# 1NC vs KState

## 1NC Identity PIC

#### (Anonymous) advocates a critical scholarly analysis of the President of the United States' war powers authority to conduct offensive cyber operations.

#### The concept of identity inherent in the 1AC creates an “us” versus “them” mentality and ensures worldwide violence

Nikki Boudreau citing Amin Maalouf author of In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, 2000, http://www.csustan.edu/honors/documents/journals/entries/Boudreau.pdf, “Violence in the Name of Identity”; hhs-ab

Ask anyone to define their identity and they will immediately rattle off a list of affiliations: race, gender, nationality, religion. Upon closer inspection, however, the subject of identity is much more complicated and conflicted. While an individual considers that their own identity is what makes them unique, their natural response is to define it by a characteristic that associates them with a larger group. An “us” versus “them” mentality results because whenever a person finds belonging with one group, it simultaneously separates from all other groups. Unfortunately, the tragedy in this need to belong is that it ultimately makes it impossible to identify with the largest of affiliations—the human race. Furthermore, this situation is becoming increasingly exacerbated as advancing communication technology encourages world cultures to grow more similar. This gives individuals even more reason to feel threatened because they feel that the qualities that are specific to their culture are coming under attack by this homogenization of world culture. This fear, this desperate need to belong, causes many people to commit fanatical and murderous crimes in the name of their identity. In his book In the Name of Identity, 1 Amin Maalouf explores how violence can erupt between different groups of people when they limit the definition of their identity to only one facet of their being. This belief that an individual is defined essentially by their nationality, race, language, or religion “presupposes that ‘deep down inside’ everyone there is just one affiliation that really matters, a kind of ‘fundamental truth’ about each individual, an ‘essence’ determined once and for all at birth, never to change thereafter” (2). This, Maalouf explains, is “a recipe for massacres” (5). A Christian who grew up in Lebanon and later moved to France, Maalouf has personally felt the conflict that can exist between different elements of a person’s identity. Quite simply, he writes that people “often see themselves in terms of whichever one of their allegiances is most under attack” (26).

#### The 1ACs usage of identity locates politics in a representational manner and prevents imperceptible political activism --- turns case

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In this sense imperceptible politics does not necessarily differ from or oppose other prevalent forms of politics, such as state-oriented politics, micropolitics, identity politics, cultural and gender politics, civil rights movements, etc. And indeed imperceptible politics connects with all these various forms of political engagement and intervention in an opportunistic way: it deploys them to the extent that they allow the establishment of spaces outside representation; that is, spaces which do not primarily focus on the transformation of the conditions of the double-R axiom (rights and representation) but on the insertion of new social forces into a given political terrain. In the previous chapter we called this form of politics outside politics: the politics which opposes the representational regime of policing. Imperceptibility is the everyday strategy which allows us to move and to act below the overcoding regime of representation. This everyday strategy is inherently anti-theoretical; that is, it resists any ultimate theorisation, it cannot be reduced to one successful and necessary form of politics (such as state-oriented politics or micropolitics, for example). Rather, imperceptible politics is genuinely empiricist, that is it is always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control. If imperceptible politics resists theorisation and is ultimately empiricist, what then are the criteria for doing imperceptible politics? There are three dimensions which characterise imperceptible politics: objectlessness, totality, trust. Firstly, imperceptible politics is objectless, that is it performs political transformation without primarily targeting a specific political aim (such as transformation of a law or institution, or a particular claim for inclusion, etc). Instead imperceptible politics proceeds by materialising its own political actions through contagious and affective transformations. The object of its political practice is its own practices. In this sense, imperceptible politics is non-intentional - and therein lies its difference from state-oriented politics or the politics of civil rights movements, for example - it instigates change through a series of everyday transformations which can only be codified as having a central political aim or function in retrospect. Secondly, imperceptible politics addresses the totality of an existing field of power. This seems to be the difference between imperceptible politics and micropolitics or other alternative social movements: imperceptible politics is not concerned with containing itself to a molecular level of action; it addresses the totality of power through the social changes which it puts to work in a particular field of action. The distinction between molar and molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 275) has only analytical significance from the perspective of imperceptible politics. In fact imperceptible politics is both molar and molecular, because by being local situated action it addresses the whole order of control in a certain field. Imperceptible politics is located at the heart of a field of power and at the same time it opens a way to move outside this field by forcing the transformation of all these elements which are constitutive of this field. In this sense, imperceptible politics is a driving force which is simul­taneously both present and absent. We described this in the previous chapter by exploring the importance of speculative figurations for the practice of escape. On the everyday level of escape (a level we called in this chapter imperceptible politics) speculative figuration can be translated into trust. This is the third characteristic of imperceptible politics; it is driven by a firm belief in the importance and truthfulness of its actions, without seeking any evidence for, or conducting any investigation into its practices. This is trust. Imperceptible politics is driven by trust in something which seems to be absent from a particular situation. Imperceptible politics operates around a void, and it is exactly the conversion of this void into everyday politics that becomes the vital force for imperceptible politics.

#### The counterplans pseudonym of anonymous solves their affirmative --- web activism proves

Max Halupka, The Flinders University of South Australia Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences School of Social and Policy Studies Honours Program in Political Studies application for BA, 2011, http://www.academia.edu/1220969/The\_Evolution\_of\_Anonymous\_as\_a\_Political\_Actor, “The Evolution of Anonymous as a Political Actor”; hhs-ab

As a virtual community, Anonymous exists without traditional form or function, adhering only to a fundamental concept of anonymity in online interactions. Structurally, they are decentralised in that they converge on no singular website, with community interactions spread across a myriad of digital platforms. Within this seemingly structureless existence however, participants of Anonymous are still able to build a sense of belonging and connectivity, a definitive element of a successful online community (Iriberri and Leroy2009). This ability is facilitated by the community’s adoption of the Anonymous persona, a faceless, hive mind concept which draws upon the notion of complete anonymity in communication. Individuals seeking to take part within an affiliated community are encouraged to communicate under the pseudonym Anonymous. As a collective, the adoption of this mass persona serves to convey an outwards perception of Anonymous as an omnipresent internet entity. Lacking leadership, individuality, or identifiable markers, Anonymous thrives off the concept that anyone and everyone could exist within their ranks. They have no pre-determined philosophy, political preference or overarching ideology. Yet regardless of this, Anonymous can still be seen as behaving as a political actor. As a collective they have orchestrated a number of political and social operations, from the 2008global protest of the Church of Scientology, to the 2010 support of Wikileaks’ founder Julian Assange (Underwood 2009; Coleman 2011). Given Anonymous’s unique structural composition, and lack of hierarchy or leadership, it is impressive that they are able to behave as a relatively coherent political actor. Therefore, this thesis asks “how does Anonymous engage politically and how has their approach to political action evolved throughout their development?”In determining how Anonymous engages politically, this thesis seeks to verify what political form, if any, the collective embodies. In establishing this, the thesis will allow for commentary on the capacity and form of the community’s political participation. Anonymous, as an online interest group, directly engages opponents through theemployment of online activist techniques, also known as cyber activism.

## 1NC War Powers K

#### Restrictions on executive war powers DO NOTHING for the state of political legal exception we live in and only gives further justification for violent intervention on the basis of legality

Dyzenhaus 05 (David, is a professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, “Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?” Cardozo Law Review 27)

