and are reduced to being masters and conquerors**. **Humans, as physical and biological beings, can, of course, be allowed to remain within nature**. What anthropocentrism especially consigns to an area outside and above nature is that part of the human self that is considered authentically human, i.e. rationality and freedom. **Human identity is in such a way construed in opposition to the natural, the physical, the biological, and the animal, including those human traits associated with animality, that the authentically human includes also the “desire to exclude and distance” from the nonhuman**. **This conception of the human self as separate from, or if anything “accidentally related” to, nature together with the conception of the nonhuman as inferior and antagonistic renders humanity a legitimate oppressor and nature a means to human ends.** **Anthropocentrism disregards humanity’s vital dependence on nature, the essential character of genuine human traits such as the emotions and the body, as well as other attitudes towards nature than that to master and conquer it.**

#### They have it backwards—human centered politics destroys the natural other—the alt solves.

Marina 9 (Daniel, Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för Kultur och Kommunikation, “Anthropocentrism and Androcentrism – An Ecofeminist Connection” <http://www.projectsparadise.com/anthropocentrism-androcentrism/>)

These three terms suggest a spatial image. Something, **in this case humanity, is situated at the centre of something.** There are numerous settings in which humans can be claimed to occupy the centre. For example, **an anthropocentric cosmology would claim that humanity occupies the physical centre of the universe**.31 **In environmental philosophy the terms are mainly applied to morality.** Here I shall analyze the ways in which humans are said to occupy the privileged spot of that specific universe. The starting point shall be Val Plumwood’s liberation model of anthropocentrism. I am beginning with Plumwood because she offers a detailed account of what centrism and anthropocentrism is. Plumwood defines centrism as a structure that is common to and underlies different forms of oppression, like colonialism, racism, and sexism. **The role of this structure is to generate a Centre and the Periphery, an oppressor and the oppressed, a Centre and the Other.** The shared features are: 1. **Radical exclusion:** Those in the centre are represented as radically separated from and superior to the Other. **The Centre is represented as free from the features of an inferiorized Other, and the Other as lacking the defining features of the Centre.** Differences are exaggerated to the point of preventing or hindering any sense of connection or continuity, to the point that “identification and sympathy are cancelled.”32 2. **Homogenization: Those on the periphery are represented as alike and replaceable. Similarities are exaggerated and differences are disregarded within that group.** “**The Other is not an individual but is related to as a member of a class of interchangeable items.”**33 Differences are only acknowledged when they affect or are deemed relevant to the desires and well-being of those in the centre. 3. *Denial*: **The Other is represented as inessential. Those in the centre deny their own dependency on those on the periphery.** 4. *Incorporation*: Those in the centre do not admit the autonomy of the Other. **The Other is represented as a function of the qualities of the Centre**. The Other either lacks or is the negation of those qualities that characterize those in the centre, being these qualities at the same time the most cherished and esteemed socially and culturally. 5. *Instrumentalism*: **Those in the centre deny the Other its independent agency. Those on the periphery are represented as lacking, for instance, ends of its own.** The Centre can consequently impose its own ends upon them without any conflict. **The Other becomes a means or a resource the Centre can make use of to satisfy its own needs, and is accordingly valued for the usefulness the Centre can find in it.** A second reason for beginning with Plumwood is that all the iniquitous senses of anthropocentrism that I have come across in the literature can, I think, be identified as either instrumentalism or denial. Warwick Fox’s *passive sense* of anthropocentrism would be an example of denial. **In this sense he speaks of anthropocentric ecophilosophy as one that focuses on social issues only, on interhuman affairs and problems**. For these environmentalists “**the nonhuman world retains its traditional status as the background against which the significant action – human action – takes place.”**34 **According to them the environmental crisis would then be solved within that human sphere by ensuring the well-being of humanity.** There would be no need to deal with the way humanity relates to nature. The other senses would be examples of either instrumentalism or of outcomes of instrumentalism: Andrew Dobson’s *strong* anthropocentrism (“The injustice and unfairness involved in the instrumental use of the non-human world”35); the account Robert Sessions gives of how deep ecology describes the anthropocentric attitude (“(1) Nonhuman nature has no value in itself, (2) humans (and/or God, if theistic) create what value there is, and (3) humans have the right (some would say the *obligation*) to do as they please with and in the nonhuman world as long as they do not harm other human’s interests”36); Tim Hayward’s account of the ethical criticism of anthropocentrism (“The mistake of giving exclusive or arbitrarily preferential consideration to human interests as opposed to the interests of other beings”37); Andrew Dobson’s description of what environmentalists consider a basic cause of ecological degradation and a potential cause of disaster (“Concern for ourselves at the expense of concern for the non-human world”38); and Warwick Fox’s **aggressive sense of anthropocentrism, according to which anthropocentrism is the overt discrimination against the nonhuman world.**

