# 1NC

### Off 1

#### A. Interpretation

#### Substantial increase is 30% to 50%.

Hantash 06, Patent Attorneys & Engineers Lynch Kneblewski - Sâo Paulo

[Feras, 3/16, http://www.freshpatents.com/Method-for-detecting-cystic-fibrosis dt20060316ptan20060057593.php]

 [0011] A substantial increase in the amount of a CFTR target segment identified means that the segment has been duplicated while a substantial decrease in the amount of a CFTR target segment identified means that the target segment has been deleted. The term "substantial decrease" or "substantial increase" means a decrease or increase of at least about 30-50%. Thus, deletion of a single CFTR exon would appear in the assay as a signal representing for example of about 50% of the same exon signal from an identically processed sample from an individual with a wildtype CFTR gene. Conversely, amplification of a single exon would appear in the assay as a signal representing for example about 150% of the same exon signal from an identically processed sample from an individual with a wildtype CFTR gene.

#### There are at least 4 kinds of OCOs and theyre aimed at foreign systems

Bradburry ‘11

[Steven, Partner, Dechert, LLP. This speech was delivered as the Keynote Address at the Harvard ¶ National Security Journal Symposium, Cybersecurity: Law, Privacy, and Warfare in a Digital ¶ World (Mar 4. 2011).¶ The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and ¶ Offensive Cyber Operations. <http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final.pdf> ETB]

By offensive cyber operations, I’m referring to a range of potential ¶ activities that could be aimed at foreign computer systems: from straight ¶ intelligence collection (the extraction or copying of data for intelligence ¶ purposes), to counterintelligence operations (meant to deter or disrupt ¶ espionage by others against us), to covert actions conducted abroad ¶ (traditionally managed by the CIA), to cyberwarfare (executed by DoD’s ¶ Cyber Command, either in support of conventional, kinetic war fighting or ¶ on a stand-alone basis).

#### In means throughout

Words and Phrases, 1959

(p. 546 (PDNS3566))

In the Act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout” such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14, p. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.

#### Violation- The plan increases restrictions on part of only one quarter of the OCO area and also increases restrictions on domestic cyber operations

=

#### Best interp

#### Ground- Our interpretation employs a flexible and reasonable definition of substantially but still excludes tiny subsets of each of areas.

#### Education: Our interp ensures the entire category of OCOs are explored, ensuring the best topic debates.

#### Limits – they explode the limits on the topic by including domestic operations as well – massively expands the negative research burden and makes it so that there’s too many arguments we have to prepare for, makes it impossible to be negative

#### Topicality is a voting issue in order to ensure competitive equity.

### Off 2

#### Their extinction claims require a defense of the intrinsic value of human survival as separated from other forms of life. This involves the image of distinctly good human life contrasted to the banal useless existence of the genes. This makes the aff’s political subjectivity an affect of a species-contingent survival paradigm which abandons bare life.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8 [tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

If only some of our genes but not our species has survived, maybe the emphasis we place upon the notion of ‘survival’ is more cultural than simply genetic. Such an emphasis stems not only from our higher cognitive powers of ‘self-consciousness’ or self-awareness, but also from our conscious celebration of this fact: the image we create for ourselves of ‘humanity’, which is produced by via language, collective memory and historical narrative. The notion of the ‘human’ involves an identification of our species with particular characteristics with and upon which we ascribe certain notions of value. Amongst others such characteristics and values might be seen to include: the notion of an inherent ‘human dignity’, the virtue of ethical behaviour, the capacities of creative and aesthetic thought, and for some, the notion of an eternal soul. Humans are conscious of themselves as humans and value the characteristics that make us distinctly ‘human’. When many, like Hawing, typically think of the notion of the survival of the human race, it is perhaps this cultural-cognitive aspect of homo sapiens, made possible and produced by human self-consciousness, which they are thinking of. If one is to make the normative argument that the human race should survive, then one needs to argue it is these cultural-cognitive aspects of humanity, and not merely a portion of our genes, that is worth saving. However, it remains an open question as to what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity would survive in the future when placed under radical environmental and evolutionary pressures. We can consider that perhaps the fish people, having the capacity for self-awareness, would consider themselves as the continuation or next step of ‘humanity’. Yet, who is to say that a leap in the process of evolution would not prompt a change in self awareness, a different form of abstract reasoning about the species, a different self-narrative, in which case the descendents of humans would look upon their biological and genetic ancestors in a similar manner to the way humans look upon the apes today. Conceivably the fish people might even forget or suppress their evolutionary human heritage. While such a future cannot be predicted, it also cannot be controlled from our graves. In something of a sense similar to the point made by Giorgio Agamben (1998), revising ideas found within the writings of Michel Foucault and Aristotle, the question of survival can be thought to involve a distinction between the ‘good life’ and ‘bare life’. In this instance, arguments in favour of human survival rest upon a certain belief in a distinctly human good life, as opposed to bare biological life, the life of the gene pool. It is thus such a good life, or at least a form of life considered to be of value, that is held up by a particular species to be worth saving. When considering the hypothetical example of the fish people, what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity’s good life would survive? The conditions of life under water, which presumably for the first thousand years would be quite harsh, would perhaps make the task of bare survival rather than the continuation of any higher aspects of a ‘human heritage’ the priority. Learning how to hunt and gather or farm underwater, learning how to communicate, breed effectively and avoid getting eaten by predators might displace the possibilities of listening to Mozart or Bach, or adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or playing sport, or of even using written language or complex mathematics. Within such an extreme example it becomes highly questionable to what extent a ‘human heritage’ would survive and thus to what extent we might consider our descendents to be ‘human’. In the case where what survives would not be the cultural-cognitive aspects of a human heritage considered a valuable or a good form of life, then, what really survives is just life. Such a life may well hold a worth or value altogether different to our various historical valuations and calculations. While the example of the fish people might seem extreme, it presents a similar set of acute circumstances which would be faced within any adaptation to a new habitat whether on the earth or in outer space. Unless humans are saved by radical developments in technology that allow a comfortable colonisation of other worlds, then genetic adaptation in the future retains a reasonable degree of probability. However, even if the promise of technology allows humans to carry on their cultural-cognitive heritage within another habitat, such survival is still perhaps problematic given the dark, violent, cruel and brutal aspects of human life which we would presumably carry with us into our colonisation of new worlds. Thinkers like Hawking, who place their faith in technology, also place a great deal of faith in a particular view of a human heritage which they think is worth saving. When considering the question of survival, such thinkers typically project a one-sided image of humanity into the future. Such a view presents a picture of only the good aspects of humanity climbing aboard a space-craft and spreading out over the universe. This presumes that only the ‘good aspects’ of the human heritage would survive, elements such as ‘reason’, creativity, playfulness, compassion, love, fortitude, hope. What however happens to the ‘bad’ aspects of the human heritage, the drives, motivations and thoughts that led to the Holocaust for example?