Rossiter had in mind Lincoln's actions during the Civil War, including the proclamation by which Lincoln, without the prior authority of Congress, suspended habeas corpus. n35 Lincoln, he said, subscribed to a theory that in a time of emergency, the President could assume whatever legislative, executive, and judicial powers he thought necessary to preserve the nation, and could in the process break the "fundamental laws of the nation, if such a step were unavoidable." n36 This power included one ratified by the Supreme Court: "an almost unrestrained power to act toward insurrectionary citizens as if they were enemies of the United States, and thus place them outside the protection of the Constitution." Rossiter's difficulties here illustrate rather than solve the tensions inherent in the idea of constitutional dictatorship. On the one hand, he wants to assert that emergency rule in a liberal democracy can be constitutional in nature. "Constitutional" implies restraints and limits in accordance not only with law, but with fundamental laws. These laws are not the constitution that is in place for ordinary times; rather, they are the laws that govern the management of exceptional times - the eleven criteria that he developed for constitutional dictatorship. The criteria are either put within the discretion of the dictator - they are judgments about necessity - or are couched as limits that should be enshrined either in the constitution or in legislation. However, Rossiter does not properly address the fact that judgments about necessity are for the dictator to make, which means that these criteria are not limits or constraints but merely factors about which the dictator will have to decide. Other criteria look more like genuine limits. Moreover, they are limits that could be constitutionally enshrined - for example, the second criterion, which requires that the person who makes the decision that there is an emergency should not be the person who assumes dictatorial powers. Yet, as we have seen, Rossiter's foremost example of the modern constitutional dictator, Lincoln, not only gave himself dictatorial powers but, Rossiter supposes, had no choice but to do this. Moreover, if these criteria are constitutionally enshrined, so that part of the constitution is devoted to the rules that govern the time when the rest of the constitution might be suspended, they still form part of the constitution. So, no less than the ordinary constitution, what we can think of as the exceptional or emergency constitution - the constitution that governs the state of emergency - is subject to suspension should the dictator deem this necessary. This explains why, on the other hand, Rossiter equated emergency rule with potentially unlimited dictatorship, with Locke's idea of prerogative. And Rossiter said, "whatever the theory, in moments of extreme national emergency the facts have always been with ... John Locke." So Rossiter at one and the same time sees constitutional dictatorship as unconstrained in nature and as constrainable by principles - his eleven criteria. The upshot is that "constitutional" turns out not to mean what we usually take it to mean; rather, it is a misleading name for the hope that the person who assumes dictatorial powers does so because of a good faith evaluation that this is really necessary and with the honest and steadfast intention to return to the ordinary way of doing things as soon as possible. Giorgio Agamben is thus right to remark that the bid by modern theorists of constitutional dictatorship to rely on the tradition of Roman dictatorship is misleading. n39 They rely on that tradition in an effort to show that dictatorship is constitutional or law-governed. But in fact they show that dictatorship is in principle absolute - the dictator is subject to whatever limits he deems necessary, which means to no limits at all. As H.L.A. Hart described the sovereign within the tradition of legal positivism, the dictator is an uncommanded commander. n40 He [\*2015] operates within a black hole, in Agamben's words, "an emptiness of law." n41 Agamben thus suggests that the real analogue to the contemporary state of emergency is not the Roman dictatorship but the institution of iustitium, in which the law is used to produce a "juridical void" - a total suspension of law. n42 And in coming to this conclusion, Agamben sides with Carl Schmitt, his principal interlocutor in his book. However, it is important to see that Schmitt's understanding of the state of exception is not quite a legal black hole, a juridically produced void. Rather, it is a space beyond law, a space which is revealed when law recedes, leaving the state, represented by the sovereign, to act. In substance, there might seem to be little difference between a legal black hole and space beyond law since neither is controlled by the rule of law. But there is a difference in that nearly all liberal legal theorists find the idea of a space beyond law antithetical, even if they suppose that law can be used to produce a legal void. This is so especially if such theorists want to claim for the sake of legitimacy that law is playing a role, even if it is the case that the role law plays is to suspend the rule of law. Schmitt would have regarded such claims as an attempt to cling to the wreckage of liberal conceptions of the rule of law brought about by any attempt to respond to emergencies through the law. They represent a vain effort to banish the exception from legal order. Because liberals cannot countenance the idea of politics uncontrolled by law, they place a veneer of legality on the political, which allows the executive to do what it wants while claiming the legitimacy of the rule of law. We have seen that Rossiter presents a prominent example which supports Schmitt's view, and as I will now show, it is a depressing fact that much recent post 9/11 work on emergencies is also supportive of Schmitt's view. II. Responding to 9/11 For example, Bruce Ackerman in his essay, The Emergency Constitution, n43 starts by claiming that we need "new constitutional concepts" in order to avoid the downward spiral in protection of civil liberties that occurs when politicians enact laws that become increasingly repressive with each new terrorist attack. n44 We need, he says, to rescue the concept of "emergency powers ... from fascist thinkers like Carl Schmitt, who used it as a battering ram against liberal [\*2016] democracy." n45 Because Ackerman does not think that judges are likely to do, or can do, better than they have in the past at containing the executive during an emergency, he proposes mainly the creative design of constitutional checks and balances to ensure, as did the Roman dictatorship, against the normalization of the state of emergency. Judges should not be regarded as "miraculous saviors of our threatened heritage of freedom." n46 Hence, it is better to rely on a system of political incentives and disincentives, a "political economy" that will prevent abuse of emergency powers. He calls his first device the "supramajoritarian escalator" n48 - basically the requirement that a declaration of a state of emergency requires legislative endorsement within a very short time, and thereafter has to be renewed at short intervals, with each renewal requiring the approval of a larger majority of legislators. The idea is that it will become increasingly easy with time for even a small minority of legislators to bring the emergency to an end, thus decreasing the opportunities for executive abuse of power. n49 The second device requires the executive to share security intelligence with legislative committees and that a majority of the seats on these committees belong to the opposition party. Ackerman does see some role for courts. They will have a macro role should the executive flout the constitutional devices. While he recognizes both that the executive might simply assert the necessity to suspend the emergency constitution and that this assertion might enjoy popular support, he supposes that if the courts declare that the executive is violating the constitution, this will give the public pause and thus will decrease incentives on the executive to evade the constitution. n51 In addition, the courts will have a micro role in supervising what he regards as the inevitable process of detaining suspects without trial for the period of the emergency. Suspects should be brought to court and some explanation should be given of the grounds of their detention, not so that they can contest it - a matter which Ackerman does not regard as practicable - but in order both to give the suspects a public identity so that they do not disappear and to provide a basis for compensation once the emergency is over in case the executive turns out to have fabricated [\*2017] its reasons. He also wishes to maintain a constitutional prohibition on torture, which he thinks can be enforced by requiring regular visits by lawyers. Not only is the judicial role limited, but it is clear that Ackerman does not see the courts as having much to do with preventing a period of "sheer lawlessness." n53 Even within the section on the judiciary, he says that the real restraint on the executive will be the knowledge that the supramajoritarian escalator might bring the emergency to an end, whereupon the detainees will be released if there is no hard evidence to justify detaining them. In sum, according to Ackerman, judges have at best a minimal role to play during a state of emergency. We cannot really escape from the fact that a state of emergency is a legally created black hole, a lawless void. It is subject to external constraints, controls on the executive located at the constitutional level and policed by the legislature. But internally, the rule of law does next to no work; all that we can reasonably hope for is decency. But once one has conceded that internally a state of emergency is more or less a legal black hole because the rule of law, as policed by judges, has no or little purchase, it becomes difficult to understand how external legal constraints, the constitutionally entrenched devices, can play the role Ackerman sets out. Recall that Ackerman accepts that the reason we should not give judges more than a minimal role is the history of judicial failure to uphold the rule of law during emergencies in the face of executive assertions of a necessity to operate outside of law's rule. For that reason, he constructs a political economy to constrain emergency powers. But that political economy still has to be located in law in order to be enforceable, which means that Ackerman cannot help but rely on judges. But why should we accept his claim that we can rely on judges when the executive asserts the necessity of suspending the exceptional constitution, the constitution for the state of emergency, when one of his premises is that we cannot so rely? Far from rescuing the concept of emergency powers from Schmitt, Ackerman's devices for an emergency constitution, an attempt to update Rossiter's model of constitutional dictatorship, fails for the same reasons that Rossiter's model fails. Even as they attempt to respond to Schmitt's challenge, they seem to prove the claim that Schmitt made in late Weimar that law cannot effectively enshrine a distinction between constitutional dictatorship and dictatorship. They appear to be vain attempts to find a role for law while at the same time conceding that law has no role. Of course, this last claim trades on an ambiguity in the idea of the rule of law between, on the one hand, the rule of law, understood as the rule of substantive principles, and, on the other, rule by law, where as long as there is a legal warrant for what government does, government will be considered to be in compliance with the rule of law. Only if one holds to a fairly substantive or thick conception of the rule of law will one think that there is a point on a continuum of legality where rule by law ceases to be in accordance with the rule of law. Ackerman's argument for rule by law, by the law of the emergency constitution, might not answer Schmitt's challenge. But at least it attempts to avoid dignifying the legal void with the title of rule of law, even as it tries to use law to govern what it deems ungovernable by law. The same cannot be said of those responses to 9/11 that seem to suggest that legal black holes are not in tension with the rule of law, as long as they are properly created. While it is relatively rare to find a position that articulates so stark a view, it is quite common to find positions that are comfortable with grey holes, as long as these are properly created. A grey hole is a legal space in which there are some legal constraints on executive action - it is not a lawless void - but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases. And since such grey holes permit government to have its cake and eat it too, to seem to be governing not only by law but in accordance with the rule of law, they and their endorsement by judges and academics might be even more dangerous from the perspective of the substantive conception of the rule of law than true black holes.

#### The affirmative purports to stand against war, but they do so in the name of humanity, security, rights and justice - They betray a universalism which can only result in imperialism and more war, turning the aff.

Rasch 2000 (William. "Conflict as a Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics." Theory Culture Society 17.1)

Schmitt would recognize these as the right questions to ask, would recognize them, in fact, as his own questions. They go to the heart of the nature and possibility of conflict (which is to say -- of politics), for wars conducted in the name of the universal normative instance are wars fought to end all wars, conflicts conducted in the name of the self-transcendence of all conflict. But what if, afterwards, we find out that the heaven of consensus and reconciliation turns out to be a realm in which conflict has been outlawed in the name of the good, the efficient, the comfortable? In a world where conflict has been outlawed, how is opposition to be staged? As uncorked agreement? It is precisely against this type of outlawry of opposition in the service of the status quo - more accurately, in the service of the unfolding and global expansion of a new type of moral and economic imperialism -- that Schmitt launches his counterattack. Since, to his mind, the non-decomposable sovereignty of the autonomous state is the only form of resistance available the fight against this seemingly relentless expansion, it is to the philosopher of state sovereignty par excellence, Hobbes, that he is drawn. Schmitt's "Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles" is quite explicitly an updated version of an older "Kampf mit Rom". In an interesting and clever move, Schmitt notices that Cole's guild-socialism, Laski's liberalism and French syndicalism all share arguments and perspectives with the social philosophers of Roman Catholicism as well as those of other Churches and sects, arguments that are aimed at relativizing the power of the state. Both the call to follow the dictates of conscience and the more explicit appeal to the higher morality as embodied in international structures (like the League or international revolutionary movements) are political weapons. The battle between "internationalism" and "nationalism", then, is not simply fought between the forces of freedom and oppression, but rather between the authority of one type of sovereign power and another. But, Schmitt warns: The Roman Catholic Church is no pluralist entity, and in its [the Church's] battle against the state, pluralism, at least since the 16th century, is on the side of the national states. A pluralist social theory contradicts itself if it wishes to remain pluralist and still play off the monism and universalism of the Roman Catholic Church, as secularized in the Second or Third International, against the state. To repeat: the battle, as he sees it, is between a sham and a true pluralism, between a pluralism in the service of a universal morality (accompanied, not so coincidentally, by a universal economy) and a pluralism in which no contestant can claim the moral high ground. It is the latter, morally neutral pluralism, based on autonomous entities, that best represents the structures and possibilities of a Schmittian form of politics. We can re-figure this debate is even more classical terms. What Schmitt argues for is a politics commensurable with the conditions found in the Earthly City, and what he argues against is the "fanaticism" of judging this terrestrial domain with standards only applicable in the City of God. Through his choice of Hobbes and the notion of state sovereignty may be deemed unfortunate and can be contested, his aim is to reconstruct a space of legitimate conflict as a space of secular politics. This space must remain immune to moral and theological infections; the Earthly City must retain a legitimacy that is autonomous from the moral but other-worldly claims of the City of God, claims that can only be redeemed at the end of history --- which is to say, not on this earth. Accordingly, his critique of the "humanism" of modern liberalism is akin to an older critique of religious fanaticism. Despite his Catholicism, Schmitt is much like the Luther who supported the princes, even though he recognized their greed and cruelty, against the prophetic iconoclasts and the Armageddon of the peasant uprisings. The eschatology of religious or secular revolutions is precisely anti-political. They advocate change to outlaw change. They oppose the order of the world in order to welcome the Messiah. Once His arrival is imminent (no matter how long imminence lasts), opposition to the order of the world becomes sin. They wage wars, repeatedly, to end war. They wage wars, but not just any wars; they wage just wars. "They", the particular instance, wage wars in the name of the universal principle, in the name of humanity, outlawing all opposition: as, for example, was attempted in the "war-guilt" clause of the Versailles Treaty, which turned a war of competing national interests into a just war against an unjust enemy; and as was attempted in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, turning wars in the national interest into crimes, and wars in the interest of the universal principle into crusades. "Imperialism does not conduct national wars", Schmitt ironically observes, referring to what he sees as the particularly modern, i.e. legal and economic, form of imperialism conducted by the Anglo-American world; "at most it conducts wars that serve international politics; it conducts no unjust, only just wars"; or, as Wyndham Lewis was to put it a few years after the Second World War: "But what war that was ever fought was an unjust war, except of course that waged by the enemy?"

#### Our alternative is to recognize the necessity of the opposition. Sovereignty necessarily functions in exception to the law. This exception is necessary to avoid the universal violence of the Law and the affirmative.

