# 1NC vs Wake DL

### 1NC Framework

#### 1. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend a restriction in the president’s war power authority

#### 2. Violation: the affirmative uses a metaphor of detention which is disconnected from the presidents war power authority

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Discussion of specific policy-questions is crucial for skills development – it overcomes preconceived ideological notions and breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Switch-side is key - effective deliberation is crucial to the activation of personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters divorce themselves from ideology to engage in political contestation – the impact is mass violence

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Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism¶ Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58)¶ What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social."¶ Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody.¶ It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives.¶ Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity.¶ Continued…¶ Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87).¶ Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes,¶ Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87)¶ Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social.¶ Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4).¶ Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies.¶ Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38).¶ By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others:¶ Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241)¶ There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed.¶ Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259).¶ Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238).¶ The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.¶ Arendt's Polemical Agonism¶ As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added).¶ Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy.¶ Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point:¶ You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42)¶ Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03).¶ In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes.¶ This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate.¶ Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263).¶ Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).¶ Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324).¶ Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism.¶ Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action.¶ In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

#### Decision-making outweighs – it’s the most portable skill - key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8

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After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### B. The magnitude of unlimiting is infinite – they allow any aff that can draw a metaphorical link to the topic. Police in the inner city can be considered armed forces, cyber bullying can be a metaphor for offensive cyber operations, targeted killing is a metaphor for racism, poverty, sexism, ableism, etc. They allow any number of affs which just say racism bad, sexism bad, etc, without any tie to the object of the topic. This form of unlimiting shifts debate too far in the affs favor and overloads and already stretched negative research burden.

#### c. Ground - We don’t think they have to pretend to be the USFG, but they do have to defend a restriction on the legal war powers of the president is good. We should always be able to say an unrestricted president is good, it’s the only core predictable ground derived from the wording of the topic.

### 1NC Anthro K

#### The affs prioritization of sexual difference becomes a vehicle for anthropocentric humanism

Emma R. **Jones. 2007**. doctoral candidate and teaching fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oregon. In the Presence of the Living Cockroach: The Moment of Aliveness and the Gendered Body in Agamben and Lispector . PhaenEx 2, no. 2 (fall/winter 2007): 24-41

The only mention of gender in Agamben’s text comes in a quotation from Walter Benjamin, which indeed appears to follow this logic: “Sexual fulfillment delivers the man from his mystery…in it alone [the mystery] is severed—not solved. It is comparable to the fetters that bind him to life. The woman cuts them, and the man is free to die because his life has lost its mystery” (in Agamben 84). In this quotation we see the logic of “forgiveness” at work, but it is only the “man” who is in need of this forgiveness—the “woman” on this picture is aligned with the mystery itself. The “man,” in other words, forgives only himself, and he uses the “woman” as an instrument of such forgiveness. But, if our analysis has been correct, he will then fail to stop the motion of the anthropological machine insofar as he still separates himself from the “woman,” even—or maybe especially—in the act of sex. This confirms the suspicion that **the separation between the sexes** (to the benefit of the “man”) **is** at least **as deeply entrenched as the separation of “man” from animal**. But what does this mean? **Given the conflation of masculinity with humanity, it seems that Agamben’s anthropological machine is,** in effect, an **andrological** 6 **machine: one that separates “man/human” from “everything else”—everything unfigurable, be it woman, animal,** non-white person, monster, **and so on. I** am here **draw**ing **attention** **to the man/woman distinction** in particular, **not because** I believe that **sexual difference is always prior** to **or more important than other differences; but because, if the “human” is always already coded as male, we can and should view the man/woman dichotomy as a fundamental metaphysical boundary drawn at the edges of the human**: in other words, as a particularly powerful delineation of what can (currently) be taken as meaningful within Dasein’s world. A brief comparison of Agamben’s work with that of Luce Irigaray helps to elucidate this point. Irigaray, like Cixous and Lispector, understands the feminine as somehow situated outside the world of so-called “human” disclosure and discourse. Indeed, her early discussions of femininity have perhaps even more in common with Agamben’s analysis than do Cixous’, since for Irigaray, the “feminine” is explicitly doubled: on the one hand, it shows up within discourse as the specular, the unrepresentable, and on the other it constitutes an “outside” to (masculine) discourse. 7 Similarly, for Agamben, the “animal” shows up within the lethe/aletheia scheme as captivation, as suspension, but it also exists “outside” as “bare life,” the exclusion of which makes the opening of world possible. However, following Irigaray it would appear that the exclusion of the “feminine,” the material, or “life” actually sets up binary sex categories themselves—since a sex can only claim to be “one” within the masculine discourse (which flees from materiality and aliveness). Thus, as Judith Butler has also noted, 8 **the emergence of the human is inextricably linked to the conferral of binary sex categories on a given body—and, according to Irigaray, both of these categories** (“man” and “woman” as understood in patriarchal society) **fail to think the feminine**, which I am here aligning with embodiment and with Agamben’s “bare life.” Thus, to take some further cues from Irigaray, **it appears that the “mirror” in which man must recognize himself in order to become human is not only the animal, but also** woman, or **the feminine**. Women are, both literally and figuratively, “a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human”—figuratively because they are reduced to a mirroring function in discourse; literally because they are forced to reproduce the “recognition” of the human by bearing children (male children, preferably); and because this reproduction is conceived as mechanistic. 9 Furthermore, the reduction of feminine specificity to a “mirror” or to a “machine” is analogous to the reduction of “life” to “nothingness.” That is to say, it is also the reduction of feminine specificity to “nothingness” that makes possible the phallic scheme of discourse, which orients meaning by reference to binary oppositions. A disruption of this discourse would then also be at stake in Agamben’s suggestion of immanent embodiment. Indeed **we will have failed to think bare life if we continue to allow the anthropological machine to operate, we will also have failed to think sexual difference if we view it as necessarily binary, or as something which occurs only after the disclosure of human “world.”** This final thought suggests that, **for Irigaray** at least, **sexual difference is ontological and not ontic. But perhaps, as Agamben suggests with regard to life itself, a full revelation of sexual difference would have to pass beyond the ontic-ontological distinction**. In fact, **“sexual difference” thus understood** perhaps **connotes** a disruption in Heidegger’s “world-forming” scheme, **a kind of jamming the brakes of disclosure itself in order to force a more considered reconciliation of the material and the spiritual**—since, for Irigaray, the feminine material has been reduced to a kind of captivation or nothingness by the masculine “spiritual” or philosophical discourse. Such a reconciliation is certainly also at stake in Agamben’s discussion, where the spiritual potential of the material (the animal) is erased by its limiting opposition to the properly “spiritual” (the human), as well as in G.H.’s encounter with the cockroach, where the cockroach itself is understood as “god”—in other words, as spiritualized matter. Thus, while according to Agamben it is enough to inhabit the space between “human” and “animal” life in order to retrieve the potentiality of aliveness—that is, the spirituality of matter—we have seen, through G.H.’s example as well as through Irigaray, that we must also try to inhabit the space between “man” and “woman,” since these categories equally attempt to halt the experience of aliveness and to propel the destructive motion of the anthropological and andrological machine.

#### AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE.

#### this rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING. that SOLVES THE ETHICAL CONTRADICTION OF THEIR SPECIES-LEVEL RACISM.

HUDSON 2K4

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### 1NC Speaking for Sarah K

#### The 1AC has no right to speak for me – I have not been duped, I have not been tricked, and I love policy debate. I have not been physically beaten until I joined this activity, I did it of my own free will and volition.

#### Even if the affirmative debaters can speak for themselves, the language of the 1AC is universalized to all the women in the debate. This is especially true for their Graham evidence which uses statistical evidence to somehow PROVE that women are psychologically dependent on men.

#### Speaking for all the women in the debate community through the generalized language of the 1AC is essentialist and bad. This is magnified by their claim to verifiable and objective statistical language which mystifies the subjective lived experiences of women. Their attempt to universalize suffering is fascim that requires the obliteration of those who do not fit their predetermined script for what constitutes a woman. The 1AC should have spoken only for themselves.

MacLure 2010 (Maggie MacLure, Manchester Metropolitan University, “Qualitative inquire: where are the ruins?” http://www.esri.mmu.ac.uk/respapers/nzareRuins.pdf)

So I want to look at the relation of language and materiality, and particularly at what happens when the body surfaces in language. I’m going to suggest that attention to the bodily entanglements of language can be put to work to perform a particular form of productive ruin - namely, the ruin of representation. This phrase echoes the title of Dorothea Olkowski’s (1999) book, ‘Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation’. What might it mean, then, to research with, and within, the ruin of representation? For Olkowski and Deleuze, representation doesn’t just refer to the mediation of reality by language. Representation is the entire logic of static hierarchy that – in Olkowski’s words - ‘subsume(s) all difference under the one, the same and the necessary’ (1999: 185). In the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, representation is tree-like or arborescent (1987: 18). It organises life in terms of genus and species, categories and instances, and can only cope with difference through relations of identity, similarity, analogy or opposition: that is, relations based on resemblance or difference among already-formed entities. Within the schema of representation, things are frozen in the places allotted to them by the structure that comprehends them, and are not able to deviate and divide from themselves to form anything new. Olkowski wants to bring about the ruin of representation so that she can develop ‘an ontology of change and becoming’ that engages the dynamism and creative force of matter and difference without going through the deadening detour of representation (211). <<< But language is nevertheless a key element in the way representation captures difference for sameness. It’s hard to escape the ‘common language of order-words’ as Olkowski (1999: 124) puts it, citing Bergson. Order-words are those words that are always already legitimated by institutions, issuing from a ready-made self. Lyotard had something similar in mind when he compared everyday language to Orwell’s ‘newspeak’. Newspeak is the mode of the ‘already-said’ through which the status quo attempts to control the threat of difference – of that which resists or exceeds meaning (Lyotard, 1992: 107; see also MacLure, 2006). Delezue argued that there is another, non-representational dimension or tendency that subsists in language, hidden by the tremendous power of representation to cut into the flow of difference to bring forth stable referents, meanings and speaking subjects. Deleuze calls this other tendency a ‘wild discourse’ or a becoming-mad of language that slides over its referents and transcends its own limits, restoring language to the open potential of becoming (2004: 3, 4). This wild discourse does not mediate anything. It does not refer outside of itself, or build towards some higher fulfilment. And it does not emanate from, or attach itself to, an already formed, phenomenological subject.