#### This species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8 [tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### The alternative is that the judge should vote negative to reject the 1AC’s human survival ethic. This rejection enables an understanding of the species-being. That solves the ethical contradiction of their species-level racism.

HUDSON 2K4 [Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, <http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23_2_04.pdf>]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### Off 3

#### Civil-military relations are strong, but could be de-railed

**Ricks 9/12/13**

[Thomas, Ed. Of *Best Defense* blog at Foreign Policy, <http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/12/gen_scales_needs_to_learn_that_discretion_is_the_better_part_of_civil_military_valo>, mg]

An additional consequence of the public's growing distance from the armed forces is the belief that, when it comes to a decision to go to war, the opinions of servicemembers should carry extra weight because they will be the ones doing the fighting and the dying. This is a profoundly undemocratic position in a country where the civilian branches of government are explicitly empowered by the Constitution to be the sole determinants of national security policy. Gen. Scales's dismissal of the White House staff as "wannabe soldiers" reinforces the dangerous idea that only military personnel, with their unique moral authority, are qualified to comment on when and how the nation goes to war. Few commentators **today would argue that American civil-military relations are in a state of crisis. Our armed forces are** loyal, patriotic, andcommitted to the principle of civilian control of the military**. The country's civil-military relationship, however, is being subjected to a set of stressors unlike any in our history**: a decade of warfare, the institutionalization of the all-volunteer force, and political gridlock which has undermined the public trust in our elected leaders. In this atmosphere, retired general officers must resist the temptation to wade too vigorously into national security debates. As lifetime representatives of their respective services, they command an authority that can dangerously encroach on the constitutional responsibilities of elected officials. For these retired officers, sometimes discretion is the better part of valor. ¶

#### Changes to war powers cause massive backlash to the military

Russia Times 13

[May 16, <http://rt.com/usa/terror-al-qaeda-pentagon-war-397/>, mg]

Even after cutting off the head of al-Qaeda, the United States Department of Defense doesn’t believe an end to the war on terror is in sight. On Thursday, one Pentagon official predicted the mission against al-Qaeda could continue for another two decades.¶ Speaking to the Senate Armed Services early Thursday, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Michael Sheehan said the Pentagon has no plans to pull out of its almost 12-year-old war overseas.¶ When asked for his take on how long the war on terror could go on for, Sheehan told lawmakers, “At least 10 to 20 years.”¶ According to US President Barack Obama, the last combat troops will move out of Afghanistan in 2014. If remarks from Sheehan and others are at all accurate, though, in reality the war could last through the 2030s.¶ Michael A. Sheehan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. (Image from defense.gov)¶ Sheehan was being grilled by members of the Senate committee on Thursday over not just the future of the war, but what rules are in play to continue the operation. Congress granted then-President George W. Bush the power to go after al-Qaeda in 2001 by signing the Authorization to Use Military Force, a legislation that essentially gave the go-ahead to use America’s might by any means necessary to avenge the attacks of 9/11. Nearly 13 years later, though, some members of the Senate saw that the overly broad powers extended to the commander-in-chief through the AUMF are being used to justify a widening war that now has soldiers targeting insurgents in venue like Yemen and Somalia.¶ The scope of America’s counterterrorism program, Sheehan said, stretches “from Boston to the FATA,” referring to the region of Pakistan considered a hotbed of terrorism. Because of that widening arena, some senators said it’s time to rewrite the law.¶ “It has spread throughout North Africa, throughout the Maghreb,” Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) said during the hearing. “The situation’s changed dramatically.¶ But while some lawmakers suggested it was time to revise the AUMF, Pentagon officials said the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act updated the law to grant the president power not just to target overseas terrorists, but suspects believed to be associated forces.¶ Robert Taylor, the acting general counsel of the Department of Defense, said that the NDAA’s update to the Bush-era bill means that even suspects born after the September 11 attacks could be targeted as warriors in the war on terror.¶ “As long as they become an associated force under the legal standard that was set out,” Taylor testified, according to Wired’s Spencer Ackermnn.¶ Sen. Angus King, an Independent from Maine, suggested the Pentagon was uninterested in changing the AUMF because they are using it to justify a war that wouldn’t otherwise be legal.¶ “This is the most disturbing hearing I’ve been to in some time,” King said. “You guys have rewritten the Constitution today.”¶ “You guys have invented this term, associated forces, that’s nowhere in this document,” King said. “It’s the justification for everything, and it renders the war powers of Congress null and void.”¶ “I assume [the AUMF] does suit you well because you’re reading it to fit everything, and it doesn’t, the general rule of war applies,” King said.¶ Even McCain, who has been by and large considered a hawkish member of the Senate, spoke out against the Pentagon’s reluctance to re-write a law that they are using to justify a war that could take US troops to all corners of the globe for the unforeseeable future.¶ “For you to come here and say, ‘We don’t need to change it,’ I think, is disturbing,” McCain said.¶ Before stepping down as secretary of defense, former Pentagon chief Leon Panetta said in late 2011, “We're winning this very tough conflict.” Osama bin Laden was executed five months later, and the Central Intelligence Agency and DoD have continuously utilized strikes to weaken al-Qaeda substantially since.