Rasch 2000 (William. "Conflict as a Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics." Theory Culture Society 17.1)

It is not difficult to see that the polemical elevation of sovereignty over the rule of law replicates a lively historical opposition, one that can be perhaps best evoked by that happy pair, Hobbes and Locke. Within the liberal tradition, the rule of law invokes reason and calculability in its battles against the arbitrary and potentially despotic whim of an unrestrained sovereign. The legitimacy of the sovereign is thus replaced by a legality that claims to provide its own immanent and unforced legitimacy. Predictable and universally accessible reason - the normative validity of an "uncorked consensus", to use the words of a prominent modern exponent - gently usurps, so it is claimed, the place that would otherwise be occupied by a cynical, pragmatic utilitarianism and the tyranny of a dark, incalculable will. The rule of law brings all the comforts of an uncontroversial, rule-based, normative security as if legality preceded by way of simple logical derivation, abolishing above all the necessity of decisions. Schmitt clearly will have none of this and in various writings attempts to expose what he considers to be the two-fold fallacy of the liberal position. As we have seen, if taken at its word, legality, or the rule of law, is seen by Schmitt to be impotent; it can neither legitimize nor effectively defend itself against determined enemies in times of crisis. Were law truly the opposite of force, it would cease to exist. But this self-description is deceptive, for if judged by its deeds, the same liberal regime that enunciates the self-evidence validity of universal norms strives to enact a universal consensus that is, indeed, far from uncorked. The rule of law inevitably reveals itself, precisely during moments of crisis, as the force of law, perhaps, not every bit as violent and "irrational" as the arbitrary tyrant, but nonetheless compelling and irresistible - indeed, necessarily so. Thus, Schmitt would argue the distinction between "decision", "force" and sovereignty", on the one hand, and the "rule of law", on the other, is based on a blithe and simple illusion. What agitates Schmitt is not the force, but the deception. More precisely, what agitates Schmitt is what he perceives to be the elimination of politics in the name of a higher legal or moral order. In its claim to a universal, normative, rule-bound validity, the liberal sleight-of-hand reveals itself to be not the opposite of force, but a force that outlaws opposition. In resurrecting the notion of sovereignty, therefore, Schmitt sees himself as one who rescues a legitimate notion of politics. Of course, this rescue attempt is itself political, a battle over the correct definition of politics. That is, we are not merely dealing with a logical problem, and not merely dealing with a desire to provide constitutional mechanisms that would prevent the self-dissolution of the constitution. Rather, we are dealing with a contest between a particularist notion of politics, in which individual conflicts can be resolved, but in which antagonism as a structure and reservoir of possible future conflicts is never destroyed, versus politics as the historical unfolding and pacific expansion of the universal morality. To evoke the long shadows of an ongoing contemporary debate, we are dealing with the difference between a politics of dissensus and a politics of consensus. Whereas the latter ideology entails an explicit or implicit belief in the "highest good" that can be rationally discerned and achieved, a "right regime", to use Leo Strauss's term, or the "just society" that hopes to actualize aspects of the City of God here on earth, the former stresses the necessity of determining a workable order where no single order bears the mantle of necessity, in fact, where all order is contingent, hence imperfect, and thus seeks to make the best of an inherently contradictory world by erecting structures that minimize self-inflicted damage. In Schmitt's eyes, the elements of such a structure must be the manifold of sovereign states. The liberal says there can only be one world-wide sovereign, the sovereignty of a universal moral and legal order. Schmitt counters with a plurality of equal sovereigns, for only in this way, he believes, can the economic and moral extinction of politics be prevented. Politics, on this view, is not the means by which the universally acknowledged good is actualized, but the mechanism that negotiates and limits disputes in the absence of any universally acknowledged good. Politics exists, in other words, because the just society does not.

#### This requires the unchecked authority of the executive to respond to the exception.

Nagan and Haddad 12 (Winston and Aitza, "Sovereignty in Theory and Practice." San Diego International Law Journal 13)

Although Schmitt was German, his ideas about sovereignty, and the political exception have had influence on the American theory and practice of sovereignty. Carl Schmitt was a philosophic theorist of sovereignty during the Third Reich. n375 His ideas about sovereignty and its above the law placement in the political culture of the State have important parallels in the developing discourse in the United States about the scope of presidential authority and power. His views have attracted the attention of American theorists. Schmitt developed his view of sovereignty on the concept described as "the exception". n376 This idea suggests that the sovereign or executive may invoke the idea of exceptional powers which are distinct from the general theory of the State. In Schmitt's view, the normal condition of the functions of the theory of a State, rides with the existence of the idea of the "exception." The exception is in effect intrinsic to the idea of a normal State. In his view, [\*487] the normal legal order of a State depends on the existence of an exception. n377 The exception is based on the continuing existence of an existential threat to the State and it is the sovereign that must decide on the exception. n378 In short, the political life of a State comprises allies and enemies. For the purpose of Statecraft, "an enemy exists only when at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts another similar collectivity." n379 In this sense, the political reality of the State always confronts the issue of the survival of the group. This reality is explained as follows. The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping. \*\*\* As an ever present possibility [war] is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and hereby creates a specifically political behavior.\*\*\* A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction between friend and enemy and hence a world without politics. n380 Schmitt's view bases the supremacy of the exception on the supremacy of politics and power. n381 Thus, the exception, as rooted in the competence of the executive, is not dependent on law for its authority but on the conditions of power and conflict, which are implicitly pre-legal. n382 The central idea is that in an emergency, the power to decide based on the exception accepts its normal superiority over law on the basis that the suspension of the law is justified by the pre-legal right to self-preservation. n383 Schmitt's view is a powerful justification for the exercise of extraordinary powers, which he regards as ordinary, by executive authority. This is a tempting view for executive officers but it may not be an adequate explanation of the interplay of power, legitimacy, and the constitutional foundations of a rule of law State. In a later section, we draw on insights from the New Haven School, which deals empirically with the problem of power and the problem of constituting authority using the methods of contextual mapping. Nonetheless, Schmitt's view provides support for theorists who seek to enlarge executive power on the unitary presidency theory.

## 1NC Framework

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Switch-side is key - effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation – the impact is mass violence

Roberts-Miller 3

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism¶ Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)¶ What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."¶ Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.¶ It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.¶ Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.¶ Continued…¶ Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).¶ Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,¶ Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)¶ Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.¶ Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).¶ Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies.¶ Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).¶ By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:¶ Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)¶ There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.¶ Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).¶ Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).¶ The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.¶ Arendt's Polemical Agonism¶ As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).¶ Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.¶ Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:¶ You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)¶ Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).¶ In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.¶ This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.¶ Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).¶ Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).¶ Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).¶ Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism.¶ Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.¶ In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

## 1NC Hegemony DA

#### The Affirmative’s criticism of American policy is dangerous – it contributes to isolationism and the eventual collapse of U.S. primacy

Robert Kagan, senior associate at the CE for International Peace and PhD in American History from American University, 1998, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=275, “The Benevolent Empire”

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget — even if most of the rest of the world does not — just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.

#### There is no alternative to hegemony—collapse goes nuclear

Ferguson 4—history and business, Harvard MA and D.Phil from Glasgow and Oxford (Niall, A World Without Power, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/vac.htm, AMiles)

Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world—and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The influence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival powers. In his bestselling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, like all past empires, the U.S. and Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of China and Japan, both still unencumbered by the dead weight of imperial military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and after surviving the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace for the ascent of new rivals. “[A] rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century,” contends Mearsheimer. “[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead.” China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (EU) too has the potential to become “a formidable rival.” Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal. The “unipolarity” identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the simple reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar, multipower world. But what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the world is actually heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers—whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states—they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of “apolarity,” if you will) is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves. Pretenders to the Throne Why might a power vacuum arise early in the 21st century? The reasons are not especially hard to imagine. The clay feet of the U.S. colossus | Powerful though it may seem—in terms of economic output, military might, and “soft” cultural power—the United States suffers from at least three structural deficits that will limit the effectiveness and duration of its quasi-imperial role in the world. The first factor is the nation's growing dependence on foreign capital to finance excessive private and public consumption. It is difficult to recall any past empire that long endured after becoming so dependent on lending from abroad. The second deficit relates to troop levels: The United States is a net importer of people and cannot, therefore, underpin its hegemonic aspirations with true colonization. At the same time, its relatively small volunteer army is already spread very thin as a result of major and ongoing military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, and most critically, the United States suffers from what is best called an attention deficit. Its republican institutions and political traditions make it difficult to establish a consensus for long-term nation-building projects. With a few exceptions, most U.S. interventions in the past century have been relatively short lived. U.S. troops have stayed in West Germany, Japan, and South Korea for more than 50 years; they did not linger so long in the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, or Vietnam, to say nothing of Lebanon and Somalia. Recent trends in public opinion suggest that the U.S. electorate is even less ready to sacrifice blood and treasure in foreign fields than it was during the Vietnam War. “Old Europe” grows older | Those who dream the EU might become a counterweight to the U.S. hyperpower should continue slumbering. Impressive though the EU's enlargement this year has been—not to mention the achievement of 12-country monetary union—the reality is that demography likely condemns the EU to decline in international influence and importance. With fertility rates dropping and life expectancies rising, West European societies may, within fewer than 50 years, display median ages in the upper 40s. Europe's “dependency ratio” (the number of non-working-age citizens for every working-age citizen) is set to become cripplingly high. Indeed, Old Europe will soon be truly old. By 2050, one in every three Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks is expected to be 65 or older, even allowing for ongoing immigration. Europeans therefore face an agonizing choice between Americanizing their economies, i.e., opening their borders to much more immigration, with the cultural changes that would entail, or transforming their union into a fortified retirement community. Meanwhile, the EU's stalled institutional reforms mean that individual European nation-states will continue exercising considerable autonomy outside the economic sphere, particularly in foreign and security policy. China's coming economic crisis | Optimistic observers of China insist the economic miracle of the past decade will endure, with growth continuing at such a sizzling pace that within 30 or 40 years China's gross domestic product will surpass that of the United States. Yet it is far from clear that the normal rules for emerging markets are suspended for Beijing's benefit. First, a fundamental incompatibility exists between the free-market economy, based inevitably on private property and the rule of law, and the Communist monopoly on power, which breeds corruption and impedes the creation of transparent fiscal, monetary, and regulatory institutions. As is common in “Asian tiger” economies, production is running far ahead of domestic consumption—thus making the economy heavily dependent on exports—and far ahead of domestic financial development. Indeed, no one knows the full extent of the problems in the Chinese domestic banking sector. Those Western banks that are buying up bad debts to establish themselves in China must remember that this strategy was tried once before: a century ago, in the era of the Open Door policy, when U.S. and European firms rushed into China only to see their investments vanish amid the turmoil of war and revolution. Then, as now, hopes for China's development ran euphorically high, especially in the United States. But those hopes were dashed, and could be disappointed again. A Chinese currency or banking crisis could have earth-shaking ramifications, especially when foreign investors realize the difficulty of repatriating assets held in China. Remember, when foreigners invest directly in factories rather than through intermediaries such as bond markets, there is no need for domestic capital controls. After all, how does one repatriate a steel mill? The fragmentation of Islamic civilization | With birthrates in Muslim societies more than double the European average, the Islamic countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East are bound to put pressure on Europe and the United States in the years ahead. If, for example, the population of Yemen will exceed that of Russia by 2050 (as the United Nations forecasts, assuming constant fertility), there must either be dramatic improvements in the Middle East's economic performance or substantial emigration from the Arab world to aging Europe. Yet the subtle Muslim colonization of Europe's cities—most striking in places like Marseille, France, where North Africans populate whole suburbs—may not necessarily portend the advent of a new and menacing “Eurabia.” In fact, the Muslim world is as divided as ever, and not merely along the traditional fissure between Sunnis and Shiites. It is also split between those Muslims seeking a peaceful modus vivendi with the West (an impulse embodied in the Turkish government's desire to join the EU) and those drawn to the revolutionary Islamic Bolshevism of renegades like al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Opinion polls from Morocco to Pakistan suggest high levels of anti-American sentiment, but not unanimity. In Europe, only a minority expresses overt sympathy for terrorist organizations; most young Muslims in England clearly prefer assimilation to jihad. We are a long way from a bipolar clash of civilizations, much less the rise of a new caliphate that might pose a geopolitical threat to the United States and its allies. In short, each of the potential hegemons of the 21st century—the United States, Europe, and China—seems to contain within it the seeds of decline; and Islam remains a diffuse force in world politics, lacking the resources of a superpower. Dark and Disconnected Suppose, in a worst-case scenario, that U.S. neoconservative hubris is humbled in Iraq and that the Bush administration's project to democratize the Middle East at gunpoint ends in ignominious withdrawal, going from empire to decolonization in less than two years. Suppose also that no aspiring rival power shows interest in filling the resulting vacuums—not only in coping with Iraq but conceivably also Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Haiti. What would an apolar future look like? The answer is not easy, as there have been very few periods in world history with no contenders for the role of global, or at least regional, hegemon. The nearest approximation in modern times could be the 1920s, when the United States walked away from President Woodrow Wilson's project of global democracy and collective security centered on the League of Nations. There was certainly a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman empires, but it did not last long. The old West European empires were quick to snap up the choice leftovers of Ottoman rule in the Middle East. The Bolsheviks had reassembled the czarist empire by 1922. And by 1936, German revanche was already far advanced. One must go back much further in history to find a period of true and enduring apolarity; as far back, in fact, as the ninth and 10th centuries. In this era, the remains of the Roman Empire—Rome and Byzantium—receded from the height of their power. The leadership of the West was divided between the pope, who led Christendom, and the heirs of Charlemagne, who divided up his short-lived empire under the Treaty of Verdun in 843. No credible claimant to the title of emperor emerged until Otto was crowned in 962, and even he was merely a German prince with pretensions (never realized) to rule Italy. Byzantium, meanwhile, was dealing with the Bulgar rebellion to the north. By 900, the Abbasid caliphate initially established by Abu al-Abbas in 750 had passed its peak; it was in steep decline by the middle of the 10th century. In China, too, imperial power was in a dip between the T'ang and Sung dynasties. Both these empires had splendid capitals—Baghdad and Ch'ang-an—but neither had serious aspirations of territorial expansion. The weakness of the old empires allowed new and smaller entities to flourish. When the Khazar tribe converted to Judaism in 740, their khanate occupied a Eurasian power vacuum between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. In Kiev, far from the reach of Byzantium, the regent Olga laid the foundation for the future Russian Empire in 957 when she converted to the Orthodox Church. The Seljuks—forebears of the Ottoman Turks—carved the Sultanate of Rum as the Abbasid caliphate lost its grip over Asia Minor. Africa had its mini-empire in Ghana; Central America had its Mayan civilization. Connections between these entities were minimal or nonexistent. This condition was the antithesis of globalization. It was a world broken up into disconnected, introverted civilizations. One feature of the age was that, in the absence of strong secular polities, religious questions often produced serious convulsions. Indeed, religious institutions often set the political agenda. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Byzantium was racked by controversy over the proper role of icons in worship. By the 11th century, the pope felt confident enough to humble Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV during the battle over which of them should have the right to appoint bishops. The new monastic orders amassed considerable power in Christendom, particularly the Cluniacs, the first order to centralize monastic authority. In the Muslim world, it was the ulema (clerics) who truly ruled. This atmosphere helps explain why the period ended with the extraordinary holy wars known as the Crusades, the first of which was launched by European Christians in 1095. Yet, this apparent clash of civilizations was in many ways just another example of the apolar world's susceptibility to long-distance military raids directed at urban centers by more backward peoples. The Vikings repeatedly attacked West European towns in the ninth century—Nantes in 842, Seville in 844, to name just two. One Frankish chronicler lamented “the endless flood of Vikings” sweeping southward. Byzantium, too, was sacked in 860 by raiders from Rus, the kernel of the future Russia. This “fierce and savage tribe” showed “no mercy,” lamented the Byzantine patriarch. It was like “the roaring sea … destroying everything, sparing nothing.” Such were the conditions of an anarchic age. Small wonder that the future seemed to lie in creating small, defensible, political units: the Venetian republic—the quintessential city-state, which was conducting its own foreign policy by 840—or Alfred the Great's England, arguably the first thing resembling a nation-state in European history, created in 886. Superpower Failure Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powers—the United States, Europe, and China—retreating into their own regional spheres of influence. But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World War? The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each considers itself in some way representative of the “international community.” Surely their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages? Yet universal claims were also an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. With the end of states' monopoly on the means of violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication, humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors who truly wield global power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction between the world's disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony—its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

## 1NC Case F/L

#### 1. Wars don’t have single causes – consensus of experts

Cashman 2kGreg, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

#### 2. And monocausal focus on root cause justifies violence and tyranny

Achterhuis 2. **[Hans**, Professor of Philosophy @ Twente University, Peace Review, vol. 14, p. 158]

At base, each person who has-or claims to have-a single account for violence is proceeding in an extremely violent manner. Those who claim to know the origin of violence, to know the root of all evil, give themselves at the same stroke the moral right to reach back and root it out-thus providing, via a chain of reasoning with which we are all familiar, the justification for using violence in order to drive violence from the world. If we know where its origin lies, what could be wrong with using violence for the (sole) purpose of obtaining eternal peace and prosperity? This is a violent chain of reasoning. Implicitly or explicitly, it entails the call for a relentless struggle against the discovered origin of evil, whether that be said to lie in a particular class, nation, or ethnic group; a particular social structure such as capitalism or socialism; or a particular condition such as poverty. Whenever or wherever such an origin is posed, violence is alread 'resent for it inevitably sets up the argument that violence is permitted in order to achieve peace. It is a means-ends logic: the noble ends sanctify the violent means. From Valkenberg I learned that we cannot think about violence as a means-ends logic, but only in the form of a dialogue between human beings. If readers sense a strong reaction on my part against monocausal theories, I readily admit that the reaction is first of all directed against myself. For it is a lesson I learned only through trial and error. Once upon a time I too thought that I had located the origin of violence and could thus revolutionize the world. But this, in my opinion, is the greatest temptation for the political thinker. Many political philosophers have proposed totalitarian therapies based on philosophical analyses that attribute the origin of social evil to a single root. But single philosophical answers to the question of violence can never be more than partial. Such answers are but pieces of a dialogue.

#### 3. Moral tunnel vision is complicit with evil

**Isaac 2** – Professor of Political Science, Indiana (Jeffrey, “Ends, Means and Politics,” Dissent 49.2, p 35-6, ebsco, AG)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### 4. Util inevitable in determining which moral rules to follow

**Ratner 84** – Professor of Law, USC (Leonard, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 723, AG)

All systems of morality, however transcendental, rest ultimately on utilitarian self interest (i.e., on personal need/want fulfillment), because those who fashion such systems, like those who accept or reject them, cannot escape their own humanness. The physically controllable acts of each individual 221 are the choice of that individual, though all of the consequences may not be foreseen or desired. 222 Behavior choices are necessarily determined by the experience, feelings, habits, and attitudes; the concerns and beliefs; the needs and wants -- in short, by the ultimate self interest -- of the individual. 223

#### 5. Terrorists have religious motivations that make discourse and compromise meaningless. The only way to win the war we are in is to kill them before they kill us.

Peters 04- (Ralph, Retired Army Officer, “In Praise of Attrition,” Parameters, Summer)

Trust me. We don’t need discourses. We need plain talk, honest answers, and the will to close with the enemy and kill him. And to keep on killing him until it is unmistakably clear to the entire world who won. When military officers start speaking in academic gobbledygook, it means they have nothing to contribute to the effectiveness of our forces. They badly need an assignment to Fallujah. Consider our enemies in the War on Terror. Men who believe, literally, that they are on a mission from God to destroy your civilization and who regard death as a promotion are not impressed by elegant maneuvers. You must find them, no matter how long it takes, then kill them. If they surrender, you must accord them their rights under the laws of war and international conventions. But, as we have learned so painfully from all the mindless, left-wing nonsense spouted about the prisoners at Guantanamo, you are much better off killing them before they have a chance to surrender. We have heard no end of blather about network-centric warfare, to the great profit of defense contractors. If you want to see a superb—and cheap—example of “net-war,” look at al Qaeda. The mere possession of technology does not ensure that it will be used effectively. And effectiveness is what matters. It isn’t a question of whether or not we want to fight a war of attrition against religion-fueled terrorists. We’re in a war of attrition with them. We have no realistic choice. Indeed, our enemies are, in some respects, better suited to both global and local wars of maneuver than we are. They have a world in which to hide, and the world is full of targets for them. They do not heed laws or boundaries. They make and observe no treaties. They do not expect the approval of the United Nations Security Council. They do not face election cycles. And their weapons are largely provided by our own societies. We have the technical capabilities to deploy globally, but, for now, we are forced to watch as Pakistani forces fumble efforts to surround and destroy concentrations of terrorists; we cannot enter any country (except, temporarily, Iraq) without the permission of its government. We have many tools—military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, law enforcement, and so on—but we have less freedom of maneuver than our enemies. But we do have superior killing power, once our enemies have been located. Ultimately, the key advantage of a superpower is superpower. Faced with implacable enemies who would kill every man, woman, and child in our country and call the killing good (the ultimate war of attrition), we must be willing to use that power wisely, but remorselessly. We are, militarily and nationally, in a transition phase. Even after 9/11, we do not fully appreciate the cruelty and determination of our enemies. We will learn our lesson, painfully, because the terrorists will not quit. The only solution is to kill them and keep on killing them: a war of attrition. But a war of attrition fought on our terms, not theirs. Of course, we shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing every terrorist we can find is a good interim solution. The truth is that even if you can’t kill yourself out of the problem, you can make the problem a great deal smaller by effective targeting. And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense. The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11 and do nothing of substance. Success breeds success. Everybody loves a winner. The clichés exist because they’re true. Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups metastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. Some fanatics will flock to the standard of terror, no matter what we do. But it’s far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they’re allowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond. Far worse than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend you’re not in one while your enemy keeps on killing you. Even the occupation of Iraq is a war of attrition. We’re doing remarkably well, given the restrictions under which our forces operate. But no grand maneuvers, no gestures of humanity, no offers of conciliation, and no compromises will persuade the terrorists to halt their efforts to disrupt the development of a democratic, rule-of-law Iraq. On the contrary, anything less than relentless pursuit, with both preemptive and retaliatory action, only encourages the terrorists and remaining Baathist gangsters.