**The 1AC has double turned themselves by using objective data to explain subjective experience.**

#### Vote negative to DISCERN this implicit double turn. If they have potential, send them back to write a more ruinous 1AC.

#### Hogeven 2006 (Bryan, Sociology at U of Alberta with Andrew Woolford Sociology at U of Manitoba “Critical Criminology and Possibility in the Neo-liberal Ethos” [Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice](http://www.synergiescanada.org/fr/journals/utp/120324) 48.5)

Thus, it is first imperative that criminologists reflect on the powers of, and limits on, thought under neo-liberal conditions - including those that burden their discourse. Wary from the hard lessons won of past engagements with the criminal-justice field, the criminologist should now move toward a criminology of possibility (Pavlich 2001b). This involves thinking and pushing the limits of the possible, which simultaneously includes thinking the impossible. But let us not get caught up in expecting an annulment of contemporary relations of domination from attempts at mind conversion through "social" education or from a vast logotherapy (Bourdieu 1997). It is delusory to maintain that the scaffolding of tyranny can be vanquished solely with the weapons of consciousness - it is both more insidious and firmly entrenched. Altering existing relations requires that the ways of meaning making - the vision of the world and the practical means through which suppression is (re)produced - be disjoined. Critical criminological efforts should thus be directed toward jimmying open the naturalized order, and doing so "by encountering experiences that peer past thresholds into vast seas of indeterminacy" (Pavlich 2005a: 112). To break out beyond the current limits of the human condition, beaten down into doxic submission by neo-liberal conditions, commands a denouncement of the silent, arbitrary, and taken-for-granted presuppositions and institutions of repression. Critical thought must, as Wacquant has urged, tirelessly pose the question of the social costs and benefits of the policies of economic deregulation and social dismantling which are now presented as the assured road to eternal prosperity and supreme happiness under the aegis of "individual responsibility" (2004:101) Discerning the mental structures that perpetually recreate the social order and the contingent arrangements therein is a precursor to liberating thought from the weight of doxa. To push the limits of what is and reveal what may be possible, critical criminology, in the throes of neo-liberalism, must analytically extirpate criminal-justice institutions, pronouncements, discourse, policy, practice, and vocabularies in order that their contingency be revealed, their lies uncovered, and their contradictions exposed. It must tirelessly question what is and what is yet to come, so as to rethink the world instead of being bound and constrained by it. It must be a criminology of possibility that transcend the giveness of the doxic order so as to interrogate the criminal-justice "reality" that emanates from it. Creating new criminal(?)-justice meaning horizons that puncture current ontology presents itself as a potentially fruitful direction for contemporary praxis. What configuration would criminal "justice" take if it did not rely on existing discourse and doxa as its point of departure? What conduct would be censured (i.e., incivility, disregard for the environment)? What would being "just" mean under such a formulation (e.g., respect for the "other")? What ethic would guide decision making and understanding? Whatever assault on the status quo reveals itself through criminology committed to possibility, it remains, nevertheless, imperative that such calculations remain open and subject to perpetual scrutiny (Pavlich 2005a). Making the world: Our argument should not be taken as fodder for criminologists who wish to sidestep "the political." We believe that today there is an enormous amount to do in all domains where alterity is (r)ejected and the powerful dispossess the marginalized in full face of the law (indeed, employing law to this end). It is in relation to this call of the other, or the dispossessed and downtrodden - those ravaged by the neo-liberal ethos - that calls to "justice" and for responsibility emerge. However, we do not offer an ontological substitute but counter that the possibilities of alternatives should remain open, even as "[they remain] empty, living on borrowed time, awaiting the content to fill [them] in" (Zizek 2000: 324). But our purposeful refusal to advance an a priori replacement or to utter the name of "the" universal subject of humanity who will liberate the totality should not be confused with a loss of nerve. Ours is a radical proposal - especially in criminological circles. What has been taken and understood as critical engagement - particularly as it relates to politics and its supporting ideologies - has been concerned with a priori rejection of all things present and ancient, such that new dogmas may take their place (Kristeva 1999). Interventions must develop in context, rather than approaching a particular (political) problem with a ready-made grid of intelligibility to lay over it and through which to judge its ultimate success (or failure?). To do otherwise holds the distinct possibility of legitimizing all manner of calamity and oppression in the name of the revolution or the spirit of the times. Merleau-Ponty's (1946) "wager," for example, seems to suggest Stalin's show trials were defensible in light of the greater good of revolutionary ends. If not legitimizing calamity, we can certainly question upon which "universal" sensibility foundations, criteria, and judgements are founded (Pavlich 2001a). Emancipatory gestures predicated upon revolutionizing the present in accordance with axiomatic idioms are negations that contain the trace of the present and threaten to swallow the drive to be otherwise whole. That is, such and such proposals are created out of the cloth of "the what is." The present becomes the muse and the spectre of the revolution. Instead of breaking beyond the present, reactive policy is forever fettered to it. Instead of employing one or another yardstick to judge the success and failure of critical moments, it is necessary to affirm and denounce the world as it is - "not to weigh out as best one can equal amounts of submission and revolt, and always end up halfway between reform and accommodation, but to make the world into place" (Nancy 1997: 158). That is, to manifest an art of critique that involves destabilizing seemingly well-anchored relations into new patterns of being that do not pander to established social logics or rely upon reactive judgements. Taken thus, criminology would multiply, not judgements about existing policy, programs, institutions, or societal structures, but logics of being; "it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invert them sometimes - all the better" (Foucault 1997: 323). Indeed, one could conceive a criminal justice beyond criminal justice, without recourse to law(yers), institutionalization, probation, and so on, which would take social harm, incivility, and environmental destruction to task without affirming its absolute certitude. This world would never remain still but would be perpetually (re)opened to its own aporias, irrationalities, and internal contradictions. Achievements that accrue from political engagement should never be considered fait accompli, such that the criminologist can sit back and admire her or his work. There is much to do. The outcomes of complacency are evident in the discourse of multiculturalism. Canada's version may seem, on first reading, an opening to the "other" that welcomes and offers hospitality. But, as Nandana Dutta (2004) argues, this position permits complacency and smugness to creep into our relations with the other. That is, with the Multiculturalism Act in tow, Canada as a country is a priori immune from claims of racism and intolerance. In other words, multiculturalism is finally reducible to a bland "rights-for-all" or a "live and let live" state that is quite immune to the other because, instead of celebrating difference and inviting a minutely calibrated response, it simply tolerates it. (Dutta 2004: 439) Multiculturalism is, then, an alibi for the continued inequalities between dominant and other. We are in no way negating the emancipatory effects of "multiculturalism" and its corresponding ontic, but we are making the point that every emancipatory step must be followed by reflexivity and further emancipatory movement. As it stands, the Multiculturalism Act promises that "every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination ... and guarantees those rights and freedoms equally to male and female persons" (Preamble). However, spending an hour in docket court or in your local remand centre will put an end to any illusion of tolerance and respect for/of the other heralded by the act. Quite simply, some groups are more equal than "others." As a result, we can never fully be aware in advance what is to be accomplished and to what ends, but the logic of intervention and investigation never closes off dialogue, debate, and critique. Rather, "each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited" (Derrida 1997: 62). This mode of analysis permits us to think the political and think emancipation by granting space - even if it is cramped - to maneuver beyond the symbolic and hegemonic. But what will become of the criminal-justice field or of multiculturalism - even if they remain tied to these signs - is not something we can know in advance, and we can no longer be lulled into believing that we can predict or command the movement of the carnivorous beast. We can, however, act and intervene in a way that allows for the possibility of some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract buttressing the established order, which, in effect, will disrupt the peaceful (symbolic) order of things. Efforts should not be directed solely toward fighting politically correct battles for inclusion that, while important in their own right, in effect maintain the foundational ontology of the neo-liberal order. Capital is expanding with increasing ruthlessness, leaving poverty, racism, homelessness, and general social misery in its wake. Attending to the latter while neglecting the former’s complicity in fostering conditions ripe for the spread of the vilest oppression diverts our attention. Thus, intervention should not fall into the trap of conceiving of programs that work well within the current ethos (Zˇ izˇek 1999). Rather, it is imperative to extend critique and thought beyond current ontological limits into the open spaces beyond criminal justice, law, and multiculturalism, using irrationality and contradictions as chaperon and source of urgency. We are certain that today’s criminal justice is spawning new and potentially more explosive contradictions. A long series of facts comes immediately to mind, including, but not limited to, the gross over-representation of Aboriginal peoples in the system, the almost exclusive targeting of the poorest segments of the population by the state’s policing arm, and the eerie absence of the most powerful from the courtroom – other than as officials whose Critical Criminology and Possibility in the Neo-liberal Ethos 695 main purpose it is to adjudicate and pass judgement upon the marginalized. The contradictions of criminal justice overflow the levies constructed to lend it the appearance of propriety, justice, fairness, blindness, and inevitability. The criminal-justice field is none of these things. It is in this realization that a criminology of possibility intervenes, unveiling the irrationalities and contradictions of the system in order to disrupt ontology and rethink the possibility of justice beyond what is.