#### Global nuclear war

Cohen ’00 (Eliot A.-, Prof. @ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies & director of the Strategic Studies department @ Johns Hopkins, worked for Dod, taught at the U.S. Naval War College, Fall, National Interest, “Why the Gap Matters - gap between military and civilian world”, http://www.24hourscholar.com/p/articles/mi\_m2751/is\_2000\_Fall/ai\_65576871/pg\_4?pi=scl //AGupta)

At the same time, the military exercises control, to a remarkable degree, of force structure and weapons acquisition. To be sure, Congress adds or trims requests at the margin, and periodically the administration will cancel a large program, such as the navy's projected replacement of the A-6 bomber. But by and large, the services have successfully protected programs that reflect ways of doing business going back for decades. One cannot explain otherwise current plans for large purchases of short-range fighter aircraft for the air force, supercarriers and traditional surface warships for the navy, and heavy artillery pieces for the army. Civilian control has meant, in practice, a general oversight of acquisition and some degree of control by veto of purchases, but nothing on the scale of earlier decisions to, for example, terminate the draft, re-deploy fleets, or develop counterinsurgency forces. The result is a force that looks very much like a shrunken version of the Cold War military of fifteen years ago- -which, indeed, was the initial post-Cold War design known as the "base force." The strength of the military voice and the weakness of civilian control, together with sheer inertia, has meant that the United States has failed to reevaluate its strategy and force structure after the Cold War. Despite a plethora of "bottom-up reviews" by official and semiofficial commissions, the force structure remains that of the Cold War, upgraded a bit and reduced in size by 40 percent. So What? WHAT WILL be the long-term consequences of these trends? To some extent, they have become visible already: the growing politicization of the officer corps; a submerged but real recruitment and retention crisis; a collapse of junior officers' confidence in their own leaders; [7] the odd antipathy between military and civilian cultures even as the two, in some respects, increasingly overlap; deadlock in the conduct of active military operations; and stagnation in the development of military forces for a geopolitical era radically different from the past one. To be sure, such phenomena have their precedents in American history. But such dysfunction occurred in a different context--one in which the American military did not have the task of maintaining global peace or a predominance of power across continents, and in which the armed forces consumed barely noticeable fractions of economic resources and decisionmakers' time. Today, the stakes are infinitely larger. For the moment, the United States dominates the globe militarily, as it does economically and culturally. It is doubtful that such predominance will long go unchallenged; were that to be the case it would reflect a change in the human condition that goes beyond all human experience of international politics over the millennia. Already, some of the signs of those challenges have begun to appear: increased tension with the rising power of China, including threats of force from that country against the United States and its allies; the development of modes of warfare--from terrorism through the spread of weapons of mass destruction--designed to play on American weaknesses; the appearance of problems (peacemaking, broadly defined) that will resist conventional solutions. None of these poses a mortal threat to the Republic, or is likely to do so anytime soon. Yet cumulatively, the consequences have been unfortunate enough; the inept conclusion to the Gulf War, the Somalia fiasco, and dithering over American policy in Yugoslavia may all partially be attributed to the poor state of American civil-military relations. So too may the subtle erosion of morale in the American military and the defense reform deadlock, which has preserved, to far too great a degree, outdated structures and mentalities. For now, to be sure, the United States is wealthy and powerful enough to afford such pratfalls and inefficiencies. But the full consequences will not be felt for some years, and not until a major military crisis--a challenge as severe in its way as the Korean or Vietnam War--arises. Such an eventuality; difficult as it may be to imagine today, could occur in any of a number of venues: in a conflict with China over Taiwan, in a desperate attempt to shore up collapsing states in Central or South America, or in a renewed outbreak of violence--this time with weapons of mass destruction thrown into the mix-in Southwest Asia. THE PARADOX of increased social and institutional vulnerability on the one hand and increased military influence on narrow sectors of policymaking on the other is the essence of the contemporary civil-military problem. Its roots lie not in the machinations of power hungry generals; they have had influence thrust upon them. Nor do they lie in the fecklessness of civilian leaders determined to remake the military in the image of civil society; all militaries must, in greater or lesser degree, share some of the mores and attitudes of the broader civilization from which they have emerged. The problem reflects, rather, deeper and more enduring changes in politics, society and technology.

### Off 4

#### Text: The United States federal government should repeal Presidential Policy Directive-20.

#### Counterplan competes- it doesn’t capitalize the term “federal government”

#### Capitalizing the term “federal government” creates tacit acceptance of state power

Lock 02

[Neil, “State Your Terms!”]

In English, capital letters are not normally used for nouns, except for proper names and for the first word of a sentence. However, it is conventional to use capital letters for the names of establishment institutions and personages. Examples of such words are government, king, parliament, president, state, church, pope. To dignify these words with capital letters – Government, President, State, Church, for example – gives to the reader an almost subliminal message of power, respect and even reverence. But, as historians and lovers of freedom know, many of these organisations and individuals have shown, by their actions, that they are not worthy of any such respect or reverence.

#### And capitalization empowers state bureaucracy

Parkinson 03

[Rob Parkinson has 35 years of experience in management communications — gained as a consultant, an instructor, a manager, an editor and a writer in both government and the private sector. He has specialized in briefings for senior executives for 15 years, including six years as the editor for the Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, Government of Canada. In that capacity, he designed departmental standards for executive documents that brought about dramatic improvements in the quality of briefing material prepared for the Minister and the Deputy Minister. M.B.A from the University of Ottowa. “Writing for Results”]

We often overuse capitals — sometimes out of fear of offending important people, sometimes to show that a certain word is important to us. However, overuse of capitals, particularly when addressing outside readers, can convey the image of a bureaucracy that is overawed by its own concepts and processes.

#### Strong state bureaucracy makes genocide and war inevitable

Martin 90

[Brian Martin, associate professor in [Science, Technology and Society](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ssmac/sts/index.html) at the University of Wollongong, UPROOTING THE WAR SYSTEM,, <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw07.html>)]

Is the state system really so bad? War is the most obvious indictment of the system, and this alone should be enough to justify questioning the state. As wars have become more destructive, there is no sign that any steps to re-examine or transform the state system are being taken by state elites. This should not be surprising. **War is not simply a by-product of the state system, to be moderated and regulated when it becomes too dangerous to populations. Rather**, war is part and parcel of the state system**, so the destructiveness of war makes little difference. State elites** (and many others**) see the world as a state-structured world, and all action is premised on this perspective.** War is the external manifestation of state violence. Political repression is its internal form. **Political freedoms are not only at a premium under military dictatorships and state socialism, but are also precarious in the representative democracies, especially in relation to 'national security.'** One of the most telling indictments **of** the state systemis found in Leo Kuper's book *Genocide*. Kuper documents the most horrific exterminations in this century, including the killing of the Jews by the Nazis, the massacre of the Bangladeshis by the Pakistan army in 1971 and the extermination in Cambodiabeginning in 1975. What is damning of the state system isthe reluctance of governments (and of that assemblage of state actors, the United Nations) to intervene againsteven the most well documentedgenocidal killing. The reasonforthis reluctanceisthe concern for the autonomy of the state. In short**,** maintaining the 'integrity' of the state system **is more important for state elites than intervening against genocide. There are many other social problems caused, sustained or aggravated by the state, including suppression of dissent, state support for corporate elites**, and the activities of spy agencies and secret police. **These problems stem essentially from the system of unequal power and privilege which the state both is part of and sustains**. **The state** is not the only way to embody and sustain unequal power and privilege: it **is a particular way involving bureaucracies for administration and military forces for defending against external and internal enemies.**