#### 6. Terrorists are inherently evil—the most moral thing to do is to prevent civilians from dying

O’SULLIVAN 2001 (John, Editor-in-chief of United Press International, National Review Online, Sept 25, http://www.nationalreview.com/jos/josprint092501.html)

. Nor is this a hypothetical criticism. Much reporting of the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Colombia, and the Basque country has blurred exactly that distinction. Finally, let us look at Mr. Jukes's underlying justification that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." By a nice coincidence this argument was justly characterized on Saturday in Canada's National Post as "an adolescent sophistry" by the Canadian poet and journalist, George Jonas. Simply put, the sophistry consists of confusing a terrorist's cause with his methods. A terrorist is a man who murders indiscriminately, distinguishing neither between innocent and guilty nor between soldier and civilian. He may employ terrorism — planting bombs in restaurants, or hijacking planes and aiming them at office towers-in a bad cause or in a good one. He may be a Nazi terrorist, or an anti-Nazi terrorist, a Communist or an anti-Communist, pro-Palestinian or pro-Israel. We may want to defeat his political cause or see it triumph. For his methods, however, the terrorist is always to be condemned. Indeed, to describe him objectively is to condemn him — even if his cause is genuinely a fight for freedom with which we sympathize. Therein lies Mr. Jukes's trial and temptation. Those who sympathize with the terrorist's cause — whether they are Islamic fundamentalists seeking America's withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, or Spanish citizens in the Basque country who want an independent Basque state, or Irish Americans seeking Britain's withdrawal from Northern Ireland — are tempted to overlook or deny his methods. They do not want to acknowledge that someone is killing innocent people in the name of a cause they passionately support. They wish to banish such an uncomfortable truth from their minds. So they do not like to see him accurately described as a terrorist. It makes them feel guilty about the support and sympathy they give him; it may even make them reconsider that support.

When Reuters decided not to call the perpetrators of the World Trade Center attack "terrorists," it took a step towards making people feel less guilty about aiding or sympathizing with such evil. It was a small step, but an unnecessary one. And it should be retraced.

#### 7. Turn- Fear of nuclear war is key to preventing it.

Futterman 94 (J. A. H., Physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Meditations on the Bomb,” http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html)

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs. In other words, when the peace movement tells the world that we need to treat each other more kindly, I and my colleagues stand behind it (like Malcolm X stood behind Martin Luther King, Jr.) saying, "Or else." We provide the peace movement with a needed sense of urgency that it might otherwise lack.

#### 8. Their representations of embracing the inevitability of threats locks us into pacifist discourse of inaction that allows for people like Hitler and nuclear weapons to arise

Futterman 94 (J. A. H., Physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Meditations on the Bomb,” http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html)AB

Still, it is worth noting that neither of the above encounters ended in violence against the aggressor. The aggressor was merely deterred from further aggression by a willingness to fight, on the part of my friends or myself. In both cases, the bully was shown that, "If you act crazy (violently), we/I will match your craziness." In both cases, that was enough. Such a reaction is neither passive nor aggressive — it is assertive. [[3]](http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html#3) Of course, if deterrence is not enough, if your opponent is that crazy, what do you do? Running away may work for individuals, but not for nations, so I will neglect that option. Negotiation is also unworkable, because you can't reason with bullies. They exhibit a kind of willful mindlessness, a demonic will to unconsciousness. They don't negotiate back, they merely use your forbearance to buy time and opportunity to get at you, or to get around you — like Hitler did, while Chamberlain declared, "peace in our time." You assert your position, and set some limits. And if they exceed your limits, you use force. But is it moral to use force? Those of us who might contemplate calling the police in order to stop a murder must believe that occasionally it is. Further, I maintain that sometimes it may be immoral to do anything else. Remember that Hitler could have been stopped easily by a show of force when he threatened to annex the Sudetenland. That force was not brought to bear in a timely manner is due largely to the pacifist sentiment in Europe and America at the time. Instead of engaging in a minor military expedition which would have forced Hitler to back down, to lose face, and ultimately to lose political power, the world passively sold out Czechoslovakia to him, paving the way for a much more prolonged and bloody conflict later — a conflict that resulted in the development of the first atomic bombs. In other words, I think a reflexive pacifism is no more entitled to a presumption of moral innocence than nuclear weapons work, and that pacifism applied in the wrong way at the wrong time contributed to the development of the nuclear weapons that pacifists now find so abhorrent. In short, pacifism can sometimes help to make wars bigger and worse than they have to be.

#### 9. Threats real—default to expert consensus

Knudsen **1**– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they refer to 'real' phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

#### 10. Don’t let them say root cause- prefer our specific conceptualization of threats

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online)

While in some natural sciences laboratory experiments can be conducted to isolate individual causal forces, this is not what defines science in natural sciences: this is an unrealistic and unnecessary expectation in the social sciences, with dynamic ontological objects. It is true that parsimonious accounts can be helpful in some contexts and that all approaches must engage in some simplification. Yet it does not mean that parsimony should be prioritised: oversimplification entails important weaknesses in social explanations. Simplified analyses of complex social processes do not necessarily provide the most interesting, nor sufficiently nuanced, causal explanations to facilitate adequate understanding of social issues. As critics have pointed out it is not insignificant theoretically or politically that positivist democratic peace theory, for example, has tended to lack appreciation of the complex historical conditioning of democratic politics within states and actions of democratic states within global economic, political and cultural relations.41

#### 11. Good-Evil Dichotomies inev- Ego in resources

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 77-78 //adi]

Humans make in-group/out-group distinctions for three reasons. First, humans seek resources—food, water, and shelter—to care for themselves and relatives, and they seek mates to reproduce their genotype; in sum, they are egoistic for the reasons advanced by Darwin, William Hamilton, and other evolutionary theorists, as I described in chapter 1 and in the discussion above. They are unlikely to assist those who are not related, but may do so occasionally, expecting reciprocal behavior. Humans behave in these ways because resources were scarce in the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holoccne environments in which we evolved. In that environment, it is easy to understand why humans would prefer more resources to fewer: more strength is preferable to less strength, more wealth to less wealth, domination to being dominated. Most people do indeed prefer more resources to fewer; the rich want even more wealth, and seldom say they are too wealthy. Rather, they seem to worry about protecting their wealth from those who may take it from them, such as revolutionaries or the government. In essence, in prehistoric times when there was too little to go around, humans discriminated between self and others, family and others, tribe and others, in-groups and out-groups. This behavior remains today. We humans are likely to perceive out-groups as threats to our resources, the resources we need to maintain ourselves and our families and extended in-groups such as the tribe or state.

# 2NC

## 2NC Identity PIC --- Overview

#### Only the counterplan accesses radical agency --- individually, we are limited by our own visualization but as an anonymous collective we have true agency

Dr. Charles Greene, received his Doctorate in Physiology and Biophysics from the University of Washington, 8/01/10, http://indigestmag.com/blog/?p=4316#.UQoKmr\_C2So, “Artburn: Anonymous Collective: Siegfried Kracauer, Guy Debord, and Andreas Gursky”; hhs-ab

Through the spectacle everything becomes fabsorbed into the visual mass, and we are doomed to understand the world only via that which can be visualized. Our consciousness thus constituted, we are ripe for the power of visual suggestion. In a society so constructed, we are not viewed as individuals, but equivalent units of consumption for whom products can be produced. In this way the modern production/consumption cycle is perpetuated. Individually we have little meaning, but as individuals within the anonymous collective we play our part, each filling in our single pixilated point in the composition of the big picture of economic “progress” (read: perpetuity). We can see this reality represented to stunning and beautiful effect in the photography of Andreas Gursky.

#### The 1AC inscription of identity controls the proximate cause of conflict --- history flows neg

John Ikenberry, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, May/June 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61533/g-john-ikenberry/identity-and-violence-the-illusion-of-destiny, Review of Amartya Sen’s “Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny”; hhs-ab

Why is the world racked by barbarity and violence? In this provocative little book, the Nobel laureate economist argues that the causes are as much distorted identities as nasty intentions. When people

acquire a strong and exclusive sense of belonging to a single group, Sen notes, the conditions ripen for conflict and violence; when shrunken and shorn of its layered complexity, identity can kill -- Hutus massacre Tutsis, for example, when they no longer see themselves also as Rwandan, African, laborers, and human beings. Sen suggests that sectarian hatreds around the world -- in places such as Kosovo, Bosnia,

Rwanda, Timor, Israel, Palestine, and Sudan -- are ignited or exacerbated by illusions of unique and choiceless identities, leading Sen to take issue with Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis. When civilizations conflict it is because of a failure -- often a cultivated failure -- to appreciate the true diversity of identities that infuse them. Sen eloquently describes the dangers of this flattening of human identity. He is less clear, however, about how to nurture a global environment where the richness and multiplicity of identities can thrive.

#### The recognition of the Anonymous pseudonym is key to freedom

Max Halupka, The Flinders University of South Australia Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences School of Social and Policy Studies Honours Program in Political Studies application for BA, 2011, http://www.academia.edu/1220969/The\_Evolution\_of\_Anonymous\_as\_a\_Political\_Actor, “The Evolution of Anonymous as a Political Actor”; hhs-ab

Anonymous can be effectively categorized as an example of Aquila and Ronfeldt’s (2001) “all-channel network”. Characterised as structurally flat the all-channel network possesses no overarching chain of command or authoritative body. The network as a whole is comprised of several autonomous nodes adhering to little or no hierarchy, yet still capable of communicating to all affiliated participants. Similarities to Anonymous own structural composition are immediately evident. As a collective it is comprised of several independent communities, each identifying with the Anonymous “brand”. Each node is functionally isolated from the others in that they possess their own combination of community parameters. The DCN period demonstrates this network form through the creation of multiple communities enacting varying functions. During this period, though Anonymous existed as a single community, it was comprised of a multitude of different operations and objectives, all being carried out simultaneously. For example, in addition to providing assistance to the Arab Spring conflict in early 2011, the Anonymous community also initiated its attacks on HBGary Federal. Though these were the most successful unpublicized political actions, AnonOps, at the same time contained dozens of smaller developing operations, each with its own dedicated participant base. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) suggest that the capacity of an all-channel network to perform effectively is dependent on the presence of an overarching doctrine or ideology which spans all comprised nodes and is deeply subscribed to by all participants. The collective identity of Anonymous itself fulfils this role adequately as it represents an understanding of the community’s implicit norms. Though the Moralist / Purist split divided the collective’s philosophical understanding of the collective itself, communal norms still arose through the outward projection that the Anonymous “brand” entailed and the internal embracement of its characteristics. Thus, individuals who utilise the Anonymous pseudonym do so in recognition of its symbolism as a collective hive mind which encourages freedom of thought and action through the removal of identifiable markers.