#### We must abandon species-level thinking instead of the affirmative’s strategy of fighting “dehumanization” with humanization which is reliant on producing “subhuman” others, confining them to slavery, slaughterhouses, camps and annihilation. Vote negative to affirm the creation of new discourses of vulnerability based on rejecting speciest logics.

Deckha 2k10 [Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

Time for a new discourse That the human/subhuman binary continues to inhabit so much of western experience raises the question of the continuing relevance of anthropocentric concepts (such as “human rights” and “human dignity”) for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. The human specialness claim is a hierarchical one and relies on the figure of an Other – the subhuman and nonhuman – to be intelligible. The latter groups are beings, by definition, who do not qualify as “human” and thus are denied the benefits that being “human” is meant to compel. More to the point, however, a dignity claim staked on species difference, and reliant on dehumanizing Others to establish the moral worth of human beings, will always be vulnerable to the subhuman figure it creates. This figure is easily deployed in inter-human violent conflict implicating race, gender and cultural identities as we have seen in the context of military and police camps, contemporary slavery and slavery-like practices, and the laws of war – used in these situations to promote violence against marginalized human groups. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. We need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for “subhuman” humans. This move, in addressing violence and vulnerabilities, should be productive not only for humans made vulnerable by their dehumanization, but nonhumans as well.

#### The role of the ballot is to use the debate site as a space for the practice of post humanities as an operative displacement of anthropocentrism inherent to the 1AC.

DOMANSKA 2K10 [ewa, adam mickiewicz university, poznon Poland, Stanford, beyond anthropocentrism in historical sciences]

It seems that in contemporary intellectual practice scholars are not connected by methods or theories but by the problems on which they focus their intellectual efforts, primarily because those problems are directly or indirectly related to controlling the life and death (biopolitics, necropolitics) of humans, on the one hand, and protecting “life” on earth, on the other. Protecting life is a “paternalistic” project and we have to be very aware of its results. Some scholars would call it “enlightened anthropocentrism” insomuch as it takes under consideration nature and nonhumans and presupposes that our ethical care for nature and nonhumans comes from our care of and responsibility to humans. This idea would be rejected by scholars working in the paradigm of “deep ecology” or the Gaia theory, who claim that nature or the earth will take care of itself. 14 Also, we should not forget that life (and the survival of species) is not necessarily the highest value for everybody. 15 Obviously, during the process of evolution, some specia become extinct and new ones appear and we should not desperately seek to preserve them. So, the survival paradigm is not by any means an unquestionable absolute. Historians themselves also express their awareness of this problem while asking: “How often do we consider the unwelcome but ineluctable ecological fact that, while life on earth could survive just fine without humans (indeed it would no doubt flourish in our absence), without ants the entire foundation would crumble?” 16 Keeping in mind the limitations of the survival paradigm, let us make the following assumption: the challenge for today’s research is not so much in asking new questions and proposing new theories or methods of analysis, which would spring from current research trends in humanities, but to place the research itself in the context of the emerging paradigm of nonanthropocentric knowledge, or posthumanities. Andrew Pickering called this strategy a “posthumanist displacement of our interpretative frameworks”. 17 Of course, the point is not to eliminate the human being from our studies (of the past) but – as I mentioned above – to displace the human subject from the centre of historical, archaeological and anthropological studies.