### 1NC Case F/L

#### They are fundamentally wrong—gendered binaries don’t organize the world

Hooper 1

Charlotte (University of Bristol research associate in politics), *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics* pp 45-46.

Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993), in their discussion of gendered dichotomies, appear to drop Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse as an explanation for gendered dichotomies in favor of a more straightforward- ly political account.14Gendered dichotomies, rather than uniformly con- structing gendered social relations through universal psychoanalytic mecha- nisms, are seen more ambiguously, as playing a dual role. Where gendered dichotomies are used as an organizing principle of social life (such as in the gendered division of labor) they help to construct gender differences and in- equalities and thus are constitutive of social reality, but in positing a grid of polar opposites, they also serve to obscure more complex relationships, commonalties, overlaps, and intermediate positions (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 24–25). Elaborating on this view, it can be argued that gendered dichotomies are in part ideological tools that mystify, masking more complex social realities and reinforcing stereotypes. On one level, they do help to produce real gen- der differences and inequalities, when they are used as organizing principles that have practical effects commensurate with the extent that they become embedded in institutional practices, and through these, human bodies. They constitute one dimension in the triangular nexus out of which gender identities and the gender order are produced. But at the same time, institutional practices are not always completely or unambiguously informed by such dichotomies, which may then **operate to obscure more complex relationships**. It is a mistake to see the language of gendered dichotomies as a uniﬁed and totalizing discourse that dictates every aspect of social practice to the extent that we are coherently produced as subjects in its dualistic image. As well as the disruptions and discontinuities engendered by the intersections and interjections of other discourses (race, class, sexuality, and so on) **there is always room for evasion, reversal, resistance, and dissonance** between rhetoric, practice, and embodiment, as well as reproduction of the symbolic order, as identities are negotiated in relation to all three dimensions, in a variety of **complex and changing circumstances**. On the other hand, the symbolic gender order does inform practice, and our subjectivities are produced in relation to it, so to dismiss it as performing only an ideological or propagandistic role is also too simplistic.

**Conflating sexual difference and patriarchy ontologizes sexual difference, obscuring women’s complicity in gender violence**

Bibi **Bakare-Yusuf, 2005.** PhD Interdisciplinary Women and Gender Studies, “Beyond Determinism: The Phenomenology of African Female Existence,” <http://www.feministafrica.org/fa%202/02-2003/bibi.html>]

Despite the contributions to understanding oppressive power relations made by theorists who focus emphatically on patriarchal dominance, there are problems with some of their underlying assumptions. By equating sexual difference with male domination, some of these writers collapse two distinct categories into one. According to Iris Young, **we need** to make **a distinction between sexual differentiation**, as "a phenomenon of individual psychology and experience, as well as of cultural categorisation", **and male domination**, as "structural relations of genders and institutional forms that determine those structures" (1997: 26). **Male domination may require sexual difference; however, sexual difference does not** in itself **lead to male domination.** **By collapsing this distinction, there is a danger of ontologising male power, and assuming that** human **relationships are** **inevitably** **moulded by tyrannical power relations.** Moreover, **equating sexual difference with male dominance can** also **obscure the ways in which both men and women help to reproduce and maintain oppressive gendered institutions.** As Young astutely notes, "**most institutions relevant to the theory of male domination are productions of interactions between men and women" (**1997: 32). As a case in point, we only have to think of the pernicious institution of female genital mutilation, which is both defended and practised by many women.

**This essentialism of sexual identity makes true resistance to patriarchy impossible**

Bibi **Bakare-Yusuf, 2005** ,PhD Interdisciplinary Women and Gender Studies, “Beyond Determinism: The Phenomenology of African Female Existence,” <http://www.feministafrica.org/fa%202/02-2003/bibi.html> ACCESSED 8-3-07]

**An emphasis on crushing patriarchal dominance can** also **lead us to ignore women's power** **and active roles within** particular **systems of** social **organisation.** For example, Llewellyn Hendrix and Zakir Hossain (1988) suggest that writers such as Ogundipe-Leslie can make their claims about women's inevitable economic and political disempowerment within their husbands' lineages only by drawing examples from patrilineal societies. In matrilineal or bilineal societies, women have more complex subject positions, as their productive and reproductive capacity is geared towards their natal clans, despite the fact that they are married to outsiders. Careful investigation could uncover the scope that women in these societies have for negotiating individual economic and political freedoms in relation to different families or lineages. Nevertheless, theorists such as Afonja (1990) claim that matrilineal systems provide little more than organising principles for connecting men across generations and space; any apparent power or authority women may have within matrilineal systems is merely symbolic and tangential to the formal power of men. **If we assume** that **women are automatically victims and men victimisers**, **we** fall into the trap of **confirm**ing **the** very **systems we set out to critique.** **We fail to acknowledge how social agents can challenge their ascribed** positions and **identities in complex ways**, **and** indirectly, we **help** to reify or **totalise oppressive** institutions and **relationships. Rather than viewing patriarchy as a fixed** **and monolithic system,** **it would be** more **helpful** **to show how patriarchy is** **constantly** **contested** and reconstituted. As Christine Battersby (1998) suggests, **patriarchy should be viewed** as a dissipative system, **with no** central organising principle or **dominant logic.** Viewing patriarchy in this way allows us to appreciate how institutional power structures restrict and limit women's capacity for action and agency without wholly constraining or determining this capacity. **By conceptualising patriarchy as** a changing and **unstable** system of power, **we can move towards** **an account** of African gendered experience **that** does not assume fixed positions in inevitable hierarchies, but **stresses transformation** and productive forms of contesta

**Gender is not the root cause of war—war causes gender oppression**

Joshua S. **Goldstein 2002**. Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland, War and Gender , P. 412

First**, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice”. Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others)** in order to pursue peace. **This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement** (women, labor, minorities), **but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war.** The evidence in this book suggests that **causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of** capitalism, imperialism, **gender**, innate aggression, **or any other single cause,** although all of these influences wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. **Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression**/” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, **the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.**

**The idea that patriarchy is the root cause of all impacts is reductionist – it ignores other forms of oppression and makes causal reasoning impossible**

**Crenshaw 2002** [Carrie Crenshaw PhD, Former President of CEDA, “Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate” 2002 p. 119-126]

Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize the voices of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for “commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive “claims of immediacy” (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions “to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists” (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of “good reasons” to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, “[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(resolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity and feminists as women with identical motivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the complexities of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists 'Mo feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. Debaters practice the convention of poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression. The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - patriarchy is the sole cause of oppression. Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance. "Within feminist movement in the West, this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20). Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships.

**Feminist criticism is too insular and self-referential—its methodology is suspect because it excludes all perspectives not from the margins**

**Jarvis 2000**, lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations, Faculty at University of Sydney, (D.S.L,

International relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, pg. 160-162) pont

Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations. **Critics of feminist perspectives** run the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist malcontent or **an androcentric keeper of the gate. At work in much of this discourse is an unstated political correctness, where the historical marginalization of women bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity group from legitimate participation in its discourse**. Only feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional (personal) ontology. Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of particular groups are, of course, welcome to lend support and encourage- ment, but only on terms delineated by the groups themselves. In this way, **they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony over their own self, identification, insuring** the group discourse is self constituted and **that its parameters, operative methodology, and standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self defined.** Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls for a "homesteading" of International Relations she does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that *we be included on our terms*" (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, **this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who question the merits** of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical," but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism. 93 Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary means of rein- venting the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identities-the most important of which is gender. 94 Intolerance or misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory." Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the disci- pline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectual-and well established-spaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is variously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as inter- generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White males, for example, become generic signifiers for historical oppression, indicating an ontologically privileged group by which the historical expe- riences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, and exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been "silenced." In this same way, self identification or "self-situation" establishes one's credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the "authoritative" vantage point from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, Worlding Women, a section titled "A (personal) politics of location," in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes appar- ent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties. 96 Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, "It is impor- tant to provide a context for one's work in the often-denied politics of the personal." Accordingly, self declaration reveals to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to "develop your brains and confess something called 'sins' to always male forever priests," and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objec- tivity. Like territorial markers**, self identification permits entry to intel- lectual spaces whose sovereign authority is "policed" as much by marginal subjectivities as they allege of the oppressors** who "police" the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and "malestream" theory. If Sylvester's version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant, per- spectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches, in reality it is as selective, exclusionary, and dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being.