### Off 5

#### Text: The President of the United States should not enforce Presidential Policy Directive-20.

#### CP solves the aff – Executive restraint is key

Belk & Noys 12

Robert Belk is a Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, studying international and global affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. In his 16 years of service, he has made four carrier-based deployments and one ground-based deployment to Iraq. Following graduation, he is scheduled to report to the Naval Operations staff in the Pentagon to develop and execute Navy network and cybersecurity policy—AND—Matthew Noyes studies international security policy and is a senior associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting. Prior to attending the Harvard Kennedy School, he served for five years as an infantry officer in the US army serving multiple tours in Iraq. Following graduation he plans to continue working on cybersecurity issues. He has a degree in Computer Science and Applied Computational Mathematics from the University of Washington. “On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities: A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy,” 20 March 2012, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cybersecurity-pae-belk-noyes.pdf>, DOA: 8-3-13

Though the strategic consideration for the operation is troubling, consequential factors bring even greater uncertainty. The American people are overwhelmingly in favor of such strikes, because they do not put troops in harm’s way. There is also broad support within Congress for supporting counterterrorism operations. Regarding soft power, however, this operation becomes less appealing. Polls in Ardia and within the region show that targeted killings of suspected terrorists have eroded American influence. It is becoming increasingly more difficult for Ardian politicians to support American priorities, even when they are in line with Ardian aims. Allied nations in the West have condemned American use of targeted killings. If the cyber force were in fact to harm one of the HVT’s family members instead of the HVT, this would have profound implications for U.S. soft power abroad. It is also unknown how our allies would react to killing through the suspected terrorist’s computers, vice through purely military means. Currently, DoD is unaware of any other allied operations concerning this particular HVT. DoD is leery to share this data as the U.S. has been searching for this HVT for many years. This would also be the first use of cyber force and the international implications are unclear. Lastly, the effect of using cyber force on the nature of the Internet is unknown. It is possible that this type of operation is limited enough in scope to have minimal effect. In such a situation, our recommendation would be to refrain from using cyber force for primarily ethical and consequential reasons. First, we believe that the use of force in cyberspace, as a new and unique medium, requires biasing toward prudence. Without a clear ability to determine distinction, the U.S. would fail to uphold the LOAC. This in turn may have serious implications for U.S. strategy in the region as well as for U.S. relations with Western allies. 1) Use of cyber force must conform to all laws governing the use of force. In particular cyber force must conform to the LOAC, especially regarding proportionality and distinction, and the UN Charter. If these factors cannot be assured, cyber force is not the correct weapon. 2) If overt, cyber force should be limited in scope with assurance that any operation has minor if any spillover effects. 3) Cyber force should be coordinated with our allied partners and perhaps legitimized through a multi-national body (NATO at least, U.N. if possible or required). 4) Cyber force should be in concert with traditional military force and as targeted as possible. 5) Catastrophic (i.e. expansive and destructive) use of cyber force should only be considered for retaliatory measures or in conjunction with prolonged, declared, large-scale hostilities. 6) The President should set a declaratory policy that clearly defines what constitutes a use of force and relate this to cyber force. We recommend the following effects based statement, “Any action in cyberspace which directly place at risk the life of U.S. citizens constitutes an armed attack against the U.S, and will be responded to at a time, place, and manner of our choosing in accordance with domestic and international law.

### Hacktivism

**War fuels structural violence, not the other way around**

**Goldstein 2001**. IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. **Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.”** Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that **causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices**.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. **Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too**. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, **the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate**.

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

### Risk

#### Threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

Kaufman 9

Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ‘9¶ (Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434)

**Even when hostile narratives**, group **fears, and opportunity are** strongly **present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed.** **Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant** ethnic **hostility among** mass **publics. Politicians must** also **seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility**, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by **riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization.** Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, **the result is a security dilemma spiral** of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** **Even if hostile narratives**, fears, and opportunity **exist, severe violence** usually **can** still **be avoided if** ethnic **elites** skillfully **define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines** to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

**Worst-case scenarios calculate for the sake of responsibility – mobilization is key to effective to political movements that prevent the worst forms of their impact**

Michael **Williams**, Professor of International Politics – U. Wales, Aberystwyth**, ‘5**

(*The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* p. 165-7)

Moreover, the links between sceptical realism and prevalent post-modern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.80 In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully charactised, to borrow Stephen White’s illuminating contrast, as expressions of ‘responsibility to otherness’ which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succeumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that **the willful Realist tradition does not lack** understanding of the **contingency** of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, **its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a wilfully liberal vision. The construction** of a realm of objectivity and **calculation** is not just a consequence of a need to act – the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It **is** a form of **responsibility to otherness**, **an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability** precisely **by** – at least initially – **reducing the self and** the **other to** a **structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability**. It is, in short, a strategy of *limitation*: a wilful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited – both epistemically and politically – **in the name of a politics of toleration**: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of *modus vivendi*.82 If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity, action, and responsibility.83 As Neumann points out, **the insight that identities are** inescapably contingent and relationally **constructed**, and even the claim that identities are inescapably *indebted* to otherness, **do** **not in themselves provide a foundation for practice**, particularly **in situations where identities are** **‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined**. In these cases, **deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice and not just in philosophic practice** the essentialist dynamics it confronts.84 Here, a responsibility to act must go **beyond** **deconstruction** **to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices**. To take **this** critique seriously **is not** necessarily **to be subjec**t yet again t**o the** straightforward **‘blackmail of the Englightenment** and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility.85 While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such **situations demand** also an evaluation of the **structures** (of identity and institutions) **that might viably be mobilized** in order **to offset the worst implications** of violently exclusionary identities. **It requires**, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of **compelling ‘as if’ stories around which** counter-subjectivities **and political practices can coalesce.** Wilful Realism, I submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such ‘stories’ within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dicohotomies.