#### That means the counterplan accesses all of their “state bad” offense --- anonymity is key to obscure the guardianship of the state

Max Halupka, The Flinders University of South Australia Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences School of Social and Policy Studies Honours Program in Political Studies application for BA, 2011, http://www.academia.edu/1220969/The\_Evolution\_of\_Anonymous\_as\_a\_Political\_Actor, “The Evolution of Anonymous as a Political Actor”; hhs-ab

As a collective, Anonymous subscribes to a leaderless ethos, backed by a community structure which does not congregate on any single platform. From this perspective, it is easy to see why Anonymous might be considered a realisation of anarchic principles. Feverishly abdicating a hierarchical structure, Anonymous’s community, in this broad sense, resists any attempt by the individual to fill the leaderless void. Such a comparison is strengthened by their adoption of a mass pseudonym as it effectively obscures the guardianship of state, and subsequent creation of a system of elites through its propagation of anonymous interactions and anti-individualistic ideology (Mills 1956). Drawing upon these characteristics, Kelley (2011) firmly positions Anonymous as a contemporary example of an anarchist actor. Coleman (2011) however, is unconvinced of this comparison. While she does observe similar elements, she argues that Anonymous subscribes to no singular political discourse. As this thesis has demonstrated, while Anonymous may display anarchistic tendencies, they also demonstrate attributes originating from several otherpolitical forms. Adding to this notion, Coleman (2011) argues that while anarchists may exist within the community, they do not comprise the majority. Furthermore, the Anonymous’s community’s sense of superiority over the inferior “mass” also seemingly contradicts the anarchism comparison.

## 2NC Identity PIC --- Solvency Wall

#### The counterplan acts as a magnifying filter for the 1ACs solvency --- we allow for the connection of lines of flight to exist that would otherwise be coopted by identification

Max Halupka, The Flinders University of South Australia Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences School of Social and Policy Studies Honours Program in Political Studies application for BA, 2011, http://www.academia.edu/1220969/The\_Evolution\_of\_Anonymous\_as\_a\_Political\_Actor, “The Evolution of Anonymous as a Political Actor”; hhs-ab

The third and final defining characteristic of a social movement refers to a capacity to engage relevant issues. To this Diani (1992, p. 11) writes ‘social movement actors are engaged in political and / or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change either at the systematic or non-systematic level’. Anonymous’s ability to engage opponents is well documented within Chapter 3’s conceptualisation of their development. Yet the key element in Diani’s (1992) characteristic is not whether they can engage, but rather if they doso to seek or prevent social change. A number of Anonymous’s operations have been focused on such socio-political change. As a definitive social movement, Project Chanology immediately comes to mind (Underwood 2009). With the introduction of moralistic elements, Project Chanology aimed to inform the public of Scientology’s questionable practices. The movement saw its ultimate goal as the restriction of the Church’s ability to affectively function both online and off. In doing this, Anonymous sought to change the societal perception of the religion, limiting its capability to convert new members. Considering its adherence to Diani’s (1992) identified dynamics, this thesis argues that Anonymous can be seen functioning as a social movement much in the same way as the anti-globalisation movement. The anti-globalization movement can be characterized by its propagation of anti-capitalist ideology. Its “collective identity” stands as the opposition tithe unregulated political power of Multinational Corporation and in this, the maximization of profits at the expense of the proletariat (Beckett 2002; Bennett 2003). Lloyd (2001) suggests that within this collective opposition to globalization, several grassroots sub-movements developed, each with their own agenda. These movements included: the Homeless Workers’ Movement, Grassroots Global Justice Alliance, and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (Redden 2001; Sullivan 2004; Couch 2010; Hunt-Hendrix and Soriano2011). Proponents of these grassroots campaigns, though independent in their specific agenda, identified with the broader anti-globalization movement. In this way the anti-globalization movement, while acting as a social movement, facilitated the development of separate sub- movements.

## 2NC Identity PIC --- AT: Perm - Do Both

#### 3.) Any attempt to ascribe identity to a leaderless mass leads to resistance and collapse of the movement

Max Halupka, The Flinders University of South Australia Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences School of Social and Policy Studies Honours Program in Political Studies application for BA, 2011, http://www.academia.edu/1220969/The\_Evolution\_of\_Anonymous\_as\_a\_Political\_Actor, “The Evolution of Anonymous as a Political Actor”; hhs-ab

As a collective, Anonymous subscribes to a leaderless ethos, backed by a community structure which does not congregate on any single platform. From this perspective, it is easy to see why Anonymous might be considered a realisation of anarchic principles. Feverishly abdicating a hierarchical structure, Anonymous’s community, in this broad sense, resists any attempt by the individual to fill the leaderless void. Such a comparison is strengthened by their adoption of a mass pseudonym as it effectively obscures the guardianship of state, and subsequent creation of a system of elites through its propagation of anonymous interactions and anti-individualistic ideology (Mills 1956). Drawing upon these characteristics, Kelley (2011) firmly positions Anonymous as a contemporary example of an anarchist actor. Coleman (2011) however, is unconvinced of this comparison. While she does observe similar elements, she argues that Anonymous subscribes to no singular political discourse. As this thesis has demonstrated, while Anonymous may display anarchistic tendencies, they also demonstrate attributes originating from several otherpolitical forms. Adding to this notion, Coleman (2011) argues that while anarchists may exist within the community, they do not comprise the majority. Furthermore, the Anonymous’s community’s sense of superiority over the inferior “mass” also seemingly contradicts the anarchism comparison.

## 2NC War Powers K --- AT: Perm - Do Both

#### 4. PERM IMPOSSIBLE- we must choose between universalization of values or recognition of enmity.

Moreiras 04 [Director of European Studies at Duke, Alberto, “A God without Sovereignty. Political Jouissance. The Passive Decision”, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3, p. 79-80, Project MUSE]

The friend/enemy division is peculiar at the highest level, at the level of the order of the political. This peculiarity ultimately destroys the under- standing of the political as based on and circumscribed by the friend/enemy division. The idea of **an order of the political presupposes that the enemies of the order as such**—that is, the enemy configuration that can overthrow a given order, or even the very idea of an order of the political—**are generated from the inside**: enemies of the order are not properly external enemies. This is so **because the order of the political**, as a principle of division, as division itself, **always already** regulates, and thus **subsumes, its** externality: **externality is produced by the order** as such, and it is a function of the order. Or rather: a principle of division can have no externality. Beyond the order, there can be enemies, if attacked, but they are not necessarily enemies of the order: they are simply ignorant of it. At the highest level of the political, at the highest level of the friend/ enemy division, there where the very existence of a given order of the political is at stake, the order itself secretes its own enmity. Enmity does not precede the order: it is in every case produced by the order. **The friend/enemy division is** therefore a division that is **subordinate to the primary ordering division**, produced from itself. The friend/enemy division is therefore not supreme: **a nomic antithesis generates it**, **and** thus **stands above** it. The order of the political rules over politics. The political ontology implied inthe notion ofan order of the political deconstructs the **political** ontology ciphered in the friend/enemy division, and vice versa. They are mutually incompatible**. Either the friend/enemy division is supreme**, for a determination of the political, **or the order of the political is** supreme**. Both** of them **cannot simultaneously be supreme. The gap between them is** strictly **untheorizable.** If the friend/enemy division obtains independently of all the other antitheses as politically primary, then there is no order of the political. If there is an order of the political, the order produces its own political divisions.

#### 4. The perm attempts to restrict the executive response to the exception, but concedes the existence of an exceptional circumstance. One cannot remain equivocal. This can only paper-over the exception to trigger the impacts.

Dysenhaus ’06 (David. The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Page 179-180)

My point here is not that the majority were wrong to defer, but that ¶ they failed to require that a proper case for deference be made. In failing ¶ so to require, they in effect conceded to Schmitt the first limb of his claim ¶ about states of emergency - that it is for the executive to decide when ¶ there is a state of exception. Moreover, they concede that limb in the ¶ way which, as I have argued throughout this book, makes things worse ¶ from the perspective of the rule of law. They still adopt the regulative ¶ assumption that all exercises of public power are legally constrained. But ¶ their understanding of constraint is so thin that it becomes merely formal, ¶ with the result that they claim that the declaration of the state of emergency ¶ has met the test of legality, even as they empty the test of rule-of-law substance. The majority did face a rather large problem though in confronting this ¶ Issue. There was no doubt that the United Kingdom faced a serious threat ¶ of terror attacks and the events of July 2005 confirmed the government's ¶ claims. But the issue of whether that threat, or indeed actual attacks, ¶ amounted to an emergency in accordance with the Article 15 definition ¶ was not so much debated but asserted, as one can gather from both the¶ account in the judges' speeches of the government's arguments and by ¶ Lord Hoffmann's cursory dismissal of those arguments. One can sum up ¶ the majority view by saying that if there is some reason to suppose that ¶ there is an emergency, that is, it is not irrational to claim that there is, even ¶ if the judges doubt that there is, they still have to give the benefit of the ¶ doubt to the executive. And not only is that just the test that was suggested ¶ by Lord Hoffmann in Rehman for review of decisions concerning national ¶ security, but Lord Bingham seemed to accept that the jurisprudence of ¶ Rehman should determine this issue. In order for the judges to do more, they would need a better justificatory basis to scrutinize. For there to be such a basis, the government would ¶ have to be prepared to treat Parliament as more than a rubber stamp for ¶ legislation when the government thinks it needs more powers to confront ¶ an alleged crisis. Not only would the government have to forego its standard (and nearly always unjustified) line that there is no time to debate ¶ properly both the extent of the emergency and the appropriate responses ¶ to it. It would have to devise some system of parliamentary committees ¶ which could hear that part of the government's case which could not be ¶ publicly debated. To use the term introduced at the end of the last chapter ¶ more constitutional furniture would have to be put in place in order to ¶ ensure that the government could meet its justificatory responsibilities ¶ before the judges could carry out their duty properly to evaluate the government's case. And for the judges to carry out that duty, they would of ¶ course have to be given some means of testing the arguments made in the ¶ closed committee sessions. The upshot for my critique of the majority on this first issue is not ¶ that I think the judges were obviously wrong to defer to the government's ¶ claim that there was a state of emergency. Rather, my critique is that ¶ they should have made clear both that they did not have an adequate ¶ basis for testing that claim and that the government should take suitable ¶ steps to make an adequate justification possible. They needed to do that ¶ because the two limbs of Schmitt's challenge cannot be separated. As we ¶ know, the majority denied the second limb of Schmitt's claim. They held ¶ contrary to him and to the government, that judges can effectively, and ¶ are entitled to, second-guess the way that the executive chooses to respond ¶ to the emergency, and the logic of that holding extends to the question¶ whether there is an emergency. For the propriety of the response can only ¶ be assessed against a view of what the response is to, a view of whether ¶ there is an emergency and, if there is, of what kind.