## Case

#### Just as American imperialists scapegoat terrorists, dictators, and basically the whole world in the way the 1AC describes, and so justifies imperialism, the aff scapegoats American imperialists to justify the exact same imperialism. This stems from a fundamental ressentiment, which: First, turns the aff. Second, results in scapegoating and genocide, locking us into a cycle of violence.Consider how the 1AC replays the original justification of 9/11 in US imperialism in the Middle East. Even if the aff is right, the solution is not to blame the US, which can only result in more attacks and counter-attacks.

William Connolly. Identity/Difference. 1991. Page 99-104.

A strong doctrine of **responsibility** is one that **supposes that** every discernible **evil must be caused by some agency that is itself blameworthy and deserves to be treated as the embodiment of an evil will**. Such a doctrine is rooted in Augustine 's solution to the problem of evil, where free will and original sin coalesce in an uneasy combination to locate the ultimate responsibility for evil within humanity. Even the human inevitability of death is something for which the first sinners were responsible. When such a doctrine converges with outbreaks of calamity, **the conditions are perfect for persecution through attribution of responsibility**. Agents are sought who might be held responsible for the new experience of evil, and among the likely candidates are members of that minority whose ancestors are said to have betrayed the first Christian. Thus, to take one example, in the mid-fourteenth century in France, when the Black Plague was ravaging the country, a massacre of Jews occurred. The evil was traced to a group that was held responsible for it. Guillaume de Machaut, in The Judgment of the King of Navarre, describes approvingly how responsibility was established and the appropriate punishment delivered: After that came a false, treacherous and contemptible swine: this was shameful Israel, the wicked and disloyal who hated good and loved every evil, who gave so much gold and silver and promises to Christians, who then poisoned several rivers and fountains that had been clear and pure so that many lost their lives; for whoever used them died suddenly. Certainly ten times one hundred thousand died from it, in country and city. Then finally this mortal calamity was noticed. He who sits on high and sees far, who governs and provides for everything, did not want this treachery to remain hidden; he revealed it and made it so generally known that they lost their lives and possessions. Then every Jew was destroyed, some hanged, others burned; some were drowned, others beheaded with an ax or sword. And many Christians died together with them in shame. An evil occurred. Human responsibility was assumed. Guilty agents were identified and punished. The prosecutors convinced themselves that their action was necessary and righteous. They were responding to persecution rather than initiating it. But that was then. Don't we today possess a germ theory of disease to immunize us against such an interpretive response? And doesn't the experience of the holocaust teach us just how the logic of persecution proceeds? A compelling account of modern anti-Semitism is provided by Sartre in Anti Semite and Jew, written in 1944 as World War II was ending. It is important both because of the particular subject it considers and because it serves as a conscious or unconscious model for a whole series of accounts of racism, sexism, national chauvinism, and antiwelfarism succeeding it during the last several decades. According to Sartre, **the anti-Semite construes the Jew as responsible for the** most demeaning **evils he and his nation suffer. This** insistence serves essential functions. First, it **allows the anti-Semite to dissociate himself from responsibility** for those things about himself or his condition he finds demeaning. "The anti-Semite is afraid of discovering that the world is ill-contrived, for then it would be necessary for him to invent and modify, with the result that man would be found to be the master of his own destinies, burdened with an agonizing and infinite responsibility. Thus he localizes all responsibility in the Jew". Second, **it enables him to avoid recognition of how much the world differs from the harmonious condition he projects** into its basic or true structure, **for this true harmony could be realized only if the Jew were removed from it**. "Underneath the bitterness of the anti-Semite is concealed the optimistic belief that harmony will be re-established once evil is eliminated". Third it allows him to defer critical examination of the good he endorses. The more one is absorbed in fighting Evil the less one is tempted to place the Good in