**Security sustains a form of democratic citizenship necessary to enhance standards of living and ensure rights**

**Loader and Walker 07** <Ian and Neil, professor of criminology and Director of the center for Criminology at Oxford Professor of European Law European University Institute Florence , *Civilizing Security*, pg 7-8)

By invoking this phrase we have in mind two ideas, both of which we develop in the course of the book. The first, which is relatively familiar if not uncontroversial, is that security needs civilizing. States — even those that claim with some justification to be ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ — have a capacity when self-consciously pursuing a condition called ‘security’ to act in a fashion injurious to it. So too do non-state ‘security’ actors, a point we return to below and throughout the book. They proceed in ways that trample over the basic liberties of citizens; that forge security for some groups while imposing illegitimate burdens of insecurity upon others, or that extend the coercive reach of the state — and security discourse — over social and political life. As monopoly holders of the means of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, modern states possess a built-in, paradoxical tendency to undermine the very liberties and security they are constituted to protect. Under conditions of fear such as obtain across many parts of the globe today, states and their police forces are prone to deploying their power in precisely such uncivil, insecurity- instilling ways. If the state is to perform the ordering and solidarity- nourishing work that we argue is vital to the production of secure political communities then it must, consequently, be connected to forms of discursive contestation, democratic scrutiny and constitutional control. The state is a great civilizing force, a necessary and virtuous component of the good society. But if it is to take on this role, the state must itself be civilized — made safe by and for democracy. But our title also has another; less familiar meaning — the idea that **security is civilizing. Individuals who live, objectively or subjectively, in a state of anxiety do not make good democratic citizens**, as European theorists reflecting upon the dark days of the 1930s and 1940s knew well (Neumann 1957). **Fearful citizens tend to be inattentive to, unconcerned about, even enthusiasts for; the erosion of basic freedoms. They often lack openness or sympathy towards others, especially those they apprehend as posing a danger to them.** They privilege the known over the unknown, us over them, here over there. They often retreat from public life, seeking refuge in private security ‘solutions’ while at the same time screaming anxiously and angrily from the sidelines for the firm hand of authority — for tough ‘security’ measures against crime, or disorder, or terror. **Prolonged episodes of violence, in particular, can erode or destroy people’s will and capacity to exercise political judgement and act in solidarity with others** (Keane 2004: 122—3). **Fear, in all these ways, is the breeding ground, as well as the stock-in-trade, of authoritarian, uncivil government.** But there is more to it than that. Security is also civilizing in a further, more positive sense. **Security**, we shall argue, is **in a sociological sense a ‘thick’ public good, one whose production has irreducibly social dimensions, a good that helps to constitute the very idea of ‘public- ness’**. Security, in other words, is simultaneously the producer and product of forms of trust and abstract solidarity between intimates and strangers that are prerequisite to democratic political communities. The state, moreover; performs vital cultural and ordering work in fashioning the good of security conceived of in this sense. **It can**, under the right conditions, **create inclusive communities of practice and attachment, while ensuring that these remain rights-regarding, diversity- respecting entities.** In a world where the state’s pre-eminence in governing security is being questioned by private-sector interests, practices of local communal ordering and transnational policing networks, the constitution of old- and new-fashioned forms of democratic political authority is, we shall argue, indispensable to cultivating and sustaining the civilizing effects of security.

**The plan results in more securitization and intervention**

Tara **McCormack, 2010**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the **rejection of the** old narrow national interest-based **security framework** by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, **has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation**. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before**. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. **Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival.** Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that **these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states,** we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. **In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches**.

# 2NC

#### New restrictions on the Executive will be resisted by the military because they are imposed externally by civilians; this crushes CMR and causes rollback, turns the case

**Owens 13**

[Mackubin Owens is Editor of *Orbis,* FPRI’s quarterly journal of international affairs, and Senior Fellow at its Program on National Security, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College; July, <https://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/07/what-military-officers-need-know-about-civil-military-relations>, mg]

All too often, **US military officers seem to believe that** if the United States does not face the prospect of a Latin-American or African style military coup d’état, then **all is well in** the realm of **civil-military relations.** But this is a straw man. A number of scholars, including Richard Kohn, Peter Feaver, the late Russell Weigley, Michael Desch, and Eliot Cohen have argued that although there is no threat of a coup on the part of the US military, **American civil-military relations have** nonetheless **deteriorated over the past two decade**s.¶ ¶ For example, **the US military has “pushed back” against civilian leadership** on numerous occasions during the last two decades. **This pushback has manifested itself in** “foot dragging,” “slow rolling” and leaks to the press designed to undercut policy **or individual policy-makers**. Such actions were rampant during the Clinton presidency and during the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. **Such pushback is based on the claim that** civilians were making decisions without paying sufficient attention to the military point of view.

#### The military will push back against the plan--- commanders are pre-authorized to use offensive cyber attacks

**CyberWarZone 12**

[http://www.cyberwarzone.com/cyberwarfare/us-needs-top-level-approval-launch-cyberattacks, mg]

The Defense Department is developing rules of engagement for how commanders will operate in cyberspace and what missions they can conduct under their own authority.¶ ¶ During congressional testimony last month, Alexander said **decisions on how to respond to adversaries in cyberspace would be made by the president and secretary of defense. But military commanders would have authority if circumstances demanded immediate action.**

#### The military wants offensive cyber ops--- it’s their new weapon of choice

Russia Times 13

[http://rt.com/usa/alexander-cyber-command-offensive-209/, mg]