## 2NC War Powers K --- Impact Wall - Generic

#### Enmity prefigures subjectivity.

Vatter 02

(Migel, Author, “ Politics as war: a formula for radical democracy”, 10 May)

Schmitt argues that in war it is up to each individual to decide for themselves "whether the otherness of the stranger in the concrete, present case of conflict means the negation of one’s own kind of existence and therefore must be fended off or fought against in battle in order to save one’s own, existential kind of life." But the force of Schmitt’s argument is precisely that it is not a pre-given, culturally determined "kind of existence" that is "one’s own" and that could serve as criterion for deciding who is the authentic enemy**.** On the contrary, **the judgment as to what ought to be one’s authentic form of life can only result from the confrontation with the decision as to who is the enemy** : "The enemy is not something that for some reason must be done away with and annihilated because of its want of value. The enemy is on my own level.For this reason I must confront him in battle in order to gain my own standard, my own limit, my own figure." Without this confrontation with the question of othernessthere is no such thing as "one’s own kind of existence" because there is no term against which to determine what is authentically "one’s own". Hence Schmitt can say that his conception of the political is none other than a transcription of the Biblical Ur-scene : the story of Cain and Abel, where "the other reveals himself as my brother," because one does not start with knowing who the enemy is, and "the brother reveals himself as my enemy," becauseone comes to know oneself only by making the decision on who is enemy. In this sense, Schmitt belongs to a postmodern constellation for which any claim to self-identity passes through the prior acknowledgment of the other as other.

## 2NC War Powers K --- Alternative Wall - Generic

#### Their attempt to police the boundaries of ‘proper’ critique destroys the possibility of self-reflection. The absolute denial of validity to forms of political expression based on asserted starting points creates a fundamentalist ethic that violently cleanses those with dirty hands.

William Rasch, Germanic Studies – Indiana, ‘5 (*South Atlantic Quarterly* 104:2, Spring)

But how are we to respond? For those who say there is no war and who yet find themselves witnessing daily bloodshed, Adornoian asceticism (refraining from participating in the nihilism of the political) or Benjaminian weak, quasi, or other messianism (waiting for the next incarnation of the historical subject [the multitudes?] or the next proletarian general strike [the event?]) would seem to be the answer. To this, however, those who say there is a war can respond only with bewilderment. Waiting for a ‘‘completely new politics’’ 10 and completely new political agents, waiting for the event and the right moment to name it, or waiting for universal ontological redemption feels much like waiting for the Second Coming, or,more accurately, for Godot. And have we not all grown weary of waiting? The war we call ‘‘the political,’’ whether nihilist or not, happily goes on while we watch Rome burn. As Schmitt wrote of the relationship of early Christianity to the Roman Empire, ‘‘The belief that a restrainer holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge between the notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian empire of the Germanic kings’’ (60).One does not need to believe in the virtues of that particular ‘‘historical monolith’’ to understand the dangers of eschatological paralysis. But as Max Weber observed firsthand, ascetic quietude leads so often, so quickly, and so effortlessly to the chiliastic violence that knows no bounds;11 and as we have lately observed anew, the millennial messianism of imperial rulers and nomadic partisans alike dominates the contemporary political landscape. The true goal of those who say there is no war is to eliminate the war that actually exists by eliminating those Lyons and Tygers and other Savage Beasts who say there is a war. This war is the truly savage war. It is the war we witness today. No amount of democratization, pacification, or Americanization will mollify its effects, because democratization, pacification, and Americanization are among the weapons used by those who say there is no war to wage their war to end all war. What is to be done? If you are one who says there is a war, and if you say it not because you glory in it but because you fear it and hate it, then your goal is to limit it and its effects, not eliminate it, which merely intensifies it, but limit it by drawing clear lines within which it can be fought, and clear lines between those who fight it and those who don’t, lines between friends, enemies, and neutrals, lines between combatants and noncombatants. There are, of course, legitimate doubts about whether those ideal lines could ever be drawn again; nevertheless, the question that we should ask is not how can we establish perpetual peace, but rather a more modest one: Can symmetrical relationships be guaranteed only by asymmetrical ones? According to Schmitt, historically this has been the case. ‘‘The traditional Eurocentric order of international law is foundering today, as is the old nomos of the earth. This order arose from a legendary and unforeseen discovery of a new world, from an unrepeatable historical event. Only in fantastic parallels can one imagine a modern recurrence, such as men on their way to the moon discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on earth’’ (39). We have since gone to the moon and have found nothing on the way there to exploit. We may soon go to Mars, if current leaders have their way, but the likelihood of finding exploitable populations seems equally slim. Salvation through spatially delimited asymmetry, even were it to be desired, is just not on the horizon. And salvation through globalization, that is, through global unity and equality, is equally impossible, because today’s asymmetry is not so much a localization of the exception as it is an invisible generation of the exception from within that formal ideal of unity, a generation of the exception as the difference between the human and the inhuman outlaw, the ‘‘Savage Beast, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.’’ We are, therefore, thrown back upon ourselves, which is to say, upon those artificial ‘‘moral persons’’ who act as our collective political identities. They used to be called states. What they will be called in the future remains to be seen. But, if we think to establish a differentiated unity of discrete political entities that once represented for Schmitt ‘‘the highest form of order within the scope of human power,’’ then we must symmetrically manage the necessary pairing of inclusion and exclusion without denying the ‘‘forms of power and domination’’ that inescapably accompany human ordering. We must think the possibility of roughly equivalent power relations rather than fantasize the elimination of power from the political universe. This, conceivably, was also Schmitt’s solution. Whether his idea of the plurality of Großräume could ever be carried out under contemporary circumstances is, to be sure, more than a little doubtful, given that the United States enjoys a monopoly on guns, goods, and the Good, in the form of a supremely effective ideology of universal ‘‘democratization.’’ Still, we would do well to devise vocabularies that do not just emphatically repeat philosophically more sophisticated versions of the liberal ideology of painless, effortless, universal equality. The space of the political will never be created by a bloodless, Benjaminian divine violence. Nor is it to be confused with the space of the simply human. To dream the dreams of universal inclusion may satisfy an irrepressible human desire, but it may also always produce recurring, asphyxiating political nightmares of absolute exclusion.

## 2NC War Powers K --- AT: Binaries Bad

#### The dissolution of binaries causes global, genocidal war BECAUSE OF lashout

#### **Reinhard 2k4**

[Kenneth, Professor of Jewish Studies at UCLA, 2004, “Towards a Political Theology- Of the Neighbor,” online: <http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards_Political_Theology.pdf>]

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destruction would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous –forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

# 1NR

## Hegemony DA --- Overview

#### shifts in heg don’t matter because it’s ultimately sustainable

Walt 9 – Prof IR @ Harvard, Stephen, “What I told the Navy”, Foreign Policy, June 18, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/18/what\_i\_told\_the\_navy

This view is at odds with a lot of contemporary writing about America's international position

AND

by continued efforts to secure existing nuclear arsenals and potentially usable nuclear materials.

## Hegemony DA --- 2NC Link Wall

#### Naïve critiques of American leadership undermine domestic support for hegemony

Holmes 8– Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director, Institute for International Studies (Kim, 3/14, Liberty's Best Hope, http://www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/hl1069.cfm, AG)

But there is a deeper, more homegrown challenge to American leadership. Some Americans no longer believe that America has the moral stature to be a world leader. Their doubts about traditional American values lead them to be skeptical about the assertion of American power abroad. In other words, they have doubts about us as a nation, mak­ing them reluctant to support an assertive foreign policy abroad. They fall back into a mindset like that of our European friends; they want to constrain and tame American power--to make us atone for our alleged sins and to create a nation not unlike what you may find in the European Union.

**Discourse at the high school academic level uniquely key—leftist critique paralyses the US and appeases enemies**

**Hanson 3** – Professor Emeritus of Classics, California State (Victor, The Fruits of Appeasement, http://city-journal.org/html/14\_2\_the\_fruits.html, AG)

Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our appeasement of Middle Eastern terrorists derived from a new sort of anti-Americanism that thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers’ paradise—not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it. If Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States. The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. Communism’s demise likewise freed these trendy ideologies from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: “I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas.” From writers like Arundhati Roy and Michel Foucault (who anointed Khomeini “a kind of mystic saint” who would usher in a new “political spirituality” that would “transfigure” the world) and from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre (“to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time”), there filtered down a vague notion that the United States and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic racism and the legacy of colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescension—all this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut. [continues] This nonjudgmentalism—essentially a form of nihilism—deemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely “different” rather than odious. Anyone who has taught freshmen at a state university can sense the fuzzy thinking of our undergraduates: most come to us prepped in high schools not to make “value judgments” about “other” peoples who are often “victims” of American “oppression.” Thus, before female-hating psychopath Mohamed Atta piloted a jet into the World Trade Center, neither Western intellectuals nor their students would have taken him to task for what he said or condemned him as hypocritical for his parasitical existence on Western society. Instead, without logic but with plenty of romance, they would more likely have excused him as a victim of globalization or of the biases of American foreign policy. They would have deconstructed Atta’s promotion of anti-Semitic, misogynist, Western-hating thought, as well as his conspiracies with Third World criminals, as anything but a danger and a pathology to be remedied by deportation or incarceration.

#### This type of ivory-tower intellectualism empirically collapses civilizations

**Hanson 3** – Professor Emeritus of Classics, California State (Victor, We Could Still Lose, http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3050721.html, AG)

Instead, we have the leisure to engage in utopian musing, assured that our economy, our unseen soldiers, or our system working on autopilot will always ensure us such prerogatives. And in the la-la land of Washington and New York, it is especially easy to forget that we are not even like our own soldiers in Iraq, now sleeping outside without toilets and air conditioners, eating dehydrated food, and trying to distinguish killers from innocents. What does all this mean? Western societies from ancient Athens to imperial Rome to the French republic rarely collapsed because of a shortage of resources or because foreign enemies proved too numerous or formidable in arms—even when those enemies were grim Macedonians or Germans. Rather, in times of peace and prosperity there arose an unreal view of the world beyond their borders, one that was the product of insularity brought about by success, and an intellectual arrogance that for some can be the unfortunate by-product of an enlightened society. I think we are indulging in this unreal hypercriticism—even apart from the election season antics of our politicians—because we are not being gassed or shot or even left hot or hungry. September 11 no longer evokes an image of incinerated firefighters, innocents leaping out of skyscrapers, or the stench of flesh and melted plastic but rather squabbles over architectural designs, lawsuits, snarling over John Ashcroft’s new statutes, or concerns about being too rude to the Arab street. Such smug dispensation—as profoundly amoral as it is—provides us, on the cheap and at a safe distance, with a sense of moral worth. Or perhaps censuring from the bleachers enables us to feel superior to those less fortunate who are still captive to their primordial appetites. We prefer to cringe at the thought that others like to see proof of their killers’ deaths, prefer to shoot rather than die capturing a mass murderer, and welcome a generic profile of those who wish to kill them en masse. We should take stock of this dangerous and growing mind-set—and remember that wealthy, sophisticated societies like our own are rarely overrun. They simply implode—whining and debating to the end, even as they pass away.