**Western feminism discursively constructs women as a homogenous powerless group and results in the objectification of women in the third world – this must be rejected**

Chandra Talpade **Mohanty 1988.** Associate Professor of Women's Studies at Hamilton College, New York, and Core Faculty at the Union Institute Graduate School, Cincinnati. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial” Feminist Review, No. 30, Autumn.

By women as a category of analysis, I am referring to the crucial presupposition that all of us of the same gender, across classes and cultures, are somehow socially constituted as a homogeneous group identifiable prior to the process of analysis. The homogeneity of women as a group is produced not on the basis of biological essentials, but rather on the basis of secondary sociological and anthropological universals. Thus, for instance, **in any given piece of feminist analysis, women are characterized as a singular group on the basis of a shared oppression. What binds women together is a sociological notion of the `sameness' of their oppression. It is at this point that an elision takes place between 'women' as a discursively constructed group and 'women' as material subjects of their own history.' Thus, the discursively consensual homogeneity of 'women' as a group is mistaken for the historically specific material reality of groups of women. This results in an assumption of women as an always-already constituted group, one which has been labelled 'powerless', 'exploited', 'sexually harassed', etc., by feminist scientific, economic, legal and sociological discourses.** (Notice that this is quite similar to sexist discourse labelling women as weak, emotional, having math anxiety, etc.) **The focus is not on uncovering the material and ideological specificities that constitute a group of women as 'powerless' in a particular context. It is rather on finding a variety of cases of 'powerless' groups of women to prove the general point that women as a group are powerless.'** In this section I focus on five specific ways in which **'women' as a category of analysis is used in western feminist discourse on women in the third world to construct third-world women' as a homogeneous `powerless' group often located as implicit victims of particular cultural and socio-economic systems.** I have chosen to deal with a variety of writers — from Fran Hosken, who writes primarily about female genital mutilation, to writers from the Women in International Development school who write about the effect of development policies on third-world women for both western and third-world audiences. I do not intend to equate all the texts that I analyse, nor ignore their respective strengths and weaknesses. The authors I deal with write with varying degrees of care and complexity; however**, the effect of the representation of third-world women in these texts is a coherent one. In these texts women are variously defined as victims of male violence** (Fran Hosken); **victims of the colonial process** (M. Cutrufelli); **victims of the Arab familial system** (Juliette Minces**); victims of the economic development process** (B. Lindsay and the — liberal — WID school); **and finally, victims of the economic basis of the Islamic code** (P. Jeffery**). This mode of defining women primarily in terms of their object status** (the way in which they are affected or not affected by certain institutions and systems**) is what characterizes this particular form of the use of 'women' as a category of analysis. In the context of western women writing about and studying women in the third world, such objectification** (however benevolently motivated) **needs to be both named and challenged.** As Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar argue quite eloquently, **'Feminist theories which examine our cultural practices as "feudal residues" or label us "traditional", also portray us as politically immature women who need to be versed and schooled in the ethos of western feminism. They need to be continually challenged'** (1984: 7).

**Their description of society as constituted by male and female bodies reinforces a gaze of indifference that not only causes the impacts they try to avoid but is used to justify genocide**

Oyeronke **Oyewumi. 1997**, Associate Professor of Sociology, SUNY Stony Brook, The Invention of Women Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses, University of Minnesota Press, 1997

**The notion of society that emerges** from this conception **is that society is constituted by bodies and as bodies — male bodies, female bodies**, Jewish bodies, Aryan bodies, black bodies, white bodies, rich bodies, poor bodies. **I am using the word “body”** in two ways: first, as a metonymy for biology and, second**, to draw attention to the sheer physicality that seems to attend being in Western culture**. I refer to the corporeal body as well as to metaphors of the body. **The body is given a logic of its own**. It is believed that just by looking at it one can tell a person’s beliefs and social position or lack thereof. As Naomi Scheman puts it in her discussion of the body politic in premodern Europe:¶ The ways **people knew their places in the world had to do with their bodies and the histories of those bodies, and when they violated the prescriptions for those places, their bodies were punished, often spectacularly. One’s place in the body politic was as natural as the places of the organs** in one’s body, **and political disorder** [was] **as unnatural as the shifting and displacement of those organs**.4¶ Similarly, Elizabeth Grosz remarks on what she calls the “depth” of the body in modern Western societies:Our **[Western] body forms are considered expressions of an interior**, not inscriptions on a flat surface. **By constructing a soul or psyche for itself, the “civilized body” forms libidinal flows, sensations, experiences, and intensities into needs, wants**.... **The body becomes a text, a system of signs to be deciphered, read, and read into. Social law is incarnated**, “corporealized”[;] correlatively, **bodies are textualized, read by others as expressive of a subject’s psychic interior**. A storehouse of **inscriptions and messages between [the body’s] external and internal boundaries**.., **generates or constructs the body’s movements into “behavior,” which then [has] interpersonally and socially identifiable meanings and functions within a social system.**5 Consequently, **since the body is the bedrock on which the social order is founded**, the body is always in view and on view. As such, **it invites a** gaze, a **gaze of difference, a gaze of differentiation — the most historically constant being the gendered gaze.** There is a sense in which **phrases such as “the social body” or “the body politic” are not just metaphors but can be read literally.** It is not surprising, then, that **when the body politic needed to be purified in Nazi Germany, certain kinds of bodies had to be eliminated.**6

# 2NC

## Anthropocentrism K

### 2NC Permutation

#### Only a COMPLETE and RADICAL break away from humanism solves

Roderick Nash, Professor of History and Environmental Studies at UC-SB, 1989 [*The Rights of Nature* p. 164-166]

Karl Marx, of course, had studied this last form of hierarchy and proposed a revolutionary remedy. Bookchin began where Marx stopped. He recommended discarding ecological as well as economic class distinctions along with the governments that sanctioned and sustained them. This meant revolution and, here again, Bookchin transcended Marx. The nineteenth-century revolutionary called for a government of and by the working class; Bookchin wanted no gov­ernment at all. His objective was not to seize power for one group or another but to dissolve‑ it entirely as an apparatus by which people related to each other and, as a species, to nature. As early as 1965 Bookchin linked anarchism and ecology. Both. perspectives, he be­lieved, stressed the equal value of every part of the community and the necessity of maximizing individual freedom so that every com­ponent could fulfill its potential. "I submit," Bookchin wrote in "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought" (1965), "that an anarchist community would approximate a [normal] ecosystem; it would be diversified, balanced and harmonious." 6 The means to this end, heexplained in his major work, *The Ecology of Freedom* (1982), was through an "ethics of complementarity" derived from an "ecological vision of nature." Bookchin's utopia was not only based on ecologi­cal models; it *included* the ecosystem. He sought a "new and lasting equilibrium with nature" just as he did with other humans.

Bookchin was under no illusion about the fact that his ecoanarchism necessitated the wholesale replacement of his civilization's "in­stitutional and ethical framework.” He also knew that this was another word for revolution. "I would like to ask," he wrote in 1974, "if the environmental crisis does not have its roots in the very constitution of society as we know it today, if the changes that are needed.., do not require a fundamental, indeed revolutionary, reconstitution of society along ecological lines?" 9 It was from this per­spective that Bookchin, like the deep ecologists whom he antici­pated, criticized most manifestations of American conservation and even large parts of modern environmentalism. As one of the first of the radical environmentalists, and as an avowed revolutionary, Book-chin remained profoundly suspicious of those who would save the world by banning aerosol cans or staging Earth-Day cleanups. He regretted that by 1980 "ecology is now fashionable, indeed faddish--and with this sleazy popularity has emerged a new type of environ­mentalist hype." 10 It featured anti-pollution campaigns but did not challenge the mental pollution that Bookchin regarded as the root of the problem. Dismissing charges that environmentalist demands were too radical, he argued "they are not radical enough." Speci­fically, Bookchin continued, "'environmentalism' does not bring into question the underlying notion of the present society that man must dominate nature; it seeks to facilitate domination by developing techniques for diminishing the hazards caused by domination.” The only meaningful, long-term solution was to replace the modern world's "odious morality" with a holistic, environmental ethic that had as its basis respect for all people and all nature. Armed with new definitions of right and wrong, ecoanarchists could tear down the old order and erect the new. Unless this happened soon, Bookchin warned, a poisoned, lifeless earth would be "a dead witness to [the] cosmic failure" of its most advanced life-form.” Murray Bookchin disappointed readers seeking practical programs for action, but his bitter indictment of contemporary ethics and his forthright call for revolutionary changes emboldened the liberators of nature.