The head of the United States Cyber Command says the US is developing 40 new teams of cyber-agents that will both protect America’s critical infrastructure from hackers and as well as launch attacks against the country’s adversaries.¶ Gen. Keith Alexander, who leads both the Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, told the US Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday that the 40 online support teams should be ready for action by 2015, with 13 of those units existing specifically to attack other countries.¶ Alexander has been reluctant to go into detail about how the newly-designed teams will engage in cyber battle with America’s enemies, but he did say that the 13 squads of offensive fighters won’t be sitting around waiting for hackers from abroad to strike first. The NSA chief described the groups as ‘‘defend-the-nation’’ teams but also stressed that their role will be one that puts them on both sides of the action.¶ “I would like to be clear that this team. . . is an offensive team,” he told reporters on Tuesday.¶ “The teams are analogous to battalions in the Army and Marine Corps — or squadrons in the Navy and Air Force,” said Alexander. “In short, they will soon be capable of operating on their own, with a range of operational and intelligence skill sets, as well as a mix of military and civilian personnel.”¶ Chris Strohm, a national security reporter for Bloomberg, says the units will “focus on missions such as protecting vital computer networks from attacks, supporting combat operations and keeping the Pentagon’s information-technology systems secure.”¶ The Associated Press reports that Gen. Alexander likened the teams’ duties to “knocking an incoming missile out of the sky before it hits a target,” and that they’d serve as defensive teams with added offensive capabilities. What offensive actions the teams will engage in exactly will likely remain unknown for now, however, as the US has continues to closely guard its secretive cyber operations.¶

#### **Pentagon supports the *offensive* nature of its new cyber powers--- the plan restricts those**

Hillburn 13

[Matthew, VOA, <http://www.voanews.com/content/us-cybercom-to-go-on-offensive/1622489.html>, mg]

The U.S. Department of Defense has made a rare acknowledgement that it is developing offensive cyber capabilities.¶ ¶ In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee this past week, Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency, said 13 cyber warfare “teams” would be ready by 2015.¶ ¶ According to a prepared statement, the teams would be “analogous to battalions in the Army and Marine Corps—or squadrons in the Navy and Air Force.” Furthermore, “they will soon be capable of operating on their own, with a range of operational and intelligence skill sets, as well as a mix of military and civilian personnel.”¶ ¶ "Let me be clear, this defend-the-nation team is not a defensive team; this is an offensive team that the Department of Defense would use to defend the nation if it were attacked in cyberspace," he said during the testimony.

**Predictions are accurate enough and should be used as a basis for political action**

**Chernoff 2009**. Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that **‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective** and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 **A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships** (which comprise ‘open systems’) **to allow any prediction whatsoever.** Two very **simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism**. First, **we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency**. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. **With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action** (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) **that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.**15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

**IR predictions are possible**

**HARVEY, 97** Frank Harvey, associate professor of Political Science, Dalhouse University, The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, And Crisis Stability After The Cold War, 1997, p. 139

Finally, the lack of purity and precision, another consequence of linguistic relativism, does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. **The study of [IR] international relations may not be exact**, given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others, **but precision is a** practical **research problem, not an insurmountable barrier** to progress. In fact, most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. Clearly, **our understanding of the causes of** international conflict—and most notably **war—has improved considerably as a consequence of applying** sound **scientific methods** and valid operationalizations. **The alternative approach, implicit in** much of the **postmodern literature, is to fully accept the inadequacy of positivism, throw one’s hands up in failure**, given the complexity of the subject, **and repudiate the entire enterprise**. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy.

#### **NIGERIA MODELS U.S. STANCE ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

AFRICA NEWS 3/27/02

United States Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Howard Jeter, yesterday in Abuja called on the defence establishment in the country to commence dialogue on the building of a healthy civil-military relationship. Speaking in Abuja at the on-going seminar on the "Role of the military in a democracy", Jeter said that the United States had found it extremely useful to have civilians work for the military services. He pointed out that in the effort to build a strong and healthy civil-military realtionship, "we have serving military officers working in various capacities in civil institutions like the legislature and the executive". According to him such interface of civil-military relationship enables the system to benefit from the expertise and operational understanding of both sides in policy formulation. "Through these exchanges, the civilian agencies are better informed, the military and the department of defence are better informed and decision making is easier," he said.

#### **CMR IN NIGERIA IS KEY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY**

BBC 8-5-02

It must be borne in mind that the Western Regional election violence (Operation wetie) of 1965-66, played a key role in the military coup of January 1999," he noted. He said that the rule of law must be strictly adhered to, while the electorate on their part, must tolerate the political, ethnic, and religion differences of others, since democracy legitimizes diversity and protects and promotes alternative options, especially the views of the minority. While advising that the fundamental human rights of citizens should be respected, Ogomudia said that the interest of the military in the area of welfare, training, procurement and maintenance of equipment, release and payment of salaries, and provision of barracks accommodation, amongst other things, should be taken care of. There is also the need for the holding and organization of regular dialogue between the political class and military leaders in order to promote transparency and ensure mutual confidence, he stressed. Ogomudia said: "It is in the interest of the nation, for the growth and consolidation of democratic culture and ethos that civil-military relations should be developed in all fronts and ensured to be cordial at all times.

#### That makes war impossible—liberal democratic norms through judicial globalization cause global peace

Kersch 6, Assistant Professor of Politics

[2006, Ken I. Kersch, Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. B.A., Williams; J.D., Northwestern; Ph.D., Cornell. Thanks to the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University, where I was a visiting research scholar in the fall of 2005, and to the organizers of, and my fellow participants in, the Albany Law School Symposium, Albany Law School, “The Supreme Court and international relations theory.”, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Supreme+Court+and+international+relations+theory.-a0151714294]