question". Finally, **it licenses him to ignore the law in fighting** the **evil** he has identified, **allowing him to humiliate, degrade, or kill the other in the name of the good** he refuses to examine. It releases his violent desires from the obligations of self-restraint. Even the ambiguous denotation "a beautiful Jewess" serves this function, identifying an attractive target who invites rape and degradation by her mode of being. The idea that "the Jew has as much free will as is necessary for him to take full responsibility for the crimes of which he is the author" (ç), then, enables the anti-Semite to live a life of "inverted liberty": he is free to accuse the other of every evil, to exempt himself from every responsibility, to take matters into his own hands if the government does not respond to the call of the "real France," and to protect himself from confronting the chasm separating the human condition as he insists it must be and the way it is in reality. "Floating between an authoritarian society which has not yet come into existence and an official and tolerant society which he disavows, he can do anything he pleases without appearing to be an anarchist, which would abhor him". In a brief, unglossed passage, Sartre suggests that "anti-Semitism has kept something of the nature of human sacrifice" (5 i). A Christian culture is supposed to transcend the cult of sacrifice, with Jesus on the cross representing the last and definitive sacrifice. But the anti-Semite reenacts this cult. The Jew must be sacrificed so the anti-Semite can inflict cruelty without responsibility. The first must be sacrificed so that the second's vision of harmony can he protected. The other is sacrificed so that the self can project an infantile image of self-identity, national unity, and the human condition. The institutionalized accusations of the anti-Semite place Jews in an untenable situation: if society is torn by class struggle, they are said to seduce the workers into it; if there is financial crisis, they create it by conspiratorial control of financial institutions; if national chauvinism is insufficiently intense, they control the culture that erodes it. In such a context of accusation and sporadic violence one response is to subject oneself to constant self-examination so that nothing in one's conduct or demeanor corresponds to the stereotype propagated against one. But this creates a new stereotype for persecution: the cautious, self-demeaning, ingratiating Jew who is inauthentic with respect to himself and all the more vulnerable to new assaults by the anti-Semite. Alternatively, the few may seek assimilation by accepting the universalistic, democratic doctrine of the liberal who says that we are all humans in essence no particular identity is essential to one's humanity. The message here is you can be assimilated as a universal man' as long as you stop being a particular Jew. And once again the Jew is called upon to purge his own particularity through self-examination and self-reformation. The problem is compounded by the fact that the Jew's official ally (the universalist democrat) lacks passion, while his overt enemies overflow with it. These two possibilities recall the options of conquest and conversion examined in Todorov's account of the first encounter between Europe and America. The strategies for constituting and coping with the internal other thus mirror those applied to the external other. And in a way that parallels Todorov's analysis of those Spanish priests who tried to transcend these two alternatives, Sartre closes his account of the dialectical relation between anti-Semite and Jew by considering the Jew who actively asserts the "Jewishness" attributed to him. He ends with a stark conclusion: "The situation of the Jew is that everything he does turns against him." Sartre's analysis of the sources and implications of this double bind is rich in detail and impressive in the insights it discloses. Surely any account of anti-Semitism must draw upon these riches. But the Sartrean account draws upon a second tier of considerations that threaten to reinstate the very dialectic it has identified and condemned. There are two poles in the (early) Sartrean model: the absolute freedom of the self to choose its self and the "situation" in which such choices occur. The former makes each self responsible for what it is and does. The latter establishes the specific context in which self-responsibility is enacted. At the level of generality Sartre says, "without respite, from the beginning of our lives to the end, we are responsible for the merit we enjoy" (27). Following this maxim, he is able to conclude that "anti-Semitism is a free and total choice of oneself" (17). But while everyone has absolute choice and a situation at the abstract