For more than a century after Karl Marx's manifesto of the 1840s, socialist advocates of universal human liberation said little about the oppression of nature. But in the second half of the twentieth century the rising tide of opposition to the exploitation of nature--and the perception, noted by Bookchin, that it was closely linked to human exploitation--opened many eyes to the possibility of a transcendent libertarianism. For instance, after thirty years of protesting the de­humanizing effects of capitalism, science, and technology, Herbert Marcuse added nature to the category of subjects deserving freedom. Indeed Marcuse was the first well-known American radical to see na­ture as humanity's slave and to use the phrase "the liberation of na­ture.''13 Capitalism, Marcuse continued, reduced both nature and people to raw materials with strictly utilitarian value. But capitalism was in its death throes and the "coming revolution" would bring "universal liberation" including "a new relation between man and nature." Its basis, Marcuse thought, was the recognition, later pub­licized by the deep ecologists, that everything existed first and fore­most "for its own sake."This led Marcuse to advocate a reduction of human impact on animals and plants, and he concluded his essay with a widely quoted phrase: "nature, too, awaits the revolution!" As it turned out, some American environmental activists were also waiting to be revolutionaries.

Only a radical break can solve – any acceptance legitimizes anthropocentricism which makes an understanding of being greater than just humans impossible to achieve

Perm can’t overcome the link – the 1AC treats nature as a knowable good for maximization – can’t go north and south at the same time!

Taylor 98 (Prue, Senior Lecturer of law and a founding member of the New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law at the University of Auckland, An Ecological Approach to International Law: Responding to the Challenges of Climate Change (Hardcover) p. 39-42, 45-48)

The question 'are ecocentric ethics really necessary?' is frequently asked. Could we not, for example, achieve our environmental goals by more rigorous environmental legislation? Obviously much could be improved as a consequence of tighter controls, but two important limitations would remain. First, the question of 'how clean is clean' would continue to be answered solely by reference to human needs and standards. Thus water quality would he determined by interests such as human welfare, recreation needs and aesthetic values. The interests of nature and the needs of fully functioning ecosystems, which full below a human centred threshold, would be left unprtxected. By taking into account a much larger and more complex set of ecocentrically determined interests, tougher environmental standards would he achieved.217 Second, as Bosselmann points out, decision makers would not be able to make the important paradigm jump to protecting nature for its own sake. Worse, in cases where decision makers felt morally committed to such a jump, they would be forced to find constrained logic to justify their decisions. The variety of ethical approaches to environmental decision making has raised the question of moral pluralism. Stone, for example, has suggested that situations can be resolved according to either anthropocentric or ecocentric views depending on the nature of the problem. Thus decision makers are able to switch from one value system to another. Such a process is rejected by commentators such as 3. Baird Callicott who believes that ecocentric ethics are 'not only a question of better rational arguments but the expres¬sion of a fundamentally changed attitude to nature. Callicott reminds Stone that anthropocentric attitudes and ecocentric ethics represent quite different paradigms. That in reality people do not follow anthropocentric attitudes in the morning, only to switch to ecocentric ethics after lunch. In the context of New Zealand's primary environmental legislation, this debate is currently being worked through in practice. The Resource Management Act 1991 (1RMA') is guided by 'sustainable management', a concept which is defined in both anthropocentric and ecocentric terms, leaving room for tension between the supporters of alternative approaches." 221 To date the RMA has been largely dominated by anthropocentricic interests due to a failure by key authorities, such as the Environment Court and local govern ment, to make the significant changes in attitude required by the Act's ecocentric principles. It has been suggested that this tension, evident in implementation of the RMA, can only be resolved by an interpretation of sustainable management' which is ecological.

Calculation DA – the permutation is an example of a methodology where they calculatively seek to be just good enough to the environment to appease environmentalists – that still functions under an anthropocentric ethic because it seeks to manipulate nature for human desire

Ethics are a prior question– the rush to action instead of questioning makes serial policy failure inevitable because it produces unethical and immoral results that we seek to prevent

Footnoting DA – The permutation’s secondary attempts to make the non-human ethically significant reduce them to insignificant in comparison to the human which reproduces anthropocentric ethics because human goals are the primary solution

Voting for the plan is to vote for the moral universe imagined by the 1AC, and voting for this moral universe requires you as a critic to adopt a particular ethical stance.

If we win that a moral universe anchored in humanism, they can’t severe that link since it’s the reason for the plan.

Greene, Assistance Profession Communications @ UT-Austin, 1998 (Ronald, *Argumentation and Advocacy,* Summer, p. 20-21)

In Scott’s hands rhetoric becomes a particular form of human action with ethical consequences. The ethical problematization of rhetoric follows from Scott’s view that rhetoric entails the ability to create situational truths which give meaning to collective human behaviors. Human agents should be held ethically responsible for what they say, how they say it and whether they say anything at all. At this point, rhetoric is a unique cultural practice, exhibiting an exemplary form through debate, locating the substance of rhetorical knowledge in the creation of a situational truth. Scott’s turn to the sophistic tradition re-activates the ethical and epistemological consequences of an Isocratean-Ciceronian thread in the tapestry of rhetorical theory. Scott allows for a rhetorical epistemology that is future oriented; moreover, the ability of rhetorical practices to imagine a future is at the heart of Scott’s initial gambit. Scott’s emphasis on imaging a future sets in motion a standard of rhetorical effectivity that can be understood as a constitutive model in opposition to an “influence model.” The point I want to emphasis here is that Scott’s articulation of the Isocratean-Ciceronian rhetorical tradition to phenomenology emphasizes how rhetoric becomes a human action of world disclosure. Since we can only imagine the future consequences of particular policy options, the “epistemic” function of rhetoric is to draw a portrait of this future. My claim is that the rhetorical process of world-disclosure marks the emergence of a constitutive model of rhetorical effectivity. Those readers familiar with Habermas (1987) might suggest that an emphasis on a constitutive model of rhetorical effectivity requires an aesthetic appreciation of rhetoric. I would agree, but to appreciate how speech communication acquired an aesthetic sensibility of its constitutive model of rhetorical effectivity it is necessary to turn to Edwin Black. In 1970, Edwin Black published the "Second Persona." In this essay, he explicated the anxiety associated with making moral judgments about rhetorical practices. Yet, he advanced the claim that moral judgments must be made if we were "to bring order to our history" (p. 109). Drawing analogically on Wayne Booth's concept of author as persona, Black argues that every discourse implies that an audience - a second persona. Black advanced a form of rhetorical reading is symptomatic - that is, it investigates the stylistic tokens of a message in order to account for the type of audience implied by the discourse. Consequently, a rhetorical critic was authorized to make moral judgments about a text by investigating the type of audience that was being called forth by the message. Black identified his project as a form of ideological criticism whereby: "what is important in characterizing a persona . . . is not age or temperament or even discreet attitude. It is ideology - ideology in the sense that Marx used the term: the network of interconnected convictions that functions in a man [or women] epistemically and that shapes his [or her] identity by determining how he [or she] views the world" (p. 113). What I would like to emphasize here is less Black's gloss of Marx but the implications of turning to Booth and Marx to ground the concept of the second persona.

Overcoming speciesism requires a qualitative transformation in consciousness—any justifications for the plan not centered on overcoming speciesism means the perm won’t solve

Katherine Perdlo, PhD, 2007 [*Journal of Critical Animal Studies* 5.1]

Animal rights campaigners disagree as to whether *empirical arguments*, based on facts such as those  concerning nutrition, or *ethical arguments*, based on values such as the wrongness of hurting sentient  beings, have greater validity and potential effectiveness. I want to address the issue in terms of  “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” arguments – a distinction that corresponds only partly to the empirical  and ethical couplet – and to make the case that animal rights campaigns are most effectively  advanced through intrinsic appeals.  “Extrinsic arguments” are those that seek to promote an aim and its underlying principle by  appealing to considerations politically, historically, or logically separable from that aim and that  principle. “Intrinsic arguments” appeal to considerations within and inseparable from the aim and  principle. In this case, the aim is animal liberation and the principle is the moral equality of species.  For example, the claim that vegetarianism (ideally, veganism) helps reduce animal suffering is  an intrinsic argument, but it can also be justified on extrinsic grounds through appeal to its  environmental benefits. You can separate vegetarianism from the benefit to the environment, since  it is logically possible that the one might not lead to the other, and environmentalism is an  independent political cause. But you cannot separate vegetarianism from the benefit to animals,  since the word vegetarianism, whatever its etymology, is used to mean abstention from meat or from  all animal products. You might say that “benefit to animals” is an independent issue in that there are  other means of ameliorating animal suffering besides vegetarianism, or you might promote  vegetarianism only for human health benefits. But in terms of animal rights campaigning,  vegetarianism is advanced for the intrinsic reasons that it benefits the animals themselves.  The case for intrinsic arguments rests not on a concern for ideological purity, but on the  need to reach a public that, although partly responsive to our ideas in some areas, has stopped far  short of the acceptance needed to make significant breakthroughs. At some point in the encounter  with us, the reaction sets in of either, “Yes, it’s terrible, but it’s justified if it saves human lives,” or,  “Yes, it’s terrible and unjustifiable, but we have more important [i.e. human] things to worry about.”  We need to tackle speciesism head-on, instead of relying on less challenging extrinsic arguments  – “widely-accepted and existing frames” in Yates’s (2006) formulation – which tacitly consign  “animal rights” and its policy demands to a marginal, indeed “extreme,” position. Besides disowning  animal rights, extrinsic arguments contain inconsistent or evasive implications that can leave the  audience doubtful and confused without being able to pin down what is wrong.  It is true that extrinsic arguments have had some positive effect. If, for non-animal rights  reasons, even one person has turned vegan or decided to oppose vivisection, while another has  taken a small step in the right direction, such as by giving up “red meat,” there are nonetheless  2!  !  benefits for animals and the planet. But what is truly needed to free billions of animals is a qualitative  transformation in people’s thinking. Without a moral paradigm shift, the public may never be motivated  to overcome either its own self-interest in using animals or governments’ aggressive protection of  animal-abusing industries

### 2NC Link Wall

The aff’s understanding of the other is wrong, Start your decision with a recognition of your connection to more than human others. Beginning with the human social betrays your anthropocentric bias and reinforces the root cause of violence.