Liberal theories of international relations hold that international peace and prosperity are advanced to the degree that the world’s sovereign states converge on the model of government anchored in the twin commitment to democracy and the rule of law.52 Liberal “democratic peace” theorists hold that liberal democratic states anchored in rule of law commitments are less aggressive and more transparent than other types of states.53 When compared with non-liberal states, they are thus much better at cooperating with one another in the international arena.54 Because they share a market-oriented economic model, moreover, international relations liberals believe that liberal states hewing to the rule of law will become increasingly interdependent economically.55 As they do so, they will come to share a common set of interests and ideas, which also enhances the likelihood of cooperation.56 Many foreign policy liberals—sometimes referred to as “liberal internationalists”—emphasize the role that effective multilateral institutions, designed by a club or community of liberal-democratic states, play in facilitating that cooperation and in anchoring a peaceful and prosperous liberal world order.57 The liberal foreign policy outlook is moralized, evolutionary, and progressive. Unlike realists, who make no real distinctions between democratic and non-democratic states in their analysis of international affairs, liberals take a clear normative position in favor of democracy and the rule of law.58 Liberals envisage the spread of liberal democracy around the world, and they seek to advance the world down that path.59 Part of advancing the cause of liberal peace and prosperity involves encouraging the spread of liberal democratic institutions within nations where they are currently absent or weak.60 Furthermore, although not all liberals are institutionalists, most liberals believe that effective multilateral institutions play an important role in encouraging those developments.61 To be sure, problems of inequities in power between stronger and weaker states will exist, inevitably, within a liberal framework.62 “But international institutions can nonetheless help coordinate outcomes that are in the long-term mutual interest of both the hegemon and the weaker states.”63 Many foreign policy liberals have emphasized the importance of the judiciary in helping to bring about an increasingly liberal world order. To be sure, the importance of an independent judiciary to the establishment of the rule of law within sovereign states has long been at the core of liberal theory.64 Foreign policy liberalism, however, commonly emphasizes the role that judicial globalization can play in promoting democratic rule of law values throughout the world.65 Post-communist and post-colonial developing states commonly have weak commitments to and little experience with liberal democracy, and with living according to the rule of law, as enforced by a (relatively) apolitical, independent judiciary.66 In these emerging liberal democracies, judges are often subjected to intense political pressures.67 International and transnational support can be a life-line for these judges. It can encourage their professionalization, enhance their prestige and reputations, and draw unfavorable attention to efforts to challenge their independence.68 In some cases, support from foreign and international sources may represent the most important hope that these judges can maintain any sort of institutional power—a power essential to the establishment within the developing sovereign state of a liberal democratic regime, the establishment of which liberal theorists assume to be in the best interests of both that state and the wider world community.69 Looked at from this liberal international relations perspective, judicial globalization seems an unalloyed good. To many, it will appear to be an imperative.70 When judges from well-established, advanced western democracies enter into conversations with their counterparts in emerging liberal democracies, they help enhance the status and prestige of judges from these countries. This is not, from the perspective of either side, an affront to the sovereignty of the developing nation, or to the independence of its judiciary. It is a win-win situation which actually strengthens the authority of the judiciary in the developing state.71 In doing so, it works to strengthen the authority of the liberal constitutional state itself. Viewed in this way, judicial globalization is a way of strengthening national sovereignty, not limiting it: it is part of a state-building initiative in a broader, liberal international order.72 A liberal foreign policy outlook will look favorably on travel by domestic judges to conferences abroad (and here in the United States) where judges from around the world can meet and talk.73 It will not view these conferences as “junkets” or pointless “hobnobbing.” These meetings may very well encourage judges from around the world to increasingly cite foreign precedent in arriving at their decisions. Judges in emerging democracies will use these foreign precedents to help shore up their domestic status and independence. They will also avail themselves of these precedents to lend authority to basic, liberal rule-of-law values for which, given their relative youth, there is little useful history to appeal to within their domestic constitutional systems. Judges in established democracies, on the other hand, can do their part to enhance the status and authority of independent judiciaries in these emerging liberal democratic states by showing, in their own rulings, that they read and respect the rulings of these fledgling foreign judges and their courts (even if they do not follow those rulings as binding precedent).74 They can do so by according these judges and courts some form of co-equal status in transnational “court to court” conversations.75 It is worth noting that mainstream liberal international relations scholars are increasingly referring to the liberal democratic international order (both as it is moving today, and indeed, as read backward to the post-War order embodied in the international institutions and arrangements of NATO, Bretton Woods, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and others) as a “constitutional order,” and, in some cases, as a “world constitution.”76 No less a figure than Justice Breyer—in a classic articulation of a liberal foreign policy vision—has suggested that one of the primary questions for American judges in the future will involve precisely the question of how to integrate the domestic constitutional order with the emerging international one.77 If they look at judicial globalization from within a liberal foreign policy framework (whether or not they have read any actual academic articles on liberal theories of foreign policy), criticisms of “foreign influences” on these judges, and of their “globe-trotting” will fall on deaf ears. They will be heard as empty ranting by those who don’t really understand the role of the judge in the post-1989 world. These judges will not understand themselves to be undermining American sovereignty domestically by alluding to foreign practices and precedents. And they will not understand themselves as (in other than a relatively small-time and benign way) as undermining the sovereignty of other nations. They will see the pay-off-to-benefit ratio of simply talking to other judges across borders, and to citing and alluding to foreign preferences (when appropriate, and in non-binding ways) as high. They will, moreover, see themselves as making a small and modest contribution to progress around the world, with progress defined in a way that is thoroughly consistent with the core commitments of American values and American constitutionalism. And they will be spurred on by a sense that the progress they are witnessing (and, they hope, participating in) will prove of epochal historical significance. Even if they are criticized for it in the short-term, these liberal internationalist judges will have a vision of the future which suggests that, ultimately, their actions will be vindicated by history. The liberal foreign policy outlook will thus fortify them against contemporary criticism.

# 1NR

#### They don’t access the solvency deficit debate- their method allows dominant ontologies to overcode the terms of debate- the terminal impact is perpetuation of statist violence

Shapiro ‘97

(Michael j., prof of pol sci @ univ of Hawaii/phd in pol sci @ northwestern 1966/former prof @ uc berkeley, nyu, & umass, violent cartographies: mapping cultures of war, univ of Minnesota press, p. 58-60)

When dealing with this use of alterity at a collective level – that is, with the primary modes of otherness with which cultures, societies, and nations police their boundaries – we must view the enmities involved in warfare more ethnographically than strategically. A comparison of tribal and state collectiveies therefore suggests itself, especially because the ontological aspects of enmity are more forthrightly expressed in the case of the former. For example, ethnographic evidence suggests that for the Huron tribes of the Great Lakes in the seventeenth century, for some of the Native American tribes of the US plains at the same tiem, and, more recently, for the Anggor of New Guinea, cosmological commitments and other dimensions of the cultural or group ontology provide the collective coherence that determines the peaceful versus militant or violent apprehension of Others. In the case of the modern state, a complex clash of interpretive positions, driven by interests, bureaucracies and institutional complexities, and ideological positions, plays a major role in the selection of dangersin general andfoesin particular. As a result, the ontological aims, which are forthrightly expressed in tribal societies, are over coded by official and bureaucratic discourses in modern states. Nevertheless, although warfare in the modern state is legitimated on the basis of a discourse of security interests, to which a variety of security-related agencies contribute, the ontological aims can be recovered despite the dominance of policy-oriented rhetoric, very much the way they were in Clausewitz’s discourse. The ontological interests driving hostilities go unarticulated because a policy grammar commands attention, and the rationale for violence emerges as something like suppressing or destroying external threats.