## Hegemony DA --- 2NC Impact Wall

#### Nuclear rhetoric is key to avoid catastrophe – Futterman 94 says only fear of nukes incentivizes us to develop solutions like hegemony

**Prefer our highly probably impact scenarios - Reject all of their Anti American authors**

**Hanson 2** – Professor Emeritus of Classics, California State (Victor, 11/27, A Funny Sort of Empire, http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson112702.asp, AG)

Much, then, of what we read about the evil of American imperialism is written by post-heroic and bored elites, intellectuals, and coffeehouse hacks, whose freedom and security are a given, but whose rarified tastes are apparently unshared and endangered. In contrast, the poorer want freedom and material things first — and cynicism, skepticism, irony, and nihilism second. So we should not listen to what a few say, but rather look at what many do. Critiques of the United States based on class, race, nationality, or taste have all failed to explicate, much less stop, the American cultural juggernaut.

**Evaluate our impacts based on historical consensus – US primacy is key to prevent loss of human rights and great power wars**

**Thayer,** Prof of Poli Sci **2006** – PolSci Professor, Minnesota Former Research Fellow, International Security Program from Harvard Bradley, Nov/Dec, In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest)

U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars.

**We control empirics – unipolarity drastically decreases conflict**

**Wohlforth** **8**—Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale (William, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest, AMiles)

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. **The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems**. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "**The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity**."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

## Hegemony DA --- 2NC Impact - Genocide

#### The west is key to prevent genocide

Boot 3 – CFR senior fellow (Max, American Imperialism?, www.attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot\_Imperialim\_fine.pdf, AG)

But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing.

## Hegemony DA --- 2NC Impact - Disease

#### Hege solves disease.

Kickbusch 2 – head of the Division of Global Health at the Yale University School of Medicine, Department of Epidemiology and Public Health. From 1994 to 1998 she was director of communication at the World Health Organization, Ilona, “Influence And Opportunity: Reflections On The U.S. Role In Global Public Health”, Health Affairs, Nov-Dec;21(6):131-41.

U.S. role in the global arena. It seems at first instance that the United States is pursuing a vigorous international health policy that provides an opportunity for leadership that is grounded in the United States’ strength in biomedical sciences and its application.13 The concept of global health has been developed in large part in U.S. academe, think tanks, foundations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which have played a key role in setting the global health agenda and in framing the international debate. The U.S. government during the Clinton administration played a persuasive role in the global arena in moving health from being defined as "just" a humanitarian issue to being one with important economic and security consequences. With strong U.S. support at the Okinawa Summit in July 2000, the G8 leaders committed themselves to halve the global infectious disease burden by reducing the share of the world’s population living in extreme poverty to half its 1990 levels by 2015 and establishing a global fund to fight infectious diseases, primarily AIDS.14 Under U.S. leadership in a March 2000 session chaired by then Vice-President Al Gore, the United Nations (UN) Security Council debated a health issue for the first time in history when it discussed HIV/AIDS. In May 2001 President George W. Bush announced $200 million as the first contribution of a government to the new Global Fund on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.15 In late July 2002 the full Senate approved S. 2525, the United States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2002, which authorizes $2.2 billion to go to the Global Fund, pending approval from the Appropriations Committee later this year.16 This pledge makes the United States the largest single donor to the Global Fund.17

#### Extinction.

Frank Ryan, M.D., 1997, virus X, p. 366

How might the human race appear to such an aggressively emerging virus? That teeming, globally intrusive species, with its transcontinental air travel, massively congested cities, sexual promiscuity, and in the less affluent regions — where the virus is most likely to first emerge — a vulnerable lack of hygiene with regard to food and water supplies and hospitality to biting insects' The virus is best seen, in John Hollands excellent analogy, as a swarm of competing mutations, with each individual strain subjected to furious forces of natural selection for the strain, or strains, most likely to amplify and evolve in the new ecological habitat.3 With such a promising new opportunity in the invaded species, natural selection must eventually come to dominate viral behavior. In time the dynamics of infection will select for a more resistant human population. Such a coevolution takes rather longer in "human" time — too long, given the ease of spread within the global village. A rapidly lethal and quickly spreading virus simply would not have time to switch from aggression to coevolution. And there lies the danger. Joshua Lederbergs prediction can now be seen to be an altogether logical one. Pandemics are inevitable. Our incredibly rapid human evolution, our overwhelming global needs, the advances of our complex industrial society, all have moved the natural goalposts. The advance of society, the very science of change, has greatly augmented the potential for the emergence of a pandemic strain. It is hardly surprising that Avrion Mitchison, scientific director of Deutsches Rheuma Forschungszentrum in Berlin, asks the question: "Will we survive!” We have invaded every biome on earth and we continue to destroy other species so very rapidly that one eminent scientist foresees the day when no life exists on earth apart from the human monoculture and the small volume of species useful to it. An increasing multitude of disturbed viral-host symbiotic cycles are provoked into self-protective counterattacks. This is a dangerous situation. And we have seen in the previous chapter how ill-prepared the world is to cope with it. It begs the most frightening question of all: could such a pandemic virus cause the extinction of the human species?

## 2NC Case --- Utilitarianism Ext

#### Comparing magnitude is inevitable and not calculative thought

Foster 97 – Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy, Lancaster (John, Valuing Nature?, p 232-3, AG)

It is crucial to see that the language of ‘costs and benefits’, just as used in [W], need not commit us to any more than this; in particular, it need not commit us to any view implying that cost-benefit analysis within a utilitarian framework offers an appropriate form of decision-procedure to institutionalise such judgement. For one thing, the term ‘benefit’ carries no necessary implication that such claims as [W] are reducible to expressions of self-interest, still less to expressions of differentially-forceful subjective preference. We might equally have said, in objective mode, that the good involved in or associated with preventing further extinctions outweighs that involved in or associated with the alternative. Most importantly, such statements about the comparative weight of benefit as against cost need not be seen as giving or anticipating the result of any calculation; rather, they represent an eminently natural way of embodying and conveying a judgement.

## 2NC Case --- Calculations Ext

#### Political calculations are inevitable and good – some people will always be wronged under any policy

Frankel**,** prof. of philosophy and public affairs at Columbia University, 1975 (Charles, “Morality and U.S. Foreign Policy”, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/v18\_i006\_a006.pdf)

What are we to make of statements like Professor Morgenthau’s to the effect that “the political act is inevitably evil”? In the ordinary use of the word evil the ‘statement is false: political acts aren’t inevitably evil. A successful negotiation staving off a bloody war, a nuclear test-ban treaty, an international agreement to combat malaria are none of ‘them evil in the everyday language of everyday people. The only explanation for this otherwise puzzling statement is that Professor Morgenthau is using the word in an esoteric way. He means, one must presume, that in negotiating an end to a war or arriving at international agreements some people’s interests will be adversely affected, that forms of bargaining will probably take place which would not be appropriate in a roomful of old friends, and that some moral values will be treated as less important than other. In sum, choosing, weighing, balancing, and blending take place. But to call this “evil” is to reserve the word “good” for only those kinds of behavior where we know exactly what the right thing to do is, and don’t need to think about the matter at all. It saves the word “good” for the behavior of gods.

#### Our body counts are good – the alternative is a dehumanized world of endless bloodshed without responsibility to the dead or the living

Chernus, 2003, (Ira, Prof of Religious Studies at UC boulder, “Bring Back the Body Count,” April 1, http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0401-12.htm

"We don't do body counts," says America's soldier-in-chief, Tommy Franks. That's a damn shame. During the Vietnam war, the body count was served up every day on the evening news. While Americans ate dinner, they watched a graphic visual scorecard: how many Americans had died that day, how many South Vietnamese, and how many Communists. At the time, it seemed the height of dehumanized violence. Compared to Tommy Franks' new way of war, though, the old way looks very humane indeed. True, the body count turned human beings into abstract numbers. But it required soldiers to say to the world, "Look everyone. I killed human beings today. This is exactly how many I killed. I am obliged to count each and every one." It demanded that the killers look at what they had done, think about it (however briefly), and acknowledge their deed. It was a way of taking responsibility. Today's killers avoid that responsibility. They perpetuate the fiction so many Americans want to believe-that no real people die in war, that it's just an exciting video game. It's not merely the dead who disappear; it's the act of killing itself. When the victim's family holds up a picture, U.S. soldiers or journalists can simply reply "Who's that? We have no record of such a person. In fact, we have no records at all. We kill and move on. No time to keep records. No inclination. No reason." This is not just a matter of new technology. There was plenty of long-distance impersonal killing in Vietnam too. But back then, the U.S. military at least went through the motions of going in to see what they had done. True, the investigations were often cursory and the numbers often fictional. No matter how inaccurate the numbers were, though, the message to the public every day was that each body should be counted. At some level, at least, each individual life seemed to matter. So It's much more likely that "we don't do body counts" because Vietnam proved how embarrassing they could be. As the U.S. public turned against that war, the body count became a symbol of everything that was inhumane and irrational about that war. The Pentagon fears that the same might happen if the Iraq war bogs down. How much simpler to deny the inhumanity and irrationality of war by denying the obvious fact of slaughter. What I fear is a world where thousands can be killed and no one is responsible, where deaths are erased from history as soon as they happen. The body count was more than an act of responsibility. It was a permanent record. It made each death a historical fact. You can go back and graph those Vietnam deaths from day to day, month to month, year to year. That turns the victims into nameless, faceless abstractions. But it least it confirms for ever and ever that they lived and died, because someone took the time to kill and count them. In Iraq, it is as if the killing never happened. When a human being's death is erased from history, so is their life. Life and death together vanish without a trace. The body count has one other virtue. It is enemy soldiers, not civilians, who are officially counted. Antiwar activists rightly warn about civilian slaughter and watch the toll rise at www.iraqbodycount.org. It is easy to forget that the vast majority of Iraqi dead and wounded will be soldiers. Most of them were pressed into service, either by brute force or economic necessity. As the whole world has been telling us for months, there is no good reason for this war, no good reason for those hapless Iraqi foot-soldiers to die. They are victims of brutality-inflicted by their own government and by ours-just as much as the civilians. They deserve just as much to be counted So let us bring back the body count. If we must kill, let us kill as one human being to another, recognizing the full humanity of our victims. Without a body count, our nation becomes more of a robotic killing machine. As we dehumanize Iraqis, we slip even further into our own dehumanization. Let us bring back the body count. if only to recover our own sense of responsibility to the world's people, to history, to our own humanity.