Rose 6 (Rebecca, Lecturer in Literature for Trinity College Foundation Studies, The University of Melbourne, 2006, C*OLLOQUY text theory critique* 12//shree)

The  ideal human-human relationship, the kind envisioned by the Universal Dec-  laration, has been established as the theoretical foundation of world peace.  By implication we perceive real human-human relationship as the basic  problem. Supposedly, if we fix the way humans treat each other, then the  ░ Human Rights 143  world’s problems will disappear. I partly agree. Without doubt, human be-  ings are today an unprecedented and fierce force. The immediate future of  earthly life does appear to be dependent upon what we humans do. How-  ever, I would disagree that what we humans do to each other is the essen-  tial determinant of peace. I am not sure, in other words, that the mistreat-  ment of humans by humans is the foremost problem.  The centralization of human-human relationships continues into the  burgeoning work for nonhuman rights, which is largely developing as sec-  ondary to human rights: either as a reinforcement or extension of human  rights. It is significant that work for nonhuman rights follows on from work  for human rights. The ideal human-human relationship is constructed as a  pre-existent, or *a priori* ethical ideal for the human-nonhuman relationship.  *Taking human rights as the foundation for nonhuman rights misdirects ethi-*  *cal development*. Although I might proceed by bringing nonhuman rights  solely into the foreground, my specific intention here is to develop human  rights. Orientating discussion towards the development of human rights  *specifically* does not undermine my belief that human and nonhuman rights  cannot be treated as exclusive subjects or forked ethical paths. Continual  and inevitable recourse to the subject of nonhuman rights will attest this.  My rejection of human-centric ethical development is not driven en-  tirely by the failure of human-centrism to really recognise nonhuman rights.  Taking human rights as the foundation for nonhuman rights misdirects ethi-  cal theory and practice to the detriment of nonhumans *and humans*. The  rest of this discussion aims to clarify how recognizing nonhuman rights in-  dependent from human interest lays a true foundation for human rights. Ar-  guably, an ethical human-nonhuman relationship is a prerequisite for an  ethical human-human relationship. To support this argument, I’ll start by  drawing attention to epistemological processes within human-nonhuman  abuse, and will continue by considering how violations of human rights by  humans originate in human-nonhuman abuse in the context of contempo-  rary war, including terrorism.  If reflecting upon how we relate to others is constitutive of human  rights work, then understanding why we practice those relations, or thinking  about the *epistemological* foundation of our selves, is critical. The dominant  modern relationship between human self and other is shaped by an epis-  temology of hyperseparation. Modern paradigms of rationality and objectifi-  cation have constructed others as *radically* other. We might note how  common and standard are the critiques that expose modern technoscience,  politics and economics as socially powerful and potentially selfish agents  that may act to disengage from, marginalise, exclude and control that which  gets otherized.17 There is nothing unfamiliar about humans regarding  themselves as exceptional and superior to the ‘other’. History is a chronicle of human mistreatment of the ‘other’ predominantly identified as nonhuman  nature: the human/nature dualism appears in classical epistemology.18  At present, the extremity of environmental destruction is grossly and  dangerously demonstrating the human attitude of superiority towards the other, and underlies the modern human-human relationship forged by epis-  temic hyperseparation. An inclusion of humans into the prior construction of  ‘radical nonhuman other’ has escalated in the modern world. These hu-  mans are identified and otherized as variously continuous with nonhuman  nature and thereat discontinuous with the human. Human difference is constructed as radical difference. Human others have typically included  people with ‘other’ skin colour or ‘other’ religions, cultures or languages,  women, the poor, or minorities. In the interest of human rights then, our re-consideration of dominant modern epistemology, and its inherent episte-  mology of hyperseparation, should be unreserved. This reconsideration,  then, involves challenging human/nonhuman, mind/nature, mind/body dual-isms .  The ethical implications of centralizing the human-human relationship  through an epistemology of hyperseparation are immense. Nonhumans are  excluded from ethical concern on the premise that, as a human-human  field, ethics is disengaged from the radically other.19 *Developing from an*  *epistemic rejection of human-nonhuman interrelationship, and subse-*  *quently upon the radical exclusion of those classed as ‘other’, ethics is a*  *flawed agency for human rights*.20 As philosopher and sociologist Mick  Smith puts it, “the ethical cannot be located entirely in the systemic inter-  changes between individual humans. Ethics also has to include our rela-  tions to nature; it is a lived multidimensional relation of care for natural (and  human) others, a relation that originates in part from the environment it-  self.”21  The ethical consequences of human-nonhuman hyperseparation for  human-human relationship can be demonstrated readily in the context of  was, partly because it regularly devastates the natural environment, but  also because there is probably a unanimous view that human rights are  violated in the context of war. My intention is to clarify how violations of  human rights during war may originate from human-nonhuman hyperseparation.  Analysts can enumerate many causes of war, and probably countless  more causes are untold. Certainly though, notions of territory commonly instigate international or intranational conflict. Today’s terrifying conflict between Israel and Lebanon is one such example of humans killing each  other through powerful convictions of land ownership. The radical otheriza- ░ Human Rights 145  tion of nonhuman nature as that without mind or as lifeless (and right-less)  supports our understanding of nonhuman nature (such as ‘land’) as a hu-  man resource. Governments interested in national resources and economy  value land as commodity and property to be amassed and defended.22  Land figures in war in another basic but highly consequential way. However  it is instigated, *warring takes place within the land.* This also applies to ter-  rorism: the psychological expectation of a terrorist attack *taking place within*  *the land* makes the threat acute. I’ll consider how the epistemology of hy-  perseparation operates firstly in war by military conflict and then by terror-  ism.  Damage by military conflict is generally palpable damage to land or to  a place. Bombs that blast the ground apart, radioactive, chemical, biologi-  cal and nuclear weapons: this abbreviated and inexpert list of modern  weaponry is sufficient to signal the disturbing nature of modern war. In this  discussion, rather than particularizing a technical inventory of modern im-  plements of war and elaborating upon what precisely these do or have the  potential to do (the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is self-explanatory),  it is more helpful to question why *challenging* *the* *epistemology* that sup-  ports such things is not *the* prioritized task in a world where war is fre-  quently, if not continually, witnessed in the modern global context?  The dominant understanding of land and sea as intrinsically lifeless,  and therefore as morally valueless, is fundamentally implicated in the viola-  tions of human rights. Firstly, the root of many conflicts – the very notion  and practice of human ownership of land (the nonhuman) – originates from  failing to recognise and denying nonhuman inherent rights. Secondly, as  long as land and see are understood as lifeless, they will remain insignifi-  cant and a morally acceptable location for an immoral activity: military con-  flict. There exists the perception of the land or sea merely as somewhere  for war to take place. A region becomes a circumscribed ‘war-zone’  wherein humans supposedly confine their attacks upon each other. Physi-  cal human conflict is the only registered activity in this zone. Or it is at least  the only activity of real concern, for land understood as lifeless and morally  valueless cannot be understood as that which can be killed or killed with  regret. Environmental activist Captain Paul Watson recognises the habitu-  ally unrecognised victims of war: “When I see the daily bombing on televi-  sion, I am not thinking of the Taliban or Bin Laden or even the victims of the  absurd concept of ‘friendly fire’. My thoughts and concerns go to those  species of nonhumans, both plant and animal that are dying under that mili-  tary assault.”23 Watson pushes us to view the problems of war from beyond  the anthropocentric position of perceiving it as an exclusively human crisis.  From an ecophilosophical perspective, an absence of ethical consideration  Rebecca Garcia Lucas Rose  146  for the nonhuman derived from denying their inherent rights continues into  unethical treatment of humans. I have now started to support this claim by  putting forward the simple assertion that to accept that war can take place  as though *the literal place* does not matter ethically exposes a critical omis-  sion and failure in human ethical codes. The illusion of a radically autono-  mous human self-identity constructed by radical otherisation (and epistemic  hyperseparation) is part of the problem.  The complexity of the human relationship to place is not fully compre-  hended. Military weapons are invented to ensure ‘efficient’ destruction and  this efficiency is derived in part from a particular level of *understanding* of  human-nonhuman interrelation. Effective weapons are designed to devas-  tate nonhuman nature precisely *because* human life depends upon water,  soil, air, plants, animals and other living things. The impact of war-ravaged  land upon humans is incontestable: humans suffer and die along with the  suffering and dying more-than-human community of life. Watson writes:  “Vietnam was a horrific killing field where humans died alongside ele-  phants, tigers, trees, frogs, water buffalo and birds – burned by napalm,  riddled by claymores, incinerated by bombs, defoliated by agent orange.”24  War destroyed land equals war destroyed life forms, including people,  maybe for unforeseen generations.  If some weapons are designed through a level of understanding hu-  man-nonhuman interdependence, on another level the epistemology of hy-  perseparation counteracts an understanding of human-nonhuman insepa-  rability and conceals the extent of warfare’s destruction. Although the land  and much life living on (and as) the land is destroyed, this destruction is  perceived as localized and isolated. Not only may a nation targeting a local-  ity claim, and possibly believe, that it is not targeting civilians but that it tar-  gets national resources, it views itself as discontinuous from the locality  and its destruction. The denial of human-nonhuman (or self-other) interrela-  tion and ecological connection is self-destructive. There do not exist eco-  logical boundaries that comply with human notions of territory, no matter  how distant warring nations on earth are geographically.25 So called ‘local-  ized’ destruction of life affects all other life, *including* humans. The conjec-  ture that a ‘localized’ war initiates widespread impact is not incredible, par-  ticularly considering the kind of weaponry used, or threatened to be used,  and the numerous wars taking place within the world that are devastating  places and people, physically, socially and emotionally.  The epistemology of hyperseparation also operates strongly in terror-  ism in a number of ways. Firstly, both the terrorists and terrorized perceive  each other as *radically* other. In part, this demarcation may be self-  cultivated. For the terrorists it amplifies their effect upon the terrorized, and  ░ Human Rights 147  for the terrorized it justifies constructing the terrorists as radically uncivilized  or as the dehumanized other. Otherisation strengthens the perception of  self as the civilized and blameless victim. The civilized/uncivilized dichot-  omy reconfigures the self/other dichotomy, and is derivative of the classical  human/nature or human/nonhuman dichotomy.  We can investigate how understanding terrorists as radical others en-  dorses a military response for dealing with terrorism. Earlier I argued that  the nonhuman other is excluded from ethical consideration. Denying the  ethical status of the nonhuman continues into diminished ethical responsi-  bility towards the other identified as uncivilised/dehumanized human other.  Moral accountability of actions towards the other (terrorists) is lessened, or  is at least qualified and legitimized in favour of a military response. De-  pending on who you are and who your other is, some human lives are  worth more or less than others. The saying ‘violence begets violence’ re-  mains unheeded by both the terrorists and those directing the ‘War Against  Terrorism’.26 Defining ‘violence’ is partially dependent upon the