#### C. The aff over-identifies with political practice at the expense of political theorization, which perpetuates flawed political thinking

BROWN ‘97

(WENDY, heller prof of pol sci @ uc Berkeley/phd in pol philosophy @ princeton 1983, THE TIME OF THE POLITICAL, THEORY & EVENT, VOL. 1, ISS. 1)

Political theory, in particular, runs a great risk of losing its distinctive value in intellectuallifeandeven its offerings topolitical life, if it becomes trapped by responding to events, by the time and space of events. It runs the risk of limiting its capacity as a domain of inquiry capable of disrupting the tyranny or givenness of the present, and expanding the range of possible futures. It runs the riskas wellof substituting political positions for political thinking, thereby sacrificing its capacity to call into question the terms of the present. This does not mean that expansive political theory requires a retreat from political life. But it does require distinguishing the theorization of political life from acting within it; this means not only

#### Improper capitalization merely personalizes state institutions- the language of the plan must be rejected

Lock 02

[Neil, “State Your Terms!”]

Each individual shows **his or** her world-view in the way **he or** she uses language**. And** we **(that is to say, lovers of freedom)** are too prone to slip into our rivals’ way of speaking and writing. When we use “we”, for example, we should try to make it clear just who we mean. We should be alert to other misuses of “we”, for example to represent statist institutions, or to project false guilt. We should avoid implying that individuals must accept responsibility for things outside their control, particularly for actions carried out by politicians. We should try to avoid “bundling” people together into groups and making sweeping statements about them. We should reject the personalization of nation-states **or cities.** We should not dignify withcapital letters **personages or** institutions that do not deserve them**. We should not misuse** words like “people” and “public”, and we should avoid warlike **metaphors**, such as calling our rivals “the enemy”. In short, **we need to “state” our case in our terms, not our rivals’.**

**Rejecting statist language is key to rolling back overwhelming state power**

**Lock 02**

[Neil, “State Your Terms!”]

We lovers of freedom are usually strong on facts and logic. But facts and logic alone will never persuade those very many people, whose minds have been poisoned towards our rivals’ world-view by their long-term, persistent propaganda. We will never roll back the power of the state, still less heal the damage done by nation-states and politicians, unless we strive to make our use of language reinforce, rather than dilute, our uncompromisingly individual, peaceful and optimistic message.

#### Attempts to change the way a topic is spoken about is not the same as eliminating speech.

Ruitenberg ‘4

[Claudia Ruitenberg, Assistant Professor in Philosophy of Education at the University of British Columbia, 2004, “How Ravitch Restricts What Readers Learn about Censorship,” Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 38 Issue 4, p. 663-668]

The word ‘censorship’ is a powerful indictment, and conjures up images of apparatchiks scrutinising private correspondence and media broadcasts. Under this one heading Ravitch bunches together a variety of attempts to influence teaching and test materials that really are quite different. The term ‘censorship’ as used by Ravitch covers a great range of phenomena, including the elimination from the curriculum of topics deemed biased (e.g., evolution), the elimination from standardised tests of topics judged to be contentious (e.g., religion or politics), the elimination from existing literary texts of words or passages, the changing of language deemed biased (e.g., ‘mankind’) in curriculum and test materials and the changing of the selection of titles and topics in literature and history textbooks. These apples and oranges sit uneasily together in the same crate. Attempts to eliminate topics from the curriculum altogether, in other words, to limit what students are invited or allowed to speak and write about, are not the same as attempts to change the language that students use to speak and write about a topic—any topic. Attempts to change the literary and historical canon are not the same as attempts to remove contentious language from standardised tests. Ravitch gives little serious consideration to the motives and contexts of these various attempts at ‘censorship’; what matters to her is the end result: certain words and topics do not appear in teaching and test materials.

#### AND the term ‘censorship’ is a moralizing freudian term which codes the function of the critic into subjectivity – by presuming that all *true* individuals reject censorship, they make exclusion of all conflicting elements inevitable. that internal link turns their offense.

Ratner 24

[joseph, journal of philosophy, de-moralizing freud, feb. 28, vol. xxi, no. 5, college of the city of new york, from “east egg”, pp.113-117]

This tendency to view our desires in isolation without trying to find out their comparative value is greatly reinforced by that other Freudian term, which is also heavily charged with moral significance, namely, the censor.This term, like the term "suppression," summons to the mind an unfortunate image. A censor, especially to modern people, is an external controlling force that is opposed to the true needs and best interests of the individual. A censor is to be tolerated in times of emergency, such as in war, but at all other times he is to be heartily despised and stubbornly resisted by all freedom-loving men. For he is the worst sort of a tyrant. The Freudians, to be sure, have by this term been calling atten- tion to an important, though quite homely, psychological fact.What they symbolize in the censor is that firmly knit and organized aspect of the individual which expresses his character and individuality and represents most fully his most permanent interests. The real function symbolized in the censor is the function of the critic in the individual-similar to that of the critic in politics or in literature- the function, namely, to maintain consistently the integrity of the individual and rigorously to exclude all sporadic conflicting elements which seek to break down the established organization.

#### Analyzing the representations of the plan must precede any political decision-making

Crawford ‘2

[Neta Crawford ,PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002 p. 19-21]

Coherent arguments **are unlikely to take place unless** and until **actors,** at least on some level, **agree on what they are arguing about**. The at least temporary **resolution of meta-arguments- regarding** the nature of the good (the content of **prescriptive norms);** what is out there, **the way we know the world,** how we decide between competing beliefs (**ontology and epistemology); and** the nature of the situation at hand( **the proper frame or representation)-** must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such **arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are** particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common **are meta-arguments over representations** or frames- **about how we out to understand a particular situation.** Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, **“Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”.** For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. **Defining and controlling representations and images**, or the frame, **affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake**

 **and** whether a particular argument applies **to the case**. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, **actors** who are struggling to characterize or **frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through** exaggeration**, analogy, or differentiation**. **Representations of a situation** do not re-produce accurately **so much as they** creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ **Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning**.” **Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized** or completely ignored **as their situation is** recharacterized or **reframed**. **Representation** thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” **The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities**. As Roxanne Doty argues, “**the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action**. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “**politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it** may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not**. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices.** Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument **because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway**. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.