level, Sartre locates the anti-Semite and the Jew at opposite poles from each other in assigning responsibility for this condition. He loads narrative weight on the absolute freedom of the self when discussing the anti-Semite and then shifts it to the situation in which freedom is enacted when discussing the Jew. The anti-Semite has freely chosen his self, and the jew has been enclosed in a situation in which any choice of self is self-defeating. Why does Sartre not, for instance, construe both parties as living in situations where every viable choice of self is self-defeating? It is easy to imagine how such an analysis might be applied to the anti-Semite. For the anti-Semite often does not fare well when mea-sured according to received standards of culture, intellectuality, social achievement, and social status, and this situation could easily generate a set of alternatives that degrade the self-respect of the agents enacting them. What if the anti-Semite as well as the Jew chooses his life within the grip of a double bind? Or, why does Sartre not identify self-generated pressures toward inauthenticity (pressures to treat identity as given or true rather than forged or chosen) in both parties, even if to varying degrees? For his abstract theory of the human condition postulates a general anxiety about freedom that exerts pressure on everyone to engage in "bad faith." Neither of these interpretive strategies would reduce or qualify the evil in anti-Semitism, at least not in the primordial sense of evil as fundamental and undeserved suffering. Why, then, not pursue them? Well, the first reason is that a simple reversal of this distribution of responsibility would replicate and intensify the logic of anti-Semitism. And second--particularly for those who insist that moral purity as such depends upon adoption of a single model of responsibility for evil—any redistribution of responsibility would make it appear that Sartre is casting blame on the victims for the evil they suffer. But why are the alternatives available to Sartre reduced to these? Better, why does the theoretical structure governing his interpretation reduce the choices to holding the anti-Semite responsible, holding the Jew responsible, or distributing responsibility between them? The Sartrean rhetorical strategy implicitly maintains symmetry between the depth of the evil identified (anti-Semitism) and the locus of responsible agency for it (the anti-Semite). **The moral demand** within that symmetry **is** this **for every evil there must be an agent** (or set of agents) whose level of responsibility is proportionate to the seriousness of the evil. **This demand** is morally satisfying, but it also contains a strain of cruelty. For it **requires Sartre to** relocate and **recapitulate the structure of accusations the anti-Semite projects upon the other**. Sartre thus stands to the anti-Semite as the mild anti-Semite (a figure of importance in his analysis) stands to the Jew. This can be seen by recasting the charges he makes against the anti-Semite. Thus, **Sartre's** very **attribution of singular responsibility to the anti-Semite discourages Sartre from “looking into himself”** to ascer-tain whether the presumption of harmony between the level of evil and the level of responsibility is a form of insistence. This attribution enables him to deflect the question whether his model of self Responsibility contains cruelty within it. Perhaps his demand to "localize all evil" flows from a fear of discovering that “the world is Ill-contrived.” Perhaps “underneath the bitterness” against the anti-Semite “is concealed the optimistic belief that harmony” between evil and responsibility for it must be discernible once the true model of freedom and situation is elucidated. Perhaps the more exclusively he is governed by this demand in his “fight against evil” the less able he is to place the “good” of singular responsibility for evil “in question.” Perhaps the demand for symmetry expresses an “optimistic belief that harmony will be re-established once evil is eliminated.” Sartre may not be entirely unaware that the charges he brings against the anti-Semite can be brought against his own analysis. The concluding chapter of Anti Semite and Jew discloses a certainuneasiness about the diagnosis of evil that precedes it. For while the anti-Semite is still held singularly responsible for the evil he does, Sartre evinces little hope that he could be brought to accept this responsibility. The attribution of responsibility functions to reassure the opponent of anti-Semitism that where there is evil there is equivalent responsibility, but it does not point to a strategy for responding to it. And Sartre s explanation of why this is so tends to vitiate the moral equation that governs the preceding analysis.