ethical in-  clusion of the other (the target of violence) by the self (the sender of vio-  lence). The classification of violence, with its ethical implications, is irrele-  vant to those operating within self-interested ethical frameworks that ex-  clude the other. In other words, what I do is not violence if it is done to a  subject outside my ethical framework. Marking the boundary for ethical in-  clusion and exclusion originates from the perception of human-nonhuman  hyperseparation.  With the psychological or emotional target being so significant in ter-  rorist attacks, in some cases it may appear more accurate to locate terror-  ism in mindscape rather than following my earlier assertion that warring  takes place in landscape. The psychological preoccupation with possibility,  with ‘what if’ scenarios, is a key means of maintaining terror beyond the ac-  tual event of a physical attack. Nevertheless, psychologically registered  possibility remains a highly *situated* threat. The possibility of a terrorist at-  tack taking place is only a possibility and only terrifying in its connection to  the possibility that *it takes place in my place*. Furthermore, while psycho-  logical abuse is imperative for effective terrorizing, ultimately the psycho-  logical domain is physically embedded. Every terrorized mind is embodied,  and our bodies, our selves, inhabit physical places that can be targeted, in-  vaded, attacked, bombed, poisoned, etcetera.  An understanding of human dependency upon the nonhuman is ap-  parent within the anxiety that a place may be attacked. The terrified person  perceives their self as connected with the place they inhabit. Naturally, per-  ception of human-nonhuman interdependence is clearer within the immedi-  ate context. If the air I breathe is contaminated with bio-chemical agents  Rebecca Garcia Lucas Rose ░  148  then I am in danger. Terrorism exploits this context specific perception of  human-nonhuman connection by *widely* generating the possibility of *local-*  *ized* targeting – that something terrible could happen where *I* live. People  are not terrified – or are terrified to a much lesser degree – if they feel that  an attack on the place which they inhabit or value is a remote possibility.  The sense of discontinuity from another place reduces or eliminates terror.  For example, much more concern is shown towards nuclear conflict be-  tween other countries if the direct fallout could reach *our* country and there-  fore us.  To some extent, terrorism relies upon the epistemology of hypersepa-  ration by utilizing the deeply established illusion of the self’s radical auton-  omy from the other. The sense of safety fabricated through the illusion of  disconnection, can be challenged by terrorist threat only because it has  been established in the first place. The strength of illusory safety estab-  lished by hyperseparation is itself a susceptible target for terrorists. The  psychological safety mechanism of confining terrorist attacks to an other  place has been largely dismantled. Christian Reus-Smit describes interna-  tional terrorism as “essentially a faceless and territorially unbound en-  emy.”27 Hence, the fear and suspicion of any ‘others’ are raised even in  relatively stable communities, resulting in tense, hostile social conditions.  The sense of safety in disconnection is an extreme illusion then vulnerable  to being converted into an inverse extremity of fear. Without this illusion of  safety in disconnection, the threat of attack would own. Instead I am wonder-  ing, if the dominant epistemology of hyperseparation were reconsidered, if  hyperseparation no longer strongly informed be a less effective agent  of terror. I am not then claiming that holding an understanding of our con-  nections to the nonhuman and to other places would result in us living with  a permanent degree of terror in our recognition that the destruction of land-  scape, near and far, affects all life including our what we do and how we un-  derstand self, other and world, would we then relate in such destructive un-  ethical ways?  How we relate to each other and overcoming our tendency towards  destructive relations remains the preoccupation for those working to estab-  lish a level of world peace. However, if efforts to resolve global conflict re-  main exclusively preoccupied with the relations between human ‘selves’  and ‘others’ an important consideration will be overlooked. Watson writes:  “Osama Bin Laden is not the problem nor is George Bush or Saddam Hus-  sein. They will be gone tomorrow and replaced by new hominid clowns.  The problem is us. As Pogo once said, ‘We have met the enemy and he is  us’.”28 Watson’s words should not be interpreted as a call to intensify our  focus upon our human selves as the problem, in the egocentric manner we  ░ Human Rights 149  have predominantly followed. We might clarify the condition of Watson’s  “us” by adding that the problem is *us humans in* our relationship with the  nonhuman other. The aim is to re-view the global problem by viewing hu-  man conflict in connection with the wider earth community. An ecophiloso-  phical approach towards conflict resolution aims to balance the anthropo-  centric mindset towards human relations with a perception of human rela-  tions on a comprehensive scale. The perception of an interdependent earth  community takes into account destructive human behaviour as it impacts  not only upon humans but also nonhumans. Watson puts this more pro-  vocatively and perhaps less carefully, however he better expresses a frus-  tration with the anthropocentric blindspot that turns our focus inwards and  away from a biocentric perspective that could help resolve global problems:  So we can either waste our time rooting for this side or that side –  West vs. East, North vs. South, Right vs. Left, Muslim vs. Jew vs.  Christian vs. Hindu, Conservative vs. Liberal, Communist vs. Capi-  talist. Or we can turn our back on all these anthropocentric concepts  and see the world for what it is – one world, one planet, one complex  biodiversity of life whose one purpose is simply to live and let live  according to a design that has been billions of years in the making.29

Although humans are radically and undeniably different from animals and other natural entities, using characteristics like aesthetics and exclusion to rationally determine the political and social value of the plan risks the worst forms of violence that are at the underbelly of civil society
Calarco ‘8 (Matthew, Asst. Prof of Phil at CSUF, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal From Heidegger to Derrida, June, p. 92-94//Shree)

Agamben gives the name “anthropological machine” (a concept he borrows from the Italian scholar of myth Furio Jesi) to the mechanism underlying our current means of determining the human-animal distinction. This machine can best be understood as the symbolic and material mechanisms at work in various scientific and philosophical discourses that classify and distinguish humans and animals through a dual process of inclusion and exclusion. The first chapters of *The Open* provide the reader with a fascinating overview of some of the historical variations on the anthropological machine at work in a number of authors and discourses, ranging from the philosophy of Georges Bataille and Alexandre Kojeve to the taxonomic studies of Carl Linnaeus and post-Darwinian paleontology. For the purposes of the argument I am developing here, it will suffice to recall the general structure of the machine and why Agamben argues that it is necessary to stop its functioning. Agamben makes a distinction between two key variations on the anthropological machine: the modern and premodern. The modern anthropological machine is post-Darwinian. It seeks to understand, following the principles of natural science, the emergence of the fully constituted human being from out of the order of the human animal (the latter, of course, is in many ways indistinguishable from certain nonhuman animals, especially so-called higher primates). In order to mark this transition, it is necessary to determine and isolate the animal aspects of the human animal and exclude them from humanity proper. Agamben describes this process as involving an “animalization” of certain modes of human life, an attempt to separate out—within human beings themselves—what precisely is animal, on the one hand, and human, on the other. This variation on the anthropological machine gives rise to the search by nineteenth-century paleontologists for the “missing link” that provides the biological transition from speechless ape to speaking human. But it also opens the way for the totalitarian and democratic experiments on and around human nature that function by excluding animal life from human life within human beings. Agamben suggests that “it is enough to move our field of research ahead a few decades, and instead of this innocuous paleontological find we will have the Jew, that is, the non-man produced within the man, or the neomort and the overcomatose person, that is, the animal separated within the human body itself” (O, 37). The premodern form of the anthropological machine, which runs from Aristotle up through Linnaeus, functions in a similar but inverted form. Rather than animalizing certain aspects of the human, animal life is itself humanized. Human beings who take an essentially animal form are used to mark the constitutive outside of humanity proper: the infant savage, the wolf-man, the werewolf, the slave, or the barbarian. Here, the beings situated at the limits of humanity suffer similar consequences to those “animalized” beings caught within the working of the modern anthropological machine. As Agamben suggests, the structure or machine that delimits the contours of the human is perfectly ironic and empty. It does not function by uncovering a uniquely human trait that demarcates a clean break between human and all other nonhuman animals—for, as Agamben himself acknowledges, no such trait or group of traits is to be found. This much we know from current debates in evolutionary biology and animal ethics. And here it is not so much a matter or subscribing to a watered-down, quasi-Darwinian continuism that would blur any and all distinctions one might wish to make between and among human and nonhuman animals but rather recognizing that deciding what constitutes “the human” and “the animal” is never simply a neutral scientific or ontological matter. Indeed, one of the chief merits of *The Open* is that it helps us to see that the locus and stakes of the human-animal distinction are almost always deeply political and ethical. For not only does the distinction create the opening for the exploitation of nonhuman animals and others considered not fully human (this is the point that is forcefully made by animal ethicists), but it also creates the conditions for contemporary biopolitics, in which more and more of the “biological” and “animal” aspects of human life are brought under the purview of the State and the juridical order. As Agamben has argued in *Homo Sacer* and elsewhere, contemporary biopolitics, whether it manifests itself in totalitarian or democratic form, contains within it the virtual possibility of concentration camps and other violent means of producing and controlling bare life. It comes as no surprise, then, that he does not seek to articulate a more precise, more empirical, or less dogmatic determination of the human-animal distinction. Such a distinction would only redraw the lines of the “object” of biopolitics and further define the scope of its reach. Thus, instead of drawing a new human-animal distinction, Agamben insist that the distinction must be abolished altogether, and along with it the anthropological machine that produces the distinction. Recalling the political consequences that have followed from the modern and premodern separation of “human” and “animal” within human existence, Agamben characterizes the task for thought in the following terms: “it is not so much a matter of asking which of the two machines [ie, the modern or premodern anthropological machine]…is better or more effective—or, rather, less lethal and bloody—as it is of understanding how they work so that we might eventually, be able to stop them” (O, 38).

#### THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS ARE JUST A KANTIAN MODIFICATION OF THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL OF LEGITIMATE WAR WHICH MASKS THE SPECIES WAR , IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE ITS IDEA OF THE GOOD LIFE

KOCHI 2K9

[tarik, lecturer in law and international security @ U of Sussex, Doctorate in Law from Griffith, “species war: law, violence, and animals”, ‘law, culture, and the humanities’, 353-359]

Modern international humanitarian law both inherits aspects of the Westphalian system and moves beyond it. While international humanitarian or human rights law still relies upon the sovereignty of nation-states and accepts to a limited degree the state’s right to go to war and its internal monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence, each of these forms of right are re-shaped and limited in accordance with a higher standard of legitimacy located around the ideals of international peace and the cosmopolitan concept of “humanity.” By attempting to place “human rights” as a category that stands above or at least challenges the traditional rights of the state, inter- national humanitarian law morally orders war and sets out a cosmopolitan and global conception of the good life. While the category of peace is held onto, survival is displaced by human rights as the central category for deriving the legitimacy of the international order and the legitimacy of war. Of course, the category of survival is not erased completely as the human-animal dis- tinction of species war continues to operate at a subterranean level.

One of the first thinkers to sketch out the theoretical justifications for such a re-ordering of inter-state relations and the legitimacy of global violence was Immanuel Kant.32 In proposing a universal moral theory which attempted to equally value all members of humanity, Kant rejected the way in which previous Western intellectual traditions had legitimated particular forms of violence and killing by valuing the lives of Europeans over non-Europeans. Further, Kant challenged the over-valuation of the “life” of the state against the lives of humans in general. In re-thinking the relation between war and law Kant enunciated a form of sovereignty located around the idea of humanity. On the basis of this higher and universal right of humanity Kant’s approach demanded that state action be guided by moral reasoning and moral duty and in this respect Kant asked that the juridical persona of states adopt a distinctly moral persona – states are conceptualized and expected to act as if they are moral persons.33

Their gendered silence is loaded – ensures replication

Bell and Russell 2K (Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow moreunique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned. Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.

### 2NC Impact Wall

#### the root cause of all impacts

Steven Best, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, 2007 [*JCAS* 5.2]

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust.As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom. For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

# 1NR

## Framework

### 1NR Framework -- Identity DA

#### The premise of their response to framework is that issues of identity should be protected from exposure to reason-giving debate---this impedes the culture of democratic debate that’s key to effective decisionmaking in a pluralistic society---it’s also simply wrong to claim that framework oppresses identity or alternate styles---our argument is style-neutral---it simply asks that narrative be used to support a policy conclusion which solves their offense as well as ours

Anderson 6

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

MY RECENT BOOK, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced-if misconceived-criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement-the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent-and in some versions, even celebratory-attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society. One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos-specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers-was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.) ¶ The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity-race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of contingency-recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smiths portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples-and the larger claim they support-are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument. ¶ Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly" This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies-to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference.¶ More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the question of disagreement about what counts as argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist-and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics-that when they have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.

### 1NR Framework -- Switch Side DA

#### Switch-side debate is key to progressive politics

English et al 7

(Eric English, Stephen Lano, Gordon Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh communications professor, Catherine Morrison, John Reif, and Carly Woods, Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” June 2007, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, [www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf](http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf%5D), - Kurr)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

### 1NR Framework -- Dialogue DA

#### Fairness is key to effective dialogue---monopolizing strategy makes discussion one-sided and subverts inclusion of the neg--- turns their inclusion arguments

Galloway 7

Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

**Debate as a dialogue** sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. **The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements**. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ **Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative**. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ **When** one side takes more than its share, **competitive equity suffers**. **However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it** fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). **A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a** fundamental condition of a dialoguethat takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness** is a demand for respect**, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking** not be silenced.¶ **Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue.** **They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ **Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions**. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because **it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions** (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, **a**n affirmative **case** on the 2007-2008 college topic **might defend neither state nor** international **action** in the Middle East, andyet claim to be germane to the topic **in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions** in the international arena **are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative** subverts any meaningful role to the negative team**, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy**.

### 1NR Framework -- Limits Impact

#### Limits o/w Independent of governmental politics, the aff’s view of debate destroys limits which spills over into all facets of life which means framework outweighs and turns the aff

Harris 13

(“Scott Harris NDT Final Round Ballot” April 5, 2013 <http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.msg10255#msg10255>, KB)

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

### 1NR Framework -- AT: Oppression

#### Framework isn’t itself forceful oppression---it’s simply an advocacy on behalf of certain decision making practices---it’s no different than any other argument in debate

Anderson 6

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

Lets first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"-that is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. ¶ Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: ¶ Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument roughly, Habermass version-and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on-in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand.¶ Lets leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody elses hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

### 1NR Framework -- AT: Deliberation

#### They say deliberation isn’t real but Deliberation is possible among all types of people

Gunderson 2k

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2k, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 106

The argument for countering partisanship at the grass roots by supporting political deliberation there is pretty simple: If deliberation is a good thing in "deliberative bodies" like congress, isn't a good thing among average citizens, too? To suppose otherwise is to hold either that the average citizen is incapable of deliberation or that the average citizen is less capable of deliberation than the average representative. Both positions collapse upon even the most glancing scrutiny. To hold that the average citizen is incapable of deliberation is both patently antidemocratic and empirically questionable, to say the very least. To hold that the average citizen is less capable of deliberation than the average representatives is perhaps slightly less antidemocratic and empirically dubious, but achieves this very modest gain in credibility only at the cost of landing in the out-and-out contradiction of valorizing deliberation in one place while denigrating it in another. If deliberation contains moments of both confrontation and engagement, democratizing deliberation by making it the province of the citizenry rather than leaving it in the hands of representatives has the potential of greatly expanding the degree to which confrontation and engagement become society-wide traits, traits which work on an ongoing basis to blunt the worst effects of partisanship. At least as important, such a democratization of deliberation is likely to enhance the deliberativeness of the polity since it will encourage deliberation at one removed from the locus of decision making—precisely the place it is most likely to succeed.